Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, Maj. Gen. Ramas and Ms.

Dimaano, G.R. No. 104768

Facts: Maj. Gen. Ramas was investigated by the AFP Anti-Graft Board of PCGG
for unexplained wealth, with his properties confiscated. Among the property
confiscated was Dimaano’s house, Ramas’ former secretary and alleged mistress.
Dimaano alleged that the seizure was illegal seizure as there is no Bill of Rights
operating that time, during Interregnum at the aftermath of EDSA People Power.
Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure was illegal
Ruling: The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly
stated in President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA
Revolution was "done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution."41
The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by
no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary
government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the
Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the
actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following
the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately
before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection
accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("Covenant") and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("Declaration") remained in effect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative
during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to
individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the
interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government
were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such
directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the
successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person
could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was
neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.

US vs Canada (1938-1941) (Trail Smelter Arbitration)

Facts: The Tail Smelter, domiciled in British Columbia since 1906, was owned and
operated in Canada. Sulfur dioxide from Trail Smelter caused damage to the state
of Washington between 1925 to 1927. The United States then sought damages in
court against Canada and filed an injunction due to the pollution caused by Trail
Smelter.
Issue: Whether or not a State has to protect other states from harmful acts of
individuals within its jurisdiction
Held: Yes, a State has to protect other states from harmful acts of individuals
within its jurisdiction. No state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory
that will result to injury in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons
therein as per the law of United States and the principles of international law.
Therefore, Canada is responsible under international law for the conduct of the
Trail Smelter Company. The Canadian government should make sure that Trail
Smelter’s conduct should be in line with the obligations of Canada as confirmed by
the Arbitration. The Trail Smelter Company will therefore be required from
causing any damage through fumes so long as the present conditions of air
pollution exist in Washington.

20. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, GR No. 139465, October 17, 2000
Facts: The US requested for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for violations of US
tax and election laws in accordance of an extradition treaty between the US and the
Philippines. Pending evaluation of the extradition, Jimenez requested for copies of
the US' extradition request. The Secetary of Justice denied the request.
Issue: Whether or not a private respondent entitled to the two basic due process
rights of notice and hearing in extradition proceedings
Ruling: Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. Extradition is a proceeding sui generis.
It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an
accused guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The process of extradition does not
involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or
innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
28. Kuroda vs Jalandoni, 83 Phil 171
Facts: Lt. Gen Shinegori Kuroda, Military Governor of the Philippines under
Japanese Empire (May 28, 1943 to September 26, 1944), and first and former
Commander in Chief of the Japanese Fourteenth Area Army (field army of
Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) controlling all IJA units in the Philippines (July 28
to September 26, 1944), was charged before the Philippine Military Commission
for war crimes. As the commanding general, he was tried for failure to discharge
his duties resulting, and (permitting) the brutal war crimes and other high crimes
against humanity committed by his men against noncombatant civilians and
Prisoners of War (PoWs) of the Japanese forces, in violation of the laws and
customs of war.
Kuroda, in his petition, argued that the Military Commission is not a valid court
because the law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He
further contends as the Philippines is not a signatory of Hague Convention’s Rules
and Regulations covering Land Warfare, he should not be held liable. Furthermore,
he alleges that the United States is not a party of interest in the case and that the
two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.
Issue: 1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional
2. Whether or not the trial is proper as the legal basis, Hague Convention’s Rules
and Regulations covering Land Warfare, is an International law in which the
Philippines is not signatory
2.Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case

Ruling: Being aligned with Sec 3, Article 2 of the Constitution which states that
“The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation”,
the Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War
Crimes Office and prescribing rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is
constitutional.
An example of generally accepted principles of international law includes those
formed during the Hague Convention and other law pertaining to Laws and
Customs of War, including the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who
have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commission of crimes and offenses in violation of laws and customs of war, are to
be held accountable. Per the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines abides by
these principles and therefore has a right to try persons that commit such crimes
and most especially when it is committed against its citizens. Even if it was not a
signatory to these conventions, it incorporates it to its own laws by incorporation
of such principles in the constitution.

The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have
been equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner
is charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a
special military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not
governed by the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special law.
Ichong vs Hernandez
Facts:
Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.”
Its provisions include:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in
the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business.
Lao H. Ichong, filed an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions,
contending that 1. the act denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws
and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law, 2. the subject
of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof and the Act
violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally
accepted principles
Ruling: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this
case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted
principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not
demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not.”

Laude v. Judge Ginez-Jabalde, et al. G.R. No. 217456, 24 November 2015.

FACTS: Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude was allegedly killed at the Celzone Lodge on
Ramon Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL
Joseph Scott Pemberton. A Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer’s sibling,
Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton before the Office of the City Prosecutor
which Information was later filed with the RTC in Olongapo City. Pemberton
surrendered personally to the RTC Judge and arraigned. Petitioner Laude, at the
same time filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to Surrender the Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail which was denied,
as well as its motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City
Jail as an assertion of their right to access to justice as recognized by international
law is proper
Whether or noyt the averments of the petitioner, that the 3-day notice rule should
be should be liberally applied due to the timing of the arrest and arraignment,
tenable?
Ruling: There is no need to discuss whether this provision has attained customary
status, since under treaty law, the Philippines, as a State Party, is obligated to
comply with its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. However, petitioners went too far in their interpretation, ignoring
completely the nature of the obligation contemplated by the provision in an attempt
to justify their failure to comply with a domestic procedural rule aimed to protect a
human right in a proceeding, albeit that of the adverse party.
The obligation contemplated by Article 2, paragraph (3) is for the State Party to
establish a system of accessible and effective remedies through judicial and
administrative mechanisms. The present trial of Pemberton, to which petitioner,
Marilou S. Laude, is included as a private complainant, indicates that there is a
legal system of redress for violated rights. That petitioners chose to act on their
own, in total disregard of the mechanism for criminal proceedings established by
this court, should not be tolerated under the guise of a claim to justice. This is
especially in light of petitioners' decision to furnish the accused in the case a copy
of her Motion only during the hearing. Upholding human rights pertaining to
access to justice cannot be eschewed to rectify an important procedural deficiency
that was not difficult to comply with. Human rights are not a monopoly of
petitioners. The accused also enjoys the protection of these rights.
While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of
Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may
still be acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to
the other party nor violate his or her due process rights. The adverse party must be
given time to study the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly
and engage the arguments of the movant. In this case, the general rule must apply
because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study petitioners’ Motion,
thereby depriving him of his right to procedural due process.
Petitioners admit that they personally furnished Pemberton a copy of the Urgent
Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of
Accused to the Olongapo City Jail only during the hearing. They attempt to elude
the consequences of this belated notice by arguing that they also served a copy of
the Motion by registered mail on Pemberton’s counsel. They also attempt to
underscore the urgency of the Motion by making a reference to the Christmas
season and the “series of legal holidays” where courts would be closed. To
compound their obfuscation, petitioners claim that the hearing held on December
22, 2014, attended by Pemberton’s counsel sufficiently satisfied the rationale of the
three-day notice rule. These circumstances taken together do not cure the Motion’s
deficiencies. Even granting that Pemberton’s counsel was able to comment on the
motion orally during the hearing, which incidentally was set for another incident, it
cannot be said that Pemberton was able to study and prepare for his
counterarguments to the issues raised in the Motion. Judge Ginez-J abalde was
correct to deny the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on
noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would be to prejudice
Pemberton’s rights as an accused.