Climate Refugees Aff and Neg - Michigan7 2018 HJPV

Climate Refugees Aff / Neg – HJPV
‘18
Alex Baime – GBS
Suchetas Boklis – Alpharetta
Jordan Frese – GBS
Adrian Gushin – Rowland Hall
Sophia Hurst – Greenhill
Tanuj Koli – MBA
Suraj Peramanu – Chattahoochee
Shreya Ram – Wayzata
Sarah Waters – Niles West

Suggested 1ac
1ac – Climate Refugees Advantage
There will be 1.4B climate refugees by 2060
Tetrick 18 – research assistant and double major on environmental and political science at the University of Minnesota
Morris (Steven, “Climate Refugees: Establishing Legal Responses and U.S. Policy Possibilities”, June 2018,
https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1064&context=horizons)//abaime
There is a strong consensus in the scientific community that climate change is occurring. Climate
change is largely
being caused by anthropogenic reasons and there are potential future harms from it
(Marquart-Pyatt, Shwom et al. 2011, 40). One of the most significant of these future harms is the
creation of climate refugees. “Climate Refugee” describes a person who is forced to leave
their home or community due to changes to the local environment, such as rising sea
levels, drought, famine, or other effects of climate change (National Geographic Society 2012). A climate
refugee can migrate either internally or internationally. Estimates of the amount of future climate refugees vary substantially due to
differing definitions of who constitutes a climate refugee, but according
to a Cornell journal, at the current
rate of human fertility increase, populations in low-elevation coastal zones, land usage
and degradation, and CO2 emission rates, 1.4 billion people could become climate
refugees by 2060 (Geisler and Currens 2017, 7).
Their numbers will grow exponentially – especially in developing countries
and coastal megacities
Climate change has been found to cause many issues that may lead to forced migration
including: drought, flooding due to changing rain patterns, rising sea levels, decrease in
water quality from flooding and worsening storms, loss of easily accessible portable water, increased
temperatures, and salination due to drought or sea water infiltration (Manou and Mihi 2017, 3-4). Without adequate policy,
forced migration may lead to an array of issues for humans including:
overpopulation, conflict over resources, cultural clashes and increased discrimination
against migrants, decreased public health as a result of overcrowding, inadequate
services provided by the government, increased spread of diseases, and increased
political differences or disputes (2017, 5). Regardless of which issues will specifically occur, the task of
creating policy properly addressing climate refugees with its complex human rights and political issues, is a challenging one.
Who and How Many?
“In Bangladesh alone, roughly 75 million people, or about 40% of its projected population for
the year 2100, would be affected” (Byravan and Rajan 2015, 5). This is just one of many studies attempting to predict how
many people will become refugees if climate change continues to worsen at its current rate. A commonly cited study by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates 250 million people displaced from their homes due to climate change
by 2050 (Funkhouser 2016). Although some have said there have not been any “reliable global estimates of past and current
migration flows” in response to climate change (Wilkinson et. al 2016, 3), there have been many individual cases documented.
While there are many numbers of climate refugees that have been cited, without a
proper definition of what constitutes a climate refugee, none of these estimates portray
the same results. Currently, almost every study has differing classifications of who qualifies as a climate refugee.
Regardless of the terminology or definitions used, as will be discussed in a later section, the
estimates of people displaced by climate change are far greater than any
historical numbers of refugees the international community has
experienced. The United Nations Human Rights Council annual report found an estimated 65.6 million people forcibly
displaced from their homes by the end of 2016, the highest since WWII (Edwards 2017). Even at a current high point,
previously cited numbers of 250 million-1.4 billion people displaced by climate change
over the next 30-40 years surpass this number greatly.
Despite the lack of specific numbers of climate refugees, researchers do have strong ideas of who will be
affected at greater rates. Due to historical settlements along coastlines, most of the world’s
megacities exist along the coast. “About 10 percent of the world’s population
lives within a mile or so of the shoreline and below 10 meters in elevation”
(Byravan and Rajan 2015, 4). This, however, is not where the majority of climate refugees are currently coming from. Those
who are most at risk to become climate refugees are from the developing world (Kane-
Hartnett 2015). The effects of climate change disproportionately impact developing nations
(2015). For example, small island states see the effects of rising sea levels first. The island nation of Kiribati will likely experience the
first complete exodus of people due to climate change (2015). Worseningdroughts also impact developing
nations at higher rates, such as many African nations, due to climate change intensifying
local weather. Another primary reason the developing world is disproportionately impacted by the effects of climate change is
caused by the development status of their nation. Developing nations generally have “limited resources, a reliance on agricultural
and maritime-based livelihoods, and generally weak governance structures” (Kane-Hartnett 2015). Governments of
developing nations do not have the ability or resources to internally relocate citizens
while maintaining their current standard of living and legal rights, as those who live in
developed nations, such as the United States do. There will of course be issues from internal migration caused by climate
change in the United States, but the people impacted will not have to face the threats
of homelessness, unemployment, or statelessness (2015). Current International Governance of
Climate Refugees
There are basically zero protections for those refugees – domestically and
internationally
grounds for protection do not include climate change as a reason one can seek
These five
refuge. In one case, a New Zealand court rejected a Tuvaluan family claiming refugee status due to the effects of climate change, because their claim didn’t fit the 1951
Refugee Convention (Ferris 2017, 13). One reason some refugee advocates and legal experts oppose expanding the five grounds for refugee status to include climate change
refugees is the fear it will weaken the rights and overall status of “refugee” (2017, 14). Others, primarily developed nations, have expressed concerns that if the Convention
definition is expanded, it will lead to mass amounts of people attempting to move to their land (2017, 15). In 2007, the UNHCR, which primarily deals with legal refugees,
extended its activities to include internally displaced people (IDPs) and other groups outside of refugees. IDPs refers to people who have fled within the borders of their nation,
for any number of reasons, but are still under the protection of their government (Biermann and Boas 2010, 72). Under the current regime, most climate refugees “could be
conceptualized as internally displaced people,” which the UNHCR have created programs for, but according to Biermann and Boas, this is only a descriptive term and states are
The UNHCR also does not have the capabilities to deal

under no obligation to provide assistance to them (2010, 73).
with the number of people who could be classified as environmental IDPs that currently
exist, let alone the number of climate refugees that will arise in the near future. With
responsibility to provide protections to climate refugees resting primarily on their home
nations, climate refugees, especially those from developing nations, have
little to no legal rights or protection under international law. One of the first modern examples
of climate refugees took place on the small Alaskan island of Sarichef. In 2004, all of the inhabitants of the island were forced to relocate to mainland when the islands
Despite such tangible events within the

permafrost began to thaw due to rising temperatures and the island began to sink (Jerneck 2009).
United States, refugee policy has remained rigid and exclusionary. According to
the Immigration and Nationality Act [INA], a refugee is defined as “a person who is unable or unwilling to
return to his or her home country because of a well-founded fear of persecution due to
race, membership in a particular social group, political opinion, religion, or national
origin” (American Immigration Council 2015, 1). The president, in consultation with Congress, sets a ceiling for the number
of maximum refugees that will be granted admission for each fiscal year. President Trump set a ceiling of 45,000 for fiscal year 2018, down from the
85,000 set in 2016 (Meckler 2018). In the first three months of the year, the US only admitted 5,000 refugees, which is on pace for admitting far less than the 45,000 maximum
The U.S. refugee program has three principal categories classifying refugees and
(2018).
their priority (American Immigration Council 2015, 3). Priority one contains individuals those with the most
compelling persecution needs with no viable solutions. Priority two consists of groups of
“special concern” to the United States, which are selected by the Department of State. The current groups include
“persons from the former Soviet Union, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Iran,
Burma, and Bhutan.” Priority three includes relatives of refugees who are already within
the United States (2015, 3). Refugees undergo extensive screening, interviewing, medical examinations, and other security clearances prior to the Refugee
Admissions Program determining placement for each refugee. The Department of State has cited the process taking an average of 18-24 months to complete, which was reduced
interagency coordinating, but many of the issues returned upon

slightly by the Obama Administration by improving
President Trump taking office (2015, 4).

Climate migration is an existential threat and conflict multiplier – it should
filter every impact
Wennerstein and Robbins ‘18
[John and Denise. John R. Wennersten is a senior fellow at the National Museum of American History at the Smithsonian
Institution, and a member of the board of directors for the Anacostia Watershed Society. He is a professor emeritus of
environmental history at the University of Maryland. Denise Robbins is a writer and communications expert on climate change
issues in Washington, DC. A graduate of Cornell University, she regularly publishes articles dealing with all aspects of global and
national environmental change, with a focus on regional politics. Rising Tides: Climate Refugees in the Twenty-First Century.
Indiana University Press. Available via GoogleBooks. //jv]
Extreme weather events in North Africa and elsewhere may become the norm rather than
the exception. Certainly desertification has put large populations on the move in search
of water. livelihood, and security. A rise in sea level will create serious situations
considering that a quarter of the world’s population lives on or near coasts
and that the majority of our own megacities are situated in coastal areas. A Pentagon memo notes:
“Picture Japan’s coastal cities flooded, with theft freshwater supplies contaminated. Envision Pakistan. India.
and China—all nuclear powers—skirmishing at their borders over access to
shared rivers and arable land with older coastal areas now submerged under rising
seas.”26 It is often difficult to differentiate between those refugees driven by environmental factors and those driven by other
factors. Economics. politics, culture, and climate intertwine like some sociological double
helix. What refugees have in common, however, is that they are suffering, and often they are
impoverished by the environmental degradation of their homeland,
affected by tsunamis, desertification, water scarcity. and disease. There is
considerable uncertainty as to where these streams of global environmental refugees
will flow. But it is a safe bet that they will lap up on the shores of prosperous
developed Western nations, which are afready becoming increasingly
xenophobic. The Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). with a lean staff of ten thousand
seven hundred workers, is already stressed by refugee crises of some twenty-one and one-third million.2 Add millions of
people displaced by climate change. and you have a crisis of governance and management
that will sorely tax the wisest solons at the UN and other governmental agencies. It is not
rocket science to conclude that as the century progresses there will be a glaring need for
more farms and farmers to feed the planet’s burgeoning population. Meanwhile,
major countries like China are buying farmland in whatever country they can find it. and
food stocks on Wall Street such as ConAgra and General Mills are soaring. Access to supplies like water and grain will become major
concerns to countries with diminished rainfall. By 2020, warns Chatham House in its Resources Futures report, “yields
from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by 50 percent” in some countries. The
highest rates of loss are expected to be in Africa, where reliance on rain-fed
farming is greatest, but agriculture in China, India. Pakistan. and Central
Asia is also likely to be severely affected.2 Heat waves will diminish the flow of
rivers, which will mean diminishing supplies of water for irrigation and hydroelectric power. Long
range, in addition to setting waves of population miation in motion, a changed environment in the future
will transform infrastructures of government out of recognition from their older
patterns. Presently. in the safe, affluent confines of our homes. we watch on our television or read in our newspapers or on the
Internet of the relentless march of hundreds of thousands of refugees out of Africa and the Middle East bound for the sanctuary
and prosperity of England and Western Europe. They are people who cannot hold on to a livelihood in their
forsaken homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification. floods, and war.
They are desperate people who are willing to risk the violence of nativist
Europeans or drowning in a tempest of the Mediterranean Sea. Unlike other refugees
of yesteryear, these people have abandoned their homeland with little hope of a foreseeable
return. Environmental refugees are a problem of development policy beyond the scope of a single country or agency. The
problems are fraught with emotion, human agency, and political controversy. How will people
be relocated and settled? Is it possible to offer environmental refugees temporary or permanent asylum? Will these refugees have
any collective rights in the new areas they inhabit? And who will pay the costs of all the affected countries during the process of
resettlement? Developed
Western nations like the United States also have begun to feel the
shock of environmental stresses and catastrophes. A decade ago Hurricane Katrina put the proud Southern
city of New Orleans underwater, and more recently Hurricane Sandy decimated the Middle Atlantic coast and flooded New York
City. Today the Southwest languishes in one of the worst droughts in recent memory while environmental historians point out
similarities with the Dust Bowl of winds that roared across the drought- ridden plains of Kansas, Texas. and Oklahoma in the 193 Os
and covered distant cities like Washington and Philadelphia in a choking mantle of dust and dirt. California worries about its San
Andreas Fault. and seismologists of the Pacific Northwest fear the coming of what they call
“The Big One”—sliding tectonic plates of the “Cascadian subduction zone” resulting in a
major earthquake followed by tsunamis whose impact will cover some 140,000 square
miles, render seven million people homeless, and destroy and flood Seattle, Tacoma. Eugene. and Salem. the
capital of Oregon. Comprehending the scale of our looming climate crisis is difficult. And
absorbing climate refugees or their war-tom brethren is burdensome and fraught with
controversy. It is easy to welcome them at the airport but more complex to provide them with sustenance and jobs. Thus, when
we contemplate the subject of refugees and the future, we might do well to look in a mirror and
recognize that every one of us is or could be a migrant.
It is causing accelerating, global eco collapse – it creates conflict,
starvation, and disease.
Agriculture has become the modem Agasthya. the mythical Indian giant who drank
the seas dry.26 Unless
careful provisions are made, the expansion of agriculture, with its immense need for irrigation
water, may gobble up what is left of the planet’s groundwater in virgin lands
and wilderness. To deal with “Agasthaya.” research into new crop yields that produce seeds tolerant of increasing
temperatures and water scarcity is increasingly a part of a survival agenda. One should mention, however, that the
technological innovations of the Green Revolution have largely run their course, and there
is little prospect in agricultural yields increasing at the exponential rate they have in the
past as a result of new farming techniques.h Despite manifold technological innovations, agriculture
appears to have plateaued. According to world climate expert Lester Brown, the world agricultural harvest in
1993 was only 4.2 percent higher than that of 1984 while world population increased by 16 percent. During this time, grain
output per person declined by 11 percent. The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United
Nations reports that about 793 million people were estimated to be chronically undernourished
in 2015.25 If projections of world population growing to 9.8 billion by 2050 come true,
farms will have to produce three times as many calories as today. Further. there
are few new areas remaining that can be opened up for agriculture around the globe. The problems
are compounded in a number of countries by inadequate government. As UN observers have said, in certain countries it
is not so much faulty as failed governments or no government. Only a few countries in this area seem
capable of remaining self-sufficient in food—Kenya. Botswana. and Zimbabwe. At present, droughts top the list of
worst global disasters. Since the beginning of the twentieth century. droughts have been
responsible for the deaths and uprooting of millions of people—China in 1907, with a
toll of twenty-five million; Ukraine in the Volga region of the Soviet Union in 1921—
1922, 5 million; and droughts in India in 1965 caused a death toll of 1.5 million. In addition.
storm surges in Bangladesh routinely kill thousands. Throughout Africa. desertification has become so
pervasive that whole villages and farms are overtaken by sand. The 1982—1984 droughts in
Africa, for example, left 184 million people in twenty-four African countries on the brink
of starvation. Ten million left their homes in search of food with two million displaced
persons winding up in refugee camps in five countries. Many who waited too long to migrate died. As a result
of these disasters owing to climate change, more people are being killed or
displaced by landslides, cyclones, and floods than ever before.29 The Stern Review, a
British government report on the economics of climate change warned: “As temperatures rise and conditions deteriorate
significantly, climate change will test the resilience of many societies around the world.
Large numbers of people will be compelled to leave theft homes when resources drop below a critical
threshold. China, for instance, could see three hundred million of its people suffer from the
wholesale reduction in glacial meltwater.”30 Landlessness derives from environmental factors as much as
economic ones. Experts point out that this problem is particularly acute in Mexico, Central America.
Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. Where people own little or no land in agriculture communities. the productive
value of farmland is degraded, as too much pressure is placed on too little to obtain a livelihood. Meanwhile. the United Nations
estimates that we
will have to feed an extra 1.3 billion people in this decade alone and 4.1
billion by 2050. In Malaysia and other countries, deforestation has resulted in a decline of rainfall,
with disastrous impact on local rice production. Recent studies have pointed out that the deforestation of the
Himalayan foothills has had a multibillion-dollar negative impact on agricultural systems in the Ganges Välley of India.51 Whatever
the cause of deforestation, it eliminatesthe homelands and livelihoods of large numbers of
people in the developing world. Desertification is now at work on over one-third
of the world’s surface— some forty-five million square kilometers drying out to a state of severely depleted
productivity. Desertification is leading to burgeoning catastrophe in sub-Saharan Africa. a
region with some of the world’s greatest population pressures. As early as the 1980s
scientists pointed to the Sahel region. the Horn of Africa. and a dry corridor from Namibia through Botswana and Zimbabwe to
southern Mozambique. By 1987 an estimated ten million people had become environmental or climate retùgees in semiarid lands.
Today a total of 900 million people are at risk in areas undergoing desertification. At the
same time. these areas also have populations growing at rates of over 3 percent a year. Drought
in Africa is now different. Areas in the Sahel. Somalia. and elsewhere face untold calamities because
there is less water and more people. Water shortages cause major problems for
health. agriculture, and industry. What is especially relevant is that in 90 percent of the
developing world there is a lack of clean water for domestic use. which results
in various diseases and maladies like cholera and intestinal parasites. Meanwhile, much of the
region suffers from a food deficit. The region’s hopes of purchasing food from outside are meager
because of its adverse trade relations and deficiencies in technological innovation and political will. In sum.
United Nations experts believe that sub-Saharan Africa’s outlook provides abundant scope
for rapidly growing numbers of climate refugees. Food shortages are already
largely responsible for driving people out of Egypt and Tunisia. Recently there has been a
major falloff in Russian wheat harvests, because temperatures in the heartland have
risen to 1oo degrees Fahrenheit. Elsewhere, in another major grain belt. Australia’s Murray River and
Queensland areas. harvests have been severely diminished. The Murray River has been plagued for years by
crop-killing drought, and the recent floods in Queensland have severely diminished Australia’s agricultural
productivity. The Wall Street Journal summed up the problem: “China’s farmers need water because China
needs food. Production of rice, wheat, and corn topped out at 441.4 million tons in 1998 and has not hit
that level since. Seawater has leaked into depleted aquifers in the north of China, threatening
to turn land barren”33. Similar developments have already happened on the Great Plains of the United States. Genetic
research into more hardy grains for an uncertain future proceeds apace with the
problem. The real project ahead is to get people into actually valuing water in a realistic manner, says water expert Peter Rogers.
“We do not have to experience a water crisis,” said Rogers. “but we could have a really
serious one if we ignore the warning signs and do not provide the
leadership and the social determination required to avoid it.”34 Meanwhile. 2011
unfolded as a year of food crisis. Prices for food reached record global levels, driven by increases in the price of wheat. corn. sugar.
and oils. Nobel Prize—winning economist Paul Krugman has argued that rising concentrations of greenhouse
gases are changing our global food system. Responding to assertions that climate change has no bearing on the
problem. he admits that changing pall ems of consumption and population growth have their influence on high food prices. But with
climate change he argues that this
is just a beginning. We may have had a few bad winters,
but “don’t let the snow fool you.” In a warming world. “there will be much
more and much worse to come.”35
Resource wars are the greatest existential threat
Kinzer ‘14
Stephen Kinzer is a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. August 14, “ America’s next
security threat: resource wars, Boston globe, https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/08/30/america-next-security-threat-
resource-wars/qCqaar507gcYweKMVOOc3J/story.html
With so much scary upheaval shaking the world, it’s hard to say where Americans
should focus our attention. Just a few months ago, the worst things we had to worry about were a heavy-handed Russia,
a recalcitrant Iran, and an ambitious China. Today we face a fanatic mini-state in Mesopotamia, a collapsing Libya, devastation in
Gaza, a surge of child refugees from Central America, and an outbreak of Ebola in Africa .
Moments of seeming world
crisis like this one present a hidden danger beneath the turmoil we see. They rivet our
attention so fully that we forget about our longer-term challenges. Sudden new
emergencies, however, should teach us the danger of being unprepared. That makes this
an ideal time to step back, reflect on what kind of “threat matrix” we will face in the
future, and ask what we can do to prevent the next explosions. For most of modern history, the
principal threat to states came from other states. State-versus-state conflict still
happens, as Ukrainians can attest, but it is increasingly rare. Today’s security threats
come from “non-state actors”— supra-national forces that do not concentrate on
building regular armies, defending borders, or fighting set-piece battles. These comprise the
new challenge: Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, al-Shabab, and now the Islamic State, the fundamentalist militia that has seized a swath of
the Middle East as large as Jordan. We were slow to recognize this latest threat, in part because it is easier to see the world through a
familiar prism than through a new one. Years or decades from now, the threats we now face will have
faded. What will replace them? Globalization and the increasing inter-dependence of
nations have made territorial war nearly obsolete. Today people fight over religion, as they have
spasmodically through history, but that phase too will pass. If wars are raging in the mid-21st century, they
will probably be “resource wars” — conflicts over access to food, water, and energy.
Fighting over resources is hardly new, but wars like these will become more common
and more intense. The first reason has to do with rising standards of living. As huge
numbers of people emerge from poverty in Asia and Africa, they will want to live better,
which means consuming more. The second tectonic factor will be climate change, which may
severely disrupt networks on which humanity depends for food, water, and energy.
Climate change will shape the fate of nations. Its effects will inevitably turn some
against others. From this clash arises the central security challenge of our century: Growing demand for food,
water, and energy coinciding with shortages caused by climate change. How can we
assure that, in this new world, Americans are not dragged into “resource wars?” We
could take some steps abroad, like re-imagining our food aid programs so they help
farmers in other countries rather than American agri-business and shipping firms. The real
key, though, lies at home. We — and other nations — will stand or fall according to our ability to
manage our sources of food, water, and energy. Reducing our reliance on foreign
resources, and more sustainably using those we have, are urgent security as well as
environmental challenges. In the last few years, Americans have learned that security
threats now come more often from militias and insurgents than from rival states. But it took
too long for us to make that shift in mind-set. We did not recognize the new threat until it was upon us. Now is the time to broaden
our focus again and deal with the threat that looms ahead. To imagine that resources rather than weapons will drive future conflicts
requires rethinking the nature of national security. Preparing for threats that do not seem imminent runs counter to the American
character and, perhaps, all of human psychology. Yet
if we fail to address the food-water-energy triangle
now, we guarantee that our grandchildren will live in a world more turbulent than any
we have known.
Food wars cause extinction
John Castellaw 17, Teaching Fellow at the College of Business and Global Affairs at the University of Tennessee, on the
National Security Advisory Council of the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, former Chief of Staff for the U.S. Central Command,
Lieutenant General, Marine Corps (Ret.), 5/1/2017, “Opinion: Food Security Strategy Is Essential to Our National Security”,
https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/9203-opinion-food-security-strategy-is-essential-to-our-national-security
The United States faces many threats to our National Security. These threats include
continuing wars with extremist elements such as ISIS and potential wars with rogue
state North Korea or regional nuclear power Iran. The heated economic and
diplomatic competition with Russia and a surging China could spiral out of control.
Concurrently, we face threats to our future security posed by growing civil strife,
famine, and refugee and migration challenges which create incubators for extremist
and anti-American government factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but
instead must be a nuanced and comprehensive National Security Strategy combining all elements of National
Power including a Food Security Strategy.¶ An American Food Security Strategy is an
imperative factor in reducing the multiple threats impacting our National wellbeing.
Recent history has shown that reliable food supplies and stable prices produce more
stable and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to
instability, unrest, and violence.¶ Food insecurity drives mass migration around the
world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring
populations, generating conflicts, and threatening our own security by disrupting our
economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. Food system shocks from extreme food-price
volatility can be correlated with protests and riots. Food price related protests toppled
governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and
grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring
uprisings. Repeatedly, history has taught us that a strong agricultural sector is an
unquestionable requirement for inclusive and sustainable growth, broad-based development
progress, and long-term stability.¶ The impact can be remarkable and far reaching. Rising income, in
addition to reducing the opportunities for an upsurge in extremism, leads to changes in
diet, producing demand for more diverse and nutritious foods provided, in many cases, from
American farmers and ranchers. Emerging markets currently purchase 20 percent of U.S.
agriculture exports and that figure is expected to grow as populations boom.¶ Moving early to
ensure stability in strategically significant regions requires long term planning and a disciplined, thoughtful strategy. To combat
current threats and work to prevent future ones, our national leadership must employ the entire spectrum of our power including
diplomatic, economic, and cultural elements. The best means to prevent future chaos and the resulting instability is positive
engagement addressing the causes of instability before it occurs.¶ This is not rocket science. We know where the instability is most
likely to occur. The
world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately,
this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and
food insecure countries. This alarming math is not just about total numbers. Projections show that the
greatest increase is in the age groups most vulnerable to extremism. There are currently 200
million people in Africa between the ages of 15 and 24, with that number expected to double in the next 30 years. Already, 60% of
the unemployed in Africa are young people. ¶ Too
often these situations deteriorate into shooting
wars requiring the deployment of our military forces. We should be continually mindful that the price we
pay for committing military forces is measured in our most precious national resource, the blood of those who serve. For those who
live in rural America, this has a disproportionate impact. Fully 40% of those who serve in our military come from the farms, ranches,
and non-urban communities that make up only 16% of our population. ¶ Actions taken now to increase agricultural sector jobs can
provide economic opportunity and stability for those unemployed youths while helping to feed people. A recent report by the
Chicago Council on Global Affairs identifies agriculture development as the core essential for providing greater food security,
economic growth, and population well-being.¶ Our active support for food security, including agriculture development, has helped
stabilize key regions over the past 60 years. A
robust food security strategy, as a part of our overall
security strategy, can mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships,
and support continued American economic and agricultural prosperity while materially
contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security.
Pandemics risk extinction—no burnout, human transportation is reaching
the tipping point for global contagion
Yaneer Bar-Yam 16, Founding President of the New England Complex Systems Institute, “Transition to extinction:
Pandemics in a connected world,” NECSI (July 3, 2016), http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition
Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region.
Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then
dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for
evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7].¶ In the research I want to discuss here, what we
were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes
natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding
airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2).¶ When we introduce
long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains
changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape
local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher
aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread.¶ As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point
at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens
die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to
extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization
may be approaching such a critical threshold.¶ In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of
global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease
that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since
Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about
evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly
connected world.¶ The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential
impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the
world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events.¶ A
key point about the phase transition to
extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a
few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase.¶ So how
close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before
it happens.¶ While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One
possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence
of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be
vindicated.¶ As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people
respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well
enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As
the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase.¶ Are people in western countries safe because
of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly
connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like
a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If
a sick food service worker in an airport infects
100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could
very well prove unstoppable.
Global environmental collapse also causes extinction and warming doesn’t
make it inevitable
Torres, 16—affiliate scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies (Phil, “Biodiversity loss: An existential risk
comparable to climate change,” http://thebulletin.org/biodiversity-loss-existential-risk-comparable-climate-change9329, dml)
Furthermore, there
are myriad phenomena that are driving biodiversity loss in addition to
climate change. Other causes include ecosystem fragmentation, invasive species, pollution, oxygen depletion caused by
fertilizers running off into ponds and streams, overfishing, human overpopulation, and overconsumption. All of these phenomena
have a direct impact on the health of the biosphere, and all
would conceivably persist even if the problem of
climate change were somehow immediately solved.
Such considerations warrant decoupling biodiversity loss from climate change,
because the former has been consistently subsumed by the latter as a mere effect.
Biodiversity loss is a distinct environmental crisis with its own unique syndrome of
causes, consequences, and solutions—such as restoring habitats, creating protected areas (“biodiversity parks”),
and practicing sustainable agriculture.
The sixth extinction. The

repercussions of biodiversity loss are potentially as severe as those anticipated
from climate change, or even a nuclear conflict. For example, according to a 2015 study published in
Science Advances, the best available evidence reveals “an exceptionally rapid loss of
biodiversity over the last few centuries, indicating that a sixth mass extinction is already
under way.” This conclusion holds, even on the most optimistic assumptions about
the background rate of species losses and the current rate of vertebrate extinctions. The
group classified as “vertebrates” includes mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, and all other creatures with a backbone.
The article argues that, using its conservative figures, the average loss of vertebrate species was 100 times higher in the past century relative to the background rate of extinction. (Other scientists have suggested
that the current extinction rate could be as much as 10,000 times higher than normal.) As the authors write, “The evidence is incontrovertible that recent extinction rates are unprecedented in human history and
highly unusual in Earth’s history.” Perhaps the term “Big Six” should enter the popular lexicon—to add the current extinction to the previous “Big Five,” the last of which wiped out the dinosaurs 66 million years
ago.
But the concept of biodiversity encompasses more than just the total number of species on the planet. It also refers to the size of different populations of species. With respect to this phenomenon, multiple studies
have confirmed that wild populations around the world are dwindling and disappearing at an alarming rate. For example, the 2010 Global Biodiversity Outlook report found that the population of wild vertebrates
living in the tropics dropped by 59 percent between 1970 and 2006.
The report also found that the population of farmland birds in Europe has dropped by 50 percent since 1980; bird populations in the grasslands of North America declined by almost 40 percent between 1968 and
2003; and the population of birds in North American arid lands has fallen by almost 30 percent since the 1960s. Similarly, 42 percent of all amphibian species (a type of vertebrate that is sometimes called an
“ecological indicator”) are undergoing population declines, and 23 percent of all plant species “are estimated to be threatened with extinction.” Other studies have found that some 20 percent of all reptile species,
48 percent of the world’s primates, and 50 percent of freshwater turtles are threatened. Underwater, about 10 percent of all coral reefs are now dead, and another 60 percent are in danger of dying.
Consistent with these data, the 2014 Living Planet Report shows that the global population of wild vertebrates dropped by 52 percent in only four decades—from 1970 to 2010. While biologists often avoid
projecting historical trends into the future because of the complexity of ecological systems, it’s tempting to extrapolate this figure to, say, the year 2050, which is four decades from 2010. As it happens, a 2006
study published in Science does precisely this: It projects past trends of marine biodiversity loss into the 21st century, concluding that, unless significant changes are made to patterns of human activity, there will
be virtually no more wild-caught seafood by 2048.
Catastrophic consequences for civilization. The consequences of this rapid pruning of the evolutionary tree of life extend beyond the
obvious. There could be surprising effects of biodiversity loss that scientists are unable to
fully anticipate in advance. For example, prior research has shown that localized
ecosystems can undergo abrupt and irreversible shifts when they reach a tipping
point. According to a 2012 paper published in Nature, there are reasons for thinking that we may be
approaching a tipping point of this sort in the global ecosystem, beyond which the
consequences could be catastrophic for civilization.
As the authors write, a planetary-scale transition could precipitate “substantial losses of
ecosystem services required to sustain the human population.” An ecosystem service is any
ecological process that benefits humanity, such as food production and crop pollination. If the global ecosystem were
to cross a tipping point and substantial ecosystem services were lost, the results
could be “widespread social unrest, economic instability, and loss of human
life.” According to Missouri Botanical Garden ecologist Adam Smith, one of the paper’s co-authors, this could occur in a
matter of decades—far more quickly than most of the expected consequences of climate
change, yet equally destructive.
Biodiversity loss is a “threat multiplier” that, by pushing societies to the brink of
collapse, will exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce entirely new struggles
between state and non-state actors. Indeed, it could even fuel the rise of terrorism. (After
all, climate change has been linked to the emergence of ISIS in Syria, and multiple high-ranking US officials, such as former US
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and CIA director John Brennan, have affirmed that climate change and terrorism are connected.)
The reality is that we are entering the sixth mass extinction in the 3.8-billion-year history of life on Earth, and the impact of
this event could be felt by civilization “in as little as three human lifetimes,” as the
aforementioned 2012 Nature paper notes. Furthermore, the widespread decline of biological populations
could plausibly initiate a dramatic transformation of the global ecosystem on an even
faster timescale: perhaps a single human lifetime.
The unavoidable conclusion is that biodiversity
loss constitutes an existential threat in its own
right. As such, it ought to be considered alongside climate change and nuclear weapons as
one of the most significant contemporary risks to human prosperity and survival.
Climate refugees undergo human trafficking and other forms of

unspeakable suffering – you have an ethical obligation to vote affirmative
Gerrard 18 - Professor of Professional Practice and environmental law at Columbia Law School (Michael, “Climate Change
and Human Trafficking After the Paris Agreement”, University of Miami Law Review, Hein Online)//abaime
<People who are displaced from their homes endure extraordinary hardships in seeking
a new place to live. A total of 187,970 migrants crossed the Mediterranean into Europe in 2016, and 1,381 died in the
crossing, often on overcrowded vessels run by traffickers. 6 3 By "one estimate, at least 50,000 persons, including
thousands of children, have died in the past two decades while seeking to cross
international borders." 64 Many of those who survive the journey find themselves in
refugee camps, which often have horrible conditions. 6 5 The world's largest refugee camp is in Dadaab,
Kenya; the government tried to close the camp and repatriate about 260,000 Somali refugees, but in 2017, a court in Kenya blocked
the closure for now. 6 6 Women are especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and to the migration it can cause.67 In
some of these camps, women frequently face sexual assault. The International Organization of Migration
conducts interviews of large numbers of people who have crossed the Mediterranean
into Europe. 6 9 From mid-February through May 2017, they held 2,769 interviews in Sicily and Apulia in the South of Italy,
and Lombardy, Liguiria and Guilia, in the North of Italy.Of these interviews, 79% of the interviewees answered
"yes" to at least one of the four indicators of human trafficking and other exploitative
practices. In particular, 67% said they had been "held . . . against their will during the[ir]
journey[] by armed individuals or groups other than ... government authorities"; 47% had
worked without getting the expected payment; 36% were forced to work; 75% suffered physical violence of some kind; and 0.3%
were approached by someone with offers of an arranged marriage. Human trafficking is a large phenomenon. The International
Labour Office estimated that in 2012, "20.9 million people [were] in forced labor globally" 73 -this is
almost twice the number of Africans who were forcibly taken to the Americas and Europe during the entire 350 years of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade. 7 4 The
vast majority were "exploited in the private economy[] by
individuals or enterprises."7 5 "Of these, 4.5 million . . . [were] victims of forced sexual
exploitation, and 14.2 million ... [were] victims of forced labor exploitation, primarily in
agriculture, construction, domestic work, manufacturing, mining and utilities."76 The same report estimated that profits from this
forced labor were $150.2 billion per year. The economics of modern slavery are much different than two centuries ago. "An enslaved
fieldworker [] cost the equivalent of [about $40,000] in 1850," but costs only about $100 today.78 To the unscrupulous "employer,"
this makes them as disposable as a ballpoint pen. In the words of Kevin Bales, [i]f slaves get ill, are injured, outlive their usefulness,
or become troublesome to the slaveholder, they are dumped-or worse. The young woman enslaved as a prostitute in Thailand is
thrown out on the street when she tests positive for HIV. The Brazilian man tricked and trapped into slavery making charcoal is
tossed out when the forest is razed and no trees are left to cut. It is well-documented that displacement leads to a
considerable increase in human trafficking. The U.N. Environment Programme has indicated that trafficking
may increase by 20-30% during disasters, and "INTERPOL has warned that disasters or conflicts may increase
the exposure of women to trafficking as families are disrupted and livelihoods are
lost."80 There are multiple instances in which trafficking has been shown to increase in the aftermath of cyclones, flooding,
earthquakes, and tsunamis, as well as after civil and military conflict. Climate change and other forms of
environmental degradation have also been shown to lead to considerable increases in
child labor83 and domestic abuse, 8 4 and contribute to armed conflict between ethnic groups8 5 and violence over the
exploitation of natural resources. 86 Corruption by officials handling international funds for refugee camps, by border crossing
officials, and others, makes matters all the worse and contributes to trafficking. Not only does environmental
degradation lead to more human exploitation-the causation has been shown to operate
in the reverse direction as well. Extremely cheap slave labor has been shown to
contribute to deforestation and to highly-polluting methods of shrimp farming, brick-
making, and gold mining. Pope Francis' 2015 Encyclical Letter on the environment, Laudato Si', eloquently discussed
the plight of those displaced from their homes: There has been a tragic rise in the number of migrants
seeking to flee from the growing poverty caused by environmental degradation. They are
not recognized by international conventions as refugees; they bear the loss of the lives
they have left behind, without enjoying any legal protection whatsoever. Sadly, there is
widespread indifference to such suffering, which is even now taking place throughout
our world. Our lack of response to these tragedies involving our brothers and sisters points to the loss of that sense of
responsibility for our fellow men and women upon which all civil society is founded. 8>
1ac – Europe Advantage
Because the US won’t accept climate refugees, they are flooding the EU –
the brink is now
Miissirian and Schlenker 17 Anouch Missirian is a PhD in Sustainable Development at Columbia University
(Anouch and Wolfram, “Asylum applications respond to temperature fluctuations,” Science Magazine, 12/22/17) // SR
The European Union (EU) has seen an unprecedented wave of immigration in 2015 (1)
as part of a larger surge in migration across the Mediterranean Sea that began in 2014.
Many of the migrants flee war-torn countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, or Iraq, and
there is an active debate as to whether a change in climatic conditions has contributed
to, and will amplify, such migration flows. For example, a 2015 study has shown that the unrest in Syria was preceded by a
record drought that led to lower agricultural yields and forced farmers to migrate to urban areas (2). Although that study does not attribute the Syrian
. For
conflict to the drought, the authors argue that it added another stressor. These arguments have gained traction outside the academic literature
instance, the Pentagon calls climate change a “threat multiplier”(3). However instead of
looking at individual countries, we take a step back and investigate the role of weather
shocks in global distressdriven migration to the EU in 2000–2014; i.e., preceding the recent crisis.
Asylum applications to the EU from the 103 source countries in our sample totaled 1.5 million in 2015; that is, more than 4 times the average in our
sample. Previous studies had found a relationship between weather variations and migration (4, 5, 6), but ours is the first to focus on distress-driven
migration (as measured by asylum applications) on a global scale. Two centuries ago, the “year without a summer” (1816), following the volcanic
eruption of Mount Tambora in Indonesia, saw massive crop failures throughout the Northern Hemisphere, caused by the aerosol-obscured atmosphere
Here we provide quantified
and unseasonal climate. It triggered sizeable migrations as peas ants deserted their fruitless farms (7).
evidence of a similar phenomenon taking place in the present day, whereby weather
shocks on agricultural regions in 103 countries around the globe directly influence
emigration, now toward the EU. The relationship of international migration decisions to
economic situation in both the source and destination country has been extensively
documented. Migration’s response to income or wealth corresponds in an inverted U
shape: Positive income shocks in the home country enable individuals to overcome
liquidity constraints and finance migration costs (8). Richer households are not liquidity-constrained and show a
negative migration-income relationship as improving conditions at home make it less desirable to leave (9). [See supplementary text sections 1 and 2
for a more detailed review and discussion (10).] Migration barriers have been described as one of the biggest distortions in the global economy (11).
We investigate how
Causes of migration are not limited to the desire for better economic opportunities: humans flee persecution and war.
exogenous weather fluctuations affect one facet of migration: asylum applications,

which equal roughly 1 =10 of the overall migration flows over our sample frame. Our
sample included the 103 non–Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) source countries that reported asylum applications to the EU in
each year between 2000 and 2014. It covered, on average, 351,000 asylum applications per year, the majority (140,000)
coming from the 31 Asian countries, including Afghanistan and Iraq, each of which supplied ~25,000 applicants. The 46 African and 11 non-EU
countries in Europe accounted for ~100,000 applicants each, whereas 16 countries in the Americas accounted for the rest (tables S7 to S9). For
Applications from all source countries
example, 55,943 people from Serbia applied for asylum in the EU in 2000.
average 378,000 per year—that is, our sample covered 93% of all applications to the EU.
Recent research (12) suggests that, in agricultural production areas, there should be a
negative relationship between economic conditions and conflict, which then translates
into asylum applications. Our baseline regression links annual asylum applications from each source country outside the OECD to
any EU member state. We use a panel analysis with source-country and year fixed effects, which is equivalent to a joint demeaning of all variables and
accounting for common annual shocks. In other words, we link anomalies in log applications to weather anomalies once common annual shocks are
absorbed (e.g., the global financial crisis in 2008). Our specification examines whether hotter-than-normal temperatures will increase or decrease
asylum applications from a given source country. Because our dependent variable is in logs, we estimate relative impacts, which is preferable as the
number of applications differs greatly among source countries in absolute terms. We allow the effect to vary by the average weather variable: Hotter-
than-usual temperatures can reduce asylum applications for cold countries and increase them for hot countries. Our model includes both average
temperature and precipitation. The coefficients and standard errors are given in table S1. We find a statistically significant
relationship between fluctuations in asylum applications and weather anomalies:
Applications are lowest for average temperatures around 20°C and increase if the
weather is too cold or too hot. We choose to focus here on the EU because it
receives the largest share of asylum application and, despite having a high
rejection rate, remains a major provider of international protection (13); other
target ensembles are considered in the sensitivity checks. Colder countries in Europe outside the EU are
predicted to account for fewer asylum applications in a warming world, whereas hotter
countries, especially in Asia and Africa, are expected to see sizable increases in a warming world (tables S7 to S9). The coefficients on
temperature are displayed in Fig. 1. We show a quadratic response function (dashed brown line), as well as flexible restricted cubic splines (solid brown
line). Both use the contemporaneous average temperature in the source country, averaged over the maize growing area and season. These models
correspond to columns (1a) and (3a) of table S1, respectively. Each line gives the point estimate and is normalized so that the minimum of the response
function is zero. We find a highly significant relationship (P < 0.01 for joint significance) between logged asylum applications and average temperature
over the maize growing area and season for the 103 source countries in our sample. If we average the weather on the basis of population in a grid cell
(table S2), the P value becomes 0.14 and the temperature variables are no longer significant, which suggests that weather shocks over the agricultural
area are the crucial channel. The use of different weather data sets yields comparable results for seasonal averages (table S3). Including data on political
conflicts as controls (table S4) produces important predictors of asylum applications, but the estimated relationship with temperature only slightly
weakens, suggesting that they either pick up other forms of aggression or persecution because our conflict measures are limited to certain continents
and actors or that the conflict data has measurement error.In summary, we link annual asylum applications
received by the EU member states to average temperature over the maize growing area
and season in the source country and find a nonlinear relationship, especially for those
applications filed into the richer EU member states. Moderate temperatures around 20°C minimize asylum
applications. Both colder and hotter temperatures increase migration flows. Extrapolating those results, an increase in
temperatures in source countries is predicted to lead to an increase in asylum

applications to the EU as well, following a highly nonlinear response function. Our findings
support the assessment that climate change, especially continued warming, will add another “threat multiplier” that induces people to seek refuge
abroad.
Europe overreacts and deports en masse – causes Middle East nuclear war
Kegl and Virtue ‘15
[Rob and Agnes. “Migrant crisis and Euro tensions threaten to trigger catastrophic conflict claim experts” 9/23/15
http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/607158/World-War-3-Experts-raise-fears-migrant-crisis-could-lead-to-catastrophic-
scenario //GBS-JV]
RISING tensions between central and east European countries over the escalating
migrant crisis could be the spark for a catastrophic world war, experts warned
today. Both the Hungarian and Italian prime ministers have spoken of huge dangers of unchecked floods of
immigrants from Africa and the Middle East which have set previously peacable EU
nations against each other. The scenario - especially the one currently being played out in Serbia and Hungary - is
hauntingly similar to that which triggered the First World War. The problem has manifesting
itself in central Europe where Hungary is besieged by growing numbers of refugees
passing through from Serbia and Croatia, forcing its government to build fences to stem the influx. Hungarian prime
minister Viktor Orbán warned European life and its established laws were under threat from huge numbers of people heading through the continent
from war-torn states in the Middle East. In a defence against criticism of the aggressive stance against refugees taken by the country , he said yesterday:
The
"Our borders are in danger. Our way of life where we respect the law is in danger. "The whole of Hungary and Europe is in danger. "
migrants are blitzing us." Hungary and Serbia have constantly been at each others'
throats over the issue, with Budapest urging its non-EU neighbours to do more to help tackle the growing neighbours migrants.
It is now sending troops armed with rubber bullets and tear gas to the border with Serbia
to protect the country's frontier. Pinter Bence, a Hungarian political journalist for the mandiner.hu website said the situation
with growing tensions between nations was reminiscent of the international scenario from just over 100 years ago. He said: " This is how the
eve of the First World War could have looked like: complete hesitancy, the termination
of the usual channels of diplomacy, the lack of solidarity, pressure to take a step and the
countries issuing threats to each other are all reminding us of that. It definitely
doesn't look like a cooperating Europe. "Mr Orban is right in stating that it would only worth to talk about
quotas if we can control the registration of the migrants coming to Europe. And so far no country has any idea how to do that. "That's what the
Hungarian Government has done, though it risks projecting an image of inhumanity." He said reports of a Croatian train filled with 1,000 migrants
illegally entering Hungary last week, could easily be the sort of act that escalates the currently fraught situation. Politicians in Budapest described the
train's unannounced arrival as a "major, major incident". Mr Pinter said: "What did the Croatian government think when they sent a train with 40 fully
armed police officers on it, crossing the border at a red signal? In the worse cases an affair like this can lead to an outbreak
of a war." The escalating situation on the continent has also drawn interest across the Atlantic Ocean. Like Mr Pinter, Gerald Celente, who is a
trend forecaster in the United States, said the current crisis draws huge parallels with a previous global
conflict - in this case the Second World War. He blames America's attacks on Libya, Iraq and most recently Syria, for
bringing "refugees of war" to Europe. Mr Celente said this is going hand in hand with trade wars, with China
devaluing its currency to gain a global advantage, similar to what happened prior to the
Second World War. Considering the current situation in Syria, where America is bombing president Bashar
al-Assad's regime while Vladimir Putin's Russia is defending him by attacking ISIS, his warnings are all too clear. He said:
"We're on the march to war. History is repeating itself. "It's a repeat of the
1930s. The crash of 1929, the Great Depression, currency wars, trade wars, world war.
"We've got the panic of '08, the Great Recession, currency wars, trade wars and now we're seeing the refugees of war sweeping on the shores of
another big terror attack on society will see an emotional outpouring across
Europe." He said
the Western world that will then transform into a catastrophic thirst for revenge. Mr Celente
said: "They are leading us to the next great war. All it is going to take is a terror attack and people will be
tying yellow ribbons around everything that doesn't move, waving American flags and we're off to what Einstein called the whole war scenario." US
economist Dr Paul Craig Roberts, who served in the Reagan administration, is another who predicts doom on the horizon. He spoke at an Occupy Peace
nuclear war under the currently
event organised by Mr Celente at the weekend about rising tensions. Dr Roberts remarked on the impact of a
tense climate, if countries such as Russia and China are involved. He said the effects would be
devastating, as there would be a "first-strike, pre-emptive force". He added:

"Armageddon could be at hand. "This is chilling. People should be scared to death." Running
alongside the rising tension between global superpowers is the threat emanating from Islamic State. Just weeks ago Italian prime minister Sergio
said the seeds of a major conflict were being planted across the region, with
Mattarella
religious-based terrorism at the root of it. Speaking at a meeting of world leaders in Rimini, he said: "Terrorism,
energised by a fanatical belief in God, aims to start a third world war in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa. Our duty is to stop it. "It is our
responsibility to defuse the threat, because peace in the world will depend on the ability of the monotheistic religions to talk with each other and to
he also called for refugees
understand each other." He called for "intelligence" in dealing with migration to help tackle radicalism. But
to be welcomed in Europe, which is at odds with many across continent, who fear ISIS is looking to exploit the migrant crisis
by sneaking jihadis into Europe with them.
Continued unsustainable refugee flows crater the European economy

Poddar, '16 – Researcher in economic policy working in collaboration with Derek Newberry (Professor at the Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania) (Shubham, "," The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2016,
https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1046&c
ontext=sire)//SB
The general economic concerns among European nations are that the addition of large number of refugees will
weaken the economies by increasing unemployment, overloading the public
budgets and straining the infrastructural capacity. Even though the discussion on debt crisis
has shifted to the background due to the increasing emphasis on the refugee crisis, nations have neither escaped nor
recovered completely from the debt crisis and fear that the refugee crisis will add to
their preexisting economic problems.
Economic sustainability is an important issue for European nations whose economies
are struggling with the debt crisis (Dullien 2016). For example, Greece plays an important role in the refugee
crisis as it is one of the primary gateways to Europe from the Middle East. At the same time, Greece
is struggling to
adhere to the demands of its bailout package as the government’s focus is on coping
with the refugee crisis and hence reforms are not being implemented. In order to assist
Greece in managing the situation and providing it with partial relief from its debt
burden, loan packages have been extended by other European nations as well as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Such financial assistance only seems to further delay Greece’s
debt problems rather than solving them as its economy continues to be stagnant and
reform implementation remains slow.
In the process of accepting and integrating the refugees, the fiscal costs come before
the fiscal benefits for the host countries. Governments have to pay a significant
amount of expenses related to receiving the refugees, processing their application,
providing them housing and meals, teaching them the national language, identifying
their skills and finally integrating them in the labor market. There are additional costs
related to processing asylum claims and then enforcing migrants who do not qualify for
asylum to return. The first-year cost of processing and including a refugee in the society can range from €8000 to €12000
per application (Kern 2015). Based on 2015 figures, the IMF estimated that the cost of refugee influx in EU will be approximately 0.1
percent to 0.2 percent of the European GDP (OECD Migration Policy Debates 2015). However, this is a lower end estimate as it does
not account for large number of refugees that entered EU in 2016 and excludes the future expected expenses related to training
programs and integration initiatives. Given a total of 3.5 million refugees, the estimate for actual expenses amount to nearly 0.5
percent of the European GDP (Dullien 2016). In view of the economic instability due to Brexit and global financial downturn, rising
number of Europeans feel that this additional
expenditure of tax payers’ money on migrants will put
further stress on the already strained economies (Kent 2015).
One other major claim by a section of the European population is that refugees
would take away employment
opportunities from European people and hence create a wave of poverty. In a survey
conducted of 11,000 people across EU, 82 percent of the people from Hungary, 72 percent from Greece, 46 percent from United
Kingdom and 31 percent from Germany claimed that the refugees would be a burden on their
economies as they would take away their jobs and social security benefits (Wike, Stokes and
Simmons 2016). Some Europeans have also raised concerns about the potential drop in wages
due to the increased labor supply in the market when the refugees get the right to work.
If Europeans focus on such notions of labor insecurity and prejudice, it would result in unhealthy competition
between the native population and refugees, making their integration in society even
more difficult.
The response of the EU members to the refugee crisis has also been uncoordinated.
While some nations are being overburdened by the costs of the crisis, others are contributing
relatively less due to the ad hoc nature of the approach. Studies have suggested that the most practical way of
combating the crisis situation is by distributing the burden among all EU member states
based on their economic capacities (Lehne 2016). However, the European Commission has been unable
to achieve this due to lack of consensus among nations as a result of domestic political
reasons. The two primary organizations that should be managing the refugee crisis are
Frontex, which is responsible for border control, and the European Asylum Support Office. Both do not have
considerable authority or funds to play a significant role in this crisis situation (Nardelli
2015). There is also no substantial legal framework for dealing with such large-scale
migration and hence each member state prefers to maintain their autonomy in this
issue.
Nuclear war
Wright 12, Thomas, fellow with the Managing Global Order at the Brookings Institution, Summer 2012, “What if Europe
Fails?” The Washington Quarterly, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerWright.pdf, Accessed 7/25/14
Yet, verbal warnings from nervous leaders and economists aside, there has been remarkably little analysis of what the
end of
European integration might mean for Europe and the rest of the world. This article does not predict that
failure will occur it only seeks to explain the geopolitical implications if it does. The severity and
trajectory of the crisis since 2008 suggest that failure is a high-impact event with a non-trivial
probability. It may not occur, but it certainly merits serious analysis. Failure is widely seen as an imminent danger.¶
Would the failure of the Euro really mean the beginning of the end of democracy in Europe?
Could the global economy survive without a vibrant European economy? What would European architecture look like
after the end of European integration? What are the implications for the United States, China, and the Middle East? Since the
international order has been primarily a Western construction, with Europe as a key pillar, would the
disintegration of the European Union or the Eurozone have lasting and deleterious effects on world
politics in the coming decade?¶ Thinking through and prioritizing the consequences of a failed Europe yield five of the
utmost importance. First, the most immediate casualty of the failure of the European project would be
the global economy. A disorderly collapse (as opposed to an orderly failure, which will be explained shortly) would
probably trigger a new depression and could lead to the unraveling of economic integration as
countries introduce protectionist measures to limit the contagion effects of a collapse. Bare
survival would drag down Europe’s economy and would generate increasing and dangerous levels of
volatility in the international economic order.¶ Second, the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis depend
not just on the severity of the crisis but also the geopolitical climate in which it occurs. Europe’s geopolitical climate is
as healthy as can be reasonably expected. This would prevent a simple repeat of the 1930s in Europe, which has been one
of the more alarming predictions from some observers, although certain new and fragile democracies in Europe
might come under pressure.¶ Third, failure would cement Germany’s rise as the leading country in
Europe and as an indispensable hub in the European Union and Eurozone, if they continue to exist, but anti-
Germanism would become a more potent force in politics on the European periphery.¶ Fourth,
economic downturn as a result of disintegration would undermine political authority in those parts of the world
where the legitimacy of governments is shallow, and it would exacerbate international tensions
where the geopolitical climate is relatively malign. The places most at risk are the Middle East
and China.¶ Fifth, disintegration would weaken Europe on the world stage–it would severely damage
the transatlantic alliance, both by sapping its resources and by diverting Europe’s attention to its
internal crisis–and would, finally, undermine the multilateral order.¶ Taking these five implications in their
totality, one thing is clear. Failure will badly damage Europe and the international order, but some types of
failure–most notably a disorderly collapse–are worse than others. Currently, the pain is concentrated on the so-called European
periphery (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Ireland). Disorderly
collapse would affect all European countries,
as well as North America and East Asia. If a solution to the Eurocrisis is perceived as beyond reach, leaders of the
major powers will shift their priorities to managing failure in order to contain its effects. This will be strenuously resisted on the
periphery, which is already experiencing extremely high levels of pain and does not want to accept the permanence of the status quo.
Consequently, their electorates will become more risk-acceptant and will pressure Germany and other
core member states to accommodate them through financial transfers and assistance in exchange for not
deliberately triggering a break-up. This bitter split will divide and largely define a failing Europe. Absent movement
toward a solution, EU politics is about to take an ugly turn.
Also, populism is on the brink of taking over Europe -- Now is key to solve
Anderson 18 - deputy director for advisory with Oxford Analytica and writer/political risk consultant for Arab News
(Kelly, “Populism’s rise is bad news for the global system”, 11 March 2018, http://www.arabnews.com/node/1263896)//abaime
<Europe and the US are experiencing a massive anti-establishment wave, which is

mostly taking the form of populist political movements. In Europe, populist movements in Hungary,
Serbia, Austria, Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and
Sweden have all gained momentum in recent years, with varying degrees of success. In the US, Donald Trump
campaigned
on a strong populist message, and his recent decision to impose new tariffs on steel and
aluminum imports demonstrates his populist and anti-globalist tendencies.
In 2018, it is less clear if populism has extensive appeal beyond the West, though it has historically played a strong role in Latin
American politics. However, there are some indications that it matters today in other parts of the world, too. For example, some
experts have suggested that Japan, India and the Philippines are experiencing populist trends.
While there are multiple definitions of populism, typically it takes the form of a leader claiming to represent “the people” against a
corrupt and unrepresentative elite. There are multiple problems with this, including big questions about exactly who “the people”
the leader claims to represent are. Nonetheless, populism’s siren song can feel magnetic in societies where many people feel left out
or are generally fed up with the current form of governance and economics. If you mix in significant demographic change and fears
about the loss of group identity, as is happening today in Europe and the US, populism can be a potent potion.
Today, manyEuropeans and Americans are generally disenchanted with their governing
and economic systems, so the populist message of tearing it down and creating
something new is appealing. The problem is that people within the US and European
countries are deeply divided about what they want to replace their current systems with.
This makes fixing the system or building a new, better functioning one difficult and can be a recipe for ongoing political and
economic instability.
Deep divisions within a society also provide fuel for populists, who often are good at drawing
supporters from different ideological or political groups. As Sam Wilkin, author of the forthcoming book “History Repeating: Why
Populists Rise and Governments Fall,” recently wrote, populists’ focus on railing against the system allows them to “pick up support
from people with very different views on politics and policy.”
To put the populist wave in perspective, they

are not fully taking over Europe, let alone the world. In
France in 2017, far-right populists gained a lot of momentum but then easily lost to centrist
Emmanuel Macron; importantly, Macron and his new party offered voters a non-populist alternative to the traditional mainstream
parties. Also in 2017, centrists in the Netherlands easily defeated the far-right party of Geert Wilders in elections. In close 2016
Austrian presidential elections, an independent won over a far-right candidate, but then the far-right party did very well in 2017
parliamentary elections.
Despite some losses for populists, they are clearly doing well politically in the West today.
Dissatisfaction with economic opportunities, fear of demographic change (especially immigration in the US and the migrant crisis of
recent years in Europe), and a sense that power is seeping out of the West into the rest of the world and challenging traditional
European and American identities are all contributing to the appeal of populism. None of these drivers are likely to change, and the
electoral success of populism might prompt other politicians to try the same approach. With ebbs and flows, populism is going to be
a major trend for years.
This will pose major challenges to the future of the EU, but beyond that it also will pose
challenges for the continuation of the post-Second World War system and economic and
political globalization. If the major powers and economies that created the system and
still drive much of it start turning their backs on global trade, migration and the
institutions that underpin the global system, it will be in serious trouble.
That is bad news for the countries that built the system and bad news for the emerging
powers and economies that have learned how to benefit from it. However, it might provide
incentives for those who benefit from the modern global system to find ways to counter populism.>
Otherwise, populism carves up NATO

Schrank ‘18
[Phil. Phillip Gary Schrank is an instructor at Korea Military Academy. He is also a doctoral candidate at Korea University’s
Graduate School of International Studies. “The Rise of Populism and the Future of NATO.” Global Politics Review, Vol 3 N2. 2018
pdf//jv]
There are some who believe that NATO must transform itself in order to stay relevant.
This would not be the first time NATO has been reinvented. After the end of the Cold
War, many called for NATO to be dissolved. The West had won. The old nemesis Soviet Union had ceased to
exist. What purpose did NATO have if they didn’t have an enemy to fight against? A quick scan of the NATO website
will present how NATO has transformed since the Cold War. It has expanded to as far
east as Turkey and even has strategic partners such as South Korea and Japan far from its
physical base. NATO’s missions have moved from border states to completely outside of Europe. It can be argued that
NATO has over- extended itself and expanded its role to areas outside its sphere of
influence. This has diluted its core mission of securing North Atlantic countries. The rise of populism in
Europe and the United States has led some to question the role of NATO in
Europe. Marine Le Pen pushed for “French independence.” She feels the previous ruling parties
have failed to put France first and instead have put Europe first. In the interview conducted by
Foreign Affairs she questioned the assumption that the EU has helped bring peace to Europe. Instead she argued that peace brought
on the EU. When talking about potential French isolation, Le Pen talks about French history
of withdrawing from NATO; Le Pen recounts how General de Gaulle pulled France from NATO and she feels the
debate now is similar to what it was in 1966. 11 Donald Trump had campaigned on questioning the US role
in NATO. The heart of the issue was countries paying their fair share into NATO
operations. He implied that US involvement in protecting NATO countries would be
conditional on those countries paying their obligations. 12 However, Trump recently
declared that the US would honor Article Five of NATO and unequivocally protect fellow
member states. It is this ambiguous policy position that has Europe worried
about the resolve of the US in times of trouble. One of the major issues in this
era of populism is that each country is more likely to focus on its own security
issues. In Europe, Southern European countries along the Mediterranean will see the
threat coming from North Africa and the Middle East whereas Eastern European
countries view Russia as a threat. 13 According to Galeotti, many citizens of Europe view
security threats as a country specific problem.
NATO collapse causes extinction via Russia nuclear launch
Marriott ‘18
[Daniel. Foreign Policy Researcher at the UK Defense Journal. “An Essential Alliance: NATO and the Nuclear Sharing Bond.” Feb
2018, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/essential-alliance-nato-nuclear-sharing-bond/ //GBS-JV]
On the surface, NATO Nuclear Sharing arrangements play a negligible role in the nuclear security of the
independently nuclear armed United Kingdom but there’s more to it. At first glimpse the programme is designed to
offer extended deterrence to non-nuclear armed Alliance members, with the UK seemingly able to ensure its
own nuclear security through its unilateral Trident system. But Nuclear Sharing plays a key role in the security
of the entire Alliance, including the UK. The programme involves the United States stationing
tactical nuclear weapons (specifically air-delivered gravity bombs) in the territory of various non-nuclear
armed European allies which are responsible for delivering the weapons in the event of
their hypothetical use. Of interest though is that despite the maintenance of an independent British nuclear deterrent, the Nuclear Sharing programme has
been essential for British nuclear security since the sweeping reforms to Western nuclear weapons postures after the end of the Cold War. In 1999 NATO unveiled a new
Strategic Concept which exclaimed that “[the Alliance]’s ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or… to mount a successful conventional defence has
significantly improved”. In line with this new confidence after the demise of the USSR, the Alliance implemented radical changes to its nuclear policy. Overall nuclear stocks
both strategic and tactical were dramatically reduced. All US and UK nuclear artillery and surface based tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the European continent,
leaving the US air-delivered gravity bombs as part of Nuclear Sharing arrangements as the only remaining tactical nuclear presence under NATO auspices. As part of this, the
UK decommissioned all surface-vessel and air launched weapons – effectively yielding its nuclear triad. It is
because of this British withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons after the end of the Cold War that
Nuclear Sharing has become so important to not just wider European nuclear
security but also British nuclear security. Although British Trident missiles are capable of carrying small-yield warheads, the system remains
nonetheless a principally strategic one and the number of warheads with a yield which
could be considered sub-strategic is believed to be very low. It is this lack of a real
tactical element to the British nuclear deterrent which makes Nuclear
Sharing so important to British security. The British reliance on NATO Nuclear Sharing arrangements is evident when one considers the decision
making policy makers and those with their fingers on the button would be faced with in the event of a potential nuclear exchange. Owing to the assurance
of mutual destruction and thus the total irrationality of a strategic retaliatory strike
against a nuclear armed aggressor which possesses a second-strike capability, any
hypothetical use or threat to use nuclear weapons first by NATO to respond to or deter a
non-nuclear attack would plausibly be limited to a tactical strike. This means that the
retention of tactical nuclear weapons, and therefore by default NATO
Nuclear Sharing, is key to the maintenance of credibility to NATO nuclear
deterrence and in turn to British nuclear security. This has been true since the widespread withdrawal of NATO (specifically British) artillery and land based
tactical nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War, with Nuclear Sharing arrangements maintaining the only NATO tactical nuclear presence in Europe. Essentially,
Nuclear Sharing exists and will continue to be necessary so long as the Alliance retains
the right to First Use and a de facto posture of Flexible Response. But even if the Alliance and its nuclear
members like Britain were to adopt a No First Use policy, Nuclear Sharing arrangements would likely continue or at the very least some other form of tactical
nuclear deterrence in Europe would be necessary to maintain European and British nuclear
security. This is because tactical weapons are logically not only necessary to ensure that
ambiguous threats of First Use are a credible deterrent to conventional invasion, but are
also required to maintain a credible deterrent to nuclear attack. Strategic weapons
alone cannot conceivably be a credible deterrent to a nuclear attack. If the
Alliance unilaterally disarmed itself of all tactical weapons, it would possess less means to
credibly respond to and thus deter in the first place a tactical nuclear
attack, as it is not credible that the Alliance or any actor would respond to a tactical
strike with a weapon of strategic yield, thus escalating a conflict. As long as the
Russian Federation possesses tactical nuclear weapons, it is only logical to assume that
NATO should retain its own tactical weapons, in this case in the form of Nuclear Sharing, lest the Alliance be
perceived to be self-deterred by the prospect of initiating a full scale strategic nuclear
exchange. Essentially, a programme of tactical weapons in the form of Nuclear Sharing or similar can (and likely would) remain even if NATO or its individual
members embraced NFU, but First Use ambiguity cannot exist credibly without tactical weapons. David S. Yost has addressed and convincingly criticised arguments that
extended nuclear deterrence could potentially be provided by the UK and France without the need for US tactical weapons provided by Nuclear Sharing, highlighting the fact
that British and French nuclear arms are not sufficient in size to provide the psychological comfort necessary to placate the concerns of non-nuclear allies. But in terms of real
nuclear security, what is particularly important to bear in mind here is the composition of, and the role played by, the nuclear weapons programmes of these two European
nuclear powers. Although it is possible that British Trident missiles are capable of carrying small-yield warheads, the system remains nonetheless a principally strategic one.
This is significant when considering the aforementioned point on the necessity of arms of both a tactical and strategic yield in providing credibility to not only the ambiguity of
nuclear First Use deterrence but to nuclear deterrence in general. In regards to France, Paris’ continued operation of an independent deterrent outside NATO auspices and its
refusal to fully partake in the decision making processes of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group would no doubt not only cause non-nuclear allies to question France’s
commitment to Alliance wide extended deterrence should it assume such a responsibility, but would also hamper the credibility of the wider Alliance’s deterrent. Of course
hypothetically if NATO embraced a policy of No First Use and Russia agreed to totally disarm itself of tactical nuclear weapons (of which it possesses a far higher number than
NATO) in a reductions agreement then the need for Nuclear Sharing to underpin the credibility of general nuclear deterrence would abate and the withdrawal of US weapons
the central role Nuclear Sharing plays in providing credibility and

from Europe would be possible. But
utility to nuclear First Use ambiguity means that for as long as the Alliance (or at the very least certain
members within it) believes that nuclear weapons hold deterrent value to non-nuclear attack, and
as long as Moscow sustains its retention of vast tactical nuclear weapons stocks, such an event is
unlikely and Nuclear Sharing will continue to play a central role in Europe’s and
indeed Britain’s nuclear security.

1ac – Solvency
Plan: the United States federal government should determine that
environmentally-displaced persons constitute ‘refugees’ as defined by the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.
Enacting legislation that affords climate migrants the same rights as other
refugee categories solves the aff but doesn’t result in uncontrollable
immigration flows
DeGenaro 15 Carey DeGenaro is the Attorney Advisor at Executive Office for Immigration Review (Carey, “LOOKING
INWARD: DOMESTIC POLICY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES AND BEYOND,” University of
Colorado Law Review, Vol. 86, HeinOnline) // SR
The United States should enact domestic legislation that creates a legal
status unique to climate migrants for several reasons. In order to understand why this country must
establish legal protection for climate migrants, it is helpful to first examine who climate migrants are and the United States' role in
their displacement. Section A identifies who these climate migrants are and ultimately concludes that, based on current migration
trends and future predictions, the United States will soon face an unprecedented influx of people
displaced by climate change. 2 1 Section B posits that the United States is obligated to
address this large population. It explains that the United States' actions directly
contribute to climate change. This contribution, combined with the potential influx of climate migrants, requires the
United States to enact legislation that protects climate migrants. A. Facing the Realities of Climate Change-Induced Migration The
practical implications of climate-induced migration justify enacting legislation to
address the climate migrant dilemma. A massive influx of climate migrants into the
United States is perhaps the most obvious consequence. Examining current
international migration flows substantiates this probability, since these flows are the
best indicia of future climate change-related migration. 22 Whether or not the United
States is prepared, it will experience increased immigration rates as climate change
displaces people around the globe. This should encourage the government to consider
how to address these new populations. This section demonstrates the potential consequences of ignoring climate
migrants, who will soon arrive in large numbers. Subsection 1 discusses various estimates of current and future climate change-
induced migration rates. Subsection 2 then examines which populations commonly migrate to the United States and considers what
this might mean for the country as climate conditions in those regions worsen. Ultimately, the predictions of the enormous number
of climate migrants that may arrive in the United States should alarm legislators; the undocumented population will swell and the
country will have a large population of immigrants that it is unprepared to accommodate or integrate into Amercian society. 1. The
Numbers at a Glance The estimates of how many people have already been displaced by climate change-and how many will be
displaced in the near future-vary. Some individuals and populations will strongly prefer to relocate within the borders of their home
countries. 23 Others will be unable to afford the costs of moving internationally. 24 Thus, numerical estimates of climate migrants in
the coming years are highly uncertain. In
making these estimates, scholars must take into account
the adaptive capacities of affected nations, 25 the possibility that climate change may
occur more rapidly or slowly than predicted,26 and the fact that so far there is no settled
definition for climate migrants. 27 In 2007, researchers Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas reviewed various estimates,
including one prediction that sea-level rise and drought will create 212 million climate migrants by 2050.28 Some scholars suggest
that this estimate is excessively high. 29 To
sum up the wide range of estimates, the International
Organization for Migration reports that the numbers range from 25 million to 1
billion by 2050.30 Even without an exact figure, the impacts of climate change on
human migration are no longer merely theoretical. Indeed, in recent years the effects of
climate change have forced more and more people to permanently relocate from their
homes with no real hope of return. 31 The island nation of Tuvalu, for example, has already lost large portions of its
coastline and six of its atolls due to sea-level rise. 32 Tuvalu has initiated a series of high profile negotiations with New Zealand and
Australia to create a resettlement regime for its population in the event of complete inundation. 33 Other
nations have
not approached the prospect of losing their land so directly. In those nations, lack of
clean water, drought, political turmoil, and loss of livelihood (for example, through
loss or substantial degradation of arable land) have caused those who can afford it to leave their homes in search of a more stable
livelihood. 34 Therefore, it is clear that climate change is already forcing people out
of their homes, and nations are already considering how to address climate change-
related, large-scale relocation. To extend the appropriate protections while maintaining
political feasibility, legal designation of climate migrants in the United States must have
certain key elements. 277 Any domestic legislation that seeks to address climate migrants
should establish a hybrid legal status that is based on asylum, conditional lawful status
as a stateless person, and TPS. This Comment proposes the following guidelines for legislation to address climate migrants:
Congress's first step should be to explicitly define "climate migrant," rather than to
require climate migrants to be able to demonstrate that they are no longer considered a
national of any state. Next, it should eliminate the discretionary nature of the
applicable legal status. While this leaves room for substantial political criticism,
setting stringent requirements on who qualifies for this relief may help mitigate
concerns of excessive immigration rates. Finally, legislation addressing climate
migrants must be available to individuals that reside outside the United
States. This Part concludes by offering an alternative proposal that contains these elements. 1. Narrowly Tailored Definition
Policymakers in the United States can draw a definition for climate migrants from the
current discourse in international law. Since passing legislation to address climate migrants in the United States will be
politically challenging, any definition for climate migrants should be narrow in scope to
respond to concerns that creating legal status for this population would invite a flood of
immigration. In considering issues of political feasibility, Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas propose a narrowly tailored definition of climate
migrants.278 They would define 'climate refugees' as people who have to leave their habitats,
immediately or in the near future, because of sudden or gradual alterations in their

natural environment related to at least one of three impacts of climate change: sealevel
rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity."279 This definition limits
legal relief to climate migrants fleeing only particular types of climate changeinduced
natural disasters. It also limits legal relief to those whose natural environment becomes
so degraded that they have to leave. Thus, it would not cover populations fleeing
political or economic turmoil, nor would it cover people who could remain in their own
countries but choose not to. Adopting this definition, with some adjustments for
domestic implementation, offers a sufficiently narrow basis for reform. The
definition proposed above is superior to Senator Schatz's definition for several reasons. Senator Schatz's amendment similarly limited the element of
causation in his definition of climate migrants, although his definition was slightly more restrictive. 280 His amendment would have extended relief
only to those whose states had been rendered completely uninhabitable due to sea-level rise, or other environmental causes. 281 Limiting the definition
as Senator Schatz proposed would necessarily have excluded many climate migrants, although it would have covered those most in need of some legal
status in a country that is not their own. Senator Schatz's proposal, however, would not have included those climate migrants in need of temporary
relocation. 282 If the definition were limited to only permanent climate migrants, then those who could not convince the United States government
that they were here to stay would be unreasonably excluded and might attempt to enter the country illegally. There are at least two major challenges
with adopting Biermann and Boas's definition. First, it may be difficult for individuals to prove that they meet the definition's requirements. As with
refugee status, relief may be granted or denied based solely on the whims of the official who reviews the application.283 However, many forms of
immigration relief under the INA mirror this procedure. 284 The system addresses this potential problem by creating a strict set of criteria for each
form of relief, and this approach could work for climate migrant legislation as well. The legislature could adopt Biermann and Boas's definition of
If the requirements are clear and strict,
climate migrant but define each element in detail via law or regulation.
individual officials have less discretion to act arbitrarily or out of bias.

Creating a strict set of criteria would also solve the second challenge. Some will argue that this
However, if the legislation
definition is too expansive, and therefore that it is both unclear and not politically feasible.
explicitly lists the definition's requirements, as the INA does with the requirements of
refugee status,285 this relief for climate migrants will be limited and clear. It will
address the needs of climate migrants while simultaneously addressing
political concerns. 2. Mandatory Application If a climate migrant meets her burden of proving
she satisfies the required elements, the determination of her legal status should be
mandatory rather than discretionary. As with Senator Schatz's proposed legislation, an applicant for relief as a climate
migrant would still bear the burden of proving that she meets the statutory definition. However, once she does so, the DHS
Secretary would be required to grant lawful status on that basis. The Secretary should
also be authorized to issue a blanket grant of lawful status to climate migrants who are
affected by a particular climate event. For example, if sea-level rise rendered an island
nation entirely uninhabitable, the Secretary could grant lawful status to all island
inhabitants as opposed to adjudicating each individual's application on a caseby-case
basis. Many critics will claim this protection goes too far, and that the Secretary should
have the authority to grant or deny relief at her discretion. This Comment acknowledges this political
difficulty; however, the provision would lose much of its value and force if relief for climate
migrants were discretionary. As with setting clear standards in implementing the definition of "climate migrant," making
relief mandatory would reduce the risk that individual officers could grant
or deny relief without justification. To make the mandatory nature of the
legislation more politically palatable, however, the narrowly tailored definition would
sufficiently limit the number of people that would qualify for relief. 3. Complete Refugee Rights As
discussed above, it is also necessary for any proposal to explicitly grant the climate
migrants all the legal rights of refugees, including the right to work and the right to
travel freely both within and outside of the country.28 6 None of the existing forms of relief in immigration law
extend such comprehensive rights to individuals who do not qualify as refugees under the INA. However, climate migrants and
refugees are similarly situated due to the difficulty for individuals from either group to
return to their home country. The creation of an entirely new legal classification for this
class of people would allow policymakers to tailor legislation to climate migrants' unique
circumstances and still provide the maximum amount of protection.28 7 Such a step is
necessary to integrate climate migrants into the United States. Ensuring that
domestic climate migrant legislation includes these key elements will help to prevent
both illegal entry and the creation of second-class citizens. 288 It provides a path to
integration that will maximize the benefits to both the United States and the
incoming climate migrant populations. 289 Finally, it will decrease uncertainty
for both climate migrants and government officials, ensuring a smooth transition and
minimizing political turmoil. Thus, legislation that creates legal status for climate
migrants should take the form of a new mechanism under United States immigration
law that would be a hybrid of existing protections for immigrants in dire circumstances.
Only the United States can solve –we have the space and economic
flexibility
Werz and Conley 12 Michael Werz is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress
(Michael and Laura, “Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict,” Center for American Progress,
January 2012, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/01/pdf/climate_migration.pdf) // SR
The United States is today one of the few global powers capable and willing
to act in the common interest. In absolute terms the United States has never been
more influential. Its defense spending is unequalled by the next 20 countries combined. It spends the largest sum of official
foreign-development assistance, exceeding the total spending of the next two nations, France and Germany.73 And it sustains the
world’s most robust and ubiquitous diplomatic presence, boasting almost 12,000 Foreign Service officers and over 260 diplomatic
missions. The
United States remains the world’s dominant economy, too, with the
world’s largest gross domestic product (the broadest measure of economic growth), of
more than $14 trillion—roughly three times that of China, the second largest. The United
States also attracts the largest flow of foreign direct investment, at more than $2.5 billion a year
compared to half that in France or the United Kingdom. Finally, the United States possesses the most sought-after universities,
drawing the best and brightest from around the globe.74 Yet the emergence of new and significant regional powers around the world
is altering the relative influence of the United States. This
so-called “rise of the rest” has prompted the
United States to review its current capabilities and the way it interacts with both the
developed and developing world. What’s more, the global challenges are so many and so complex that a new
division of labor is necessary, especially when it comes to long-term economic and social development that is effective and
sustainable. The Obama administration is seeking to transform U.S. global engagement to meet these new challenges in the 21st
century. In early 2010 the administration released the congressionally mandated National Security Strategy75 and the Defense
Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review.76 Together, these texts begin to outline the emerging strategic environment that the
United States faces—the growing role of emerging countries and the further diffusion of global political, economic, and military
power. The two reports are complemented by the administration’s first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review,77 as
well as by the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development, which look to add cohesion to the proliferation of government
agencies that are involved in U.S. foreign and national security policy. All four of these reviews acknowledge climate change as a
major factor in planning global development and security strategies. To meet this challenge the United States needs to provide a new
brand of integrated 21st century foreign, development, and security strategy in cooperation with partners around the world. The
Presidential Policy Directive is a first step in this direction. President Barack Obama noted in a speech to the United Nations shortly
after the directive was completed that this new policy is built on the ideas that “dignity is a human right and global development is in
our common interest.”78 While President Bush placed increased emphasis on development, President Obama’s speech marked the
first time that the importance of global development was framed as a primary interest within the larger security environment by a
U.S. president. The
climate, migration, and conflict nexus is one challenge that will create
both questions and opportunities for U.S. policymakers learning to navigate
this new environment. How they choose to address it will certainly have broader
implications for the 21st century strategic environment, and the ongoing institutional
debate in Washington will define the tools and resources available to policymakers
confronting these issues. Europe’s role in global-capacity development Europe finds itself in a
particularly challenging position. Rising migration from Africa—much of it illegal—is
now a contentious domestic policy issue across the European Union and
among nations outside the European Union, such as Norway. The European Union has responded to
this increasing migration from Africa by partnering with the African Union (an association of 54 African states to strengthen political
and socio-economic integration) to enhance safety at sea and formalize migration routes. The focus on better migratory coordination
with the African Union is intended to reduce illegal immigration while creating a strong system of integration and remittances. Yet
these two very unequal regional organizations have not made any serious efforts to
tackle climate change, migration, and conflict challenges on a region-to-region level. At
the bilateral level, however, there is more concrete action. For some time, the European
Union has delegated the management of refugee issues to countries such as Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. This policy, however, will not hold in the long run
and has already forced difficult compromises with regard to human-rights issues. Take
Spain: Although “irregular” African migrants (those who do not enter the country through legal channels) began arriving in Spain in
1994, public perception and policy debates changed after a larger number of boat refugees arrived in 2007. The Spanish government
signed an agreement with a number of nations to deter illegal migration, sent officials of its Interior Ministry to African countries,
and began establishing Spanish Consulates in sub-Saharan Africa at the same time. Currently, liaison Officers of the Spanish
Guardia Civil are cooperating with local police to discourage migrants from leaving via Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Mauretania, or Cape
Verdes. More progressive policies are now being tried as well. Spain grants temporary working permits in small numbers (3,000 per
year in the case of Senegal) for countries that accept repatriation of illegal immigrants in turn. Another pilot project that began in
2007 included the establishment of Spanish-run vocational schools in African countries so that younger potential migrants would
stay home.79 Belgium, Italy, and Spain—under the auspices of the European Union—also partner with the Public Employment
Services of Morocco, Tunisia, Benin, Cameroon, Mali, and Senegal to offer vocational training which matches the labor needs of the
region’s economies and to provide migrants with alternative destinations.80 But
these steps alone will not resolve
the migratory pressures on Europe. Javier Solana, the European Union’s former High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, points out that climate
change threatens the entire multilateral system of the international
community. He went further to say, “the effects of climate change would promote a policy of
resentments between all those who are responsible for climate change and those who
are its worst victims.”81 This was a fairly transparent warning that climate migration might convert the Mediterranean
into a flashpoint between Europe and Africa. Despite the difficulties of aligning the diverse interests of its member states into a
broader regional approach, the European Union has taken steps toward addressing the nexus of climate, migration, and security in
the Mediterranean basin affecting its planning and implementation of development assistance to northwest Africa. One of the
measures is the European Investment Bank’s regional focus on the Mediterranean Neighborhood, meant to integrate EIB services to
the region. A prime example is the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership, or FEMIP, which allocates
financing and technical help to projects designed to promote sustainable economic growth in the nations of the basin. This allocation
of financing has been accompanied by a promising change in rhetoric and a process of institutional reform within the European
Union, with the establishment of bodies integrating environmental and migration concerns with the process of development
assistance and financing. The EIB’s 2009 establishment of the Marseille Center for Mediterranean Integration, or MCMI, offers an
example of these nascent changes. At the opening, Christian Masset, general director of Globalization, Development and
Partnerships for the French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs outlined the MCMI’s mission with an eye towards this
process: In the Mediterranean Basin, one of the most populated and arid regions, we need to look together for the means to preserve
the common space and public goods we are sharing in order to ensure sustainability for the population of the region. This is indeed
what the MCMI aims at, and the meaning we seek to convey concerning ‘the Mediterranean integration.’82 The
realization
of the region’s interdependence—and its shared environmental concerns—is an
important step which, accompanied by projects to promote sustainable development and increase employment in migrants’
countries of origin, represents the opening attempt to tackle the problems posed by the nexus of climate, migration, and security.
But there is undoubtedly a long way to go in integrating diverse institutional bodies,
fully appreciating the interplay of climate change with migration and security issues,
interfacing with other regional institutions, and expanding scope to other regions.
Affirmative
Solvency & Plans
Ext. Climate Refugees Coming Now
Rising sea-level, desertification, and water scarcity is displacing millions
around the world and will displace 17% of the global population by 2050
Mastor et al. 18- Roxana A. Mastor is a Senior Fellow on International Climate and Energy Law and
Mackenzie L. Landa and Emily Duff are former Research Associates with the Institute for Energy and the
Environment (IEE) at Vermont Law School. Currently Roxana A.Mastor works as a Programme Manager
for Climate Strategies in London, while Mackenzie L. Landa is a United States Congressional Aide, and
Emily Duff is a State Policy Associate at Ceres. Michael H. Dworkin is a professor at Vermont Law School,
the Founder and former Director of the IEE, and former Chairman of the Vermont Public Service Board.
The IEE is a national and world energy policy resource with an advanced energy law and policy
curriculum focused on the energy policy of the future, “ENERGY JUSTICE AND CLIMATE-REFUGEES”,
THE ENERGY BAR ASSOCIATION, May 2nd 2018, 144-147, http://www.eba-
net.org/assets/1/6/Duff_Dworkin_Landa__Mastor_FINAL_(2).pdf, // Suraj P
The 2008 United Nations Human Development Report recognized climate change as the “defining human development issue of our
generation” and the IPCC Working Group II, in its fifth assessment report in 2014, explicitly recognized that “[c]limate change over
the 21st century is projected to increase displacement of people.”16
Current data is already giving clear
indications of this future.17 The climate is projected to continue to warm.18 Although
the international community is attempting to reduce emissions and limit the level of
global warming, “[a] certain amount of continued warming of the planet is projected to
occur . . . even if all emissions from human activities suddenly stopped.”19 As the planet
continues to warm, “new frameworks of law and ethics will be needed to govern our relationship to the natural world and to each
other.”20 Human displacement induced by climate change can be seen as a
response to two effects: climate processes and climate events. “Climate processes” take
the form of “slow-onset” events “such as sea-level rise, desertification, and growing
water scarcity.”21 “Climate events,” in contrast, are effects of climate change that are sudden, abrupt, natural disasters
such as storms, floods, forest fires, and droughts.22 Although some natural disasters occur regardless of climate change, many
natural disasters such as tropical cyclones, floods, heat waves, droughts, and severe storms are exacerbated by climate change and
will increase in frequency and severity as the climate warms.23 This
distinction is real, but should not be
perceived as contradicting the permanent character of climate change and the
permanent status of climate-refugees. This is because although some climate-refugees
may be sent back to their home country by the host nation, once the imminent threat
has passed, there will continue to be the possibility that they will once again be forced to
flee their home country.24 Thus, under either category, “climate change is a permanent phenomenon.”25 Although the
world is pushing towards “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and
pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels,” greenhouse gas emissions can remain in the
atmosphere from a few years to thousands of years, contributing to the long-lasting effects.26 Nevertheless,
the
transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy will not happen overnight, and even if
we speed up the process, many nations, such as the small island developing states, will
be under water irrespective of the progress. It can, however, be difficult to pinpoint the direct cause for a
refugee-triggering event because of the multi-causal factors that create a situation in which people are forced to leave their home
countries. Scholars generally agree that climate change plays a role in human displacement, but the extent of its contribution is less
certain.27 In some cases, it
is clear that climate change is the cause of displacement. These are
cases in which there is a direct link from the triggering event to the human
displacement, such as flooding due to sea level rise.28 In other situations, the
underlying triggering event is less clear. For example, resource scarcity due to climate
change may be the root cause of violent conflict in already politically unstable nations
that can lead to displacement.29 Furthermore, climate change can “act as a threat multiplier by exacerbating resource
scarcity and existing vulnerabilities (i.e., scarce financial resources, weak governments, and ineffective legal systems).”30
Indeed, already unstable political regimes can find it difficult “to adapt to the effects of
climate change and to resolve conflicts without violence.”31 This is particularly true in
situations where a nation’s government already struggles with political instability or has
limited resources to handle the effects of climate change.32 For example, in Syria and Darfur, droughts,
expansion of dry, arid areas due to climate change, and disputes over water resources coupled with preexisting vulnerabilities led to
mass migration, which then morphed into widespread and long-lasting civil wars.33 It is
vital to note that many
persons displaced because of climate change will have no home to return to
and therefore will not be repatriated. Rising sea levels due to climate change are
already causing populations in nations such as Vanuatu and Fiji to migrate inland or, in
some cases, to evacuate their native country.34 As sea levels rise and more land becomes
flooded, internal migration will become a less viable option and affected residents will
be forced to flee across borders with no hope of returning to their home country.35 This
differs from the traditional assumption that refugee status is temporary (i.e., most refugees will return to their original homes). This
distinction from traditional refugee status is fundamental, shaping everything from initial decisions about how much insulation to
put in housing to operational matters such as vocational training and core concepts about personal and cultural identity. The
climate-refugee phenomenon will be a long-term issue for individuals and a permanent one for many cultures. The
magnitude of the problem speaks for itself: the number of climate-refugees is predicted
to be between hundreds of millions to billions.36 The difficulty in attaining an exact
prediction of the number of climate-refugees is due to the fact that in most cases climate
change is perceived as a “threat multiplier,” believed to be one of many factors and not
the one having the capacity to “inevitably result” in displacement.37 However, reality is already
trumping this perception. This is most obvious in the ‘sinking’ of small island developing states where climate change will inevitably
create climate-refugees, leaving many nationals without a state and forcing them to relocate.38 These small island developing states,
such as Kiribati and Fiji, are “the canary in the coal mine — that is, they are an early indicator of what other states can expect from
the impacts of climate change.”39 But
it is not small islands alone that face this threat; major
populations are already at risk in large low-lying areas such as Bangladesh. In
Bangladesh, a nation in which half the population lives less than 16.5 feet above sea
level, rising sea levels have already left 500,000 people homeless and
scientists predict the country will lose 17% of its land by 2050 to flooding.40
This land loss could cause up to 20 million people from Bangladesh to become climate-
refugees.41 Also, even where climate change is labeled as a secondary factor in
comparison to persecution and conflicts, note that most such conflicts are concentrated
in ‘climate change hotspots’ around the world, and the fact that already-vulnerable
people are living in disaster-prone areas increases the risk of displacement.42 Thus, whether
directly or indirectly, totally or incrementally, the reality is that climate change is creating climate-refugees at an unprecedented
scale with little or no chance of returning to their homes of origin.43
Climate change magnifies precarious economic positions and displaces

millions.
Todd Miller 12-7-2017 -- Todd Miller is an author and journalist who has written on border and immigration issues for The
New York Times, Al Jazeera America, and the NACLA Report on the Americas. ["The United States Is Polluting the World and
Locking Refugees Out", Accessible Online at: https://www.thenation.com/article/the-united-states-is-polluting-the-world-and-
locking-refugees-out/] @ AG
For Central America, this was not an anomaly. Not only had the region been experiencing increasing
mid-summer droughts, but also, as the best climate-forecasting models predict, a “much
greater occurrence of very dry seasons” lies in its future. Central America is, in fact, “ground
zero” for climate change in the Americas, as University of Arizona hydrology and atmospheric sciences professor
Chris Castro told me. And on that isthmus, the scrambling of the seasons, an
increasingly deadly combination of
drenching hurricanes and parching droughts, will hit people already living in the most
precarious economic and political situations. Across Honduras, for example, more than 76
percent of the population lives in conditions of acute poverty. The coming climate
breakdowns will only worsen that or will, as Castro put it, be part of a global situation in which “the wet gets wetter,
the dry gets drier, the rich get richer, the poor get poorer. Everything gets more extreme.” Talking with those
farmers in the Tenosique train yard felt, in a way, like a scene from a sequel to the movie The Road in which a father and son walk
across a post-apocalyptic North America devastated by an unknown cataclysm. In reality, though, I was just in a typical border zone
of the Anthropocene, the proposed new geologic era characterized by human activity as the dominant force on the climate and
environment. And these young, unarmed farmers with failing harvests are now facing the only welcome this planet presently has to
offer for such victims of climate change: expanding border regimes of surveillance, razor-wire walls, guns, and incarceration centers.
As they keep heading north, they will have to be on guard against ever more army and police patrols, while enduring hunger and
thirst as well as painful separations from their families. They will have to evade endless roadside checkpoints, which Fray Tomás
Tómas González Castillo, director of a nearby shelter for migrants in Tenosique, told me were almost “impossible” to avoid, at a time
when, he noted, “organized crime” controls the trains. Such a predicament is hardly unique to the Mexico-Guatemalan border region
or even the US-Mexican version of the same. Think of the maritime divide between North Africa and the European Union or the
Jordanian border where patrols now reportedly shoot at “anything that moves” coming from Syria—or so a Jordanian official who
prefers to remain anonymous told me. And Syria was just one of the places where the ever-increasing impacts of climate change,
migration, and tightly enforced border zones intersected. Now homeland-securityregimes are increasingly
unleashing their wrath on the world’s growing numbers of displaced people, sharpening
the divide between the secure and the dispossessed. Whether in Mexico or on the Mediterranean Sea, as
ever more human beings find themselves uprooted from their homes and desperate,
such dynamics will only intensify in the decades to come. In the process, the geopolitics and
potentially the very geography of the globe will be reshaped. It’s not just Donald Trump.
Everywhere on Planet Earth, we seem to be entering the era of the wall. THE DISPLACED
According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the “impact and threat of climate-related
hazards” displaced an average of 21.5 million people annually between 2008 and 2015.
The growing impact of the Anthropocene—of intensifying droughts, rising seas, and mega-
storms—is already adding to a host of other factors, including poverty, war, and
persecution, that in these years have unsettled record numbers of people. While many of the
climate-displaced stay close to home, hoping to salvage both their lives and livelihoods, ever more are crossing international borders
in what many are now calling a “refugee crisis.” “Catastrophic convergence” is the term sociologist Christian Parenti uses to describe
this 21st-century turmoil, since manyof these factors combine to displace staggering numbers of
people. As Camila Minerva of Oxfam puts it, “The poorest and the most marginalized are five times
more likely to be displaced and to remain so for a longer time than people in higher
income countries and it is increasing with climate change.” Though the numbers are often debated, the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees suggests that climate breakdowns will displace 250 million
people by 2050. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre suggests that those numbers could actually
range from 150 million to a staggering 350 million by that year. In reporting on how climate change
is already affecting Mexico City, Michael Kimmelman, the architecture critic of The New York Times, cited a report suggesting that
the number may be far higher than that, possibly reaching 700 million—and that, by 2050,
10 percent percent of all Mexicans between 15 and 65 might be heading north, thanks to rising temperatures, droughts, and floods.
Demographic trends are undermining ecosystem health, causing surging

levels of forced migration
Wittbold et. al 18 (Brian, holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and an LL.M. in International Law of the
Sea, has joined UN Environment as Regional Humanitarian Affairs Officer coordinating the Disasters and Conflicts sub-programme
for Western Asia from the ROWA regional office, Human mobility in the Anthropocene from: Routledge Handbook of
Environmental Displacement and Migration, pg. 415-416 //waters)
We live in an era of unprecedented human mobility: movement of ideas, values, money and,
increasingly, of people. Increased human mobility and migration in the twenty-first century is spurred by, and also drives, economic
growth and interdependency at the national, regional and global levels. 250 million people live and work outside the country of their
birth, while 750 million people migrate within their own countries (World Bank, 2015).
When properly managed, migration has immense potential as a driver of human development and progress, spreading ideas and
connecting the world. However, when migration is unmanaged and people are forced from their
homes as result of negligence, crisis or compulsion, the issue can become politically
divisive and societies forego the tremendous benefits that migration can otherwise offer. Indeed,
protracted violent conflicts, climatic pressures and meteorological disasters have contributed to an upsurge
in displacement and forced migration in recent years, adding urgency and complexity to the current global
discussion on migration and displacement.
By mid-2017, an unprecedented 65.6 million people around the world had been forced
from their homes, including nearly 21.3 million refugees (UNHCR, 2017). Fleeing from war, persecution and unmitigated
destitution in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and elsewhere, affected
populations have continued to surge as conflict and violence endure and new
crises emerge. Nearly 7 million new cases of internal displacement due to conflict were
recorded 2016. Analysis of civil wars over the past 70 years indicate that at least 40 per cent are
linked to the contested control or use of natural resources such as land, water, miner- als or oil (UNEP,
2009).The effects are not limited to countries directly involved in conflicts, but reverberate across regions with
destabilizing consequences. Globally, the burden of hosting refugees is disproportionately
shared, with a mere six countries hosting over one-third of the world’s total refugee population.1
As the magnitude of conflict-induced displacement continued togrow at an unprecedented rate between 2011 and 2015,
annual
displacement attributable to natural disasters now accounts for a far greater proportion
of the global caseload of people forced to leave their homes. Research shows that since 2008,
disasters have displaced an average of 26.4 million people each year – the equivalent to one person per
second (IFRC, 2016). In 2016 alone, some 24.2 million people were displaced by disasters brought on by sudden-onset natural
hazards in 118 countries and territories (IDMC, 2017: 31). While it is increasingly difficult to determine the immediate causes of
displacement and disentangle the various social, political, environmental and economic drivers of conflicts and disasters, these
staggering statistics attest to the truly global scale of a challenge faced by developing and developed
countries alike.
Indeed, recent demographic trends across the globe put humanity on a crash course
with disasters that will undoubtedly be accompanied by increased displacement.
Rapid population growth and our activities have upset ecological balances and pushed
planetary boundaries so profoundly that scientists now suggest that we have entered “the
Anthropocene”, a new geological epoch that recognizes humans as the dominant in uence on the climate and environment.
With the human population predicted to peak at more than 9 billion by the middle of this century, this new epoch is
characterized by a state of ecological disequilibrium that is likely to bear witness to the largest mass
extinction of biodiversity since the dinosaurs (WWF, 2016).
Human-caused environmental change and environmental degradation – desertification, deforestation, land

degradation, ocean acidi cation, climate change and water scarcity – are fundamentally redrawing the map of
our world.The health of terrestrial and marine ecosystems and the continued availability of the critical services
they provide affect where people are able to find sustenance and pursue livelihoods to sustain themselves,
and ultimately where they are able to live (UNEP 2017).Their degradation may result in the collapse of fragile and
complex life support systems, undermining self-suf ciency and resilience. Indeed, it is increasingly recognized by policy makers that
environmental degradation and mismanagement can be root causes of populations’
deprivation, destitution and vulnerability, ultimately contributing to the desperation
that fuels forced migration.
The interlacing trends of climate change, population growth, rising consumption and environmental degradation may lead to
greater numbers of people displaced in the future. The most commonly cited gure is that there
could be as many as
200 million people displaced for environmental reasons by 2050.2 That would mean that, in a world
of 9 billion people, 1 in 45 would have been forced from home for environmental reasons.
Clearly, addressing such displacement could prove to be a defining environmental management challenge of the twenty-first
century. Having created the Anthropocene, humanity
must now acknowledge the imperative of
responsible environmental stewardship, ensuring that we strive towards a safe planet on which we can all live.
Relevance of migration and displacement to the UN Environment
The links between the environment and displacement are multi-directional and complex, but make a compelling case for
engagement from the United Nations Environment Programme (henceforth UN Environment). Not only do environmental factors
have the potential to contribute to migration and displacement, but they also emerge as consequences of population movement.As
such, the environmental dimensions of migration and displacement may manifest themselves differently across ecosystems and
countries of origin, transit and destination.
UN Environment is the leading global environmental authority that sets the global environmental agenda, promotes the coherent
implementation of the environmental dimension of sustainable development within the United Nations system and serves as an
authoritative advocate for the global environment. UN Environment’s mission is “to provide leadership and encourage partnership
in caring for the Environment by inspiring, informing, and enabling nations and peoples to improve their quality of life without
compromising that of future generations.”3
The number of climate refugees is increasing as escalating climate change

poses more severe risks
Elsheikh and Ayazi, '17 – * director of the Global Justice Program at the Haas Institute AND **graduate research
assistant at the Haas Institute (Elsadig and Hossein, "Moving Targets: An Analysis of Global Forced Migration ," Global Justice
Program at the Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at the UC Berkeley, 9-2017,
http://haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/haasinstitute_moving_targets_globalmigrationreport_publish_web.pdf)//SB
Along with the myriad socioeconomic and political dynamics, global

climate change has contributed to
forced migration by way of abrupt environmental disasters as well as long-term,
slowly occurring environmental changes. The effects of climate change are most predominately
affecting communities in the Global South and are triggering new conflicts. We use the term “climate crisis” to
describe both environmental change and the hardship faced by certain communities because of such change. We identify climate
crisis as the third dynamic of forced migration, operating alongside and in conjunction with neoliberalization and securitization.
Estimates of the extent of climate-induced migration vary significantly, but the numbers
are staggering by
any measure. As of June 2011, according to the UNHCR, there were an estimated 42.3 million
people displaced by sudden-onset disasters caused by natural events in 2010.75 Furthermore,
“since 2008 an average of 26.4 million people a year have been displaced from their
home by disasters brought by natural hazards. This is equivalent to one person being
displaced every second.”76
Researchers predict a larger increase in climate refugees not only due to more
frequent and intense weather events but also to rising sea levels, which are rising at an
annual rate of 0.13 inches (3.2 millimeters) a year, roughly twice the average speed of the past 80 years.78 Most impacted are several
small island and coastal countries, which must grapple with the possibility of complete submersion. Bangladesh
is
projected to lose 17 percent of its land by 2050, causing about 20 million people to seek
refuge elsewhere, and the Maldives could lose all of its 1,200 islands.79 People worldwide
who depend on the fishery industry are witnessing a decline in revenue as increasing
fresh water from melted polar caps drives saltwater fish away and harms
ocean ecosystems. If current rates of ocean water temperature continue to rise, for example, the ocean is projected to
be too warm for coral reefs to survive by 2050.80
Climate change also contributes to desertification, wherein a relatively dry land region becomes
increasingly arid and bodies of water, vegetation, and wildlife can no longer thrive.81 Desertification is
threatening the livelihoods of many communities by completely transforming the
ecosystem and diminishing, if not eliminating, the productivity of land.
200M more climate refugees by 2050

Micinski and Weiss, '17 – *Research and Editorial Associate at the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies
and Ph.D. candidate in political science at the Graduate Center, City University of New York AND ** Presidential Professor of
Political Science at The Graduate Center and Director Emeritus of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, The City
University of New York. (Nicholas R. and Thomas G., "Global Migration Governance: Beyond Coordination and Crises," The Global
Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence 2017, G. Ziccardi Capaldo ed., Oxford University Press, 2017,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3180639)//SB
The first factor that supports cooperation is the dramatically increased number of
vulnerable individuals: refugees and asylum seekers from conflicts and humanitarian disasters, migrant laborers, victims of human
trafficking, and climate refugees. In 2017, UNHCR reported that 65.6 million people were displaced, including 22.5
million refugees, 2.8 million asylum seekers, and 40.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).37 The total number of displaced
people grew from 33.9 million in 1997—nearly doubling in two decades.38 This does not include the estimated 150.3 million39
migrant workers or 9.1 million trafficked people.40 In addition, some
predict that climate change might
create an additional 200 million displaced by 2050.41 These increases have
highlighted some of the gaps in international protection and put pressure on
international institutions to take more effective actions.
Now key – Climate crisis could displace tens of millions of refugees, risks
civil war outbreaks
Taylor 17 – 11/2/2017, Matthew Taylor, Environmental Correspondent, Climate change ‘will create world’s biggest refugee
crisis,’ https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/02/climate-change-will-create-worlds-biggest-refugee-crisis//TK
Experts warn refugees could number tens of millions in the next decade, and call for a new legal
framework to protect the most vulnerable Tens of millions of people will be forced from their homes
by climate change in the next decade, creating the biggest refugee crisis the world has
ever seen, according to a new report. Senior US military and security experts have told the Environmental Justice Foundation
(EJF) study that the number of climate refugees will dwarf those that have fled the Syrian conflict, bringing huge challenges to
Europe. “If Europe thinks they have a problem with migration today … wait 20 years,” said retired US military corps brigadier
general Stephen Cheney. “See what happens when climate change drives people out of Africa – the Sahel [sub-Saharan area]
especially – and we’re talking now not just one or two million, but 10 or 20 [million]. They are not going to south Africa, they are
going across the Mediterranean.” The study published on Thursday calls on governments to agree a new legal framework to protect
climate refugees and, ahead of next week’s climate summit in Germany, urges leaders to do more to implement the targets set out in
the Paris climate agreement. Sir David King, the former chief scientific adviser to the UK government, told the EJF: “What
we
are talking about here is an existential threat to our civilisation in the longer term. In the
short term, it carries all sorts of risks as well and it requires a human response on a scale
that has never been achieved before.” The report argues that climate change played a part in the
build up to the Syrian war, with successive droughts causing 1.5 million people to
migrate to the country’s cities between 2006 and 2011. Many of these people then had no reliable
access to food, water or jobs. “Climate change is the the unpredictable ingredient that,
when added to existing social, economic and political tensions, has the potential to
ignite violence and conflict with disastrous consequences,” said EJF executive director, Steve Trent. “In
our rapidly changing world climate change – and its potential to trigger both violent conflict and mass
migration – needs to be considered as an urgent priority for policymakers and business
leaders alike.” Although the report highlights to growing impact of climate change on people in the Middle East and Africa, it
says changing weather patterns – like the hurricanes that devastated parts of the US this
year – prove richer nations are not immune from climate change. But Trent said that although
climate change undoubtedly posed an “existential threat to our world” it was not to late to take decisive action. “By taking strong
ambitious steps now to phase out greenhouse gas emissions and building an international legal mechanism to protect climate
refugees we will protect the poorest and most vulnerable in our global society, build resilience, reap massive economic benefits and
build a safe and secure future for our planet. Climate change will not wait. Neither can we. For climate
refugees, tomorrow is too late.”
1ac – Plan – Expand the Definition
Plan: the United States federal government should determine that climate
migrants constitute ‘refugees’ as defined by the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1990.
Ext. S – Expand the Definition
Amending the definitions of persecution and refugee grant climate
migrants legal protections.
Breanne Compton 2012 -- J.D. at the University of Colorado Law School. ["The Rising Tide of Environmental Migrants: Our
National Responsibilities", Accessible Online at: https://www.colorado.edu/law/sites/default/files/Compton%2025-2.pdf] @ AG
For the abovementioned reasons, environmental migration is a growing concern, especially with
the advent of climate change. The terms environmental refugee and climate refugee are
evolving terms that bring to light the reality that environmental factors are increasingly
forcing people to emigrate. Environmental refugees have few options when seeking refuge under the constraints of
current international and national refugee law. To cure this growing human rights dilemma, the
United States must recognize that environmental refugees are valid
refugees and that they are fleeing legitimate threats to their lives and livelihoods. This
Note proffers several solutions that would amend the existing infrastructure of the United States’ immigration systems to
accommodate environmental refugees.
Environmental refugees have become an unavoidable part of our globalized world. The
reasons people are migrating today, where they are migrating from, and where they are headed, is a vastly broader inquiry today
than ever before. Due
to the global scope of environmental degradation and the connectivity
of uninhabitable environments and shrinking resources, the treaty signed in 1951 no
longer offers adequate protection for the growing and diversified classes of refugees
in our international system.
One proposal to accommodate the plight of environmental refugees is to reform the
internationally accepted definition of “refugee” to include a broader and more realistic definition
of who contemporary refugees actually are. In Article I, the 1951 Convention endorses a single
definition of the term refugee, which excludes the contemporary classification of environmental
refugees.171 When broken down into segments, the 1951 Convention states that a refugee is (1) a person, (2) outside their
country of nationality, (3) who is unable or unwilling to return or to avail herself to the protections of that country, (4) because of
past persecution or a wellfounded fear of future persecution, (5) on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
group, or political opinion.172 In
order for environmental refugees to qualify under this definition,
segments four and five need to be either expanded or removed.
In addition to expanding the definition of refugee, other
elements of the refugee definition could be
expanded or eliminated. For example, law professor Scott Rempell advocates for a broader definition of
persecution.173 While this expansion argument can be made in many creative ways, the point is that the current
definition of “refugee” under United States refugee law is inadequate and
underinclusive. Importantly, the United States has the power to redefine its own
definition of refugee even if the international community is unwilling to do so.174
Two regional bodies, the Organization of African Unity and the Cartagena Declaration, have managed to expand the definition of
refugee beyond the traditional confines.175 The Organization of African Unity states that a refugee is “any person compelled to leave
his/her country owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either
part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality.” 176
The Cartagena Declaration specifies that refugees

are “[p]ersons who flee 5their countries because
their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign
aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances
which have seriously disturbed the public order.” 177 Despite this expansion, both regional
bodies failed to explicitly include environmental refugees or to mention environmental triggers as a source of flight within the
expanded definition of refugee.178
While the purpose of the Organization of African Unity and the Cartagena Declaration was to protect refugees fleeing “civil
disturbances, widespread violence, and war,” 179 these two expanded
definitions are a step in the right
direction for the plight of environmental refugees. Both definitions contain a catch-all
phrase legitimizing flight for events that “have seriously disturbed the public order.”
180 Unquestionably, the effects of climate change and natural disasters can be classified as events that disturb the public order.
Therefore, environmental refugees arguably can secure legal refugee protection under these
catch-all provisions.181 While this Note does not proffer a proposed environmental refugee definition, at a minimum,
the United States should expand its refugee definition to include a similar
catch-all provision where environmental refugees may be considered for
legal protections.
Law should be expanded to incld climate

Friedman et al 18 – Univerity of Washington Task Force Report, The Future of U.S. Migration Policy: Addressing and
Improving the Current System, Kathie Friedman, 2018, https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Task-
Force_G_2018_Friedman.pdf//TK
While there are more refugees forced to flee based on environmental and geophysical
factors than political refugees fleeing wars and conflicts, the issue of climate refugee
displacement is not treated with the same reverence. Currently, there is no international law
or U.S. legislation that provides a transparent and secure ground for protection for
communities forced to evacuate their homes as a result of natural disasters, much less as
a result of climate change. In devising mechanisms for the U.S. to offer a viable source of protection for those displaced by climate change ,
several gaps in the United States’ current system on refugee protection must be
reconsidered. Firstly, refugee status is not granted to those whose claims are interpreted
as a case of “voluntary” migration rather than “forced” migration and because
environmental change is not one of the five protected grounds under the 1951 Refugee
Convention, “those displaced across international borders as a result of natural disasters
are unlikely to be protected.” In nearly any case of climate induced flight, there is no way to separate
“voluntary” from “forced” or “involuntary” movement. Experts at the Nansen Initiative suggest that instead of drawing a sharp distinction, that
the motivation to flee certain regions due to climate change should be recognized as “a continuum with “voluntary” at one end of the spectrum, in a gradual
transition to “forced” at the other.” This gradient is a more accurate model of how “voluntary” and “forced” should be discussed in political spheres because
it is imperative for
motivations to migrate are multifaceted and nearly impossible to neatly fit inside the category of “voluntary” or “forced.” Secondly,
the U.S. to accept that cross-border movement is nearly never monocausal and that
environmental degradation also works in tandem with socioeconomic factors to
exacerbate displacement. In cases where lives are actively being threatened by the deprivation
of basic needs such as food, water, and shelter as a result of climate change – such as the
aforementioned hot, island, and dry regions – testing the habitability or possibility to stay should not determine the extension of aid. Instead, recognizing that
catalysts to migration are multidimensional is an important legal change that would offer more displaced persons safety. Lastly, compensation in the
form of financial foreign aid from the world’s largest polluters is not enough to make up for the loss
of place that climate refugees experience. While it is important that we provide foreign aid to nations suffering from natural disasters and resource scarcity, the
U.S. must consider resettling those who are forced by safety concerns and threats caused
by climate change. Subsidizing the cost of adaptation through compensation is helpful
but does not prevent the suffering and loss of life that natural disasters frequently cause.
The countries that are most liable for the destruction of climate stability are seldom the countries that are paying for it in damage to their safety and livelihoods. Thus,
it is “central to the protection of people displaced by natural disasters” that the U.S. implements a systematic process, a “rights-based” disaster management
. Although most of the
framework that treat those “affected or displaced by natural disasters as rights-holders, not as beneficiaries of disaster relief
displacement caused by climate change will be temporary and within national borders,
programs such as the Nansen Initiative demonstrate the clear necessity for addressing
long term or permanent cross-border flight due to habitat destruction. The United States
should seek to work with the Nansen Initiative’s signatories to foster international solidarity and
cooperation in solving the displacement crisis that human-induced climate change
creates. Based on the model of the Nansen Initiative, the United States’ administration should also
support legislation that creates standards for the treatment of forced
migrants regarding their admission, stay, and status as well as a procedure
of actions that should be taken in the aftermath of a climate disaster. Because the
magnitude of devastation and displacement that climate change is projected to engender, we must do far more to ensure that early
recovery measures are funded and implemented as quickly as possible in the face of
disasters where the community can quickly return.
Should expand legal rights to climate refugees

DeGenaro 15 (Carey, J.D. Candidate at the University of Colorado, Looking Inward: Domestic Policy for Climate Change
Refugees in the United States and Beyond, http://lawreview.colorado.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/11.-86.3-
DeGenaro_Final.pdf//waters)
As discussed above, it is also necessary for any proposal to explicitly grant the
climate migrants all the legal rights of refugees, including the right to work and the right to travel
freely both within and outside of the country.286 None of the existing forms of relief in immigration law
extend such comprehensive rights to individuals who do not qualify as refugees under
the INA. However, climate migrants and refugees are similarly situated due to the difficulty for
individuals from either group to return to their home country. The creation of an entirely new legal
classification for this class of people would allow policymakers to tailor
legislation to climate migrants’ unique circumstances and still provide the
maximum amount of protection.287 Such a step is necessary to integrate climate
migrants into the United States. Ensuring that domestic climate migrant legislation includes these key elements will
help to prevent both illegal entry and the creation of second-class citizens.288 It provides a path to integration that will maximize
the benefits to both the United States and the incoming climate migrant populations.289 Finally, it
will decrease
uncertainty for both climate migrants and government officials, ensuring a smooth
transition and minimizing political turmoil. Thus, legislation that creates legal
status for climate migrants should take the form of a new mechanism under United
States immigration law that would be a hybrid of existing protections for immigrants in dire circumstances.
1ac – Plan – New Category
Plan: The United States federal government should create a new visa
category for climate migrants with an expanding annual quota.
Creating a new visa category for climate refugees is necessary and sufficient
to solve
U.S. law needs to recognize climate change as a legitimate and separate reason to
migrate and seek refuge. Within the current Refugee Admissions Program, climate refugees would not be able to claim
refugee statue. Recognition of the effects of climate change as legitimate motivation to seek
refugee status is required prior to any policy implementation. Climate refugees should
be recognized as separate from the established reasons to seek refuge in
order to avoid confliction with current policy. 3. The United States should
establish a governmental body to ensure successful and efficient planning of climate
refugee policies. In order to develop the most effective climate refugee policy, the
establishment of a new governmental body is necessary. The issue of climate
refugees is multifaceted and would not fit within one existing body or
agency. An intersectional body would allow for the most knowledgeable individuals
to work towards planning climate refugee policy on the national and international levels
to suggest to lawmakers. 4. The United States must establish a separate climate
refugee visa program that does not have such a limited quota ceiling set in
place and has a significantly reduced time of admission. The current refugee admission program has a
multitude of issues that would make dealing with the considerable amount of projected future climate refugees. The creation
of a new refugee policy will ensure current refugee policies are not weakened. The new
visa program must allow for a significantly higher quota of annual
admission in order to properly keep up with and address the issue of
climate refugees. Reduced time for admission is also necessary to keep on this same
pace. These steps will benefit surrounding nations as well as the U.S by leading to
greater cooperation and ease at the regional level. 5. The climate refugee visa program
must have a focus on planned relocation. Planned relocation refers to the
placement of climate refugees, assistance in moving, and providing the ability
for individuals to create new lives. This will allow for the ability to prevent climate
refugees from settling in already overpopulated cities, it will prioritize jobs for refugees,
and have a set plans for the resources needed in communities receiving individuals.
Ext. S – New Visa
Creating a new visa category and an exception for asylum seekers solves the
aff.
A further option for the United States to consider is to create a new category of
environmental refugee visa or removal defense to exist within the structure of our nation’s
immigration laws.185 This new category could be crafted in many different ways. As to the visa, one option would
be to establish an environmental refugee visa for those who are fleeing slow onset
environmental changes. As with other visas, families could apply for it in advance from their
country of origin in anticipation of their pending migration. The number of available visas could be
capped at a very low number, and would thus create minimal administrative stress on our existing system.
In the removal realm, the environmental refugee defense could be crafted as an affirmative
defense or waiver. Additionally, asylum or withholding of removal within the United States’
immigration laws could be amended to include an exception to grant coverage for
environmental refugees.186 This exception could be granted upon satisfying specific
terms and conditions such as leaving one’s homeland because of a changing
environmental factor that made further habitation life threatening or impossible.187 The
other elements necessary to receive asylum or withholding could remain unchanged,188 and this avenue of relief would
essentially achieve the same purpose as the abovementioned environmental refugee visa.
Ext. Lack Legal Protections
Climate refugee flows will exponentially increase – status quo solutions will
lock them out
While a majority of research on climate refugees focuses on global policy, migration to Europe,
and refugees from African, Asian, and Island nations, there have recently been those looking at how the
United States and Americas will be impacted. Todd Miller, an immigration and border journalist, interviewed
a group of Honduran men attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border. When asked why they were heading to the United States, they
responded simply “there was no rain” (Miller 2017). Extreme drought is rising throughout all of Central
America and Mexico. For example, in 2015, around 400,000 people in a region of Honduras didn’t receive any rain and no
crops grew, causing extreme famine (2017). There have been many studies over the last ten years that portray an influx
in immigration directly correlated with drought, such as that done by Colunga and Rivera (2011). Their study
shows the increase in migration from Mexico to the United States in response to drought
and the lack of Mexican policy to assist the most vulnerable populations. Drought isn’t
the only issue causing people to migrate north. Extreme weather has been shown to
increase with climate change and be a major contributor to forced migration. One study
estimates 470,000 Puerto Ricans, or 14% of the population, will leave the island by 2019
due to increased damage from hurricanes and extreme weather (Melendez and Hinojosa 2017, 1).
Nearly all of these people are projected to move to the United States. The
primary response by the United States to this increase in immigration has been walls
and surveillance technology. Even before Donald Trump ran for office, there was 700 miles of border walls
constructed along the U.S.-Mexico border, with the number of Border Patrol agents increasing exponentially (Miller 2017).
Border walls are not only occurring in the United States as way to cope with increased
immigration. According to Elisabeth Vallet, there are 70 border walls around the world, up from 15 in 1988 (2017). Border
walls are showing how government officials view immigration and climate
refugees as a threat to national security. Rather than preparing policy and
practices to provide protections to future immigrants, the Department of Homeland
Security and U.S. military view climate change as a “threat multiplier” and are preparing
for long-term security issues, with mass population movements as one of the
main sources of risk (2017). >
Status quo protections are insufficient for climate refugees – new
legislation is key
DeGenaro 15 Carey DeGenaro is the Attorney Advisor at Executive Office for Immigration Review (Carey, “LOOKING
INWARD: DOMESTIC POLICY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES AND BEYOND,” University of
Colorado Law Review, Vol. 86, HeinOnline) // SR
To understand why the United States should enact legislation that protects climate migrants, 92 it is necessary to examine the state
of immigration law as it stands in January 2015. The United States has a tumultuous immigration history with varying periods of
high and low rates of migration from many different parts of the world. 93 Immigration to the United States has caused much
political turmoil; the goals of immigration law are constantly in flux.94 Today,
immigration law is generally
immigrant-exclusive, focused primarily on closing borders and deporting
undocumented immigrants. 95 According to the Pew Research Center, there were
approximately 11.2 million undocumented immigrants in the United States in 2012.96
The United States' legal system inadequately addresses this population, which
significantly impacts the country's economy and culture. 97 This population's status and rights are
unsettled: unlawfully present individuals generally do not qualify for public benefits such as in-state tuition and driver's licenses, 98
employment laws do not protect undocumented and documented workers equally, 99 and the policy surrounding who should be
deported (as well as how to treat those who are not prioritized for deportation) is muddled.100 The government has no
comprehensive plan to address these "Americans in waiting," and they consequently exist in a state of flux. 10 1 Although
immigration reform continues to be a topic of great importance in the United States'
political system, Congress continuously fails to pass a legislative overhaul.102 Additionally,
while the Senate passed another comprehensive immigration reform bill in 2013, the House did not adopt the proposal, and
Congress has not acted on immigration since then. 103 Nevertheless,
it is essential for the United States to
develop and implement legislation to determine the legal status of climate
migrants as they begin arriving in the country. If scholars have correctly estimated the
number of climate migrants that will exist by 2050, the United States will face a rapidly
increasing population of immigrants with no viable path to legal status, and potentially
no inhabitable country to which they can return. 10 4 The current legal infrastructure,
however, is inadequate to address even the existing immigrant population-let alone an enormous influx of climate
migrants. Thus, the country must pass legislation to avoid swelling the ranks of
undocumented immigrants whose illegal presence will contribute to costs and confusion
in the United States. Why does the current legal regime inadequately protect climate migrants? Section A will discuss
refugee law, the most well-known protection for immigrants in the United States, and explain why it does not apply to climate
migrants. Next, section B will discuss alternative legal protections that may be available, but which ultimately are inappropriate to
address the influx of climate-displaced persons who lack legal status. A. Refugee Law and Asylum in the United States Refugee law
in the United States largely tracks that of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the
Convention's corresponding 1967 Protocol. 10 5 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in the United States, a "refugee"
is defined as: any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is
outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion .... 106 The
United States
has not significantly altered this definition since the international community
established it in 1951.107 For an individual to show that she is a refugee, she must
establish (1) past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, (2) that is or
was on account of one of the protected grounds listed in the definition, and (3) that the
applicant was unable or unwilling to enlist government protection.108 If an alien establishes that
she is a refugee, an immigration judge or asylum officer may grant her application for asylum. 109 It is generally settled
that the definition of "refugee" in the United States does not apply to individuals or
groups fleeing the environmental consequences of climate change."10 The international community
defined the term "refugee" and created the Convention and Protocol in the wake of World War II to protect victims of political,
religious, and social upheaval.11' This is why establishing refugee status requires proof of past persecution or a well-founded fear of
future persecution. 112 It is difficult to argue that scarce resources, degraded economic and
environmental conditions, or even increased political turmoil resulting from climate
change, meet the standards of persecution as defined by the statute. Even if an
asylum-seeker can prove persecution, she must also be able to show that it
was "on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion." 113 Discrete climate events are naturally
occurring, even if those events subsequently contribute to the gradual degradation of
environmental and economic conditions inside a country. 11 4 Therefore, such degradation is not "on
account of' any of the listed factors. 115 To prove that she is a refugee, an applicant must also
demonstrate that she is unable to turn to her government for help."l6 The United States construes
this requirement strictly, and is unlikely to grant asylum if the applicant did not suffer persecution "imposed by the government or
by groups which the government is unable or unwilling to control." 117 Thus, the applicant must name some identifiable actor as her
persecutor. 118 Since
neither climate change nor its consequences were imposed upon
individuals by their own government or by a group that the government was unable or
unwilling to control, it follows that these individuals will be unable to show that they are
"refugees," as defined by the statute. 119 Applicants for asylum in the United States face
additional barriers beyond meeting the legal definition of refugee. For example, entering
the country in the first instance is increasingly challenging, as the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has the right to refuse entry at the border to any alien who
does not claim persecution or request asylum. 1 20 In fact, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
the subsequent passage of the Patriot Act in 2001,121 and the passage of the REAL ID Act in 2005,122 securing both entry and legal
status in the United States has become significantly more difficult. 123 Another
restrictive act, the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 124 requires that an asylum
applicant file within one year of arrival in the country. 125 This timeline does not
adequately account for the fact that many refugees do not know how to apply or are
unaware that they may qualify for this form of relief, and it imposes arbitrary
constraints on potentially meritorious claims. The one year deadline, increased difficulty
of entry, and the reduced number of applications granted post-9/11 have together
caused the number of applications filed to decrease substantially. 126 Most importantly,
the United States grants asylum as a matter of discretion on a case-by-case basis. 127 If
the government finds that a particular applicant's case merits both a finding of refugee
status and an affirmative grant of asylum, that decision can be limited to her unique
situation. 128 The limit on the number of refugees the government will admit into the
country each year further challenges asylum applicants. 129 Given the expected
estimates of climate migrants that may come to the United States, refugee law in the
United States is insufficient to handle the impending influx.
Climate refugees are afforded zero legal protection

Lieberman, '15 – Immigration Specialist (Amy, "Where will the climate refugees go?," Al Jazeera, 12-22-2015,
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/11/climate-refugees-151125093146088.html)//SB
New York, US - No one can be sure just how many people will be displaced by climate change by the middle of this century. In fact,
the estimates vary widely, with some
putting the number at 25 million and others suggesting it
could hit the one billion mark.
What is clear, however, is that cementing
a number is not the only hurdle facing those attempting
to decipher the practical ramifications of climate change. Terms such as "climate
refugee" and "environmental refugee" are still not classified as legal
categorisations. And it's difficult to determine whether a person is fleeing their home because of an environmental
disaster, lack of work, or the established, long-term impacts of climate issues like drought or rising sea levels.
However, one
factor is increasingly clear: This amorphous, global population of refugees
does not have any international legal protection or agency upholding their
basic human rights and helping to keep them safe.
AT//Climate Change Isn’t Happening
Arguments against climate change rely on cherry-picked facts and flawed
papers – prefer reliable data
Pilkey et al. 16 Orrin H. Pilkey is a James B. Duke Professor Emeritus of Geology (Orrin H.,
Linda Pilkey-Jarvis, Keith C Pilkey, “Retreat from a Rising Sea : Hard Choices in an Age of
Climate Change,” 5/24/16, Columbia University Press) // SR
Arthur Robinson
In 1998, Arthur Robinson of the Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine circulated in
a mass mailing what has become known as the “Oregon Petition.” Attached to it was an
unpublished paper, by Robinson with Willie Soon and Sallie Baliunas, that looked like a
publication of the National Academy of Sciences. It used the same typeface and format as official NAS
proceedings, along with a cover note signed by its former president, Frederick Seitz. The petition urged the U.S.
government to reject the Kyoto Protocol or any similar proposals, stressing that the
“proposed limits on greenhouse gasses would harm the environment, hinder the
advance of science and technology, and damage the health and welfare of mankind.” It
further argued:
There is no convincing scientific evidence that human release of . . . greenhouse gasses is

causing or will, in the foreseeable future, cause catastrophic heating of the Earth’s
atmosphere and disruption of the Earth’s climate. Moreover, there is substantial scientific evidence that
increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide produce many beneficial effects upon the natural plant and animal environments of the
Earth
The petition quickly picked up 19,000 signatures (and was up to 31,487 by January 2010). The NAS did
issue a statement stressing that the “petition does not reflect the conclusions of expert reports of the Academy.” This petition
offers an excellent example of the climatechange deniers’ strategy. Express a contrarian
view in a non-peerreviewed format and then repeatedly promote the paper or, in this
case, talk up the signatures on a misleading document. Not only had the paper bypassed the traditional
peer-review process, but it was deceptively packaged to look like it was a peer-reviewed publication! David McCandless, a journalist
and blogger, and Helen Lawson Williams examined the backgrounds of the signatories and concluded that 49 percent were
engineers. We
should note that contrarians often are scientists or professionals whose areas
of expertise lie outside the field of climatology. Scientists who deny climate change and
our role in it typically produce flawed papers with cherry-picked facts published in
non-peer-reviewed journals. The results are then trumpeted by right-wing think
tanks, websites, and news organizations like Fox News. These papers are eventually
debunked in scientific journals a year or so later, to much less fanfare, but nonetheless
they have served their purpose of creating doubt in the minds of the public.
Indeed, despite its deceptive format, the Oregon Petition served its purpose as a tool of doubt. For
instance, it allowed
Diane Bast of the Heartland Institute, a prominent think tank and source of climate-
change-denier propaganda and funding, to proclaim that the debate over climate change
was not settled. In an article on the institute’s website, she stressed that more than 30,000 “American scientists reject the
assertion that global warming has reached a crisis stage or is caused by human activity.” With regard to this “debate,” science
historian Naomi Oreskes reviewed the abstracts of 928 papers on global climate change published in scientific journals between
1993 and 2003 and found not a single one that did not explicitly or implicitly accept the human role in climate change.
In their important 2010 book Merchants of Doubt, Oreskes and Erik Conway convincingly link Big Tobacco with efforts to discredit
science harmful to corporate interests, not just those of Big Tobacco, but to other corporate interests such as the fossil-fuel industry.
They took the title of their book from a letter from the tobacco industry proclaiming, “Doubt
is our product since it is
the best means of competing with the ‘body of fact’ that exists in the mind of the general
public. It is also the best means of establishing a controversy.” Oreskes and Conway detail the role of
Frederick Seitz and others in the creation of a systematic approach to combating science and government regulation. The tobacco
company Philip Morris may even have coined the term junk science for peer-reviewed studies that might harm its industry, as
opposed to sound science for studies that support its views. Steven Milloy, operator of the junkscience.com website, has popularized
the notion of junk science while making light of the threat from climate change. Once employed as a lobbyist for a firm hired by
Philip Morris to downplay the dangers of secondhand smoke, Milloy was executive director of the Advancement for Sound Science
Center (formerly Coalition) (TASSC), a group that, Oreskes and Conway state, is dedicated to discrediting, rather than advancing,
science.
A commentator for Fox News, Milloy is a well-positioned cog in the climate-
change-denial machinery.
AT//ILaw Protections
International law is insufficient to protect climate refugees
McDonnell 6/20 (Tim, reporter for National Public Radio, covering the environment, conflict and related issues in sub-
Saharan Africa, The Refugees The World Barely Pays Attention To,
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/06/20/621782275/the-refugees-that-the-world-barely-pays-attention-
to//waters)
This month, diplomats from around the world met in New York and Geneva to hash out a pair of new global agreements that aim to
lay out new guidelines for how
countries should deal with an unprecedented surge in the number
of displaced people, which has now reached 65.6 million worldwide. But there's
one emerging category that seems to be getting short shrift in the conversation: so-
called "climate refugees," who currently lack any formal definition, recognition or
protection under international law even as the scope of their predicament becomes more clear. Since
2008, an average of 24 million people have been displaced by catastrophic weather
disasters each year. As climate change worsens storms and droughts, climate scientists and migration
experts expect that number to rise. Meanwhile, climate impacts that unravel over time, like desert expansion and
sea level rise, are also forcing people from their homes: A World Bank report in March projects that within three of the most
vulnerable regions — sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America — 143 million people could be displaced by these impacts by
2050. In
Bangladesh, hundreds of thousands of people are routinely uprooted by coastal
flooding, many making a treacherous journey to the slums of the capital, Dhaka. In West Africa, the almost total disappearance
of Lake Chad because of desertification has empowered terrorists and forced more than four million people into camps. It's a
problem in the United States as well. An estimated 2,300 Puerto Rican families displaced by Hurricane Maria are still looking for
permanent housing, while government officials have spent years working to preemptively relocate more than a dozen small coastal
communities in Alaska and Louisiana that are disappearing into the rising sea. A December study by Columbia
University
climate researchers in the peer-reviewed journal Science projected that if global temperatures
continue their upward march, applications for asylum to the European Union could
increase 28 percent to nearly 450,000 per year by 2100. But so far, there's no international agreement on
who should qualify as a climate refugee — much less a plan to manage the growing crisis. "These people
fall through the cracks," says Erol Yayboke, a development expert at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies who helped author a May report on forced migration. "It's hard for countries to come to a consensus on something like this."
That difficulty took shape during the second and third weeks of June in the latest round of negotiations on the Global Compact for
Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees, which are due to be adopted at the U.N. General Assembly this fall. When the
compacts were first proposed in 2016, there was some hope among migration researchers and advocates that they could provide a
platform for new international policies on climate refugees, which had gained prominence since the 2015 Paris climate talks. But
that hope was quashed in March, when Louise Arbour, the U.N. official leading the migration compact — which, of the two
agreements, was considered the more likely venue for strong climate language — told the European Unionthat the document would
not grant "specific legal international protection to climate-induced migrants." Both compacts do make some reference to the
climate. The latest draft of the migration compact calls on U.N. members to "better map, understand, predict and address migration
movements, including those resulting from sudden- and slow-onset natural disasters, environmental degradation, the adverse
effects of climate change" and "cooperate to identify, develop and strengthen solutions, including planned relocation and visa
options" for climate migrants. The refugee compact stops much shorter, only mentioning climate as one of many factors that "may
interact with the drivers of refugee movements."
Ideally, the compacts should encourage countries to
create new legal processes to document and manage climate migrants "so people can move before
the water is literally lapping at their feet," says Nina Hall, a migration expert at Johns Hopkins University. As an example, she cited a
plan in New Zealand to offer up to 100 special climate visas to Pacific Islanders — although
that process is still in
development and isn't likely to open for several years, she said. But the language in the compacts is too
vague to spur much progress, she says, and in any case neither compact will be legally binding. "We have to be
up front that the global compacts are not going to transform the landscape for climate
migrants," Hall says. Climate refugees pose a number of unique challenges for international
policymakers compared to those displaced by persecution, the traditional driver recognized by the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.
While some people, like the Puerto Ricans displaced by Maria, are affected by a specific disaster, many others are forced to move
because of slow-onset changes like sea level rise and desertification, which can make it hard to identify them as climate refugees.
Researchers are still working to understand how climate change interacts with the panoply of other factors, including national
security and local economic trends, that might prompt a family to move. At the same time,
the majority of today's
climate refugees are displaced within the borders of their own country, whereas the new
compacts focus exclusively on cross-border movement. And for Pacific island nations that face a truly existential threat from sea
level rise, there's no legal precedent to guide how they might relocate to new territory in another country — if they even want to
move. Even a comparatively simpler effort — to relocate a community of fewer than 100 people in Louisiana whose island home, Isle
de Jean Charles, has lost 98 percent of its land to sea level rise since the 1950s, to a new town 40 miles inland — has taken several
years and cost $50 million and still faces setbacks, including complaints from the predominantly Native American residents that the
state government didn't adequately involve them in the planning process. "The
reality is there are tens of
millions of these people, and we don't agree on what we can do about them,"
Yayboke says. Meanwhile, the wave of nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment that has swept across Europe and the U.S. in
recent years has made it a challenge for the U.N. to even get governments to follow existing refugee protocol, let alone expand it to
cover an entirely new class of refugee, Hall says. "To get any progressive international policy, much less hard law, is almost
impossible in today's climate," she says. "We're not going to get any kind of binding convention on displaced people due to climate
change." The U.S. pulled out of the migration compact in December, citing concernsthat it could impede the Trump administration's
immigration agenda. While that means the final agreement will be missing any commitment from the world's number-one migrant
destination, it does remove a potential roadblock to including climate-specific language, given Trump's disbelief in climate change.
In any case, the global compacts aren't the end of the issue. A different U.N. task force that was established in the Paris climate
agreement is set to deliver a new set of recommendations on climate refugees around the same time the compacts are adopted. They
will likely focus on measures individual countries can take to prevent climate refugees from being displaced in the first place, says
Mariam Traore Chazalnoel, a climate expert at the U.N.'s International Organization for Migration. "Most
people don't
actually want to migrate," she says. "They would rather stay where they are. But they need the means to stay where they
are." That could include programs to train and equip farmers for drought tolerance, she says, raise homes out of flood plains, and
other measures aimed at increasing communities' resilience to climate shocks. Yayboke believes that development agencies need to
step up funding for climate adaptation programs, which can help prevent displacement and reduce government spending on
recovery from predictable natural disasters later on. "We are spending so much money on this stuff, but we're being totally reactive,"
he says. "There are proactive things we can do that we're just not doing." Few places are more illustrative of that problem than
Bangladesh. According to the CSIS report, up to 70 percent of the five million people living in Dhaka's slums were displaced from
their original home by environmental disasters. "The situation and scope of this problem is entirely new,
and of biblical proportions," says Steve Trent, executive director of the Environmental Justice Foundation, which
released its own report on Bangladesh in 2017. "It demands an entirely new legal convention. The global
compacts are a start, but it's clear that they're not enough."
AT//Not Everyone Emigrates
Remittances are key to develop resilience to climate disasters among family
members who stay behind
Veronis et al. 18 (Luisa, Associate Professor Geography, Environment and Geomatics Faculty of Arts, University of
Ottawa, Transnational approaches to remittances, risk reduction, and disaster relief from: Routledge Handbook of Environmental
Displacement and Migration, pg. 271-272//waters)
Researchers have debated whether migrants’ remittances should be considered a
successful or sustainable form of development assistance as opposed to a form of conspicuous
consumption (see Castaneda 2013; de Haas 2005; Faist 2008). Others have suggested that remittances can
play a role in mitigating the environmental risk of family members who stay behind, thus
aligning with those who see remittances as contributing to more than conspicuous consumption. In Vietnam, for example, it
was found that because remittance income is generally not dependent on local
environmental conditions, receiving remittances could assist in livelihood stability
and risk reduction (Adger 1999).A study in Burkina Faso and Ghana found that
households that receive international remittances have increased resiliency during natural
disasters because of home improvements and greater access to communications (Mohapatra et al. 2012).
Our research similarly indicates that remittances
sent from Canada to the Philippines during and
after Typhoon Haiyan were used for risk reduction, and moreover, were used in some cases as a
means to eliminate the need for the household to evacuate or relocate.We were able to identify
specifically how the relatives of Canadian Filipinos reacted to Typhoon Haiyan and how remittances from Canada were used by
individual recipient households. In many cases, family members and friends evacuated temporarily to local public buildings, such as
churches, while others traveled to Manila to shelter with relatives; but virtually all quickly returned home to rebuild. Few
considered moving away permanently.1 In these cases, for migrant households in the
Philippines, remittances from family members play a role in reducing their vulnerability
to environmental events and in increasing their ability to return home and rebuild afterward. For example, remittances
from one of our participants allowed her relatives to build a second floor on their house so that they could go somewhere safe during
almost monthly ooding incidents in their home. Whereas previously they had gone to a relative’s home on higher ground when
typhoons and ooding occurred, her remittances allowed the family to stay put. Now when it floods, she says,“they’re OK . . . I tell
them never mind the stuff, just go upstairs.”
While remittances can play a role in making home improvements that reduce environmental risk, the literature is conflcting when it
comes to the influence of land ownership; in some locations it increases the possibility of migrating, and in others it does not
(Obokata et al. 2014). Land ownership should therefore not be considered a sole determinant of
whether a household or individual migrates (whether temporarily or permanently); other factors such
as geographical context, education levels, and social networks must also be taken into
account. This is also the case when investigating the environmental risk of remittance-receiving households who own land or
property. Existing research shows that overall, remittance-receiving households are better able
to cope with environmental problems such as flooding and natural
disasters (Adger 1999; Mohapatra et al. 2012; Predo 2010), but it is important to note that this ability is linked not only to the
higher income provided by remittances, but also to factors such as education levels. That is, financial capital can
contribute to increasing households’ resilience when combined with human capital. One example is Predo’s
(2010) research in Ormoc, Philippines. He found that the higher a household’s education level, annual income, and total
landholding, the lower the household’s vulnerability, which was in line with his predictions. However, contrary to expectation, he
also found that vulnerability to flooding actually increased with house size, and that those with larger houses were those where one
member of the family was working or living overseas (i.e., remittance-receiving households). Although existing research suggests
that being part of a migrant household leads to risk reduction, this finding illuminates that this may only be the case insofar as
having a family member overseas correlates to raising a household’s level of education and annual income (or having higher levels of
each to begin with). Indeed, migrant households who invest in bigger houses may potentially be increasing their exposure and
vulnerability to extreme events.
AT//Any SQ Solves Argument
Trump is slashing climate aid programs – granting refugee status to EDPs
is necessary to pull people out of existential crises.
Alex Lenferna 3-15-2018 -- Alex Lenferna is an Endeavour Research Fellow at the University of New South Wales’ Practical
Justice Initiative and a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Washington. ["Don’t Celebrate The U.S. For Protecting Climate
‘Refugees’ ", Accessible Online at: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opinion-lenferna-climate-
refugees_us_5aa92f40e4b001c8bf15db8f] @ AG
The Trump administration has been moving to dismantle climate adaptation programs,
many designed to aid communities being displaced by climate change. The administration’s actions, which are
reckless on their own, have also exposed a troubling reality: Though the media has declared them
America’s “first climate refugees,” individuals displaced by climate change ― both in the United States and
abroad ― have not actually been granted the legal protections that come with
refugee status.
One of the climate adaptation programs the administration is cutting is the Denali Commission, an agency developing plans to
safeguard or relocate dozens of Alaskan communities at risk from rising sea levels, storms and melting sea ice. This commission was
one of the few U.S. programs in place to help communities displaced by climate change, and it helped ensure protection for 31
Alaskan communities that, according to the Army Corps of Engineers, face “existential” threats from
climate change.
As the Trump administration rescinds adaptation and relocation funding ― both at

home and abroad ― communities displaced by climate change see themselves in an
increasingly precarious position, with little legal recourse upon which to draw for
support.
And the mainstream media, unfortunately, has played a problematic role in obscuring the reality of the situation.
In 2016, media outlets across the globe clamored to tell the story of America’s “first climate refugees.” They were referring to the
Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw of Louisiana, a tribe the Obama administration had committed to relocating after rising sea levels and
fossil fuel extraction practices threatened to displace their community.
Referring to the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw as climate refugees was problematic for several reasons. For one, many people displaced
by climate change resist being called “refugees,” because it paints them as victims, thus ignoring the remarkable agency many of
them have displayed. They prefer phrases like “migration with dignity” or “planned relocation.”
Such a label also misleadingly suggests that, just like refugees under the U.N.’s 1951 Refugee Convention,
individuals displaced by climate change obtain a legal status guaranteeing them a right
to safe asylum. The very term “refugee” refers to a specific legal designation that
provides protections to people displaced across international borders as a result of
specific forms of persecution. However, this designation and the protections that come with
it do not currently apply to people displaced by climate change or to internally displaced persons (people displaced
within a country).
Many argue that people displaced by climate change deserve legal protection akin to other
refugees; however, that is currently not the case in the U.S. or internationally. Migration scholar Tracey Skillington has said,
“In lacking a full legal identity, the climate displaced are pushed into spaces beyond
adequate legal protection where their ‘irregular’ status forms the basis of a routine and
publicly legitimated legal violence against them.”
The Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw spent 17 years fighting for protection and ultimately had to enter a competition to qualify for
relocation assistance, exemplifying the precarious legal limbo that climate change-displaced communities experience.
The program that ultimately provided support to the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw did not specify that they were being protected due
to climate change displacement. And the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw were certainly not the first U.S. community to be displaced by
climate change. The Quinault Indian Nation of the Pacific Northwest, currently in the process of relocating to higher land, and the
Inupiat of Kivalina, Alaska, whom the media also deemed America’s first climate refugees back in 2013, have long been fighting for
relocation assistance.
Furthermore, there’s an irony in mainstream media’s celebrating the U.S. for protecting its first climate refugees. Evenunder
President Barack Obama, the U.S. resisted efforts to protect climate change-displaced
persons under the United Nations ― even though the U.S. is the largest historical emitter of greenhouse gas emissions, and thus
arguably the country most morally responsible for assisting individuals being harmed by climate change. More recently, the
Trump administration took a large step backward, withdrawing from a United Nations
Agreement to establish rights for migrants and refugees more broadly.
The injustice of the U.S. resisting such efforts is compounded by the fact that developing and least-developed countries ― the
countries least responsible for climate change ― are the ones suffering the most because of it. As the number of people being
displaced by climate change potentially climbs to 250 million by 2050, the global south is set to feel the brunt of the impact, and will
likely continue to carry the lion’s share of the responsibility for taking care of migrants and refugees.
Developing countries currently host 84 percent of all refugees; less than 1 percent are resettled in
Western nations. Far from recognizing their responsibility to take in climate change-displaced people, rich, polluting, developed
countries ― especially the United States and Australia ― are further tightening border security and restricting immigration.
Climate change-related displacement existed well before Trump took office; however, instead
of working to fix these
problems, his climate change-denying administration is causing further harm. As the world’s
largest historical carbon emitter, the U.S. has a moral responsibility to assist those dealing with climate change displacement. It also
has a responsibility to fund climate adaptation programs both at home and abroad.
Having already contributed so much to the problem, U.S.

legislators must provide solutions for those who
can no longer adapt to their changing surroundings. This includes welcoming displaced
persons through the country’s borders and supporting international efforts to protect them.
Until it acts responsibly to address climate change displacement, we should not be celebrating the U.S. for protecting climate
“refugees.” Instead, we should be castigating the U.S. for being the largest contributor to climate change displacement.
Climate Refugees Advantage
Ext. State Failure / Resource Scarcity IL
Climate migration causes resource scarcity and water shortages in every
corner of the world while flooding Europe with too many refugees
At this writing, Europe is under siege by Syrian war refugees who represent one of the
largest war-induced migrations in history. The war has dragged on for over four years now, taking more than
two hundred thousand lives and causing untold destruction to the Syrian environment. Well over a million refugees
have entered Europe, adding a complex religious and cultural mix to the already
complicated issue of climate refugees. These streams of migrants may literally change the face of the continent in
a generation. Optimists hope that through resettlement and education the issues can be resolved. Others believe that this
might be the time when things begin to fall apart in our global system. At
present, while a dangerous situation unfolds, many world leaders have chosen paralysis and mutual
recrimination. At this juncture members of the EU nations of Europe are discussing ways to
keep further immigration limited to “documented” refugees. In 2009 only 30 percent of Americans
believed that the world climate was changing. By 2012, surveys revealed that 70 percent of the American people had come to believe
that greenhouse gases had altered the planet. A new age of environmental change—and subsequently
refugees—had dawned.2 Environmental refugees in an age of sectarian violence, civil war. and economic recession are
not a flashy public policy project. Most policy makers wish the subject would go away. But in an age
when the world is being forced to bear witness to the fact that millions are fleeing their
homes owing to sea rise. desertification, drought, unprecedented hurricanes. tsunamis. and war. the topic is
stubbornly resistant to the kinds of public amnesia so often in effect in the world theater
of nations. We do not know how soon reality will trump ideology. At present there are lots of back-and-forth discus sions
between national and international leaders that have not been very productive. What is certain. however, is that climate
change is not just changing the planet; it is changing human lives. In a 2007 essay
for the Financial Times, David Cameron points out that “as early as 1971. Richard Falk [a professor of international law at Princeton
University,] argued that environmental change was a security issue and outlined what he called his ‘first law of ecological politics’:
the faster the rate of change. the less time to adapt, the more dangerous the
impact will be.”24 We are now living in an age of resource shocks. Unbridled
world consumption of food and water and other resources combined with
the advent of climate change may produce a global explosion writes Michael Klare in
his book The Race for What& Left. Different nations are coming up with different strategies on migration. Ultimately, climate
refugees present us with a troublesome issue of human rights in an age of
climate change. violence. and technological transformation.
Climate change drives developing world state failure – accepting climate
refugees is key
The tunnel is part of a larger issue of the

number of people illegally trying to get into Europe from
the Middle East and North Africa. Because of war and worsening environmental
conditions. a constant flow of humanity is coming across into Europe, and there is no
sign that it will be slowing down. Whether attempted by tunnel entry or in boats, which frequently capsize in
the Mediterranean. this migration is part of humanity’s distress call. Climate change is
with us and we need to think about the next big, disturbing idea—the potentially disastrous
consequences of massive numbers of environmental refugees at large on
the planet. As early as 1990 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reported that “the greatest single
impact of climate change could be on human migration with millions of people
displaced by shoreline erosion. coastal flooding, and agricultural disruption,” writes the United
Nations Development Program in its 2015 Human Development Report. These people will be left to seek
new homes in an era where “asylum” has increasingly become an
unwelcome term. In a recent book entitled Constant Battles. Steven LeBlanc of the Peabody Museum of Archeology
argues that environmental changes such as population growth, droughts. and crop failures
in the ancient Middle East resulted in higher levels of warfare. Anthropologist Jared Diamond
describes similar developments among the ancient Mayans of Mexico and the Anasazi culture of New Mexico in Collapse: How
Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed.3 In addition, as Michael Klare observes, “Many experts believe that the fighting in
Darfur and other war-ravaged areas of North Africa has been driven, at
least in part, by competition among desert tribes for scarce water supplies,
exacerbated in some cases by rising population levels.”4 University of Hawaii biogeographer
Camilo Mora and colleagues have recently published a disturbing analysis of what lies in the global future. They call it the era of
“climate departure,” a point at which, as Diane Toomey of Yale’s Environment 360 puts it, “the earth’s
climate begins to cease resembling what has come before and moves into a new state. one
where heat records are routinely shattered and what was once considered extreme will
become the norm.”6 Mora and his coauthors examined millions of data points from various regions to
determine what climate departure will mean for our planet. Interviewed by Toomey. Mora pegs the date of climate departure as
2047: “At the broadest scale. we calculate that year. Under a business as usual scenario, is going to be 2047. Basically, by the
year 2047 the climate is going to move beyond something we’ve never seen in
the last 150 years.” The scientific models cover 200-year periods from sixty thousand locations
around the world. The biggest climate changes, Mora’s team predicts, will actually occur sooner
in the tropics, where species have long adapted to a stable climate and will suffer
dramatically if the average temperature increases by just one or two degrees Celsius. This is already
happening in some places in the world’s oceans, with massive bleaching of
coral reefs.8 What scares Mora as a scientist and as an earth dweller is that changes are already happening
around the world and that “people can’t appreciate the magnitude of these changes until
it is too late.” but “when we start damaging physical systems and the carrying capacity of
physical systems to produce food, people will react to this in a terrible way.”9 Climate
departure will take place in a world of limited food. People need about two hectares each to
provide the food to sustain them. Since there are some seven billion people on earth at present, and Mora’s team has estimated that
the planet has only eleven billion hectares that can be sustainably harvested. “every year we consume three billion hectares.” The
only remedy for the future. Mora notes, is to alert the public consciousness and embark on a concerted effort at reducing population
growth.10 Most potential climate change consequences are described are in terms of weather
extremes such as heat waves, floods, and severe storms. If we can extrapolate Mora’s data well into the
future, we can anticipate greater and more damaging tropical storms and extreme heat
waves that will transform moderate climate zones in the hemispheres into tropical
environments or deserts. According to a data analysis published by the US Climate Change Science Program, there have
been three distinct periods in the twentieth century in which the average number of tropical storms increased and then continued at
“elevated levels.” The level of tropical storms globewide remained relatively stable until the close of the century, but in the ten-year
period from 1995 to 2005, the number of extreme cyclones and hurricanes increased from an average of ten to fifteen: eight
hurricanes and seven tropical storms.” And as the Climate Institute notes. “It is important to consider that two
of the
driving forces behind hurricane formation (sea surface temperature and humidity
levels) have been influenced by climate change.”12 Heat waves are another extreme
weather event that will increase in number as greenhouse gas emissions continue,
driving global temperatures caused by climate change increasingly higher. India and a number
of other countries have seen their summer temperatures increase to over one hundred degrees Fahrenheit. The summer of
2003 saw one of the highest weather-related death tolls in European history as fifty-two thousand people died
as a result of heat extremes. With increased temperatures comes increased capacity
of the atmosphere to hold moisture. resulting in heavier rainstorms. An increase in the intensity of
floods in low-lying areas would be catastrophic around the world. In Bangladesh. for example, over
seventeen million people live in elevations of less than three feet above sea level, and
millions inhabit the flood plains and flat banks in the subcontinent along the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers.14
Environmental factors are almost invariably linked with economic factors
in the push and pull of everyday existence. In developing countries it is the
impoverished who often bear the brunt of the most environmental damage, which in turn
sets off migration events. Because people often become climate refugees as the result of multi-causal factors, it is
not easy to quantify their displacement as a social science problem. But it should also be recognized that sometimes environmental
decline has nothing to do with political economy. As Norman Myers has pointed out, “Not all factors can be quantified in
comprehensive detail, nor can all analyses be supported with across-the-board documentation.”15 As we have seen. however, the
links between climate and human migration are not new. The droughts of the 1930s in
the plains of the American Dust Bowl forced hundreds of thousands of migrants toward
California. and those that struck the Sahel region of Africa between 1969 and 1974 displaced
millions of farmers and nomads toward the cities.16 If future changes in the climate
continue to force mass levels of migration. it raises the question of when
these victims will be granted rights to a form of protection.
Climate refugees experience widespread inequality and exacerbate civil
conflicts – the plan is key
Faist 18 - Professor of Sociology of Transnationalization, Migration and Development at Malmo University (Thomas, “The
Socio-Natural Question: How Migration Reproduces Inequalities in an Age of Climate Change”, MIM Working Paper Series,
http://muep.mau.se/bitstream/handle/2043/24700/18-%202%20Final.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y, 2018)//abaime
As to inequalities resulting in migration, it is a well-established finding that class as a

heterogeneity plays a prominent role, since the poorest segments of the population are
especially vulnerable to environmental risks (for the following empirical claims, see the case studies in
McLeman, Schade & Faist 2016). If at all, the poorer strata of groups usually have the option to move
inside their countries, although crossing internationally recognized borders may be the
only option in the long run, especially when island states become submerged. In such a
constellation, resettlement may be the only option to maintain a decent living ; the inhabitants of the
island Kiribati have all been resettled (Schade 2013). However, costly resettlement programmes may
backfire. For example, Inuits in Alaska were (re)settled in areas which are now slowly disappearing in swamps (Bronen 2013).
In general, the situation is especially precarious for trapped populations who are neither able to engage in in-situ adaptation nor
migration as adaptation. Also, the intersection of class and gender, for example, constitutes an obvious link: Women are especially
vulnerable, also among the landless and poor, as they are eight times more likely to be killed in natural disaster events compared
with men (Adeniji 2011; IPCC 2014: chapter 11). Those persons who are not destitute engage in migration mainly as a mechanism of
opportunity hoarding (Tilly 2005) which means the availability of a modicum of financial resources and/or social ties which reduce
the costs and risks of long-distance, international migration. Beyond
well-known heterogeneities, such as
class, gender, age, religion, location/citizenship or ethnicity, it is spatial heterogeneities
which make a difference for coping with climate change induced risks. Populations in
urban areas tend to have more capacities to cope with climate change, those in the global North
more than in the global South, etc. Yet people often migrate in the wrong direction, toward areas
endangered by flooding, not away from them. This is the case for migration to urban areas in low-lying river
deltas, such as Dhaka or Shanghai (Lassailly-Jacob & Peyraut 2016). As to the opposite direction in the nexus, from migration to
inequalities, it is remittances which stand at the center of attention by researchers. It is by a now a basic insight of research that
financial (and social) remittances from international migration often reproduce the class structures in the emigration locales.
Moreover, there is a wealth of evidence, for example from the Pacific Island States and Mexico that international remittances have
ambiguous effects in that they contribute to poverty reduction and exacerbate inequalities (see also Aksakal & Schmidt 2015). In
general, remittances are a mixed blessing because of the ubiquitous risks of moral hazard on the scale of both states and households.
State governments use financial remittances to correct currency deficits and may even seek to avoid structural changes in the
provision of social protection, such as health and education. After all, much of the remittances are used for expenses in these two
areas. And on the household level, dependent family members may rely on income from abroad instead of reconstituting the local
sources of income (Horst et al. 2014). Legal status is another heterogeneity which is tightly connected to inequalities in migration. It
is crucial because it concerns the politico-legal constitution of the category climate refugees. One of the fundamental scientific
obstacles – and
it is here that the socionatural question becomes important again – is the
difficulty of legally codifying migrants in the context of climate change as refugees which
would provide for their protection (Kälin 2015). It is close to impossible to clearly assign
singular natural hazards to the consequences of climate change. Yet although no clear legal
case can be made with respect to the causality between climate changes and migration,
there is abundant plausibility and thus social space for “norm entrepreneurs” (Sunstein 1996). This category of entrepreneur has
been active trying to establish particular human rights for refugees in situations of climate-induced migration. One proposal seeks to
make planned relocation the corner stone of their proposal for a climate refugee regime (Bierman & Boas 2008). The authors
defined the term ‘climate refugee’ embracing only people who flee the direct effects of climate change (within or across borders), that
is, sea-level rise, extreme weather events, droughts and water scarcity. The use of the term ‘refugee’ in this
context became quite disputed, however, because of its legal meaning under the Geneva Refugee Convention. Indeed,
the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) – the United Nations (UN) refugee organisation –
did reject the use of the term “climate refugee” or “environmental refugee” and any
attempts to broaden the mandate of the Convention. For example, it was argued that
“giving refugee status to environmental refugees would only distort the definition and
strain the desperately scarce resource of the international refugee regime.” (Suhrke 1994: 492)
This opposition might have been one of the reasons why the term “environmental
migration” and “climate migration” have since dominated in the debate and in research.
Obviously, there are additional arguments in the debate over the desirability of legal codes for climate-induced migrants.Nullius in
verba: The SocioNatural As this analysis suggests, the first generation of scholarship on climate change and migration did, by using a
mechanistic “nature” approach, seriously underestimate the adaptive capacities of humans in the face of seminal ecological changes.
The second generation of scholarship focused on a particular kind of agency in light of “society”. The main protagonist has been the
resilient migrant who engages in successful adaptation to climate change. This newer generation has propagated a mostly neoliberal
version of mobility – a mobile and docile migrant who acts in an anticipatory and preventative manner. Moreover, it has given
insufficient attention to the fact that the nexus between climate change and singular events cannot be proven, at least not by natural
science methods. Taking a combined “nature/society” lens (cf. Mooney, Duraiappah & Larigauderie 2011), we see that migration
leaves intact deeper structures of social inequalities and reinforces exclusionary mechanisms (cf. Faist 2016). What is nonetheless
interesting is that this hurdle has not prevented norm entrepreneurs from scandalizing the dire fate of many migrants who engage in
or are even forced into climate-induced mobility. Research needs to be broadened to not only link climate change and migration to
inequalities but to also bring in civil violence. In most cases,
climate change and violence are treated as two
independent threats, each of which potentially contribute to the flow of migrants around
the world. Recent work, however, suggest that climate change and civil violence are, in
fact, causally interrelated. Indeed, we already know that outbursts of civil violence are closely tied to variations in the El
Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) (Hsiang, Meng, & Crane 2011). The probability of a civil conflict erupting doubles during El Niño
versus La Niña years, and the ENSO may have been behind 21 per cent of all civil conflicts between 1950 and 2005. This is quite a
remarkable correlation and variance. Likewise, there is evidence suggesting a link between global
warming and a greater risk of civil violence in much of sub-Saharan Africa (Burke et al. 2009).
Given the potential of climate change to influence the frequency and severity of weather
events such as El Niño, global warming not only has the potential to generate migration
directly through displacement but also indirectly by triggering civil conflicts in affected
areas throughout the world. Again, civil wars trigger even more migration and refugee
flows. With respect to changing perceptions of climate change, migration needs to be placed in the context of general politico-
economic transformations, the most important of which is the mode of organizing economic life. Some analysts speak of a
“metabolic rift” (Foster 1999). This term refers to ecological crisis tendencies under capitalism. Already Karl Marx theorized a
rupture in the metabolic interaction between nature and society/culture which derives from the mode of capitalist production and
the growing rupture between urban and rural regions. He spoke of an “irreparable rift in the interdependent process of social
metabolism” (Marx 1981: 949). Marx held this rift to be irreconcilable with any kind of sustainability (cf. Rosa et al. 2015) and the
exploitation of humans paralleling that of the soil. In a similar vein, another founding figure of sociology, Max Weber, declared that
industrial society would work “bis der letzte Zentner fossilen Brennstoffs verglüht ist” (“until the last ton of fossil fuel has burnt to
ashes”). However, in the meantime we have learned that, while capitalism has remained a pervasive force, it is “local at all points”
(Latour 1993: 117). It is
exactly on the local scale where conflicts over mitigation and adaptation
to climate change have occurred over the past years, before and after the Paris Climate
summit, far away from spectacular but ultimately inconsequential world gatherings. It has
not been (global) climate governance but (local) climate conflicts which have been propelling some progress in addressing rampant
carbonization. What
needs to be determined in future research is the combination of
responses to climate change which encompasses both exit and voice.>
Climate change displaces millions, causes instability, and will only worsen
with time
In 2009, Antonio Guterres, the then-U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, now the Secretary General
of the U.N., predicted that climate change would become the largest driver of population
displacement, both inside and across national borders.1 8 Climate change is already a major
contributor to migration and displacement, but the chain of causation is complex. 19 It is generally agreed that
climate change is seldom the sole cause of migration and displacement, but that it worsens existing economic,
political, and religious or ethnic tensions, and hits especially hard at populations that
are already vulnerable. 2 0 As one report stated: [h]azard events such as floods and earthquakes create direct physical
threats and immediate impacts that trigger displacement. Drought contributes more indirectly to displacement risk, largely through
the erosion of food and livelihood security among vulnerable populations to the point where fleeing their homes becomes a survival
strategy, often of last resort. Some scholars have attributed particular refugee crises in part to changes in regional climates (though
not necessarily of anthropogenic origin). One well-known study concluded that persistent
drought forced as many
as 1.5 million Syrian farmers to move to overcrowded cities, contributing to social
turmoil and ultimately a civil war that drove hundreds of thousands of people to attempt
to cross the Mediterranean into Europe. 2 2 Drought, combined with ethnic tensions,
government policies, and other factors, led to the crisis in the Darfur of Sudan in the
mid-2000s, though the importance of drought is contested. 2 3 Even the United States has experienced
massive internal migration as a result of climate disruption-the "dust bowl" of the 1930s caused millions of people to flee the Great
Plains(as unforgettably depicted in John Steinbeck's 1939 novel The Grapes of Wrath).24 Climate
change can cause
displacement in multiple ways. The most prominent are extreme flooding, and water shortages and
desertification that threaten food supplies and livelihoods. 2 5 Often, these conditions
combine with existing poverty and political instability, leading to worsened situations.
The direct causal connection between climate change and displacement is less difficult to establish for one particular impact: sea
level rise. 2 7 If
the seas have risen above a location's land surface, its population has no
choice but to move, except in those rare places (such as the Netherlands) that can afford to build sea walls and other
protections. Due to uncertainties concerning the rate of climate change, the ability of
different societies to cope with this change, the availability of new homelands, and other
factors, no reliable estimates exist of the number of people who will be displaced partly
or wholly by climate change. 2 9 However, several estimates put the number of people in the
hundreds of millions by the middle of this century. 3 0 One 2009 article presented these estimates from
various sources, using differing-and sometimes not fully disclosed-methodologies: * People at risk of sea-level rise by 2050: 162
million * People at risk of droughts and other climate change events by 2050: 50 million * People potentially at-risk of being
displaced because of desertification: 135 million * Refugees due to by climate change by 2050: 250 million[] * People estimated to
become permanently displaced 'climate refugees' by 2050: 200 million[]. A 2010 article, after reviewing numerous available
estimates, concluded, "[t]he total number of people at risk of becoming climate refugees by 2050 could well be around or over 200
million, even though this number is a rough estimate with a large margin of error." These, and all other estimates, involve
considerable degrees of speculation; the number of uncertainties and variables is daunting.3 3 However, even the orders of
magnitude involved are frightening. 3 4 One 2016 study examined how many people would have to move and how far they would
have to move if global mean temperatures rise by 2 0 C, and if they would need to go to a place that has the approximate
temperatures of today in order to maintain similar agricultural patterns. 3 5 The study calculated that by the end of the century,
about 12.5% of the world's population (mostly in the tropical areas of Latin America, Africa, and South Asia) would have to migrate
more than 1000 km, and 33.9% would have to migrate more than 500 km.3 6 If, as the United Nations estimates, world population
in 2100 is about 11.2 billion, 3 7 the resulting numbers are jaw-dropping. Of course, these numbers may be too high because many
people could find ways to adapt to the changing climate. On the other hand, the numbers may be too low because (as discussed
below) global temperatures in 2100 may well considerably exceed a 2 0 C rise. The country with the largest number of people
endangered by climate change is probably Bangladesh. 3 9 "A three-foot rise in sea levels[, which seems likely by the end of the
century,] would submerge almost 20[%] of the entire country and displace more than 30 million people"; and if the rise is five to six
feet, perhaps 50 million people would be displaced. 4 0 Sea level rise is not the only climate-related threat facing Bangladesh; the
country also faces risks from extreme heat, river flooding, riverbank erosion, salinization of groundwater resources, loss of water
from the Himalayas and Hindu Kush glaciers, and decreased agricultural productivity. All this means that by
the end of the
century, climate change could displace several times the number of people who are
currently displaced. Unless there are advance planning and preparations, we can expect to see further
international crises over where people fleeing uninhabitable areas will go, as well as
degrading and dangerous conditions in the inevitable refugee camps and informal
settlements.
Sea level rises from climate change leads to drought and death – complete
relocation is key
Pilkey et al 16 – professor of Earth and Ocean science at Duke, geologist in the State of Washington’s Department of
Ecology, and professor of mechanical engineering at Queen’s Univesity (Orrin, Linda, and Keith respectively, “Coastal Calamaties”,
“Retreat from a rising sea”, 2 May 2016)//abaime
Atolls are coral islands, whose origin Charles Darwin famously discerned in 1835. The coral reefs once formed a ring around volcanic
peaks that extended above the ocean surface. As the seafloor spread, the volcanoes moved away from the mid-ocean ridge into
deeper water to become submerged. The reefs, however, continued building upward and maintained the ring shape that
characterizes the atolls of today. These ring-shaped islands surround an interior lagoon. Darwin got it all right, except he didn’t
know about the phenomenon of seafloor spreading, which was discovered 150 years after his participation in the voyage of the
Beagle. Because the offshore slope (the sides of the volcano) is steep, storm surges there are small. But it
takes only a small
storm surge to flood a low-lying atoll. Typically on the open-ocean side of the atoll’s rim
is a continuous ridge 15 to 20 feet high, which is made up of coral reef fragments and
debris tossed up in storms. The ridge usually is not habitable because it is frequently overwashed by storms. Rather, the
living space is a flat area behind the ridge, typically 6 feet or so above sea level. Table 6 lists some of the atoll island nations and
communities in the Pacific Ocean. The one exception is the Maldives atolls, which are in the Indian Ocean. All the numbers are
approximate, and the number of islands often includes small, uninhabited islands. The populations indicate the number of
environmental refugees who soon will need to be relocated in one way or another. In total, more than a million people
live on atolls or other low oceanic islands in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Some of the
atoll nations listed as independent have a semiformal relationship with a larger country. For example, the Marshall Islands have a
“free association” with the United States, which provides defense and social services plus grants for infrastructure assistance. New
Zealand also has special relationships with some of the island nations. These free-association relationships are likely to be a factor in
funding future relocation. Perhaps the biggest
single problem currently facing the people on these
islands is the precarious source of acceptable drinking water. The freshwater lens under
the islands floats on top of seawater in the reef-rock substrate. As the sea level rises, the freshwater
lens thins and, in some places, has disappeared altogether. That is, the contact or interface between freshwater and saltwater moves
pollution of this
upward as the sea level rises, contaminating wells. Not only is the shrinking lens problematic, but
groundwater from surface contamination infiltration is a frequent occurrence. An
alternative source of drinking water is the collection of rainwater, but the larger towns
cannot depend on this source. In addition, the salty groundwater leads to the destruction of food crops like coconuts
and the root crops taro and pulaka. In some communities, people have taken up planting in old oil drums because of the poor soil
conditions caused by the intrusion of saltwater. The growing number of unsanitary conditions on these small, shrinking islands,
many with densely packed populations, is adding to the problem. Some visitors report very poor sanitary conditions throughout and
around densely populated villages where trash and piles of dog, pig, and human excrement abound. The problem is especially
serious in the larger towns like Majuro in the Marshalls and Tarawa in Kiribati (more in chapter 9). The atolls’
solution to
sea-level rise must be more than retreat. It will be complete abandonment and complete
relocation, and not merely to another atoll. Relocation will mean moving body and soul
to new lands, usually the mainland, with strange vegetation, unfamiliar foods, and
unfamiliar customs. The islanders’ future will not be easy and brings into serious
question the future existence of island governments and culture.
Climate change in LDCs destroy water availability and food production and
promote regional tensions – migration is the only adaptive strategy
Nawrotzki 14 Raphael Nawrotzki is a postdoctoral associate for the University of Minnesota Population Center on the
Terra Populus project (Raphael, “Climate Migration and Moral Responsibility,” 4/2/14. NCBI,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5035111/) // SR
Climate change is likely to increase weather extremes across the globe (IPCC
2007). The nature and strength of these weather events will vary between geographical locations. The following sections present
different effects of climate change on the livelihoods of rural households in less developed countries (LDCs). It is a well established
phenomenon that an increase in the global mean temperature leads to the increase in
atmospheric moisture content (Kundzewicz et al. 2010). Through this mechanism, climate change has
begun to alter the monsoon onset in south Asia, impacting the magnitude, frequency,
and duration of floods (Douglas 2009). These variations pose major problems to the local
livelihoods of farmers, because agriculture is highly sensitive to changes in the rainfall
regime. For example, the 1998 floods in Bangladesh led to a lower food intake alongside
deteriorating human health conditions especially among children (Del Ninno and Lundberg 2005).
Sea level rise Sea-level rise has the power to impact a large number of people (Nicholls 2004),
based on the global tendency to settle close to the ocean. For example, already in 2003,
more than half of the world population lived within 200 kilometers of a coastline (Creel
2003). Small island nations are particularly vulnerable to sea level rise. The best known case is
probably Tuvalu (Farbotko and McGregor 2010), a pacific island state, which is in danger of inundation if the sea-level continues to
rise, due to its low elevation (Dickinson 1999, Yamano et al. 2007). On
other islands, such as the coral atolls of
Micronesia, sea-level-rise events have led to coastal erosion, shoreline inundation, and
saltwater intrusion, resulting in crop losses and contamination of freshwater sources,
severely impacting local livelihoods (Keim 2010). Droughts and decrease in rainfall It has been
projected that climate change will cause an increase in droughts and desertification (IPCC
2007). Especially in sub-Saharan Africa, these tendencies have received scientific coverage. For
example, Elagib
(2009) found a trend towards intensifying and more recurrent droughts over a time
period of 34 years in Sudan. Zeng and Yoon (2009) used a coupled atmosphere-ocean-
land model to predict an expansion of the world’s major subtropical deserts by 34% at
the end of the 21st century. Droughts and an increase in desertification are likely to lead to food insecurity (Stringer
2009), requiring people to respond with changes in livelihood strategies (Nielsen and Reenberg 2010). Water shortage due to
melting glaciers Global warming is impacting the water supply in countries like Nepal and
China. Through the ongoing retreat of major glaciers, which serve as giant water storage
units, the flow of rivers will gradually decrease (Shen 2010, Chalise et al. 2003). In addition, global
warming has begun to reduce annual snowfall. Both effects, will severely impact the
water availability and food production in areas such as the Karnali region of
Western Nepal (Chalise et al. 2003). Tropical storms Finally, climate change has been related to an
increase in oceans’ water surface temperatures with a trend toward more frequent and
intense hurricanes (Webster et al. 2005). In May 2008, cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar. It killed
thousands of people and destroyed the majority of the rice fields. Survivors of the
cyclone faced a severe food shortage and tried to escape to bordering countries
such as India and Thailand, which created regional tension (Rice 2008) Listed above are
only a few examples that illustrate the range of impacts of climate change on LDCs. Its adverse impact will be felt
most by the rural poor who depend heavily on agriculture as the main source of
household income. In the face of a decline in livelihood options, migration becomes a significant
adaptive strategy at the household level (McLeman and Hunter 2010). Even though the IPCC stated as early
as 1990 that human migration might be the greatest single impact of climate
change (Brown 2008), the link between climate change and migration is an area of research that is only emerging slowly.
Henry et al. (2004) broke ground in the study of population environment interactions and proved a significant association between
reduction in rainfall and out-migration for Burkina Faso. Similarly,
some other studies have linked
migration to droughts in Africa (Findley 1994, Nielsen and Reenberg 2010). In addition, a recent study
undertaken in Nepal provides evidence that environmental change increases migration,
especially short-distance moves (Massey et al. 2010).
Displaced climates refugees spur political instability and regional conflict

through mass energy consumption, environmental degradation, and
depletion of local economies in developing countries
In order to provide for their energy needs, refugees are reliant on the natural resources of the host
state, whose management is not a straightforward process in many situations.204 The
lack of reliable energy delivery has the capability to affect the surrounding
environment and the local economies of the respective country.205 Moreover, countries
hosting a large number of refugees, already deal with deforestation, resource stress,
severe energy access challenges, fuel pollution and high fuel costs.206 The influx of
refugees can result in environmental degradation, economic instability and, in some
cases, violent conflict due to exceeding the “‘carrying capacity of their environment[]’”
and a governance system that is no longer perceived “as effective and legitimate.”207
Refugees can often have disastrous results on the environment which may include
“deforestation, soil erosion, and depletion and pollution of water resources.”208 The
initial environmental damage caused by an influx of refugees begins in the
refugee camps where refugees rely on the surrounding natural resources to
sustain themselves.209 This reliance on local natural resources will continue throughout the period that refugees
spend in the camp, as there will always be some commodities that cannot be given by external donors. An influx of
refugees and their energy consumption and production patterns can also impact the
economic development of a host country.211 Refugees settled in camps are more
dependent upon “assistance from humanitarian agencies” than self-settled refugees.212
Therefore, the economic impact of refugees settled in camps is not typically felt by the
local population, while the impact of self-settled refugees in urban areas, where refugees
are usually more active in the economic structure and dependent on the economic
networks, is greater.213 An influx of refugees can decrease local wages and put a
substantial strain on the infrastructure and availability of land.214 As the majority of
refugees migrate to neighboring developing countries, the need to provide welfare services forces local authorities to divert resources
and manpower from local populations to assist refugees, which can delay their own development.215
Although a
sustainable energy intervention for refugees can result in immeasurable economic
benefits for both refugees and the host population — as explained above — energy use
and energy delivery in camps and outside of camps by refugees is conducted in an
unsustainable way.216 For example, even construction of an energy efficient
settlement for refugees could yield massive economic benefits on a longer
time scale. Conflicts can erupt as refugees put a strain on the host state’s environment,
energy resources, economy, “and change the ethnic composition of
receiving areas.”217 Some studies indicate that “countries highly dependent on natural
resources, as well as those experiencing high rates of deforestation and soil degradation
or low per capita availability of arable land and freshwater, have higher than average
risks of conflict.”218 As refugees flee, mostly to developing countries, the
security implications are more pronounced due to the possible conditions in those
host states, particularly poverty, political instability, already existing conflict,
limited resources, and “inadequate access to information or resources.”219 Additionally,
unanswered concerns of local communities regarding refugees’ environmental, energy,
and economic impacts on host states can cause friction and lead to possible
conflicts.220 However, the impacts of refugees’ energy use are not
constricted to a particular area, community, or even to the present time.
They can have impacts that can affect generations to come. Future people have
the right to enjoy an environment undisturbed by the damage that the employed energy
systems can inflict over time. Decisions made today on the energy use patterns of
refugees and the distribution of impacts will be significant even decades from now. By
addressing the procedural and distributive gaps for refugees, we will not be only
improving the living conditions of current refugees and host communities, but also of
future generations.
Climate change and refugees causes regional instability through additional
stress on developing countries—creates global conflict, risk of terrorism,
and failed states
Stewart 14- Mark G. Stewart is Professor of Civil Engineering and Director of the Centre for
Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at The University of Newcastle in Australia. He is co-author of
Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Engineering Systems (Chapman & Hall, 1997, and Japanese edition in
2003), and has published more than 400 technical papers and reports. He has 30 years of experience in
probabilistic risk and vulnerability assessment of infrastructure and security systems that are subject to
man-made and natural hazards. Professor Stewart has received extensive Australian Research Council
support, including an Australian Professorial Fellowship, to develop probabilistic risk-modelling
techniques for infrastructure subject to military and terrorist explosive blasts, and cost-benefit
assessments of aviation security, policing, and counter-terrorism protective measures for critical
infrastructure, “Climate Change and National Security: Balancing the Costs and Benefits”, January 2014,
146-148,
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mark_Stewart8/publication/301293584_Climate_Change_and_
National_Security_Balancing_the_Costs_and_Benefits/links/5710466f08aefb6cadaaa7e9/Climate-
Change-and-National-Security-Balancing-the-Costs-and-Benefits.pdf, // Suraj P
It is argued that an increased likelihood of droughts, floods, famine, disease, loss of

habitable land, damage to housing and infrastructure, and other large-scale natural and
humanitarian disasters will place additional stress on communities and
governments. If climate projections are accurate, that increased stress could be a
“threat multiplier,” leading to “widespread political instability” and “failed
states,” while fostering “the conditions for internal conflicts, extremism, and
movement toward authoritarianism and radical ideologies.” It is maintained that
the logical outcomes of those dire scenarios mean “the U.S. may be drawn more
frequently into these situations . . . to help provide stability before conditions
worsen and are exploited by extremists” and “the U.S. and Europe may experience mounting pressure to accept
large numbers of immigrant and refugee populations.”53 Retired Admiral T. Joseph Lopez gloomily predicts that “climate change
will provide the conditions that will extend the war on terror.”54 That prediction, of course, assumes business as usual with no
efforts to mitigate CO2 emissions, to implement climate adaptation strategies, to develop new technologies, or to achieve
improvements in wealth creation and human capital. It also
assumes that terrorism thrives in “failed
states.” Although that conclusion is true in some cases, a 2008 Congressional Research
Service report finds the opposite also holds true: “Terrorists have been known to exploit
safe havens in non-weak as well as weak states. The Political Instability Task Force, a research group
commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency, found in a 2003 report that terrorists operate in both ‘caves’ (i.e., failed states,
where militant groups can exist with impunity) and ‘condos’ (i.e., states that have the infrastructure to support the international flow
of illicit people, funds, and information).”55 Moreover, after the costly enterprises in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
United
States and its allies will likely resist the temptation to get drawn into peacekeeping and
stabilization missions to rescue “failed states.” As former secretaries of state Henry A. Kissinger and James
A. Baker III attested in 2011: “We cannot be the world’s policeman. We cannot use military force to meet every humanitarian
challenge that may arise.”56 Moreover, other foreign policy levers—such as financial aid for transformational development, civilian
stabilization, and reconstruction assistance; the fragile states strategy of the U.S. Agency for International Development; and
military, police, and counterterrorism assistance57—will typically produce better outcomes than direct military intervention.
There is additional concern about refugees. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees,
in 2011 there were 15.2 million refugees, 26.4 million internally displaced persons, and
895,000 applications for asylum. Conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria have added to
those figures. Sea-level rise in river deltas has the potential to displace tens of millions
of inhabitants and might threaten the very existence of small island states. Maxine Burkett
from the East–West Center in Honolulu estimates a total of 200 million to 250 million
climate migrants by 2050, although some of those projections are based on “heroic extrapolations.”58 Moreover,
Jon Barnett and Michael Webber from the University of Melbourne suggest “that social processes linked to
poverty and marginality as well as the treatment of migrants may be more
important determinants of the amount and consequences of migration than
environmental change.”59 However, if intracountry and intercountry migration accelerates because of climate
change, it would most likely happen in a gradual manner and not in any sudden exodus of refugees more commonly associated with
war zones. The populations of small island states are by definition small—fewer than 3 million people reside in Pacific Islands, for
example. More ethnic Pacific Islanders live abroad than reside in their home countries; therefore, “the greatest concentrations of
Pacific Islanders” are “in cities such as Auckland, Sydney, Honolulu, and Los Angeles.”60 If all Pacific Islanders were to become
“climate refugees” because of rising sea levels over the next 30 to 50 years, and if they were all to be resettled in the United States,
Australia, and New Zealand, those countries would need to lift their existing immigration levels by only 5 to 8 percent.61 Migration,
whether voluntary or forced, is a perennial feature of life. The International Organization for Migration estimates that the total
number of migrants is about 1 billion worldwide today.62 Australia, Canada, and the United States accepted nearly 70 million
migrants in the 20th century, and today they welcome nearly 1.5 million new migrants each year.63 Europe accepted 1.7 million
migrants in 2011. Immigration to the 34 member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) totaled 5.3 million in 2011.64 Although climate change may provide a tipping point for mass migration, it is unlikely to
occur. Movement of people across borders happens regularly on a large scale. Assuming Burkett’s upper figure of 250 million
climate migrants over the next 40 to 50 years, and further assuming that they were all to be resettled in just the OECD member
countries, then 5 million additional migrants per year could be accommodated by Australia, Canada, Europe, the United States, and
other OECD member countries by doubling their existing migrant quotas. That might not be politically palatable to some, but it is
not an insurmountable problem. Moreover,
issues of food and energy security, as well as mass
migration, can be ameliorated by funding climate adaptation measures in the
developing world. Adaptation measures to reduce the vulnerability of infrastructure,
coastal zones, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and human health to climate-change
hazards would include (a) flood-control dikes and levees, (b) dams, (c) cyclone shelters,
(d) storm- and flood-resistant housing, (e) improved communications infrastructure, (f)
resettlement of populations to lower-risk zones, and (g) improved health care. In 2010, the
World Bank estimated the cost to the developing world of adapting to a world that is warmer by approximately four degrees
Fahrenheit by 2050 at about $75 billion per year.65 That figure represents less than 0.2 percent of world GDP and 55 percent of
official development assistance from OECD countries.66 U.S. foreign aid was approximately $30 billion in 2011, or 23 percent of aid
provided by OECD member countries. If the 55 percent increase in foreign aid is shared equally by all developed nations, the U.S.
foreign aid contribution would need to increase by roughly $16.5 billion per year, and
aid from the rest of the developed world would increase by $58.5 billion per year.
Increasing foreign aid may be an overly optimistic solution given the “sorry track
record” of foreign aid where governance is poor,67 but investing in targeted adaptation
measures may have a better chance of success. Mitigating CO2 emissions and investing in research and
development (R&D) of new technologies for emission reduction and carbon sequestration are another option to ameliorate the
effects of climate change. One study suggests that a global investment of $18 billion per year in “R&D and mitigation” could halve
“business as usual” CO2 emissions by 2100, reducing the impact of climate change by at least 60 percent.68 If that is true and if the
burden of that investment were shared by OECD member countries in proportion to their GDP, the U.S. contribution would be
around $5 billion per year, equivalent to a tax of only $1 per ton of CO2.
Climate refugees cause resource shortages and destabilize entire nations –
empirics
Stevenson 18 - Associate Professor of International Relations at the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (Hayley, “Climate
Conflicts: Myth or Reality?”, 5 March 2018, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/climate-conflicts-myth-or-reality)//abaime
The specter of water wars has long loomed large in political and popular imaginations.
With the end of the Cold War, fresh concerns emerged that future wars would be fought not over ideology but over natural resources.
The alliteratively appealing phrase of “water wars” began rolling off the tongue as United
Nations leaders and
politicians made bold claims about the inevitable carnage that resource scarcity would
bring. Climate change heightens these concerns as the gap widens between what science
tells us is necessary and what politics tells us is feasible.
Climate change poses multiple risks with the potential to trigger tensions within and
across nation-states. In some places flooding and the rise of sea levels will threaten
homes and essential infrastructure; shrinking access to water for irrigation and
consumption will undermine rural livelihoods, especially in semi-arid areas; and
warming, drought, flooding, and changes in rain patterns will disrupt food systems and
exacerbate food insecurity. The severity of these risks rises with higher global temperatures. In other words, risks are
directly related to the present scale of mitigation action. So what can we expect in the years ahead? Are climate wars on the horizon,
or do they largely lie in the realm of cli-fi fantasy?
History can be a guide to the future, so what do past experiences tell us about the relationship between environmental change and
conflict? In the case of water, we see a mismatch between assumptions and evidence. Common wisdom holds that states—and
perhaps individuals—will resort to conflict to secure their own access to scarce
resources, like freshwater. Research by environmental scientist Peter Gleick in the early 1990s was the first to back up
this assumption with historical analysis. He predicted that growth in population and demand, combined with uncertain supply,
would increase the likelihood of international military action to secure supplies.
The Middle East, as the world’s most water scarce region, provides numerous cases—both historic and
contemporary—to support the hypothesis. Fourteen centuries ago, the King of Assyria reportedly seized water
wells to weaken Arabia and gain strategic advantage. More recently, the Jordan River basin has been a hot spot.
Animosities in the region have run high since Israel was formed in 1948. But it was the Arab countries’ attempt to divert headwaters
of the Jordan River away from Israel in the 1960s that pushed them towards violent conflict. In 1967, shortly before war broke out,
the Israeli Prime Minister warned that water is essential for the country’s survival and they would use “all means necessary” to
secure water flows. Over six days, Israel then bombed a Jordanian dam on an important tributary to the Jordan River and seized
large swathes of upstream territory; and in the process expanded its access to freshwater.
But some scholars remained skeptical that examples from the Middle East reflected a more general connection between resource
scarcity and war. Studies out of Norway showed that most of the conflicts Gleick identified were only verbal conflicts, threats of
violence, or water-related violence in already-occurring wars. In other words, they were not cases of water scarcity triggering armed
conflict. Furthermore, in most cases, water was only an instrument of war or a strategic target, not the objective of fighting in the
first place.
Further research at the University of Oregon categorized 2,000 international interactions over war and found that cooperative
actions were far more prominent than conflictual ones. Cooperative water bodies have even survived conflict and war between
water-sharing countries in various parts of Asia (such as during the Vietnam War). It turns out that violent conflict specifically over
water is a fairly rare and isolated phenomenon. Democratic regimes, international trade relations, and membership of cooperative
international institutions all reduce the likelihood of conflict. This “democratic peace thesis” should not prompt a Pollyanna vision of
the future, but it should tame fears about the likelihood of climate change driving conflict.
Of course, we cannot know that the future will reflect the past: irrespective
of whether scarcity was a driver of
historical conflicts it may well be a driver of future ones. Water is non-substitutable in
agriculture, human wellbeing, and some manufacturing and electricity generation. The
world population is estimated to increase by 83 million people per year until 2100, when it will peak at roughly 11 billion. So as long
as demands increase, water will become ever scarcer and create conditions we haven’t seen in the past. We also cannot rule out the
potential for sub-national conflict, especially in areas where ethnic and regional tensions are already high (such as along the Nile and
Indus rivers), and where local populations compete with multinational companies for dwindling resources. Mining companies are
profligate water users in arid and semi-arid countries, and this is likely to provoke further tensions in the years ahead.
In Peru, melting glaciers and warming temperatures are reducing the water available for agriculture in the Andean highlands. This
provokes clashes with mining companies, which have privileged access to water and a reputation for contaminating common water
supplies. This problem is not unique to Peru. As climate change threatens water supply and quality, we will likely see more intense
debates about how to use this resource, which in turn places greater pressure on states’ capacity to peacefully and fairly manage
competing demands. At the international level, multilateral institutions can promote cooperation and stifle tensions, but these
institutions are designed to manage relations among states, not among sub-national groups, or among communities and firms.
Events in Syria have ignited fears about climate change driving civil war. In 2015, Time magazine
presented the “surge of migrants” crossing into Europe as foretelling a future crisis of climate
refugees. With everyone from Barack Obama to Prince Charles repeating the claim that unprecedented severe
drought in Syria triggered civil tension and ultimately civil war, it quickly became
accepted wisdom. But here too we should avoid hasty assumptions, as researchers from the United Kingdom and Germany
concluded that the “drought migration-civil war thesis” rests on weak evidence.
Of course, whether or not migration is fueled by conflict or other climate-related destitution, human
displacement is
now inevitable in the years ahead. The scale of displacement will depend on the
mitigation and adaptation actions put in place now. The attention of the international
policy community should be directed to this question of “human security,” irrespective
of the risk of climate conflicts in the years ahead.
Ext. Disease IL
Unresolved climate migration exacerbates infectious disease, food
insecurity, and disruption of healthcare
Pilkey et. al 17 (Orrin H. Pilkey is James B. Duke Professor Emeritus, Division of Earth and Ocean Sciences, at Duke
University. His books include A Celebration of the World's Barrier Islands and Useless Arithmetic: Why Environmental Scientists
Can't Predict the Future, Linda Pilkey-Jarvis is a geologist at the Washington State Department of Ecology, where she helps manage
the state's oil-spills program. She is the coauthor, with Orrin H. Pilkey, of Useless Arithmetic: Why Environmental Scientists Can't
Predict the Future, Keith C. Pilkey is an administrative law judge with the Social Security Administration. He has an undergraduate
degree from Appalachian State University and a juris doctor from Wake Forest University School of Law. He is coauthor, with Orrin
H. Pilkey, of Global Climate Change: A Primer, Cities on the Brink from Retreat from a Rising Sea, pg. 65-66//waters)
Extreme events in crowded urban areas will disrupt health care, public-health services
and the availablility of fresh food and waterthereby exacerbating underlying health
conditions and the ability to control infectious diseases. The rise in sea level and its
associated floods will compromise food security and increase malnutrition, spreading
infectious diseases, causing food poisoning, and exposing people to pathogens as sewage
systems overflow. These changes will likely contribute to mental stress and post-traumatic stress disor- der (PTSD). The
impact in urban areas will be greater in those less wealthy countries lacking adequate
infrastructure and capacity in health services and public health. The 2014 World Health Organization’s “Report from the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)” is the fifth in a series of WHO reports on the effect of climate change on health.
The report outlines with “high confidence” the long-term risks to human health related to climate change and sea-level rise. In urban
areas, the most likely risks are (NIPCC). The NIPCC has countered by noting potentially positive outcomes of climate change and
sea-level rise, such as fewer cold weather–related deaths. But even this group acknowledges that sea-
level rise will make
existing poverty-related health problems even worse. According to the United Nations’ predictions in its
2013 “World Population Prospects” report, by 2050 one in six people will be age 65 or older, which is double the proportion today.
Between 2010 and 2050, this population in the United States is expected to increase by 111 percent, and by 181 percent in the world
(1.5 billion worldwide). About
54 percent of the world’s population, a number that is expected to
increase to 66 percent by 2050, now live in urban areas. Much of that expected growth
will be in developing countries. In a very thorough study for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), Robert Nicholls and his colleagues compared the relative exposure of the world’s largest port cities to
flooding from rising seas and storm surges, both for today and projected into the year 2070. (The OECD is an international
organization whose member nations share information on trade and economic growth.) The report ranks cities’ vulnerability to a
once-in-a-100-years surge-induced flood based on the economic value of their port and city assets (buildings, transportation, and
utility infrastructure). The OECD study doesn’t account for flood adaptations that could change the impact of the future events.
Using this lens, 60 percent of the world’s assets that are exposed to sea-level rise and flooding are found in three wealthy, developed
countries: the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands (table 1). The report then projected how the top 10 ranked cities would
change by the year 2070. Over the coming decades, the growth and economic development of the largest cities in Asia are key
driving factors in how this list would change.
Ext. Impact Filter / Root Cause
It is empirically a threat multiplier that explains the root cause of global
conflict
Sindico 17 – environmental law professor at the University of Strathclyde (Francesco, “Climate Change and Security”, The
Inaugural Issue a Decade Later, Hein Online, March 2018)//abaime
<The discussion in 2007 at the UNSC on climate change was not an isolated event. It was followed by a meeting in 2011, two in 2015
and a further one in April 2017. These meetings have followed the Arria formula, meant to encourage more informal discussions that
do not necessarily lead to the adoption of formal documents, hence giving countries more space to voice their positions and
concerns. Stemming from such discussions the UN
General Assembly adopted in 2oo9 a Resolution on
'Climate change and its possible security implications', 4 which man dated the Secretary
General to submit a report on the topic of climate change and security,5 which was published
later the same year.6 Rather than providing a clear indication as to whether climate change is indeed to be considered a threat to
peace and international security, and far from clarifying a potential role for the UNSC, these
meetings have, over the
last decade, provided space for soft power and climate diplomacy to push climate
change higher on the UNSC agenda as a 'threat multiplier'. And that is precisely what climate
change is and should be considered. Climate change per se is no threat to peace and international
security, but its negative effects, when coupled with other factors that lead to conflicts
and violence, can make a situation, literally, explosive. An example of this approach comes from Lake
Chad. The UNSC organised a visit to the region in March 2017, which ended with a statement by Mr Rycroft, the UK President of the
UNSC at the time, who framed the causes of tension and conflict in the region in the following way: 'Those are
multifaceted, complex set of problems and require a holistic set of solutions.' Amongst
these multifaceted challenges 'drought and other environmental challenges' were
singled out.7 That same month, UNSC Resolution 2349 (2017) on the Lake Chad refers to climate change in the following
terms: Recognizes the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among
other factors on the stability of the region, including through water scarcity, drought,
desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and emphasizes the need for
adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations
relating to these factors; 8 Only l0 years after the first meeting discussing climate change before the UNSC, the
latter has adopted a legally binding Resolution where it did not shy away from mentioning
climate change and its adverse effects as one of the 'roots causes' of a
conflict, in this case the tension and violence in the Lake Chad region. Interestingly, it does not limit itself to stating that
climate change is a threat multiplier, but it takes a further step and encourages countries and the UN to step up its efforts in terms of
'risk assessment' and 'risk management' strategies. I will show how this last recommendation may well be a potential link with the
current international climate change legal regime.
But before I get there, let us pause and reflect as to whether the past ten years have proved that climate change is indeed a threat
multiplier leading to threats to peace and international security. One of the major conflicts of the last ten years has been increasingly
linked to climate change. According to some authors, the apparent sectarian and political nature of the
Syrian conflict also hides causes directly linked to climate change.9 In 2006, the worse
drought in centuries paved the way for unrest in already crowded cities. Water shortages
and rise in food prices increased tensions and led to violence within the cities where the
unrest and the civil war started. Moving to the African continent, a UNEP report links climate
change to the violent conflict in Darfur. Water scarcity and crops decline in productivity
were hailed as many of the factors exacerbating the already existing tensions.10 Talking about
the Darfur conflict, former UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon referred to it in the following way: 'Amid the diverse
social and political causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at
least in part from climate change.' And on the Arab peninsula, water and climate change have
been said to be at the heart of the ongoing conflict in Yemen.12 Further studies have
highlighted the relationship between extreme climatic conditions and unrest in
countries and regions, such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Northern Africa. The same study
concludes by maintaining that 'natural disasters had the potential to amplify already existing societal tensions and ... thus to further
destabilise several of the world's most conflict prone regions'.1 3 It would be difficult to argue that these past and current conflicts
are directly linked to climate change, but the
past decade has proven that climate change and its
negative effects, water scarcity in particular, pose a considerable threat multiplier to
countries that are already prone to tension for other non-environmental reasons.
This short piece has showed that in the last ten years the UNSC has continued to address climate change as a security issue and has
recently even included it in a Resolution as one of the root factors of a conflict. A brief
overview of tensions and
violence over the past decade, from Syria to Yemen and beyond, confirms climate
change as a threat multiplier. Notwithstanding these developments that seem to align climate change with security,
the role of the UNSC and the response it can take to deal with cli mate change is still unclear. 14 It is hence necessary to better
understand whether the securitisation of the climate discourse has opened up new legal opportunities or raised new legal challenges
outside of the UNSC. I will briefly touch upon three of these legal questions: international litigation, climate refugees, and loss and
damage.>
Climate migration contributes to conflict in a variety of ways

Null and Herzer Risi 17 - Writer/Editor at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and enior
Program Manager in the Environmental Change and Security Program at the Wilson Center (Schuyler and Lauren, ”Climate,
migration, and conflict in a changing world”, 9 October 2017, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/10/climate-migration-and-
conflict-in-a-changing-world)//abaime
Record levels of displacement and accelerating climate change have prompted many to
wonder if the world is headed toward a more violent future. Whether a policymaker, practitioner,
diplomat, or peacebuilder, the nexus of climate change, migration, and conflict is posing
fundamental challenges in myriad ways. The Wilson Center’s study, Navigating Complexity: Climate, Migration,
and Conflict in a Changing World, sets out to provide insights into these challenges and examine policy responses. Climate
change is expected to contribute to the movements of people through a variety of means.
At the same time, there is significant concern climate change may influence the form, type,
and location of violent conflict. Our understanding of these dynamics is evolving quickly and sometimes producing
surprising results. There are, in fact, considerable misconceptions about why people move, how many move, and what effects they
have. While not exhaustive, the authors give a sense of the major lines of thinking and seek to help answer the following questions:
What do we know (and not know) about the links between climate change, migration, and violent conflict? And what can be done to
maximize the potential for constructive outcomes? Interwoven factors Experts
generally agree that the risk of
violent conflict or instability related to climate change-induced migration is highly
dependent on local context. Climatic factors are very difficult to separate from other critical factors in decisions to
move or engage in armed conflict. These economic, political, and social factors will always be key
parts of any analysis of climate change, migration, and conflict. Nevertheless, climate change
and large movements of people clearly present major societal and governance
challenges. Governments, international organizations, and civil society are being asked
to respond, whether they are prepared or not. The report provides a background scan of relevant literature
and an in-depth analysis of the high-profile cases of Darfur and Syria to discern policy-relevant lessons. The study offers five major
takeaways: 1) Labels such as “climate refugees” are misleading, given the current underdevelopment of legal frameworks defining
these terms, lack of formal protections or status, and multiple causes of human mobility. 2) Because the vast majority of migration
and displacement occurs within national borders, strengthening local institutions, including customary institutions, and
encouraging flexibility in resource rights may help enable the peaceful accommodation of new arrivals. The primacy of resource
rights also suggests the principles of environmental peacebuilding can help reduce vulnerability in areas prone to climate problems.
3) Conflicts
where climate change and displacement play substantial roles may begin at
the communal level but can quickly expand beyond. Related peace processes will therefore likely need to be
carried out at multiple spatial and political levels. 4) Movement
in response to environmental change has
a long history, and migration can be a successful and peaceful means of
climate adaptation if enabled by smart policy. Although taking action is essential, simplistic analyses of climate’s
impacts on migration, displacement, and conflict can prompt misdirected responses. Political, economic, and social contexts are as
important to understanding vulnerability as exposure to the physical effects of climate change itself. 5) Some mechanisms for coping
with climate change are tenuous and susceptible to policy change, as in the case of Darfur’s hakura land tenure system, which helped
alleviate resource tensions before it was dismantled. Indeed, climate change responses can contribute to the
displacement of people and social conflict. “Do no harm” should be the operating principle—though not “do
nothing,” as people will adjust to their situation, regardless of how prepared the policy environment is, potentially turning to
destructive responses if faced with few other option
Climate migration uniquely leads to conflict – many warrants

Reuveny 07 – professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University (Rafael, “Climate change-
induced migration and violent conflict”, 2007, https://ac-els-cdn-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/S0962629807000601/1-s2.0-
S0962629807000601-main.pdf?_tid=aab16bb6-e9eb-4df1-bbdb-
014f146dec85&acdnat=1530987099_20711cbcca36e607983242568dc62148)//abaime
This section argues that climate

change-induced migration can promote conflict in areas receiving
migrants, the intensity of which may vary across cases. The process leading from migration to conflict works
through four channels, which may act concurrently. In this conceptual model, conflict is more likely when two or more of the
following channels work together facing certain auxiliary conditions. Competition The arrival of environmental
migrants can burden the economic and resource base of the receiving area, promoting native-
emigrant contest over resources. Pressures are expected to rise with the number of migrants and residents, particularly
when resources are scarce in the receiving area and property rights are underdeveloped. The excess demand for
resources may also generate lateral pressure, expansion of economic and political activities
beyond the region’s or state’s borders in order to acquire resources, which increases the risk of
conflict. Ethnic tension When environmental migrants and residents belong to different ethnic
groups, the migration may promote tension. Residents may feel threatened, host countries may
fear separatism, migrants may attempt to reunify with their home country, and residents may
respond aggressively. Situations involving long-standing ethnic disputes between migrants and residents are likely to be
particularly prone to conflict. Distrust Environmental migration may generate distrust between the area
of the migration’s origin and host area. For example, the migrants’ origin country may suspect that the receiving
country accepts migrants in order to upset the ethnic balance in the origin. The receiving government may suspect
that the origin seeks to penetrate the host, while the origin side may resent actual or perceived mistreatment of
migrants by the receiving side. Fault lines The conflict may also follow existing socioeconomic fault lines.
For example, migrant pastoralists and resident farmers may compete over land, or migrants and
residents may compete over jobs. Additionally, migration from rural to urban areas another fault line presents
competing effects. Rebels may mobilize poor and frustrated rural migrants to challenge the state,
which may respond with force. However, urban settings may offer migrants more opportunities,
defusing tensions. Auxiliary conditions Whereas developed economies can absorb migrants in
various sectors, underdeveloped economies, reliant on the environment for survival, are limited
in this regard, particularly if their resources are scarce. Therefore, they are more prone to
conflict due to the arrival of environmental migrants. Political instability and civil strife in the
receiving area also increase the likelihood of conflict. For example, migrants may join antagonizing groups or
intensify the violence through any of the above channels. R. Reuveny / Political Geography 26 (2007) 656e673 659 It is apparent
that thelogic of this model applies to both climate change-induced and ordinary migration. What
sets the former migration apart from the latter is its scope and speed. When migration
flows are small and slow, migrants can be absorbed more smoothly, lessening the likelihood of
conflict. Thus far, climate change has induced slow changes, but its effects are expected to include
evermore frequent and intense droughts and storms. Quick changes of this type can push many to migrate
quickly, especially when they depend on the environment for livelihood. In this case, the
forces promoting conflict in
the receiving area may be stronger, ceteris paribus. It should also be recalled that while causation in this model flows
from migration to conflict, conflict itself can promote migration, including that from the receiving area itself. This causal effect is not
discussed here.>
Ext. Ethics Impact
Aiding in the climate refugee crisis reduces suffering and human trafficking
– both are an ethical obligation
Climate change represents one of the most profound injustices in today's society, for
those who will suffer the most, those displaced from their homes, are the poorest among
us- those who contributed the least to the excess energy use that is at the root of much of
the climate problem. 1 28 There is an urgent need for people, regardless of their faith, to heed the call of
Laudato Si' to protect the environment and reduce the suffering of the least fortunate. Lawyers
have a particular responsibility to act on this sentence in Paragraph 53 of the Encyclical: "[t]he establishment of a legal framework
which can set clear boundaries and ensure the protection of ecosystems has become indispensable, otherwise the new power
structures based on the techno-economic paradigm may overwhelm not only our politics but also freedom and justice." .
Not all discussions are couched in terms of religion and morality. Elizabeth M. Wheaton and colleagues wrote a paper,
"Economics of Human Trafficking," in which they "envision human trafficking as a monopolistically
competitive industry in which traffickers act as intermediaries between vulnerable
individuals and employers by supplying differentiated products to employers. In the human
trafficking market, the consumers are employers of trafficked labour and the products are human beings." 130 They propose
to reduce trafficking both by lowering the supply (making people less vulnerable) and
lowering the demand (by taking legal action against both the traffickers and the
employers, and also by publicizing to the downstream supply chain what goods are
produced using trafficked labor).
The climate refugee crisis effects millions of the least fortunate – they
should be elevated and prioritized
Nawrotzki 14 - postdoctoral associate for the University of Minnesota Population Center (Raphael, “Climate Migration and
Moral Responsibility”, “Ethics, Policy, and Environment”, Taylor and Francis Online)//abaime
The high standard of living in all major industrialized societies depends on a large
amount of fossil fuel combustion. This has resulted in the emission of substantial amounts of CO2 in the
atmosphere. The increase in the atmospheric abundance of CO2 and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) alters the energy
balance of the climate system, and causes a variety of natural phenomena such as
increased desertification, more severe droughts, floods, tropical cyclones, more frequent
wildfires, rising sea levels and melting glaciers. According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner of
Human Rights, poor people from developing countries will suffer earliest and most seriously
from climate change even though they have contributed the least to its emergence. A
common strategy for humans to escape the consequences of a changing climate—such as
malnutrition, disease, or even death—is human migration. The numbers of climate
change migrants is likely to increase substantially later in the twenty-first century, with
estimations ranging from 50 million to 1 billion displaced people. Despite the significance of the
issue of climate migration, only a few articles have touched on its ethical implications.This article sets out to begin filling this gap by
using a justice claim approach rooted in the utilitarian school of thought that highlights the causal link between anthropogenic
climate change and migration.
Climate refugees become invisible in their suffering – legal refugee status
via the plan is key
The lack of a solid empirical foundation for the causal link between climate change and migration might explain why environmentally
displaced people are not recognized under international law, and are therefore invisible
Often, they fall through the cracks of international refugee and immigration policies. A
major obstacle to legal recognition is the lack of an officially accepted definition of who qualifies as a climate migrant/refugee. However, some
unofficial definitions are available: The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines environmental migrants as ‘persons or groups of
persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions,
are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or
abroad’ Even stronger
legal protection would result from ascribing refugee status to
environmentally displaced individuals. El-Hinnawi described three major types of environmental refugee: (1) Those
temporarily dislocated due to disasters, whether natural or anthropogenic; (2) Those permanently displaced due to drastic environmental
changes, such as the construction of dams; (3) Those who migrate based on the gradual deterioration of environmental conditions. Although
theoretically appealing, this classification does not allow distinguishing between migration for environmental reasons and migration for
economic reasons, especially for El-Hinnawi's third category. Adding to the complexity, environmental problems are themselves caused by
population-related factors. For example, unsustainable natural resource extraction, as well as population growth and related increases in
consumption patterns, are factors that contribute to environmental degradation and may subsequently influence migration dynamics. As such,
economic considerations interact in complex ways with environmental factors and population growth, leading to a certain migration outcome
based on the specific cultural, historical, political, and geospatial context.
Despite these complexities, some countries have established legal provisions to protect environmentally motivated migrants and refugees. In
member states of the European Union (EU), temporary protection can be applicable in cases of environmental displacement under Article 2(c)
of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD). In addition, the principle of non-refoulement under the Qualification Directive (Article 21, sub-
paragraph 1) may provide some basic protection against returning refugees to an area where their lives are under threat due to dangerous
environmental conditions. However, these laws apply only in cases of natural disasters, not for slow-onset hazards and degradation of peoples'
livelihoods. Although, a paradigm shift seems to take place at the office of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), which
acknowledged in a recent policy document that ‘some movements likely to be promoted by climate change could indeed fall within the
traditional refugee law framework, bringing them within the ambit of international or regional refugee instruments, or complementary forms of
protection, as well as within UNHCR's mandate. But at the same time, UNHCR cautions that further empirical research is needed prior to
possible legal changes.
Besides the lack of empirical research and a clear legal standing, the problem of climate
migration has received only superficial coverage in the philosophical literature. Thus, the
remainder of this article investigates the ethical issues of climate migration with a focus on causality.
Acknowledging climate refugees is key – millions would be saved

The question of climate migration is surely underemphasized in contemporary writings

on environmental philosophy, given its political and humanitarian importance. Millions
of lives among the poor in developing countries could be positively affected if climate
migrants/refugees were to be recognized under international law. Acknowledging the causal link
between GHG emission in MDCs, climate change induced livelihood destruction in
LDCs, and climate migration might help in the justification of greatly needed policies
and programs to address the problem of climate migrants/refugees.
This paper has used the historical principle to emphasize the importance of causality in
arguing for the admission of climate migrants into one's territory. Not taking causality into account
constitutes a major shortcoming in the current ethical debate surrounding immigration. To be clear, the intention was not to argue
for open borders, but rather to suggest revising
current immigration policies to include
environmental factors and to ease immigration restrictions for climate
migrants/refugees. This paper appeals to countries to take responsibility for whatever harm their behavior has caused to
citizens of other countries. More research is needed to establish the causal link between climate change and human migration in
order to strengthen the empirical foundation of the advanced justice claims. In addition, further work should aim to develop clear
criteria and standards to distinguish climate change induced displacement from other forms of migration.
Besides the development of clear standards to distinguish climate migrants, the paper recommends that policy initiatives begin to
focus on the development of sound climate migrant governance mechanisms Ideally, the management of climate refugee/migration
streams should be conducted by an international authority that should be able to operate independently of country-specific party
politics. This international authority would determine whether the migrant has a legitimate reason for leaving their own country,
based on a set of sound environmental criteria. For eligible individuals, this agency would then decide to which country the
registered climate refugee/migrant should be assigned, taking into account their own wishes, social relationships, language,
occupation, and also the needs and preferences of receiving countries. International governance of climate migration would have the
benefit of allowing for a more even distribution of migrants across receiving nations, facilitation of migration as a coping strategy to
deal with the adverse impacts of climate change and livelihood insecurities, and would help decrease socioeconomic inequalities
between MDCs and LDCs. As a final advantage, an international governance system would provide the institutional platform to
manage claims of moral responsibility within a space devoid of the influence of power
disparity between MDCs and LDCs, and thus would help to increase global equality and
justice.
Displaced Climate Refugee exponentially increase global emissions and

suffer from malnutrition and dire health consequences because they lack
access to secure energy services in host countries
Depending on where refugees are able to migrate, they are usually settled in organized
settlements such as camps or choose to be self-settled, migrating to urban areas, most
often slums.180 One might erroneously think that keeping refugees in camps can restrict their impact on the host state
because environmental damage would be contained to the respective area and refugees would be less likely to use the resources from
the local environment. Similarly, one
might think that relief agencies can provide refugees with all
necessary resources, reducing the economic and cultural impact on the local
community, since they live separately from the host community and are less dependent
on local assistance.181 However, refugees cannot readily be restricted to camps or
isolated from the surrounding community and environment. For example,
deforestation is a major problem around refugee camps, as extensive areas of forest are
used to power the refugee camps each year.182 As a result of the extensive
deforestation, more “families are forced ever further afield in search of firewood in the
absence of alternative sources of fuel,” a process that involves high costs and
security risks.183 Factors like this contribute to the evolution and enhancement of the unsustainable pattern of energy
production and consumption affecting the environment, economy and security of the host state.184 At the same time that camps
have persisted and grown, a parallel trend has seen self-settled refugees in urban areas as a result of the growing number of
displaced persons.185 The impact of the self-settled refugees is more difficult to measure, lacking in empirical studies, in
comparison with the refugees who reside in camps or organized settlements.186 However, the most important difference that we
have to take into consideration when discussing the refugees impacts is that “the pressure and demands imposed by self-settled
refugees on local resources are less concentrated and more widely distributed throughout the receiving region,” which results in a
faster “recovery rate[] of local resources . . . [and] less overall degradation.”187 Many impacts
of climate-refugees on
host states will be similar regardless of whether refugees reside in camps and organized
settlements or are self-settled.188 Whether living in organized settlements or self-
settled, there are currently millions of refugees that “lack access to clean, safe and
secure energy services.”189 Energy services are an area of overlap between humanitarian and development goals,
“since many displaced people face challenges of poverty and energy access similar to those encountered by local populations.”190
Hence, themajority of refugees have “minimal access to energy, with high dependence on
traditional biomass for cooking and no access to electricity,” generating high emissions
relative to the energy consumed, but nevertheless “represent a small proportion of
global emissions.”191 Food rations are usually the main source of income for
the majority of refugees.192 Thus, they “engage in coping strategies,” such as selling their
food rations, in order to afford cooking fuel, which potentially has dire health
consequences such as malnutrition.193 Firewood and charcoal, the commonly used fuels in refugee
camps, vary in cost between being free and being unattainably expensive in camps as compared to fuel sources commonly provided
to locals.194 For example, the majority of camps “in Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda rely on wood for cooking . . . spend[ing] an
average of 31 hours a month” to collect it, seldomly triggering conflicts with the host community.195 Sometime,
in camps,
wood is the only available energy source, also being the most familiar source of energy,
while alternative energy sources, namely “coal, kerosene, liquid propane gas and
electricity, are used more” in cases of urban displacement rather than rural camps.196
However, the demand for wood is influenced also by “the type of wood and stove used and . . . the climate.”197 The energy situation,
particularly the “[l]ack of light and power” in refugee settlements, “drives displaced people to deploy high-risk coping strategies such
as power theft, with its risks of electrocution.”198 Furthermore, in countries with harsh winters, the
lack of insulation
and proper heating can lead to grave health risks.199 In the case of a handful of camps
“connected to the electricity grid, costs per kilowatt-hour (kWh) may be lower than
those of diesel generation . . . [but] total costs may well be higher as [a] more plentiful
energy supply prompts higher consumption.”200 However, for example in Zaatari, a Syrian refugee camp in
Jordan, refugees used to having electricity started connecting informally to the camp’s street lights to power their homes and
businesses, increasing consumption and ultimately costing the UNHCR $8.7 million between 2014 and 2015.201 As a result, some of
the businesses returned to using diesel generators.202 Nevertheless, over the years UNHCR and related partners have been
employing several strategies, such as SAFE, Light Years Ahead, Ikea Foundation’s Brighter Lives for Refugees Campaign, and the
Moving Energy Initiative, adopting and implementing measures to address the issues presented above, like “providing refugees with
fuel-efficient stoves, solar street lighting solar lanterns, and implementing environmental activities such as land rehabilitation.”203
However, there is still more work to be done, as some of these projects are still in their
initial stage, reaching only a handful of refugee settlements, and facing project
implementation challenges such as lack of funding, technical expertise, and cultural
awareness.
The US has an ethical obligation to accept climate immigrants – greenhouse
gas emissions prove
DeGenaro 15 Carey DeGenaro is the Attorney Advisor at Executive Office for Immigration
Review (Carey, “LOOKING INWARD: DOMESTIC POLICY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES AND BEYOND,” University of Colorado Law Review,
Vol. 86, HeinOnline) // SR
Despite disagreements over the details, scholars agree in predicting that there will be a large number
of climate migrants who will significantly impact immigrant-receiving nations. Moreover, as
discussed above, many climate migrants will choose to resettle in the United States.
This raises some important questions: Should the United States welcome this population? If so, why? This Section argues that the
United States is ethically obligated to assist climate migrants because its excessive
greenhouse gas emissions greatly contribute to climate change.
Proving the direct cause of climate change is a unique problem. The effects of different nations' emissions
cannot be differentiated from one another; rather, the impacts of all greenhouse
gas emissions are global. 64 Thus, some might argue that no one should be held responsible for particular climate
events since it is impossible in each instance to prove whose emissions caused them. 65 Scholars address this
dilemma by suggesting that the group of nations with the highest greenhouse gas
emissions should be collectively responsible for addressing the various effects of climate
change, 66 including the challenges faced by displaced populations. In keeping with this logic,
developed nations bear a greater responsibility to address the consequences of climate change. The United States and
the European Union have led the world in greenhouse gas emissions for decades. 67
These greenhouse gas emissions have increased the temperature of the planet and
caused severe disruption to the global ecosystem, and continue to do so today.68
Developed nations' role in changing the global climate system gives rise to an ethical
obligation to shoulder the burden of solving the problem. 69 Thus, although it is
impossible to prove that United States emissions directly caused the climate events that
displaced populations and led them to resettle in the United States, justice and fair
compensation demand that the country assist those displaced persons seeking relief at
its borders.
Scholars also argue that developed nations are obligated to help less developed nations address climate change because they are in
the best economic position to do so. 70 Indeed, members of the international community codified the notion that developed nations
bear greater responsibility for mitigating climate change and assisting less developed nations in adapting to its impacts in the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. 71 Moreover,
developed
nations are economically advantaged largely because of their historical emissions. 72
Because they profited from the emissions that caused climate change, developed nations
should assist the populations of those nations that suffer from these emissions rather
than profit from them. 73
If developed nations bear greater responsibility than less developed nations to reduce
emissions and mitigate climate change, then it is natural to extend this notion of
common yet differentiated responsibilities to the question of how to address the legal
status of climate migrants. Although this Comment focuses primarily on the practical reasons for adopting legislation
governing climate migrants, there are ethical reasons for doing so as well. 74 Many scholars suggest that the
nations responsible for causing climate change must deal with the way this global
change impacts other people and nations. 75 They propose various solutions, including paying damages or
restitution and welcoming climate migrants. 76 Though individual proposals vary, this Comment agrees that the
United States, as a highly industrialized nation with high greenhouse gas emissions, should address climate
change not merely by reducing emissions and offering financial assistance to impacted
nations, but by offering climate migrants sanctuary-a new home to replace a
lost home.
The European Union has taken a leadership role in addressing climate change and is a
good model for the United States. Not only did each of the individual nations which comprise the European Union
sign on to the Kyoto Protocol and accept obligations for emissions reductions, 77 they also implemented a regional emissions trading
program78 and signed on to the Doha Amendment in 2012 to establish a second Kyoto Protocol commitment period-some of the
only developed nations to do so. 79
Although the European Union nations have not yet come to a
consensus as to the proper legal status for climate migrants, they have at least started
this conversation and acknowledged their ethical obligations.80 For example, at least in writing,
Finnish and Swedish asylum law offer humanitarian protection on the basis of environmental catastrophe or climate change.8 '
Belgium explicitly considered creating legal status for "climate change refugees," and many other nations have forms of discretionary
relief for climate migrants.8 2 Although
the United States is hesitant to acknowledge any
obligations to assist climate migrants, it is similarly situated to the European Union in
terms of emissions.8 3 In fact, the United States continues to be one of the top greenhouse gas emitters per capita; for total
emissions, only China exceeds the United States.84
Moreover, the UNFCCC requires the United States, as an Annex 1185 developed nation,
to take on certain obligations to mitigate and help others adapt to climate change.8 6
Although it does not explicitly address the subject of climate migrants, the UNFCCC requires developed nations to assist less
developed nations in adapting to climate change in article four. 87 Since relocating one's home is one form of adaptation,8 8 this
article can be read to require developed nations to assist in such relocation. 89 One way for them to do so would be to provide safe
haven within the United States for those who are relocating. The UNFCCC also mandates that developed nations share technological
advances that make industry more efficient or cleaner. 90 So
far, the United States has not met either of
these legal obligations. 9 1 The United States has not made meaningful efforts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, and it continues to ignore its international
obligations. Therefore, at the very least, it must join the conversation surrounding legal protection for climate migrants as
an ethical matter
The US has an ethical obligation to accept climate migrants – migration is

unavoidable, but we can still prevent adverse climate impacts
Nawrotzki 14 Raphael Nawrotzki is a postdoctoral associate for the University of Minnesota
Population Center on the Terra Populus project (Raphael, “Climate Migration and Moral
Responsibility,” 4/2/14. NCBI, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5035111/) // SR
The Ethics of Migration
Scholars hotly debate the issue of immigration in the ethical literature. Some strongly defend closed borders (e.g., Meilaender 2001,
Walzer 1984, Beck 1996, Wellman 2008), whereas others argue for less stringent border protection or they are outright proponents
for open borders (e.g., Dummett 2004, Carens 1987, 2003, Exdell 2009, Huemer 2010, Hayter 2000). The debate follows either an
egalitarian or a libertarian line of arguments, but is generally focused on the rights and responsibilities of nation-states.
However, the issue of climate change induced migration warrants a different approach
because it deals with a global phenomenon in which causality extends beyond borders.
The climatic changes that destroy the livelihoods of individuals in less developed
countries (LDCs) can be causally connected to century long emission of anthropogenic
greenhouse gases (GHGs) in more developed countries (MDCs). Due to the fact that the literature on
the ethics of immigration gives only little attention to causality, this paper borrows the evaluative principle from the broader
literature on the ethics of climate change. The body of this paper then attempts to justify the use of these principles on utilitarian
ground, followed by a discussion of major arguments made against immigration.
In order to make the ethical discussion more tangible, this paper will use Mexico as an
example of an LDC, with a high percentage of agriculturally dependent rural
populations that are experiencing the full impact of climate change, and the U.S. as an
MDC that is mainly responsible for the emission of large amounts of GHGs (Caney 2010),
though most of my arguments apply equally well to other countries. Migration from Mexico to the United States has a long history of
public and political concern and has been the subject of a number of studies (e.g., Riosmena 2009, Massey and Espinosa 1997).
About 30 percent of U.S. legal immigrants and almost 60 percent of the unauthorized
foreigners are from Mexico (Martin and Midgley 2010, Passel and Cohn 2009). Political relevance is the reason why
Mexico and the U.S. have been used by other authors to discuss the ethical implications of migration (Carens 2003).
For the present ethical discussion of climate change induced migration, Mexico provides a useful case study. Only 25
percent of Mexico’s 20 million hectares of cropland are irrigated (Leiva and Skees 2008). The
dependence on rain-fed agriculture makes rural Mexicans by default vulnerable to
climatic changes that impact rainfall regimes and adversely impact crop yields (Vasquez-
Leon, West and Finan 2003, Eakin 2005, Thomas and Twyman 2006). The inability to make a living from the
land due to dry conditions is then an important contributor to the decision of rural
Mexican families to send a member elsewhere (Schwartz and Notini 1994). Empirical evidence has begun to
emerge which investigates the impact of droughts and changes in rainfall patterns, associated with climate change, on Mexico-U.S.
migration. Munshi
(2003) explored the impact of rainfall variability on migrant labor
networks in the U.S. and found that rainfall deficits reduced employment in Mexico and
increased migration to the U.S. A study by Feng, Krueger, and Oppenheimer (2010) observed at the state level
that a decrease in crop yields, as a result of climate change, was significantly associated
with international out-migration to the U.S. More recently, studies by Hunter, Murray and Riosmena (2011)
and Nawrotzki, Riosmena, and Hunter (2012) have used data from the Mexican Migration Project and the year 2000 census to
model the impact of state-level rainfall data on international out-migration from rural areas in Mexico. Although
using
different methodologies (event history models, multilevel models), both studies
consistently demonstrate a positive association between a decrease in rainfall and
Mexico-U.S. migration. Similar relationships have been confirmed for a number of Latin
American countries such as Ecuador (Gray 2009, 2010) and El Salvador (Halliday 2006). Despite the
significance of the observed associations, most of these studies fail to provide details regarding the magnitude of the migration
stream. Although political and economic drivers likely displace larger numbers of people at present, the share of climate migrants
might increase substantially in the near future, especially if dense social networks connect two countries and function as migration
corridors (e.g., Bardsley and Hugo 2010). However, it is important to stress that the ethical argument developed in this paper is
independent of the size of the actual migration stream, may it be large or small.
The Historical Principle
The following ethical discussion uses a principle that was introduced under the name “historical principle” by Peter Singer (2010).1
At first, the paper establishes the principle in the abstract without reference to a particular country, which allows a more general
application. To discuss the practical application and to address major concerns, illustrations will then be based extensively on the
Mexican case.
The historical principle is based on the “polluter pays” notion (Reuveny and Moore 2009:476). It takes historical wrongs into
account and bases justice claims not only on unfair distribution at the current point in time but also on what has been done in past
decades and centuries (Singer 2010). MDCs
in general and the U.S. in particular, have built their
wealth and prosperity by means of fossil fuel combustion and have enjoyed the benefits
that these developments bring with them. LDCs, especially poor rural populations, on
the other hand, have largely not shared in these benefits and now have to bear the
costs in the form of crop failures and livelihood destruction. However, some residual
responsibility resides with LDCs. For example, many scholars consider rapid population growth combined with increasing levels of
natural resources consumption to be key drivers of global environmental change, of which climate change is but one component
(Liverman 2001, Meyer and Turner 2002). The idea that human population growth can have adverse environmental consequences
dates back to influential work by scholars such as Thomas Malthus (1798) and Garrett Hardin (1968). However, Ehrlich’s (1968)
I=PAT formula, in which cumulative environmental impacts (I) are equal to the product of population numbers (P), the level of
consumption (A), and the technologies (T) used to extract and consume resources, emphasizes that technological development,
besides population increase, is a major determinant of environmental impacts. As
such, the bulk of present and
past atmospheric GHG emission that causes global warming can be empirically linked to
the industrialization process of MDCs (Hoehne and Blok 2005).
Given this fact, justice claims call for the producer of the problems to take responsibility. Or as Singer (2010:190) puts it, “If we
believe that people should contribute to fixing something in proportion to their
responsibility for breaking it, then the developed nations owe it to the rest of the world
to fix the problem with the atmosphere.” This claim is far-reaching since even for
powerful MDCs such as the U.S., fixing climate change may be a project beyond their
technological and financial abilities. Thus, if prevention is not possible, adaptation
seems to be the only vital solution. At the very minimum MDCs should help LDCs to
adapt in a way that restores the livelihood conditions of LDCs to the state
prior to the adverse impact of climate change (Shue 2010a).2 The logical argument takes the
following form.
Premise 1
a) The activities of country X cause a change in environmental conditions of country Y.
b) The change in environmental conditions of country Y destroys the livelihoods of some residents (e.g., rural farmers).
Therefore, country X’s activities cause livelihood destruction of some residents in country Y.
Premise 2
a) Country X’s activities cause livelihood destruction of some residents in country Y.
b) Destruction of livelihoods is a morally wrong action.
c) Morally wrong actions require restorative measures.
Therefore, country X’s action required restorative measures towards country Y.
Two different types of action could be considered as restorative measures. Either MDCs transfer some of their wealth to LDCs in
order to improve the livelihoods of poor rural populations, or MDCs allow the worst-off, who have lost the means to make a living, to
enter the more resource secure MDC territory (cf. Wellman 2008). Some authors have argued in favor of sending financial aid to
LDCs instead of facilitating migration by pointing out that open borders would not help the very poor (Miller 2005, Brock 2009,
Cavallero 2006). They point out that people most likely to move would be highly educated individuals such as doctors, engineers,
and other professionals but not the poorest of the poor (see Bloom 2009 for an example of Somali migrants to the U.K). Thus,
increasing out-migration would further degrade the situation in the poor country through a process aptly termed “brain drain”
(Tessema 2010). On
the other hand, studies (see Taylor et al. 1996 and references therein)
find that migration may have a very beneficial impact on migrant-sending households
and communities since the additional income through remittances may relieve financial
constraints and encourage investment in new technologies (e.g. drought resistant crops,
rainwater harvest systems).
However, even if we assume that encouraging migration might not be the best way to
address climate change induced livelihood problems, a number of reasons suggest that
migration is unavoidable, thus requiring the ethical consideration of its
implications: 1. Frequently, people have already lost their livelihoods through harvest
failure and increased desertification and have left their homes (McLeman and Hunter 2010). For
these migrants, long-term measures to improve livelihood situations in their country of
origin will not provide the help necessary to improve their current situation. Also, in the case
of sea level rise, where land completely disappears, adaptation “in place” is not an option (Shen and Gemenne 2011). 2. It is
unlikely that transfer of funds from MDCs will be large enough to prevent livelihood
destruction in all poor countries of the world and thus, outmigration is unavoidable. 3. A
further problem is that LDCs frequently constitute what has been called “failed states” (Di
John 2010), with highly corrupt or nonexistent governments. In such situations, it is
difficult to ensure that funds for adaptation measures reach the needy population.
Henceforth, it appears to be important to develop clear ethical standards to
evaluate the issue of climate migration as a problematic, yet unavoidable
phenomenon.
Ext. State Failure Impact
Failed states cause multiple scenarios for extinction
Myers and Choi 6- Young-Jin Choi is the permanent representative of the Republic of Korea to the
United Nations, and Joanne Myers is Director of the Carnegie Council's Public Affairs Programs,
“Terrorism, Failed States, and Enlightened National Interest”, 12/12/2006, // Suraj P
The question arises now: Can we turn a blind eye to those failed states? The interdependence works both ways. It works between
strong nations through means of trade, but also it works between strong and weak nations, the have's and have-not's. It works both
ways. In other words, if we do not tend to them, they will come to us. The failed
states, if unattended, will become
hotbeds of international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, environmental degradation,
communicable diseases, and overpopulation—all the transnational problems. And those problems
do not recognize borders. They will come to us in the end. We cannot turn a blind eye to
those failed states for our own interests, not for theirs. Not the traditional war and peace
problem, but these transnational issues will become our major concern in the future, the
21st century. So the question is how to deal with them. Are we prepared to deal with
newly emerging transnational issues? If you remember the headlines of newspapers for the last two decades,
there is hardly any mention about traditional war and peace problems. No major wars broke out among nations. But the headlines
are filled with transnational problems: failed states, international terrorism, and proliferation of nuclear weapons. So transnational
issues will preoccupy human beings for the foreseeable future and we have to find a way to deal with them in the 21st century. In
dealing with the transnational issues, there is one thing that is absolutely clear. That
is, no nation, however
powerful, can win the war against international terrorism alone; no nation, however
determined, can prevent nuclear proliferation alone; no nation, however advanced
scientifically, can avert the outbreak of communicable diseases alone; and no nation,
however isolated geographically, can prevent the global warming alone or other
environmental degradation. So we have to work together. We are bound to work together. There is no other way
out. The problem is we do not take into account this dramatically changed new international order or the environment of the 21st
century. In the current situation, how nations deal with those important traditional issues is really discouraging. We are divided
through the fault-line of have's and have-not's—in a way, the North/South divide. This
divide is the self-defeating
dynamic of all the transnational issues. For example, on nuclear proliferation, the have's
want to focus only on nonproliferation. On the other hand, the have-not's want to focus
only on disarmament. The upshot is that for the last five years there has been not a
single agreement in the international affairs in terms of disarmament or
nonproliferation. The disarmament conferences in Geneva stopped working for the last five years. In 2005 the
Nonproliferation Review Committee produced not even a single sentence that was agreed upon. Nothing works on this front. The
same with all the other transnational issues. The North/South divide seems increasingly to replace the East/West divide of the Cold
War period, and this will be the dominant dynamic of the 21st century governing international relations—North/South divide, have's
and have-not's—this is the serious situation we are facing now. Within this North/South divide, each nation is resorting to
traditional national interests. But
suppose that within this shrunken global village each nation
seeks to prevail on their own national interests. What will happen to our planet? It will
become uninhabitable. Each country wants to have nuclear weapons. Each country
does not care what happens with global warming. Each country does not care what
happens with overpopulation and communicable diseases. So national interest does not work
anymore. It works only in an open world, when we had unknown territories to expand, to conquer, and to explore. But in this closed
world of a global village, a small village, national interest does not work. We have a precedent. With the advent of industrialization in
the 18th century, people didn't care about other people. Children under the age of four who were not rich had to work in factories.
The scavengers, the piecers, are the names we still remember. Four-year-old children were scavengers, were piecers, in the factories.
And women were not an exception. But
as citizens within a nation or national border became
interdependent, more and more closely knit, they began to realize that they are truly
interdependent. Whenever these bad things are happening to other people, one cannot
truly prosper, one cannot be truly happy. That is why industrialized countries began to
discover the value of enlightened self-interest. We pay a high rate of taxes in the name of enlightened self-
interest. We take care of those failing or failed citizens inside our borders. The ill, the poor, the old, children, the unemployed or
unemployable, we take care of them. There is an element of altruism, but also basically we are doing it for our own interest. So it is
self-interest which saved us from this difficult situation. This is the analogy we have to introduce to international relations now,
because in a closed world nations have become interdependent, the same way that citizens have become interdependent inside a
border. No nation can be truly happy, secure, or stable when there are many failed states out there. This is not because we want to be
altruistic, but this is because we want to ensure more fully our own national interest. So, in a way, enlightened national interest is a
better form of national self-interest, and this is the way we have to go. Some may say that this is ethics, this is altruism, and by
definition is against national interest. No. Enlightened national interest encompasses traditional national interest and wants to do
more than the national interest. So those terms are not in opposition, but enlightened national interest is encompassing the national
interest. This is the larger concept which will better ensure our survival in this interdependent world. But again, the situation is not
encouraging. During the Cold War period, all the developed countries tried to reach the target of 0.7 percent of ODA, Official
Development Assistance. Many countries were approaching that target. But, after the demise of the Cold War, what we are
witnessing is that instead of moving toward that target, countries are back-stepping from that target. So most countries contribute
less than they did in terms of assisting failed states. This is another discouraging sign. This is a sign that we have not fully taken into
account the dramatic change, the historic paradigm shift, from raid to trade. This is a very serious matter we have to take into
account somehow. The major transnational issues are really, really serious. The
problem these transnational
issues are posing is that, for the first time in history, they are irreversible. Global
warming, once it happens, cannot be turned back. Nuclear apocalypse, once it
happens, cannot be undone. This is a new situation in our history. It never happened
in the past. Any wars of conquest, expansion, massacre, could be healed. Not global
warming, not nuclear apocalypse.
-- Impact AddOn – Global Refugee War
Absent the plan, climate change will create a refugee crisis that dwarfs the
Syrian conflict -- it's an existential threat to civilization
Taylor 17 (Matthew, environmental correspondent for The Guardian, Climate change 'will create the world's biggest refugee
crisis,' https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/02/climate-change-will-create-worlds-biggest-refugee-
crisis//waters)
Tens of millions of people will be forced from their homes by climate change in the next
decade, creating the biggest refugee crisis the world has ever seen, according to a new
report. Senior US military and security experts have told the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) study that the number
of climate refugees will dwarf those that have fled the Syrian conflict, bringing huge challenges to
Europe. “If Europe thinks they have a problem with migration today … wait 20 years,” said
retired US military corps brigadier general Stephen Cheney. “See what happens when climate change
drives people out of Africa – the Sahel [sub-Saharan area] especially – and we’re talking now not just one or two million, but 10 or
20 [million]. They are not going to south Africa, they are going across the Mediterranean.” The study published on Thursday calls on
governments to agree a new legal framework to protect climate refugees and, ahead of next week’s climate summit in Germany,
urges leaders to do more to implement the targets set out in the Paris climate agreement. Sir David King, the former chief scientific
adviser to the UK government, told the EJF: “What
we are talking about here is an existential
threat to our civilisation in the longer term. In the short term, it carries all sorts of risks as well and
it requires a human response on a scale that has never been achieved before.” The report
argues that climate change played a part in the build up to the Syrian war, with successive droughts causing 1.5 million people to
migrate to the country’s cities between 2006 and 2011. Many of these people then had no reliable access to food, water or jobs.
“Climate change is the the unpredictable ingredient that, when added to existing social,
economic and political tensions, has the potential to ignite violence and conflict with
disastrous consequences,” said EJF executive director, Steve Trent. “In our rapidly changing world climate change – and
its potential to trigger both violent conflict and mass migration – needs to be considered as an urgent priority for policymakers and
business leaders alike.” Although the report highlights to growing impact of climate change on people in the Middle East and Africa,
it says changing weather patterns – like the hurricanes that devastated parts of the US this year – prove richer nations are not
immune from climate change. But Trent said that although climate change undoubtedly posed an “existential threat to our world” it
was not to late to take decisive action. “By taking strong ambitious steps now to phase out greenhouse gas emissions and building
an international legal mechanism to protect climate refugees we will protect the poorest
and most vulnerable in our global society, build resilience, reap massive economic benefits and build a safe and
secure future for our planet. Climate change will not wait. Neither can we. For climate refugees, tomorrow
is too late.”
-- Impact AddOn – Trade
Massive climate migration is certain and shreds interdependence
Lester Brown. in his book World on the Edge, writes that “over
the longer term. rising-sea refugees will
likely dominate the flow of environmental refugees.”8 How far might sea levels rise? The most
conservative projections estimate between one and three feet. The ever-practical and forward-looking Dutch, for planning purposes.
are assuming a two-and-a-half-foot rise by 2050. Maybe the Dutch can withstand two and a half feet, but this is enough to obliterate
large portions of island nations like the Maldives. Yet scientists
now think we are locked in to a sea level
rise of at least three feet, and that is only with aggressive worldwide reduction of fossil
fuels. Without climate action, sea levels could rise six feet by the end of 2100
and as much as ten feet within two centuries. creating —places as diverse as neighborhoods in
Norfolk, Virginia; major parts of southern Louisiana; and island republics like Tuvalu and the Maldives in the Indian and Pacific
oceans. In the Western Hemisphere. Americans
may find themselves struggling to resettle tens of
millions forced to migrate because of rising tides along the Gulf of Mexico, South
Florida, and the East Coast, reaching nearly to New England. While scientists cannot predict
the details of short-term human history, there is little doubt that changes
will be momentous. Renowned climatologist James Hansen argues that China will have great
difficulties despite its growing economic power as “hundreds of millions of Chinese are
displaced by rising seas. With the submersion of Florida and coastal cities, the United States may be equally stressed.”
With global interdependence, he notes. “there may be a threat of collapse of
economic and social systems.”11
Signal of protectionism causes nuclear war
Lieberthal and O’Hanlon ‘12
[Ken – Dir of the China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings. And Michael – Dir of Research and Senior Fellow
of Foreign Policy at Brookings. “The Real National Security Threat: America’s Debt” The LA Times, 7/10/12 //GBS-JV]
Second, such a chronic economic decline would undercut what has been 70 years of strong
national political consensus in favor of an activist and engaged American foreign policy.
One reason the United States was so engaged through the Cold War and the first 20 years of the
post-Cold War world was fear of threats. But the other reason was that the strategy was associated
with improvements in our quality of life as well. America became even more
prosperous, and all major segments of society benefited.¶ Alas, globalization and
automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream
into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy
this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of
the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America —
especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses.¶
Lastly, American
economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries
sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this
perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive,
countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future.
Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their
own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in
throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf
and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely.¶
When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the
Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a
world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there
is
now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing
else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign
policy is not reestablished.
-- Impact AddOn – China/India War
Climate migration flows cause China-India resource wars
When profound water shortages or ravaging floods put populations on the move, they
must go somewhere. and this migration can create conflict in the area receiving migrants.
The arrival of migrants to areas that already are experiencing water shortages, such as parts
of India. can burden the economic and resource base of the receiving area.22 And when
these migrants belong to different ethnic or religious groups, residents may feel
threatened and respond aggressively. No matter how peaceful climate refugees may be, in most cases
their arrival will generate significant levels of public suspicion and mistrust.
As Rafael Reveny notes, sudden drastic environmental changes can push many people to
migrate quickly. The arrival of Bangladeshi climate refugees in India led to violence in the 1980s.23 Similarly. the absorption
of Dust Bowl migrants in California during the 1930s depression had more than its share of conflict. “Okies” from the Oklahoma
plains faced slurs, discrimination. and beatings. Their shacks were burned, and police manned the California border to block their
entry into the state. The
main crisis to come, however, will be the water rivalry between
India and China, which undoubtedly will produce an anguished flow of
climate refugees. China’s unique water power status stems from its control of the
headwaters of the Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers that flow into India and other Southeast Asian
countries. As both China and India have nuclear weapons. hydrologists worry
that water conflicts between India and China may result in nuclear attacks
on dams and other riparian systems. China’s aggressive dam construction of India’s headwaters in the high Himalayas is a constant
irritant to India. As the Carnegie Foundation points out in its report, “A Crisis to Come,” China
now has
hydrohegemony over key headwaters that flow into much of South Asia and more dams “than the rest of
the world combined,” yet has historically poor environmental practices over these
waters. “which has had devastating consequences for the environment”: Headwaters—China is
the largest source of transboundary river flows, including many, such as the Brahmaputra River. that flow from the Tibetan plateau
to much of South Asia. Dams—No country in history has built more dams than China, which has built more dams than the rest of the
world combined. Environmental practices—China’s use of rivers has been ecologically unsafe, which has had devastating
consequences for the environment. The Carnegie Foundation offers this perspective: “After many years of denying plans to build a
mega- dam on the Brahmaputra River, one of the maj or rivers of Asia. China recently announced plans to begin construction. This
river is one of India’s and Bangladesh’s largest sources of water, and any
water diversion could be devastating
to both countries.” Water conflict between China and its neighbors has real
national security implications, a problem that will only become worse.24 Water issues in this part
of the world involve the fate of the Tibetan Himalayan plateau and rivers that flow from
there to serve the water needs of a billion people. Currently. glaciers in Tibet are
melting as a result of increased temperatures. After an initial burst of too much water. there is
going to be a shortage. Climate models suggest “peak meltwater” could be reached by the
2050s, with major rivers losing up to 20 percent of their flow. China will monopolize
what’s left of the water resource, and that will lead to major problems. With
China and India attempting to store water for their combined four hundred dams, water shortages will create
instability in the region. Clashes along the border between Chinese and Indian troops
over the past five decades have resulted in deep mistrust on both sides. Both countries have
memories of a short but brutal war between them in 1962.2
The Tibetan Plateau is unique – key geopolitical hotspot that contains a
wealth of water and energy resources
Vidal ‘13
[“China and India 'water grab' dams put ecology of Himalayas in danger” The Guardian, 8/10/13 ln //GBS-JV]
The future of the world's most famous mountain range could be endangered by a vast dam-building
project, as a risky regional race for water resources takes place in Asia. New academic
research shows that India, Nepal, Bhutan and Pakistan are engaged in a huge "water grab" in
the Himalayas, as they seek new sources of electricity to power their economies. Taken
together, the countries have plans for more than 400 hydro dams which, if built, could together provide more than 160,000MW of
electricity – three times more than the UK uses. In addition, China has plans for around 100 dams to
generate a similar amount of power from major rivers rising in Tibet. A further 60 or more
dams are being planned for the Mekong river which also rises in Tibet and flows south through south-east
Asia. Most of the Himalayan rivers have been relatively untouched by dams near their sources. Now the two great
Asian powers, India and China, are rushing to harness them as they cut
through some of the world's deepest valleys. Many of the proposed dams would be among the tallest
in the world, able to generate more than 4,000MW, as much as the Hoover dam on the Colorado river in the US. The result, over
the next 20 years, "could be that the Himalayas become the most dammed region in the
world", said Ed Grumbine, visiting international scientist with the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Kunming. "India aims
to construct 292 dams … doubling current hydropower capacity and contributing 6% to
projected national energy needs. If all dams are constructed as proposed, in 28 of 32 major river valleys, the Indian
Himalayas would have one of the highest average dam densities in the world, with one dam for every 32km of river channel. Every
neighbour of India with undeveloped hydropower sites is building or planning to build multiple dams, totalling at minimum 129
projects," said Grumbine, author of a paper in Science. China, which is
building multiple dams on all the
major rivers running off the Tibetan plateau, is likely to emerge as the ultimate
controller of water for nearly 40% of the world's population. "The plateau is the
source of the single largest collection of international rivers in the world,
including the Mekong, the Brahmaputra, the Yangtse and the Yellow rivers. It is the headwater of rivers on which nearly half the
world depends. The net effect of the dam building could be disastrous. We just don't know the consequences," said Tashi Tsering, a
water resource researcher at the University of British Columbia in Canada. "China
is engaged in the greatest
water grab in history. Not only is it damming the rivers on the plateau, it is financing
and building mega-dams in Pakistan, Laos, Burma and elsewhere and making
agreements to take the power," said Indian geopolitical analyst Brahma Chellaney. "China-India disputes
have shifted from land to water. Water is the new divide and is going centre
stage in politics. Only China has the capacity to build these mega-dams and the power
to crush resistance. This is effectively war without a shot being fired."
It escalates and independently tanks Himalayan biodiversity
Lehmann ‘13
[Jean-Pierre Lehmann, an emeritus professor of international political economy at IMD, in Lausanne, Switzerland. He is currently a
visiting professor on the Faculty of Business and Economics at Hong Kong University. “Tibet and 21st Century Water Wars” 7/11/13
http://www.theglobalist.com/tibet-and-21st-century-water-wars/ //GBS-JV]
The crucial global role that Asia will play in the 21st century cannot be
underestimated. The pivot of global economic power is shifting east. Asia represents the new
arena for analysis, power and influence. The narrative of the coming Asian century is dominated by a variety of factors — rising
economic power, demography, ecology, fierce resource competition, water and food supply and security, as well as increasing
military expenditure. In addition, Asia has the greatest number of geopolitical “hot spots”
and nuclear powers. In the latter context, the Tibetan Plateau stands out. Strategically
located between the two Asian giants, China and India, the Tibetan Plateau and its
surroundings have come to represent Asia’s most critical 21st century
battleground. Potentially, they may also be the world’s battleground. The narrative of this century and of Asia will be
written, to a very large extent, in terms of what is the “hottest geopolitical issue” — water security. The Tibetan Plateau
extends from the Hindu Kush in central Afghanistan, through Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan
and onto the borders of Myanmar. The geopolitical significance of Tibet has been
tremendous historically, too. It was invaded by Britain in 1904 for that reason. Forty-five years later China’s
Liberation occurred and, almost immediately afterwards, the People’s Liberation Army annexed Tibet in 1950-51. For Mao Zedong,
the strategic importance of Tibet was clear. It was fundamental to national security. The Tibetan Plateau acts as a major buffer zone
and provides China with leverage over almost the entire Eurasian continent. From a national security point of view, the
vast
barriers of the Tibetan Plateau shield China’s internal populace in the east from military
aggression originating from the west. This strategic importance was clearly manifested in the Sino-Indian War of
1962 — the only war in which the People’s Liberation Army has been successful so far! Losing Tibet would be seen as greatly
weakening China strategically and a national humiliation. Apart from its strategic location, the renewed
importance of Tibet for China lies in its water riches. China has long been eyeing the
water reserves of Tibet, especially during and since the period of Mao (1949-1976). Located at a high altitude on an
average of 4,500 meters, it is richly endowed with fresh water contained in its oxygen deprived
vast glaciers and huge underground reservoirs. It is in fact the largest repository of
freshwater after the two poles, Arctic and Antarctic, thus claiming the sobriquet, the “third pole.”
Many of the world’s greatest rivers flow out of the Tibetan Plateau — the Yellow River, Yangtze
Kiang, Mekong, Salween, Sutlej and the Brahmaputra. More important, in terms of human geography, almost
half of the global population currently lives in the watershed of the Tibetan Plateau.
This explains the enormous importance of Tibetan freshwater for China.
China, on the whole, is an extremely arid country. One quarter of the country consists of deserts. China has
severe water shortage challenges. At the same time, most of its rivers are either too polluted or
are too silted to quench the thirst of 1.3 billion people. The basic internal issue for China regarding water security is to transfer
fresh water from the Tibetan Plateau in the country’s west to its industrial and populated corners in its north and east. This has
resulted in a spree of building dams, canals, irrigation systems, pipelines and water
diversion projects. As Brahma Chellaney points out in his seminal work, “Water: Asia’s Next Battleground,” China
has created more dams in the last five decades than the rest of the world combined, largely
in order to divert the flow of rivers from the south to its north and east corners. The end result was the diversion of
routes of various rivers originating in the Tibetan Plateau. China considers such
diversions to be an internal security matter. But these inter-basin and inter-river water
transfer projects in the Tibetan Plateau have tremendous consequences on other
downstream countries that draw water from those rivers. Thus, what was seen as a national concern for China in reality
has vast external ramifications. Chinese policy so far has been to seek to minimize issues to be negotiated with its neighbors. But
diversion of rivers could boil into a hot conflict in the near future. Water
wars could largely destabilize not just the wider Tibetan region, but also all of Asia. Based on current
trends, the question is not “how” and “why” such conflicts would arise, but
“when”? Today, countries surrounding the Tibetan Plateau in Southeast Asia, the Indian
subcontinent and, of course, China are scrambling to build “mountains of concrete.” For
now, they are addicted to dam building for the purposes of power generation, water
security, food security, livelihoods and national identity. To give but one example, at present the biggest
source of income to the economies of Nepal and Bhutan comes from hydropower development. That reflects their strategic upstream
location. However, the country that has been most aggressive in this dam-building trend has been China. China utilizes the rivers
originating upstream in the Tibetan Plateau to build as many as 60 new dams to augment its demand for energy. Electricity
originating from these dams from the Tibetan Plateau finds its way to China’s large metropolises of Shanghai, Chongqing and
Guangzhou. However, China’s action to promote and preserve its national interest can have severe economic, social, political and
environmental consequences in the downstream countries. These represent the most populous regions of the world. The
construction of dams on rivers originating in the Tibetan Plateau may seriously interrupt the water supply in downstream countries.
In addition, these
constructions pose a grave threat to the regions’ biodiversity and
environment. Located in a highly seismic zone, dam building also increases risks of
catastrophic earthquakes affecting hundreds of millions. Even though China claims to have the interests
of these countries in consideration, it remains one of the only nations without any institutionalized water sharing agreement with
downstream countries. Lack of information sharing, transparency in building projects and data sharing with the affected states
downstream remain a constant source of tension. For instance, China is building three large hydropower dams on the upstream
Yarlung Tsangpo River (in Tibet, which China has renamed the River Yarluzangbu). Further downstream, it flows as the
Brahmaputra into densely populated areas of India and Bangladesh. The great consequences of these dams are clear for all to see.
These dams could well interrupt the fresh water supply to northeastern India and
Bangladesh. This is also a region where most of the people depend on the fresh water
supply for livelihoods, agriculture and food. India’s and Bangladesh’s combined
population of over 1.3 billion is already edging past China’s. India alone is expected to surpass China’s
population in just over a decade. Whatever the merits of the current South-North Water Diversion Project, China’s multi-decade
river rerouting plan at a cost of $62 billion, it will have severe environmental and water security consequences for its neighbors. The
Chinese ambition to go forward with such projects in the Tibetan Plateau is fueled by its “success” with the controversial Three
Gorges Dam. And it is part of the legacy left behind by its past President Hu Jintao, a hydrological engineer by training. Engineering
pride aside, that project connected two of China’s most chronic problems — water and Tibet. The northward rerouting of the
Brahmaputra River to join the fast drying Yellow River with the construction of three dams in the Great Bend is bound to have
significant geopolitical ramifications well beyond the typical issues in Sino-India relations. Together, the pair represents around 40%
of the global population. Although India has more arable land than China, the Tibetan Plateau is the source of
origin for most Indian rivers. There has been a long lull in Sino-Indian tensions since the
1962 war between the two Asian giants. Today the two have “re-emerged” as relatively amicable great powers. Their
conflict potential has now shifted from territorial dispute to water security.
That is not a reason for optimism. Countries in Southeast Asia are also affected by China’s dam-building
projects. China has built dams upstream on the Mekong River, whose water is shared downstream by Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and
Vietnam. Almost 60 million people in these countries depend on the Mekong River for fresh water, food income, health and, most
important, for their national identity. Any
interruptions in their water supply could pose catastrophic
threats to food security and greatly affect their rich biodiversity. Such consequences
could result in tens of millions of environmental refugees. All of which makes
plain why the Tibetan Plateau is a global strategic epicenter. It may well determine
whether the “Asian century” emerges as a variation on an earlier European
theme or it traces its own peaceful trajectory.
Indo-China border dispute goes nuclear

Goswami ‘13
[Namrata, a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, and a research fellow at the Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, “Ending Sino-Indian border dispute essential to continued prosperity,”
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/756338.shtml //GBS-JV]
China-India border tensions have been an increasing cause of concern between two of
the most vibrant economies of Asia. While the border conflict in 1962 had occurred in the context of two countries
whose economies were weak, today the situation is quite different. At present, both China and India are major global economies.
Trade between them was negligible in 1962. Today, it stands at $75 billion and will soon pass the $100-billion mark. However,
despite growing bilateral economic relations, the border dispute appears
intractable. Why so? One need not look far for the answer. Sino-Indian relations are still affected by some thorny
divergences over issues like the McMahon line and the presence of the "Tibetan government-in-exile." These contradictions
are further complicated by border negotiations held in a climate of Indian
apprehensions that the 1962 border war between China and India could be repeated.
The apprehensions are not without merit. The militarization of the border from both the
Chinese and the Indian side is a growing reality. China has vastly improved its border roads in the eastern
sector bordering India, which will considerably enhance movement by the PLA. On the border with India, China has deployed 13
Border Defense Regiments totaling around 300,000 troops. Six divisions of China's Rapid Reaction Forces are stationed at
Chengdu, a southwestern Chinese city, with 24-hour operational readiness and supported by an airlift capability to transport the
troops to the China-India border within 48 hours. India too has upgraded its military presence near the eastern border. A five-year
expansion plan to induct 90,000 more troops and deploy four more divisions in the eastern sector is underway. There are 120,000
Indian troops stationed in the eastern sector, supported by two Sukhoi-30 MKI squadrons from Tezpur in Assam. Two more Sukhoi-
30 MKI squadrons are in the process of being inducted into the air force structure in the eastern sector. Given
this overt
militarization of the China-India border conflict, any escalation in the conflict
dynamics there will have a direct bearing on the regional strategic stability
of Asia. This is even more plausible in the present context as China and India emerge as two of the largest military hardware-
importing countries in the world. Through the China-India conflict, one envisages a scenario
where a nuclear-armed China and India with more than 300 nuclear
weapons, 3 million standing troops, and a population of 2.3 billion people between them, will fight a future
war. This is dangerous for Asia and the world and will severely undermine global peace and prosperity. The physical
proximity of both countries forewarns a great tragedy for their populations
if war occurs. Security analysts have argued that internal problems within India and
China would create large disincentives for conflict. However, despite such constraints, wars
have broken out between states based on misunderstandings about each other's
intentions. Therefore, the border conflict between both countries is becoming a high price to pay especially in the context of
the rise of Asia. For Asian stability and prosperity, both these powerful countries of Asia should earnestly work toward resolving the
border issue within the three-stage process that has been identified. Moreover, it is
pertinent that both China and
India recognizes that despite increasing economic cooperation, political tensions
over land can lead to conflict, as the example of Europe prior to World War I clearly reflects. As a
result, $75 billion in bilateral trade does not mean that all is well. While
competition at a particular level is inevitable, both countries must ensure that Asia
remains peaceful if they want to continue Asia's path to prosperity. Hence, managing and
resolving the border issue peacefully in the next five years is something worth
seriously working for.
Tibetan biodiversity collapse is also an existential risk
ICT ‘14
[The Intl Campaign for Tibet. Updated 2014. “The Crucial Nature of the Tibet Environment” https://www.savetibet.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/Crucial_Tibet_Environment.pdf //GBS-JV]
FROM A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVE, few places in the world

are as important as the Tibetan plateau. Encompassing an area of over 2.5 million square kilometers,
the Tibetan plateau is the largest and highest elevation region on the earth. With an average
elevation of 4,500 meters above sea level, Tibet is encircled by high moun tains the Himalaya to the south, the Karakorum in the
west and the Kunlun across the north. There are over 46,000 glaciers on the Tibetan plateau; the
largest area of ice outside the polar regions. Tibet, often referred to as the ‘roof of the
world’ or the ‘world’s third pole’ because it contains the biggest ice fields outside of the Arctic and Antarctic, is
threatened by melting glaciers and other extreme weather phenomena. Scientists believe that
the Tibetan plateau offers an early warning of climate change and it is therefore a critical
global climate barometer. Because Tibet plays a prominent role in the Asian monsoon
system, the consequences will affect the lives of millions of people downstream as well as
those on the high plateau. The plateau is the source of many of Asia’s greatest rivers: the Yellow,
Yangtze, Mekong, Brahmaputra, Ganges and Indus Rivers all originate here, and the water they provide is
critical to the survival of millions of people downstream. What happens in
Tibet has profound implications for hundreds of million of people, not only in China itself,
but in neighboring countries. A number of biodiversity ‘hotspots’ and eco-regions are located on
the Tibetan plateau. With their distinctive species, ecological processes, and evolutionary
phenomena, these areas are some of the most important areas on earth for conserving
biodiversity. The Tibetan plateau also includes the most intact example of mountain
rangelands in Asia with a relatively intact vertebrate fauna, and is one of the largest
remaining terrestrial wilderness regions left in the world. The region supports rare and
endangered wildlife species such as the wild yak, Tibetan wild ass, Tibetan antelope,
Tibetan argali and snow leopard. Due to extensive resource extraction, poaching and unsustainable
development, Tibetan ecosystems and many of their species are now endangered.
Conserving these animals and their habitat is an important priority for the global
community. The Tibetan plateau is one of the earth’s important grazing ecosystems,
encompassing about i.6s million square kilometers of grazing land. It contains the highest grasslands in the world and with a severe
climate, it is one of the world’s harshest grazing environments, yet these pastures supply forage for an estimated 12 million yaks and
30 million sheep and goats and provide livelihood for about million pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. More than 8o% of Tibetans
live in rural areas, and for centuries, the majority have sustained themselves through a nomadic herder lifestyle, uniquely adapted to
the harsh conditions and fragile ecosystem of the Tibetan plateau. The
implementation of Chinese government
policies to settle Tibetan nomads and to resettle Tibetans in towns is now threatening
the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of people and imperilling the Tibetan
landscape. These policies, based on an urban industrial model and imposed by planners in Beijing, are
counterproductive: they have made nomads poorer and degraded Tibet’s vast grasslands.
Scientific research has established that the mobility of the herds keeps the grasslands healthy, that taking nomads off the land does
not help conserve water resources, and that herdspeople denied their livelihood become demoralized and dependent. One of the last
examples of sustainable nomadic pastoralism on this planet faces extinction unless this policy is soon changed. Tibet’s
precious high-altitude environment is increasingly endangered by Chinese government
policies. Conserving the environment of the Tibetan plateau requires a better
under standing of its unique ecology and the collaboration of all of the people who have a stake in the
future of Tibet.
Europe Advantage
Ext. Europe L / Economy IL
The climate refugee crisis will become unmanageable for Europe – the plan
is key
Taylor 17 - environment correspondent for the Guardian (Matthew, “Climate change 'will create world's biggest refugee
crisis'”, 2 November 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/02/climate-change-will-create-worlds-biggest-
refugee-crisis)//abaime
<Tens of millions of people will be forced from their homes by climate change in the next
decade, creating the biggest refugee crisis the world has ever seen, according to a new report. Senior
US military and security experts have told the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) study that the number of climate
refugees will dwarf those that have fled the Syrian conflict, bringing huge challenges to
Europe. “If Europe thinks they have a problem with migration today … wait 20 years,” said
retired US military corps brigadier general Stephen Cheney. “See what happens when climate change drives people out of Africa –
the Sahel [sub-Saharan area] especially – and we’re
talking now not just one or two million, but 10 or
20 [million]. They are not going to south Africa, they are going across the Mediterranean.” The study published on
Thursday calls on governments to agree a new legal framework to protect climate
refugees and, ahead of next week’s climate summit in Germany, urges leaders to do more to implement the
targets set out in the Paris climate agreement. Sir David King, the former chief scientific adviser to the UK
government, told the EJF: “What we are talking about here is an existential threat to our civilisation in the longer term. In the short
term, it carries all sorts of risks as well and it requires a human response on a scale that has never been achieved before.” The report
argues that climate change played a part in the build up to the Syrian war, with successive
droughts causing 1.5 million people to migrate to the country’s cities between 2006 and
2011. Many of these people then had no reliable access to food, water or jobs. “Climate
change is the the unpredictable ingredient that, when added to existing social, economic
and political tensions, has the potential to ignite violence and conflict with disastrous
consequences,” said EJF executive director, Steve Trent. “In our rapidly changing world climate change – and its
potential to trigger both violent conflict and mass migration – needs to be considered as
an urgent priority for policymakers and business leaders alike.” Although the report highlights to
growing impact of climate change on people in the Middle East and Africa, it says changing weather patterns – like
the hurricanes that devastated parts of the US this year – prove richer nations are not
immune from climate change.>
Climate immigrants lack protection internationally – they are going to the
EU now
Sengupta, '17 – International Climate Reporter and Specialist (Somini, "Climate Change Is Driving People From Home. So
Why Don’t They Count as Refugees?," New York Times, 12-21-2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/climate/climate-
refugees.html)//SB
UNITED NATIONS — More than 65 million people are displaced from their homes, the largest
number since the Second World War, and
nearly 25 million of them are refugees and asylum seekers
living outside their own country.
But that number doesn’t include people displaced by climate change.
Under international law, only those who have fled their countries because of war or
persecution are entitled to refugee status. People forced to leave home because of
climate change, or who leave because climate change has made it harder for
them to make a living, don’t qualify.
The law doesn’t offer them much protection at all unless they can show they are fleeing a war
zone or face a fear of persecution if they are returned home.
Is a legal definition outdated?

That’s not surprising, perhaps: The treaty that defines the status of refugees was written at the end of World War II.
A research paper, published Thursday in Science magazine, suggests that weather
shocks are spurring people to
seek asylum in the European Union. The researchers found that over a 15-year period, asylum applications in Europe
increased along with “hotter-than-normal temperatures” in the countries where the asylum seekers had come from.
They predict that many

more people will seek asylum in Europe as temperatures in their
home countries are projected to rise.
The paper, by Anouch Missirian and Wolfram Schlenker, looks at weather patterns in the countries of
origin for asylum applicants between 2000 and 2014. It found that ”weather shocks on agricultural
regions in 103 countries around the globe directly influence emigration” to Europe.
“Part of the flow,” said Dr. Schlenker, a professor at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University and a co-
author of the study, “we can explain by what happens to the weather in the source country.”
Climate refugees are going to the EU – results in a substantial influx of

refugees – hurts their economy
Greshko, '17 – Science Specialist and Writer (Michael, "Future Warming Could Worsen Europe's Refugee Crisis," National
Geographic News, 12-21-2017, https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/12/climate-change-migrants-refugees-european-union-
environment/)//SB
In recent years, a
refugee crisis has gripped the European Union, as unrest in Syria and
elsewhere has sent hundreds of thousands of migrants to Europe’s shores, seeking safe harbor.
Now, anew study says that if all else were to remain equal—a necessary but major if—the stresses
of climate change could drive more migrants into the European Union in future years.
As warming worsens, these influxes would accelerate. Under one scenario where warming
stabilizes by 2100, asylum applications could increase by some 28 percent. But in a
scenario with “business-as-usual” warming, applications could nearly triple, to more
than a million asylum seekers per year.
That said, these forecasts assume that applicants’ home countries do not adapt to a changing climate.
“This is an incredibly important study,” Solomon Hsiang, a researcher at the University of California, Berkeley,
who models climate change’s social impacts, said by email. He wasn’t involved with the study. “This work layers on top
[of existing research] new evidence that populations try to escape these deteriorating
conditions by applying for asylum in safer countries.”
The findings, published in Science on Thursday, are the latest to show how Earth’s changing climate
could exacerbate global conflict.
A growing body of research suggests that climate change can sow chaos within individual
countries. One 2015 study found that human activity increased the odds of the extreme drought
that gripped Syria and Jordan from 2007 to 2010. Some argue that this drought helped displace
Syria’s farmers, contributing to the instability that triggered Syria’s civil war.
Fewer studies, however, have zoomed out to see whether Earth’s changing climate might shape relationships among many countries.
“Even though the consequences of climate change may not be felt or seen in a given
country, the interconnections between that country and all the countries of the world
will be felt at home,” says study coauthor Anouch Missirian, a Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University’s School of
International and Public Affairs.
Trouble on the Farm
To tease out this interconnectedness, Missirian and Columbia University economist Wolfram Schlenker looked at 103 countries that
had sent asylum applications to the EU each year from 2000 to 2014. The researchers then compared these application counts
against the countries’ weather data.
After crunching the numbers, Missirian and Schlenker found a U-shaped relationship between the number of asylum seekers from a
given country and average annual temperatures. Overall, applications reached their lowest when temperatures swung near 20
degrees Celsius (68 degrees Fahrenheit), a temperature associated with high crop yields. But when countries saw hotter or colder
swings, asylum applications increased.
Political scientist Jan Selby of the University of Sussex, who has criticized the claims that climate change was connected to Syria’s
civil war, dismisses this relationship as coincidental.
“It’s not really surprising that the paper finds a statistical relationship… since, as is well known, the period since 2000 has seen both
increased civil conflict and refugee flows and, independently, significant temperature increases and weather shocks,” he said by
email. “The key question is whether this correlation tells us anything about causation. I would venture that it doesn’t.”
Missirian and Schlenker disagree. For one, they note that their study accounts for how weather affects a given country’s agricultural
land—and finds that asylum applications vary with changes in weather over these areas in particular. Their analysis also accounted
for shocks that all countries shared, such as the 2008 global financial crisis.
And since short-term fluctuations in weather are random, Schlenker says, their effects on migration wouldn’t correlate with other
factors, such as whether a country was a democracy. Similarly, randomized trials let drug companies tell whether medicines
outperform placebos, even though many factors determine someone’s health.
“I’m pretty much willing to go to bat that the relationship between weather shocks and asylum applications we observed from 2000
to 2014 is causal,” says Schlenker.
An Evolving Landscape
To tease out climate change’s contribution, the study assumes that the 2000-2014 relationship between temperature and migration
will hold through the end of the century. But Schlenker and Missirian readily acknowledge that this might not be the case.
“You have to be very careful when you make these kinds of extrapolations, because you can expect that there will be adaptation to
climate change—maybe better-suited crops, or just a reallocation of populations within a country,” says Missirian.
“It could go either way,” she adds. “The effect of temperature could be felt much more vividly, or [depending on] our capacity to
adapt, much milder.”
Caitlin Werrell, the president of the Center for Climate and Security, a non-partisan think tank focused on climate change’s security
risks, agrees that governance plays a critical role.
Ext. Populism IL
The refugee crisis exacerbates the populist crisis in Europe – the US is key
Postelnicescu 16 – (Claudia, “Europe’s New Identity: The Refugee Crisis and the Rise of Nationalism”, 31 May 2016,
https://ejop.psychopen.eu/article/view/1191/html)//abaime
The refugee crisis, with its millions of people fleeing war and conflicts, let aside the ones
migrating to Europe for economic reasons, triggered the acceleration of an underlying
conflict of visions among the European member states and even states outside the
European Union, such as Iceland who dropped the plan of joining the European Union. There is suddenly a
sense of urgency in dealing with all kinds of pressures inside the EU: some of those are
old issues with new developing patterns, others are new: the inapplicability of the Dublin III agreement that
underlined the minimal common rules on asylum-seekers and migrants failed implementation in several EU states in the summer of
2015, the financial crisis, the Greek debt crisis, the Crimeea/Ukraine crisis, the Brexit crisis, the terrorism crisis, with attacks or
threats in Brussels, Paris or anywhere else in Europe. On the other side there is the rise of extremist parties in many European
countries; the radicalization among European citizens who are becoming foreign terrorist fighters; the rise of hybrid terrorism and
cyber terrorism; the end of Schengen area and the future of a more integrated EU. The debate over these pre-
existing aspects acquired more heat in the refugee crisis, when Angela Merkel went forward with an open
gate approach, while other European countries refused to follow suit. The most prominent opponent of Germany’s vision is
Hungary, through its prime-minister Viktor Orban, who refused any solidarity and proclaimed the demise of Schengen. The gap
between Germany and other European States is widening also on a number of other issues, such as the Greek debt crisis and the
Euro zone. The failure to narrow this gap might mean the disintegration of EU. At the same time, the
incapacity of the
European leaders to prove solidarity by voluntarily taking in refugees generated a huge
amount of pressure on the few countries that had no other choice. Greece and Italy are some of the
main entry points in the EU and were put in the impossibility of facing the waves of refugees alone; in fact Greece did not manage to
keep the Dublin requirements in place and large numbers of people went unregistered across Europe giving rise to criticism and
anti-immigration phobias. From here to a full revival of nationalism and extreme right parties was only a step further. What
do
all these new leaders claim? They justify the return to the nation state and the national
identity and the rejection of the union. What Europe claims? Divided visions, no common
European identity and going from a crisis to another with no rational solution in sight.
The situation is rapidly deteriorating with the success of nationalist leaders riding the
wave of instability and fear of the future among huge migrants’ waves and imported
terrorism in Europe via ISIL. In the background looms also the involvement of Russia’s
president, Vladimir Putin, who is more than happy to see the European Union crumbling into
pieces.
Ext. NATO IL
European populism unravels NATO
Schrank ‘18
[Phil. Phillip Gary Schrank is an instructor at Korea Military Academy. He is also a doctoral candidate at Korea University’s
Graduate School of International Studies. “The Rise of Populism and the Future of NATO.” Global Politics Review, Vol 3 N2. 2018
pdf//jv]
Populism in Europe has surged since the early 2000s. According to some scholars, populism was
widespread in Europe. At that time, entrepreneurs like Silvio Berlusconi in Italy and Simeon II in Bulgaria
took advantage of large reserves of cash and innovative marketing schemes. 1 At that time, no
one speculated that the rise of populism would call the basic tenets of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to question. The rise of populism in the
last five years in both the United States and Europe has led some to question the power
of NATO. During his campaign, President Trump stated, “We will no longer surrender this country
or its people to the false song of globalism. The nation-state remains the true foundation
for happiness and harmony. I am skeptical of international unions that tie us up and bring America down.” 2 Since he
has made that statement, Trump has also called NATO irrelevant and called on US’s Asian allies
to pay more for US support. In the short period he has been president, Trump has scrapped the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), criticized NATO, NAFTA, the WTO, and most bilateral
relationships the US has fostered since the end of World War II. In Europe, Marine Le Pen, former French
presidential candidate associated with the National Front, has praised Trump for calling NATO ‘obsolete’ and
criticized him for his subsequent backtracking on that statement. 3 Similar to Trump being skeptical to international organizations,
Geert Wilders, former presidential candidate in the Netherlands wanted to “liberate” the Netherlands and
pull the country out of the EU and NATO.
Canada Advantage
1ac
Trump has slashed TPS protections for thousands fleeing environmental
devastation – this triggers a surge of immigration to Canada.
Byjessica Corbett 11-22-2017 -- Jessica Corbett is a staff writer for Common Dreams. ["Trump's Treatment of Haitians
Portends Brutal Future for World's Climate Refugees", Accessible Online at:
https://www.commondreams.org/news/2017/11/22/naomi-klein-trumps-treatment-haitians-portends-brutal-future-worlds-
climate-refugees] @ AG
Following an announcement this week from the

Trump administration that it is terminating temporary
protections for some 59,000 Haitians who fled to the United States after a devastating
2010 earthquake—a highly anticipated move that has motivated thousands of Haitians to cross
the border into Canada to seek asylum over the past year—journalist Naomi Klein warns decisions by the
U.S. and Canadian governments indicate how wealthy nations may handle climate refugees in the years to come.
Amid growing fears that the Trump administration would not renew their Temporary Protected Status (TPS)—a federal program
that allows foreign nationals from a select list of countries to live and work in the United States, due to conditions such as civil war or
environmental disaster—thousands
of Haitian refugees have fled to Canada in recent months,
overwhelming its government's resources to a degree that up to a quarter of those who
make it across the border reportedly could be deported.
Writing for The Intercept, Klein details the experiences of multiple Haitian immigrants who have lived in the United States for
several years, but have recently made the journey to Canada, crossing over into the country at remote locations in spite of
treacherous weather conditions. Though they share heart-wrenching tales, Klein argues "there is a bigger picture to be seen here"—
"the climate connection."
The thousands of Haitian refugees who came to the United States under TPS were not fleeing what was seen as a permanently
unlivable island, and the Trump administration is claiming—despite arguments to the contrary—that conditions on the island have
improved enough that such protections are no longer warranted. However, as the planet continues to warm, in large
part because of major greenhouse gas emitters like the United States, island nations such as Haiti will face
increasing threats from rising sea levels and natural disasters that are
intensified by warmer oceans.
Klein writes:
Because TPS—which singles

out "environmental disaster" as one of the key reasons a country
would receive this designation—is currently the most significant policy tool available to
the U.S. government to bring a modicum of relief to the countless people worldwide who
are already being displaced as a result of climate change-related crises, with many more
on the way. Little wonder, then, that Trump officials are rushing to slam this policy door shut....
As the only U.S. immigration program that grants legal rights to migrants in response to environmental disasters, the
fate of
the program should be seen as a de facto test case for how the world's wealthiest
country, and its largest historical emitter of greenhouse gases, is going treat the coming waves of climate
refugees.
It creates a surge in Canadian populism
Cindy Carcamo 1-29-2018 – Reporter for the LA Times. ["Worried about Trump-stoked exodus of immigrants, Canada
discourages illegal crossings", Accessible Online at: http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-canadian-envoy-tps-20180129-
story.html] @ AG
In a private dining room at Zov's restaurant in Tustin, a Canadian envoy made his pitch to about a dozen immigration attorneys and
immigrant rights leaders.
Pablo Rodriguez, a member of Parliament, leaned over from his seat in the middle of the
table and asked everyone to spread the word: Please do not cross into Canada illegally.
"Get the facts and make a decision based on the right facts, before leaving your jobs and taking your children out of school and going
up there hoping to stay there forever," Rodriguez said. "Because if you don't qualify … you
will be returned and in
this case not to the United States. You will have lost your status and would be returned
to your country of origin."
Worried that anti-immigrant rhetoric and decisions from the Trump administration
could drive more people across its border, the Canadian government is trying to nip that
in the bud.
The whip for the majority Liberal Party in Parliament, Rodriguez arrived in the U.S. a few days after President Trump
announced his decision to end temporary protected status of an estimated 200,000
Salvadorans in the country.
His message was not that different from immigration hardliners in the U.S. But it was
delivered with a nicer Canadian soft sell.
Rodriguez was a young boy when he arrived in Canada as a political refugee from Argentina. He said he can empathize with those
looking north.
He said that Canada is "an open country" and a nation of immigrants. But, he stressed, immigrating to the country needs to be done
legally.
"You can't just come to Canada and cross the border and stay there the rest of your life," he said. "We want to avoid a
humanitarian crisis along the border."
The Canadian government, Rodriguez said, wants to avoid a repeat of what happened last
summer when thousands of Haitians crossed Canada's southern border "irregularly"
after losing temporary protected status in the U.S.
The influx created a massive backlog of refugee claimants.
Last week was Rodriguez's fourth outreach visit to the U.S. since the fall.
Rodriguez is one of several lawmakers and dignitaries Canada has sent in recent months to combat misinformation about gaining
asylum in Canada. Recently, Canadian representatives traveled to Haitian communities in Miami and a Somalian enclave in
Minneapolis.
During the meeting in Orange County, Rodriquez wore an infectious smile and an easygoing demeanor as he engaged in what he
called a "friendly conversation" with immigration attorneys and immigrant community leaders.
It's unclear how effective he was.
Some of those at the meeting said Canada seemed awfully hospitable compared to the countries some immigrants had left behind.
Countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and parts of Mexico are among the most dangerous places in the Western
Hemisphere.
"If you are facing certain death in your country … Canada seems like a very excellent option," said George W. Abbes, an immigration
attorney.
Rodriguez said that so far there isn't any indication that more Latin Americans are crossing the border from the U.S. to Canada.
But the Canadian government wants to be proactive, he said. Rodriguez said officials wanted to counter false reports in Latin
American media that suggest migrating to Canada is an easy way to find immigration relief.
"We want to have an honest, transparent conversation," Rodriguez said. "Canada is a very open country but there are rules."
The meeting comes at a time of considerable anxiety for immigrants in the U.S. illegally,
with rumors about huge raids in Northern California, the impending ending of
protective status for many Salvadoran immigrants and tough talk from the White
House.
First impact is the Canada Economy: climate refugee inflows devastate
Canada’s growth
Immigration Watch Canada 11-22-2015 – Canadian news source reporting on immigration issues. ["Unjustified Immigration
Levels Against Public's Wishes", Accessible Online at: http://immigrationwatchcanada.org/2015/11/22/unjustified-immigration-
levels-against-publics-wishes/] @ AG
The reality is that Canada’s average 250,000 per year immigration intake since 1990 has been far
too high. In fact, Canada’s intake is the highest per capita in the world. And it has obviously been destructive
and senseless. What are some examples of the destruction and senselessness? First, our high intake has had
major negative economic consequences for a minimum of 1.5 million Canadians who
are looking for work. At the very least, it has forced many of them to compete (through
Canada’s so-called “Employment Equity for Visible Minorities” programme and others) with immigrants for a limited
number of jobs. Second, relentless high immigration has caused two results : (1) relentless
demand for a basic human need such as housing and (2) relentless increases in
house prices. The urban area which is the best example of this is Metro Vancouver where house prices are now the second
highest in the world. (Metro Toronto has also been seriously affected.) Much of Metro Vancouver’s population can no longer afford
house ownership. In
cases where the existing population has bought housing, they have had to
take on huge mortgages. UBC Geography Professor David Ley has clearly shown the connection between immigration
and Metro Vancouver house prices.
Canadian innovation key to mediate the AI tech race

Kim 04/17 – Post-Graduate Research Fellow at Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (Dongwoo, “The Artificial Divide:
Canada’s Role in the East-West Clash Over Machine Intelligence,” Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 04/17/18,
https://www.asiapacific.ca/blog/artificial-divide-canadas-role-east-west-clash-over-machine)//SI
Just a few years ago, conversations about artificial intelligence (AI) ethics and policy were limited to a very specific community of
academics and enthusiasts, and perhaps a marginal few in the circle of avant garde policy-makers. Today,
with rapid
advancements in the field and a growing awareness of the potential impacts – including
disruptions in the labour market and the potential development of autonomous ‘killer
robots’ – AI has become a topic of a larger and more urgent discussion.
From the perspective of government, the technology cuts across different sectors and raises unprecedented policy questions that
require comprehensive, co-ordinated responses. AI – commonly defined as the capacity of a computer to perform operations
analogous to learning and decision-making in humans – has increasingly become an arena for international competitiveness, and
governments around the world have begun engaging in earnest.
While an existential clash of cultures may be an exaggerated assessment, a

‘fracture’ along the East-West divide
has become increasingly evident and raises concerns about a growing schism
between nations in approaching such powerful technology, which
permeates borders. East Asian and Western states have demonstrated starkly
differing approaches to AI, underscoring existing differences in terms of values and
governance. This fracture could further the deterioration of the existing
global order.
In the West, discussions about AI ethics and policy have been steeped in a broader debate about the nature of democracy and the
future of the liberal order. The European Union has been proactive in promoting a co-ordinated response among its member states,
with plans to develop a comprehensive AI strategy in the coming months. A report on AI by the European Group on Ethics in
Science and Technologies entitled Ethical Principles and Democratic Prerequisites states that “key decisions on the regulation of AI
development and application should be the result of democratic debate and public engagement.” It further states that the “rule of
law, access to justice and the right to redress and a fair trial provide the necessary framework for ensuring the observance of human
rights standards and potential AI-specific regulations.”
French President Emmanuel Macron, in his interview with Wired magazine on France's newly launched national AI initiative,
highlighted the impact of AI on democratic processes, asserting that Europe has a responsibility to implement policies that protect
democratic values. “Europe is the place where the DNA of democracy was shaped, and therefore I think Europe has to get to grips
with what could become a big challenge for democracies,” he said.
Similarly, discussions
on AI in Canada increasingly underscore the threats to
democratic and liberal values. Université de Montréal has been running a series of public consultations in
developing the Montreal Declaration of Responsible AI. The Declaration lists “democracy” as one of its seven principles, stating that
“the development of AI should promote informed participation in public life, co-operation, and democratic debate.” Meanwhile,
discussions at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), which has been running essays by Canada’s leading
experts on AI and data policy, feature democracy quite prominently.
AI governance is a relatively new topic, limited mostly to wealthier, Western states with AI research and development (R&D) and
deployment capabilities. As such, while conversations on AI governance have started to proliferate, they primarily arise in Western-
dominated settings: the OECD recently launched the Going Digital project, in which AI ethics and governance feature prominently,
and the G7
will host a conference in Canada in the fall of 2018 to discuss a common vision
for AI technology. However, the problem with these current initiatives is that they
exclude China, a global AI player, and the particularities of East Asian states generally
may be lost in these predominantly Western fora.
China, Japan, and South Korea all feature strong AI R&D industries, buttressed by co-ordinated government science and technology
policies and highly-educated workforces. Coupled with the projected economic growth in the region, East Asia’s AI industries stand
to emerge as much more relevant and influential players on the international stage.
China, along with the U.S., is expected to hold a ‘duopoly’ on AI. With the availability of massive capital and big data capacity, along
with the support of the central government that views AI as a key strategic sector for development and global influence, China is
already shaping up to be an ‘AI superpower.’ According to its Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, China is
positioning itself to become the world leader in AI R&D by 2030. However, the application of AI for military technology and civilian
surveillance à la the popular TV series Black Mirror has raised concerns in the West, and possibly nudged conversations towards the
twin topics of democracy and liberalism.
While not as uncompromising as China, the debates and policy initiatives in South Korea and Japan suggest that both Asian
democracies are taking approaches that diverge from their Western peers when it comes to AI. Both governments have launched
comprehensive roadmaps for AI development and deployment that cover a wide range of sectors – from R&D to welfare reform –
but unlike in the Western discourse, the keyword “democracy” is missing. The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence’s Ethical
Guidelines, for instance, does not mention anything about AI’s intersection with governance.
This divergence from the Western discourse may be explained by differences in social and political culture, or by historically-formed
policy-making processes. East Asian states are, for instance, generally able to implement more centralized, co-ordinated policies due
to the existence of strong bureaucracies that emerged alongside the developmental state model that prioritizes economic growth.
Regardless of the underlying drivers of these divergent policy environments, it is increasingly clear that states with strong AI
capabilities do not necessarily share similar views on its development, deployment and ongoing governance, which without proactive
measures may have far-reaching implications for the prospects of a shared future.
In this context, Canada has a positive role to play in bringing together East
and West.
Canada’s strengths in AI R&D and its reputation as a responsible,
multilateral player on the international stage only bolster its credibility.
While the U.S. is perceived as a ‘rival’ to China, and the EU increasingly presents itself
as the global headmaster of a euro-centric interpretation of liberal, democratic values,
Canada, with its historic role as a ‘trusted mediator’ between all parties, may be in the
perfect position to facilitate dialogues between the competing paradigms. More
specifically, while Canada is part of the Western bloc, it also has historical credibility as
a reasonable middle power.
As government-to-government discussions on this key technology remain insulated
within the Western circle, Canada, as it did during the Cold War, is in a position
to engage with East Asian states to shape a truly global norm on
responsible, accountable use of this disruptive technology – and exercise leadership in
mitigating the risk to an increasingly precarious global order.
Otherwise, it escalates – AI weaponization is an existential threat
Poovanna 17 – Scholar, research fellow, engineer and writer (Pete, “We Must Stop The Artificial Intelligence Arms Race At
Any Cost,” Huffington Post, 08/21/17, https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/pete-poovanna/we-must-prevent-an-artificial-intelligence-
arms-race-at-any-cost_a_23117234/)//SI
Recent advances in science and technology have made nuclear bombs more powerful
than ever, and one can imagine how devastating it could be to the world. These
advances in science and technology have also created many unprecedented and still
unresolved global security challenges for policy makers and the public.
Many AI experts fear that a terrifying AI arms race may already be under
way.
It is hard to imagine any one technology that will transform the global security more than artificial intelligence (AI), and it is
going to have the biggest impact on humanity that has ever been. The Global Risks Report 2017 by
the World Economic Forum places AI as one of the top five factors exacerbating geopolitical risks. One sector that saw
the huge disruptive potential of AI from an early stage is the military. AI-based
weaponization will represent a paradigm shift in the way wars are fought, with profound
consequences for global security.
Major investment in AI-based weapons has already begun. According to a WEF report, a
terrifying AI arms race may already be underway. To ensure a continued military edge
over China and Russia, the Pentagon requested around US$15 billion for AI-based
weaponry for the 2017 budget. However, the U.S. doesn't have the exclusive control over AI.
Whichever country develops viable AI weaponry first will completely take
over the military landscape as AI-based machines have the capacity to be
much more intense and devastating than a nuclear bomb. If any one country has a
machine that can hack into enemy defence systems, that country will have such a distinct advantage over any other world
government.
Without proper regulation, AI-based weapons could go out of control and they may be used indiscriminately, create a greater risk to
civilians, and more easily fall into the hands of dictators and terrorists. Imagine if North Korea developed an AI capable of military
action — that could very quickly destabilize the entire world. According to an UNOG report, two major concerns of AI based weapons
are: (i) the inability to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants and (ii) the inability to ensure a proportionate
response in which the military advantage will outweigh civilian casualties
My visit to Japan is also marked by concerns in the region about the possibility of nuclear missile strikes, particularly after U.S.
President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un threatened each other with shows of force. As Elon Musk said, "If
you're not concerned about AI safety, you should be. [There is] vastly more risk than North Korea."
Students type on laptop computers during a cyber-defence programming class in the "War Room" at Korea University in Seoul,
South Korea, on Nov. 26, 2015.
AI technology is growing in a similar fashion as the push for nuclear technology. I don't know if there is a reasonable analogy
between the nuclear research and AI research. Nuclear research was supposed to bring an unlimited supply of energy to the power-
starved countries of the world. However, it was also harnessed for nuclear weapons.
A similar push is now been given to AI technology as well. AI might have great potential to help humanity in profound ways;
however, it's very important to regulate it. Starting
an AI arms race is very bad for the world,
and should be prevented by banning all AI-based weapons beyond
meaningful human control.
In 2016, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced the government's Pan-
Canadian AI strategy, which aims to put Canada at the center of an
emerging gold rush of innovation. So, what does this actually mean for the AI arms race that is well
underway?
We are living in an age of revolutionary changes brought about by the advance of AI

technology. I am not sure there lies any hope for the world, but certainly there is a
danger of sudden death. I think we are on a brink of an AI arms race. It should be
prevented at any cost. No matter how long and how difficult the road will be, it is the
responsibility of all leaders who live in the present to continue to make efforts.
Second impact is Populism – more refugees will leave Canada vulnerable to
populist backlash – it destroys their global cred
Gilmore, '17 – former diplomat and social entrepreneur (Scott, "Does Canada have too many immigrants?," Macleans.ca, 3-
7-2017, https://www.macleans.ca/politics/worldpolitics/how-populism-is-taking-over-the-world/)//SB
Which brings us to Canada. Will

we see a similar rise in populism here? When I sat down to write this column,
my instinctive answer was “no.” I agreed with many of the arguments made by my colleague John Geddes, who sees
systemic and political barriers to Canadian populism. My thinking was that the apparent growth in global populism is because we
are focused on Trump and starting to pay attention. But where I could find data, it didn’t support my
conclusion. One study from Harvard, for example, found that support for populist parties
on both the left and the right has grown undeniably and steadily since the 1960s, doubling its
support since then. But it was another study completed late last year by a group of academics
from the U.S., Europe and Japan that left me especially troubled. They looked at a dozen
European countries to see if there was a correlation between the relative size of the immigrant
population and the support for right-wing populist movements. The researchers found that
there was a direct connection, and that support grew at an increasing rate as the
size of the immigrant population grew. And what is more, their data suggested there was a
“tipping point” in western societies: when immigrants comprised 22 per cent of the
population, support for anti-immigrant parties approached a political majority. If a
country takes in too many immigrants, a populist backlash may be unavoidable. In
Canada, our foreign-born population is already at 20 per cent and growing. This is
far higher than in the United States and (except for Luxembourg and Switzerland, where there are large numbers
of itinerant professional residents like bankers) it is far higher than in any other European nation. And it’s
getting bigger. Statistics Canada just released a report that projected Canada’s immigrant population will
increase to between 26 per cent and 30 per cent within two decades. This puts Canada
well beyond the theoretical 22 per cent threshold in the European study. It makes sense that
countries become unstable with too many foreigners. I have first-hand experience in places like Pakistan
and Timor Leste, where sudden massive influxes of refugees can pull a country apart at
the seams. But is it possible that even when immigrants arrive gradually and they are integrated successfully, it can still
destabilize a country? Perhaps a populist backlash is inevitable in Western democracies when the immigrant population grows to a
certain size. This
is not because the newcomers bring crime or undermine our democratic
institutions (they do neither), but because the native citizens, whether they are Canadians
or Austrians or Americans, instinctively feel threatened by newcomers. Perhaps the
experiences add up—new faces on TV, new clothes in the street, new music on the radio—until the average
person reaches a tipping point and pushes back. After all, a fear of strangers is wired into our brains, an
instinct that kept us alive in our tribal past. If this is true, it upends a lot of assumptions that this country is built on regarding
multiculturalism, pluralism and immigration. Canada
may be facing larger global forces, tectonic shifts
which are are not felt until it’s too late and a populist earthquake shatters our
carefully built house of peace, order and good government.
Canada’s standing as a middle power is a controlling impact – necessary to

mediate otherwise-inevitable great power conflict
Bothwell ‘11
[Alice. International Studies at Univ of Stellenbosch. “Can Canada Still be Considered a Middle Power?” March 2011
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/6698//Jv]
Robert Cox in his 1989 article “Middlepowermanship, Japan and the Future World Order” poses a¶ valid question “what is the
essence of the middle power’s functional relationship to the world¶ order?” (Cox, 1989:825). Before delving into the theory behind
middle powers it is important to¶ understand why they are so important in the world. Middle powers have acted
as a stabiliser and¶ neutraliser, especially during the Cold War, middle power countries acted
within the interests of¶ their bloc to neutralise the tension, “or urging restraint on the
alliance leader, or resisting renewed¶ 21¶ tendencies towards isolationism on the part of the bloc
leader”(Cooper et al. 1993:20). “The¶ middle-power role is to affirm the principle of adherence to
acceptable rules of conduct by all¶ powers, great and small” (Cox, 1989:834). Middle
powers are able to affirm this world order¶ through various international
institutions based on a post- Westphalian political structure and a¶ decentralization
of global hegemony (Cox, 1989:835).¶ In the era after the Second World War when the Great Powers had been
decimated a new grouping¶ of powers began to emerge. A country like Canada who was very involved in
the war through¶ industry, finance, technology and manpower came out on the other
side with a new place in the¶ global order. No longer was Canada a former colony or a nation pretending to be its
own country;¶ rather, as a nation Canada had an important impact. Perhaps most importantly, the
Canadian¶ economy was stronger than ever at the end of the war. Since Canada was not a
‘great power’ like¶ the United States or Britain but was no longer a small power a new place in the world order needed¶ to be
sought out. This is where the evolution of middle powers began.¶ After the Cold War ended there were new
opportunities for middle powers. They were not needed¶ to try and keep a stable world order;
there were new initiatives they were able to participate in.¶ Since the Soviet Union and the United States were no longer caught in a
constant power struggle¶ and there was no longer the same divide between east and west and as a result, “middle powers
had¶ greater freedom of action thrust upon them in terms of their
diplomacy” (Cooper et al.1993: 21).¶ Middle powers have the ability to come together through
multi-lateral bodies such as NATO and¶ the UN to uphold “the norms and rules of the
international system and perform certain tasks to¶ maintain and strengthen
that system” (Cooper et al. 1993: 21). Throughout the 1980s with the¶ United States’ declining resources middle
powers were poised to take on a more active role in the¶ international arena (Cooper et al.1993:
21).
Canadian softpower’s key to navigate tensions on the subcontinent

Clark ‘12
[Campbell. Foreign Affairs Writer for the Globe and Mail. “Canada must help strengthen Pakistan's civilian rule” 9/10/12
http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-must-help-strengthen-pakistans-civilian-rule/article625838/?service=mobile
//Jv]
Even after combat in Kandahar, Canada, like the rest of the world, has
an interest in seeing that this
dangerous dynamic doesn't heat up. Pakistan and its uncontrolled army intelligence
agency, which has already frustrated the United States, is at the centre of the question.¶ Immigration Minister
Jason Kenney said Canada supports India in its fight against terrorists. "We've seen a similar attack in a similar way not long ago,"
he said.¶ He was referring to the 2008 attacks in Mumbai that killed 164, and were traced to Lashkar-e-Taiba, a militant Pakistan-
based group backed by elements of Pakistan's intelligence agency. They, and the homegrown Indian Mujahedeen, who also are
believed to have been helped by the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, are immediate suspects in India this time.¶ An
immediate danger is that the attacks could derail India-Pakistan talks aimed at cooling
tensions. The bombings may have, in fact, been a spoiler attempt, said Daniel Markey, senior fellow for India and Pakistan at the
Council on Foreign Relations in Washington.¶ Tensions between India and Pakistan have a larger effect
in the region. Pakistan, especially its powerful army, sees India as its overriding adversary and has
sponsored groups such as the LeT as strategic assets. It backed the Taliban in Afghanistan in a proxy
battle with India for influence.¶ That doesn't seem to be the policy of Pakistan's civilian government now, but it isn't
really in control. The army is dominant, and inside the army, the intelligence service, the ISI,
is powerful.¶ It's hard to tell how much of the army or the government supports terror groups or insurgents. "Parts of the ISI
very clearly still support LeT. It's dangerous to go beyond that," Mr. Markey added.¶ Many Canadian officials have
held the same view about support for the Afghan Taliban. Former Canadian ambassador to Afghanistan
Chris Alexander, now a Conservative MP, last year accused Pakistan's army of "complicity."¶ Some wanted Ottawa to
out that role with criticism, others wanted to try to change it. Carleton University professor Eliot
Tepper argues that India, Pakistan and Afghanistan should be treated as one "security
complex" and Canada should adopt a broader aid and trade policy to
strengthen Pakistan's civilian elements.¶ There was an international wave to do that two years ago, led
by late U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke. Pushing India to reduce troops on the border would make Pakistan feel more secure and
would stop support for insurgents, it was argued. But Mr. Markey said that ran into a "buzzsaw" with India, which wouldn't make
security compromises that, it argued, wouldn't change Pakistan's behaviour anyway.¶ Now the United States is
frustrated with engagement in Pakistan. Osama bin Laden was found there, and then-CIA chief Leon Panetta
reportedly confronted the ISI over leaks that allowed insurgents to slip away. Since then, Washington has decided to
withhold $800-million in military aid to Islamabad.¶ That alone won't change Pakistan, Mr. Markey
argued; another step is to quietly convince others with influence, such as China and Saudi Arabia, that the "increasingly
unmanageable" ISI must be cleaned up, for their interests, too.¶ Canadian
criticism won't move Pakistan, either.
But Canada does have a smaller part: Encouraging India to keep talks going, looking
for ways to foster civilian government in Pakistan and pressing the world to see
its intelligence agency as a global problem.
South Asian war causes extinction – other conflicts do not
Robock and Toon ‘10
[Dr. Alan Robock is a professor of climatology in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University and the associate
director of its Center for Environmental Prediction. Prof. Robock has been a researcher in the area of climate change for more than
30 years. His current research focuses on soil moisture variations, the effects of volcanic eruptions on climate, effects of nuclear war
on climate, and regional atmosphere/hydrology modeling. He has served as Editor of climate journals, including the Journal of
Climate and Applied Meteorology and the Journal of Geophysical Research-Atmospheres. He has published more than 250 articles
on his research, including more than 150 peer-reviewed papers and Owen Brian Toon is professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic
Sciences and a fellow at the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics (LASP) at the University of Colorado, received his Ph.D.
from Cornell University – From the January 20 10 Scientific American Magazine –
http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSciAmJan2010.pdf]
By deploying modern computers and modern climate models, the two of us and our
colleagues have shown that not only were the ideas of the 1980s correct but the effects
would last for at least 10 years, much longer than previously thought. And by doing
calculations that assess decades of time, only now possible with fast, current computers,
and by including in our calculations the oceans and the entire atmosphere— also only
now possible—we have found that the smoke from even a regional war would be heated
and lofted by the sun and remain suspended in the upper atmosphere for years,
continuing to block sunlight and to cool the earth. India and Pakistan, which together
have more than 100 nuclear weapons, may be the most worrisome adversaries capable of a regional nuclear
conflict today. But other countries besides the U.S. and Russia (which have thousands) are well endowed: China, France and the
U.K. have hundreds of nuclear warheads; Israel has more than 80, North Korea has about 10 and Iran may well be trying to make its
own. In 2004 this situation prompted one of us (Toon) and later Rich Turco of the University of California, Los Angeles, both
veterans of the 1980s investigations, to begin evaluating what the global environmental effects of a regional nuclear war would be
and to take as our test case an engagement between India and Pakistan. The latest estimates by David Albright of the Institute for
Science and International Security and by Robert S. Norris of the Natural Resources Defense Council are that India has 50 to 60
assembled weapons (with enough plutonium for 100) and that Pakistan has 60 weapons. Both countries continue to
increase their arsenals. Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests indicate that the yield of the warheads would be sim-
ilar to the 15-kiloton explosive yield (equivalent to 15,000 tons of TNT) of the bomb the U.S. used on Hiroshima. Toon and Turco,
along with Charles Bardeen, now at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, modeled what would happen if 50 Hiroshima-
size bombs were dropped across the highest population-density targets in Pakistan and if 50 similar bombs were also dropped across
India. Some people maintain that nuclear weapons would be used in only a measured way. But in the wake of chaos, fear and broken
communications that would occur once a nuclear war began, we
doubt leaders would limit attacks in any
rational manner. This likelihood is particularly true for Pakistan, which is small and
could be quickly overrun in a conventional conflict. Peter R. La voy of the Naval
Postgraduate School, for example, has analyzed the ways in which a conflict between
India and Pakistan might occur and argues that Pakistan could face a decision to use all
its nuclear arsenal quickly before India swamps its military bases with traditional forces.
Obviously, we hope the number of nuclear targets in any future war will be zero, but
policy makers and voters should know what is possible. Toon and Turco found that
more than 20 million people in the two countries could die from the blasts, fires and
radioactivity—a horrible slaughter. But the investigators were shocked to discover that a
tremendous amount of smoke would be generated, given the megacities in the two countries, assuming
each fire would burn the same area that actually did burn in Hiroshima and assuming an amount of burnable material per person
based on various studies. They calculated that the 50 bombs exploded in Pakistan would produce three teragrams of smoke, and the
50 bombs hitting India would generate four (one teragram equals a million metric tons). Satellite observations of actual forest fires
have shown that smoke can be lofted up through the troposphere (the bottom layer of the atmosphere) and sometimes then into the
lower stratosphere (the layer just above, extending to about 30 miles). Toon and Turco also did some “back of the envelope”
calculations of the possible climate impact of the smoke should it enter the stratosphere. The large magnitude of such effects made
them realize they needed help from a climate modeler. It turned out that one of us (Robock) was already working with Luke Oman,
now at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, who was finishing his Ph.D. at Rutgers University on the climatic effects of volcanic
eruptions, and with Georgiy L. Stenchikov, also at Rutgers and an author of the first Russian work on nuclear winter. They
developed a climate model that could be used fairly easily for the nuclear blast calculations. Robock and his colleagues, being
conservative, put five teragrams of smoke into their modeled upper troposphere over India and Pakistan on an imaginary May 15.
The model calculated how winds would blow the smoke around the world and how the smoke particles would settle out from the
atmosphere. The smoke covered all the continents within two weeks. The black, sooty smoke absorbed sunlight, warmed and rose
into the stratosphere. Rain never falls there, so the air is never cleansed by precipitation; particles very slowly settle out by falling,
with air resisting them. Soot particles are small, with an average diameter of only 0.1 micron (μm), and so drift down very slowly.
They also rise during the daytime as they are heated by the sun, repeatedly delaying their elimination. The calculations showed that
the smoke would reach far higher into the upper stratosphere than the sulfate particles that are produced by episodic volcanic
eruptions. Sulfate particles are transparent and absorb much less sunlight than soot and are also bigger, typically 0.5 μm. The
volcanic particles remain airborne for about two years, but smoke from nuclear fires would last a decade. Killing Frosts in Summer
The climatic response to the smoke was surprising. Sunlight was immediately reduced,
cooling the planet to temperatures lower than any experienced for the past 1,000 years.
The global average cooling, of about 1.25 degrees Celsius (2.3 degrees Fahrenheit), lasted for several years, and even after 10 years
the temperature was still 0.5 degree C colder than normal. The models also showed a 10 percent reduction in precipitation
worldwide. Precipitation, river flow and soil moisture all decreased because blocking sunlight reduces evaporation and weakens the
hydrologic cycle. Drought was largely concentrated in the lower latitudes, however, because global cooling would retard the Hadley
air circulation pattern in the tropics, which produces a large fraction of global precipitation. In critical areas such as the Asian
monsoon regions, rainfall dropped by as much as 40 percent. The
cooling might not seem like much, but
even a small dip can cause severe consequences. Cooling and diminished sunlight
would, for example, shorten growing seasons in the midlatitudes. More insight into the
effects of cooling came from analyses of the aftermaths of massive volcanic eruptions.
Every once in a while such eruptions produce temporary cooling for a year or two. The
largest of the past 500 years, the 1815 Tambora eruption in Indonesia, blotted the sun and produced global cooling of about 0.5 de-
gree C for a year; 1816 became known as “The Year without a Summer” or “Eighteen Hundred and Froze to Death.” In New England,
although the average summer temperature was lowered only a few degrees, crop-killing frosts occurred in every month. After the
first frost, farmers replanted crops, only to see them killed by the next frost. The price of grain skyrocketed, the price of livestock
plummeted as farmers sold the animals they could not feed, and a mass migration began from New England to the Midwest, as
people followed reports of fertile land there. In Europe the weather was so cold and gloomy that the stock market collapsed,
widespread famines occurred and 18-year-old Mary Shelley was inspired to write
Frankenstein. Certain strains of crops, such as winter wheat, can withstand lower
temperatures, but a lack of sunlight inhibits their ability to grow. In our scenario,
daylight would filter through the high smoky haze, but on the ground every day would
seem to be fully overcast. Agronomists and farmers could not develop the necessary
seeds or adjust agricultural practices for the radically different conditions unless they
knew ahead of time what to expect. In addition to the cooling, drying and darkness,
extensive ozone depletion would result as the smoke heated the stratosphere; reactions that
create and destroy ozone are temperature-dependent. Michael J. Mills of the University of Colorado at Boulder ran a completely
separate climate model from Robock’s but found similar results for smoke lofting and stratospheric temperature changes. He
concluded that although surface temperatures would cool by a small amount, the stratosphere would be heated by more than 50
degrees C, because the black smoke particles absorb sunlight. This heating, in turn, would modify winds in the stratosphere, which
would carry ozone-destroying nitrogen oxides into its upper reaches. Together the high temperatures and nitrogen oxides would
reduce ozone to the same dangerous levels we now experience below the ozone hole above Antarctica every spring. Ultraviolet
radiation on the ground would increase significantly because of the diminished ozone.
Less sunlight and precipitation, cold spells, shorter growing seasons and more
ultraviolet radiation would all reduce or eliminate agricultural production. Notably, cooling and
ozone loss would be most profound in middle and high latitudes in both hemispheres, whereas precipitation declines would be
greatest in the tropics. The specific damage inflicted by each of these environmental changes would depend on particular crops,
soils, agricultural practices and regional weather patterns, and no researchers have completed detailed analyses of such agricultural
responses. Even in normal times, however, feeding
the growing human population depends on
transferring food across the globe to make up for regional farming deficiencies caused
by drought and seasonal weather changes. The total amount of grain stored on the planet today would feed the
earth’s population for only about two months [see “Could Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” by Lester R. Brown; Scientific
American, May]. Most cities and countries have stockpiled food supplies for just a very short period, and food shortages (as well as
rising prices) have increased in recent years.
A nuclear war could trigger declines in yield nearly
everywhere at once, and a worldwide panic could bring the global agricultural trading
system to a halt, with severe shortages in many places. Around one billion people
worldwide who now live on marginal food supplies would be directly threatened with
starvation by a nuclear war between India and Pakistan or between other regional
nuclear powers. Independent Evidence Needed Typically scientists test models and theories by doing experiments, but we
obviously cannot experiment in this case. Thus, we look for analogues that can verify our models. Burned cities. Unfortunately,
firestorms created by intense releases of energy have pumped vast quantities of smoke into the upper atmosphere. San Francisco
burned as a result of the 1906 earthquake, and whole cities were incinerated during World War II, including Dresden, Hamburg,
Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These events confirm that smoke from intense urban fires rises into the upper atmosphere. The
seasonal cycle. In actual winter the climate is cooler because the days are shorter and sunlight is less intense; the simple change of
seasons helps us quantify the effects of less solar radiation. Our climate models re-create the seasonal cycle well, confirming that
they properly reflect changes in sunlight. Eruptions. Explosive volcanic eruptions, such as those of Tambora in 1815, Krakatau in
1883 and Pinatubo in 1991 provide several lessons. The resulting sulfate aerosol clouds that formed in the stratosphere were
transported around the world by winds. The surface temperature plummeted after each eruption in proportion to the thickness of
the particulate cloud. After the Pinatubo eruption, the global average surface temperature dropped by about 0.25 degree C. Global
precipitation, river flow and soil moisture all decreased. Our models reproduce these effects. Forest fires. Smoke from large forest
fires sometimes is injected into the troposphere and lower stratosphere and is transported great distances, producing cooling. Our
models perform well against these effects, too. Extinction of the dinosaurs. An asteroid smashed into Mexico’s Yucatán Peninsula 65
million years ago. The
resulting dust cloud, mixed with smoke from fires, blocked the Sun,
killing the dinosaurs. Massive volcanism in India at the same time may have
exacerbated the effects. The events teach us that large amounts of aerosols in the earth’s
atmosphere can change climate drastically enough to kill robust species.
Canadian populism risks Quebec secession
E.B. Schmitt 7-9-2018 – Reporter for Politisme. ["The rise of the Canadian populism", Accessible Online at:
https://politisme.com/2018/06/09/the-rise-of-the-canadian-populism/] @ AG
With the Doug Ford’s victory in Ontario, the possibility that François
Legault winning the next general election in Quebec, and the very right-
wing positions of federal Conservatives leading by Andrew Scheer (a pro-christian
and pro-choice advocate), Canada – at every level of governance – seems moving to populism. If the
comparison of those political leaders with Donald Trump is tempting, this article postulates this populism is a local
adaptation of a new conservatism’s world tendency.
Columnists are often traped by political discourses. In discourses, the French President Emmanuel Macron pretends to be a liberal,
a world citizen. Nevertheless, his recent immigration bill was voted with the far-right support, condamned as the most coercitive
immigration law of French Republic history by academics, NGOs and refugees activists. This example tries to explain there is a gap
between political discourses and political actions, not because « all politiciens are liars », neither political discourses are related to
ideology whereas political actions depended of power experiment. This gap is the consequence of a simple but efficient catch-all
communication strategy in which a political leader presents himself/herself with manifold faces. In fact, the French President
doesn’t pretend be something, but – depending of few buzz words and a little bit of marketing – ideological and sociological biases of
columnists rewrite his discourses as liberal ones, while other people listen it differently.
Thus, Politics is a question of interpretation : every part of population find in a single discourse its own moto.
Populism is not an ideology, but a political practice which constits to grow the gap between range of interpretations. Populists don’t
speak to the people as whole or to a specific group of individuals, but speak about the people as whole for the exclusive benefit of a
specific group of individuals. In other words, populism tries to monopolize the concept of « people » by reducing it in very few
aspects depending of the specific group of individuals. Among them, some are parts of the system or elites. However, not sure that
critique of the system and elites of Donald Trump, Doug Ford or François Legault targets capitalism or social hierarchies, but social-
democracy and intellectual elites. That’s the reason why every anti-system or anti-elite discourses are not populist, but populism is
necessarly anti-system or anti-elite.
There are many common characteristics between Donald Trump, Doug Ford and
François Legault : same profile, same style, same discourses about economics, political institutions,
immigration, etc. Nevertheless, Canadian populist leaders adapt their political perspectives in a Canadian context of equal
society, a society less violent than US, a society without racial conflicts. Immigration, identity of the
majoritarian group and the Canadian social modele are serious and controversial stakes,
but – once again – they are not so conflictual. Even Canadian populists are agreed of a minimum social
protection or the necessity of immigrants for Canada economy. Obviously, their vision of society is rooted to
conservative tradition, with sometimes a certain indulgence for far-right orientations.
In brief, Canadian populism is an evolution of Canadian conservatism. In my opinion, it reflects a new
elective strategy rather than an ideological change. That’s the reason why not Doug Ford nor François Legault are outsiders like
Trump, but insiders.
Quebec secessionism causes Russia to first-strike the US

Lamont ‘94
Lansing Lamont, Time Correspondent and President of American Trust for the British Library, 1994, Breakup, p. 236
It might choose to believe that through its control of territory crucial to the Western alliance, plus its vital natural resources, it could
continue to wield disproportionate influence on international and continental security planning. More likely, if Ottawa continued to
stint on its defense spending and became increasingly unable to patrol or secure its own borders, the United States would feel
compelled to step in and do the job itself. In that event America would rekindle all the deepest passions about Canadian sovereignty,
especially in the Arctic. Its development in the late 1980s proved a signal advance in continental security, although some Canadians
believed that new radar technology would render the network obsolete by the end of the century. Others feared it would draw
Canada further into the Star Wars strategizing of Pentagon planners. Paved Paws did not assuage the larger fear of military analysts
that by the early 1990s, after the START Treaty had been signed by the United States and Russia, Canada the front line of any
nuclear attack on North America, stood to face an expanded armory of Russian cruise missile which could be launched southward
from the Arcctic through Canadian airspace. A provision in the treaty to rescue both superpowers nuclear stockpiles ironically
permitted the Russians, as part of a trade-off to increase their cruise missiles arsenal by nearly half. Thus, instead of landbased
ICBMs, easier to track and shoot down with their predictable trajectories, Canada now faces the possibility of some day having to
track one or more cigar shaped cruises streaking at tree level over Canadian territory toward a designated target. That prospect,
however dim at the moment, could take on sharper tones in the context of these possible developments: Quebec's separation and the
emergence to America's north of a fragmented Canada, neither event enhancing the continent's security; Canada's military
inadequacies and an erosion of Canada-U.S. relations, which might send signals inviting aggression by the Western alliance's
adversaries; or a political upheaval in the former Soviet Union, which would precipitate an international crisis. Any prolonged crisis,
as security analysts know, involves not only heightened tensions and escalating suspicions but a shift in emphasis to preparing for a
very rapid response if hostilities erupt. In such situations the usual safeguards are sometimes apt to be disregarded or even removed.
Ext. Canada AI IL
Canada is key to serve as a middle power in the AI tech race
Kim 04/17 – Post-Graduate Research Fellow at Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (Dongwoo, “The Artificial Divide:
Canada’s Role in the East-West Clash Over Machine Intelligence,” Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 04/17/18,
https://www.asiapacific.ca/blog/artificial-divide-canadas-role-east-west-clash-over-machine)//SI
Just a few years ago, conversations about artificial intelligence (AI) ethics and policy were limited to a very specific community of
academics and enthusiasts, and perhaps a marginal few in the circle of avant garde policy-makers. Today,
with rapid
advancements in the field and a growing awareness of the potential impacts – including
disruptions in the labour market and the potential development of autonomous ‘killer
robots’ – AI has become a topic of a larger and more urgent discussion. From the perspective of
government, the technology cuts across different sectors and raises unprecedented policy questions that require comprehensive, co-
ordinated responses. AI – commonly defined as the capacity of a computer to perform operations analogous to learning and
decision-making in humans – has increasingly become an arena for international competitiveness, and governments around the
world have begun engaging in earnest. While an existential clash of cultures may be an exaggerated assessment, a
‘fracture’
along the East-West divide has become increasingly evident and raises concerns
about a growing schism between nations in approaching such powerful
technology, which permeates borders. East Asian and Western states have
demonstrated starkly differing approaches to AI, underscoring existing differences in
terms of values and governance. This fracture could further the deterioration of
the existing global order. In the West, discussions about AI ethics and policy have been steeped in a broader
debate about the nature of democracy and the future of the liberal order. The European Union has been proactive in promoting a co-
ordinated response among its member states, with plans to develop a comprehensive AI strategy in the coming months. A report on
AI by the European Group on Ethics in Science and Technologies entitled Ethical Principles and Democratic Prerequisites states that
“key decisions on the regulation of AI development and application should be the result of democratic debate and public
engagement.” It further states that the “rule of law, access to justice and the right to redress and a fair trial provide the necessary
framework for ensuring the observance of human rights standards and potential AI-specific regulations.” French President
Emmanuel Macron, in his interview with Wired magazine on France's newly launched national AI initiative, highlighted the impact
of AI on democratic processes, asserting that Europe has a responsibility to implement policies that protect democratic values.
“Europe is the place where the DNA of democracy was shaped, and therefore I think Europe has to get to grips with what could
become a big challenge for democracies,” he said. Similarly, discussions
on AI in Canada increasingly
underscore the threats to democratic and liberal values. Université de Montréal has been
running a series of public consultations in developing the Montreal Declaration of Responsible AI. The Declaration lists “democracy”
as one of its seven principles, stating that “the development of AI should promote informed participation in public life, co-operation,
and democratic debate.” Meanwhile, discussions at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), which has been
running essays by Canada’s leading experts on AI and data policy, feature democracy quite prominently. AI governance is a relatively
new topic, limited mostly to wealthier, Western states with AI research and development (R&D) and deployment capabilities. As
such, while conversations on AI governance have started to proliferate, they primarily arise in Western-dominated settings: the
OECD recently launched the Going Digital project, in which AI ethics and governance feature prominently, and the G7
will
host a conference in Canada in the fall of 2018 to discuss a common vision for AI
technology. However, the problem with these current initiatives is that they exclude
China, a global AI player, and the particularities of East Asian states generally may be
lost in these predominantly Western fora. China, Japan, and South Korea all feature strong AI R&D industries,
buttressed by co-ordinated government science and technology policies and highly-educated workforces. Coupled with the projected
economic growth in the region, East Asia’s AI industries stand to emerge as much more relevant and influential players on the
international stage. China, along with the U.S., is expected to hold a ‘duopoly’ on AI. With the availability of massive capital and big
data capacity, along with the support of the central government that views AI as a key strategic sector for development and global
influence, China is already shaping up to be an ‘AI superpower.’ According to its Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development
Plan, China is positioning itself to become the world leader in AI R&D by 2030. However, the application of AI for military
technology and civilian surveillance à la the popular TV series Black Mirror has raised concerns in the West, and possibly nudged
conversations towards the twin topics of democracy and liberalism. While not as uncompromising as China, the debates and policy
initiatives in South Korea and Japan suggest that both Asian democracies are taking approaches that diverge from their Western
peers when it comes to AI. Both governments have launched comprehensive roadmaps for AI development and deployment that
cover a wide range of sectors – from R&D to welfare reform – but unlike in the Western discourse, the keyword “democracy” is
missing. The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence’s Ethical Guidelines, for instance, does not mention anything about AI’s
intersection with governance. This divergence from the Western discourse may be explained by differences in social and political
culture, or by historically-formed policy-making processes. East Asian states are, for instance, generally able to implement more
centralized, co-ordinated policies due to the existence of strong bureaucracies that emerged alongside the developmental state model
that prioritizes economic growth. Regardless of the underlying drivers of these divergent policy environments, it is increasingly clear
that states with strong AI capabilities do not necessarily share similar views on its development, deployment and ongoing
governance, which without proactive measures may have far-reaching implications for the prospects of a shared future. In
this
context, Canada has a positive role to play in bringing together East and
West. Canada’s strengths in AI R&D and its reputation as a responsible,
multilateral player on the international stage only bolster its credibility.
While the U.S. is perceived as a ‘rival’ to China, and the EU increasingly presents itself
as the global headmaster of a euro-centric interpretation of liberal, democratic values,
Canada, with its historic role as a ‘trusted mediator’ between all parties, may be in the
perfect position to facilitate dialogues between the competing paradigms. More
specifically, while Canada is part of the Western bloc, it also has historical credibility as
a reasonable middle power. As government-to-government discussions on this key
technology remain insulated within the Western circle, Canada, as it did during the
Cold War, is in a position to engage with East Asian states to shape a truly
global norm on responsible, accountable use of this disruptive technology – and
exercise leadership in mitigating the risk to an increasingly precarious global order.
Ext. AI Impact
Extensive study shows that AI makes nuclear war more likely
Irving 18 – Communications Analyst at RAND (Doug, “How Artificial Intelligence Could Increase the Risk of Nuclear War,”
RAND Corporations, 04/24/18, https://www.rand.org/blog/articles/2018/04/how-artificial-intelligence-could-increase-the-
risk.html)//SI
Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov settled into the commander's chair in a secret bunker outside Moscow. His job that night was simple:
Monitor the computers that were sifting through satellite data, watching the United States for any sign of a missile launch. It was
just after midnight, Sept. 26, 1983. A siren clanged off the bunker walls. A single word flashed on the screen in front of him.
"Launch." The fear that computers, by mistake or malice, might lead humanity to the brink of nuclear annihilation has haunted
imaginations since the earliest days of the Cold War. The danger might soon be more science than fiction. Stunning
advances in AI have created machines that can learn and think, provoking a new arms
race among the world's major nuclear powers. It's not the killer robots of Hollywood
blockbusters that we need to worry about; it's how computers might challenge the basic
rules of nuclear deterrence and lead humans into making devastating decisions. That's the
premise behind a new paper from RAND Corporation, How Might Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of Nuclear War? It's part of a
special project within RAND, known as Security 2040, to look over the horizon and anticipate coming threats. "This isn't just a
movie scenario," said Andrew Lohn, an engineer at RAND who coauthored the paper and whose experience with AI includes using it
to route drones, identify whale calls, and predict the outcomes of NBA games. "Things
that are relatively simple
can raise tensions and lead us to some dangerous places if we are not careful." Petrov would
say later that his chair felt like a frying pan. He knew the computer system had glitches. The Soviets, worried that they were falling
behind in the arms race with the United States, had rushed it into service only months earlier. Its screen now read “high reliability,”
but Petrov's gut said otherwise. He picked up the phone to his duty officer. “False alarm,” he said. Suddenly, the system flashed with
new warnings: another launch, and then another, and then another. The words on the screen glowed red: "Missile attack." To
understand how intelligent computers could raise the risk of nuclear war, you have to
understand a little about why the Cold War never went nuclear hot. There are many theories, but
“assured retaliation” has always been one of the cornerstones. In the simplest terms, it means: If you punch me, I'll punch you back.
With nuclear weapons in play, that counterpunch could wipe out whole cities, a loss neither side was ever willing to risk.
Autonomous systems don't need to kill people to undermine stability and
make catastrophic war more likely. That theory leads to some seemingly counterintuitive conclusions. If
both sides have weapons that can survive a first strike and hit back, then the situation is stable. Neither side will risk throwing that
first punch. The situation gets more dangerous and uncertain if one side loses its ability to strike back or even just thinks it might
lose that ability. It might respond by creating new weapons to regain its edge. Or it might decide it needs to throw its punches early,
before it gets hit first. That's where the real danger of AI might lie. Computers
can already scan thousands of
surveillance photos, looking for patterns that a human eye would never see. It doesn't
take much imagination to envision a more advanced system taking in drone feeds,
satellite data, and even social media posts to develop a complete picture of an
adversary's weapons and defenses. A system that can be everywhere and see
everything might convince an adversary that it is vulnerable to a disarming
first strike—that it might lose its counterpunch. That adversary would
scramble to find new ways to level the field again, by whatever means
necessary. That road leads closer to nuclear war. "Autonomous systems don't need to kill
people to undermine stability and make catastrophic war more likely," said Edward Geist, an associate policy researcher at RAND, a
specialist in nuclear security, and co-author of the new paper. "New
AI capabilities might make people think
they're going to lose if they hesitate. That could give them itchier trigger fingers. At that
point, AI will be making war more likely even though the humans are still quote-
unquote in control." A Gut Feeling Petrov's computer screen now showed five missiles rocketing toward the Soviet Union.
Sirens wailed. Petrov held the phone to the duty officer in one hand, an intercom to the computer room in the other. The technicians
there were telling him they could not find the missiles on their radar screens or telescopes. It didn't make any sense. Why would the
United States start a nuclear war with only five missiles? Petrov raised the phone and said again: False alarm. Computers can now
teach themselves to walk—stumbling, falling, but learning until they get it right. Their neural networks mimic the architecture of the
brain. A computer recently beat one of the world's best players at the ancient strategy game of Go with a move that was so alien, yet
so effective, that the human player stood up, left the room, and then needed 15 minutes to make his next move. The military
potential of such superintelligence has not gone unnoticed by the world's major nuclear powers. The United States has experimented
with autonomous boats that could track an enemy submarine for thousands of miles. China has demonstrated “swarm intelligence”
algorithms that can enable drones to hunt in packs. And Russia recently announced plans for an underwater doomsday drone that
could guide itself across oceans to deliver a nuclear warhead powerful enough to vaporize a major city. Whoever
wins
the race for AI superiority, Russian President Vladimir Putin has said, "will
become the ruler of the world." Tesla founder Elon Musk had a different
take: The race for AI superiority, he warned, is the most likely cause of
World War III. The Moment of Truth For a few terrifying moments, Stanislav Petrov stood at the precipice of nuclear
war. By mid-1983, the Soviet Union was convinced that the United States was preparing a nuclear attack. The computer system
flashing red in front of him was its insurance policy, an effort to make sure that if the United States struck, the Soviet Union would
have time to strike back. But on that night, it had misread sunlight glinting off cloud tops. "False alarm." The duty officer didn't ask
for an explanation. He relayed Petrov's message up the chain of command. The next generation of AI will have "significant potential"
to undermine the foundations of nuclear security, the researchers concluded. The time for international dialogue is now.
Keeping the nuclear peace in a time of such technological advances will require the
cooperation of every nuclear power. It will require new global institutions and agreements; new understandings
among rival states; and new technological, diplomatic, and military safeguards. It's possible that a future AI system could prove so
reliable, so coldly rational, that it winds back the hands of the nuclear doomsday clock. To err is human, after all. A machine that
makes no mistakes, feels no pressure, and has no personal bias could provide a level of stability that the Atomic Age has never
known. That moment is still far in the future, the researchers concluded, but the years between now and then will be especially
dangerous. More nuclear-armed nations and an increased reliance on AI, especially before it is technologically mature, could lead to
catastrophic miscalculations. And at that point, it might be too late for a lieutenant colonel working the night shift to stop the
machinery of war. The story of Stanislav Petrov's brush with nuclear disaster puts a new generation on notice about the
responsibilities of ushering in profound, and potentially destabilizing, technological change. Petrov, who died in 2017, put it simply:
"We are wiser than the computers," he said. "We created them." PERSPECTIVE ONE Skepticism About the Technology Many
of
the AI experts were skeptical that the technology will have come far enough by that time
to play a significant role in nuclear decisions. It would have to overcome its vulnerability
to hacking, as well as adversarial efforts to poison its training data—for example, by
behaving in unusual ways to set false precedents. PERSPECTIVE TWO Nuclear Tensions Will Rise But
an AI system wouldn't need to work perfectly to raise nuclear tensions, the
nuclear strategists responded. An adversary would only need to think it does and respond accordingly. The
result would be a new era of competition and distrust among nuclear-armed rivals. PERSPECTIVE THREE AI Learns the
Winning Move Is to Not Play Some of the experts held out hope that AI
could some day, far in the future, become so reliable that it averts the threat of nuclear war. It could be used to track nuclear
development and make sure that countries are abiding by nonproliferation agreements, for example. Or it could rescue humans from
mistakes and bad decisions made under the pressure of a nuclear standoff. As one expert said, a future AI might conclude, like the
computer in the 1983 movie " WarGames ," that the only winning move in nuclear war is not to play.
Ext. Populism IL
Surges of immigration spur Canadian populism.
Mack Lamoureux 6-26-2017 – Author for Vice. ["Turns Out Canada is Ripe for Populism, Too", Accessible Online at:
https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/43ykdg/turns-out-canada-is-ripe-for-populism-too] @ AG
The time is right for a little populism in the Great White North.
At least that's what a recent EKOS/Canadian Press poll is telling us. The poll, released on June 24, surveyed around 5,500 Canadians
and indicates that in regards to the question of populism in Canada the "answer appears to be – somewhat surprisingly – yes."
"Thecontinued denial and dismissal of this new force among the more comfortable and
educated portions of society is both empirically wrong and a force fuelling the very
phenomenon they seem to despise," the poll reads.
In a rather disheartening response, around 71% said they believe it is coming to Canada and only 33% of those surveyed say that a
possible rise of Canadian populism is a bad thing. EKOS
operationalized the term populism as "a
rejection of elite authority and as a wariness of immigration, trade, and globalisation." If you're wondering about
what this means in real world terms, well, you only have to look south to President Trump who clumsy surfed into the White House
on a wave of the stuff or the Brexit vote in the UK.
"While the most common response was one of ambivalence, uncertainty, or conditional 'wait-and-see', it is striking that two-
thirds of Canadians either think it's a good thing or aren't sure," reads the poll.
Unsurprisingly,
the economic situation of the respondents plays strongly into the their
opinion of populism—a common trope in history is a turning to populism by those who have been left behind by
politicians or the changing world—in the survey only 29% of respondants thought their economic situation would be better in five
years.
Populism can rise from either side of the political spectrum but, within Canada, it seems Conservative voters are also more likely to
support populism. Again, this isn't the most surprising thing in the world as only two years ago a decade of Conservative rule was
toppled by Justin Trudeau's Liberals. Other things you would expect is that the majority of those in favour are male and that
populism is most popular in the conservative heartland of Alberta.
All that said, there are some things out of the ordinary—the fact that it's not, to quote Stephen Harper, "old-stock Canadians" who
are in favour of it being the most prominent.
"Quite strikingly, positive attitudes to populism are stronger among new Canadians and, by
corollary, weaker among traditional, 'born in Canada' citizens," reads the poll. "If Trump populism is rooted in the white working
class, that explicitly does not appear to be the case in Canada."
Furthermore, Canadian supporters of populists tend to support—most likely to the ire of some of the far-right in the country—
globalization. Over
80% are in support of the North American Free Trade Agreement, however, they are more likely
to support President Trump and small government. With the oddities in mind, those behind the poll
conclude that all this points to a "new class conflict" being the well behind the spring of populist support in Canada.
Incoming climate migrants strain Canada politically and generate

backlash.
Kim Mackrael 7-7-2018 -- Reporter, The Wall Street Journal. ["New Migrant Surge Tests Canada’s Welcoming Stance ",
Accessible Online at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-migrant-surge-tests-canadas-welcoming-stance-1526376601] @ AG
PERRY MILLS, N.Y.—A small group of people from Nigeria and Mali stepped off a shuttle bus here on a recent evening and lugged
suitcases and backpacks along a country road toward the border with Canada. A Canadian police officer was waiting there to arrest
them.
The group is part of a fresh wave of asylum seekers flooding into Canada in recent
weeks, undeterred by the threat of arrest and posing the latest test for Canada's
immigration-friendly stance.
Roughly 2,600 people used unofficial border crossings like this one to enter the country
in April, according to Canadian police data. That marked the latest surge following the crossing last
summer of some 8,500 asylum seekers.
People breaching the border is a new challenge for Canada. The country's geographic
isolation has traditionally allowed it to maintain a highly selective immigration
and refugee system, as migrants from Africa and the Middle East have poured into
Europe in recent years and the U.S. has grappled with illegal immigration from Mexico
and Central America.
"Itforces Canadians, who have always patted themselves on the back for being very open to immigration, very welcoming,
to deal with the kinds of challenges Italy, Greece and others have been facing and to
realize it's not so easy," said Irene Bloemraad, a migration expert and the chair of Canadian studies at University of
California, Berkeley.
Canada's Liberal government has faced heated criticism over its handling of the influx. The
opposition Conservatives want the government to shut down unofficial border crossings,
saying the asylum seekers using them are sapping resources normally devoted to
processing applicants from other immigration and refugee streams. The Immigration and Refugee
Board, which decides on asylum claims, has a backlog of 53,000 cases, and the labor union representing Canada's border officers has
said that staffing is insufficient to deal with the added pressure of asylum seekers.
"They risk turning Canadian support away from our once compassionate and orderly immigration
system," Conservative lawmaker Michelle Rempel said in a press conference last week.
The province of Quebec complained

publicly last month that it wasn't receiving enough
support from the federal government to deal with the new spike in asylum seekers. In
response, officials have promised to come up with a plan for moving more asylum seekers into English-speaking provinces.
Last year, facing the arrival of thousands of Haitians who feared losing their temporary protected status in the U.S., Canadian
officials began a campaign to dissuade them from turning up at the border and seeking
asylum. The effort included targeted advertising and visits to Haitian and Central
American communities to dispel rumors that Canada granted automatic residency.
For a while, the efforts appeared to be working, and asylum claims at the border fell sharply. But those earlier arrivals have been
replaced by others, mostly from Nigeria, officials said, illustrating the challenge Canadian officials face in identifying and preventing
the next big influx.
Officials say the Nigerians have been turning up at the Canadian border after obtaining visas that allow them to travel to the U.S.
Last week, Canada Immigration Minister Ahmed Hussen said the U.S. and Canada are studying a 14-year-old treaty called the Safe
Third Country Agreement that requires asylum seekers to make their claims in whichever country they arrive first.
There is an exception if they enter Canada illegally, making routes like the one used from upstate New York into Quebec popular
because it allows asylum seekers to get around the deal. Canada says it isn't practical to apply the agreement to the entire border, in
part because much of the border isn't staffed by guards.
Unless police believe they represent a threat to Canada, asylum seekers are released after their arrest and don't face criminal
charges.
The response in Canada to the wave of asylum seekers has been mixed. A Quebec-based organization called Bridges Not Borders has
sent delegations to the border to greet incoming migrants and is lobbying Canadian officials to allow asylum seekers to use official
points of entry. But last year, the
arrival of thousands of Haitians in the French-speaking province
triggered several anti-immigration rallies. Another Quebec group is planning a protest at
the border with New York state later this month. The group wants asylum seekers
turned back if they approach at unofficial crossings.
Mr. Hussen and other officials are concerned shutting down unofficial crossings would push migrants to use more dangerous routes
and sneak into the country undetected. Instead, they are trying head off a big wave of claimants ahead of
summer. The minister met with Nigeria's high commissioner to Canada last month to discuss the rise in the number of
Nigerians using U.S. visas to enter Canada and then claim asylum. His department has also sent officers to Nigeria to communicate
with U.S. embassy officials about abuse of travel visas; Mr. Hussen is in Nigeria this week. The Canadian government also aims to
send officials to Nigerian churches in the U.S. to dispel myths of easy entry to Canada.
Immigration fuels populism in Canada.

Eli Yufest 4-18-2017 -- Eli Yufest is the CEO of Campaign Research. ["One half think Canada admits too many immigrants
and/or refugees", Accessible Online at: https://www.campaignresearch.ca/single-post/2017/04/18/One-half-think-Canada-admits-
too-many-immigrants-andor-refugees-One-tenth-or-fewer-think-too-few-are-admitted-One-third-find-number-admitted-about-
right] @ AG
In the third wave of the Campaign Research Poll, an online omnibus opinion survey conducted among 1970 Canadian voters, one
half believe Canada admits too many immigrants (49%), while just more than 4 in 10 (43%) think the
number admitted is too few (7%) or about right (36%). Thinking too many immigrants are coming to
Canada is common to Gen X (45 to 54 - 58%), Albertans (56%), federal Conservatives (69%) and Bloc
Quebecois voters (62%) and the less wealthy ($20K to $40K - 54%).
One half think too many refugees are allowed into Canada
One half of Canadian voters also believe too many refugees are allowed into the country
(49%), while, again, just more than 4 in 10 (42%) think the number is too few (10%) or about right (32%). Those who think
there are too many refugees are similar to those who hold the same view about
immigrants.
“These findings suggest that many people draw no distinction between immigrants, those who
have legally moved to this country, and refugees who are here illegally because they have nowhere else to
go. While the two groups are dissimilar, they seem to evoke the same sentiments“. said Eli Yufest, CEO of
Campaign Research.
-- Canada Populism U
Massive migrant surges spur populist violence in Quebec and encourage
secession
Canadian Press 2017—Canadian Newspaper. ["Tensions run high in Quebec during pro and anti-immigrant rallies",
Accessible Online at: http://www.iheartradio.ca/max-104-9/news/tensions-run-high-in-quebec-during-pro-and-anti-immigrant-
rallies-1.3150964] @ AG
Tensions boiled over in Quebec City as police were pelted by beer bottles and smoke bombs set
off in garbage cans in an ugly end to a weekend of pro and anti-immigrant rallies.
The far right group Quebec group La Meute called for a rally Sunday to protest the
federal and provincial government's handling of the recent flood of border crossers,
but ended up having its members pinned inside a garage while counter-protesters demonstrated outside.
Once the counter-protesters turned violent, police declared the protest illegal and at least one protester was arrested.
The protests in the Quebec capital were far more tense than Saturday's rally in Vancouver
where thousands of people peacefully demonstrated.
The rallies sprung up in the wake of last week's deadly events in Charlottesville, Virginia in which one person was killed when a
vehicle plowed into anti-racism protesters.
When asked Sunday if the

unprecedented number of border crossers was stoking
anti-immigrant sentiments, Prime Minister Justin said he stood with millions of Canadians ``who reject the
hateful, harmful, heinous ideologies'' that have sprouted across the country.
Canadian populism rising now – polling proves.

Stephanie Levitzthe 1-22-2018 – Reporter for the Canadian Press. ["Fewer than half of Canadians hold an open view of the
world, poll on populism finds", Accessible Online at: https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/01/22/fewer-than-half-of-
canadians-hold-open-view-of-the-world-poll-on-populism-finds.html] @ AG
OTTAWA—Canada’s reputation as a nation with an open and optimistic world view that
flies in the face of rising pessimism and nationalism elsewhere is being challenged by new
research suggesting many Canadians hold views acutely in line with some of those darker forces.
Fewer than half of Canadians appear on the “open” side of an index devised by EKOS
Research and The Canadian Press to gauge populist sentiment here, and the remainder either have
a closed-off view of the world or are on the fence — a potentially volatile swing group.
The research aggregated polls involving 12,604 people to explore to what extent Canadians’ views are in line with voters who
backed two of the most surprising manifestations of 21st century populism in recent years — Donald Trump’s
campaign for U.S. president and the exit of Britain from the European Union.
Both were understood to be the results of rising discontent among those side-swiped by technological, cultural and economic
transformation and seeking to regain some measure of control by eschewing the political status quo in favour of a dramatic new
approach.
Whether Canada could be facing a similar issue has been a question ever since.
The results of the study suggest 46 per cent of Canadians are open-minded towards the world and each other, with the highest
numbers found in B.C. and the Atlantic Provinces.
But 30 per cent report feeling economically and culturally insecure, a sentiment found in the largest
numbers in Alberta and Saskatchewan. The remainder — roughly 25 per cent — have a mixed view.
To gauge where Canadians sit, EKOS Research and The Canadian Press aggregated responses to questions posed in two telephone
polls between June and December about people’s perceptions of their economic outlook, class mobility, ethnic fluency and tolerance.
Pollsters also asked whether they believed such movements were good or not.
The results were in turn plotted on a spectrum from “open” to “ordered” — a new way of classifying people’s political viewpoints that
goes beyond the traditional right-versus-left.
The old partisan markers are driven by fiscal and social philosophies and are less a part of today’s political debate that broader
opinions about how the world should be run, said EKOS President Frank Graves.
“The left-right has mutated under these pressures into this ‘ordered-open’ and it brings along some of the traditional left-right, but it
brings along a lot of new divisions,” Graves said.
“The questions now are: Do you want to pull up the drawbridge? What do you think about people who don’t have the same skin
colour as you? What do you think about the importance of tolerating dissent or having a more-ordered versus a more-chaotic or
creative society?”
The telephone polls had a margin of error of 0.9 per cent, 19 times out of 20.
OPEN: The Atlantic region
The research reveals the complex nature of what EKOS has called “northern populism.’
For example, 50 per cent of those surveyed in the Atlantic region hold an “open” view. That means they feel positive about their
economic future and class mobility and have a perception of the ethnic makeup of the country that most closely mirrors reality.
They’re also the least likely to view populism as a positive force.
Yet, in the Atlantic, the population is older, less diverse and somewhat less educated that
other regions.
Those are all factors understood to underpin a more closed-minded view of the world:
supporters of Britain’s exit from the EU were more likely to have lower incomes than those who voted to stay, and lower levels of
education as well.
Graves pointed out that the region’s dependence on immigration to sustain its fiscal future likely influences the rankings there, and
also a coastal culture that literally provides a more open view of the world.
ORDERED: Oshawa, Ont.
The economy of Oshawa — despite the precarious state of the auto industry — is growing, median income levels are high and so are
the numbers of people with post-secondary degrees. Yet, 38
per cent of those polled in that city skewed
toward having a more ordered view of the world. No city had more people on that side of
the spectrum.
“Where you live is instructive, and the collective economic experiences and the demographic is also important. But they are by no
means deterministic,” Graves said.
“It means that communities can choose to take different routes.”
Many people have held up the diversity of Canada’s major centres as a reason why a populism rooted in anti-immigrant sentiment
that was part of both Trump’s victory and Brexit could never take hold here.
The researchsuggests however that in the suburbs of those centres, some of which feature
exceptionally high concentrations of single ethnic groups, people can be just as much in
search of a more traditional order as those in the rural pockets of the country.
“Canadian populism shares more with southern American populism than
people think, but there are some important and distinct differences,” Graves said.
“One of the most important is that populism in Canada is not rooted in just the white population; in fact there isn’t any significant
difference across white and non-white portions of the population in Canada.”
MIXED: a prime political target

Questions about class and inequality are top of mind this week as world leaders meet in Davos, Switzerland for the annual World
Economic Forum. Among them is Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and an entourage of Liberal cabinet ministers.
“We must have the full and equal participation of all to have economies that work for everyone and a future that is fairer, more
inclusive, and more compassionate,” Trudeau said in a statement ahead of the trip.
It’s a message that the 25 per cent of Canadians who fall into the “mixed” category in the study are meant
to hear, suggested Graves.
“That’s a swing group,” Graves said.
“They are probably people who were on the ‘open’ side 10 years ago. You can argue that
if you can’t produce a sense that there is a hopeful future then this problem is going to
get bigger (rather) than smaller.”
Canadian populism coming now – the influx of new immigrants spurs
nativism.
Teresa Wright 4-17-2018 – Reporter for the Canadian Press. ["Canada far from immune to populism despite Justin Trudeau’s
progressive rhetoric: experts", Accessible Online at: https://globalnews.ca/news/4151378/canada-populism-justin-trudeau-
progressive-rhetoric/] @ AG
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau

might see his country as a beacon of hope in a roiling sea of
polarization and angry nationalist sentiment, but Canada is far from immune, experts
warn.
Just as he did Tuesday at the French National Assembly, Trudeau likes to portray Canada as a place where progressive values
flourish – free trade, ethic diversity, immigration, environmental protection and gender equality.
“At a time when the political movements exploit the real anxiety of their citizens, Canada has chosen to be against cynicism and
embrace audacity and ambition,” he said.
A sizable proportion of the Canadian public believes otherwise, research suggests.

Ekos Research and The Canadian Press teamed up earlier this year to gauge populist sentiment in Canada. Fewer than half of
respondents – 46 per cent – expressed views that reflected an open-minded perspective of the world and each other, while 30 per
cent landed in the “ordered” category, which means feeling economically and culturally insecure. 25 per cent expressed “mixed”
views.
The survey, an aggregation of polls conducted with more than 12,000 Canadians, carried a margin of error of plus or
minus 0.9 percentage points, 19 times out of 20. Its results suggested there is indeed fertile ground in
Canada for a populist movement to take hold.
Canada has largely staved off the negative politics of pessimism and xenophobia that are major areas of concern in the U.S. and parts
of Europe, said Ekos president Frank Graves. But that doesn’t mean populist sentiment isn’t brewing north of the border.
“Those forces are very much at work,” Graves said, noting the icy reaction to Trudeau’s remarks from right-wing
National Front leader Marine Le Pen.
“Those forces are by no means extinguished in France and we see them definitely evident in Canada as well.”
Graves cited Ontario Conservative Leader Doug Ford

as an example of a political leader who speaks the
language of the ordered, populist view, with campaign rhetoric that blames his Liberal
rivals for the economic insecurity plaguing those who are struggling.
Graves also mentioned recent electoral victories in Hungary and Italy by polarizing populist parties that show populism is on the
march.
“Canada
did seem to be picking a different path on things like xenophobia and trade and
immigration,” he said of his findings.
“However, there was still a very sizable, very engaged portion of the public that were not buying into this at all… this is by no means
a settled issue yet.”
University of Amsterdam researcher Mike Medeiros, who specializes in ethnopolitics, political

behaviour and
political psychology, pointed to immigration as an issue that could become a
flashpoint in Canada.
Spurred in part by fear of a crackdown from U.S. President Donald Trump, illegal
migrants have been streaming over the border into Ontario and Quebec in hopes of
seeking asylum in Canada.
All it would take is a charismatic leader to come along and exploit such issues to bring
nativist sentiment in Canada to a boil, he said.
“If (Trudeau) is expressing simply that Canada is different, fine, that’s fair, because Canada is different – or at least it has been so
far,” Medeiros said.
“But if he is expressing that, ‘We do not have these concerns,’ that is not accurate.”
Populism is on the rise in Canada

Toronto Sun, '17 – (Postmedia Network, "Of course populism on the rise in Canada," Toronto Sun, 6-26-2017,
https://torontosun.com/2017/06/26/of-course-populism-on-the-rise-in-canada/wcm/93f0eb89-0b4b-4689-b5ba-
3cddc5923944)//SB
A recent poll commissioned by The Canadian Press reveals the

public believes there’s a “northern
populism” movement growing in Canada.
The elites predictably will react with fear and alarm to this story and inevitably try to
convince regular Canadians into thinking that’s a bad thing.
It’s what they do every time their agenda is threatened.
Populism is a dirty word to those who lost their minds when Donald Trump got elected, or who saw the sky falling after the Brexit
vote in Britain.
The reality is Canadians

are losing confidence in their institutions because
increasingly those institutions fail to serve or reflect their priorities.
Our public school boards, universities, unions and government, and its many agencies, increasingly are driven by ideological
agendas, often ones that reflect the narrow interests of disgruntled activists.
They are out of touch with regular people, who care about making the world a better place but rightly worry
more about jobs and putting their kids through school.
The CP survey reveals three-quarters

of Canadians believe some version of populism is on the
rise here, either to a moderate or high degree.
And it shows “22 percent of people who weren’t born here thought populism was a good thing, compared to 18.5 per cent of those
whose parents were both born here.”
So new immigrants like populism slightly more than other Canadians! Who would’ve thought?
But if you view populism as paying attention to the thoughts and needs of regular people over the elite sentiments coming from self-
interested institutions – which is how we define it – then this shouldn’t be a shocker.
People come to Canada from all over the world to seek a better place for their families. They don’t want to be oppressively taxed.
They don’t want to be turned into guinea pigs for the latest progressive agenda. They don’t want the nanny state telling them how to
raise their kids.
The elites aren’t just out of step with common sense Canadians. They’re out of touch with new immigrants as well.
Every time the conversation of populism in Canada comes up, the usual suspects start wringing their hands. This threatens their
privilege.
Good. Let them dwell on it. Maybe it’ll force them back to reality.
Populism, at face value, seems almost healthy. Or at least to me it does. I was raised in Alberta, a populist heartland. It was accepted
as a fact that the government chronically ignores “the people.” Men like Ralph Klein, who drank in a rundown pub and boasted
about his lack of education did well there. Ralph, as he was universally known, painted himself as an outsider, the only one looking
out for the roughnecks and the farmhands. And we ate it up.
But after I moved overseas, it didn’t take me long to realize populism isn’t just backslapping good ol’ boys. I found that from
Indonesia to England, “rule by the people” almost always ends up undermining democracy.
At the heart of every populist movement is the idea that the establishment has to go. There is no grand theory of economics or social
policy. There is the idea that the people are being hurt by the powers that be—and that makes the establishment illegitimate.
Therefore, the only legitimate candidate is the populist. He or she is on the same side as the people, and electing him or her means
the people will be back in charge. As Trump himself explained during his inaugural address: “Jan. 20, 2017, will be remembered as
the day the people became the rulers of this nation again.”
Because the current way of doing politics is illegitimate, populists scorn it by acting out. Their supporters love the “honesty” of their
transgressions, sexual escapades and illicit opinions. This erodes the political system. Consider the United States. In the next
election cycle, will voters see sexual assault or tax evasion as a disqualifier?
The populist is the avatar of the people, the embodiment of their will. If somehow they lose the election, then the people’s will was
subverted; the election was corrupt, or there was a conspiracy to stop them. Spreading doubt about the electoral system further
erodes democracy and the public’s trust in institutions.
Even after taking power, a populist still needs an opponent. This means attacking the bureaucrats, policies and systems that were in
place when he arrived. The battle against the establishment is constant, and success is a zero-sum game, measured by how much the
other guys lose. In the end, the greatest casualties are actually the institutions that keep a democracy relatively stable.
There is one other foil that populists almost always target: immigrants, minorities and foreigners. In France, the populists blame
Muslims (8 per cent of the population). In Indonesia, it’s the Chinese (1 per cent). In the United Kingdom, it’s the Jews (0.5 per
cent). It doesn’t matter how small or powerless these groups are, they are held responsible for any setback or failure suffered by a
populist government or movement.
Right now, it feels like populism is surging globally. In the U.K., we have seen the rise of the anti-immigrant UKIP party and the
success in the Brexit vote to leave the European Union. Across the channel, the polls are predicting the anti-Muslim, anti-European
Union party of Geert Wilders may form the largest party in the Netherlands’ parliament. Similarly, in France, the Front National’s
Marine Le Pen is being boosted by her ability to blend centrist policies with strong anti-immigration messages.
In Hungary, the anti-immigrant Prime Minister Viktor Orban gave a speech this week calling for more “ethnic homogeneity.” Not
surprisingly, he also wants closer ties to Russia. There, Vladimir Putin is the most influential populist in the world. At home, he has
pushed an agenda of nationalism, while energetically subverting elections. Abroad, Russia has actively supported populist
movements everywhere: money to Le Pen in France, leaked emails for Trump and clandestine support for the Brexit campaign in the
U.K.
Another new friend of Russia is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He has become increasingly populist while greatly
expanding his powers. Further south, in Africa, the past decade has seen a marked increase in populist movements in countries like
Zimbabwe, South Africa, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. In Asia, the Philippines elected an anti-intellectual strongman who
boasts about breaking the law. And in India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power railing against a corrupt and ineffectual
status quo and making abusive comments against the Muslim minority.
Populism rising and and is popular – Quebec proves.

Mike Medeiros 1-8-2018 -- Mike Medeiros is an assistant professor in the department of political science at the University
of Amsterdam. ["The populism risk in English Canada", Accessible Online at: http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/january-
2018/the-populism-risk-in-english-canada/] @ AG
The Quebec government’s Bill 62 — “An Act to foster adherence to State religious neutrality and, in particular, to
provide a framework for requests for accommodations on religious grounds in certain bodies” — is a response to a
lingering collective concern among Quebecers regarding religious diversity and the integration of
immigrants. The law, which came into effect in mid-October, provoked outrage among political and media elites in the Rest
of Canada (ROC). But the indignation that targeted Quebec does not represent the attitudes of regular Canadians.
Bill 62 seeks to prevent individuals whose face is covered from providing or receiving
public services. While the law was widely attacked by opposition politicians in the National Assembly and by Quebec media
pundits for being confusing (notably due to Justice Minister Stéphanie Vallée’s inability to explain how it would be applied and to
her changing the interpretative limits of its proscriptions), the
principle behind the law — that public services should
is quite popular in the province. According to polls, a large
be given and received with an uncovered face —
majority of Quebecers support it, as do many members of the political and journalistic
class.
The reaction has been different in the ROC. Although media pundits were not unanimous in their opinions, the vast majority were
strongly against Quebec’s attempt to ban individuals who cover their face from providing and, especially, receiving public services.
The reaction was even more uniform among politicians in English Canada, who strongly condemned the Quebec government’s
attempt to regulate religious expression.
While this split of opinion may seem to be a manifestation of Canada’s “two solitudes,” the reality is quite different. Foreigners who
happened to read the reactions to Bill 62 from politicians and pundits in English Canada might conclude that English Canada is
strongly against a ban on people with covered faces giving and receiving public services. However, they would be wrong.
A number of polls that have been published since Bill 62 was voted into law have shown
that the opinions of Canadians in the ROC on this issue are aligned with those of
Quebecers.
Restrictions on face coverings receive support among a majority of English Canadians.
This should not be surprising. At the heart of such a ban are negative attitudes toward the niqab
and the burqa, and the perceived symbolic changes that they represent to a Western
society. While Quebecers have often been labelled as being hypersensitive to the perceived social changes brought on by
immigration, the cultural sensitivities of English Canadians have been somewhat overlooked. I explored this issue, in a recently
published article in Ethnic and Racial Studies, and found that anglophone Canadians
are just as sensitive to
perceived cultural threats as francophone Quebecers. My findings are in line with those from an article recently
published in Policy Options. Érick Lachapelle and his colleagues present findings from an original survey that show that Quebec is
not distinct in its level of support for restricting religious garb; in fact, Quebecers are not even the most supportive of such a
restriction.
While anglophones in the ROC clearly manifest discomfort related to issues of immigration and integration, these attitudes are
seldom voiced by their political representatives.
The disconnect between elites and citizens in English Canada with regard to cultural sensitivity leads to two major sociopolitical
dilemmas. First, there is a problem of democratic representation. While anglophones in the ROC clearly manifest discomfort related
to issues of immigration and integration, these attitudes are seldom voiced by their political representatives. The example of
restrictions on face coverings being strongly supported by citizens yet demonized by their elites demonstrates a gap in political
representation. At the very least, these attitudes, widely shared by citizens in English Canada, should be brought forth and debated
by political elites.
While English Canada has avoided the rise of movements similar to those credited with leading to Brexit and to the Trump
presidency, it is not immune to this trend.
Second, this
gap provides a fertile ground for a populist and nativist movement to take
hold in English Canada. The recent rise of populist movements in Western liberal
democracies underlines a dissatisfaction of citizens with elites. The rhetoric from
populist politicians has placed the concerns of a hard-working citizenry in opposition to
the policies of a disconnected, self-centred elite. While English Canada has avoided the
rise of movements similar to those credited with leading to Brexit and to the Trump
presidency, it is not immune to this trend. You don’t have to be very old to remember the success of the
Reform Party, which built its electoral base in part by pitting western Canadians and their concerns against an unrepresentative
political elite in Ottawa.
Although nativism differs conceptually from populism, it has often featured in the
rhetoric of populist movements. Changes to society, and notably to culture, brought on by
immigration can be rife with emotion. Therefore, sensitivities related to the perceived
social changes induced by immigration are an easy, yet potentially powerful, tool to
garner political attention.
Nevertheless, ifthese cultural sensitivities are not addressed, they can fester and become
even more ripe for exploitation by calculating political actors, leading to the overt bigotry seen in
many countries today. It is not unimaginable that a more charismatic politician than Conservative MP Kellie Leitch,
with more sophisticated tactics, could use English Canadians’ discomfort with social diversity to
garner political support.
The disconnect concerning cultural sensitivity in English Canada needs to be addressed. Elites in English Canada should stop
focusing on Quebec, often in a negative light, look at their own backyard, and start to take seriously the cultural insecurity felt by
their citizens. While cultural sensitivity caused by social diversity is a delicate issue, and one that sometimes leads to an escalation of
political rhetoric, it cannot simply be ignored or, worse, undermined. A mature democratic society should be able to discuss and
debate responsibly the most uncomfortable of issues affecting its population.
English Canada’s political elites need to be more courageous and more representative of their citizenry’s perception that there is a
threat to their culture. If not, a
populist and nativist movement that seeks to represent the
“unrepresented” might become a serious political force in English Canada.
AT//Canada Populism Inevitable
Canadian populism is at a low now but could increase due to an influx of
immigration – expert studies prove populist sentiment is on the rise
Wright ’18 – 4/17/18, Teresa Wright is an award-winning reporter for the Canadian Press
with a Master’s from Holland College and expertise in ethics, populism, and immigration, The
Canadian Press, “Experts warn Canada not immune to populism, despite Trudeau’s progressive
rhetoric,” https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/04/17/experts-warn-canada-not-immune-to-populism-despite-
trudeaus-progressive-rhetoric.html // shurst
“At a time when the political movements exploit the real anxiety of their citizens, Canada
has chosen to be against
cynicism and embrace audacity and ambition,” he said. A sizable proportion of the Canadian
public believes otherwise, research suggests. Ekos Research and The Canadian Press teamed
up earlier this year to gauge populist sentiment in Canada. Fewer than half of respondents — 46 per
cent — expressed views that reflected an open-minded perspective of the world and each
other, while 30 per cent landed in the “ordered” category, which means feeling economically and culturally
insecure. 25 per cent expressed “mixed” views. The survey, an aggregation of polls conducted with more than 12,000
Canadians, carried a margin of error of plus or minus 0.9 percentage points, 19 times out of 20. Its
results suggested there is indeed fertile ground in Canada for a populist
movement to take hold. Canada has largely staved off the negative politics of
pessimism and xenophobia that are major areas of concern in the United States and parts of
Europe, said Ekos president Frank Graves. But that doesn’t mean populist sentiment isn’t brewing
north of the border. “Those forces are very much at work,” Graves said, noting the icy reaction to Trudeau’s remarks from
right-wing National Front leader Marine Le Pen. “Those forces are by no means extinguished in France and we see them definitely
evident in Canada as well.” Graves cited Ontario Conservative Leader Doug Ford as an example of a political leader who speaks the
language of the ordered, populist view, with campaign rhetoric that blames his Liberal rivals for the economic insecurity plaguing
those who are struggling. You might be interested in Prime Minister Justin Trudeau — posing Friday with participants in Toronto’s
Caribbean Carnival — has made a policy virtue out of zero tolerance for sexual harassment. Justin Trudeau, the virtuous feminist,
has painted himself into a corner Trump is now up to 1,929 false claims for the first 528 days of his presidency, an overall average of
3.7 per day. Donald Trump makes 100 false claims for second consecutive week Hamilton’s first shipping container home rises on
Arkledun Avenue Hamilton’s first shipping container home rises on Arkledun Avenue Graves also mentioned recent electoral
victories in Hungary and Italy by polarizing populist parties that show populism is on the march. “Canada
did seem to be
picking a different path on things like xenophobia and trade and immigration,” he said of his
findings. “However, there was still a very sizable, very engaged portion of the public that
were not buying into this at all ... this is by no means a settled issue yet.” University of
Amsterdam researcher Mike Medeiros, who specializes in ethnopolitics, political behaviour and political psychology, pointed to
immigration as an issue that could become a flashpoint in Canada. Spurred in part by fear of a
crackdown from U.S. President Donald Trump, illegal migrants have been streaming over the border into Ontario and Quebec in
hopes of seeking asylum in Canada. All it would take is a charismatic leader to come along and exploit such issues to bring nativist
sentiment in Canada to a boil, he said. “If [Trudeau] is expressing simply that Canada is different, fine, that’s fair, because Canada is
different — or at least it has been so far,” Medeiros said. “But if he is expressing that, ‘We do not have these concerns,’ that is not
accurate.”
Populism in Canada is suppressed and unforeseen – assumes their evidence

Milke ’18 – 3/19/18, Mark Milke is a senior fellow at the Fraser Institute with a PhD in
political science from the University of Calgary, “Why People Never See Populism Coming,”
https://www.macleans.ca/opinion/why-people-never-see-populism-coming/ // shurst
When some pundits, professors and politicians write or speak of populism, they often do
so with a sneer and the assumption that populist voters are knuckle-dragging
reactionaries with genetic stock firmly planted in the evolutionary Neanderthal period.
You know the arguments and the attitude: a new politician cobbles together a coalition or platform defined by someone as populist
and out come the rhetorical knives and eye-rolls. Politicians in the past and present endured this treatment: Tommy Douglas,
W.A.C. Bennett (his critics called him “wacky”), Ralph Klein, Mike Harris, Preston Manning and, more recently, Rob Ford and now
Doug Ford. Internationally, the politicians most associated with populism include Juan and Eva Peron in Argentina in the 1950s and
1970s, the American president Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, and the La Pen father-and-daughter National Front tag team in France
over the last few decades. Many of the newer political parties in other European countries including European Union diktat-resisting
parties in Hungary and Poland are categorized in such a manner. Populists include the left and right in Great Britain as represented
by Jeremy Corbyn and the Brexit movement. As of 2015 in the United States, the list includes the rise of Bernie Sanders who almost
upended Hillary Clinton in the Democratic party primaries and Donald Trump who did topple “his” party’s assumed favourites and
then became president. In other words, the
new populists are like the old populists: They act as
divining rods and sometimes take power if established politicians ignore concerns on
the ground. Populism from “left” to “right” and beyond The list of names should give us pause. They range from those who in
economic terms might be labelled left-wing (Douglas, Corbyn and Sanders) or right-wing (Ronald Reagan, Mike Harris and Ralph
Klein). Plenty of others defy such stereotypes. Economic pigeon-holes skip over, for example, cultural and social issues. But the
latter more helpfully explain the rise of the new European parties, Brexit and Trump. As
with any new movement
and the politicians and parties that later surf on populism to power, there is often no
coherent or consistent program, economic or otherwise. There instead exists a
mishmash of concerns that should be taken seriously—early, rather than, as is often the case, dismissed. I’m not arguing
that each of the above-named personalities is always correct on policy. But we should see populism for what it is: An expression of an
under-represented or unheard chunk of the public. As one example, today’s anxieties in Europe, the
United States and
Canada include whether new immigrants are successfully integrating into the norms of
Western nations, such as the equality of women and the freedom to criticize others’ gods. These concerns ought to be frankly
discussed and addressed, not least because in a virtually connected world where people can retain their tribal identities and fail to
integrate into the modern liberal democratic Western nation-state, such realities pose a threat to stable, functioning societies and to
traditional Western freedoms—I can criticize your god and if you dislike it, you do not get to silence me via the law or even not-so-
subtle shaming or threats. That’s just one example where a so-called populist impulse (about immigration over time and integration)
is a valid, non-xenophobic concern. I can think of other issues: The rise of identity politics, native Canadian and minority carve-outs
in policy preferences, higher education and employment. Populism in Canada: Repressed One reason why populism—
average Canadians who buck elite preferences—surprises the self-referencing classes
when a populist shows up at the top of a political party (Doug Ford and his Ontario PC leadership win) is
because there are few ways for Canadians to adequately and regularly express their
preferences. I don’t mean every four or five years in an election. Elections are an obvious, necessary part of a liberal democracy
but never enough to set complicated issues on the path to smart and workable remedies. That is because elections often turn on
personalities (“Sunny ways and socks”– Justin Trudeau versus the dour Stephen Harper) and rarely on issues. One remedy is a
greater use of referendums, including citizen-initiated versions just in case politicians and governments are resistant to chronic
public irritations. But Canada’s
political system is mostly devoid of such populist
safety valves. That is unlike Europe and the United States where they are widespread
and in many cases, required. (The Swiss have multiple referendums on often contentious issues ranging from
minimum wage to abolishing the military and no one thinks they are less civilized for doing so.) Referendums are helpful to honest
debate and provide clearer results on what actually matters to the voting or protesting public. The other reason populism in
Canada is rarely spotted until it hits the top of a political party is because our parties
routinely make it more and not less difficult to run against an incumbent or the leader’s
favourite. For example, the party leader is usually the one to sign off on a candidate’s nomination papers. (Patrick Brown
practiced this top-down approach in spades before he was toppled and chased out of the Ontario PC party.) This allows incumbents
and existing party favourites to more easily shield themselves from challenges that may result from a populist wave. That further
delays addressing core concerns. In addition, through gag laws on free expression, governments across Canada thwart populist
sentiment that might arise come from citizen’s groups—so-called “third parties” in the lead-up to and during elections. Such gag
laws are yet another sign the chattering classes and those with political power don’t
want their carefully-planned writ periods disturbed by voters who might actually care to
discuss and promote idea debates, and not personalities. The snobby reaction is blinding to
understanding Back to Ford: Is he tapping into something? Yes. Do people know in detail what his policies are? Not yet. But Ford is
obviously signalling at least some Ontarians’ angst on power bills, parental rights on educational matters and the general annoyance
with the Wynne government’s pay-the-debt forward approach to everyone’s great-grandchildren’s finances. Which is to say this:
Here’s another way to look at populism: As reflective of democratic urges that are often ignored by those currently in power, and
thus often entirely legitimate. In fact, that’s the Oxford definition of populism: “A political approach that strives to appeal to
ordinary people who feel that their concerns are disregarded by established elite groups.” For those ensconced in the safe space of an
ivory tower, newsroom or political office, it might help to get out a bit more –and listen to people very unlike you. And some advice:
After you do that, don’t follow it up with a snide lecture.
Ext. Canada Middle Power Impact
Canada’s middle power legitimacy is vital to global stability (also AT:
Canada no longer relevant & AT: theory outdated)
Bothwell ‘11
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/6698//Cal-JV]
Tracing the development of traditional middle powers gives insight into the importance
of the world¶ order. It shows how relatively ‘neutral’ nations are integral to
maintain the peace and mediate¶ through crises. As the global order is constantly
shifting it is important to be able to classify¶ emerging middle powers in the same manner as
traditional middle powers like Canada, Australia¶ and Sweden. As in 1945, the world is recognising the distinct
differences between the not great and¶ the great countries but perhaps on a more specific
scale. New and more accepting categories are¶ developing to keep up with the constant change in the world order. Some of the
frameworks¶ discussed cannot keep up with the shifting global landscape. The hierarchical model is dated and is¶ based on an out of
date way of quantifying power based on population and military capabilities. On¶ the opposite end of the spectrum, the behavioural
model is too flexible and can classify some states¶ as middle powers when they only act like a middle power, but are not necessarily a
middle power¶ through and through.¶ After examining the various types of middle power analysis it is clear that Jordaan presents
the best¶ framework. Inspired by Cox and Gramsci, Jordaan highlights characteristics essential to both¶ emerging and traditional
middle powers while applying them to relevant examples. Furthermore,¶ Jordaan has also created a strong distinction between
emerging and traditional middle
powers,¶ showing how the theory is flexible and can keep up with
the shifting global order.
Canada is key to the rest of the world’s middle powers – otherwise, bipolar
conflict
Bothwell ‘11
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/6698//Cal-JV]
The postwar era was ideal for Canada to make a name for itself externally as a middle
power. It¶ has acted as legitimiser, peacekeeper, proponent of conflict
reduction and supporter of multilateral¶ solutions with like-minded states. From the
outset there are some elements of middle powermanship¶ which are more obvious than
others. Jordaan presents many attributes necessary for a nation to be¶ considered a middle power. Some of these
characteristics are easily applied when examining¶ Canada’s middle power status of the
past including: regional significance, identity, foreign policy¶ participation in
multi-lateral bodies and leadership. Since Canada has an “inability… to unilaterally¶
and single handily shape global outcomes in any direct manner” it is essential for them
to¶ participate in multi-lateral bodies and have a strong foreign policy (Jordaan, 2003:169). As a result,¶
Canada has acted as a legitimising force to the current world order
upholding the middle power¶ reputation.
Ext. Quebec Secessionism IL
Failed foreign policy causes Canadian populism – prefer empirics
Rioux and Hay ’99 – Jean-François Rioux has a PhD in political science from St. Paul
University and Robert Hay is a Parliamentary Affairs Advisor at Senate of Canada, “Canadian
foreign policy From internationalism to isolationism?” // shurst
Nevertheless, retrenchment and 'Canada First' attitudes, which have intermittently existed in
Canada (in Quebec nationalism and in western populism of bygone eras, for instance), have
reappeared since the end of the cold war but especially in the last few years, born of
economic and budgetary concerns and preoccupation with the constitutional issue. They
have been bolstered by widespread disappointment over failed multilateral actions in
which Canada participated, made worse by the scandalous behaviour of some members of the armed
forces, most notably in Somalia. Such attitudes are not the exclusive preserve of the right in Canada, but tend to straddle
the political divide. For instance, while Robert White, the president of the Canadi an Labour Congress, advocates spending
on foreign aid, the United Nations, and peacekeeping, he also calls for withdrawal from NATO because 'Canada's foreign policy
should be grounded in Canadian realities. Our priorities should start with our relations with the United States and Latin America,
the Asia-Pacific region and our Arctic neighbours. This is not to exclude other parts of the world, but to simply acknowledge and
reflect the priority of our self-interest in these regions.'9 CANADIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE 1990S: THE
EROSION OF INTERNATIONALISM Clearly the end of the cold war and of a forty-year nuclear standoff that for many observers
posed an imminent threat to existence has had an impact on Canadian foreign policy. For
policy-makers the most
immediate effect of the end of the cold war was the removal - in theory, if not in practice - of the
only serious military threat challenging Canadian security. This not only eased Canada's retreat - at
least militarily - from NATO, which had served as a pillar of Canadian foreign policy since the Second World War, but it also
heralded a turn from Europe and the rise of selective internationalism, made easier by the redefinition of security.
Ext. Quebec Impact
Quebec secession causes US-Russia miscalc
Lamont ‘94
Lansing Lamont, Time Correspondent and President of American Trust for the British Library, 1994, Breakup, p. 238-239
That is why, with Canada's and Russia's future in doubt today, it is possible to imagine this scenario in the wake of Quebec's
secession: Economic reform has collapsed throughout Russia. Widespread despair over soaring prices, injured pride over Russia's
loss of stature, and disgust with Moscow's leadership boil over. A cabal of so-called "Reds" and "Browns"-unreconstructed former
Communist officials and neo-Fascist militarists-sweeps the Yeltsin reformers from office. In the name of restoring social order and
averting total economic ruin, the leaders of the coup establish an authoritarian provisional government backed by key elements of
the disaffected military. The new government resents the Western Alliance for its Cold War triumph and humiliation of the Soviet
Union, resents the infatuation with Western culture and consumer products. It especially resents the United States for having won
the arms race and reduced Russia to a beggar nation, then acting niggardly in its response to Russian requests for massive economic
aid. The Russians, who have always regarded Canada as a less vehemently anti-Soviet balance against the United States in the
continental partnership, particularly resent Canada's fracturing after Quebec's separation and the prospect of its pieces eventually
attaching to the U.S. empire. Russian-North .American relations move from tepid to subfreezing. The new hardliners running the
Kremlin reassess Russia's arsenal of Bear and Blackjack long-range bombers, its nearly 1,200 air-launchable cruise missiles. They
reanalyze the strategic value of the Arctic, whose jigsawed desert of ice conceals not only an estimated 500 billion barrels of oil but
lurking nuclear-armed submarines. Then, the Russians order a sequence of air-borne reconnaissance missions to hard-probe the
Arctic and North American defenses. Somewhere on the eastern end of the Beaufort Sea, 30,000 feet above the approaching Parry
Islands, a Russian Bear-H intercontinental bomber prepares to enter North American airspace clandestinely. The turboprop
bomber, a bright red star on its side, has averaged 400 miles per hour since it left its base in Siberia and headed over the polar icecap.
It carries inside its bulky frame eight AS-X-15 cruise missiles, each a little over 20 feet long, each packing a nuclear warhead with
more than five times the power of the Hiroshima bomb. As it wings over Canadian territory, high enough so that air resistance is
minimal, the Bear approximates the flight mode of a glider, moving silently through the ether except for short irregular bursts of
acceleration from its engines. The bomber is some 200 miles off Canada's Arctic coast when the ultrasensitive radars of the North
Warning System's CAM-M site at Cambridge Bay pick it up. CAM-M instantaneously relays the raw data on the unknown aircraft or
"bogie" to NORAD' s Region Operations Control Center (ROCC) at North Bay. In the operations room of the center's subterranean
complex, 600 feet deep in a Laurentian mountain, the "ass opers" (Air Surveil-lance Operators) start a 31/2-minute sequence to
establish whether the bogie is a military or civil aircraft, friend or foe, and the nature of its flight path and probable destination. The
Bear does not respond to ROCC requests to identify itself. The ass opers within seconds have established some basic information on
the bogie: military, unfriendly, Bear-Hotel class, and on a flight path pointing generally toward Winnipeg and Minneapolis. What the
ass opers do not know is whether the Bear is carrying nuclear weapons, its intentions, and whether it is the vanguard of a possibly larger
attack force. At the command post on the floor above the oper-ations room, the commanding major general and two deputies quickly
assess the ass opers' data and order fighter-interceptors to scramble from an airfield at Paved Paws' nearest Forward Operation
Location. They also notify NORAD' s central U.S. command post in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. A pair of CF-18 Hornets,
attached to the Alouettes, the 425th Tactical Fighter Squadron based in Bagotville, Quebec, race into the skies and somewhere above
Victoria Island lock their radars onto the approaching Bear. One of the jets springs a fuel leak and turns back. The other, armed with six
AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles and a 20-millimeter rapid-fire can-non, intercepts the intruder and buzzes it at close range. The young
francophone pilot gets no response to his repeated demands that the Russians confirm whether they are carrying a nuclear payload. He
frantically radios his base command for instructions and zooms in for a closer look at the bomber, narrowly avoiding the Bear's tail on
the pass. The Bear's pilot takes immediate evasive action, banking his plane steeply at the same time he finally identifies himself and
his payload in angry, almost threatening tones. For one fearful moment intruder and interceptor seem transfixed in uncertainty,
hovering above the icy barrens of Victoria Island. The Hornet pilot prepares to respond with a warning burst from his cannon. The
fuming pilot of the'Bear considers activating the ejector cartridges that would thrust a single silvery cruise into the blue, streaking along
its computer programmed flight path toward a NORAD target. Then discipline and cold sense reassert themselves. The Bear makes a
shuddering 180-degree turn and heads homeward. The Hornet lingers several minutes to track the Bear's retreat before it, too,
swings back toward its base. In a dangerously unpredictable, post-Cold War world, some arms experts believe the chances of a fatal
miscalculation happening in the near future are better than 50 percent.
It also renders NORAD inoperable – Russia first strike

Lamont ‘94
Lansing Lamont, Time Correspondent and President of American Trust for the British Library, 1994, Breakup, p. 236
America’s foremost concern, however, would be the impact of a diminished Canada on continental security, the fact that Washington
regards uninhibited access to Canadian territory, airspace, and waters as critical to U.S. defense. An independent, territorially
sensitive Quebec could seriously complicate continental security arrangements affecting the use of its airspace, landing, and
refueling privileges, the status of NORAD francophone units in Quebec, and the free flow of international shipping through the
Quebec end of the St. Lawrence Seaway. The disbanding and relocation to Canada of its Armed Forces based in Quebec, for instance,
would cause considerable disarray in Canada’s operational effectiveness and its ability to meet its NORAD obligations. A
compromised tripartite NORAD command, including Quebec, would hardly appeal to the Pentagon, but remains a distinct
possibility. Of graver import would be the will and capability of Canada itself to continue supporting the North American defense
structure. With its ongoing debt crisis, its traditional aversion to U.S. military initiatives, and the fading of the Soviet threat, Canada
might reduce even further its NORAD and NATO commitments.
AT//Quebec Secession Impact Defense
There is a perennial risk of Quebec secession – and it’s as high as it has
been in decades because of Catalonia and the Liberal Party of Quebec
Johnson ‘17
[William. Staffer, National Post. “Quebec's fantastical reactions to Catalonia's secession attempts” The National Post, 11/13/17
ln//jv]
Reacting to Catalonia’s reckless attempt at unilateral secession, Quebecers have

displayed their own confusion about how secession could or could not be achieved in Quebec. Here,
ambiguity reigns. Louis Bernard, the former chief of staff to separatist Premier René Lévesque, published an article in
Le Devoir recently in which he claimed that, in Canada, unlike in Spain, victory in a referendum would lead
seamlessly to an independent Quebec. “Comparing the situation of Quebec with that of
Catalonia, the commentators have emphasized how fortunate it is that the right of Québec to choose
democratically its constitutional status is recognized both by Canada and
the rest of the world,” he said. Meanwhile, Parti Québécois leader Jean-François Lisée put all the
blame for the violence that is now occurring between Spanish police and citizens on the
Spanish government. Lisée praised the democratic character of the Catalan
referendum, and denounced Prime Minister Justin Trudeau for not speaking out against
the violence. Lisée has proposed a motion in Quebec’s National Assembly to denounce the violence and urge international
mediation, thus echoing the call of Catalan President Carles Puigdemont. Quebecers have displayed confusion about how
secession could be achieved in Quebec. Other separatist leaders followed the same line. Bloc Québécois
leader Martine Ouellet, who was in Barcelona for the referendum, tweeted her disgust at the “deafening
silence” of the Canadian government. Her party tried unsuccessfully to introduce a motion in the House of
Commons to condemn the Spanish government’s “violent repression.” And the left-wing separatist party Québec Solidaire
tried to introduce a motion in the National Assembly that would have recognized Catalonia’s
eventual independence. It failed to get sufficient votes to be accepted for debate. And what about the “federalist”
Liberal Party of Quebec, led by Premier Philippe Couillard? He chooses federalism, yet maintains that
Quebec has an unfettered right to secede should Quebecers so choose,
because Quebec is a nation. Couillard refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the 1982 Constitution Act On
June 1, 2017, with great fanfare, the premier released a 177-page document detailing his party’s new constitutional
policy. Titled Quebecers: Our way of being Canadian, it contained three passages that claimed Quebec
is free to choose any status. It notes, for instance, that “Quebec is free to make its choices and
able to take control of its destiny and its development. Quebec possesses all the
characteristics of a nation and recognizes itself as such.” The document also
refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the 1982 Constitution Act, which
patriated Canada’s constitution and entrenched the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. That act, which was
supported by nine provinces and fulfilled the conditions set out by the Supreme Court of Canada, was rejected at the time by premier
René Lévesque, and has been rejected by every Quebec premier since. Keeping with this tradition, Couillard’s
document affirms the Quebec government’s continued opposition to the
Constitution Act of 1982.
Climate Leadership AddOn
Climate Leadership AddOn – 2ac
Trump has ruined US climate leadership – but it’s not too late – the plan
revives it
Alice Thomas 6-1-2018 – Author for Refugees International. ["Moving Forward to Tackle Climate Displacement after the
U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Accord", Accessible Online at:
https://www.refugeesinternational.org/blog/usabsencefromtheparisaccord] @ AG
One year ago today, the

Trump administration made its ill-advised decision to withdraw the
United States from the historic Paris Climate Accord. The decision effectively sidelined
the United States on this critical issue, moving the country from a position of
international leadership on the climate crisis and undermining global efforts to establish a
cleaner, more stable world. But the good news is that despite the absence of U.S. presidential leadership on climate
policy, other countries – along with states, cities, and communities within the United States and around the globe – are moving
forward. Important progress is being made including with respect to the impacts of climate change on forced displacement. Last
week, I joined almost 100 representatives of national governments, UN agencies, leading academic institutions, civil society
organizations, and the private sector at a stakeholders’ meeting with the Task Force on Displacement (TFD) established under the
Paris Accord. The mandate of the TFD is to develop integrated approaches to avert, minimize, and address displacement related to
the adverse impacts of climate change. During the meeting, participants identified solutions and provided concrete input into the
TFD’s recommendations, which will be reported to countries in December 2018 at the next round of climate change negotiations in
Katowice, Poland. Refugees International’s
written submission stressed the importance of acting
on opportunities to minimize forced displacement from extreme weather events like
hurricanes through improved risk management, thereby avoiding the protracted displacement we are seeing
in Puerto Rico and other parts of the United States and the Caribbean which were slammed by last year’s wave of powerful
hurricanes. And this coming Monday, June 5, I will head back up to UN headquarters in New York where UN member states are
meeting for the fifth round of negotiations on a global compact for safe, orderly, and regular migration. Unsurprisingly, the Trump
administration also decided to sit this one out. The
United States refused to join the negotiations which
seek to improve international cooperative efforts to address the enormous challenges
and human catastrophe resulting from disorderly and unsafe migration, which is
playing out around the world and at our own borders today. Significantly, the latest draft of
the migration compact includes commitments by countries to enhance protection and
assistance for vulnerable communities that are uprooted by disasters brought on by
extreme weather as well as slower-onset climate change adverse effects such as sea level rise. This commitment marks
significant and critical progress in efforts to protect millions of at-risk communities around the globe who at present, lack legal
protection under the 1951 Refugees Convention and its Protocol. Refugees
International has urged states to
act on this opportunity to enhance protection and promote the human rights for persons
uprooted by disasters and climate change in the migration compact and its sister
compact, the UN global compact on refugees. Given that it will take several more years for the United States
to formally withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord, there is still time for the Trump administration
and Members of Congress to get on board and show leadership and global stewardship.
But not doing so won’t stop the rest of us from striving to move the forward toward a cleaner, safer, and more prosperous planet.
Alternative’s extinction
Schlanger 17 – Zoë Schlanger, Environment Reporter for Quartz and Akshat Rathi, Science Journalist with Quartz, “It’s
Official: Trump is Forcing the US to Turn its Back on the Paris Climate Agreement”, Quartz, https://qz.com/996376/trump-has-
decided-to-pull-the-us-from-the-paris-climate-agreement/
Since Trump reportedly waffled up to the last moment on the Paris agreement decision, we decided to show you what almost could
have been. Here’s our story, written both ways. US president Donald Trump announced today (June 1) he’s decided to withdraw the
country from the Paris climate agreement. The US emits about one-sixth of the planet’s total greenhouse gas emissions, making it
the second-largest emitter in the world. The decision removes the US from its commitments to international efforts to reduce fossil-
fuel emissions and thereby avoid levels of global temperature rise that imperil the future viability of
human life on Earth . The US joins Nicaragua and Syria as the only countries to reject the Paris agreement. Notably,
Nicaragua refused to join because its leadership felt the agreement did not go far enough. Syria, meanwhile, has since 2011 been
mired in one of the globe’s most violent civil conflicts. Not leaving means Trump will have to respect the US’s commitments to
reduce emissions. Trump will abide by the structure laid out in the agreement, which means it could take the US up to four
years to actually leave . So the real question of whether the country stays in the Paris climate agreement may be decided by
voters in 2020 the presidential election . Trump, who reportedly was undecided as recently as last evening, ultimately listened
to ignored the voices of energy industry giants like ExxonMobil and Shell, coal company Cloud Peak, and Rex Tillerson, his own
secretary of state, not to mention some of his most trusted advisors, daughter Ivanka Trump and son-in-law Jared Kushner. He thus
ignored instead listened to the climate-denying faction of his inner-circle, including Environmental Protection Agency administrator
Scott Pruitt, chief strategist Steve Bannon, and a coterie of 22 Republican senators who sent a letter to the president urging him to
back out. (Those senators have collectively received $10 million in campaign contributions from the oil and gas industry since 2012.)
The pledge made by the Obama administration to the Paris agreement is was not legally binding, but symbolically important . It
offers offered an assurance to other nations that the country would take responsibility for its own share of global emissions.
Within weeks of Trump taking office, however, his administration began the process of rolling back key federal emissions standards,
making clear that it had no intention of working towards meeting the US’s commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 2025 to
about a third of the country’s 2005 emission levels. Without the US, the total number of countries that have formally pledged
emissions reductions remains 147 drops to 146, in total accounting for roughly 80% 65% of the planet’s emissions. As the US vacates
its seat at the bargaining table, it has partners in it cedes climate leadership to India, China, and the EU, all of which have publicly
pledged to strengthen their commitments to mutually reduce emissions. Still, without US participation during what scientists
agree are critical years , the hope of avoiding dangerous levels of climate change slips farther away.
Ext. Climate Leadership L
Plan bolsters US cred and immediacy is key
Through these six recommendations, lawmakers will create the most comprehensive
strategy dealing with climate refugees in the world, making the United States an
international leader in the area. This would also strengthen the status of the United
States in the international community, which leads to stronger
international relationships and economic benefits. At the core of climate
refugees is an issue of justice. Individuals who come from developing nations that have contributed to climate
change at insignificant rates compared to the United States are those who fear statelessness. It is the duty and best
interest of the lawmakers in the United States to create comprehensive policy providing
legal protections to climate refugees. Waiting until the effects of climate change worsen
and the projected 250 million individuals are forced to leave their home communities
will only cause greater issues and strain U.S. resources. The discussion of climate
refugee policy in the United States needs to begin immediately in order to
mitigate and protect individuals and communities.
The plan is independent of international gridlock on climate refuge and sets
a precedent globally
The review of literature and policy options shows the complexity of issues and options to address climate refugees. As the
international debate will not likely be solved in the near future, the United States is
able to move forward with the implementation of climate refugee policy
and, in doing so, set a precedent for how other nations may implement such
a policy and motivate others to take similar actions. Based on the literature review, policy options review,
and overall assessment of mechanisms pertaining to climate refugees, the following set of recommendations is put forth to the U.S.
government with the intention of providing legal protections to climate refugees in a practical manner.
US inaction on climate refugees decks climate cred broadly – the plan

overcomes the signal sent by Paris Withdrawal
Yet also significant is the fact that it

officially considers mass migration as one such effect of
climate change. Specifically, the Paris climate accord calls for developing
recommendations “to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse
impacts of climate change.” This explicit acknowledgment of the dangers of migration
was one that some of the poorest of the 195 countries involved in the talks had sought to
include in the text, for estimates state that by 2050, about 200 million people—primarily from the Global South—may be
permanently displaced. Significantly, wealthier
nations acknowledged the perils of climate
change with regard to forced migration.
During the September 2016 ratification then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated that “[e]ach
day the planet is on
this course, it becomes more dangerous…[i]f anyone doubted the science, all they have
to do is watch, sense, feel what is happening in the world today. High temperatures are
already having consequences, people are dying in the heat, people lack water, we
already have climate refugees.”
Regardless, after U.S. negotiators demanded the exclusion of language that could
allow the agreement to be used to claim legal liability for climate change, critics said
the agreement would still condemn hundreds of millions of people living in low-lying coastal areas and small
islands to a precarious future. Even further, in June 2017, President Donald Trump announced that the
U.S.— the world’s second largest emitter of greenhouse gases—will withdraw from the Paris Climate
Agreement stating that the agreement is “less about the climate and more about other countries gaining a financial advantage
over the United States." The announcement undermines ongoing efforts toward climate
mitigation, adaptation, and finance, in and outside the agreement. Further, it undermines
more expansive accounts of the climate crisis itself that had begun to surface in recent year, including
acknowledgement of its effects with regard to mass migration.
Ext. Climate Leadership Impact
US climate leadership solves a laundry list of existential threats
Klarevas 9 – Professor of Global Affairs
Louis, Professor at the Center for Global Affairs – New York University, “Securing American Primacy While Tackling Climate
Change: Toward a National Strategy of Greengemony”, Huffington Post, 12-15, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/louis-
klarevas/securing-american-primacy_b_393223.html
By not addressing climate change more aggressively and creatively, the United States is
squandering an opportunity to secure its global primacy for the next few generations to come. To
do this, though, the U.S. must rely on innovation to help the world escape the coming
environmental meltdown. Developing the key technologies that will save the planet from
global warming will allow the U.S. to outmaneuver potential great power rivals
seeking to replace it as the international system's hegemon. But the greening of
American strategy must occur soon. The U.S., however, seems to be stuck in time, unable to move
beyond oil-centric geo-politics in any meaningful way. Often, the gridlock is portrayed as a partisan
difference, with Republicans resisting action and Democrats pleading for action. This, though, is an unfair characterization as there
are numerous proactive Republicans and quite a few reticent Democrats. The real divide is instead one between realists and liberals.
Students of realpolitik, which still heavily guides American foreign policy, largely discount environmental issues as they are not seen
as advancing national interests in a way that generates relative power advantages vis-à-vis the other major powers in the system:
Russia, China, Japan, India, and the European Union. Liberals, on the other hand, have recognized that global warming might very
well become the greatest challenge ever faced by mankind. As such, their thinking often eschews narrowly defined national interests
for the greater global good. This, though, ruffles elected officials whose sworn obligation is, above all, to protect and promote
American national interests. What both sides need to understand is that by becoming a lean, mean, green fighting machine, the U.S.
can actually bring together liberals and realists to advance a collective interest which benefits every nation, while at the same time,
securing America's global primacy well into the future. To do so, the U.S. must re-invent itself as not just your traditional hegemon,
but as history's first ever green hegemon. Hegemons are countries that dominate the international system - bailing out other
countries in times of global crisis, establishing and maintaining the most important international institutions, and covering the costs
that result from free-riding and cheating global obligations. Since 1945, that role has been the purview of the United States.
Immediately after World War II, Europe and Asia laid in ruin, the global economy required resuscitation, the countries of the free
world needed security guarantees, and the entire system longed for a multilateral forum where global concerns could be addressed.
The U.S., emerging the least scathed by the systemic crisis of fascism's rise, stepped up to the challenge and established the postwar
(and current) liberal order. But don't let the world "liberal" fool you. While many nations benefited from America's new-found
hegemony, the U.S. was driven largely by "realist" selfish national interests. The liberal order first and foremost benefited the U.S.
With the U.S. becoming bogged down in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, running a record national debt, and failing to shore up the
dollar, the future of American hegemony now seems to be facing a serious contest: potential rivals - acting like sharks smelling blood
in the water - wish to challenge the U.S. on a variety of fronts. This has led numerous commentators to forecast the U.S.'s imminent
fall from grace. Not all hope is lost however. With the impending systemic crisis of global warming on the horizon, the U.S. again
finds itself in a position to address a transnational problem in a way that will benefit both the international community collectively
and the U.S. selfishly. The current problem is two-fold. First, the competition for oil is fueling animosities
between the major powers. The geopolitics of oil has already emboldened Russia in its 'near abroad' and
China in far-off places like Africa and Latin America. As oil is a limited natural resource, a nasty zero-sum contest
could be looming on the horizon for the U.S. and its major power rivals - a contest which threatens American primacy and
global stability. Second, converting fossil fuels like oil to run national economies is producing irreversible harm in the form of
carbon dioxide emissions. So long as the global economy remains oil-dependent, greenhouse gases will continue to rise. Experts are
predicting as much as a
60% increase in carbon dioxide emissions in the next twenty-five years. That likely
means more devastating water shortages, droughts, forest fires, floods, and storms. In
other words, if global competition for access to energy resources does not undermine
international security, global warming will. And in either case, oil will be a culprit for the
instability. Oil arguably has been the most precious energy resource of the last half-century. But "black gold" is so 20th century.
The key resource for this century will be green gold - clean, environmentally-friendly energy like wind, solar, and hydrogen power.
Climate change leaves no alternative. And the sooner we realize this, the better off we will be. What Washington must do in order to
avoid the traps of petropolitics is to convert the U.S. into the world's first-ever green hegemon. For starters, the federal government
must drastically increase investment in energy and environmental research and development (E&E R&D). This will require a serious
sacrifice, committing upwards of $40 billion annually to E&E R&D - a far cry from the few billion dollars currently being spent. By
promoting a new national project, the U.S. could develop new technologies that will assure it
does not drown in a pool of oil. Some solutions are already well known, such as raising fuel standards for automobiles;
improving public transportation networks; and expanding nuclear and wind power sources. Others, however, have
not progressed much beyond the drawing board: batteries that can store massive amounts of solar (and possibly even wind)
power; efficient and cost-effective photovoltaic cells, crop-fuels, and hydrogen-based fuels; and even fusion.
Such innovations will not only provide alternatives to oil, they will also give the U.S. an
edge in the global competition for hegemony. If the U.S. is able to produce technologies
that allow modern, globalized societies to escape the oil trap, those nations will eventually have no
choice but to adopt such technologies. And this will give the U.S. a tremendous economic
boom, while simultaneously providing it with means of leverage that can be employed to keep
potential foes in check.
Kiribati Addon
Kiribati – 2ac
Climate change will erase the people of Kiribati
Siddle 14 – February 3, 2018, Julian Siddle, “Kiribati: Tiny island’s struggle with overpopulation,”
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-26017336//TK
The Pacific island chain of Kiribati is one of the most densely settled places on Earth. The
BBC's Julian Siddle investigates how the island is dealing with its overpopulation problem. Kiribati is perhaps best
known as one of the countries most likely to disappear due to climate change. Most
people who live on Kiribati's main island - South Tarawa - rely on the surrounding seas
for their livelihoods. The ocean is also the greatest threat to their future survival: No
land on this island sits more than 2m (6ft 6in) above sea level, so rising seas could prove
devastating. We have contamination from housing, agriculture, from people holding pigs, the sanitation practices Peter
Sinclair, Secretariat of the Pacific Community But that's not the only challenge facing this Pacific nation. Stretching over 3.5 million
sq km (1.35 million sq mi) of the ocean, Kiribati consists of several islands spread across a territory of similar size to India, but most
of the population is concentrated on South Tarawa. This
tiny crescent of land is home to around 50,000
people - it's overcrowded, with a population density similar to Tokyo or Hong Kong.
"We've a relatively stable climate at the moment, but a shift in weather patterns, that pushes us into the hurricane belt, that could
wipe us out," Kiribati's President Anote Tong told the BBC World Service programme Discovery. He has long campaigned on the
international stage to fund the development of Kiribati to help it resist climate change - and to resettle the population elsewhere,
should rising seas engulf the islands. However, while
the effects of climate change may seem distant, the
impact of so many people concentrated in such a small space is immediate. The key issues are
those facing many developing nations - providing enough food, water and adequate sanitation. South Tarawa Image caption The
island can look like a tropical paradise... Beach strewn with rubbish Image caption ...but in other areas, the illusion is broken when
the tide goes out While it does rain here with predicable regularity, tanks needed to collect rain water are in short supply. Much
of the population relies on underground aquifers, a series of natural horizontal channels
which fill up with rainwater. These are located under the widest section of the island at Bonriki, around the airport.
Two related scientific projects are currently looking at ways to ensure this precious water store is protected. "We've put 15
oceanographic instruments around the reef to better understand the wave transformation, measuring wave height, current strength,
water level," says Herve Damlamian, a coastal numerical modeller with the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC). Local people
report that drinking water now tastes increasingly salty. Herve's project, the Bonriki inundation vulnerability assessment, is trying to
assess the risk of flooding: if a king tide (an especially high one) overtops the island, sending waves crashing from one side to
another, this could fill the underground system with undrinkable sea water. On the reserve itself, Peter Sinclair, water resources
adviser at the SPC, heads a team measuring the quality of underground drinking water. Artan Rajit, deputy Mayor of Abaiang Image
caption Artan Rajit says people on the island of Abaiang want the amenities people enjoy on South Tarawa "If the seawater came in
over the top, it would have an immediate and catastrophic effect, causing salination for 15 months to two years - this could make the
water undrinkable," he says. However, population pressure is an issue in this discussion too, Mr Sinclair explains. "As long as we get
rainfall, the system will replenish, but the population pressure encroaches on the reserve and also affects the bacterial content in the
water - we have contamination from housing, agriculture, from people holding pigs, the sanitation practices," he says. "Elsewhere,
water is very contaminated, especially where people live over the top of their wells." Nearer the islands' centres of population, the
beaches are covered in all manner of waste from litter to excrement. "When the tide is up, it does look like a paradise. When the tide
goes out, you see the horrible degradation because of humans," says Cliff Julerat, a coastal engineer with the Kiribati ministry of
works. One way to deal with the problems created by increasing populations may be a return to the old way of life, suggests Tabao
Awaerika, secretary to Kiribati's president. Water tank Image caption A shortage of water tanks means that
many have to rely on underground stores "It's like taking a step back into our history - but it's very difficult to
do that," he explains. "We had this thought of getting people to eat babai, it's a local food crop like taro, but it takes about four hours
to cook. Breadfruit is about an hour - rice is easier to cook, nicer and cheaper. So why do it? "We need a total change of mindset. To
encourage sustainable activity on outer islands so they don't need to come to Tarawa." However, persuading more people not to
come could be difficult. Artan Rajit, the deputy mayor of nearby Abaiang - a greener, more spacious island with a population of
under 10,000 - says simply: "We want what they have in Tarawa." For people enduring a near subsistence lifestyle on Kiribati's outer
islands, accepting the overcrowding and polluted environment seems a worthwhile price to pay for the vibrancy of South Tarawa,
with its few shops, access to imported food, tinned meat and rice and medical centres. Despite the pot-holed road and decrepit
vehicles, there is also the potential for paid employment - though only around 20% of the population have full-time, paid jobs.
Cultural erasure should be prioritized

Clech-Lam 2k
[Maivan. Assc Prof of Law @ American University. At the Edge of the State: Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination, 2000, Pg
205//JVOSS]
Nevertheless, as anthropologists know, ethnicity is both an enabling and an inescapable condition of human existence. It is a
collective system of meaning that generates social energy which can be put to constructive and destructive uses equally.
Stavenhagen writes: Cultures are complex patterns of social relationships, material objects, and spiritual values that give
meaning and identity to community life and are a resource for solving the problems of
everyday life. That some very ugly campaigns in modern history, usually unleashed by the destructive economic and military
policies of the world’s powerful states, have tapped, frighteningly successfully, into ethnic energy is undeniable. But it is just as
undeniable that knowledge—of the universe, of a specific part of it, of workable social relationships, of human nature—that
is crucial to the project of human survival remains separately encoded in the distinctive
cultures of ethnic groups. No human community or ethnic group can construct an
informed and meaningful future if it is cut off from its cultural past. And alienation from
meaning, as much as exploited meaning, can lead to violence.
Ext. Kiribati L
Kiribati catastrophe is all but certain
Doane 17 – Ausgust 21, 2017, Seth Doane, CBS, Behind the Lens: Climate Refugees,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/behind-the-lens-climate-refugees-kiribati-cbsn-on-assignment//TK
Kiribati is on the frontier. On a map, this tiny island nation looks like a little speck in the middle of the South Pacific.
Just over the international date line from America, it's one of the first countries in the world to see a new
day and scientists say it'll be among the first to feel catastrophic effects of climate
change. When I think about our shoot in Kiribati, one of the images that sticks in my mind was bumping along a rutted, dirt
coastal road on an outer-lying island. We were in the back of an open truck (one of the few large vehicles on the island) with our
camera equipment while most residents were riding bicycles or little mopeds or walking. Through the palm trees and tropical plants
lining the road, we'd see the most stunning vistas and glimpse lives that seemed to be trapped in time. Folks live in simple huts with
thatched roofs made from palm trees. We could see families cooking on open fires or drying coconut in the sun. Fisherman would be
stitching together fishing nets. Most didn't have cars, running water or what we'd consider "the basics." FULL REPORT: Click here
to explore more about Kiribati Their "carbon footprints" are among the lowest in the world. These are
not people who travel by air or drive gas-guzzling vehicles. For many, on this remote island in Kiribati, electricity is a luxury. They're
not the big carbon polluters but they're the ones who'll be among the first to have their lives disrupted by climate change through
rising sea levels and extreme weather. cbsn-oa-kiribati-6.jpg The turquoise Kiribati sea is central to the lives of Kiribati residents,
and an ever-increasing threat to the future of their homeland. CBS NEWS We met many folks who already had to leave homes as the
seawater encroached and contaminated groundwater and crops or, in some cases, pulled homes into the ocean. Some told us how
they've contemplated relocating. Kiribati purchased land in Fiji as a "back-up" plan in case huge numbers of people had to flee. The
water that we'd see at every turn was always changing colors. At points it was turquoise sea green, or sometimes a brilliant, deep
purple. For
generations in Kiribati the sea has been at the center of life, but now, that
beautiful, stunning water threatens their very existence. One man we interviewed told us that the idea of
moving away from these islands was overwhelming. Here in Kiribati, he explained, nature had always provided what they needed:
they could climb a tree and pick a coconut to eat or could pick up his fishing spear and catch dinner. See more stories from "CBSN:
On Assignment" I've
visited parts of the U.S., like New Orleans, where technology (and
money) allows entire neighborhoods to exist below sea level. I've traveled around The
Netherlands where a significant portion of its land mass would be below water were it
not for advanced engineering. But those are places with money and resources. Kiribati's
development index is one of the lowest in the world and fancy engineering is -- at least
now -- out of reach. While many in Kiribati are forced to deal with the possibilities of sea
level rise, extreme weather exacerbated by climate change, they were not the ones who caused it. One
woman told us they were looking toward the "big" countries. They caused the problem, she said, "now when will they help?"
LDC AddOn
LDC AddOn – 2ac
Climate change devastates developing economies – giving them an
outlet is key
Vulnerability to climate change—and the manifold resource conflicts climate change

triggers and exacerbates—is disproportionately experienced in the Global South
across key eco-regions. These regions include areas commonly affected by storms,
particularly in Central America and Southeast Asia; communities in arid environments and in close
proximity to a desert, such as those around the Sahara Desert; and coastal cities and low-lying island-
states, such as the Maldives.85 Additionally, the impact on such communities is expected to
worsen given, for example, that coastal populations are burgeoning in developing countries
in particular. Over the past three decades coastal populations have increased globally from 1.6 billion to over 2.5 billion and in
2007, with over 1.9 billion in developing countries in particular.86 Hence, a meter increase in sea levels and a 10
percent intensification of storm surges could cause flooding affecting 31 million people
in developing countries and would broaden the areas of exposure from 7 percent to 12.6 percent.87
Such acute vulnerability to climate change experienced by many across the Global South also occurs as a fact of the predominance of
natural resource-based economies. For example, countries and communities with large economic
contributions from agriculture and a large number of subsistence-level households are
more vulnerable to a changing climate. In addition to disasters, climate change causes
unpredictable weather patterns that place pressure on already fragile low-income
rural economies. Climate change manifests in hotter days, drier seasons, more
flooding, and shorter growing seasons, which reduces yields and increases
poverty.88 According to the United Nations, the largest segment of the world’s poor live in rural
environments: “these are the subsistence farmers and herders, the fishers and migrant
workers.”89 In 2010 about 34 percent of the total rural population of developing countries was classified as extremely poor and
about 80 percent of rural households engaged in farm activities of some sort.90 As such, a large majority of the
world’s poor depend on moderate seasonal changes to produce their food, yet such
communities are losing one of their few assets, one which is essential for their livelihoods: knowing
when to sow and harvest.91
The collapse of developing economies decimates global growth

Drezner ‘16
professor of international politics at Tufts and Senior Fellow at Brookings (Daniel, “Five Known Unknowns about the Next
Generation Global Political Economy” May, http://www.anamnesis.info/sites/default/files/D_Drezner_2016.pdf
The erosion of the trade and demographic drivers puts even more pressure on technological innovation to be the engine of economic
growth in the developed world. As one McKinsey analysis concluded, “For economic growth to match its historical rates, virtually all
of it must come from increases in labor productivity.”78 Growth in labor
productivity is partially a function of capital investment, but mostly a function of
technological innovation. The key question is whether the pace
of technological innovation will sustain itself.
This remains a known unknown. The pace of innovation relative to global population has slowed dramatically over the past fifty
years.79 Consider that the developed world still relies on the same general purpose technologies of modern society that were
originally invented 50-100 years ago: the automobile, airplane, telephone, refrigerator, and computer. To be sure, all of these
technologies have improved in recent decades, in some cases dramatically. But nothing new has replaced them. And even these
improvements have not necessarily had dramatic systemic effects. For example, the average speed on a passenger aircraft has
actually fallen since the introduction of the Boeing 707 in 1958, because of the need to conserve fuel. For all of the talk of “disruptive
innovations,” the effect of these disruptions on both the business world and aggregate economic growth have been exaggerated.80
At present, many of the fields that seem promising for innovation—nanotechnology, green energy, and so forth—require massive
fixed investments. Only large institutions, like research universities, multinational corporations and government entities, can play in
that kind of game. Joseph Schumpeter warned that once large organizations became the primary engine of innovation, the pace of
change would naturally slow down. Because large organizations are inherently bureaucratic and conservative, they will be less able
to imagine radical innovations.81 What if the “secular stagnation” debate is really just a harbinger of a deeper debate about a return
to pre-19th century growth levels?
An obvious counter to this argument is that the pace of technological innovation in laptops, smart phones, tablets, and the Internet
of things has accelerated. This is undeniably true—but the problem is that the gains in utility have not been, strictly speaking,
economic. Most of the important innovations that we think about with respect to the Internet—Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia,
YouTube and so forth —are free technologies for consumers. As Tyler Cowen argues, “The big technological gains are coming in
revenue-deficient sectors.”82 They generate lots of enjoyment but little employment. The largest and most dynamic information
technology firms, like Google and Apple, hire only a fraction of the people who worked for General Motors in its heyday. At the same
time, Internet-based content has eroded the financial viability of other parts of the economy. Content-providing sectors—such as
music, entertainment, and journalism—have suffered directly. The growth of “sharing economy” firms like Uber and Airbnb that
develop peer-to-peer markets are causing similar levels of creative disruption to the travel and tourism sectors.83 The rapid
acceleration of automation is also leading to debates about whether the “lump of labor” fallacy remains a fallacy—in other words,
whether displaced workers will be able to find new employment.84
A slow-growth economic trajectory also creates policy problems that increase the likelihood of even slower growth. Higher
growth is a political palliative that makes structural reforms easier. For example,
Germany prides itself on the “Hartz reforms” to its labor markets last decade, and has advocated similar policies for the rest of the
Eurozone since the start of the 2008 financial crisis. But the Hartz reforms were accomplished during a global economic upswing,
boosting German exports and cushioning the shortterm cost of the reforms themselves. In a low-growth world, other economies will
be understandably reluctant to engage in such reforms.
It is possible that concerns about a radical growth slowdown are exaggerated. In 1987, Robert Solow famously said, “You can see the
computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.”85 A decade later, the late 1990s productivity surge was in full bloom.
Economists are furiously debating whether the visible innovations in the information sector are leading to productivity advances
that are simply going undetected in the current productivity statistics.86 Google’s chief economist Hal Varian, echoing Solow from a
generation ago, asserts that “there is a lack of appreciation for what’s happening in Silicon Valley, because we don’t have a good way
to measure it.”87 It is also possible that current innovations will only lead to gains in labor productivity a decade from now. The
OECD argues that the productivity problem resides in firms far from the leading edge failing to adopt new technologies and
systems.88 There are plenty of sectors, such as health or education, in which technological innovations can yield significant
productivity gains. It would foolhardy to predict the end of radical innovations.
But the possibility of a

technological slowdown is a significant “known unknown.” And if such a slowdown occurs, it
would have catastrophic effects on the public finances of the OECD economies. Most of the developed world will have to
support disproportionately large numbers of pensioners by 2036; slower-growing economies will worsen the debt-to-GDP ratios of
most of these economies, causing further macroeconomic stresses—and, potentially, political unrest from increasingly stringent
budget constraints.89
2. Are there hard constraints on the ability of the developing world to converge to developed-country living standards?
One of the common predictions made for the next generation economy is that China will displace the United States as the world’s
biggest economy. This is a synecdoche of the deeper forecast that per capita incomes in developing countries will slowly converge
towards the living standards of the advance industrialized democracies. The OECD’s Looking to 2060 report is based on “a tendency
of GDP per capita to converge across countries” even if that convergence is slow-moving. The EIU’s long-term macroeconomic
forecast predicts that China’s per capita income will approximate Japan’s by 2050.90 The Carnegie Endowment’s World Order in
2050 report presumes that total factor productivity gains in the developing world will be significantly higher than countries on the
technological frontier. Looking at the previous twenty years of economic growth, Kemal Dervis posited that by 2030, “The rather
stark division of the world into ‘advanced’ and ‘poor’ economies that began with the industrial revolution will end, ceding to a much
more differentiated and multipolar world economy.”91
Intuitively, this seems rational. The theory is that developing countries have lower incomes primarily because they are capital-
deficient and because their economies operate further away from technological frontier. The gains from physical and human capital
investment in the developing world should be greater than in the developed world. From Alexander Gerschenkron forward,
development economists have presumed that there are some growth advantages to “economic backwardness”92
This intuitive logic, however, is somewhat contradicted by the “middle income trap.” Barry Eichengreen, Donghyun Park, and
Kwanho Shin have argued in a series of papers that as an economy’s GDP per capita hits close to $10,000, and then again at
$16,000, growth slowdowns commence.93 This makes it very difficult for these economies to converge towards the per capita
income levels of the advanced industrialized states. History bears this out. There is a powerful correlation between a country’s GDP
per capita in 1960 and that country’s per capita income in 2008. In fact, more countries that were middle income in 1960 had
become relatively poorer than had joined the ranks of the rich economies. To be sure, there have been success stories, such as South
Korea, Singapore, and Israel. But other success stories, such as Greece, look increasingly fragile. Lant Prichett and Lawrence
Summers conclude that “past performance is no guarantee of future performance. Regression to the mean is the single most robust
and empirical relevant fact about cross-national growth rates.”94
Post-2008 growth performance of the established and emerging markets matches this assessment. While most of the developing
world experienced rapid growth in the previous decade, the BRICS have run into roadblocks. Since the collapse of Lehman Brothers,
these economies are looking less likely to converge with the developed world. During the Great Recession, the non-Chinese BRICS—
India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa—have not seen their relative share of the global economy increase at all.95 China’s growth has
also slowed down dramatically over the past few years. Recent and massive outflows of capital suggests that the Chinese economy is
headed for a significant market correction. The collapse of commodity prices removed another source of economic growth in the
developing world. By 2015, the gap between developing country growth and developed country growth had narrowed to its lowest
level in the 21st century.96
What explains the middle income trap? Eichengreen, Park and Shin suggest that “slowdowns coincide with the point in the growth
process where it is no longer possible to boost productivity by shifting additional workers from agriculture to industry and where the
gains from importing foreign technology diminish.”97 But that is insufficient to explain why the slowdowns in growth have been so
dramatic and widespread.
There are multiple candidate explanations. One argument, consistent with Paul Krugman’s deconstruction of the previous East Asia
“miracle,”98 is that much of this growth was based on unsustainable levels of ill-conceived capital investment. Economies that
allocate large shares of GDP to investment can generate high growth rates, particularly in capital-deficient countries. The
sustainability of those growth rates depends on whether the investments are productive or unproductive. For example, high levels of
Soviet economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s masked the degree to which this capital was misallocated. As Krugman noted, a
lesser though similar phenomenon took place in the Asian tigers in the 1990s. It is plausible that China has been experiencing the
same illusory growth-from-bad-investment problem. Reports of overinvestment in infrastructure and “ghost cities” are rampant;
according to two Chinese government researchers, the country wasted an estimated $6.8 trillion in “ineffective investment” between
2009 and 2013 alone.99
A political explanation would be rooted in the fact that many emerging markets lack the political and institutional capabilities to
sustain continued growth. Daron Acemoğlu and James Robinson argue that modern economies are based on either “extractive
institutions” or “inclusive institutions.”100 Governments based on extractive institutions can generate higher rates of growth than
governments without any effective structures. It is not surprising, for example, that post-Maoist Chinese economic growth has far
outstripped Maoist-era rates of growth. Inclusive institutions are open to a wider array of citizens, and therefore more democratic.
Acemoğlu and Robinson argue that economies based on inclusive institutions will outperform those based on extractive institutions.
Inclusive institutions are less likely to be prone to corruption, more able to credibly commit to the rule of law, and more likely to
invest in the necessary public goods for broad-based economic growth. Similarly, Pritchett and Summers conclude that institutional
quality has a powerful and long-lasting effect on economic growth—and that “salient characteristics of China—high levels of state
control and corruption along with high measures of authoritarian rule—make a discontinuous decline in growth even more likely
than general experience would suggest.”101
A more forward-looking explanation is that the changing nature of manufacturing has badly disrupted the 20th century pathway for
economic development. For decades, the principal blueprint for developing economies to become developed was to specialize in
industrial sectors where low-cost labor offered a comparative advantage. The resulting growth from export promotion would then
spill over into upstream and downstream sectors, creating new job-creating sectors. Globalization, however, has already generated
tremendous productivity gains in manufacturing—to the point where industrial sectors do not create the same amount of
employment opportunities that they used to.102 Like agriculture in the developed world, manufacturing has become so productive
that it does not need that many workers. As a result, many developing economies suffer from what Dani Rodrik labels “premature
deindustrialization.” If Rodrik is correct, then going forward, manufacturing will fail to jump-start developing economies into higher
growth trajectories—and the political effects that have traditionally come with industrialization will also be stunted.103
Both the middle-income trap and the regression to the mean observation are empirical observations about the past. There is no
guaranteeing that these empirical regularities will hold for the future. Indeed, China’s astonishing growth rate over the past 30 years
is a direct contradiction of the regression to the mean phenomenon. It is possible that over time the convergence hypothesis swamps
the myriad explanations listed above for continued divergence. But in sketching out the next generation global economy, the
implications of whether regression to the mean will dominate the convergence hypothesis are massive. Looking at China and India
alone, the gap in projections between a continuation of past growth trends and regression to the mean is equivalent to $42 trillion—
more than half of global economic output in 2015.104 This gap is significant enough to matter not just to China and India, but to the
world economy.
As with the developed world, a growth slowdown in the developing world can have a feedback effect that makes more growth-
friendly reforms more difficult to accomplish. As Chinese economic growth has slowed, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s economic reform
plans have stalled out in favor of more political repression. Follows the recent playbook of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who
has added diversionary war as another distracting tactic from negative economic growth. Short-term steps towards political
repression will make politically risky steps towards economic reform that less palatable in the future. Instead, the advanced
developing economies seem set to double down on strategies that yield less economic growth over time.
3. Will geopolitical rivalries or technological innovation alter the patterns of economic interdependence?
Multiple scholars have observed a secular decline in interstate violence in recent decades.105 The Kantian triad of more
democracies, stronger multilateral institutions, and greater levels of cross-border trade is well known. In recent years, international
relations theorists have stressed that commercial interdependence is a bigger driver of this phenomenon than previously
thought.106 The liberal logic is straightforward. The benefits of cross-border exchange and economic interdependence act as a
powerful brake on the utility of violence in international politics. The global supply chain and “just in time” delivery systems have
further imbricated national economies into the international system. This creates incentives for governments to preserve an open
economy even during times of crisis. The more that a country’s economy was enmeshed in the global supply chain, for example, the
less likely it was to raise tariffs after the 2008 financial crisis.107 Similarly, global financiers are strongly interested in minimizing
political risk; historically, the financial sector has staunchly opposed initiating the use of force in world politics.108 Even militarily
powerful actors must be wary of alienating global capital.
Globalization therefore creates powerful pressures on governments not to close off their
economies through protectionism or military aggression. Interdependence can also
tamp down conflicts that would otherwise be likely to break out during a great power
transition. Of the 15 times a rising power has emerged to challenge a ruling power between 1500 and 2000, war broke out 11
times.109 Despite these odds, China’s recent rise to great power status has elevated tensions without leading to anything
approaching war. It could be argued that the Sino-American economic relationship is so deep that it has tamped down the great
power conflict that would otherwise have been in full bloom over the past two decades. Instead, both China and the United States
have taken pains to talk about the need for a new kind of great power relationship. Interdependence can help to
reduce the likelihood of an extreme event—such as a great power war—from taking place.
Will this be true for the next generation economy as well? The two other legs of the Kantian triad—democratization and
multilateralism—are facing their own problems in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.110 Economic openness survived the negative
shock of the 2008 financial crisis, which suggests that the logic of commercial liberalism will continue to hold with equal force going
forward. But some international relations scholars doubt the power of globalization’s pacifying effects, arguing that interdependence
is not a powerful constraint.111 Other analysts go further, arguing that globalization exacerbates financial volatility—which in turn
can lead to political instability and violence.112
A different counterargument is that the continued growth of interdependence will stall out. Since 2008, for example, the growth in
global trade flows has been muted, and global capital flows are still considerably smaller than they were in the pre-crisis era. In
trade, this reflects a pre-crisis trend. Between 1950 and 2000, trade grew, on average, more than twice as fast as global economic
output. In the 2000s, however, trade only grew about 30 percent more than output.113 In 2012 and 2013, trade grew less than
economic output. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that global flows as a percentage of output have fallen from 53 percent in
2007 to 39 percent in 2014.114 While the stock of interdependence remains high, the flow has slowed to a trickle. The Financial
Times has suggested that the global economy has hit “peak trade.”115
If economic growth continues to outstrip trade, then the level of interdependence will slowly decline, thereby weakening the liberal
constraint on great power conflicts. And there are several reasons to posit why interdependence might stall out. One possibility is
due to innovations reducing the need for traded goods. For example, in the last decade, higher energy prices in the United States
triggered investments into conservation, alternative forms of energy, and unconventional sources of hydrocarbons. All of these steps
reduced the U.S. demand for imported energy. A future in which compact fusion engines are developed would further reduce the
need for imported energy even more.116
A more radical possibility is the development of technologies that reduce the need for physical trade across borders. Digital
manufacturing will cause the relocation of production facilities closer to end-user markets, shortening the global supply chain.117 An
even more radical discontinuity would come from the wholesale diffusion of 3-D printing. The ability of a single printer to produce
multiple component parts of a larger manufactured good eliminates the need for a global supply chain. As Richard Baldwin notes,
“Supply chain unbundling is driven by a fundamental trade-off between the gains from specialization and the costs of dispersal. This
would be seriously undermined by radical advances in the direction of mass customization and 3D printing by sophisticated
machines…To put it sharply, transmission of data would substitute for transportation of goods.”118 As 3-D printing technology
improves, the need for large economies to import anything other than raw materials concomitantly declines.119
Geopolitical ambitions could reduce economic interdependence even further.120 Russia and China have territorial and quasi-
territorial ambitions beyond their recognized borders, and the United States has attempted to counter what it sees as revisionist
behavior by both countries. In a low-growth world, it is possible that leaders of either country would choose to prioritize
their nationalist ambitions over economic growth. More generally, it could be that the
expectation of future gains from interdependence—rather than existing levels of interdependence—constrains great power
bellicosity.121 If great powers expect that the future benefits of international trade and investment will wane, then commercial
constraints on revisionist behavior will lessen. All else equal, this increases the likelihood of great
power conflict going forward.
Economic collapse risks nuclear war

Mann 14 (Eric Mann is a special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic and international
counterintelligence and counter-terrorism experience. Worked as a special assistant for a U.S. Senator and served as a presidential
appointee for the U.S. Congress. He is currently responsible for an internal security and vulnerability assessment program.
Bachelors @ University of South Carolina, Graduate degree in Homeland Security @ Georgetown. “AUSTERITY, ECONOMIC
DECLINE, AND FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL SECURITY,” May 2014,
https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf)
The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can figure prominently
into the calculus for future conflicts. The findings also suggest that security issues with economic or
financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states
engage in hostile acts toward one another. The research shows that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the
inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing
states new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states.¶ The security areas, identified in the proceeding chapters, are
likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the
overlapping security issues associated with economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will affect
allied confidence in America’s security guarantees. The study shows that this outcome could
cause regional instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for
U.S. national security. Rival states and non-state groups may also become emboldened to challenge
America’s status in the unipolar international system.¶ The potential risks associated with stolen or loose
WMD, resulting from poor security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North
Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can
influence WMD proliferation by contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons
technology. The inherent vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state
groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to disrupt global finance and
perhaps weaken America’s status. A more ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing diversification of foreign
currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for international trade, or engaging financial warfare against the United
States.
Ext. LDC L
Climate refugees migrate to less developed and fragile economies, which
drives resource scarcity and overpopulation
Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi 2013-- Professor of Political Science at the University of Northern Iowa in Cedar Falls. ["Climate
Change, Sustainable Development, and Human Security: A Comparative Analysis", Accessible Online at:
https://catalog.princeton.edu/catalog/7958155] @ AG
However, neither these documents nor the UNFCCC provides explicit mechanisms for
accommodating large-scale movements of populations displaced by climate change,
highlighting wider normative questions about whether migration constitutes a viable
adaptation strategy. Chap- ter 17 of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (Adger et al., 2007: 736), for instance, suggests
that migration leading to the permanent abandonment of land and livelihood is not a desirable adaptation option. Moreover, as
noted earlier, national governments and international institutions are often strongly
predisposed against the idea of accommodating new populations displaced (either
permanently or temporarily) as a result of environmental and non-environmental factors. Moreover, there is
still a lack of consensus about what adaptation means, and how it should be applied to
existing decisions about future vulnerability and risk (cf. Burton 2004 [2009]; Huq and Reid 2004 [2009]; Moench 2007 [2009];
Peskett et al., 2009; Ayers and Huq, 2009; Brooks et al., 2009; Boyd et al., 2009).8 Although the UNFCCC provides a number of
Articles (4.1, 4.4, 4.8 and 4.9) that identify the ways in which parties to the Conven- tion may be expected to support adaptation, the
Convention lacks a precise definition that can be operationalized through the UNFCCC (Burton, 2004 [2009]). Similarly, although
the GEF has responsibility for assisting developing countries in the preparation of NAPA documents, neither its website nor its
brochure “Linking Adaptation to Development” (GEF 2007) provides a precise definition of what adaptation may entail. To
understand the ways in which migration has been defined and supported through the UNFCCC, a content analysis of the forty-seven
NAPAs currently listed on the UNFCCC website was used to establish: whether specific reference is made to migration in the NAPA
documents; whether migration is considered a form of adaptation; whether it is associated with “positive” or “negative” policy
outcomes, including for instance, urbanization, over-population and resource degradation; and whether there is a specific policy
statement in the NAPA aiming to support migration. Table 4.1 presents the results of the survey, which reveal that of the forty- seven
NAPAs currently eligible for LDC funding, only two (Sao Tome and Principe and Tanzania) describe migration in positive terms.
Twelve NAPAs (including, surprisingly, the Maldives) make absolutely no reference to migration; the remaining thirty-three
describe migration in terms of the threat it poses to resource scarcity, urban crowding, agrarian conflicts (involving primarily
herders and farmers) and social stability. Among many of the NAPAs, a common concern is that climate
change will
exacerbate resource scarcities and population pressures, thereby fueling a vicious
cycle in which migration leads to additional resource degradation, chronic poverty, and
ultimately some form of social breakdown. The following quotation from Uganda’s NAPA (2007: 37) captures
the essence of this concern: If affected communities have no option for coping with climate-
induced stress, especially in drought-prone areas then, victims migrate to urban areas or
resource-endowed neighbourhoods . . . In the protected areas such as the national parks and game reserves, these
negative aspects of the strategy are more pronounced . . . In the pastoral communities where
livestock is the major source of food, migration of the men (family leaders) with the livestock herds in
search of water and pasture often leaves the family behind more vulnerable to famine. Similarly, Sudan
(2007: 45) highlights the problems that can arise when . . . local farmers are unable to harvest during the rainy season but equally
unable to harvest during summers where climate variability produces drought, many are forced to migrate to find more suitable
land, resulting in tribal confrontation over land resources and internal displacement.9 In
almost every instance
migration is being conceptualized in terms of the threats and vulnerabilities it poses to
societies, ecosystems, and migrants themselves. In almost no instances is it characterized as a means of
diversifying or improving livelihoods and income sources, understat- ing dramatically the very large literature that now exists on
migration, remittances, and poverty reduction (cf. de Haan 1999; Perch-Nielson et al., 2008; de Sherbinin et al., 2008; Barnett and
Webber 2010).=
Ext. Impact
Economic decline leads to nuclear war
Stein Tønnesson 15, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala
University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311
Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current
understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and
economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four
conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit
and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but
asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may
generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase
the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the
interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war
between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could
drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in
Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global
system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions
for war and peace are
taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International
relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers
to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If
leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to
seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on
external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to
gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred
by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift
could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.
Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war.
As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make
provocative moves. The
greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present
circumstances but
that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways
that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading
relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and
exacerbating nationalist emotions. This
could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security,
with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from
Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two
great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war,
or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.
Economic decline threatens US credibility and economic leadership, makes

war likely
Haass 2017 – President of CFR
Richard, A World in Disarray, Penguin Press, p. conclusion
The strategic consequences of growing indebtedness are many and worrisome. The need to finance the debt will
absorb an ever-increasing number of dollars and an ever-increasing share of the U.S.
budget. This will mean that proportionately fewer resources will be available for national security,
including defense, intelligence, homeland security, and foreign assistance. There will as well be fewer dollars
available for discretionary domestic programs ranging from education and
infrastructure modernization to scientific research and law enforcement. What this portends is an increasingly
sharp and destructive debate over guns versus butter while the two fastest-growing parts of the budget, debt service and
entitlements, remain largely off-limits.
Mounting debt will raise questions around the world about the United States. U.S. inability
to deal with its debt
challenge will detract from the appeal of the American political and economic model. It will make
others less likely to want to emulate the United States and more wary of depending on it as it will raise questions about this country’s
ability to come together and take difficult decisions. The
result will be a world less democratic and
increasingly less deferential to U.S. concerns in matters of security. To some extent this is already
happening; U.S. failure to deal with its debt promises to accelerate a worrisome evolution .
Mounting debt will leave the United States more vulnerable than it should be to the whims of
markets and the machinations of governments. Already nearly half of U.S. public debt is held by foreigners,
with China one of the two largest lenders. It is of course possible that China will be constrained by its stake in not seeing its own
huge pool of dollars lose its value and by its need for the United States to continue to buy its exports. The
result, according to
this line of thinking, is the financial equivalent of nuclear deterrence. This may be true, but I
for one am not sanguine that China would not decide to slow or stop accumulating U.S.
debt as a signal of displeasure or even to sell debt amid, say, a crisis over Taiwan or one
involving its claims in the South or East China seas. In such circumstances, Chinese leaders
might well judge it to be worth paying a financial price to protect what they viewed as
their vital national interests. Interestingly, it was American threats aimed at the pound sterling that more than
anything else persuaded a British government that was fearful of the need to devalue its currency to back off its ill-fated venture to
regain control of the Suez Canal in 1956.
Mounting debt
could absorb funds that could otherwise be usefully invested at home or
abroad. This will in turn depress already modest levels of economic growth. Making matters worse
is that high levels of debt and debt financing will increase concerns about the government’s willingness to maintain the dollar’s value
or, worse yet, meet its obligations. This will cause foreigners in particular to demand high returns on their loans, something that will
increase the cost of debt financing and further crowd out other spending and depress growth. This is a vicious, not a virtuous, cycle.
Mounting debt limits American flexibility and resilience. There is no way of stating in the
abstract what constitutes the right level of debt for the country or knowing with
precision what level is sustainable. But the United States does not want to make high levels of debt the new normal,
if only because it removes flexibility if, for example, there were to be another financial crisis that required
large-scale fiscal stimulus or a major national security challenge that demanded a costly
response. Keeping debt levels low enough to allow for a surge without triggering a debt
crisis seems to be a prudent hedge and, as is the case with preventive medicine or insurance, worth paying a reasonable premium
for.
Let me just add one more prediction. Mounting

debt will hasten the demise of the dollar as the world’s
reserve currency. This will happen due to loss of confidence in U.S. financial
management and the related concern that what the United States will need to do to
finance its debt will be at odds with what it should be doing to manage the domestic and,
indirectly, world economy. It is possible that such a move away from the dollar would have happened were it not for the
EU’s problems and China not being prepared to free up the yuan. Granted, there is no alternative to the dollar on the immediate
horizon, but the United States cannot depend forever on the weaknesses and errors of others, and a
postdollar world will
be both more costly (as it will require the United States to move in and out of other currencies) and one of less
leverage when it comes to imposing dollar-related sanctions.
-- Impact – Ethics
LDC economic collapse is a self-replicating exploitation of wealth disparity
that must be rejected
Karan et al 16 (Abraar Karan, Daniel DeUgarte, and Michele Barry, July 2016, Dr. Abraar Karan is an internal medicine
resident at the Brigham and Women's Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Daniel DeUgarte, MD, is Co-Director of the Global
Health Education Programs at the UCLA Center for World Health. He is an Associate Clinical Professor of Surgery in the Division of
Pediatric Surgery at the David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, Michele Barry is SENIOR ASSOCIATE DEAN, GLOBAL
HEALTH, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR INNOVATION IN GLOBAL HEALTH, PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE (PRIMARY CARE &
POPULATION HEALTH), SENIOR FELLOW AT THE WOODS INSTITUTE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND AT THE FREEMAN
SPOGLI INSTITUTE, “Medical “Brain Drain” and Health Care Worker Shortages: How Should International Training Programs
Respond?”, http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/07/ecas1-1607.html) MKIM
the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that 23 health

To contextualize the importance of the problem,
care workers per 10,000 people is the minimum ratio needed to maintain a health
system—and as of 2013, 80 countries worldwide fell short of this threshold level of care [3]. The
disparity is most pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa, which is home to 14 percent of the world’s population
but only 3 percent of its health care professionals [3]. A study of the world’s medical schools found that the majority of countries
Perhaps
with the greatest need for physicians (almost all of which were in sub-Saharan Africa) had only one medical school [4].
the most concerning aspect of medical brain drain is its self-reinforcing impact on
health care systems that are already weak: as a health care system weakens, bright
physicians and health care workers tend to leave; the more who leave, the more the health care
system is weakened. A number of studies have quantified factors that propel physician migration from source countries:
access to better training opportunities, higher salaries, need to escape political instability and corruption, poor quality of facilities
and equipment, and plans for raising children [5-8]. Conversely, factors that influence physician retention in the destination
countries include strong and robust health systems and political stability, which tend to facilitate improved lifestyles and
opportunities for physicians and their families. Presumably, Dr. R’s US-based training program invests in him to improve his
surgical skills not only for his individual benefit but also for the benefit of his home community and his country. As part of his
participation in the program, there might be an expectation, if not an obligation, that he will transfer his medical skill acquisition to
Africa is currently afflicted by a significant
other surgeons and surgeon assistants in Nigeria. Sub-Saharan
dearth of surgeons, which is exacerbated by surgeons’ emigration and the limited training
capacity for surgeons who stay in the region [5]. An analysis by Tankwanchi et al. using the 2011 American Medical Association
Physician Masterfile of residency and graduation data from all US trainees found an increase in physician emigration to the United
States from every sub-Saharan African country except South Africa [9]. Figure 1 shows the number of physicians per 100,000 people
worldwide, based on data from the WHO’s 2006 report [10].Given this evidence of disparities in access to
physicians, one might argue that the investment of Dr. R’s home country in his training suggests an
obligation, both contractual and ethical, on the part of Dr. R. not to exacerbate that disparity. However, Dr.
R’s case is not quite as straightforward as that of an individual obliged to a particular program or community. Although Dr. R might
have applied to participate in the program with an intention to return and practice in Nigeria, we cannot ignore the impact that his
experience in the United States could have on his perceptions of his professional potential. After being exposed to a health system
with many opportunities, advanced technologies, high salaries, and fair patient burden, Dr. R’s vision for his own career might
reasonably shift. If the training experience contributes to his possibly changing personal and professional goals, might we consider
those goal changes to be ethically fraught? This is another important question in the case. Medical Brain Drain as Exploitation of
public investment in health care professionals in resource-
Wealth Disparities Particularly problematic is that
poor countries tends to be greater than in wealthier ones, probably due to the relative
cost of educating each individual physician. A study in Kenya estimated that the total cost of
educating a physician from primary school until earning a medical degree was nearly $66,000 USD and
the loss of return on investments if the physician did not return to the source area to practice was over
$517,000 USD [12]. Estimates suggest that, annually, emigration of health care workers from sub-Saharan Africa costs the
region $2.17 billion USD [13]. While it is important to account for the remittances that are sent back to the source country by
emigrants, it is difficult to quantify how much of this money is recirculated in the home economy [13]. By contrast, the areas to
which these doctors move are spared the cost of their medical education, benefiting instead by the influx of an educated health care
These consequences suggest that medical brain drain is an
workforce.
important kind of exploitation of wealth disparity and a source of
ethical and justice-based concerns [14].
Answering Counterplans
AT//CPs that Solve Warming
Can’t stop warming and there are all sorts of other factors that cause
climate refugee inflows
Migration is driven by a number of factors that are interrelated and often

conjoined with the problems of social and economic privilege. Listed below are the principal drivers of climate
refugee populations [are]: 1. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, and droughts. 2.
Development projects that involve changes in the environment. Specifically, this refers to dam
and irrigation projects, nuclear power plants, and industrial accidents. 3. Environmental
problems caused by population growth. 4. Slow climate changes: agricultural failure,
deforestation, and desertification. 5. Conflicts or wars caused by environmental change. 6.
Economic distress.
AT//Temporary/Parole CP
TPS fails for climate refugees – it fails to achieve certainty and allows the
Trump administration to track and deport migrants
Barrett 18- Sarah Elizabeth Barrett is a global health research assistant for the University of Vermont
which is comprised of acting as a liaison between refugee-focused healthcare providers in the Burlington
area and undergraduate students at UVM, facilitating Service-Learning partnerships between these
service providers and students, working to catalog and produce informational guides on best practices for
students interested in engaging in work related to refugees, migrants, and New Americans, and
researching global health issues affecting refugees and displaced persons. “Seeking Asylum Across the
International Boundary: Legal Terms and Geopolitical Conditions of Irregular Border Crossing and
Asylum Seeking between the United States and Canada, 2016 – 2018”, April 18, 2018, Global and
Regional Studies Program, http://spatializingmigration.net/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Barett_Thesis.pdf, 43-46 // Suraj P
Because TPS does not confer any form of citizenship, permanent residency, or any right
to ongoing immigration status, these populations revert to their prior immigration
status upon the expiry of their program (Messick & Bergeron, 2014). Herein is the production of populations in
need of protection noted earlier in this chapter. While these former TPS recipients have a vested interest in continuing their lives in
the US, the
impending risk of detention or deportation can act to motivate these
populations to cross the border into Canada. This is in part because life in Canada may retain some degree of
normalcy for these former beneficiaries and their children when compared to the alternative of return to a developing country of
origin -- either through self-deportation or deportation by USCIS. Voluntary
repatriation is presented by the
US government as the natural next step for former beneficiaries upon termination of
their TPS status. This proposal, however, is impractical for a number of reasons. Perhaps
most notable, in consideration of pragmatic decision-making on the part of these former beneficiaries, is the nature of their strong
personal, familial, and economic ties to the US. Between six to ten percent of TPS recipients are married to a legal resident of the US.
TPS beneficiaries who have lived in the US for over 20 years as well as those who arrived as children themselves are closely linked
and tightly embedded in the US, presumably more so than they are to their countries of origin because these beneficiaries have spent
the better part of their lives establishing social and familial ties to the US. The
statistical portrait of TPS
beneficiaries reveals a hard-working population who are deeply embedded
in the US (Warren & Kerwin, 2017; Menjívar, 2017). In addition to social and familial connections, TPS beneficiaries have
substantial economic ties and obligations in the US. The labor force participation rate for TPS populations ranges from 81-88
percent (well above the rate for the total US population [63 percent] and the foreign-born population [66 percent]). About 27,100 of
those in the labor force are self-employed and have created jobs for both themselves and others. TPS recipients live in over 206,000
households, almost one-half of which have mortgages. More than one-half of TPS beneficiaries have health insurance in the US
(Warren & Kerwin, 2017). Families
and individuals who have built lives for themselves in the US
over the past ten to twenty years are simply not likely to return themselves to a resource
constrained state. This is especially valid in consideration of the high proportion of TPS
recipients who are the parents of US citizen children. A return to their country of origin
would almost certainly represent the splitting of tens of thousands of families as
these children have evidently better prospects for education and employment should
they remain in the US. While TPS termination notices from the DHS delay the effective date of termination to “provide
time for individuals with TPS to arrange for their departure or to seek an alternative lawful immigration status in the US, if eligible”
(Nielsen Announcement on El Salvador, 2018), the latter proves very difficult for beneficiaries of TPS (Chishti et al., 2017). As
TPS itself is a provisional protection against deportation, many TPS beneficiaries
entered the US illegally. This fact limits all legal avenues towards an alternative legal
status and negates most options for adjustment of immigration status (Chishti et al., 2017). This
issue was taken to court in February 2018 when the AIC, NIRP, and several TPS holders filed a class action lawsuit against officials
at the DHS and USCIS challenging “the government’s unlawful practice of depriving [TPS beneficiaries] … from becoming lawful
permanent residents” (AIC, 2018; Moreno v. Nielsen 2018). For the majority of TPS recipients who entered the US unlawfully, the
ineligibility to seek an alternative lawful immigration status in the US leaves few options available. For
many, migrating
to a third country is a more feasible option than either remaining in the US illegally or
returning to their country of origin (Chishti et al., 2017). Herein is the push factor driving these populations across
the border in search of protection. Fleeing to Canada in search of asylum proves a more feasible option than remaining in the US
given the limited legal avenues to adjust to an alternative legal status. Remaining in the US as an undocumented immigrant is a high
risk option for three key reasons. First, TPS
recipients’ work authorization has been
publically revoked through the widely televised TPS termination reports;
second, arrests and deportations of undocumented immigrants from the interior of the US
are rising under the Trump administration (Sacchetti [Washington Post], 2017); and third, TPS
recipients are registered with USCIS, meaning that their personal information
could easily be used for purposes of tracking and arrest. President Trump campaigned
on a platform prioritizing a legislative crackdown on illegal immigration. While the
Trump administration’s stated chief goal is to deport criminals, it is arresting and
deporting significant numbers of people who never committed any crimes beyond
entering the US without the proper documentation for a legal arrival. From January to September
9, 2017, ICE deported a total of 142,818 immigrants from the border and the U.S. interior, including 59,564 of these noncriminal
noncitizens (Sacchetti [Washington Post], 2017). When asked about the deportation of these undocumented but otherwise law-
abiding immigrants, Thomas Homan, President Trump’s nominee for director of US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
made his position clear: “I get asked a lot why we arrest somebody that’s not a criminal, [but] those who do enter the country
illegally … violate the law. That is a criminal act” (Bendix [The Atlantic], 2017). While levels of deportation rose under the Obama
administration, this enforcement targeted criminals convicted of what the DHS defines as “serious crimes” and the deportation of
unauthorized border crossers who had recently entered the US (Chishti et al., 2017). Now, however, the enforcement
policies of the Trump administration focus instead on the interior, putting former TPS
recipients at high risk of detention or deportation upon the end-date of their status. While
this social and political environment puts any and all undocumented immigrants at high risk of arrest or deportation, former-
TPS beneficiaries are at an intensely increased risk because the DHS has all
of their personal data on-file. As such these populations will be very easy to track for purposes of arrest,
detention, and deportation at the whim of the current administration. Coupled with the politically charged and public nature of the
TPS terminations, populations
formerly protected by TPS may either risk remaining in the US
as undocumented immigrants or migrate to a third country to seek asylum. In
consideration of geographic and socioeconomic limits, Canada is the only safe third
country accessible to these populations.
Temporary admission doesn’t solve certainty and is subject to legal
challenges
Gauthier 16 (Matthew, law student at the University of North Carolina, Climate Refugees and International Law: Legal
Frameworks and Proposals in the US and Abroad, http://studentorgs.law.unc.edu/documents/elp/2016/m_gauthier.pdf//waters)
As discussed above, any

international agreement would have a limited effect on the United
States unless it is adopted and implemented at the national level. Furthermore, some have argued
that even if the United States adopted an international regime, it would not be likely to have the full desired effect.18 Some argue
that for the United States to have any affect on the environmental migration situation, it would need to adopt its own protocol.19
Without any legislative action, the United States has several methods of allowing
increased environmental migration.20 These include, but are not limited to: (1) temporary
protected status granted by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security;21 (2) prosecutorial
discretion by the executive branch not to pursue cases against environmental migrants;22 (3)
parole granted by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security or executive
branch allowing environmental migrants to remain in the United States;23 and, (4)
withholding of removal, preventing the return of an individual to another sovereign nation where they may be
persecuted.24 The downsides of mechanisms such as granting parole is that they
are largely temporary and not without various legal challenges.25 Thus, at this point,
environmental refugees are left with limited options in the United States.26
Absent a legal claim to refugee status grounded in the existing UN Convention, climate refugees have only limited
options in the United States for refugee or asylum claims. Moreover, measures like prosecutorial
discretion are not without legal challenges. For example, in 2014 President Obama announced a program to
use prosecutorial discretion to not prosecute individuals who had unlawfully migrated to the US as minors as well as undocumented
parents of U.S. citizens and legal residents.27 In
just over a year, legal challenges to the use of
prosecutorial discretion have arisen around the country, with courts conflicted on the legality of deferred
action.28 Given that the Obama Administration’s use of prosecutorial discretion has currently been enjoined29 pending an appeal to
the Supreme Court, any attempt to expand it would need to overcome existing hurdles as well as likely novel challenges. There
is one final important characteristic of US immigration law to consider. The
US (as well as other nations) could unilaterally change its definition of
“refugee” to include climate refugees.30 With or without the international community, the US could
choose to allow climate refugees under its existing immigration framework. This option will become more viable
if the movement toward an international framework continues to falter. Of course, this would
likely require legislative action by Congress.31 Senator Brian Schatz of Hawaii attempted to add a climate refugee amendment to a
comprehensive immigration reform bill Congress considered in 2013.32 This amendment would have allowed the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security to designate certain climate refuges as stateless persons, thus
entitling those
persons to conditional lawful status while applying for permanent resident status.33
However, Congress did not adopt this reform bill.34 At this point, any further change in US policy on climate migration is unlikely35
Temporary status fails – uncertainty, withheld public benefits

One option for climate migrants who move to the United States is temporary protected
status (TPS). Under TPS, the Secretary of DHS 134 may grant temporary legal status
and work authorization to immigrants for a predetermined period of time. 135 The Secretary
may extend this period so long as the conditions that initially led to the designation persist. 136 Since TPS designation
applies explicitly in cases of natural disasters, it would appear to be the ideal tool to
grant climate migrants legal status in the United States. 137 In fact, the United States extended TPS to
Haitians who lived in the United States after the devastating earthquake of 2010.138 However, TPS has many
shortcomings and limitations that render it insufficient for climate
migrants' particular circumstances. The most obvious limitation is that TPS only
applies to individuals already present in the United States. 139 TPS would not
cover someone attempting to enter the country at the border after fleeing her home in
the wake of a severe or continuous climate event. 140 Thus, by definition, this legal status
does not extend to climate migrants. However, even climate migrants already in the country will find fault with
this form of relief. The Secretary may affirmatively grant TPS status to nations or groups of citizens from those nations that are
suffering hardship after a significant climate event. 141 The Secretary may deem it appropriate to designate a country eligible for TPS
pursuant to section 244 of the INA, but she is not required to do so, and a country may not affirmatively apply for TPS.142
Further, the Secretary has explicit authority to decline to designate a country under
section 244, even if it is suffering severe and adverse effects from climate change. 143
Even if a certain nation receives TPS designation under INA section 244, it still leaves
permanently displaced climate migrants, such as nationals of inundated island nations,
insecure because TPS status may be revoked as a discretionary matter. 144 TPS
has a number of other limitations as well. First, while aliens are designated under TPS,
they may not travel freely outside the country, they are not considered to be
permanently residing in the United States under color of law, and states may
choose to withhold public benefits from them. 145 Second, the initial designation of
TPS for any nation lasts between six and eighteen months, although the Secretary may
extend this period if country conditions persist. 146 The Secretary may revoke this status
at any time upon a finding that country conditions no longer call for a designation under
Section 244.147 Finally, Congress may choose to extend lawful permanent residence to
TPS beneficiaries upon the expiration of their status, but this requires a
supermajority of the Senate. 148 As a result, climate migrants would remain
uncertain of the duration of their work authorization and legal status in
this country. Because of its temporary, discretionary nature and limited scope, TPS is
insufficient to address the potentially large and diverse influx of climate
migrants.
Parole is insufficient -- no benefits and is subject to Congressional
discretion
DeGenaro 15 (Carey, J.D. Candidate at the University of Colorado, Looking Inward: Domestic Policy for Climate Change
Refugees in the United States and Beyond, http://lawreview.colorado.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/11.-86.3-
DeGenaro_Final.pdf//waters)
Parole is a legal fiction whereby aliens who are already present in the United States unlawfully are allowed to remain, and are treated
as if they crossed the border lawfully.159 The DHS Secretary may grant parole to individuals who do not meet the definition of a
refugee if there is a “compelling reason in the public interest” to do so, or for urgent humanitarian reasons.160 The executive branch
may also use parole to admit otherwise ineligible immigrants, though Congress has attempted to limit this authority with language
requiring a compelling reason for granting parole.161 For climate migrants, parole suffers from
many of the same downfalls as TPS and prosecutorial discretion. Not only is it
temporary, it is discretionary and does not confer on a beneficiary the same
rights to which a lawful permanent resident or citizen would be entitled.162
This form of relief is not widely granted, and is typically limited to exceptional circumstances.163 Notably, even if the
President grants parole to an entire population, Congress retains the authority to grant
or withhold that population’s adjustment of status to lawful permanent residents.164 If
Congress chooses not to pass legislation allowing for adjustment, the grant expires once the humanitarian crisis or purpose of the
parole has subsided.165 Additionally, since parole is at its core a form of prosecutorial discretion, any challenge to the executive’s
authority to favor certain groups over others using this legal tool will cast its legitimacy into doubt.166 Therefore,
parole is also insufficient to address incoming climate migrants in a
consistent, efficient, and certain manner.
Parole fails – discretionary, limited benefits, no legal status
3. Parole
Parole is a legal fiction whereby aliens who are already present in the United States
unlawfully are allowed to remain, and are treated as if they crossed the border lawfully.
159 The DHS Secretary may grant parole to individuals who do not meet the definition of a refugee if there is a "compelling reason in
the public interest" to do so, or for urgent humanitarian reasons.160 The
executive branch may also use parole
to admit otherwise ineligible immigrants, though Congress has attempted to limit this
authority with language requiring a compelling reason for granting parole. 161 For climate
migrants, parole suffers from many of the same downfalls as TPS and prosecutorial
discretion. Not only is it temporary, it is discretionary and does not confer on a
beneficiary the same rights to which a lawful permanent resident or citizen
would be entitled. 162 This form of relief is not widely granted, and is typically limited to exceptional circumstances.
163 Notably, even if the President grants parole to an entire population, Congress retains
the authority to grant or withhold that population's adjustment of status to
lawful permanent residents. 164 If Congress chooses not to pass legislation allowing for
adjustment, the grant expires once the humanitarian crisis or purpose of the parole has
subsided. 165 Additionally, since parole is at its core a form of prosecutorial discretion,
any challenge to the executive's authority to favor certain groups over others using this
legal tool will cast its legitimacy into doubt. 166 Therefore, parole is also insufficient to
address incoming climate migrants in a consistent, efficient, and certain manner.
AT//Prosecutorial Discretion CP
Prosecutorial discretion doesn’t solve – uncertainty, fear of deportation
Prosecutorial discretion is a decision on the part of the executive branch not to target
certain unlawful aliens for removal if a substantial interest will not be served by
pursuing the case. 149 In both 2011 and 2012, DHS issued memos calling for prosecutorial discretion on the part of
immigration officers. 1 50 President Obama used this legal tool in 2012 to offer relief from deportation to undocumented aliens who
were brought into the country at a young age and met certain criteria.1 51 As with President Obama's Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals, an explicit grant of prosecutorial discretion acts as the executive branch's promise not to deport an individual. 152 A grant
of prosecutorial discretion affords an alien work authorization, either automatically or after she submits an application. 153 While
prosecutorial discretion has many benefits, there are major challenges to using this
legal mechanism to solve the plight of climate migrants. First, like TPS, it is
temporary in nature. 154 The executive branch's application of prosecutorial discretion is
subject to judicial challenge based on political differences between the legislative and
executive branches of government. 155 Second, this form of relief is a policy but not a
law; the government does not guarantee that an individual will be safe from
deportation. 156 Finally, aliens receive limited legal rights under prosecutorial discretion. 157 The memo that outlined the
President's deferred action program explicitly acknowledged that it does not grant legal status. 158 Although it may be
used to benefit a large group of aliens-unlike refugee law which is applied case-by-case-
it nevertheless fails to adequately address climate migrants' legal status. Therefore,
prosecutorial discretion is both fleeting and uncertain.
AT//Withhold Removal CP
Withholding of removal doesn’t encompass climate migrants – places
unnecessarily high burdens
4. Withholding of Removal
Another option, withholding of removal, is related to refugee law's principle of

nonrefoulement, which suggests that a sovereign nation must not return an individual
to another sovereign nation if she is likely to suffer persecution. 167 Withholding of
removal requires the applicant to show that it is "more likely than not" that she will
suffer persecution upon return to her home country on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 168 This is a
higher burden than an applicant for asylum must meet, and therefore involves
overcoming the same challenges for climate change refugees. 169 As discussed above,
refugee and asylum law are unlikely to apply to climate migrants. Thus, withholding of
removal is also an inadequate legal tool for climate migrants. Ultimately, the suite of
immigration tools available today does not encompass climate migrants. These
individuals do not clearly fall under any legal status in the United States. Although individuals
may be able to use refugee law or parole to enter the country on a case-by-case basis, the current legal framework offers little
flexibility to address large populations of climate migrants forced to leave their homes. The next question, then, is why and how the
country must change its piecemeal approach to climate migrants and what elements it should consider in drafting domestic
legislation.
AT//Intl CPs – General “US Key”
The US is key – they can harness the effectiveness of RCM member states
The United States must continue to work with the RCM and lead the effort to create a new RCM Guide
that offers protections for climate refugees. As a majority of climate refugees coming to the United
States will be arriving from the Americas, utilizing regional agreements will be in
the best interest of all RCM member countries and the United States. With the
previously mentioned climate refugee visa program, the United States can utilize their membership as an
RCM country to strengthen relationships with other member countries. This will allow
the U.S. to assist in establishing programs in other member countries to review climate
refugees’ cases and expedite the time for admission in new countries. The United States can
also work with other member countries to actually reduce the amount of individuals
who are seeking refuge within the United States itself. The United States can provide resources and
information to other member countries to improve their infrastructure, which can
combat some of the effects of climate change. They can also assist countries that to not
currently have the resources or structures to support large amount of climate refugees,
such as Mexico, in establishing new programs and policies. This will allow for more
climate refugees settling in other nations and less of a direct reliance on the
United States to provide all support. In order to maximize this regional body, the United
States must lead the effort to create a legally binding document that will thoroughly address all aspect of
providing legal protections to climate refugees in the Americas. This type of legally binding regional document will also
reduce the amount of climate refugees migrating to the United States, as other regions
around the world may be stimulated to adapt similar policy allowing for
less reliance on the United States alone.
Multilateral treaties fail – political hurdles, lack of complexity

Warren 16 Phillip Dane Warren is a JD Candidate at Columbia Law School (Phillip Dane,
“FORCED MIGRATION AFTER PARIS COP21: EVALUATING THE “CLIMATE CHANGE
DISPLACEMENT COORDINATION FACILITY” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 116, No. 8) // SR
B. MULTILATERAL TREATY PROPOSALS
Having discussed and dismissed an amending Protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention, this next section explores
another possibility: a multilateral treaty. Various commenters have discussed the possibility of drafting such a
treaty to address climate migration, though at present there seems to be little international momentum to do so.162 This section
evaluates the prospects of a multilateral treaty.163
1. Leading Multilateral Treaty Proposals. — Similar to the 1951 Refugee Convention, one
could imagine a multilateral treaty (independent of the UNFCCC) to address climate
change migration.164 A multilateral treaty, defined as an agreement “between three or
more states,”165 could bridge the existing legal gaps by providing protected rights for
climate change migrants (presumably mirroring the provisions in the 1951 Refugee Convention’s grant of
nonrefoulement protection and providing basic human rights, such as access to the judiciary and public education).166 A new
multilateral treaty could be specifically tailored to climate change migrants and avoid
conflict with the existing refugee community.
Very early discussions in this area advocated for a cap-and-trade mech--anism that
would allow countries to trade allocations of displaced people.167 Although the most developed
treaty proposals discussed below abandon that approach, the concept of a cap-and-trade mechanism in this area is not particularly
surprising—cap-and-trade is commonly discussed as a possible strategy to cut emissions.168 More recently, some have suggested
that a treaty could allocate climate migrants based on historical emissions,169 mirroring the concept of “common but
differentiated responsibilities” found in the UNFCCC.170
Professors Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas,171 Professors Bonnie Docherty and Tyler Giannini,172 and Professor David
Hodgkinson et al.173 have developed the most comprehensive multilateral treaty proposals in the literature,174 but none provide
the right combination of feasibility and comprehensiveness to adequately protect climate change migrants, and none of these
commenters wrote with the benefit of current trends.
Professors Biermann and Boas focus primarily on what Professor Katrina Wyman calls
the “funding gap” by emphasizing internal displacement funding.175 Professors Biermann and
Boas treat the issue as primarily one of development policy, focusing their proposed protocol on providing financial assistance to
domestic resettlement programs in the form of a “Climate Refugee Protection and Resettlement Fund.”176 While the proposal
carefully reasons through the importance of provid-ing funding for those displaced, by treating the issue as one of devel-opment
policy and financial support alone, Biermann and Boas do not address the principle of nonrefoulement or cross-border
displace-ment to any substantial degree. Their proposal defines the group in question underinclusively and then focuses primarily
on funding domestic resettlement.177
In contrast, Professors
Docherty and Giannini and Professor Hodgkinson et al. support a
rights-based approach with expansive protections for climate migrants. Both
approaches argue for a binding multilateral agreement that would provide
nonrefoulement protection for those displaced by climate change (modeled after the 1951
Convention),178 with rights expanding over time.179
While both focus primarily on extending rights to those displaced, the two proposals do contain a few marked differences. Professors
Docherty and Giannini explicitly limit their focus to cross-border dis-place-ment,180 while Professor Hodgkinson et al. recognize
that the majority of displacement will remain internal and envision a “Climate Change Displacement Fund” to support internally
displaced persons.181 Professors Docherty and Giannini argue broadly for the creation of a new international agency to protect the
human rights of those displaced by climate change, modeled after the UNHCR.182 Professor Hodgkinson et al. more explicitly
develop the institutional structure of their newly minted “Climate Change Displacement Organization.”183 Finally, Professor
Hodgkinson et al. recognize the special position of small island states and suggest that these nations could negotiate bilateral
agreements with neighboring countries based on proximity, self-determination, and cul-ture.184 While both treaty proposals
admirably attempt to create broad, rights-based protections for migrants, both would likely fail due to feasibility issues and lack of
comprehensiveness.
2. Evaluation of Multilateral Treaty Options. — An

independent multilateral treaty that creates rights
and funding protections for climate change migrants would likely fail for a number
of reasons. First, such a treaty would prove difficult (if not impossible) to negotiate, and nego-tiations would likely move
incredibly slowly.185 Climate-related migration is sufficiently imminent that those who will be
displaced (at least in part) by climate change cannot wait for the development of a complex
international architecture with rights-based protections.186 Second, multilateral treaties
often provide only the “lowest common denominator” solution to a problem.187 Given
both time and political constraints, efforts to secure the full scope of refugee-like rights
for climate migrants would likely fail. Third, a rights-based treaty would encounter
substantial (and likely insurmountable) political hurdles in the United States.188 Instead,
this Note argues for a regional approach to the problem, coordinated by an existing international architecture, that would provide
the optimal protection for migrants.
Additionally, the incredibly complex causation problems in climate migration would
likely prove far too much for a massive multilateral instrument to manage. In order for
someone to attain “refugee-like” status under such an agreement, a decisionmaker
would have the impos-sible task of determining that climate change caused a specific
event and then pinning an individual migrant’s decision to move on that specific event (in
a situation in which poverty and other factors likely played a role).189 Defining a workable “status” under a
multilateral treaty might require narrowing the scope of those covered to cross-border
displace-ment or disappearing states, for example. Narrowing the scope in this way would inevitably fail to
provide adequate protection for all those affected by climate change displacement, as most of those displaced will move internally, at
least at first.190
Due to the feasibility and comprehensiveness concerns discussed above, a multilateral

treaty that focuses on expansive rights protections (like the 1951 Refugee Convention)
would not fully protect climate migrants. Instead, this Note argues for a regional approach to the problem,
coordinated through the existing structure of the United Nations, that would provide the optimal protection for climate change
migrants.
The next two cards are for a potential counterplan
International treaties fail and hinder process – the US must take immediate
action on climate migrants
A. An International Treaty?
Some scholars argue that climate migrants should be protected under an international
treaty. A treaty would require signatories to resolve a number of issues, including how to
define climate migrants, and what type of international mechanism would best address
the issues they face. These international debates help inform the national discussion. Accordingly, this Comment discusses
them briefly below.
1. Finding a Workable Definition
The international treaty discussion includes a debate over how to define climate migrants that could be very useful in the United
States. The notion of an "environmental refugee" is generally credited to Essam El-Hinnawi of the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP).204 El-Hinnawi proposed the following definition:
[T]hose people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked
environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality
of their life [sic]. By 'environmental disruption' in this definition is meant any physical, chemical and/or biological changes in the
ecosystem (or the resource base) that render it, temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support human life. 205
Although El-Hinnawi's was the first definition of its kind, it has not settled the debate
over who should be included.20 6 Scholars point to at least five broad points of debate: (1)
whether relocation is forced or voluntary,207 (2) whether relocation is temporary or
permanent, 20 8 (3) whether the relocation is within the home country or crosses
national borders, 20 9 (4) whether the environmental harm causing the migration was
anthropogenic or not,210 and (5) whether the environmental harm was gradual or
sudden. 211 There is no consensus on how nations should resolve these issues. Notably, the international community has not
reached a consensus regarding even the proper term to use to describe individuals and populations that relocate as a result of
climate change. 212 This question has framed the international debate over who should receive protection as a climate migrant, and
it will also frame the debate in the United States.
2. Proposals Under International Refugee Law
As in domestic law, refugee law is an area of international law that may be a useful tool
for climate migrants. The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol outline the
law on international refugees.21 3 The Convention defines a refugee as someone who:
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result
of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.214
The Convention also specifies the basic rights of refugees and the obligations of host
nations.215 These include access to education, the right to travel freely with travel
documents issued by the host nation, access to the judicial system, and the right to
work.216 Additionally, host nations agree not to expel or return refugees to their home
country. 217 Despite the issues with refugee law as a solution for climate migrants in the United States discussed in Part II, at
least one proposal suggests that the rights of climate change refugees should be outlined
as a protocol under the United Nations Refugee Convention of 1951 or perhaps added as
an amendment to the 1967 Protocol. 218
3. Proposals Under International Environmental Law
Scholars have also considered basing protection for climate migrants on the
international environmental law regime. The leading proposal would adopt a protocol under the UNFCCC. 219
Yet another proposal calls for a distinct United Nations International Convention.220
Most environmental-law-based proposals share several features.22 1 First, they
presuppose that a top-down agreement set up and enforced by an organization rather
than by individual nations according to their own standards, or a treaty with
international participation is the best way to approach climate change.222 Second, they
recognize that a working definition of climate change refugees must be settled on in
order to move forward in this process. 223 Third, the proposals have a sense of urgency, suggesting that scholars
believe mass migration will occur, and that it will happen soon.224 Last, most scholars insist that participation by individual
sovereign nations, which have failed to implement domestic precautionary measures, is essential to the development of a
comprehensive legal regime that protects the rights of climate migrants.225
B. The Failure of International Solutions
The Montreal Protocol's success in eliminating ozonedepleting substances convinced many that an international treaty would be the
best way to solve climate change and greenhouse gas emissions.226 As Professor William Boyd explained in his article exploring the
evolution of environmental law, both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were modeled off the Montreal Protocol, and most
scholars believed that they would be similarly successful in reducing emissions across the planet.227
But the major
issues with creating a legal regime based upon international law are that the
process is slow and cumbersome, consensus is elusive, and enforcement is
difficult. The international climate regime is composed of individual sovereign nations,
each with its own goals and agenda. 228 For this reason, international climate governance
since the Montreal Protocol has failed to address the biggest issues of
environmental law.229 Professor Boyd argues that despite the global nature of climate
change, a global solution with a top-down climate change framework is unrealistic
and unattainable. 230 Rather, problem solving in environmental governance should consist of "multiple actors
coordinating through a variety of organizational forms. '231 National
regulatory systems thus fit nicely into
such a cross jurisdictional system, making it possible to solve a global problem where it
might otherwise be impossible. 232
Although Professor Boyd's article assessed the structure of global environmental law in the context of emissions rather than
migration, it provides a useful lens through which to view new patterns of climate change-induced migration. An
international, treaty-based system is likely unattainable in the near future,
despite the imminent increase in substantial climate-induced migration. 233
One important question to ask is, "What examples of national, sovereign state law, bilateral agreements, and regional instruments
This
could provide a roadmap for developing interlocking systems of complementary and temporary protections? ' 234
approach, like Professor Boyd's, recognized that the international community may not
be able to craft and implement a timely solution to challenges such as climate migrants.
235 As Professor Jane McAdam suggested, focusing too narrowly on establishing a global
treaty may allow difficult conversations-such as what the treaty would look like and who
should bear the greatest responsibilities-to impede progress. 236 This would, in turn,
shift the focus away from implementing alternative, more immediate
solutions.237 Professor McAdam points to the complexity and unsettled nature of the
nexus between climate change and human migration as one of the major impediments
to creating a comprehensive international mechanism to deal with this problem.238
Some scholars continue to argue that an international treaty is the best mechanism to address climate migrants. 239 For example,
Professors Bonnie Docherty and Tyler Giannini from Harvard Law School called for a new climate change refugee convention.240
They rejected a climate-migrant solution based on existing international treaties, arguing that these treaties were not created for the
purpose of addressing climate migrants and therefore would not adequately fit their needs.241 They emphasized that a new
convention was needed because it could be interdisciplinary, bring attention to the problem, and promote the involvement of many
actors in creating a flexible solution to fit the problem. 242 While
their argument successfully identified the
failures of other proposals, it failed to take into account the political challenges and long
lag-time of implementing an international treaty in a fractured global community with
competing interests. Negotiating a new treaty takes a substantial amount of time.
Additionally, to reach an agreement, the parties might have to concede issues or take on
obligations that they oppose. This could put their compliance with those obligations at risk. On the other hand, a
variety of interlocking bilateral and multilateral agreements would be more flexible and give each party a sense of ownership over its
own obligations.
Thus, because the process is lengthy and cumbersome, the United States cannot wait for
the international community to reach consensus on climate migrants. Moreover,
because they do not sufficiently address domestic conditions and politics, the United
States cannot rely on international treaties to solve this problem. For these reasons,
the United States must take responsibility and create its own solution for climate migrants.
They’ll migrate to the US no matter what – the plan allows the US to get out
in front of it
Although exact numbers are difficult to predict, many who voluntarily or involuntarily
relocate outside of national borders will choose to make the United States their
final destination. Predicting the number of climate migrants that will come to the United States is difficult since most
scholars have focused on predicting global estimates of migration. 35 The United States has long been a destination for immigrants
from around the world. According to the Migration Policy Institute, about one in five immigrants resided in the United States in
2014.36 However, the United States will receive even more immigrants from certain
nations as a result of climate change. Historical ties and geographic proximity render it
likely that Mexican climate migrants will migrate to the United States. There are already
signs that cross-border migration from Mexico is increasing as climate change begins to
impact crop yields. 37 Researcher Shuaizhang Feng and his colleagues, acknowledging that there are many factors unique
to the Mexican-American relationship driving migration from the former to the latter, estimate that the effects of climate
change will cause 5.5 to 6.7 million Mexicans to migrate to the United States by
2080.38 This would be a substantial increase, yet it represents just a fraction of climate
migrants worldwide. Although immigration rates from Mexico to the United States have decreased since 2001, 3 9 Mexico
nevertheless produced the most migrants to the United States of any country in the world as recently as 2010.40 The United
States will also see substantial immigration from Asia, both because of the sheer size of
the region's population, and because the United States has historically been a receiving
nation for this population. 4 1 The Asian Development Bank published a report in 2012 on
expected climate change-induced migration patterns from Asia and the Pacific. 42 The study
noted that international migration to the United States from certain countries in the Asia Pacific region would substantially increase
in the coming years. 43 Due to historic migration patterns, both Micronesia and Polynesia have strong ties to North America and the
United States, and migrants from those countries tend to settle abroad permanently. 44 The study also predicted that
environmental stress in Bangladesh would lead to large-scale permanent relocation of
Bangladeshis to "traditional immigrant-receiving countries," a category that includes
the United States. 45 Sealevel rise will cause approximately 26 million climate migrants to leave Bangladesh by 2050.46
Anywhere between 39 and 812 million people (a "worst case scenario" estimate) in
South Asia alone will be at risk of water stress resulting from temperature rise
by the year 2085. 4 7 Sea-level rise has already begun to disrupt the livelihood of many
living along the GangesBrahmaputra-Meghna River Delta.48 Many small island nations
also have social and political ties to the United States that will cause climate migrants to
resettle there as climate events become more common. Climate change-related weather
patterns have already begun to displace people from island nations in the Pacific
region.49 In 2005, sea-level rise caused the government of Papua New Guinea to
relocate 2,600 residents of the Carteret Islands, one of its groups of atolls, to a nearby
island-should sea-level rise affect the nation's larger islands, there will be no nearby
island and many residents will relocate to the United States instead. 50 Additionally, the
Asian Development Bank noted that tropical cyclones and storm-tide swells have
displaced people in Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Solomon Islands, and the
Federated States of Micronesia, all countries whose citizens also tend to migrate to the
United States. 51 Moreover, extreme weather events will likely affect these regions even more frequently in the future. 52
The United States is, and will continue to be, a common destination for the population
of climate migrants that will be displaced by these weather events. 53 The Philippines is
another island nation that will likely produce a substantial number of climate migrants.
The United States has a special relationship with the Philippines, stemming from its
colonial authority over the island nation that lasted from 1898 to 1946. 54 For this
reason, many Filipino climate migrants will migrate to the United States. In 2010, the
Philippines produced the tenth highest number of international migrants to the United States. 55 Moreover, the effects
of climate change on the region are already apparent. Typhoon Haiyan, a record-making
violent storm, devastated the Philippines in 2013.56 Manila, the nation's capital, was already sinking and
was therefore at heightened risk of inundation. 57 Nationwide, the typhoon rendered an estimated 600,000 Filipinos homeless and
affected as many as 11 million by damaging property, farms, roads, and other essential infrastructure. 58 As storms like Typhoon
Haiyan increase in frequency, those with the resources to do so will relocate to safer, less weather-prone regions; many Filipinos will
choose the United States. The
United States can also expect climate migrants from Haiti. Haiti
has a strong diaspora community in the United States, and the 2010 earthquake is one
of many instances of substantial Haitian immigration to the United States. 59 The 2010
earthquake left over 200,000 dead and at least 1 million people homeless, and the country continues to struggle with inadequate
housing, waterborne disease, food scarcity, and deforestation that increases the risks of flooding. 60 After the earthquake, the
United States extended relief from deportation to 100,000 Haitians living in the United States illegally, and 30,000 Haitians that
had already been ordered deported. 61 As
climate change exacerbates the impacts of occurrences
such as the 2010 earthquake, residents will likely leave the island in increasing numbers.
Although many Haitians will migrate to other destinations, 62 many others will join friends and family in the United States. 63 In
sum, this country faces an influx of climate migrants in the coming years.
International cooperation fails – divergent interests, asymmetric power

relations, conflicting ideas, sovereignty, and public opinion
Barriers to cooperation
The traditional barriers to cooperation identified by political scientists apply to migration

governance: conflicts over divergent interests, asymmetrical power, and
conflicting ideas are rife in negotiations for cooperation on migration.20 As described,
states from the North and Global South often have different interests and motivations for cooperation. For example, migrant
sending states often try to maintain strong connections with their diasporas in order to encourage and facilitate remittances; but
migrant receiving states emphasize a need to integrate with local communities and invest resources in local migrant institutions.21
Such disparate interests render cooperation an arduous if not impossible task.
The second barrier to cooperation is asymmetrical power relations between

migrant-sending and migrant-receiving states. Among the latter are often rich, developed countries
in the North America or Western Europe that can exert their power system to set visa regimes, border
security standards, or fund humanitarian stop-gaps. Such initiatives are led by wealthy,
industrialized states and reflect their interests, making international cooperation on
issues important to migrant-sending states less likely. Asymmetrical power relations do not necessarily
lead to lack of cooperation; more powerful and certainly hegemonic states can provide important leadership in migration
governance. For example, Germany accepted more than a million asylum seekers in 2015-16, setting a precedent for other EU
countries to accept more as well. Germany continues to exert its leverage within the EU to push cooperation on new EU-wide
relocation and resettlement schemes.22
A third barrier is the conflicting ideas about what kind of migration and what type of
cooperation are most beneficial, and for whom. States have different understandings of
how migration can help or hurt their economies and communities. For example, those in
North Africa consider circular migration (when migrant repeatedly move between host and home countries for a
temporary period, usually for seasonal work) a historical pattern and crucial to their economies. In
contrast, European states sometimes view circular migration as a threat to domestic labor
markets and a source of transient populations that threaten the cohesion of local
communities. While issue linking and cross-issue persuasion may reduce this barrier, conflicting
understandings of ideas about migration are a persistent obstacle in global
migration governance.
One manifestation of a conflicting conceptualization with significant impact is the ongoing and seemingly endless debate over the
difference between refugees and migrants. International refugee law provides rights for refugees but not economic migrants. In this
respect, the refugee definition recognizes that they were forced to flee in order to seek protection, but implies that migrants choose
of their own volition to move for economic opportunities. While the law is clear about this division, the actual motivations and real-
world situations that push and pull people to move are more complex and less stark. Betts argues that people who move in order to
stay alive because of hunger, extreme poverty, or widespread violence—what he deems “survival migration”—require similar
protection to refugees fleeing political persecution.23 As discussed, states in Africa and Latin America have recognized an expanded
definition of refugees, but they clash with European or North American ideas of asylum. Further, global cooperation on migration
may be unnecessary if regional cooperation is effective. Regional institutions use more appropriate responses for specific migration
issues in their area of the world, especially because most refugees flee to contiguous countries. Regional cooperation has the
potential to relieve pressure from global institutions and break an impasse in global cooperation because states can find common
areas of cooperation within other states in the region, even if a few states refuse to participate at the global level.
A fourth barrier to cooperation is sovereignty: many states understand migration

policy as a reflection of the core competency of national governments. They seek
to prevent global institutions from encroaching on their power to set policy on who enters or
works in their territory. States are even hesitant to relinquish authority to regional
institutions. The European Union has both successes and barriers to regional cooperation on migration. The EU’s Common
European Asylum System (CEAS) is a set of directives agreeing on a minimum set of standards and principles for asylum, reception,
qualifications, and return. While the CEAS attempts to harmonize asylum processes across all EU member states, it has not been
successful in forcing implementation by them all. In 2016, for instance, the Visograd countries (Poland, Czech Republic, and
Hungary) refused to participate in the EU-wide refugee relocation schemes, citing national sovereignty; and asylum acceptance rates
for refugees from the same country vary widely across the EU.
A fifth barrier is opposition in the domestic public opinion to migration and

cooperation on migration issues.24 There are strong anti-immigrant trends worldwide: in Europe, 59 percent of
those polled in 2016 were concerned that more refugees could lead to more terrorism, 25 and less than 30 percent thought that
diversity made their country a better place to live.26 In
Africa, 40 percent of people polled thought
immigration should be decreased; in South America, 39 percent wanted a decrease; in Asia, only
29 percent wanted a decrease.27 In the United States, public opinion is more complex: 63 percent28
believed immigrants strengthened the country, but a majority believed immigrants from Africa or the Middle East have a negative
impact.29 These
beliefs influence how politicians position themselves with local
audiences on international 7 cooperation for migration. Often, politicians are eager
to cooperate on border controls, increased technology, and deportation; but they are less
enthusiastic about refugee resettlement, labor mobility, or family reunification.
Trump himself scuttles the CP
Sengupta, '17 – International Climate Reporter and Specialist (Somini, "Climate Change Is Driving People From Home. So
Why Don’t They Count as Refugees?," New York Times, 12-21-2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/climate/climate-
refugees.html)//SB
Why isn’t anyone proposing a new law?

For starters, refugee advocates fear that if
the 1951 refugee treaty were opened for renegotiation,
politicians in various countries would try to weaken the protections that exist
now. That includes the Trump administration, which has barred people from eight
countries — including refugees from war-torn Syria and Yemen — from coming into the country altogether.
A group of academics and advocates has spent the last two years proposing an entirely new treaty, with new categories to cover those
who are forcibly displaced, including by the ravages of climate change. Michael W. Doyle, a Columbia professor leading the effort to
draft a new treaty, said he didn’t expect a new treaty to be embraced anytime soon, but insisted that those conversations should start
as record numbers of people leave their home countries and end up displaced in others, often without legal status.
“In the modern world,” Dr. Doyle said, “people are fleeing for their lives for a variety of reasons.”
Trial balloons have been floated
A New Zealand lawmaker recently proposed a special visa category for people displaced by climate change. “One of the options is a
special humanitarian visa to allow people who are forced to migrate because of climate change,” the minister, James Shaw, said in an
interview from a global climate summit in Bonn, Germany, in November.
Mr. Shaw has said nothing since then about when legislation might be proposed, and it’s far from clear whether it would pass.
Several countries have offered humanitarian visas in the aftermath of calamitous natural disasters, including the United States after
hurricanes and earthquakes, including in Haiti in 2010. (The Trump administration ended that so-called protected status for
Haitians in November.)
There’s a bigger problem
As Elizabeth Ferris, a professor at Georgetown University, points out, most people whose lands and livelihoods are ravaged by either
natural disaster or the slow burn of climate change aren’t likely to leave their countries. Many more will move somewhere else within
their own country — from the countryside to cities, for instance, or from low-lying areas prone to flooding to higher elevation.
Indeed, natural disasters forced an estimated 24 million people to be displaced within the borders of their own country in 2016,
according to the latest report by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center.
AT//United Nations CP
Regardless of mechanism – the cplan’s a bandaid for a bullet wound
Refugee literature often distinguishes between “temporary” or “permanent” migrations, but these
distinctions provide little help in the aftermath of environmental disaster. International
support is required in all disaster situations whether the displaced climate exiles are
permanent or not. As Biermann and Boas note, the main institution dealing with refugees is the
United Nations, acting through the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees.1 The UN is restricted to helping individual political refugees
who flee theft countries because of state-led persecution. and this does not
cover climate refugees. At best, the UN refers to climate refugees as “internally
displaced persons” and offers some programs for them under the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights. But it is more of a Band-Aid program than a
major corrective. The current international regime embodied in the United Nations
provides only marginal protection. with no specific mandate. to climate refugees. This is a
problem that strikes at the core of Western development policy toward poorer nations, especially the very poorest. Nothing
positive can happen with United Nations leadership until an independent
regime for the protection and resettlement of climate refugees is
established.
The UN can't do it -- too contentious and member states wouldn't all
approve
Gauthier 16 (Matthew, law student at the University of North Carolina, Climate Refugees and International Law: Legal
Frameworks and Proposals in the US and Abroad, http://studentorgs.law.unc.edu/documents/elp/2016/m_gauthier.pdf//waters)
III. Proposals for New Frameworks to Manage Environmental Migration A. Updating the Current Definition of “Refugee” Within the
Existing UN Framework to Include Environmental Refugees
One proposal for creating a legal means to
address environmental migrants has been to simply reform the current definition of
“refugee” within the existing UN Convention and protocols. Proponents argue that environmental
migration is already occurring and migrants have a right to a legal solution.36 Proposals to redefine the term “refugee” have
commonly suggested redefining or eliminating the persecution element as well as expanding or eliminating the protected grounds.37
This proposal, while on its face straightforward, would drastically change the current refugee regime and would likely be
quite controversial. Another suggestion is to simply add environmental migrants as a class of people protected by the
existing UN Convention.38 While both of these proposals appear to be simple, scholars have already identified five
points of contention.39 What this shows is that even simply expanding the current definition is
not free from dispute;40 framing the debate as a simple issue of definitions, while perhaps the most straightforward
option, is not without debate. At this point, the debate centers around: (1) the causes of relocation, (2)
the permanence of relocation, (3) whether or not the relocation is international, (4) the
influence of the environmental harm, and (5) the suddenness of the environmental
harm.41 This serves to illustrate the difficulty of enacting a comprehensive international
definition to the existing UN Convention.
B. Adopting a New Comprehensive Legal Framework for Environmental Migrants With the absence of consensus on adding
environmental migrants to existing refugee frameworks, some have advocated for creating a new, comprehensive structure for
environmental migration. This could potentially look like either an environmental migration protocol adopted by the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change or an entirely new and distinct United Nations protocol.42 There are a number of characteristics
common to these proposals. First, while it will be created at the international level, it will depend on the adoption and cooperation of
sovereign nations.43 Additionally, rights and definitions of environmental migrants must still be agreed upon.44
UN definitions of ‘refugee’ don’t include climate as a grounds for assistance

– CP doesn’t solve
Barrett 18- Sarah Elizabeth Barrett is a global health research assistant for the University of Vermont
which is comprised of acting as a liaison between refugee-focused healthcare providers in the Burlington
area and undergraduate students at UVM, facilitating Service-Learning partnerships between these
service providers and students, working to catalog and produce informational guides on best practices for
students interested in engaging in work related to refugees, migrants, and New Americans, and
researching global health issues affecting refugees and displaced persons. “Seeking Asylum Across the
International Boundary: Legal Terms and Geopolitical Conditions of Irregular Border Crossing and
Asylum Seeking between the United States and Canada, 2016 – 2018”, April 18, 2018, Global and
Regional Studies Program, http://spatializingmigration.net/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Barett_Thesis.pdf, 35-38 // Suraj P
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Convention defines a refugee is a person who is “unwilling or

unable to return to his country of nationality or habitual residence because of a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion” (UNHCR, 1967). The basis of the definition of a “Convention
refugee” rests on the protection of persons from political or identity-based persecution that affects an individual personally. This
often includes conditions of war or conflict and, “[e]xcept in contexts of conflicts and persecution,
there is no lead UN agency that has at its core the protection of people forced to flee
owning to disasters, including those triggered by climate change, and which could coordinate an
international response” (UN News, 2014). Thus because the legal definition of a refugee requires that a
person claiming such status must experience a form of persecution, persons affected
by EID are some of the most vulnerable populations in the world. This
includes those affected by the earthquakes in El Salvador and Haiti as well as the
hurricanes in Honduras and Nicaragua that led to the designations of these populations
for TPS. The Convention also mandates a claimant for status as a refugee must have fled
beyond the borders of their own state in that they are “unwilling or unable to return to
their country of origin” and as such a person may only make a claim for refugee status
from a country other than their own (UNHCR, 1967). This renders internally displaced
persons (IDPs) ineligible for a claim of refugee status. Environmental displacement often
produces large numbers of IDPs and, as such, these displaced persons are “not protected by international law or eligible to receive
many types of aid” (UNHCR, 2018). This is because they remain within the borders of their own country and thus legally remain
under the protection of their own government. Such
narrow delineations in the definition of a
Convention refugee necessitate additional programs of protection -- such as TPS -- for
forcibly displaced populations that do not meet these particular legal qualifications. Until the current annulment of
the program, TPS provided vital protection for those dislocated by EID. In global context, EID is a growing concern in relation to
forced displacement around the world. Climate
change and its related environmental
disasters, displacement and development are a significant concern for expanding
global displacement. Millions of people have already been forcibly uprooted by
worsening environmental conditions (UNHCR, 2018). It is estimated that there has
been an average of 25.4 million new displacements associated with disasters each year
since 2008; most of those affected are IDPs. This is more than twice as many displacements caused by conflict
and violence (IDMC, 2016). In 2010, an estimated 42 million people worldwide were
displaced from their homes as the result of immediate and long-term changes in the physical environment (Yonetani [IDMC],
2011). This estimate is roughly equal to the number of people displaced by war
and persecution during the same period (UNHCR, 2010). The UNHCR (2015) warns that “increasing
incidence and changing intensity of extreme weather events due to climate change will lead directly to the risk of increased levels of
displacement.” Such extreme weather events that render a place uninhabitable and cause large-scale forced displacement include
those experienced by El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Haiti. While the term “environmental refugee” is first attributed to
Essam El-Hinnawi, a United Nations Environment Programme researcher, in 1985, this term is misleading because international
law (as articulated in the the Convention) defines a “refugee” as a person who is (1) fleeing persecution, and (2) has crossed an
international border. El-Hinnawi
describes an environmental refugee as “those people who
have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because
of a marked environmental disruption […] that jeopardized their existence and/or
serious affected their quality of life” (El-Hinnawi, 1985 qtd in Bose & Lunstrum, 2014, p. 6). This definition,
however, is criticized for being “so wide as to render the concept virtually meaningless” (Suhrke & Visentin qtd in Bose & Lunstrum,
2014, p. 6). The legal application of the term and concept of “environmental refugees” has sparked considerable debate. For
example, Bose & Lunstrum (2014, p. 6) explain that the UNHCR “‘has serious reservations with respect to the terminology and
notion of environmental or climate refugees.’” The UNHCR has itself noted: “[T]he
terminology and notion of
environmental or climate refugees … have no basis in international law … UNHCR is
actually of the opinion that use of such terminology could potentially undermine the
international legal regime for the protection of refugees whose rights and obligations are
quite clearly defined and understood … UNHCR considers that any initiative to modify
this definition would risk a renegotiation of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which could
not be justified by actual needs [emphasis added]” (UNHCR qtd in Bose & Lunstrum, 2014, p. 6). This
leaves those displaced and affected by natural disasters ‘out in the cold’ as they
lack legal recognition under the international standards of protection that govern the
asylum systems of both the US and Canada as well as the global refugee determination
regime at large. While TPS offered safe haven for those affected by EID from El Salvador, Nicaragua and Haiti, the
termination of this protection renders these vulnerable populations without access to
protection or legal status in the US. This will be discussed further in subsection II of this chapter.
-- AT//Soft Law / UNGA Mechanism
That fails – it cannot induce members to help and does not generate enough
funds
Mayer 11 (Benoit, LL.M. (McGill), Master of Political Sciences (Sciences Po), Bachelor of Law (Sorbonne), is a PhD candidate at
the National University of Singapore, The International Legal Challenges of Climate-Induced Migration: Proposal for an
International Legal Framework, https://heinonline-
org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/colenvlp22&div=20&start_page=357&collection=journals&set_as_curs
or=6&men_tab=srchresults#//waters)
A fourth mode of action consists of a resolution adopted either by the Security Council
or the UNGA. The Security Council already addressed climate change in a debate on April 17, 2007.249 However, it did not
adopt a resolution but instead concluded that the Security Council is not the correct institution to deal with climate change
migration. In any case, the Security Council's responsibility for "maintenance of international peace and security" 250 would exclude
any general approach. This seems to undermine the triggering effect that a resolution by the Security Council may have if the
resolution decides that a well-known international issue calls for an immediate international answer. For this reason, a group of
Pacific Small Island Developing States is currently pushing the Security Council to address this issue again and to adopt a resolution
as the start to a lobbying effort.25 ' The UNGA, which has already adopted Resolution 63/281 on climate migration,252 may be a
more appropriate forum for a decision because its procedures to adopt a resolution are less demanding and its general competence
allows it to adopt a global approach to climate- induced migration. A resolution by the UNGA may press states to negotiate a global,
concerted, early, and sustainable response to this phenomenon, which would implement the guiding principles of burden- sharing,
subsidiarity, and respect for collective, as well as individual, rights. More concretely,
a resolution may also
recommend that existing fundamental rights of climate migrants be respected, including
the right to life and the right not to be submitted to inhuman or degrading treatment. A right to resettlement may also be deduced
from existing fundamental rights. Eventually,
the UNGA may encourage states or international
organizations to take some measures to protect climate migrants. Eventually, it may recommend
that states ratify a convention. Soft law would have a highly symbolic importance and may define universal norms that should be
applied by states. Obviously, its
main pitfall stems from the absence of an obligation of states to
cooperate in a compulsory funding instrument, although a fund such as the UNHCR's can be opened to
voluntary contributions. Furthermore, contrary to a treaty, because a resolution does not
have to be ratified, it would not raise national debate and public awareness.
Overall, one can hardly imagine that a UNGA resolution would be sufficient to push states to recognize the rights of climate
migrants. Therefore,
a resolution is probably a starting point, but it will in no case
be sufficient to deal with climate-induced migration.
-- AT//Expand UNHCR Mechanism
Changing the definition of ‘refugee’ to include environmental displacement
doesn’t solve and exacerbates refugee flows more broadly
Biermann and Boas 10- Frank Biermann is Professor of Political Science and of Environmental
Policy at VU University Amsterdam and Visiting Professor of Earth System Governance at Lund
University, Sweden, Ingrid Boas is Assistant Professor in Climate Governance at the Environmental Policy
Group at Wageningen University, the Netherlands. Her research particularly focusses on the topic of
climate change-induced migration and climate security, “Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a
Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees”, Vol. 10 No. 1, Global Environmental Politics,
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Biermann/publication/227627225_Preparing_for_a_War
mer_World_Towards_a_Global_Governance_System_to_Protect_Climate_Refugees/links/5422bc260c
f238c6ea6b866f/Preparing-for-a-Warmer-World-Towards-a-Global-Governance-System-to-Protect-
Climate-Refugees.pdf, // Suraj P
To what extent is the current global governance system able to deal with the crisis that may emerge in the decades to come? The
main global institution dealing with refugees is the regime provided for by the 1951
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees. These institutions are restricted to individual political refugees
who ºee their countries because of state-led persecution, and thus do not cover climate
refugees.47 A broader definition of refugees has been adopted in two regional
conventions, the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Speciªc Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (concerning refugees from Central America, Mexico and Panama).48 Both
regional conventions cover also people seeing from events seriously disturbing public order,49 and the African convention applies to
groups too.50 Even though
the extension of protection to people affected by a seriously
disturbed public order and to groups may open the two regional conventions—which
happen to cover regions most severely affected by future climate change—to include
climate refugees, both conventions were originally not intended to protect
these types of refugees.51 The main agency in the United Nations system for the protection of refugees is the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Its primary focus is (political) refugees protected under the Geneva Convention
and the Protocol of 1967,52 and thus it does not cover environmental or climate refugees. By the end of 2007, 11.4 million refugees
fell under the formal mandate of the UNHCR.53 Given
the restrictive definition of political refugee
under the Geneva convention, the executive committee of UNHCR and the UN General
Assembly permitted the agency to extend its activities towards other groups, such as
former refugees who have returned to their homeland, internally displaced people, and
people who are stateless or whose nationality is disputed, even though these people have
a different legal status and are formally not referred to as “refugees.”54 In total, by the end of
2006 the UNHCR dealt with 32.9 million people and by the end of 2007 with 31.7 million,55 including “refugees, asylum seekers,
returnees, stateless people and a portion of the world’s internally displaced persons (IDPs).”56 In the current regime, most climate
refugees could be conceptualized as internally displaced persons. The UNHCR has a variety of programs for such people, even
though the High Commissioner maintains not to have a specific mandate over them.57 Environmentally internally displaced persons
also fall under the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.58
However, the concept of “environmentally internally displaced person”
serves, according to Keane, only “as a descriptive term, not as a status that
confers obligations on states.”59 The Guiding Principles state for example that the
primary duty to provide protection and humanitarian assistance lays with national
authorities,60 and the 2006 Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural
Disasters “Protecting Persons Affected By Natural Disasters” from the Inter-Agency
Standing Committee directed to internally displaced people, places primary
responsibility on national authorities of affected countries with assistance of
humanitarian agencies.61 No duties or obligations of other states are
mentioned. In sum, the current legal regime on refugees provides only marginal
protection, with no specific mandate, to climate refugees. The main responsibility is
placed with their home countries, which contradicts the global responsibility for the
victims of climate change. In addition, the maximum number of persons the UNHCR can currently deal with is merely a
small fraction of the additional number of climate refugees that many studies predict for 2050. It is doubtful whether these
governance arrangements can cope with the looming climate refugee crisis.62 One reform option within the present institutional
setting could be to extend the mandate of the 1951 Geneva Convention and of the UNHCR to cover also “climate refugees.” This has
been proposed recently by the Republic of the Maldives,63 but does not and much support in the literature.64 Politically it would
seem unlikely that donor countries would allow the current refugee regime with its fixed set of refugee rights to be extended to cover
a group of refugees that is 20 times larger than that which is currently covered. Related
to this, such extension
could produce a trade-off between climate refugees and the (political)
refugees that are protected under the Geneva Convention. Most importantly, however,
climate refugees require a different kind of protection. Most climate refugees will not leave their home countries, and will still be
able to enjoy protection of their governments. Also, many potentially affected population centers—notably low-lying coasts and
islands—can be predicted within limits. Climate-related
migrations can therefore be planned and
organized with the support of their governments and public agencies, exactly the
opposite of the political or religious persecution faced by political refugees. In sum, the
problem of climate refugees is at its core a problem of development policy. It requires
institutions that take account of this special character.
The UNCHR lacks enforcement capacity
Economist, '18 – Economics and Policy News Source (Economist, "Why climate migrants do not have refugee status," 3-
6-2018, The Economist, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/03/06/why-climate-migrants-do-not-have-
refugee-status)//SB
On the surface, the

problem is bureaucratic. Environmental migrants are not covered by the
1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which is designed to protect
those fleeing persecution, war or violence. The UN agencies most involved in refugee
rights, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the UN Development Programme, agree that the
term “climate refugee” should not be used to describe those displaced for environmental
reasons. The UNHCR already struggles to provide adequate support for the world’s
22.5m refugees (from war and persecution). During the Syrian refugee crisis, it admitted to being
“stretched to the limit”. If the UNHCR broadens its definition of “refugee” to support
an entirely new category, it is unclear if the political appetite exists to provide
the necessary funding.
Multiple reasons the counterplan fails

McAdam, '17 – scientia professor of law and director of the Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law at UNSW (Jane,
"The Sydney Morning Herald: The UN Refugee Convention Should Not Include “Climate Refugees”," Yale University’s YaleGlobal, 6-
15-2017, https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/sydney-morning-herald-un-refugee-convention-should-not-include-climate-
refugees)//SB
Critics of the United Nations Refugee Convention tend to fall into two camps. In one camp are those who think the treaty is too old
to respond to the displacement challenges of the 21st century, such as climate change and disasters. In the other camp are those who
think the treaty is too generous and somehow responsible for the large numbers of refugees we see around the world today.
Curiously, the convention is somehow too narrow and too broad at the same time; simultaneously blocking yet facilitating access to
protection.
The convention remains the most comprehensive statement we have of the rights and obligations of refugees, supplemented by
international human rights law.
It doesn't provide a "blank cheque", but carefully balances the needs of refugees and governments. It also contains exclusion clauses
to keep out people who are suspected of committing very serious crimes, such as murder or terrorism.
Indeed, the drafters were well aware that refugee protection was not a way to bypass migration controls – on the contrary, refugee
status determination exposes people to the most extreme vetting imaginable.
Although drafted in the 1950s, the convention's definition of a refugee has proven itself capable of a dynamic interpretation over
time. For instance, gender-related persecution is now accepted as founding a refugee claim.
To be fair, the convention does not protect every displaced person in the world – but nor was it designed to. For instance, it doesn't
extend to the millions of people displaced within their own countries.
Recently, people displaced by the impacts of disasters and climate change have been
identified as another group in need of protection. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many have leapt to
the assumption that we need to extend the convention to these so-called "climate
refugees".
There are at least seven reasons why this assumption is flawed.
the vast majority of disaster displacement will occur within countries, not across
First,
international borders.
a lot of movement will be gradual as conditions deteriorate over time, rather
Second,
than in the nature of refugee "flight".
climate change and disasters alone do not cause movement. Rather, they are the straw
Third,
that breaks the camel's back, overlaying existing drivers like conflict, human rights
abuses, poverty and poor governance. This causal complexity would be difficult
to reflect in a treaty definition.
Fourth, somehave questioned why protection should be extended to those affected by
"climate change" or "disasters", rather than for instance "abject poverty", which may be
equally attributable to global structural inequities. As experts have noted, focusing on a
single cause can distort and oversimplify the context, and impede the
identification of appropriate solutions.
Fifth, there
is little political appetite at the moment to expand the Refugee Convention.
Opening it up for renegotiation would most likely result in a far weaker protection
framework, with less protection for all – including those it currently protects.
Sixth, a
treaty needs to be implemented and enforced to have any meaning in practice; 148
countries have signed up to the Refugee Convention, and yet there are more refugees in
the world now than at any other time since World War. The problem is not an absence of law, but an
absence of political will to implement the law.
That's why – seventh – we need to think more creatively about pre-emptive responses to displacement linked to the impacts of
climate change and disasters. Right now,
governments could do so much to avoid the risk of future
displacement, such as implementing disaster risk reduction and climate change
adaptation measures; enhancing voluntary migration opportunities; developing
humanitarian visas; and potentially even undertaking planned relocations, in full consultation
with affected communities.
So, when returning to the objections levelled at the Refugee Convention, we need to be cautious about misdiagnosis. The
convention provides a principled, predictable, universal, and solutions-
oriented system. It remains fit for the purpose for which it was created. It just needs political will to be able to do its job.
AT//Localized Adaptive Measures CPs
Localized adaptive mechanisms fail
Marshall 15 Nicole Marshall is a PhD in the Department of Political Science at the University
of Alberta (Nicole, “Environmental Migration in an Era of Accelerated Climate Change:
Proposing a Normative Framework for International Migrant Rights and Domestic Migration,”
University of Alberta, https://era.library.ualberta.ca/items/46a0b9dd-e055-4afd-82e1-6009da437ff6/view/c5b1c266-
2794-4776-853b-72a7a57fb0e8/Marshall_Nicole_M_201508_PhD.pdf) // SR
Indeed, the 21st

century has seen a renewed interest in peoples who feel compelled to
migrate as a result of environmental issues. In many ways, today, people who are seeking to
avoid difficult climates face complications that were not experienced by our ancestors.
As climate change increases the frequency, strength, and impact of storms and related
weather events, environmental migration is increasingly associated with large-scale
displacement and immediate loss of life. Moreover, many of those who need to migrate to obtain a
stable food supply are crippled by systemic poverty, which often effectively eliminates migration from their range of possible
adaptation strategies. And
so the complications of modern climate migration begin to compile.
With an increased potential for loss of life, and desperate populations who are unable to
legally migrate, it is clear that there are new faces of forced environmental migration:
ones that urgently demand particular and appropriate responses from policymakers and
the international community. Of course, it also must be recognized that migration is but one of a list of adaptation
strategies, and many of the populations threatened by the effects of climate change have been very clear that they are not primarily
seeking migration as an adaptive option. For example, the peoples of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Kiribati, and the Maldives
have been particularly vocal about this point (see Threatened Island Nations Conference proceedings 2011). Instead, many
populations would rather employ local environmental adaptation strategies such as the construction of seawalls to keep out rising
tides, or dike systems to manage increasing groundwater, to extend the habitability of their homelands. The
primary
challenge with these localized adaptive mechanisms, however, is that they are quite
costly and the communities and states that would most benefit from them do not
typically have the financial resources to develop and implement the required
infrastructure (for example, the Republic of the Marshall Islands: see Johnson 2010). To do so successfully, these states
would require significant international assistance – assistance that is not readily available in today’s international political climate
(see discussion in Chapter Five and Six). For
example, Republic of the the Marshall Islands has faced
particular challenges in meeting the costs of constructing sufficient seawalls, where
these would make a substantial difference in keeping salinized water away from crops
and protecting the stability of roadways, houses, and other infrastructure from flood-
related deterioration. In 2010, the United Nations launched a plea for US$20 million in aid, meant to finance the
construction of three seawalls in the most vulnerable areas of the island chain (Johnson 2010). While billions of dollars were
pledged to assist with climate change adaptation since 2008, according to the Republic of the Marshall Islands’ United Nations
Ambassador, Phillip Muller, “not much of this pledged money has flowed to countries [like his] that need it” (in Johnson 2010).
Moreover, evidence is mounting to suggest that the possible success of these and other adaptation strategies is declining as we move
forward in time. Without
sufficient funding and technological advances, these island-based
societies may find themselves out of adaptation options beyond international migration
as sea levels continue to rise and local habitability declines. Indeed, today’s increasingly volatile and
unpredictably changing global climate sees, on average, more than 25 million Environmentally Displaced Persons sitting in a
condition of displacement each year (UNHCR 2013; also see Myers 1997, 2001). As
the number of environmental
migrants increases, the makeup of these migrants is also becoming more complex. Many
forced migrants cannot afford safe migration, and all international migrants face the further challenge of securitized state borders
that impede access to a full range of available migration options. Clearly, there are a number of new challenges associated with this
longstanding problem, and this often leaves modern environmental migrants deeply challenged to fully and effectively adapt to local
and regional changes in climate, even in instances where their ancestors may have succeeded.
AT//Canada CP
Immigrants earn more and assimilate better in the US
Neeraj Kaushal et al 2016 -- Neeraj Kaushal is a Professor of Social Policy at the University of New York, Yao Lu is an
Associate Professor of Sociology, and faculty affiliate of the Columbia Population Research Center, Nicole Denier is a Postdoctoral
Fellow in Sociology at Colby College, Julia Shu-Huah Wang is an Assistant Professor at the University of Hong Kong, and Stephen J.
Trejo is a Professor of Economics at the University of Texas at Austin. ["Immigrant employment and earnings growth in Canada and
the USA: evidence from longitudinal data", Accessible Online at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5270643/] @ AG
Our analysis has three main findings: One,

on average immigrant men (pooled across cohorts) in Canada do
not experience significant relative growth in the three labor market outcomes compared
to men born in Canada. Immigrant men in the U.S., by contrast, experience positive annual
growth in all three domains relative to U.S. born men. Further analysis shows that this difference is
largely driven by low-educated immigrant men, who experienced faster or longer duration of
relative growth in all three outcomes in the U.S. than in Canada. We attribute this in
part to the differences in the structures of labor market and welfare institutions in the two
countries that incentivize or necessitate faster economic assimilation in the U.S. The earnings trajectories of recent high-educated
immigrant men in both countries are identical, but high-educated immigrant men living in Canada for more than 20 years
experience negative employment and wage assimilation, which is not the case for immigrants in the U.S. We think the last finding
could also be related to some extent to Canada’s more generous welfare system (employment and health insurance) that works to
depress labor market engagement, especially for those getting close to retirement age. Indeed, estimates stratified by age suggest
that the results are less robust for younger immigrants in Canada. Two, as expected, on all three domains, recent immigrant
men in both countries experience some form of economic assimilation. However, the relative
positive growth in employment, hours worked, and real wages begins to taper off for groups who have been in the host countries for
a longer period, and in
the case of Canadian immigrants there is evidence of early retirement
among those who are in the country for more than 20 years. Our findings differ somewhat from
Antecol et al. (2006), which used repeated cross-sections of data. They too concluded that immigrant men in both countries
experienced positive earnings growth, and that U.S.
immigrants experienced higher earnings
assimilation than Canadian immigrants. But in their estimates, earnings growth remained robust for earlier
arrivals, which is contrary to our finding. They also find that in the U.S. employment growth mostly happened in the first few years
after arrival, but for Canadian immigrants it continued into later years as well, which is contrary to our finding. The difference in our
findings could be on account of the difference in data and methodologies or due to the difference in period under study (they focus
on the 1980s, whereas our study period is from 1996–2008). We also estimated synthetic cohort models using multiple panels of
SIPP and SLID data. Similar to Antecol et al., our cross-sectional analysis also shows that wage growth is robust for earlier arrivals in
both countries, and in fact, for immigrants in Canada, the cross-sectional estimates suggest that almost all the wage growth is
confined to immigrants who are in the country for at least 10 years (11–20 years and 20+ years). Comparing this with the short-term
earnings trajectories based on longitudinal data leads us to conclude that the cross-sectional trajectories over-estimate the wage
assimilation of earlier arrivals in both countries. Our findings are similar to those of previous research that have used longitudinal
data in the U.S. (see e.g. Lubotsky, 2007), but differs from similar research in Canada (e.g. Picot and Pitaino, 2013).32 Finally, we
find that recent immigrant women in the U.S. also experience economic assimilation on
all three domains, and recent immigrant women in Canada experience economic
assimilation in work effort – employment as well as hours worked, but not in wages. In
both countries earlier arrivals (in the host country for more than 20 years) experienced a decline in relative earnings, which might be
an indicator of limited long term wage growth opportunities in the occupations (low-end service occupations) or locations (e.g.
ethnic enclaves) where a majority of immigrant women, especially the earlier arrivals, work in the two countries. It is also possible
that earlier arrivals among immigrant women in both countries seek more flexible jobs that come with lower wages to take care of
children or grandchildren. To sum up, our
estimates suggest a faster economic assimilation of
immigrants in the U.S. than in Canada. The difference in immigrant labor market trajectories that we observe
could be on account of the positive selection of immigrants to the U.S. (compared to Canada) in terms of unobserved attributes (after
adjusting for observed attributes) or they could be due to differences
in labor market and welfare
institutions that, as we hypothesize, incentivize or necessitate greater labor market assimilation in
the U.S. than in Canada. It could also be associated with the differences in immigration policies paired with country-
specific labor market regulations. Observed outcomes for immigrants in these countries could also differ as a result of differences in
macroeconomic conditions. In our paper, we include controls for native trajectories. But this is a potential source of difference if
macroeconomic conditions affect immigrants and natives differently in the two countries. Further, differences in services provided
to immigrants could be an additional source of difference in their trajectories.
Canadian refugee acceptance causes backlogs and bankrupts the Canadian

economy
Levin ’17 – October 19, 2017, Dan Levin is a foreign correspondent for The New York Times
who specializes in Canada coverage, “Canada Welcomed Refugees, but Now Struggles With
Backlog,” https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/world/canada/canada-refugees-immigration.html // shurst
A wave of asylum seekers entering Canada this year has exacerbated a backlog of refugee
claims that the government is struggling to manage, leaving tens of thousands of people stuck in
bureaucratic limbo even as they try to build new lives. Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board says it has a backlog
of 40,700 cases. More than 10,000 asylum seekers have crossed illegally into Quebec from the United States since July
alone. But the board has the money and staff to process just 24,000 cases a year, meaning that many people will have to
wait around 16 months for their case to be heard. “The strain on the organization to handle this many
people’s hearings is enormous,” Shereen Benzvy Miller, the head of the board’s refugee protection division, told a parliamentary
immigrations committee this month. “The math is clear,” she added. “Unless you put more resources to this problem, then it takes
longer time to schedule, so there will be longer wait times.” The
delay also increases the amount of
money Canada spends on asylum seekers’ medical care, education and
public assistance, said Richard Kurland, a former national chairman of the Canadian Bar Association’s citizenship and
immigration section. “The longer they stay, the more Canadians pay,” he said. The
immigration board set up a special task force in August to respond to the influx of asylum seekers who crossed
illegally into Quebec. By the end of September, the task force had finalized around 300 claims,
rejecting about 50 percent of them. That acceptance rate is below the national norm of 65 percent, which could
bode poorly for migrants who came to Canada on the basis of economic opportunity rather than a well-founded fear of persecution,
as is legally required for refugee protection. The board hopes to pick up its pace of reviewing claims, and expects the task force to
hear 1,500 claims by the end of November, Ms. Benzvy Miller said. Yet more people keep coming in, about 1,400 a month since
April. And a government review of the asylum processing procedures, begun in June, will not be completed until next summer.
Most of the 8,500 asylum seekers who walked into Quebec from New York State in July
and August were Haitians fearing deportation from the United States and seeking to benefit from
a loophole in a treaty between the two countries that allows people to make refugee claims in Canada if they do not arrive at legal
ports of entry. As daily arrivals soared into the hundreds, the Quebec provincial government turned the Montreal Olympic Stadium
into a temporary shelter with space for 1,500 beds. Once
asylum seekers have been screened for security
risks and make a refugee claim, they are given a monthly stipend and a work permit, and
their children are allowed to enroll in school. But this gives many a false sense of
security, immigration lawyers say. With civil war raging in his native Yemen and his Saudi Arabian residency expiring after 16
years, Sami Alromi, 40, a clothing salesman, made a desperate decision to fly to the United States with his pregnant wife and
daughter in February, leaving behind three other children. Just weeks earlier, President Trump had tried to introduce a travel ban
on people from Yemen, which Mr. Alromi said left his family with only one option: Canada. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of
Canada had recently tweeted, “Those
fleeing persecution, terror & war, Canadians will welcome
you, regardless of your faith,” so the Alromi family crossed on foot into Quebec in March and made refugee claims. But
their hearing was indefinitely postponed in April. Mr. Alromi’s wife gave birth in Canada, and ever since their hearing postponement
they have been consumed by fear that their other children, whose Saudi Arabian residency permits have expired, will be deported to
Yemen, where teenagers are used as soldiers and diseases like cholera are rife. “Being here I can’t do anything for my kids over
there,” Mr. Alromi said in a phone interview from Montreal, adding that his wife had become so depressed over their plight that she
had to go to the hospital and take medication. “If they are deported to Yemen, I don’t know what I’m going to do.” This month, the
immigration board sent word that Mr. Alromi’s claim would go through expedited processing under a new policy that allows the
authorities to review claims without a hearing for people from Yemen and several other countries. But Mr. Alromi doesn’t know
whether his claim will be accepted. “Waiting is very hard,” he said.
AT// “Climate Refugee” Word PIC
AT: climate refugee word pic – it is the correct term
1. TheUnited States should utilize the term “climate refugee” over other terms
such as “environmental migrant.” The arguments made against utilize “climate refugee”
are overall unconvincing. One of the primary arguments made against “refugee” is that
it does not fit within the existing legal framework and will weaken refugee law. This can
easily be disputed, as law can evolve over time to adapt to new circumstances that did
not exist at the time of enactment. Climate refugee does not have to fit within the
same category or follow the exact established refugee convention. The other
commonly cited argument against “climate refugee” is the negative connotations
associated with the term “refugee.” Although these negative connotations do exist, these
thinkers do not acknowledge the positive connotations or negative connotations
associated with the term “migrant.” The term “refugee” has the implication that there is
no other option available, whereas “migrant” implies a choice. Whether an individual is forced to
migrate due to their home community being destroyed by rising sea levels, severe droughts preventing the growth of crops, or any
other known impact of climate change, they are doing so in order to seek “refuge.” To
deny an individual the right to
claim refuge, despite being unable to return to their home community, is
inherently wrong.
Only the term 'climate refugee' ensures displaced groups receive legitimacy
and protection
Biermann & Boas 10 (Frank Biermann is Professor of Political Science and of Environmental Policy at VU
UniversityAmsterdam and Visiting Professor of Earth System Governance at Lund University, Sweden. Ingrid Boas is Assistant
Professor in Climate Governance at the Environmental Policy Group at Wageningen University, the Netherlands. Her research
particularly focusses on the topic of climate change-induced migration and climate security. "Preparing for a Warmer World:
Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees," https://www-mitpressjournals-
org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/glep.2010.10.1.60//waters)
Some intergovernmental agencies—such as the International Organization for Migration and the Oface of the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)—prefer the term “environmentally displaced persons.”15 They reject the term
environmental or climate “refugee” because of the legal rights that the intergovernmental system currently bestows
upon “refugees,” that is, persons who cannot avail of the protection of their home state for fear of (political) persecution. On the
other hand, it was an intergovernmental agency—UNEP— that popularized the term “environmental refugee” in the 1980s.16 In
1992, Agenda 21—the inouential intergovernmental program of action agreed upon by almost all governments at the 1992 United
Nations Conference on Environ- ment and Development—also used the term “environmental refugees” repeatedly.17 The notion of
“climate refugees” appears to and acceptance in some national political debates too. For example, when in opposition, Australia’s
Labor Party proposed an international coalition to accept climate refugees from the Paciac18 in response to the Australian
government’s position that rejected the notion of climate refugees.19 And in 2007 Australia’s Green Party even tabled a Migration
Amendment (Climate Refugees) Bill.20 We support the use of the term climate “refugee” for two main reasons. First, the distinction
between transboundary and internal flight that is a core element of the traditional “refugee” concept does not help much since
climate change will cause both transnational and internal flight. Some
island nations will effectively cease to
exist, and some countries, especially those affected by drought, will be overburdened by
the scope of the national predicament. These people will have to findnd refuge
outside of their home country. Some climate refugees might thus cross borders while
most will stay within their country. It seems difficult to argue that a global governance
mechanism for their protection should bestow a different status, and a
different term, depending on whether they have crossed a border. Second, we
see no convincing reason to reserve the stronger term “refugee” for a category of people
that stood at the centre of attention after 1945, and to invent less appropriate terms—
such as “climate-related environmentally displaced persons”—for new categories of
people who are forced to leave their homes now, with similar grim consequences. The
term refugee has strong moral connotations of societal protection in most world cultures and
religions. By using this term, the protection of climate refugees will receive the
legitimacy and urgency it deserves. In sum, we propose for both the emerging
research program and the political discourse on climate-related migration to define
“climate refugees” as people who have to leave their habitats, immediately or in the near
future, because of sudden or gradual alterations in their natural environment related to
at least one of three impacts of climate change: sea-level rise, extreme weather events,
and drought and water scarcity. This deanition covers climate refugees in both industrialized and developing
countries. However, in practical terms only climate refugees in poorer developing countries will be an issue of international concern,
cooperation and assistance. It is people in developing countries who are most likely to be compelled to leave their homes and
communities, owing to low adaptive capacities, their often vulnerable location vis-à-vis climate change events, often high
population densities, pre-existing hunger and health problems, low level of per capita income, often weak governance structures,
political instability and other factors.21 The following analysis is thus restricted to climate refugees in Africa, Asia, Latin America,
and Oceania.
There’s admittedly disagreement about the correct term – but it all basically
means the same thing and debates about the terminology trade off with
practical solutions
Due to the lack of legal rights under international law, as well as the fact that concept of climate refugees
has only emerged within the last 30 years, the terminology, narratives, and definitions
surrounding climate refugees is one that is highly discussed. The discussion
around “environmental refugees” primarily began in 1985 with the publication of a paper by El-Hinnawi (Berchin, et
al. 2017). He defined environmental refugees as “those people who have been forced to leave their
traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental
disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardize their existence and/or seriously
affects the quality of their life” (2017, 148). Throughout the years, multiple authors, such as Renaud et al. in 2007,
have proposed three categories of environmental migration in attempt to create stronger
typology (Kraler et al. 2011, 32). The first category is “environmental emergency migrants.” This
includes people who are forced to flee rapidly in avoidance of an environmental event such as natural disasters. These people
typically remain within their country or are able to return for those who move across borders (2011, 32). The second
category is “environmentally forced migrants.” This category is most strongly relates to
climate refugees, as it refers to people who don’t have an option but to leave their home
nation, but typically as a slower pace than the first category. The y cannot return to their home nation for various reasons such as
rising sea levels, extreme soil degradation, or socio-economic factors (2011, 32). The third category is
“environmentally motivated migrants,” which includes people who preemptively leave
their home nation because of a “constantly deteriorating environment,” but is not necessarily the
last option available to them. This category could be associated with the concept “migration as
adaptation” and is most often driven by socio-economic factors (Kraler et al. 2011, 33). The second
and third categories above are what has been the subject of most discussion in the field. One of the most debated and critiqued
concepts is the usage of the term “refugee” when discussing forced migration. Many claim the term climate
refugee is flawed and adds to socio-political inequality and injustice. Bettini et al. a rgue that
using climate refugee undermines human mobility, is not identifiable because of an
inability to single out an environmental stressor as the cause of a migration, and is not
practical within the existing legal systems (Bettini et al. 2016, 351). Others focusing on legality argue refugee is
a “legal misnomer” that will weaken refugee law if used in this way. The connotations already associated with the term
refugee are also seen as a threat by some thinkers. The conversation around policy could turn to “they” are dangerous, or “we” are
developed (Mayer 2014, 30). The cause of migration does not matter; it’s the increased number of seeking refuge, which leads to
xenophobia and racialization (2014, 31). Kraler et al. state that for
the simple reason of the term refugee
being challenged in academic and political debate, we should adopt a more general
term of “environmentally induced migration” (Kraler et al. 2011, 33). In contrast, “climate
refugee” has its proponents. Mayer disputes the “legal misnomer” calling it “a
misunderstanding of law as an immutable set of given norms” (Mayer 2014, 30). The 1951
Convention does not claim the exclusive definition of refugee. Legal notions and the
interpretations of different laws are always open to \negotiation. There are so many
challenges with creating new categories of international legal protections, let alone those
associated with determining the environmental causes of migration. The use of
refugee would at the very least reduce the many barriers that would occur
before proper legal protections are put in place (2014, 30 -32). Biermann and Boas also support
the term “climate refugee” for similar reasons. As the effects of climate change become increasingly apparent, such as island nations
ceasing to exist, peopl e will have to find refuge outside of their homes. Seeking
refuge already has global
mechanisms attached to it and creating new terminology or statuses for
these instances would be inefficient and difficult (Biermann and Boas 2010, 64).
Answering DAs
AT//Wages/Economy DAs
Climate refugees are good for the economy and offset costs – many
warrants
Legrain 17 - nior visiting fellow at the London School of Economics' European Institute and founder of OPEN, “Refugees are
a Great Investment”, 3 February 2017. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/03/refugees-are-a-great-investment/)//abaime
<Refugees are a tiny proportion of the U.S. population — some 3.3 million have been admitted since 1975
— but they have had an outsized impact. Google co-founder Sergey Brin was a child refugee from the Soviet
Union; Google’s parent company, Alphabet, is now America’s second-most valuable firm, with a market capitalization of $553
billion. WhatsApp co-founder Jan Koum and PayPal co-founder Max Levchin were refugees from Ukraine. The late Andy Grove, who
helped start and was later CEO of Intel, fled from communist Hungary. So, too, did hedge-fund manager and philanthropist George
Soros; Thomas Peterffy, the founder of Interactive Brokers Group; and Steven Udvar-Hazy, the founder of Air Lease Corp.
Yet nobodycould have guessed when they arrived in the United States that those refugees
would be so successful. Had they been denied entry, nobody would have realized the opportunity that America had
missed. So just imagine what some of the brave Syrians fleeing the barbarism of the Islamic State, President Bashar al-Assad’s brutal
regime, and the bombing raids ordered by Russian President Vladimir Putin could go on to achieve in the United States. After all,
the biological father of the late Steve Jobs, the co-founder and legendary CEO of Apple, America’s most valuable company, was a
Syrian who fled his country for political reasons.
People originating from the seven countries on Trump’s blacklist already have contributed a lot to America. eBay was founded by an
Iranian-American, Pierre Omidyar. Its market capitalization of $36.1 billion dwarfs the value of Trump’s unlisted business holdings,
while Omidyar’s self-made $8.2 billion fortune is more than twice as big as Trump’s partly inherited one. Oracle Corp., a software
giant worth $162.2 billion, was co-founded by the late Bob Miner, who was also Iranian-American. While the communities from the
other countries are much smaller and generally more recent, one notable Somali-American is author and activist Ayaan Hirsi Ali, an
outspoken critic of both Islamic extremism and Trump’s anti-Muslim policies.
Of course, not
all refugees and immigrants turn out to be exceptionally successful. But
prejudice is a poor predictor of how they will fare. When Vietnamese “boat people” fled their country in the
late 1970s and sought refuge elsewhere, they were seen as undesirable and often turned away. Eventually, many were allowed to
settle in America. Most arrived speaking little or no English, with few assets or relevant job skills. Yet Vietnamese refugees in the
United States are now more likely to be employed than people born in America and have higher average incomes.Vietnamese
refugees in the United States are now more likely to be employed than people born in America and have higher average incomes.
They have also played a key role in building trade and investment links with Vietnam. One notable entrepreneur is David Tran, who
founded Huy Fong Foods. Its main product is Sriracha chili sauce, that big red bottle you see in every Vietnamese restaurant. Most
of what he makes is exported to Asia, something that Trump ought to approve of, given his obsession with America’s trade balance.
Refugees contribute to the economy in many ways: as workers, entrepreneurs,

innovators, taxpayers, consumers, and investors. Their efforts can help create jobs; raise
the productivity and wages of American workers; increase capital returns; stimulate
international trade and investment; and boost innovation, enterprise, and growth.
Some do low-skilled jobs that Americans spurn, such as working on farms, cleaning
offices, and caring for the elderly. Contrary to fears that they steal jobs, studies show
that refugees enable Americans to do better-paying jobs that they prefer.
Higher-skilled refugees — and their highly educated children — provide valuable talent
and boost the productivity and wages of Americans with complementary skills. For instance,
Syrian nurses can help American doctors provide better care to more patients. Some 28 percent of refugees have a bachelor’s or
advanced degree, the same proportion as people born in the United States. Among the immigrants on Trump’s banned list, those
from Iran, Libya, Syria, and Sudan are more likely to have a degree than the U.S. average. Many work for leading U.S. businesses,
notably in the technology sector, that are now up in arms about the travel ban.
Whatever their skill level, refugees tend to be highly motivated and work hard to rebuild
their lives. At Chobani, the company that makes America’s leading brand of Greek yogurt, three in 10 employees are refugees.
Chobani founder Hamdi Ulukaya doesn’t just employ them to do good; it also turns out to be good for the bottom line. Starbucks
CEO Howard Schultz’s admirable announcement that the company plans to hire 10,000 refugees worldwide in the next five years is
likely to be financially rewarding, too.
Enterprising refugees start businesses that create wealth, employ locals, boost growth, and stimulate trade and investment. Like
migration itself, starting a business is a risky venture that takes hard work to make it pay off. For those who arrive in America
without contacts or a conventional career, it is a natural way to get ahead. A study by the Kauffman Foundation found that in 2012,
immigrants to the United States were almost twice as likely to start businesses as people born in America.
Last but not least,newcomers and their children can help spark new ideas and technologies
that make all Americans better off. People uprooted from one culture and exposed to another tend to be more
creative. Moreover, groups with diverse perspectives and experiences — such as refugees and
people born in the United States sparking off each other — tend to outperform like-
minded experts at problem solving, which is what most work these days consists of.
Overall, refugees have a higher employment rate than people born in America. While Iraqis and
Somalis have lower employment rates, they are mostly recent arrivals, and employment rates tend to rise sharply over time.
Refugees who have been in the United States for 20 or more years also have higher median household incomes than people born in
America.
A study by Kalena Cortes of Texas A&M University found that among immigrants who arrived in the United States between 1975 and
1980, refugees integrated faster than “economic migrants.” Whereas refugees earned 6 percent less and worked 14 percent fewer
hours than economic migrants in 1980, by 1990 they were earning 20 percent more and working 4 percent more hours, notably
because in general they improved their English, skills, and education faster over that period.
Of course, welcomingrefugees costs money upfront. But it’s a drop in the ocean: Out of the
$3.3 trillion federal budget in fiscal year 2015, the budget for the refugee resettlement
program was $609 million. That money tends to be spent on local goods and services, benefiting businesses and
creating jobs. And like providing public education to American teenagers, it’s an investment that yields further dividends once
refugees start working.
In fact, investing
one dollar in helping refugees get started can yield nearly two dollars in
economic benefits within five years.In fact, investing one dollar in helping refugees get started can yield nearly two
dollars in economic benefits within five years. That’s the key finding of my recent study for OPEN, an international think tank
focused on refugee and other openness issues that I founded, and the Tent Foundation, whose mission is to help forcibly displaced
people.
A study of greater Cleveland found that while $4.8 million was spent on refugee services in 2012, spending by refugees, refugee-
owned businesses, and refugee service organizations boosted the local economy by $48 million, creating 650 jobs and providing $2.7
million in tax revenues to local and state governments.
Refugees’ reliance on public assistance declines sharply over time, although it tends to remain
higher than the general population. Even so, refugees tend to be net contributors to public finances
over their lifetimes: Two-thirds of new arrivals are of working age (and thus schooled abroad), on average they are in their
mid-20s (and thus have a full working life ahead of them), and their taxes help service the huge public debt incurred by the existing
U.S. population.>
Leaving climate migrants unaddressed spurs anti-immigration policies and

degrades wages and conditions for unskilled jobs
C. Avoiding "Business as Usual" in the United States
Aside from human rights, there are significant practical justifications for the United
States to enact domestic legislation to address the arrival of climate-displaced
populations. First, the country already has a large population of undocumented immigrants. 170 This has created domestic
political turmoil, as well as a large population that exists without legal rights or protection. 171 The country does not have the
economic resources to process and deport climate migrants if they arrive in numbers approximating scholarly predictions. 1 72 Next,
the fact that climate migrants may be fleeing completely uninhabitable countries means there may be no logical return country. 173
The subsections that follow will discuss these justifications for why the United States should enact legislation addressing the legal
status of climate migrants before they arrive.
1. The Undocumented Population and its Impacts
Undocumented climate migrants will cause political and economic disruption in the
same manner as other undocumented immigrants, but on a much larger scale due to
their much larger numbers. As discussed above, the United States immigration policy 1 74 typically tracks periods of
domestic economic conditions and immigration rates. 175 If history provides an accurate model for the
future, large numbers of climate migrants arriving in the United States will significantly
impact the country as a whole, as well as local communities. This may, in turn, spur
anti-immigration policies that marginalize climate migrants. 1 76
The government should try to integrate undocumented immigrants, including climate migrants, for many reasons.
Marginalization imposes costs on the entire economy. The presence of a large,
undocumented labor force in this country tends to degrade wages and conditions
for unskilled jobs. 177 This hurts both United States citizens and immigrant
populations. On the other hand, studies show that where immigrants are legally present, their
participation in the economy has historically provided concrete economic benefits
for the receiving country. 178 Additionally, although immigrants are often accused of
taking citizens' tax dollars in the form of public welfare benefits, empirical evidence
shows that they do not consume those resources at greater rates than citizens. 179 In fact,
Professor Kevin Johnson points to the European welfare state to suggest that "[r]elatively easy access to benefits for immigrants in
Europe... has not caused unduly negative fiscal impacts." 180 Moreover,
access to public benefits in the
United States is often limited to citizens. 181 Thus, the fears that cause the country to
close its borders are misplaced, and the benefits of opening them go unrecognized.
If there are costs to having open borders, there are also substantial costs associated with enforcing restrictive immigration laws. 182
DHS, charged with enforcing immigration law in the United States, receives limited financial resources. 183 In fact, President
Barack Obama cited budget constraints to justify exercising prosecutorial discretion for undocumented immigrants that came to the
country as children. 184 An
influx of climate migrants that far exceeds current rates of
immigration has the potential to overwhelm the immigration enforcement system.
Failing to economically and socially integrate undocumented immigrants is also likely to
impose both economic and social costs by fracturing communities and creating a
"shadow population" of unlawful aliens. 1 85 Society as a whole suffers the consequences of the existence of this
population.18 6 In sum, creating some legal mechanism to integrate climate migrants before they arrive in the United States will
maximize economic and social benefits to the country while minimizing costs.
2. Dealing with Disappearing Nations
Assuming that the United States declines to enact legislation for climate migrants and
continues to rely on existing immigration law to address this problem, it will face the
practical challenge of how to treat individuals whose homes become uninhabitable due
to sea-level rise or other environmental disasters. 18 7 In many cases, the United States will have no logical
country to which it could deport climate migrants. 188 It would be challenging to decide the meaning of "uninhabitable" in this
instance. This
Comment would grant Congress that responsibility by suggesting that it
should define climate migrant narrowly and technically. 189 Focusing on an individual or
population obviates the need to determine whether a nation itself is uninhabitable. If
these populations benefitted from targeted prosecutorial discretion or one of the
country's other alternatives to refugee status, 190 they would still be subject to the
potential issues outlined in Part II, including the temporary nature of the relief, the lack
of access to public benefits and travel, and the legal hurdle of entering the United States.
191
Moreover, dealing with climate migrants on a case-by-case basis would divide them into
several different legal categories. The resulting complicated, piecemeal approach would
lead to confusion for government officials, employers, and climate migrants themselves
as to their legal status, rights, and obligations. Deporting climate migrants on a case-by-case basis comes with
its own problems. Not only would the United States need to find receiving nations for deportees, but such an approach would subject
it to international human rights criticism. 192 Finally, the government is unlikely to have the resources to deport climate migrants in
large numbers; those who are granted temporary relief would swell the ranks of an already-large population of undocumented
immigrants. 1 93
Moral claims of justice and equal distribution of costs trump

nonquantifiable impacts on wages – economic effects of immigration are
negligible
Nawrotzki 14 Raphael Nawrotzki is a postdoctoral associate for the University of Minnesota
Population Center on the Terra Populus project (Raphael, “Climate Migration and Moral
Responsibility,” 4/2/14. NCBI, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5035111/) // SR
Argument 2
Another common argument against immigration is that immigrants cause economic

hardship for existing citizens in that they take jobs away, depress wages, and cause
higher marketplace competition to drive up prices (Beck 1996). Also, applying the historical
principle here sheds a different light on the situation. Since MDCs have generated their
wealth and technological status through fossil fuel combustion, the whole economy has
been financed without taking the entire costs into account. LDCs carry much of these externalities in
the form of destroyed livelihoods resulting from the impacts of climate change. It appears to be fair to redistribute
the externalized costs to the causal agents (MDC markets). The redistribution process might take the form of
slightly increased prices and depressed wages through higher market competition. This argument does not falsify Beck’s (1996)
objection of a potentially negative economic impact of immigration; rather,
his objection is overridden by a
more pressing moral claim of justice and equal distribution of costs, which trumps non-
essential economic interests of citizens.3
Instead of looking at the issue from an egalitarian perspective, proposing the fair redistribution of costs, we can take a rights based
approach. To this end, this paper modifies an interesting scenario originally presented by Huemer (2010):
Pedro is in desperate need of food since a large swarm of locusts has destroyed his harvest. The locusts have (noticed or unnoticed)
escaped Sam’s barn, who is breeding locusts for sale as food for snakes and other reptiles to the local zoo. Fortunately, Pedro has a
plan to remedy his food problem: he will walk to the local marketplace, where he will buy bread. Sam is aware of all this and is
watching Pedro. Due to his economic circumstances, Pedro will have to buy the cheapest bread available at the market. Sam’s
daughter, however, also plans to go to the market, slightly later in the day, to buy some of this same bread. This bread is often in
short supply, so that the vendor may run out after Pedro’s purchase. Sam’s daughter could buy more expensive bread, but she would
prefer not to. Knowing all this, Sam fears that if Pedro is allowed to go to the market, his daughter will be forced to pay a slightly
higher price for bread. To prevent this from happening, he accosts Pedro and physically restrains him from traveling to the market.
Pedro returns home empty-handed, where he dies of starvation.
In this scenario the marketplace is the territory of the U.S. The main actors are Pedro, the poor Mexican farmer who has lost his
livelihood, and Sam, representing the U.S. population and government. Pedro’s livelihood destruction results from an environmental
force (the locusts) representing climate change which can be causally linked to the economic activities of Sam. Sam’s action of
actively preventing Pedro from entering the marketplace is exemplary of strict U.S. border control. Even without the causal link to
Pedro’s harvest failure, Huemer (2010:432) concludes that Sam’s behavior is extremely wrong since it constitutes “harmful
coercion.” The causal link to Pedro’s plight makes the case even stronger. But could Sam’s action be excused, since it was necessary
to protect his daughter from economic disadvantage? Certainly not! Slight economic disadvantages can never justify preventing
Pedro from reaching a place of livelihood security, especially if Sam is responsible for Pedro’s livelihood insecurity.4
In addition to this moral argument, there is some ambiguity regarding immigrants’

economic impact. While some authors have argued that immigration might reduce labor market opportunities of less skilled
natives (e.g., Borjas 2001), the general opinion among migration scholars seems to be that the
overall economic effects of immigration are negligible (Simon 1999, Card 2004, Hanson
2009, Holzer 2011).
AT//USCIS DA
Link-turn—deporting climate migrants causes clog—the aff reverses that
DeGanaro 15- Cary DeGanaro- Executive Office for Immigration Review, University of Colorado
School of Law, “LOOKING INWARD: DOMESTIC POLICY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE REFUGEES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND BEYOND”, 2015, https://heinonline-
org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/ucollr86&id=1073, //
Suraj P
Assuming that the United States declines to enact legislation for climate migrants and
continues to rely on existing immigration law to address this problem, it will face the
practical challenge of how to treat individuals whose homes become
uninhabitable due to sea-level rise or other environmental disasters. 18 7 In many cases, the United States will
have no logical country to which it could deport climate migrants. 188 It would be
challenging to decide the meaning of "uninhabitable" in this instance. This
Comment would grant Congress that responsibility by suggesting that it should define
climate migrant narrowly and technically. 189 Focusing on an individual or population
obviates the need to determine whether a nation itself is uninhabitable. If these
populations benefitted from targeted prosecutorial discretion or one of the country's
other alternatives to refugee status, 190 they would still be subject to the potential issues
outlined in Part II, including the temporary nature of the relief, the lack of access to
public benefits and travel, and the legal hurdle of entering the United States. 191 Moreover,
dealing with climate migrants on a case-by-case basis would divide them into several
different legal categories. The resulting complicated, piecemeal approach would lead
to confusion for government officials, employers, and climate migrants
themselves as to their legal status, rights, and obligations. Deporting climate
migrants on a case-by-case basis comes with its own problems. Not only would
the United States need to find receiving nations for deportees, but such an approach
would subject it to international human rights criticism. 192 Finally, the government is
unlikely to have the resources to deport climate migrants in large numbers; those who
are granted temporary relief would swell the ranks of an already-large population of
undocumented immigrants.
Answering Critiques
No Root Cause
There is no single explanation for climate migration – totalizing assertions
are reductionist and close doors on victims
Hall ’17 – Shane Donnelly is a doctoral candidate from the University of Oregon in Environmental Science and English-
Focalization, “War by Other Means: Environmental Violence in the 21st Century,” ProQuest Dissertation Publishing // shurst
The construct of the forced climate migrant, or the closely-affiliated notion of the climate refugee, is a
paradigmatic and prominent figure within climate change discourses. Such a claim requires a few
terminological caveats in the service of clarity and concision before I proceed to describe what paradigms climate migrants
instantiate. Strictly speaking, there
are no climate refugees. A refugee is someone with or seeking a legal protection
governed by the 1951 Geneva Convention. Under the UN’s definition, a refugee is “someone who has been
forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence” (“What is a Refugee?”).
Someone who flees their country of origin due to changing climate conditions in that country (or less commented on, conditions
within the country being migrated to) are not currently recognized as refugees. As the one report of the UN Secretary General on the
security implications of climate change unequivocally states: “Although terms
such as “environmental refugee” or
“climate change refugee” are commonly used, they have no legal basis” (UN Secretary General 2009). Beyond
legalistic ambiguity, there is wide uncertainty within academic literature regarding the actual
number of climate migrants, and even the ontology of climate migrants and refugees. The
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report estimates anywhere 157 between 50 and 350 million people may be displaced by climate change in
2050, while Richard Black, an analyst for the UNHCR, published a report on the 51st anniversary of the 1951 Geneva Convention
lambasting the focus of policymakers on environmental refugees as a category of migrants in need of additional legal protections.
Regarding the existence of climate migrants, Black writes, “despite the breadth of examples provided in the literature, the strength of
the academic case put forward is often depressingly weak” (2). There are so many complex forces that cause people to move, it
is
perhaps too difficult or too reductive to single out environmental change as
the dominant cause of mass migrations. Black’s analysis, however, is confined to studies of more
contemporary cases of mass migrations; Takeyyuki Tsuda and Brenda Baker synthesize numerous studies in archeology and
bioarcheology to argue that environmental disruptions have powered human migration for millennia, and that contemporary
migrations are also motivated or hindered by environmental change, a position endorsed by the UN Secretary General (297-298,
2009). Andrew Baldwin separates the academic literature of climate migrants into the
“maximalists” and the “minimalists,” two camps that take generally opposing positions on the phenomenon of
climate migration. In general, the maximalists see climate change or other environmental changes
as major contributors or direct catalysts of international migration and the creation of internally displaced peoples
(IDPs), while the minimalists see climate change as a relatively minor contributor within a
larger collection of “push” and “pull” factors governing migration in and between nation
states (Baldwin “Securitizing climate migration…” 121-122). Like Black and Baldwin, I place myself in the minimalist camp, yet
nonetheless argue that climate migrants as constructs, as figures in climate narratives, carry forward major weight not 158 only in
UN refugee policy circles, but also in climate discourse and security discourse more broadly.45
Permutation
Failure to accept climate migrants is a form of western securitization and
neoliberalism against “inferior” nations – the aff reverses this
Dalby ’15 – Simon Dalby is an academic and CIGI Chair in the Political Economy of Climate
Change at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, July 2015, “Climate geopolitics: Securing
the global economy,” https://doi-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1057/ip.2015.3 // shurst
Indeed it is the failure to respond effectively and the increasingly alarming projections from
climate sciences concerning what is coming that have made security agencies pay attention to
climate matters (Anderson and Bows, 2011). Faced with long-term changes and required to think about
strategic threats to the integrity of states, security planners have been generating technical
reports and projection of the risks to states and directly to military infrastructure too over the last
few years. The focus on climate has revived the earlier discussions of environmental security
(Dalby, 2002) and added an immediacy and urgency to addressing these issues (Floyd and Matthew, 2013). Dalby 438 © 2015
Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics Vol. 52, 4, 426–444 Once again the
arguments were that
political instability in the global South would be caused by environmental change, and
fear of hordes of refugees in motion to the North were assumed to present crises that the
military might be called upon to ‘solve’. Much of this discussion in the US was
focused on tropes of national security, asking questions about what climate
change would do to American interests and how the American military
would be called on to act (Chalecki, 2013). The danger here is that traditional rhetoric of
national security will be invoked to specify poor, marginal and endangered populations
as a threat to stability that requires military interventions to stop migration or
deal with local violence deemed a security threat. Insecurity ‘over there’ might spill over
boundaries and disrupt trade or threaten regimes unable to handle the
influx. Climate migration is on the policy agenda (White, 2011). It is important to emphasize
that there is little serious research that suggests that environmental scarcities will lead to war, whatever social vulnerabilities might
occur and however frequently neo-Malthusian fears are reproduced in media accounts of imminent catastrophe (Theisen et al,
2011)! Dealing with humanitarian crises, especially in the Asia-Pacific theater, is a growing concern for Pentagon planners (Briggs,
2012), given the vulnerability of many island states to both rising sea levels and increased typhoon intensity. These events might
cause political instabilities that generate conflict too. But in the case of many island states their inundation is a problem that needs
urgent attention, and migration is going to continue to be necessary; this is an existential threat to island states but one that has not
generated much international sympathy despite repeated calls to understand this as a security threat. This
is a matter
of survival for low lying atoll states, a new matter of ‘national’ security as
states face the prospect of obliteration by rising sea water.
Negative
Note
The aff admits to the United States millions of refugees without any regard to their skill level or anything else. DA links, K links, CP
solvency arguments from case negatives to affirmatives that are similarly silent on immigrant qualifications (travel ban, open
borders, etc.) all apply here as well. If preparing your own case negative against this aff, I would recommend starting with the
materials below but supplementing them with evidence from other files.
Case
Squo Solves
There are sufficient global legal protections for refugees – US not key
Zeghbib 18 Hocine Zeghbib is a Senior Lecturer in Public Law at the University of
Montpellier (Hocine, “What protection is there for ‘climate refugees’?” 2/5/18,
https://progressivepost.eu/protection-climate-refugees/) // SR
Global warming and environmental degradation are leading to the forced relocation of millions of people, which, for ease of
reference we shall refer to as ‘climate refugees’. Should substantive law, which is unsuitable to protect them, be amended, be totally
reconstructed or replaced with pragmatic solutions?
Proven inapplicability of international law
The Geneva Convention on refugees is not applicable to the situation involving ‘climate
refugees’, as demonstrated by the decision of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in
2015. As such, is it appropriate for the Convention to be amended, as argued by certain NGOs and as was reiterated without
success at COP 23? That would amount to opening Pandora’s box. So is the solution to prepare a specific convention? If a specific
convention is deemed appropriate how should the scope of such an instrument be defined? Do we refer to the people as ‘climate
refugees’ or ‘environmentally displaced persons’? In short, the United Nations and their partners around the world now favour a
regional approach to the issue and are abandoning the purely legal approach. The New York Declaration that has been weakened by
the recent U-turn by the United States is an illustration of this.
Collaborative Research Solutions
The Nansen Initiative, strongly supported by the European Commission, seeks to meet
the basic needs of ‘refugees’ by guaranteeing the right to personal integrity and to the
family unit; the rights of the child; the reconstitution of civil status; the qualifications of
people, etc. The 2015 agenda established, inter alia, mechanisms for cooperation between states within the same region,
encouraged the development of emergency planning, the relocation of populations, the issuance of appropriate movement (travel)
visas and temporary residence permits. Limits: non-binding text applicable only to persons crossing at least one border.
The Kampala Convention, offers a unique solution that aims to prevent and prepare for
displacement in Africa: the Convention seeks to create and implement early warning
systems, disaster risk reduction strategies, contingency measures and disaster
management plans. The Convention is binding and encompasses all known causes of
forced displacement including armed conflicts. Its limitation is that only internally
displaced persons are referred to in the Convention.
On the European side, a motion for a resolution has been put forward that requires the
Commission to draft “criteria that clearly defines climate refugee status”. The own-
initiative report that would trigger the required procedure before Parliament is still
missing.
Unilateral Research Solutions
Norway, Sweden, Finland: a secondary protection may be granted to persons resident

overseas in circumstances where they are unable to return to their country of residence
due to an environmental catastrophe. Denmark provides the same protection for women. These measures are
rarely applied.
In the United States, the

“Temporary Protected Status” (TPS) provides protection
for residents and nationals of countries affected by wars, conflict or natural
disasters, including Sudan, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Somalia, Haiti and provides them with said protection until
such time as they can return to their country of residence. As a unique protection specific to “climate refugees”, the TPS has faced
criticism from the Trump administration and has already been revoked for nationals from Haiti, and will in time be revoked for
nationals from Honduras (2018) and Nicaragua (2019).
New Zealand which has previously developed bilateral agreements with Tuvalu on
quota-based immigration is now considering creating a specific visa for ‘climate
refugees’. Is this a real breakthrough or simply a rediscovery of the ‘humanitarian visa’?
Forced displacement and relocation of millions of people; inadequate legal protection;
regional solutions which prove to be ineffectual and unable to cope: “…significant reparations can
be achieved by the law: we, or more accurately, our children should have hope, for the future is not forbidden to anyone” (L.
Gambetta), even less so to ‘climate refugees’.
Status Quo solves – New Zealand will act as a model to other countries
Adele Peters, 11-8-2017, a staff writer at Fast Company who focuses on solutions to some of the world's largest problems, from
climate change to homelessness, There Will Soon Be Floods of Climate Refugees: Will They Get Asylum? Fast Company,
https://www.fastcompany.com/40491897/there-will-soon-be-floods-of-climate-refugees-will-they-get-asylum //Frese
In 2012, a migrant worker from the tiny, low-lying Pacific island nation of Kiribati tried to become a refugee in New Zealand,
arguing that he and his family were afraid to go home because of the impacts of rising sea levels. The courts didn’t accept that the
dangers were imminent–or that they were due to reasons of persecution that are outlined in the international refugee convention–
and rejected his claim. But people fleeing the effects of climate change on Pacific islands may soon have a new option: New Zealand’s
new climate change minister hopes to create an experimental humanitarian visa for “climate refugees.”
“There’s a conversation just beginning in New Zealand, with the change of government, that makes lots of things that didn’t feel
possible before now at least open for discussion,” says Vivien Maidaborn, executive director of UNICEF New Zealand, who has
advocated for support for people in neighboring countries who may soon be forced to move.
If implemented, the new visa category could give up to 100 people a year admission to
New Zealand because of climate change. (Because the potential visa is in the early stages of planning, it’s not yet
clear what the requirements will be to get one.) It’s an early attempt to begin to address migration that
will soon happen on a much larger scale. In Kiribati alone, climate change is likely to cause problems not
only because some villages are submerged; saltwater is already affecting drinking water supplies and the ability to grow food. As
ocean water acidifies, local coral reefs could suffer, affecting the supply of fish. Diseases, like dengue fever, could become more
common. Similar problems will play out across other island countries.
By 2050 hundreds of millions of people around the world–or, by some estimates, as many as 1 billion–could be displaced because of
environmental problems, such as drought and flooding, that are made worse by climate change. Some people will
move within countries. In the U.S., for example, an entire community living on an island in Southern Louisiana is
being relocated to higher ground within the state. But many will be forced to cross borders.
It may be unlikely that people forced to move because of climate change will ever be recognized as refugees under international law,
which requires someone to prove persecution based on politics, religion, or other aspects of identity (though people who are official
refugees aren’t afforded particularly good treatment, either). Climate change is indiscriminate. But
a growing
number of countries may do something similar to New Zealand.
New Zealand’s possible new visa isn’t completely unprecedented; some other countries
already have “humanitarian visa” categories that have been used to respond to
particular disasters. After the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Brazil created a policy to temporarily
accept Haitian immigrants. Argentina and Peru have created similar
categories for people affected by disasters.
“Thisnotion of humanitarian visas, legal pathways, and temporary protection are policy
options that we are encouraging states to use,” says Atle Solberg, head of the coordination unit of the
international Platform on Disaster Displacement.
There are challenges, at least with the policies that have existed to date in places like Brazil. “These categories are not really designed
for the long haul, and for durable, lasting solutions,” he says. “That is particularly relevant if you think of some of the more negative
effects in developing states. Let’s say it won’t be possible to return, and people will need to permanently leave some of these areas–
then these tools may come up short in terms of the need for permanent solutions.” But if
multiple countries create
new pathways for migration, and begin to coordinate regionally, Solberg says that he thinks “it
would go a long way” to help both in short-term crises and in the longer term.
In New Zealand, Maidaborn argues that the country could benefit from letting more people
migrate. “I don’t want to fall into the trap of thinking that people from Pacific nations who are really threatened by climate
change are victims,” she says. “A lot of world leadership has gone on from the Pacific around
climate action . . . I think there’s lot of expertise, a lot of thinking and development and action, that’s gone on in the Pacific
because it’s had to have gone on, and all that learning can be very applicable here.”
She believes that more

countries will follow New Zealand’s example. “I think as a world,
we’re going to see in much more material terms that our earth is a closed system . . . We sort
of pretended that they’re all separate systems, and we’re coming very much face-to-face with the idea that it’s all connected. The
solution will resolve us to act in an interconnected way.”
Status quo solves – international cooperation on migration is on the rise

Momentum has accelerated for enhanced international cooperation on migration. In

September 2016, the UN General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for
Refugees and Migrants, which affirmed the human rights of migrants and refugees, condemning xenophobia, and
committing to a new framework for comprehensive refugee responses.18 The General Assembly also agreed to
bring the International Organization for Migration (IOM) into the UN system, which previously had lacked a
designated agency for migration, although an opportunity was missed because IOM was denied a norm-setting role in the rights of
migrants.19 The
New York Declaration also committed to a two-year negotiation process for
a Global Compact for Migration and a Global Compact on Refugees.
Alt Causes / Climate Change not Key
There are many alt-causes to migration – price, political issues, language,
ethnicity, religion and education
Hildegard Bedarff and Cord Jakobeit, 5/2017, Center for Research on the Environment and Development,
University of Hamburg Faculty of Business Economics and Social Sciences, The University of Hamburg,
https://www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/20170524-greenpeace-studie-climate-change-migration-displacement-
engl.pdf //Frese
2.2. Households and individuals decide whether to stay or leave
The reasons for flight and migration are complex. Researchers have shown that migration is
usually based on decisions made by households and individuals who are influenced in
turn by many (often interconnected) push and pull factors.16 These decisions are often not
voluntary, but attempts to ensure survival, escape extreme poverty, to live in dignity,
or flee from violence, persecution and war. In some African states, entire villages will pool the means for travel
and decide together which member of the village should migrate to later support the community with remittances, invitations for
visa applications, and the like. It is almost impossible for the individuals selected to oppose this collective decision because they and
their families would otherwise become isolated in the community.
The diagram illustrates the

complexity of decisions regarding migration. Factors on three
different levels influence the decision to stay or leave. At the macro-level, changes in politics, economics,
society, environment, demographics and land use, as well as conflicts and war, play a role. Although each of these factors can be the
most important driver of migration, people
often decide to leave their home or stay when changes in
several of these areas coincide. Changes in one area affect other areas, potentially
causing the overall situation of inhabitants to greatly deteriorate (or improve). If climate change
continues to advance, worsening or even destroying the livelihoods of more and more people, it will become a more significant
factor. Of key importance, of course, is whether the targeted region or country will even permit entry and residence.
Specific contexts (meso-level in the diagram) also contribute to decisions on migration. Social networks in the homeland and in the
diaspora can act both as drivers or inhibitors of migration. Agencies for recruiting workers outside the region simplify migration.
Measures to adapt to climate change, such as local protection programs against
hurricanes/cyclones or floods, and aid for post-disaster construction, can persuade
people to stay or return. Not least, the costs of migration are crucial for deciding
whether people can undertake the journey at all.
Poverty can be a driver of, or an obstacle to migration. The search for better livelihoods motivates people to migrate, but poor
people in particular do not often have the financial means to do so. On the micro-level, it is not only
prosperity/poverty and individual goals that play a role, but many other factors as well, such as language,
ethnicity, religion, age, gender and education. The extent to which decision makers are
informed about dangers, risks and opportunities is also of great importance. Many migrants
and communities sending off a village member do not seem to know how dangerous it is to cross the Sahara and the Mediterranean,
and how radically Europe is closing its doors to refugees. Research based on interviews has shown that island inhabitants
in the South Pacific are not necessarily well-informed about the consequences of climate
change. To be able to plan their lives, it is essential that islanders be aware that sea levels will continue to rise. To fill this gap in
knowledge, Fiji has now introduced climate change as a subject at school.
Climate changes doesn’t correlate with more refugees – political stability is
the primary reason
Mark Maslin, 6-12-2018, A Professor ff Earth System Science At University College London And Founding Director Of
Rezatec Ltd, A U.K.-Based Geospatial Data Analytics Company, Undark, https://undark.org/article/climate-change-migrations-
conflict/ //Frese
THE DARFUR CONFLICT began as an ecological crisis”, wrote the then-UN secretary general Ban Ki-Moon back in 2007, about an
ongoing war which arose, he said, “at least in part from climate change.” Since then the
idea that climate change has
caused and will cause human conflict and mass migrations has become more and more
accepted — just look at the claimed effects of droughts in Syria and Ethiopia.
The media has even started using terms such as “climate refugees” and “environmental
migrants” to describe people fleeing their homes from these climate-driven conflicts. But it isn’t clear
whether there is much evidence for this link between climate change and conflict — there
certainly seems to be no consensus within the academic literature.
In our recent paper, my student Erin Owain and I decided to test the climate-conflict hypothesis, using East Africa as our focus. The
region is already very hot and very poor, making it especially vulnerable to climate change (in fact neighbouring Chad is by some
measures the single most vulnerable country in the world).
As the planet warms, East Africa’s seasonal rains are expected to become much more unpredictable. This is a particular problem as
recent economic development has been concentrated in agriculture, a highly climate-sensitive sector that accounts for more than
half of the entire economy in countries like Ethiopia or Sudan. One study led by the European Commission found that declining
rainfall over the past century may have reduced GDP across Africa by 15-40 percent compared with the rest of the developing world.
East Africa also has a long history of conflict and human displacement, which persists in some countries to this day, such as the civil
wars in Sudan and Somalia. The UN Refugee Agency reports there were more than 20 million displaced people in Africa in 2016 — a
third of the world’s total. The World Bank predicts this could rise up to 86 million by 2050 due to climate change.
To test the climate-conflict hypothesis, Erin

and I therefore focused on the 10 main countries in East
Africa. We used a new database that records major episodes of political violence and
number of total displaced people for the past 50 years for each of the 10 countries. We
then statistically compared these records both at a country and a regional level with the
appropriate climatic, economic, and political indicators.
We found that climate
variations such as regional drought and global temperature
did not significantly impact the level of regional conflict or the number of
total displaced people. The major driving forces on conflict were rapid population
growth, reduced or negative economic growth and instability of political
regimes. Numbers of total displaced people were linked to rapid population growth and
low or stagnating economic growth.
The evidence from East Africa is that no single factor can fully explain conflict and the
displacement of people. Instead, conflict seems to be linked primarily to long-term
population growth, short-term economic recessions and extreme political instability. Halvard Buhaug, a professor at the
Peace Research Institute Oslo, looked at the same questions in 2015 and his study reached much the same conclusion: sociopolitical
factors were more important than climate change.
Things were different for “refugees,” however — those displaced people who were forced to cross borders between countries.
Refugee numbers were related to the usual demographic and socio-economic factors. But
in contrast to total displaced people and occurrence of conflict, variations in refugee numbers were found to be related significantly
to the incidence of severe regional droughts. And these droughts can in turn be linked to a long-term drying trend ascribed to
anthropogenic climate change.
However, it is important to consider the counterfactual: had there
been slower population growth, stronger
economies and more stable political regimes, would these droughts still have led to
more refugees? That’s beyond the scope of our study, which may not be a definitive test of the links between climate change
and conflict. But the occurrence of peaks in both conflict and displaced people in the 1980s
and 1990s across East Africa suggest that decolonization and the end of the Cold War
could have been key issues.
Nonetheless, while conflict has decreased across the region since the end of the Cold War,
the number of displaced people remains high. We argue that with good stable governance
there is no reason why climate change should lead to greater conflict or displacement of
people, despite the World Bank’s dire predictions. Water provides one reason to be optimistic. The UN reports that, over the past
50 years, there have been 150 international water resource treaties signed compared to 37 disputes that involved violence.
What our study suggests is the

failure of political systems is the primary cause of conflict and
displacement of large numbers of people. We also demonstrate that within socially and geopolitically fragile
systems, climate change may potentially exacerbate the situation particularly with regards to enforced migration.
Climate change doesn’t cause conflict

Kita et. al 18 (Stern Mwakalimi, Research student in Geography at the University of Sussex, Environmental migration and
international political security from: Routledge Handbook of Environmental Displacement and Migration, pg. 358-359//waters)
Using similar datasets from similar geographical locations, other scholars have found no link between
environmental change and conflict. Using an event coincidence analysis, Schleussnera et al. (2016) found
that 23% of outbreaks of conflicts in countries with highly fractionalised ethnic groups
coincide robustly with climatic disasters such as heat waves and droughts. They also found a 9% global
coincident rate of armed conflict outbreak and occurrence of natural disasters. However, it is
important to note that their study does not show any evidence of armed conflicts being directly triggered by climate-related
disasters, but simply an occasional and infrequent temporal coincidence. In a study on the link between environmental scarcity and
conflict in 39 Sub-Saharan countries, Bell and Keys (2016) identified three
socio-political conditions that
explain the link between environmental scarcity and civil conflict: social vulnerability,
unequal resource distribution and the capacity of the state. Noteworthy is that the study found
no evidence that drought increases the risk of armed conflict in fragile states, even those
where socio-political conditions favour conflict outbreak. A study by Hegre et al. (2016) found no
significant effect of temperature anomalies on the risk of conflict, but the authors did suggest that
climate change may lead to low socioeconomic growth that may lead to further conflict. This could also affect investment in climate
change adaptation and mitigation, especially in low-income countries. In
a study on Sub-Saharan Africa, Buhaug et
al. (2015) analysed data on climate variability, food production and conflict over a 50-year
period and found no effect of food production shocks on the likelihood of conflict, dispelling
the position that harvest failure and bad weather conditions contribute to violence in Africa. They argue that political and
socioeconomic factors such as corruption, market failures and government policies better explain occurrence
of civil unrest in times of food crisis. Investigating the possibility that climate affects conflict risk through economic
challenges, van Weezel (2013) studied rainfall and conflict patterns between 1981 and 2010 in Sub- Saharan Africa and concluded
that there is no robust link between rainfall failure, an important determinant of crop
failure in Sub-Saharan Africa, and conflict onset, directly or indirectly. A study by Ayana et al. (2016)
focused on pastoralists in East Africa, and found that livelihood stresses due to rainfall and forage yields
fail to predict the occurrence and location of conflicts. Bergholt and Lujala (2012) have demonstrated that
even the indirect link between climate change and conflict is suspect. The authors used historical data for the period 1980–2007 to
show that severe and frequent climate-induced disasters create income shocks and affect
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of affected countries, but do not lead to conflict outbreaks
directly or indirectly. Many studies result in counterclaims by other scholars, with the ensuing debates often centering on
data and methods. For example, when Burke et al. (2009) claimed that Sub-Saharan African temperature increases contributed to
conflict outbreak in the region, Buhaug (2010) questioned the veracity of such claims given the restricted time period used in the
study by Burke and colleagues (the years 1981–2002), and suggested that the study used a purposefully narrow definition of
conflicts, and other methodological oddities. Buhaug therefore reached an opposite conclusion: climate change and
variability are poor predictors of conflicts in Africa. After recalibrating their models, Burke and colleagues
found that the purported relationship vanished, and accepted that their earlier results were wrong (Aldhous, 2010). In another
study, Hsiang and Burke (2014: 42) examined 50 quantitative studies and found “strong support for a causal association between
climatological changes and conflict across a range of geographies, a range of different time periods, a range of spatial scales and
across climatic events of different duration.”This led them to presume that the ‘climate security’ was firmly based in evidence. In
response, Buhaug et al. (2014) identified three challenges with the study: across-study independence, causal homogeneity and
sample representativeness. They employed the same method, but were not able to replicate the original results on climate change
and conflicts using the same cases used by Hsiang and Burke (2014).
Solvency Takeouts
The US doesn’t solve – hurricanes and poor infrastructure mean EDPs will
be affected here too.
Orrin H. Pilkey et al. November 2017-- Orrin H. Pilkey is James B. Duke Professor Emeritus, Division of Earth and Ocean
Sciences, at Duke University. Linda Pilkey-Jarvis is a geologist at the Washington State Department of Ecology, where she helps
manage the state's oil-spills program. Keith C. Pilkey is an administrative law judge with the Social Security Administration.
["Retreat from a Rising Sea", Accessible Online at: https://cup.columbia.edu/book/retreat-from-a-rising-sea/9780231168441] @
AG
What is to be done with the many hundreds of miles of high-rises jammed up against
the sea around the world, most spectacularly in Florida? To move all these buildings is not
economically feasible, but even if they could be moved, a suitable place for them would be difficult to find. One could
build seawalls that would have to enclose the islands completely and grow bigger and higher with time, but these would destroy the
very beaches that drew the construction in the first place. Preserving beaches for future generations is a compelling reason to
retreat in response to sea-level rise. As former Florida governor Bob Graham asserted, “This generation doesn’t have the right to
destroy the next generation’s beaches.” So for the sake of our grandchildren and great-grandchildren, we don’t have the right to
build beach-destroying seawalls to save our beachfront buildings from sea-level rise.
We can’t begin to replenish (i.e., pump or truck in new sand) all of Florida’s beaches. Furthermore,
much of Florida’s beachfront development is on permeable rock through which water
will rise and flood behind seawalls or levees. Replacing cars with small boats might work until the waves from
big storms roll through the community. Demol- ishing the high-rises would cost a fortune and produce a vast amount of water
pollution, although modern demolition techniques could salvage and recycle large portions of the building materials. Thus ,
by
the latter half of this century, much of the beachfront high-rise problem will be in our
laps to solve.
We humans find it hard to grasp the magnitude of changes that are under way, especially when the deniers try to confuse us. Sea-
level rise is at the forefront of the expected changes, and if the higher estimates of sea-level rise rates are valid, a true global human
catastrophe by the end of this century is in the offing. Our perception of what is permanent or lasting will be challenged, even
though nothing is happening with regard to the sea level that hasn’t happened before in the geologic past. The recent disasters
intensified by rising seas are not random events without underlying causes. Indeed, climate changes, including the frequency of
extreme events, have advanced to the point that we can no longer predict future events based partly on what has happened in the
past.
Even events on the scale of Hurricane Sandy rarely result in immediate significant
changes in coastal development patterns. In the 1980s, many coastal planners and scientists were saying that if
just one more hurricane hit, surely things would change, and we would start moving back from the beachfront and prohibit further
construction in these extremely dangerous areas. Then along came Hurricane Hugo in 1989, and the idea of responding
sensibly to the storm to prevent damage from the next inevitable storm was tabled.
At the time, South Carolina had a law that any beach house destroyed in a storm could not
be replaced. This law was perhaps the most merciful and politically least controversial way to begin a retreat from the beach.
But influential citizens with damaged houses howled, and the rules were changed so that
if you could find the roof of your house, you could rebuild! When the dust cleared,
Hurricane Hugo had become an urban-renewal project with many mom-and-pop cottages replaced by
“McMansions” and even some high-rise condos. Several other post-Hugo hurricanes in the southeastern United States also proved to
be urban-renewal projects when they should have been opportunities to retreat. These urban-renewal projects also have effectively
priced out lower-income residents from the coast.
The aff fails – not quick enough, broadening refugees undermines funding
and allow renegotiation to dilute obligations
W. H. 3-6-2018, writer for the Economist, Why climate migrants do not have refugee status, Economist,
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/03/06/why-climate-migrants-do-not-have-refugee-status //Frese
EACH morning, as the tide recedes, the people of the Marshall Islands check the walls that protect their homes from the sea. Sea
levels in this part of the western Pacific are rising by 12mm a year—four times the global average—and countering them with
sandbags, concrete and metal is a Sisyphean task. Eight islands in nearby Micronesia have been
swallowed by the ocean in recent decades, and most of the Marshall Islands could follow by the end of the
century. Here and elsewhere on the world’s fringes, the apocalyptic consequences of climate change have become reality. Many
people will be forced to find new places to live. Forecasts vary, but one widely cited
study, from the United Nations University, suggests that there will be 200m
environmental migrants by 2050. Both migrants fleeing environmental disaster and those escaping war will be
constrained in their choices. But currently only the latter may seek refugee status, and with it the right to safe asylum. Why?
On the surface, the problem is bureaucratic. Environmental

migrants are not covered by the 1951
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which is designed to protect
those fleeing persecution, war or violence. The UN agencies most involved in refugee rights, the UN Refugee
Agency (UNHCR) and the UN Development Programme, agree that the term “climate refugee” should not be used to describe those
displaced for environmental reasons. The UNHCR already struggles to provide adequate support for the world’s 22.5m refugees
(from war and persecution). During
the Syrian refugee crisis, it admitted to being “stretched to
the limit”. If the UNHCR broadens its definition of “refugee” to support an
entirely new category, it is unclear if the political appetite exists to provide
the necessary funding.
Nina Birkeland, senior adviser for disasters and climate change at the Norwegian
Refugee Council, says that the process of renegotiating the existing refugee treaty or
creating a new one could take decades. Experts also worry that political
opportunists, who regard the current refugee convention as being too generous, would
use its renegotiation as an opportunity to dilute current obligations. Perhaps more importantly,
some of those affected do not want to be called “refugees”. The former president of the central Pacific nation of Kiribati, Anote Tong,
resisted the label, stressing that his people wished to “migrate with dignity”. Slowly unfolding disasters brought about by rising sea
levels, desertification and droughts result in complex and often gradual patterns of movement. Their victims resist easy
classification.
At the same time, New Zealand is set to become the first country to recognise the impact of
climate change as grounds for a claim of asylum. The prime minister, Jacinda Ardern, has plans to create a
special visa for Pacific Islanders forced to relocate because of rising sea levels. Though the scheme will only offer
100 visas annually, it sets a precedent. Indeed state-led solutions offer the best hope for such refugees. The
Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), launched in 2016 by a coalition of national governments, will encourage countries to
assist these migrants despite the lack of legal recognition of their plight. It builds on a “Protection Agenda” that 109 countries
endorsed in 2015, and aims to integrate its principles into national laws. The
PDD’s reach is more limited than
that of the UN agencies. It cannot create new global legal standards. But supporters argue that it
provides the most effective way to organise the necessary resources. With climate change set to cause new
waves of migration, states cannot implement new rules quickly enough.
The US has it’s own climate issues – the plan would exacerbate them
Pilkey et al 16 – professor of Earth and Ocean science at Duke, geologist in the State of Washington’s Department of
Ecology, and professor of mechanical engineering at Queen’s Univesity (Orrin, Linda, and Keith respectively, “Coastal Calamaties”,
“Retreat from a rising sea”, 2 May 2016)//abaime
Other flat, low-lying stretches of land next to the sea include the northeastern corner of mainland North Carolina, which is one of
three areas in the lower 48 states most threatened by sea-level rise. The Mississippi Delta and
South Florida are the other two areas with this distinction. The mainland behind the Outer Banks of North Carolina is a broad, flat,
swampy area (including the Great Dismal Swamp) surrounding Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds. Compared with the residents of the
barrier islands facing the sea, the mainland folks are, on average, less prosperous, less visible, less educated, and less influential in
the North Carolina political scene. Probably more than 100 small towns, some consisting of a few
houses and usually a church, are located there, and many have an elevation of less than
5 feet. Some of the larger towns include Manteo (population 1,340), Manns Harbor (821), Elizabeth City (18,470), Swan Quarter
(324), Bath (247), Aurora (520), Washington (9,744), Columbia (863), and Plymouth (4,107). In 2011, the Category 1
Hurricane Irene affected much of the area, flooding the lower portions of most of these
towns and inundating almost all of Manteo. As usual, the news media in North Carolina concentrated on
Irene’s damage to the buildings on the barrier islands on the Outer Banks and almost ignored the detrimental effects on the
mainland villages. In 2010, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) gave North Carolina a $5 million grant to map the
northeastern corner of the state, including maps of the predicted storm-surge levels with various sea-level rise scenarios of 1.5 feet, 3
feet, and 5 feet likely to occur by the year 2100. This kind of information is critical to community planners, to individuals building or
buying houses with the hope of eventually leaving them to their children, and also to industry scouts seeking new locations for
businesses and factories. Unfortunately, fearing
the impact on real-estate prices and local economies,
the state government prohibited the publication of the storm-surge maps, which now sit
in a drawer in a cabinet in someone’s office. This reckless, irresponsible act by the state
government lost it a critical opportunity to begin considering its options, including
planning a gradual retreat from one of North America’s areas most threatened by sea-
level rise.
Climate refugees are impossible to define -- other factors contribute to
migration
Wyman 13 (Katrina Miriam, Professor of Law at NYU School of Law, Responses to Climate Migration, https://heinonline-
org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/helr37&id=211, pg. 200-202//waters)
In addition to the moral qualms that we may have about designing a new binding legal instrument to assist solely
climate migrants, any proposal for such an instrument also presents practical problems. As
mentioned above, it may be difficult in practice to identify persons who migrate due to
climate change because migration decisions are typically the result of several factors. 66
While the environment may influence migration decisions, environmental considerations are rarely
the sole factor determining the decision to migrate. The multi- migration to climate change.'67
Setting to the side the prevailing multi-factorial understanding of migration decisions, B&B, D&G, and HEA recommend
definitions intended to confine the beneficiaries of their proposals to climate refugees or climate change displaced persons.'68 It is
questionable whether the proposals' definitions would cover all people migrating
because of climate change while excluding people migrating for other reasons,
assuming, as the proposals must, that it is possible to identify people moving because of
climate change. B&B propose to "restrict the notion of climate refugees to the victims of a set of three direct, largely
undisputed climate change impacts: sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity."' 61 9 In addition, B&B
propose to differentiate the level of funding available from their Climate Refu- gee Protection and Resettlement Fund based on the
extent to which the eligible impact can be causally linked with climate change. Full reimbursement would be available for the
incremental costs due to sea-level rise on the basis that "general causality with climate change is undisputed" while only "additional
funding" would be available for migration due to the other climate impacts on the basis that climate might be "only one causal factor
to account for environmental degradation."' However, if the goal is to assist climate migrants, B&B's highly specific definition of
climate refugee might be under-inclusive. As D&G argue, B&B's decision to restrict eligibility to persons moving due to three types of
climate impact "does not take into account the possibility that advances in science could enable more accurate determination of
which events are caused by climate change."'' Thus B&B's restrictive list of impacts risks excluding from coverage persons who are
displaced due to impacts that future science suggests are climate impacts. In addition, B&B's definition includes a number of
exclusions that could be questioned. The definition excludes persons who migrate for reasons that B&B deem indirectly related to
climate change, "such as international or national conflicts over diminishing natural resources."'172 For example, while B&B would
cover refugees from drought, they would not cover persons who flee conflicts triggered by the same drought.173 B&B also would
exclude persons who migrate due to efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change, such 1 74 as the building of dams or planting of
"biofuels crops."' There is a smaller risk that B&B's definition also could be over-inclusive. Future science might suggest that
components of the three types of impacts that B&B would cover should not be attributed to climate change. Also, as B&B
acknowledge, extreme weather events, drought, and water scarcity generally may be linked to climate change, but climate change
also might be only one factor contributing to them. B&B's effort to address this multi-causality by limiting the funding for migration
due to these environmental impacts to "additional" funding begs the question of how the Climate Refugee and Resettle- ment Fund
would ensure it reimburses only for the portion attributable to climate change.'75 If the Fund paid for more than the migration due
to climate- related drought damage, it would overpay in B&B's terms. Conversely, it would underpay if it paid for less than the
migration due to climate-related drought. D&G limit the beneficiaries of their proposal by defining a "climate change refugee as an
individual who is forced to flee his or her home and to relocate temporarily or permanently across a national boundary as the
resultof a sudden or gradual environmental disruption that is consistent with climate change and to which humans more likely than
not contributed."176 D&G envisage that a "body of scientific experts" created by their proposed convention would define the
disruptions that the convention would cover and periodically review whether disruptions should be incorporated into or removed
from the 177 eligible list. HEA largely follow D&G in attempting to circumscribe the beneficiaries of their proposal by limiting them
to persons moving due to events that are "consistent with climate change and to which humans very likely contributed," rather than
itemizing a list of covered climate change impacts. 78 However, HEA argue that their "'very likely' standard" would make it harder
than D&G's "'more likely than not' standard" to gain coverage, and accordingly their standard would better target resources to assist
persons moving due to assist policymakers in applying the definition. Is0 The open-endedness of the definitions of D&G and HEA
may detract from their efforts to assist climate migrants but only such migrants. D&G and HEA emphasize that the IPCC has been
able to identify impacts "as 'consistent with"' climate change."'1 They also are confident in the ability of science to indicate whether
environmental disruptions consistent with climate change are related to human actions, based again on the work of the IPCC.82
However, in characterizing a type of disruption as consistent with climate change or related to human activity, scientists will likely
be making judgments amid uncertainty. Moreover, they
presumably will be doing so with the knowledge
that their characterizations of disruptions may influence policymakers' determinations
about eligibility for protection under the climate migration instrument." 3 If the scientists are apt
to err on the side of over-inclusion in the face of uncertainty, eligibility might be extended beyond the limits that D&G and HEA
envisage. On the other hand, if the scientists are inclined to err on the side of under- inclusion in the face of uncertainty, eligibility
might be overly constrained. The open-ended
definitions of D&G and HEA carry the danger of de facto
delegating their conventions' breadth of coverage to a body of scientists. Despite the difficulties
with each proposal's definition of the intended beneficiaries, it may be possible to devise a definition that in principle would protect
climate migrants and only those migrants. Nonetheless, the
difficulties underscore that it will not be easy
to craft such a definition. Moreover, because of the multiplicity of factors
influencing migration, it may not be possible in practice to ascribe many
migration decisions to climate change.
Canada – AT//Populism IL
No backlash against immigrants – Canadian opinion is high.
Stephen Smith 3-22-2018 – Reporter for the Canada Immigration Newsletter. ["Majority of Canadians remain in favour of
immigration, new study finds", Accessible Online at: https://www.cicnews.com/2018/03/majority-of-canadians-remain-in-favour-
of-immigration-new-study-finds-0310368.html] @ AG
A majority of Canadians continue to hold positive views about immigration and its
impact on Canada’s economy, a new public opinion survey has found.
Conducted in February, the annual Focus Canada survey by the Environics Institute and the Canadian Race Relations Foundation
interviewed 2,000 Canadians over the age of 18.
Despite the hardening of views against immigrants in the United States and Europe, the study found that most Canadians
continue to view immigration in a mainly positive light.
This chart shows responses in favour or against the statement ‘Overall, there is too much immigration to Canada.’ Source:
Environics Institute
“Canadians as a whole continue to be more positive than negative about the current
levels of immigrants coming to this country, and with the legitimacy of refugees who
have been arriving,” the study says, noting that “worldwide, Canadians are among the most accepting
of immigrants in their country.”
Overall, 60
per cent of those surveyed expressed a favourable view of immigration. This
jumped to 80 per cent who see immigration having a positive impact on Canada’s
economy. Only 16 per cent of Canadians disagreed with this view.
“The positive impact of immigration is the majority view across the population, and the upward shift is evident across across most
groups but especially in Quebec and the western provinces, while holding steady in the Atlantic provinces and Ontario,” the study
notes.
The survey results were published on the same day Statistics Canada revealed that international migration was the main driver of an
increase in the country’s population in the last quarter of 2017. It also follows a report on Canada’s Atlantic provinces that says the
retention of immigrants to the region is crucial for its economic survival.
To find out if you are eligible for any Canadian immigration programs, fill out a FREE assessment form.
Integration concerns waning
The positive view of immigration was balanced by the fact 51 per cent of those surveyed said too many immigrants are not adopting
Canadian values. This percentage, however, was the lowest since the survey began asking Canadians about this issue in 1993.
Across Canada, positive opinions on immigration and refugees are more widespread in the province of British Columbia, where 66
per cent disagreed with the view that “overall, there is too much immigration in Canada.” The same percentage of Canadians aged 18
to 29 and second-generation Canadians also disagreed, as did 69 per cent of Canadians with a university degree.
Negative views of immigration and refugees were more widespread in the province of Alberta, among Canadians above the age of 60
and those with only a high school education.
Alberta also led Canadian provinces in the number of respondents who believed too few immigrants were adopting Canadian values
(62 per cent). This view, meanwhile, was lowest in British Columbia and Manitoba / Saskatchewan, where 46 per cent of
respondents shared this view.
Attitude toward refugees remains positive
The admission of 40,000 Syrian refugees since 2015 and the arrival of nearly 50,000
asylum seekers in Canada last year has not dampened Canadian support for refugees.
Of those surveyed,
45 per cent said they believe most people claiming to be refugees are
legitimate compared to 38 per cent who believe they’re not. Environics said uncertainty has replaced
some of the more strongly held views on the issue that it found in 2017, with 17 per cent now saying they have no clear opinion on
the legitimacy of refugee claims, an increase of seven points.
“This softening trend is evident across much of the population, but is most noticeable in Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan,” the
study says, adding this was also the case in Quebec, which was the focus of the asylum seeker influx in 2017.
Negative perceptions of refugees tend to increase with age, decrease with socio-economic status, and are more prevalent among men
and immigrants.
90% of Canadians feel their city is good for immigrants

Environics also shared the findings of the 2017 Gallup World Poll, which is conducted each year in 140 countries. This study found
Canadians holding some of the most positive views about their cities as a welcoming place for immigrants.
This chart shows the percentage of Canadians who believe their city is a good place for immigrants to live. Source: Environics
Institute
More than nine in 10 Canadians (92 per cent) said the city or area where they live is “a good place” for immigrants. This is an
increase of four points over 2016.
“Canadian public opinion on their community as a place for immigrants is significantly

more positive than for all other 34 OECD countries (where the average is 65 per cent), and has been
consistently so since 2006,” the study says.
Overall, Canada was ranked third by Gallup’s Migrant Acceptance Index, which measures comfort levels and attitudes to
immigrants. Only Iceland and New Zealand outranked Canada.
These findings mirror the recently released World Happiness Report, which surveys
immigrants about their sense of well-being in their adopted countries. Canada ranked
seventh in the world in terms of immigrant happiness, which Environics said parallels that of native-born Canadians.
Canada is resilient to populism – the political system is designed to
minimize extremism.
Amanda Taub 6-27-2017 – Reporter for the New York Times. ["Canada’s Secret to Resisting the West’s Populist Wave",
Accessible Online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/world/canada/canadas-secret-to-resisting-the-wests-populist-
wave.html] @ AG
A Different Kind of Identity
In other Western countries, right-wing populism has emerged as a politics of us-versus-

them. It pits members of white majorities against immigrants and minorities, driven by a sense that cohesive national identities
are under threat. In France, for instance, it is common to hear that immigration dilutes French identity, and that allowing minority
groups to keep their own cultures erodes vital elements of Frenchness.
Identity works differently in Canada. Both whites and nonwhites see Canadian
identity as something that not only can accommodate outsiders, but is enhanced by the
inclusion of many different kinds of people.
Canada is a mosaic rather than a melting pot, several people told me — a place that celebrates different
backgrounds rather than demanding assimilation.
“Lots of immigrants, they come with their culture, and Canadians like that,” said Ilya Bolotine, an information technology worker
from Russia, whom I met at a large park on the Lake Ontario waterfront. “They like variety. They like diversity.”
Identity rarely works this way. Around the world, people tend to identify with their race, religion or at least language. Even in the
United States, an immigrant nation, politics have long clustered around demographic in-groups.
Canada’s multicultural identity is largely the result of political maneuvering.
A Liberal Party worker distributed signs commemorating Canada’s 150th anniversary in Toronto’s Little Italy on June 17.CreditCole
Burston for The New York Times
In 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau

faced a crisis amid the rise of French Canadian separatism
in Quebec. His party was losing support, and his country seemed at risk of splitting in
two.
Mr. Trudeau’s solution was a policy of official multiculturalism and widespread
immigration. This would resolve the conflict over whether Canadian identity was more Anglophone or
Francophone — it would be neither, with a range of diversity wide enough to trivialize the old
divisions.
It would also provide a base of immigrant voters to shore up Mr. Trudeau’s Liberal Party.
Then, in the early 2000s, another politician’s shrewd calculation changed the dynamics of ethnic politics, cementing
multiculturalism across all parties.
Jason Kenney, then a Conservative member of Parliament, convinced Prime Minister Stephen Harper that the party should court
immigrants, who — thanks to Mr. Trudeau’s efforts — had long backed the Liberal Party.
“I said the only way we’d ever build a governing coalition was with the support of new Canadians, given changing demography,” Mr.
Kenney said.
He succeeded. In the 2011 and 2015 elections, the Conservatives won a higher share of the vote among immigrants than it did among
native-born citizens.
The result is a broad political consensus around immigrants’ place in Canada’s national
identity.
That creates a virtuous cycle. All parties rely on and compete for minority voters, so
none has an incentive to cater to anti-immigrant backlash. That, in turn, keeps anti-
immigrant sentiment from becoming a point of political conflict, which makes it less
important to voters.
In Britain, among white voters who say they want less immigration, about 40 percent also say that limiting immigration is the most
important issue to them. In the United States, that figure is about 20 percent. In Canada, according to a 2011 study, it was only 0.34
percent.
Courting Ethnic Groups
Even as politicians engineered a pro-diversity consensus, immigrant and minority groups have organized, unapologetic about
asserting their interests.
In Canada, because
all parties compete for all ethnic blocs, minorities do not tend to
polarize into just one party. That leaves little incentive for tribalism, even as minority groups feel
empowered to champion their ethnic or religious identity.
“We say, ‘Look, where do you stand on particular issues of importance to us?’” said Kulvir Singh Gill, a member of Toronto’s
powerful Sikh community. “And on the basis of that, we’ll be selective in our support.”
This month, Mr. Gill helped organize a fund-raiser dinner for Seva Food Bank, a Sikh-led charity he co-founded
The event was crawling with politicians. Senior members of Canada’s three main parties were present, as were several members of
Parliament and the provincial premier, Ontario’s equivalent of governor. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (Pierre Trudeau’s son) had
recorded a video to open the dinner.
All were seeking support from Canada’s Sikhs — but all were going to have to work for it.
Mr. Gill attributed this to “a real maturation in the community,” with Sikhs cultivating ties to all three parties, ensuring that the Sikh
voice would be represented no matter who holds office.
Other minority groups have pursued this strategy, too. As a result, while minorities in other countries feel pressure to assimilate, in
Canada they do best when they retain a strong group identity.
Political science research suggests that this

dynamic may have also made Canada resistant to
political extremism and the polarization plaguing other Western countries.
Lilliana Mason, a professor at the University of Maryland, has found that when group identity and partisan identity overlaps, that
deepens partisan polarization and intolerance against the opposing party.
But because Canadian politics accounts for diversity without polarizing across ethnic or
religious lines, it is more resilient. Everyone, including whites, becomes less likely to see
politics as a game of us versus them.
Canada won’t become a populist nation
John Geddes, 3-7-2017, Ottawa bureau chief at Maclean's and has covered federal politics and policy for more than two
decades, Canada's last lines of defence against populism Macleans.ca https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/canadas-last-lines-
of-defence-against-populism/ //Frese
A week after Donald Trump’s election as president of the United States last Nov. 8, Conservative MP Ted Falk rose in the House of
Commons during the time set aside for “members’ statements,” which falls just before question period and is, as a rule, politely
ignored. Falk represents the Manitoba riding of Provencher, hard by the windswept Minnesota border, and he spoke briefly of the
“special relationship we have with our long-time friends and neighbours” to the south. Then he finished up with, “May God continue
to bless America—God bless Donald Trump.”
That last part raised eyebrows among the many who take it for granted that Canadians had recoiled en masse at Trump’s win. But
back home in southeastern Manitoba, often referred to as the province’s Bible belt, Falk’s words weren’t controversial. His
constituency is largely evangelical Christian, reliably conservative and shares a lot in common with the American voters who made
Trump president. (Falk declined to be interviewed for this story.)
In fact, Canadian
conservatives in general tended to welcome Trump’s win. An
Ekos Research poll, which happened to be released on the day Falk rose in the House, found that while only 30 per
cent of Canadians approved of Trump, fully 57 per cent of declared Conservative
supporters viewed the new president favourably.
The populist energy stored in that reservoir of pro-Trump sentiment has to be taken
seriously by Canadian Conservatives, especially those now vying for the federal party’s leadership. From the
Liberal perspective, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has lately reaffirmed his old warning of a populist backlash unless government
policy reduces economic inequality. And, further left, MP Charlie Angus launched a bid for the NDP leadership last month by urging
his party to redefine itself in opposition to Trump-style populism.
All this attention to populism takes on a real-world urgency in light of what’s been happening—among other places on the Canada-
U.S. border—along that stretch of the 49th parallel separating Manitoba from Minnesota, mentioned in the House by Falk. It’s
there, as most Canadians have heard in news reports, that undocumented migrants have
been crossing by the dozen—often trekking for hours across snowy fields in bitter cold—
to leave Trump’s America behind and take their chances with Canada’s refugee process, maybe after warming up first
over coffee at Little Jay’s Café in Emerson, Man. (pop. 700).
The prospect of a growing number of asylum-seekers slipping into Manitoba—and Quebec and
British Columbia—is shaping up as an early test of Canada’s mood in the Trump era. Will the phenomenon ultimately benefit the
Liberals, highlighting again Trudeau’s welcoming embrace of newcomers? Or will a perceived challenge the migrants pose to law and
order reward a sterner rhetorical response from Conservatives, as it has in the U.S. and Europe, and help spark what is
routinely labelled a “populist” upsurge on the right?
Exactly what’s meant by populist isn’t always easy to pin down. Broadly speaking, though, the term is used most often these days to
capture what happens when politicians on the right tap anxieties over mass migrations, linking those fears with underlying
discontent over scarce jobs and stagnant wages for less-educated workers. In other words, populism means Trump’s rise in the U.S.,
the Brexit referendum vote to pull Britain out of the European Union and the serious challenges various right-wing parties pose in a
string of European elections set for this year.
Could that same recipe be cooked up in Canada? Trudeau’s

election triumph in 2015, followed by his
celebrated welcome of more than 40,000 Syrian refugees in 2016, had many observers
portraying Canada as almost uniquely immune to the inward-turning instinct behind Trump and Brexit.
Yet Frank Graves, the veteran Ekos pollster, has tracked and quantified similar strong currents coursing through Canadian
conservatism. “The
idea that a populist leader couldn’t win in Canada, that we couldn’t have
an analogue to Trump, is I think nonsense,” Graves says.
His public opinion research shows pessimism about the economic outlook and misgivings about diversity. For instance, Ekos polling
found back
in 1995 that 81 per cent of Canadians agreed that “cultural diversity” contributed
positively to Canadian identity. Asked the same question early
last year, only 66 per cent rated diversity as
having a positive impact.
Then there’s economic unease. According to Ekos, the percentage of Canadians who view themselves as middle-class has plummeted
from nearly 70 per cent around 2002 to below 50 per cent last year. Few
adult Canadians think the next
generation will fare better economically than theirs has. And presented with the statement “If the
current patterns of stagnation among all except those at the very top continue, I would
not be surprised to see the emergence of violent class conflicts,” Ekos found that 57 per cent of
Canadians agreed.
Combine hopelessness about economic prospects with a magnified sense of the risks out there in the world, and Graves says the
result is, among some Canadians, a growing hankering for more order—even a tendency
to accept authoritarianism.
“That type of outlook is much more receptive to the idea that we need a strongman who’s going to make decisive government actions
to deal with this,” he says. “So he’s going to build a wall, or he’s going to deport illegal immigrants, or he’s going to bomb enemies.”
Graves is careful to stress that being primed to accept right-wing populist messages isn’t a majority mindset in Canada. These
tendencies are, not surprisingly, by far most pronounced among avowed Conservative voters, and particularly in places like Alberta.
Which raises the question of how the Conservative party—and its 14 aspiring leaders—might adjust in the Trump era.
Other researchers also point to Canadian attitudes that appear receptive to a Trump-like message. For a recent McGill Institute for
the Study of Canada conference in Montreal, University of Toronto political science professor Michael Donnelly analyzed an online
survey of 1,522 Canadians conducted by the polling firm Ipsos and found scant evidence that Canada is particularly big-hearted
when it comes to outsiders who want in.
Donnelly reported that when Canadians were asked how much they agree or disagree with the
statement “The government should be generous in judging people’s applications for
refugee status,” their tendency to be generous ranked a middling ninth out of 22
countries. Canadian generosity only outranked Britain’s by a notch, and was just modestly ahead of Germany—both countries
widely regarded as having struggled to accept immigrants. “Whatever is driving Canada’s exceptionally
positive history of immigration and integration over the past half century,” Donnelly concluded,
“it does not appear to be an exceptionally tolerant public.”
Note that he didn’t say, however, that Canada’s world-famous reputation for integrating newcomers is undeserved—only that it can’t
be chalked up mainly to national niceness. Perhaps the
most persuasive case for why Canada really does
better than the U.S. and most European countries when it comes to fostering diversity
has come from researchers who focus not on Canadians’ attitudes, but on Canada’s
immigration policies and the political system.
It starts with the demographic clout of Canada’s foreign-born voters. They made up 20.6 per cent of the total population in the 2011
census, the highest proportion among the G8 countries, far higher than the roughly 13 per cent in both the U.S. and Germany. It also
matters that the vast majority of Canadian immigrants choose to live in big cities in Ontario, B.C., Quebec and Alberta.
University of Toronto political science professor Phil Triadafilopoulos stresses how immigrants to Canada become voting citizens
more quickly than in other Western democracies, and how potent their votes have become in Canadian elections. “They don’t remain
outsiders,” Triadafilopoulos says. “Politically, they become insiders very quickly.”
In an influential 2013 paper entitled “Immigration, Citizenship and Canada’s New Conservative Party,” Triadafilopoulos and two co-
authors, McMaster University’s Inder Marwah and Carleton University’s Stephen White, note that 84 per cent of eligible immigrants
in Canada become citizens, compared to just 75 per cent in Australia, 56 per cent in Britain, and a mere 40 per cent in the U.S.
They emphasize research showing that voting among immigrant Canadians roughly
matches turnout rates among native-born Canadians, and that immigrants are more likely
than voters born here to pay attention to election news, including watching televised
leaders’ debates.
Even more crucially, immigrants in Canada tend to cluster in Toronto and Vancouver, in what most
political party election strategists view as key ridings. “To alienate large numbers of immigrant voters in
dozens of federal ridings would almost certainly mean surrendering those ridings to
other parties,” Triadafilopoulos, Marwah and White write.
Still, they point to “grassroots
conservative opinion” that often seems resistant to high levels of
immigration and policies promoting multiculturalism. That leads to what Triadafilopoulos, Marwah and
White dub a “populist’s paradox” facing right-of-centre Canadian political leaders, who must find ways to speak to their base while
also broadening their “ethnic” appeal.
It’s a dilemma that’s familiar to Preston Manning. He remembers coping with anti-immigrant bigots when he was leader of the
upstart Reform party in the 1990s. “We had wild meetings,” Manning recalled in a recent interview. “Our first week in the ’97
campaign, we had ‘Let the People Speak.’ It was like Russian roulette. I would get up there and say, ‘Rather than us telling you what
this election is about, you’re going to tell us what it’s about.’ There would be some good, ordinary people, but there would always be
some nutcase who’d get up.”
Manning says he would try to politely disavow the nutcase’s anti-immigrant (or sometimes anti-Quebec) ideas without denouncing
the individual. He now heads the Calgary-based Manning Centre, which trains Conservative political operatives, conducts research
and holds a key annual gathering of the Canadian right in Ottawa.
At this year’s conference, held in late February, Manning urged Conservatives to try to harness the energy of Trump-era populism,
rather than only “denounce and decry” its dark side. Talking of grassroots Conservatives who worry that multiculturalism and
immigration threaten “Canada’s national values and identity,” Manning advised against “contemptuously dismissing [their]
concerns.”
But allowing anti-immigrant views any room to breathe has proven strategically risky.
Former Tory prime minister Stephen Harper laboured hard to make inroads among immigrant voters, relying largely on tireless
outreach efforts by Jason Kenney (who has left federal politics and is now seeking the Alberta Progressive Conservative leadership).
It paid off big in the Conservatives’ 2011 majority election win, which netted the Tories 32 of 47 seats in Toronto and its suburbs,
where immigrants made up about half the population.
Then came the 2015 election reversal. Facing Trudeau’s challenge, the Conservatives stoked the part of their base that was alarmed
by Islamic extremism or fundamentalism by proposing a ban on face veils during citizenship ceremonies, which Harper even said he
would consider broadening to the federal public service. The Conservatives would also strip the Canadian citizenship of dual
nationals convicted of terrorist offences and set up a “barbaric practices tip line.”
Chris Alexander, the former Conservative immigration minister who lost his Toronto-area seat in the 2015 election, later admitted
that non-Muslim immigrant communities he didn’t anticipate would feel directly threatened by these controversial policies found
them deeply unsettling. Those immigrant-heavy ridings swung almost entirely back to the Liberals.
“It was clear to me, and it’s even clearer in retrospect, that in
urban Canada we were already in danger of
being perceived as somehow an unwelcoming party,” Alexander, who is now running for the federal Tory
leadership, said in an interview. “That was, in my view, undeserved. But in political terms, it was a disaster.”
Are Conservatives inclined to flirt with the same disaster again? Among the federal party’s 14 current leadership aspirants, Kellie
Leitch, who proposes subjecting would-be immigrants to a Canadian “values test,” is clearly taking that gamble. She seems to be an
outlier, though. Kevin O’Leary, seen by many as the race’s front-runner—and whose business and reality-TV resumé, and promises
to slash taxes, invite Trump comparisons—shows zero inclination to mimic the president’s identity-politics blustering.
Tom Flanagan, a University of Calgary professor emeritus of political science and former Reform and Conservative campaign
manager, says the Canadian way of selecting party leaders would likely frustrate an insurgency like Trump’s anyway. The U.S.
primary system allows any American to vote for presidential nominees, so Trump was able to court votes from a broad, disaffected
public. Canada’s next Conservative leader will be picked only by paid-up party members, which Flanagan says is a harder group for a
risk-taking populist outsider to win over.
In any case, there’s just no Tory leadership aspirant who has the makings of a Canadian version of the current occupant of the White
House. “Kellie Leitch is a very pallid imitation of Trump,” Flanagan says. “Kevin O’Leary isn’t even interested in the same kind of
issues.”
If the Canadian election map makes taking an anti-immigrant line a losing proposition, and the Canadian way of choosing party
leaders makes it hard for a populist outsider to win, there’s still the possibility that the Conservatives might try to activate the
economic side of populism.
Even there, though,

the formula behind Trump and Brexit doesn’t look like a natural fit in
Canada. Trump blended his anti-immigrant rhetoric with promises to scrap or overhaul
free-trade agreements. The Brexit forces linked discomfort with foreigners to
resentment of the EU free-trading order. But in Canada, liberalized trade enjoys broad buy-in—particularly on
the political right, and notably in the Conservatives’ resource-exporting western strongholds.
So echoing Trump and the Brexiters in railing against unfair foreign competition is a non-starter for Canadian Conservatives. That
leaves, perhaps, finding a way to give voice to the anxieties of that broad swath of Canadians who, as Graves portrays them, fear that
the middle class is shrinking and that opportunities for their children and grandchildren are dwindling.
But the Tories would find themselves playing catch-up with the Liberals when it comes to tailoring a populist message for those
worried voters. Trudeau has been arguing since 2014 that failure to push income growth down from high-earners to middle-class
families would eventually prompt a dangerous backlash. His answer, or at least part of it, came in last year’s budget, in the forms of a
modest middle-income tax cut, an upper-income tax hike and a significant boost in federal payments to parents.
Is more policy in the same vein coming in next month’s 2017 budget? In a significant recent speech in Germany, at Hamburg’s
annual St. Matthew’s Day Banquet, Trudeau strongly suggested he isn’t done trying salve that middle-class sense of grievance. “With
the pace of globalization and technological change,” he said, “there is a very real fear out there that our kids will be worse off than we
are.”
Adopting his own version of the populist line, Trudeau took direct aim at corporations that post record profits but somehow can’t
afford to offer job security to their workers. “Increasing inequality has made citizens distrust their governments, distrust their
employers,” he added. “It turns into ‘us vs. them.’ ”
From the sounds of his Hamburg speech, Trudeau doesn’t intend to leave the next Conservative leader any easy opening to outdo
him when it comes to giving voice to the disquiet of Canadians who believe the economic order is stacked against their families. It
remains to be seen what additional policies the Liberals unveil in the upcoming budget to back up that rhetoric.
If Trudeau fails to deliver, a right-leaning populist might seize the chance to try to fill the vacuum. Overall, though, the
prospects for a right-of-centre populist movement in Canada look dim, even
though opinion in Canada, according to pollsters like Graves and academics like Donnelly, contains plenty of the same mix of fear
and pessimism that fuelled Trump and Brexit.
There’s no shortage of Canadians who, if they’d heard Ted Falk wishing God’s blessing for Donald Trump, might well have said,
“Amen.” But
if they’re hoping that Trump-style populism will slip across the
border and succeed in Canadian politics, they’re likely to discover that
Canada’s welcoming reputation has its limits.
Double bind – either Canadian populism is inevitable or it won’t happen

Scott Gilmore, 3-7-2017, a former diplomat and social entrepreneur who works in (and writes about) the United States,
Africa and Asia, Does Canada have too many immigrants? Macleans.ca https://www.macleans.ca/politics/worldpolitics/how-
populism-is-taking-over-the-world/ //Frese
Populism, at face value, seems almost healthy. Or at least to me it does. I was raised in Alberta, a populist heartland. It was accepted
as a fact that the government chronically ignores “the people.” Men like Ralph Klein, who drank in a rundown pub and boasted
about his lack of education did well there. Ralph, as he was universally known, painted himself as an outsider, the only one looking
out for the roughnecks and the farmhands. And we ate it up.
But after I moved overseas, it didn’t take me long to realize populism

isn’t just backslapping good ol’ boys. I
found that from Indonesia to England, “rule by the people” almost always ends up
undermining democracy.
At the heart of every populist movement is the idea that the establishment has to go. There
is no grand theory of economics or social policy. There is the idea that the people are being hurt by the powers that be—and that
makes the establishment illegitimate. Therefore, the only legitimate candidate is the populist. He or she is on the same side as the
people, and electing him or her means the people will be back in charge. As Trump himself explained during his inaugural address:
“Jan. 20, 2017, will be remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this nation again.”
Because the current way of doing politics is illegitimate, populists scorn it by acting out. Their
supporters love the
“honesty” of their transgressions, sexual escapades and illicit opinions. This erodes the
political system. Consider the United States. In the next election cycle, will voters see sexual assault or tax evasion as a
disqualifier?
The populist is the avatar of the people, the embodiment of their will. If somehow they lose the election, then the people’s will was
subverted; the election was corrupt, or there was a conspiracy to stop them. Spreading doubt about the electoral system further
erodes democracy and the public’s trust in institutions.
Even after taking power, a

populist still needs an opponent. This means attacking the
bureaucrats, policies and systems that were in place when he arrived. The battle against the
establishment is constant, and success is a zero-sum game, measured by how much the other guys lose. In the end, the greatest
casualties are actually the institutions that keep a democracy relatively stable.
There is one other foil that populists almost always target: immigrants, minorities
and foreigners. In France, the populists blame Muslims (8 per cent of the population). In
Indonesia, it’s the Chinese (1 per cent). In the United Kingdom, it’s the Jews (0.5 per cent). It doesn’t
matter how small or powerless these groups are, they are held responsible for any setback or failure suffered by a populist
government or movement.
Right now, it feels like populism is surging globally. In the U.K., we have seen the rise of the anti-immigrant UKIP
party and the success in the Brexit vote to leave the European Union. Across the channel, the polls are predicting the anti-Muslim,
anti-European Union party of Geert Wilders may form the largest party in the Netherlands’ parliament. Similarly, in France, the
Front National’s Marine Le Pen is being boosted by her ability to blend centrist policies with strong anti-immigration messages.
In Hungary, the anti-immigrant Prime Minister Viktor Orban gave a speech this week calling for more “ethnic homogeneity.” Not
surprisingly, he also wants closer ties to Russia. There, Vladimir Putin is the most influential populist in the world. At home, he has
pushed an agenda of nationalism, while energetically subverting elections. Abroad, Russia has actively supported populist
movements everywhere: money to Le Pen in France, leaked emails for Trump and clandestine support for the Brexit campaign in the
U.K.
Another new friend of Russia is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He has become increasingly populist while greatly
expanding his powers. Further south, in Africa, the past decade has seen a marked increase in populist movements in countries like
Zimbabwe, South Africa, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. In Asia, the Philippines elected an anti-intellectual strongman who
boasts about breaking the law. And in India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power railing against a corrupt and ineffectual
status quo and making abusive comments against the Muslim minority.
Which brings us to Canada. Will we see a similar rise in populism here? When I sat down to
write this column, my instinctive answer was “no.” I agreed with many of the arguments made by my colleague John Geddes, who
sees systemic and political barriers to Canadian populism. My thinking was that the
apparent growth in global
populism is because we are focused on Trump and starting to pay attention. But where I could
find data, it didn’t support my conclusion. One study from Harvard, for example, found that support
for populist parties on both the left and the right has grown undeniably and steadily since
the 1960s, doubling its support since then.
But it was another study completed late last year by a group of academics from the U.S., Europe and Japan that left me especially
troubled. They looked at a dozen European countries to see if there was a correlation between the relative size of the immigrant
population and the support for right-wing populist movements. The researchers found that there
was a direct
connection, and that support grew at an increasing rate as the size of the immigrant
population grew. And what is more, their data suggested there was a “tipping point” in western
societies: when immigrants comprised 22 per cent of the population, support for
anti-immigrant parties approached a political majority. If a country takes in too many immigrants, a populist backlash may be
unavoidable.
In Canada, our foreign-born population is already at 20 per cent and growing. This is far
higher than in the United States and (except for Luxembourg and Switzerland, where there are large numbers of itinerant
professional residents like bankers) it is far higher than in any other European nation. And it’s
getting bigger. Statistics Canada just released a report that projected Canada’s immigrant population will increase to between
26 per cent and 30 per cent within two decades. This puts Canada well beyond the theoretical 22 per cent threshold in the European
study.
It makes sense that countries become unstable with too many foreigners. I have first-hand experience in places like Pakistan and
Timor Leste, where sudden massive influxes of refugees can pull a country apart at
the seams. But is it possible that even when immigrants arrive gradually and they are integrated successfully, it can still
destabilize a country? Perhaps a populist backlash is inevitable in Western democracies when the
immigrant population grows to a certain size.
This is not because the newcomers bring crime or undermine our democratic
institutions (they do neither), but because the native citizens, whether they are Canadians
or Austrians or Americans, instinctively feel threatened by newcomers. Perhaps the
experiences add up—new faces on TV, new clothes in the street, new music on the radio—until the average person reaches a tipping
point and pushes back. After all, a fear of strangers is wired into our brains, an instinct that kept us alive in our tribal past.
If this is true, it upends a lot of assumptions that this country is built on regarding multiculturalism, pluralism and immigration.
Canada may be facing larger global forces, tectonic shifts which are are not felt until it’s too late and a populist earthquake shatters
our carefully built house of peace, order and good government.
Canadia won’t become populist – there are many checks

Amanda Taub, 6-27-2017, Former human rights lawyer, now covering foreign policy, human rights, and shetland ponies,
Canada’s Secret to Resisting the West’s Populist Wave, The New York Time,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/world/canada/canadas-secret-to-resisting-the-wests-populist-wave.html //Frese
TORONTO — As right-wing populism has roiled elections and upended politics across the
West, there is one country where populists have largely failed to break through: Canada.
The raw ingredients are present. A
white ethnic majority that is losing its demographic dominance.
A sharp rise in immigration that is changing culture and communities. News media and political
personalities who bet big on white backlash.
Yet Canada’s politics remain stable. Its centrist liberal establishment is popular. Not
only have the politics of white backlash failed, but immigration and racial diversity are sources of national pride. And when anti-
establishment outsiders have run the populist playbook, they have found defeat.
Outsiders might assume this is because Canada is simply more liberal, but they would be
wrong. Rather, Canada has resisted the populist wave through a set of strategic decisions,
powerful institutional incentives, strong minority coalitions and idiosyncratic
circumstances.
While there is no magic answer to populism, Canada’s experience offers unexpected lessons for other nations.
A Different Kind of Identity
In other Western countries, right-wing populism has emerged as a politics of us-versus-

them. It pits members of white majorities against immigrants and minorities, driven by a sense that cohesive national identities
are under threat. In France, for instance, it is common to hear that immigration dilutes French identity, and that allowing minority
groups to keep their own cultures erodes vital elements of Frenchness.
Identity works differently in Canada. Both whites and nonwhites see Canadian identity
as something that not only can accommodate outsiders, but is enhanced by the inclusion
of many different kinds of people.
Canada is a mosaic rather than a melting pot, several people told me — a place that
celebrates different backgrounds rather than demanding assimilation.
“Lots of immigrants, they come with their culture, and Canadians like that ,” said Ilya Bolotine,
an information technology worker from Russia, whom I met at a large park on the Lake Ontario waterfront. “They like variety. They
like diversity.”
Identity rarely works this way. Around the world, people tend to identify with their race, religion or at least language. Even in the
United States, an immigrant nation, politics have long clustered around demographic in-groups.
Canada’s multicultural identity is largely the result of political maneuvering.
In 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau

faced a crisis amid the rise of French Canadian separatism
in Quebec. His party was losing support, and his country seemed at risk of splitting in
two.
Mr. Trudeau’s solution was a policy of official multiculturalism and widespread
immigration. This would resolve the conflict over whether Canadian identity was more Anglophone or Francophone — it
would be neither, with a range of diversity wide enough to trivialize the old divisions.
It would also provide a base of immigrant voters to shore up Mr. Trudeau’s Liberal
Party.
Then, in the early 2000s, another politician’s shrewd calculation changed the dynamics of ethnic politics, cementing
multiculturalism across all parties.
Jason Kenney, then a Conservative member of Parliament, convinced Prime Minister Stephen Harper that the party should court
immigrants, who — thanks to Mr. Trudeau’s efforts — had long backed the Liberal Party.
“I said the
only way we’d ever build a governing coalition was with the support of new
Canadians, given changing demography,” Mr. Kenney said.
He succeeded. In the 2011 and 2015 elections, the Conservatives won a higher share of the vote among immigrants than it did among
native-born citizens.
The result is a broad political consensus around immigrants’ place in Canada’s national
identity.
That creates a virtuous cycle. All parties rely on and compete for minority voters, so
none has an incentive to cater to anti-immigrant backlash. That, in turn, keeps anti-
immigrant sentiment from becoming a point of political conflict, which makes it less
important to voters.
In Britain, among white voters who say they want less immigration, about 40 percent also say that limiting immigration is the most
important issue to them. In the United States, that figure is about 20 percent. In Canada, according to a 2011 study, it was only 0.34
percent.
Courting Ethnic Groups
Even as politicians engineered a pro-diversity consensus, immigrant and minority

groups have organized, unapologetic about asserting their interests.
In Canada, because
all parties compete for all ethnic blocs, minorities do not tend to
polarize into just one party. That leaves little incentive for tribalism, even as minority groups feel empowered to
champion their ethnic or religious identity.
“We say, ‘Look, where do you stand on particular issues of importance to us?’” said Kulvir Singh Gill, a member of Toronto’s
powerful Sikh community. “And on the basis of that, we’ll be selective in our support.”
This month, Mr. Gill helped organize a fund-raiser dinner for Seva Food Bank, a Sikh-led charity he co-founded.
The event was crawling with politicians. Senior members of Canada’s three main parties were present, as were several members of
Parliament and the provincial premier, Ontario’s equivalent of governor. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (Pierre Trudeau’s son) had
recorded a video to open the dinner.
All were seeking support from Canada’s Sikhs — but all were going to have to work for it.
Mr. Gill attributed this to “a real maturation in the community,” with Sikhs cultivating ties to all three parties, ensuring that the Sikh
voice would be represented no matter who holds office.
Other minority groups have pursued this strategy, too. As a result, while minorities in
other countries feel pressure to assimilate, in Canada they do best when they retain
a strong group identity.
Political science research suggests that this
dynamic may have also made Canada resistant to political
extremism and the polarization plaguing other Western countries.
Lilliana Mason, a professor at the University of Maryland, has found that when group identity and partisan identity overlaps, that
deepens partisan polarization and intolerance against the opposing party.
But because Canadian politics accounts for diversity without polarizing across ethnic or
religious lines, it is more resilient. Everyone, including whites, becomes less likely to see politics as a game of us
versus them.
“We’re an articulation of that Canadian dream, the Sikh Canadian dream, of living our
values and putting them into action,” Mr. Gill said.
Making Mass Immigration Work
Rapid changes in demographics tend to spur anti-immigrant sentiment within the

dominant group, experts say, bolstering far-right politicians who promise harsh tactics against outsiders.
But althoughCanada’s high immigration rates have transformed the country in just a few
decades, the public has mostly been calm and accepting.
One reason may be Canada’s unusual immigration policies. A sponsorship system, in which Canadian families host newcomers,
allows communities to feel they are a part of the country’s refugee resettlement program.
And a points system, which favors migrants who are thought to contribute economically, makes immigration feel like something that
benefits everyone.
As a result, immigration
is broadly accepted as positive, closing off a major avenue of
populist mobilization.
Ahmed Hussen, the federal immigration minister, said “the luck of geography” had also helped make immigration feel less
threatening.
Virtually every immigrant to Canada is brought here deliberately. Research suggests that uncontrolled immigration, for example the
mass arrival of refugees in Europe, can trigger a populist backlash, regardless of whether those arrivals pose a threat.
“We have the luxury of being surrounded by oceans on three sides, and then by the U.S. border,” Mr. Hussen said. “Which, relative
to your southern border, doesn’t have the same amount of irregular migration.”
Immo Fritsche, a professor at the University of Leipzig, in Germany, has found that when people feel a loss of control, they cling
more closely to racial and national identities. And they desire leaders who promise to reassert control.
European populists have run on such promises, and by accusing political establishments
of selling out their countries to migrants. President Trump’s promise to build a border
wall is, at its core, a promise of control.
But Canada’s points- and sponsorship-based systems, along with its geographic position, help communities feel a sense of control
over immigration so that, even as new arrivals change politics and society, backlash has been minimal.
The Face of Canadian Populism
The result is a system tilted heavily against populist outsiders.

Although somehave found local success, particularly in Quebec, they have not managed to
get national traction. At the end of my time in Toronto, I attended a conference held by The Rebel, an online news media
channel that is often called “Breitbart North” and once seemed like Canada’s populist vanguard.
Like the American outlet Breitbart News, it has risen on dark warnings about Shariah law and
nefarious elites.
Last year, as
the populist wave rose worldwide, The Rebel threw tacit support to a handful
of politicians. One, Kellie Leitch, received airtime and praise as she sought to push populism into the mainstream.
But this year, when
Ms. Leitch ran for the leadership of the Conservative Party, a major test
of populism’s appeal in Canada, she won less than 8 percent of the vote, placing sixth.
When I attended The Rebel’s daylong conference in Toronto, I saw no politicians drumming up support — a
sharp contrast to the Seva gala the night before.
Tara Cox, a yoga teacher, said she had some concerns about Shariah law, but quickly added that “a Syrian family moved to our small
town, and everyone has rallied around them.”
When a speaker warned of Muslim no-go zones in “every hamlet, every village” in
Britain, saying that the same could happen in Canada, there were no bellows of rage
from the audience, only courteous murmurs of concern.
This was the face of Canadian populism. As their counterparts fan out across Europe and the United
States, flexing their political muscle against frightened establishments, here was a listless, modestly sized crowd, whose members
seemed aware that they had underperformed but unable to explain why.
Canadian populism won’t happen – many checks and it won’t be driven by
immigration
Tom Flanagan, 11-17-2016, professor emeritus of political science and a distinguished fellow at the School of Public Policy,
University of Calgary, The political context in the US and Europe is very different from that in Canada; the next Canadian populist
movement will be a new political party, Policy Options Politiques, http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/november-2016/could-
a-populist-wave-also-sweep-canada/ //Frese
Many observers see similarities among Donald Trump’s victory in the American presidential election, the Brexit vote in the United
Kingdom, and right-wing populist or conservative-nationalist parties in Europe; for example, the National Front in France, the
Freedom Party of Austria, and Jobbik in Hungary. Is any of this relevant to Canada?
Left-leaning Canadian politicians are already condemning anything they don’t like as Trumpism, recalling the days of Bush
Derangement Syndrome, when Canadian conservatives were automatically labelled “clones of Dubya.” And indeed, some
Conservative politicians are echoing selected Trumpian themes, as in Kellie Leitch’s misguided call
for a values-test for would-be immigrants to Canada (I fear I would be among the first immigrants to be deported!). But there
will be no full-fledged New Right in Canada, because the conditions driving these
developments elsewhere are largely absent here.
A major factor behind the rise of the New Right in Europe is the confrontation with political Islam. Europe is close to North Africa
and the Middle East, where political convulsions are producing millions of refugees. Many refuges seek safety in Europe, even
though they may have little desire to assimilate into Europe’s Christian or post-Christian secular civilization. Major cities such as
Brussels have no-go areas, into which even the police are reluctant to enter except with overwhelming force. Spectacular terrorist
incidents are common. European nations, from Spain to Austria and Poland to Bulgaria, have historical memories of fending off
invasions from the Moors and the Turks. It is thus no surprise that many
voters are turning to political parties
that promise a stronger stand against the threat of Islamism.
In the United States, the confrontation with radical Islam takes a somewhat different form. Islamic
refugees are not
close at hand, but the international role of the United States has involved it in endless
wars and proxy conflicts in Islamic territory — under both Republican and Democratic administrations — such
as Somalia, Iraq (twice), Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, and Yemen. In addition to that, there is the problem of 11 million illegal
immigrants, who have mostly come across the long and porous border with Mexico.
None of these conditions apply to Canada, which is located far from the trouble spots of the Middle
East and Latin America. We annually admit a large number of immigrants relative to the size of
our population, but the majority are selected through the point system or come through
family reunification. We even get to choose many of the refugees who resettle here. Illegal immigrants
are a minor problem of law enforcement, not a serious social issue. We have no common
border with a major source of refugees or economic migrants. Our cities do not have no-go zones of Muslims or any other
immigrant group. Episodes of Islamic terrorism have occurred, but on a much smaller scale than in other Western countries.
No major Canadian political party in recent decades has taken an anti-immigrant

position. Of course, there are debates over immigration policy, such as the weighting of economic vs. humanitarian
considerations, or how to manage refugee flows, but all parties support the concept of large-scale
immigration and actively compete to win the support of immigrant voters. Internationally,
we have participated in some of the Middle Eastern wars, but never as major combatants.
In the United Kingdom, the surrender of sovereign authority to the European Union produced a backlash, which led to the Brexit
referendum. (Fans of the “Yes, Minister” TV series will remember Jim Hacker’s defence of the British sausage.) But again, this has
no relevance to Canada. NAFTA is a trade agreement with the United States and Mexico. It does not involve surrendering
sovereignty and it did not create a North American machinery of government.
Finally, Donald Trump’s

success in the United States was partially driven by growing income
inequality. His margin of victory came from states such as Pennsylvania, Ohio,
Michigan, and Wisconsin, which have been particularly hard hit by de-industrialization
and job loss. The phenomenon is real enough, even if unfair trade agreements are not the real cause. Canada, however, is
different. The Gini index of inequality rose in Canada during the 1990s but stabilized in the 21st century, while
American indicators of inequality have kept on rising. We are closer to European social
democracies than to the United States in levels of poverty, concentration of wealth in the
hands of the “1 percenters,” and overall income distribution. Thus there is not the same basis for a
political movement based on economic ressentiment as there is south of the border.
For all these reasons, the wave of populist politics taking place in the United States and many European countries is not likely to
wash up in Canada. But over a longer time frame, Canada
has a powerful tradition of populism
extending back about a century, which includes the Progressive Party, the Social Credit League, and the Co-operative
Commonwealth Federation. The most recent large-scale manifestation was Preston Manning’s Reform Party, founded in 1987.
Reform’s success was due to the inability of the Laurentian elites to control runaway
deficit spending and to put up effective resistance to Quebec separatism. The Reform Party
subsequently entered mainstream politics through Stephen Harper’s merger with the Progressive Conservative remnant; but, as
Manning once said, when populist movements die, “the seeds go back into the ground.”
One thing is reasonably certain: the

next Canadian populist movement, when it does emerge, will
take the form of a new political party. A Trump-style takeover of an existing
party is almost inconceivable in Canada, because party members choose the leader;
there is no primary system that would allow an outsider like Trump to surge to the
forefront. Unlike an American president, a Canadian prime minister is not elected as an individual
but is the leader of a party with a dominant number of seats in the House of Commons.
There is nothing like the American primary system that allowed Trump to run for president under the banner of a major party.
Partydiscipline has proved to be essential to parliamentary government, but every

public opinion poll shows that voters dislike it. Thus, political mavericks frequently attempt to found new
parties representing views that can’t get a fair hearing in the major parties. Most such attempts fail, but talented leaders such as
William Aberhart, Tommy Douglas, Preston Manning and Lucien Bouchard occasionally manage to upset the applecart of
Populist rebellions are the main source of creativity in Canadian political
conventional wisdom.
history, but the Laurentian elites always condemn them, unless and until they can co-opt them. Instead
of fear-mongering about the falling sky and the end of civilization as we know it, elites here and abroad would be better advised to
seek to understand how their own failures give rise to these populist movements.
Canada will keep the populist forces at bay

Neuman and Adams, '17 – *executive director at the Environics Institute for Survey Research AND **founder and
president of the Environics Institute (Keith and Michael, "Canada keeps the populist forces at bay," Globe and Mail, 7-3-2017,
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/canada-keeps-the-populist-forces-at-bay/article35526134/)//SB
The results of this research could not be clearer.

TheCanadian public's level of confidence in its country's democracy and system of
government has remained remarkably stable since 2014, and largely consistent with results dating back to
at least 2010.
Across more than three dozen measures, public

trust levels have either held steady or showed
modest improvement in comparison with three years ago. For instance, eight in 10 (79 per cent)
Canadians now say they are very, if not somewhat, satisfied with the way democracy works in this country, continuing a small but
noticeable upward trend dating back to 2010, when 70 per cent expressed this view. Four in 10 (41 per cent) now have a lot of trust
in the way elections are held in this country, up 20 percentage points from 2014, when public controversy swirled around robocalls
influencing the previous federal election.
Further, we
find no evidence of growing anti-government feelings or populist
aspirations. And polarized views between those on the left and the right of the political
spectrum have actually diminished noticeably, mostly because progressive Canadians are
now much more comfortable with the current federal government than they were in 2014, when
Stephen Harper was in charge.
It is hardly the case that Canadians give a full vote of confidence, as few have strong trust in such institutions as Parliament (19 per
cent), political parties (10 per cent) and the mass media (16 per cent). But the
public has long expressed
skepticism about these institutions and such opinions have shown modest improvement
over the past three years. What's more, it is among the youngest cohort of voting-age adults
(of ages 18 to 29) where engagement and confidence in the country's institutions has
strengthened most noticeably since 2014, reversing or erasing a previous generation gap.
Canada may be avoiding the downward spiral affecting other Western countries
because our economy and middle class are holding firm. Survey results show Canadians are feeling more
confident about the national economy and their own household finances, compared
with three years ago. Income inequality is a reality in this country, but has yet to produce a growing
divide between income classes when it comes to opinions about the country's democracy and institutions. We have
yet to see an emerging segment of people feeling economically and politically alienated, which might fuel the kind of backlash now
spreading in other countries.
Of course, public sentiments can change. A major economic downturn or a significant terrorist attack on our home soil, if combined
with a charismatic populist leader, could shift the public mood toward xenophobic populism and away from our democratic and
inclusive traditions. But so far, it is not happening here and we would do well to properly recognize this as we celebrate 150 years in
this place (or 15,000 if you are Indigenous); and to figure out how peace, order and good government can continue to be secured.
Trudeau will ensure that Canada resists populism

Reich and Marsden, '17 – *Former U.S. Labor Secretary; professor of public policy at the University of California at
Berkeley AND **political strategist (Robert and Rachel, "Rachel Marsden: Why Canada has resisted populism," chicagotribune, 2-7-
2017, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/sns-201702071330--tms--amvoicesctnav-b20170207-20170207-
column.html)//SB
PARIS -- In the run-up to the recent U.S. presidential election, a lot of conservatives began using the term "cuck" to describe
"cuckolded" males beholden to leftist policies. Lately, some conservatives have been applying that rather unflattering term to
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, one of the few Western leaders staying the globalist course while other countries opt for a
greater degree of national security.
When U.S. President Donald Trump imposed a 90-day immigration ban on refugees and
visa holders from certain Muslim-majority nations, Trudeau responded on Twitter: "To
those fleeing persecution, terror & war, Canadians will welcome you, regardless of your
faith. Diversity is our strength #WelcomeToCanada."
The tweet was celebrated by open-borders activists worldwide.
What was much less reported than Trudeau's
welcome to refugees was the fact that Canada has
actually capped private sponsorship of Syrian and Iraqi refugees for this year at 1,000.
So that's good news for Canadians worried about national security, right? Don't worry about Trudeau's tweet, because the
government is putting a tight cap on refugee sponsorship.
Except that it's the much greater number of government-sponsored Syrian refugees that isn't being capped so strictly.
Canada has taken in 39,671 Syrian refugees since November 2015. According to the government's
own data, most of them are unskilled, lack higher education and don't speak either English or French. A recent survey by the
Immigrant Services Society of British Columbia noted that only about 17 percent of B.C.'s government-sponsored refugees are
actually working. Most of those who have found jobs are working in retail, hospitality, manufacturing and construction -- relatively
unskilled sectors that pit them against locals for employment. Many of those among the first wave of refugees are now complaining
about their one-year resettlement assistance money running out.
Trudeau consistently leverages discrepancies between image and reality -- illusions that
can be used to appease both the left and right sides of the political spectrum.
Take Trudeau's repeated declarations about the importance of climate change, which
have helped him win over environmental activists. Trudeau nonetheless applauded
Trump's recent revival of the Keystone XL pipeline despite the project being at the top of
environmentalists' hit list in both Canada and the U.S.
It's not a foolish strategy that Trudeau is employing. It's difficult to convince people to
rebel against a leader who appeases potential opponents by saying all the things they
want to hear. Voters tend to pay attention to sound bites and proclamations, which are a lot
more compelling than parliamentary votes.
To illustrate yet another blurring of image and reality: Canada is now the second-largest arms exporter to the Middle East (behind
the United States), according to IHS Jane's, which tracks military spending. In 2014, under then-Prime Minister Stephen Harper,
Canada landed a $15 billion deal to provide combat vehicles to Saudi Arabia -- the foremost sponsor of the Islamic State, which is
responsible for flooding Western nations with migrants. The "humanitarian" Trudeau government approved the export permits for
those vehicles.
A recent Ipsos survey suggests that Canadians are less concerned about external threats than Americans, with only 39 percent of
Canadian respondents agreeing that the country needs to "take more steps to protect itself from today's world" (versus 47 percent of
the Americans surveyed). Canadians generally like their government to leave them alone and not to muck around too much, lest the
politicians screw something up.
The manner in which a country's citizens react to the adverse effects of globalization can be significantly attributed to that country's
history. Canada doesn't have the revolutionary history of the United States or France, and Canadians tend to pride themselves on
diplomatic thoughtfulness over brute force in response to challenges. Canadians usually just "vote the buggers out" long before
protests spill into the streets.
Trudeau benefits from the fact that Canada never fully bought into globalism. The country has had the good sense to avoid donning
the economic straightjacket that Europe got itself into, favoring the sort of balanced trade agreements that the United Kingdom is
now seeking in the wake of the Brexit vote. Canada also benefits from having a lot of space and an ocean separating it from the
cultural tsunami that Europe is currently experiencing.
Canada doesn't have the same sense of urgency that other Western nations have in this era of anti-globalist backlash. The two-faced
approach currently being taken by Trudeau and the Canadian government mostly has citizens blissfully ignorant or confused. Fog of
war isn't a bad strategy as long as people don't notice a negative change in their daily lives -- and the Canadian government has yet to
see what happens when people do.
Canada’s refugee policy explicitly excludes climate refugees – they

wouldn’t go to Canada anyways absent the plan
Musampa ’17 – November 17, 2017, Benjamin Musampa holds an MA in International Law
and International Politics from Universite de Sherbrooke, “How will Canada handle climate
refugees?” https://cusjc.ca/bootcamp/o-zone/how-will-canada-handle-climate-refugees/ // shurst
Abdul Kadir arrived in Canada in 2007 after spending three years in a Kenyan refugee camp. Political
instability and recurrent armed conflicts were the primary reasons Kadir, now 55, left his country.
But there was another, less obvious factor forcing him to flee: environmental disasters
caused by human and natural forces. “Food scarcity, the lack of infrastructure
and the absence of rain falling … made my daily life very miserable and
difficult to survive,” Kadir said. Abdul Kadir sits in his office at Ottawa’s Somali Centre for Family Services. Kadir
requested that his face not be shown in any photos. According to a report released by Oxfam, nearly 11 million people
like Kadir living around the Horn of Africa face severe hunger this year due to increased
droughts caused by climate change and political conflict. International bodies such as the United
Nations have warned that the number of environmental migrants is likely to rise
worldwide due to climate change. Political instability and the inefficiency of national and
subnational institutions in Somalia has resulted in a slow response to drought-related issues. The
ministries of forestry, livestock, health and social services have all been reported as corrupt and dysfunctional. Because these
institutions are ill-equipped to tackle Somalia’s chronic vulnerabilities to floods, droughts and food insecurity, many citizens find
themselves without clean water and other vital resources. Luisa Veronis, an associate professor at the University of Ottawa, has
studied the environmental influences on African migration to Canada. She said that the depletion of Somalia’s natural resources as a
result of climate change and political conflict is worse than in any other African country. University of Ottawa professor Luisa
Veronis addresses environmental issues in immigration policy Somali participants in her study identified deforestation as a major
environmental concern in their home country. Wood is needed for cooking and for charcoal production, and deforestation has led to
competition between pastoralists attempting to grab any remaining vegetation to feed their animals during droughts. Often Somalis
have no choice but to abandon everything and escape these precarious conditions, hoping to reach one of the refugee camps located
in neighbouring countries like Kenya. “While living in a refugee camp in Kenya, life was harsh, very hard, no water, no shelter, no
sanitations,” Kadir recalled. Kadir was very happy to begin his new life in Canada after he was accepted as a political refugee. He
quickly found a well-established Somali community in the Ottawa-Gatineau region. Somalis are the largest community among
African-descent immigrants living in Ottawa with 11,000 people. But not all those seeking to escape Somalia will have a chance to
settle in Canada. Earlier this month, the
Canadian government unveiled a new immigration plan
which aims to bring in an additional one million people over the next three years.
However, there is nothing in the policy to help people fleeing environmental
challenges in countries like Somalia. “People in Somalia who suffer from these ongoing problems simply do not have access
to Canada’s immigration system unless they are fortunate enough to have a close family member or other potential sponsor already
established there,” Veronis said. If they don’t meet the requirements for immigration, people like Kadir might think to turn to the
refugee system, which is designed as humanitarian relief for those fleeing persecution or war. He succeeded in getting to Canada on
political grounds. But the
Canadian refugee program does not currently recognize
environmental migrants as a distinct category. In February, the Refugee Research Network and the Centre for
Refugee Studies at York University issued a policy brief calling for the development of a national policy in the area of international
environment migration. So far, that has not happened. Abdul Kadir may have been able to escape his life in Somalia and come to
Canada, but there are many like him who cannot under the current immigration and refugee system.
Canada – AT//Quebec Impact
The threat of secession is gone.
Reg Whitaker, adjunct professor at the University of Victoria and a Distinguished Research Professor Emeritus at York
University, August 24, 2002, Toronto Star
Chretien will no doubt be ranked as one of Canada's more successful prime ministers. His legacy, not yet over by any means, with an
ambitious agenda ahead for his last year and a half, is a positive one. The country is in better shape fiscally and economically than
when he came into office. The threat of Quebec secession has receded. Political tempers, which had reached boiling point under
Mulroney, have moderated considerably. But this legacy is not his alone. Paul Martin has shared in it, as has the Liberal party. When
it appeared that Chretien was growing unaccountable, the party called him to account.
Europe – AT//Economy Impact
No impact—Eurozone growth is steady and resilient, and ECB policy solves
Heise 15 - Michael Heise is Chief Economist of the Allianz SE. He advises the Allianz SE Board on economic and strategic issues and is
responsible for analysis and forecasts of the German and world economy and financial markets and risk analysis. (“How resilient is the eurozone?”
http://www.euractiv.com/section/euro-finance/opinion/how-resilient-is-the-eurozone/ 4/17/2015) STRYKER
The worst of the eurozone crisis is behind us – or so many observers claimed last year. Today, with Greece
and its eurozone partners constantly at the verge of showdown, analysts and politicians once again fear
that the single currency area could be fraying. However, if we turn our attention from shrill political rhetoric to
economic fundamentals, we find that the eurozone economy as a whole today is more
resilient than in 2012, the last time that Grexit risk was being discussed. We measure the underlying
stability of the euro area by looking at the sustainability of public finances, private and
foreign debt levels as well as developments in employment, productivity and
competitiveness. By collating such numbers into a single indicator, we get an early warning signal for macroeconomic imbalances in the
eurozone. At the moment, our warning indictor is not flashing red – at least not if we look
at the eurozone as a whole. Although stability indicators have not returned to pre-
crisis levels, it seems unlikely that a contained flare-up caused by Greece could plunge
the entire currency union into economic turmoil. Over the last year, all 18 eurozone
countries have moved towards more balanced economic growth. This includes
Greece, although in that country, hard-won macro-economic stability is today endangered by political developments. None of the
other eurozone countries today fall below the score that we define as the danger zone of
economic vulnerability. The eurozone as a whole has made most headway in the area
external competitiveness. Several euro countries that used to have gaping external deficits now run current-account surpluses.
Importantly, improvements on the external front are increasingly driven by genuine
competitiveness gains: a favorable unit labor cost trend and gradually recovering
domestic demand are evidence that external surpluses are not solely the result of
demand compression but that structural reforms are bearing fruit. Progress has also
been notable in the area of debt. Debt ratios have declined for governments, private
households and non-financial enterprises – although the absolute stock of debt remains very high. On the other hand, our
ratings are abysmal when it comes to unemployment, which still stands at 11.6% across the eurozone. We also worry about the fact that eurozone
exports, on average, are not gaining global market shares. This is a reminder that measures of economic stability can differ markedly from those of
economic dynamism. While the eurozone as a whole looks more resilient, there are, of course, big differences between the member countries. There is
still a noticeable split between what economists have come to refer to as the core and the periphery of the eurozone. Austria, Germany, Luxembourg,
Estonia and Latvia look very balanced. They tend to have stable public finances, low private debt, few external imbalances and they mostly manage to
defend their shares in global markets. The (former) program countries, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, all have some way to catch up. Greece still
brings up the rear in our ranking (only Cyprus scores even worse). Greece has cut its budget deficit and regained competitiveness, but it remains
vulnerable because of its mountainous debts, mass unemployment and rigid labor and product markets. Although other peripheral countries are on the
right track, they still have their own problems. Portugal, for example, is struggling with the highest interest rate burden in the eurozone, while Spain’s
unemployment rate is still 24%. Both factors make it harder to get debt and deficits under control. Fiscal policy is also Italy’s Achilles’ heel. Public debt
stands at over 130% of GDP and although the Italian government borrows more cheaply these days than the US Treasury, this might leave the country
vulnerable to a sudden deterioration in market sentiment. Italy’s debt burden looks particularly daunting, given its low scores on employment,
productivity and competitiveness. Although France’s economic malaise has been much discussed, in terms of economic stability, the country ranks in
mid-field – disappointing but not overly vulnerable. Fiscal indicators look steady but have not improved. France’s ongoing loss of world market share
To assess the resilience of the eurozone, we do not look only at how
stores up trouble for the future.
solid individual member countries are. The broader framework also matters. Over the
last five years, the Europeans have made much headway in strengthening the institutional
architecture of the euro – including banking union, bail-out funds and more meticulous monitoring – that should help them manage
crises better. The European Central Bank has proven that it is willing to interpret its mandate
to include propping up markets if and when confidence fails. It is the interplay

between a more solid eurozone framework and the steady progress that literally all
eurozone countries are making towards more balanced growth that renders the
single currency more resilient. And it is this underlying resilience which allows
European governments to engage in sometimes shrill rhetoric and political
brinkmanship.
Growth during and after the Paris attacks prove underlying resilience
Soergel 15 - Andrew Soergel is an Economy Reporter at U.S. News. (“Eurozone Economy Resilient Through Adversity,”
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/11/23/eurozone-economy-resilient-despite-paris-attacks-refugee-crisis 11/23/2015) STRYKER
In one of the most emotionally trying months the eurozone has weathered in recent history,
European businesses thus far in November reported the steepest business activity growth
rates the region has seen in 4 1/2 years, according to a report issued Monday by statistics firm Markit.
Manufacturing orders from the region climbed to a 19-month high, while the service
sector employment posted its biggest monthly gain in five years. "The improved
performance in terms of economic growth and job creation seen in November are all the
more impressive given last weekend's tragic events in Paris, which subdued
economic activity in France – especially in the service sector," Chris Williamson, Markit's chief economist,
said in a statement accompanying Monday's report. A Markit index measuring activity in the French service sector dipped to a three-month low this
month, and the accompanying report noted that "some service providers reported that the terrorist attacks in Paris had negatively impacted" business.
the component of the index measuring French manufacturing climbed to a 19-
That said,
month high. Overall new business growth reached a five-month high, and business
expectations for the next 12 months remained relatively unchanged – which
is notable in and of itself, considering most analysts expected the tragedy in Paris
to weigh heavily on consumer sentiment.
Alt causes to European growth—China, low inflation, and geopolitics
McHugh and Pylas ‘16 - David McHugh and Pan Pylas (“Europe's top economic authorities warn of risks to growth,”
http://www.ajc.com/ap/ap/top-news/ecbs-draghi-dont-wait-to-act-against-low-inflation/nqJh8/ 2/4/2016) STRYKER
FRANKFURT, Germany — Europe's top economic authorities warned Thursday of the dangers
to the region from the slowdown in China, weak inflation and heightened
geopolitical uncertainties. Mario Draghi, the head of the European Central Bank, said it was imperative that
policymakers act swiftly to deal with low inflation, while the European Union
downgraded its growth forecast for the 19-country eurozone this year and warned of
further reductions. All eyes are on the ECB ahead of its next policy meeting on March
10. There's a growing consensus in the markets that the bank will follow up last December's stimulus boost with a further package of measures to help
nudge up eurozone inflation, which is way below target at an annual 0.4 percent rate. The bank's aim is to have inflation just below 2 percent.
Europe – AT//Middle East Impact
Tensions in the Middle East will never escalate
Omidi 15- Ali, associate professor of international relations, Five reasons why Iran-Saudi conflict won't escalate,
(http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/02/five-reasons-iran-saudi-cold-war-turn-hot.html#) JB
In 2011, as the Arab Spring spread across the Middle East, the wall of mistrust between Tehran and Riyadh
grew thicker. The civil wars in Syria and Yemen pushed the two sides into indirect military confrontations.
Riyadh’s Jan. 2 execution of Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, amid Tehran’s protestations, brought the worsening tension to a
head. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s decision to cut ties with Iran after its diplomatic facilities were stormed by Iranian protesters, with
countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Bahrain and Djibouti soon following suit, brought about a novel state in the Iranian-Saudi
relationship. In this atmosphere, media pundits are asking whether it is possible that Tehran and Riyadh may enter direct military
confrontation. The answer is clear: There
will not be a war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, for five main reasons.
First, the administration of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is pursuing a policy of constructive
engagement with the world — which is what Iranians elected him for in 2013. In Iran’s complicated political system,
the executive and legislative branches are elected by popular vote, though the Guardian Council’s vetting of candidates makes the
elections process not entirely free. Within this political system, making a decision to engage in war is not an easy task. Therefore,
while some Saudi leaders may beat the drums of escalation, the
possibility of outright war depends on
factors such as whether there is political will for such action and how the two countries
choose to handle the crisis in their relations. In sum, engaging in war is not something
that can be done by one side alone. Moreover, Iran’s government has no incentive to increase tensions, as
evidenced by the condemnation of the attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran by the triangle of power in Iranian foreign policy,
meaning Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. In a goodwill effort, Iran
has also announced that it will continue to send pilgrims to Saudi Arabia for the hajj this year. Thus, if Saudi Arabia intends to
initiate war, the Iranian public — seeing themselves as victims of a violation — will mobilize, and also gain the sympathy of the
international community. Second,
the majority of Iran’s current leaders were involved in the
destructive war with Iraq and are fully aware of its costs. Rouhani held several military positions during
the conflict, while Zarif and his deputies also remember the hardships of that era in their capacity as diplomats. Khamenei, who was
president at that time, also served as chairman of the Supreme Defense Council, while Rafsanjani served as the de facto commander-
in-chief of the Iranian military. Even Iran’s parliament speaker, Ali Larijani, served as a commander with the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC). Larijani’s brothers, including incumbent judiciary chief Sadegh Larijani, were also involved in the conflict.
Many other influential Iranian figures, including a great number of parliamentarians and Friday prayer leaders, also have bitter
memories of war, some of them as war veterans. Moreover, although the IRGC at times seems to favor showdowns — such as in the
cases of the recent detention of US sailors or its surveillance of the aircraft carrier USS Harry Truman in the Persian Gulf — it is not
empowered to take arbitrary actions. Third, the very nature of the current crisis makes war unlikely.
According to Charles Hermann, a renowned analyst of issues related to US foreign policy, crisis management and decision-making,
what defines a crisis are the three elements of threat, time and surprise. Whether the
situation threatens the vital interests of a state allows only a short time for decision-
making, and whether it occurs as a surprise to policymakers must all be considered.
When it comes to Iran and Saudi Arabia, the nature of their crisis does not meet this
criteria. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s tone against Iran has even softened in recent weeks. Indeed, Saudi Deputy Crown Prince and
Minister of Defense Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud recently told The Economist, “Whoever is pushing toward [war with Iran] is
somebody who is not in their right mind.” Fourth, on the international level, Saudi Arabia believes that in the event of a military
confrontation with Iran, the United States and the rest of the West may side with the Islamic Republic. Riyadh’s decision to cut ties
with Tehran has received virtually no international support aside from some African countries that play no significant role in
international power equations. Even US Secretary of State John Kerry has urged calm following the breakdown in the Saudi-Iranian
relationship. There may have been a time when, because of Saudi Arabia’s oil or its position, Washington would have gone out of its
way to serve the interests of Riyadh. However, now, even some US elites view Saudi Arabia as a slightly more civilized version of the
Islamic State. Last
but not least, victory is uncertain in a potential Iranian-Saudi war. Saudi Arabia and Iran may
take destructive blows from each other, but both
know that neither has the ability to destroy the other
side or impose regime change. Saudi Arabia has more warplanes and modern military equipment, while Iran has
better missile capabilities and military personnel. Riyadh’s involvement in the Yemen war is another factor that reduces the
motivation for war with Tehran. Moreover, the population in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province is mainly Shiite and has the
potential to revolt — an advantage for Tehran that Riyadh cannot easily create for itself in Iran. Lastly, Iran’s control of the Strait of
Hormuz, through which Saudi Arabia conducts much of its trade, is a further preventative factor, since war would necessitate
redirecting all that trade to the Red Sea, which in the short run is just not possible.
Water scarcity makes violence and instability inevitable

Ahmed 15- Nafeez, bestselling author, investigative journalist and international security scholar, New Age Of Water Wars
Portends ‘Bleak Future’ For The Middle East, (http://www.mintpressnews.com/new-age-of-water-wars-portends-bleak-future-for-
the-middle-east/203712/) JB
Behind the escalating violence in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, as well as the epidemic of civil
unrest across the wider region, is a growing shortage of water. New peer-reviewed
research published by the American Water Works Association (AWWA) shows that water scarcity linked to
climate change is now a global problem playing a direct role in aggravating major
conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa. Numerous cities in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East,
North Africa and South Asia are facing “short and declining water supplies per capita,” which is
impacting “worldwide” on food production, urban shortages, and even power
generation. In this month’s issue of the Journal of the AWWA, US water management expert Roger Patrick assesses the state
of the scientific literature on water scarcity in all the world’s main regions, finding that local water shortages are now having “more
globalised impacts”. He highlights the examples of “political instability in the Middle East and the potential for the same in other
countries” as illustrating the increasing “global interconnectedness” of water scarcity at local and regional levels. In 2012, a US
intelligence report based on a classified National Intelligence Estimate on water security, commissioned by then Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton, concluded that
after 2022, droughts, floods and freshwater depletion would
increase the likelihood of water being used as a weapon or war, or a tool of terrorism. The
new study in the Journal of the AWWA, however, shows that the US intelligence community is still
playing catch-up with facts on the ground. Countries like Iraq, Syria and Yemen, where US
counter-terrorism operations are in full swing, are right now facing accelerating
instability from terrorism due to the destabilising impacts of unprecedented water
shortages.
Europe – AT//NATO Impact
No impact—NATO and other alliances only risk conflict, and there aren’t
any threats anyway
Bandow 15 - Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and served as a Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He is a
columnist with Forbes online and frequent contributor to National Interest online and American Spectator online. (“Allies Are Not Like Facebook
Friends: US Should Drop Useless and Dangerous Alliances,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/allies-are-not-like-faceb_b_7142408.html
6/25/2015) STRYKER
If America ends up at war, it almost certainly will be on behalf of one ally or another.
Washington collects allies like most people collect Facebook "friends." The vast majority of U.S. allies are security
liabilities, tripwires for conflict and war. Perhaps even worse, American officials constantly abase themselves,
determined to reassure the very countries which the U.S. is defending at great cost and risk. Indeed, America's most hawkish politicians, who routinely
posture like reincarnations of Winston Churchill, routinely talk of sacrificing U.S. lives, wealth, and security for the benefit of other nations. For
instance, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fl.) recently worried, "What ally around the world can feel safe in their alliance with us?" The more relevant question
should be with what ally can America feel safe? Instead of relentlessly collecting more international dependents, Washington policymakers should drop
Allies In Name Only (AINOs). The U.S. should return to a more traditional standard for alliances:
Join with other nations only when doing so advances American security. Alas, that
rarely is the case today. Indeed, contra the scare-mongering of hawkish politicians such as Sen. Rubio and his GOP compatriots,
the strategic environment today is remarkably benign for the U.S. The world is messy, to be sure, but that's always been the case. The number
of big conflicts is down. More important, America faces no hegemonic threat or peer competitor
and is allied with every major industrialized state other than China and Russia. All of Washington's recent wars have
been over -- from America's standpoint -- unimportant, indeed, sometimes frivolous stakes. The
Islamic State, Libya and Iraq were regional problems for U.S. allies with minimal
impact on America. Iran and North Korea are ugly actors, but mostly for
Washington's dependents. The two would face destruction if they attacked
America. The latest crisis du jour, Yemen, worries Riyadh but is not even a speed bump for the globe's sole superpower. Yet Washington now is
involved in another sectarian proxy war through its totalitarian "ally" Saudi Arabia. Terrorism remains a genuine threat,
but falls far short of the sort of existential danger posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Worse, terrorism typically is a response to foreign intervention and occupation. Washington has inadvertently encouraged terrorism by backing
America has done some of the worst
authoritarian regimes, joining foreign conflicts, and creating enemies overseas.
damage to itself when protecting the interests of allies -- fighting their wars, killing their
enemies, backing their campaigns, advancing their interests. Adding unnecessary
allies obviously makes this problem worse. In Ukraine, for instance, the Obama administration is under
pressure to treat a non-ally as an ally -- arming and/or defending Russia's neighbor -- which would yield a proxy war with Russia, a nuclear-armed state
which considers border security a vital interest. Bringing Ukraine (and Georgia) into NATO would be even more dangerous, inviting a geopolitical game
of chicken over minimal stakes. Neither country has ever been considered even a marginal security concern of America. In contrast, both were long
ruled by Moscow, which sees their links to the West as a form of encirclement, capping the extension of NATO up to Russia's borders. Of course, both
nations have been treated unfairly and badly by Moscow. But that doesn't justify a military alliance with the U.S. Alliances should be
based on interest, not charity. They should not be an end, an independent security interest, but a means to an end, to protect
America. Adding troubled states with limited military capabilities and unresolved conflicts turns the purpose of alliances on their head. The U.S. long
eschewed alliances and other "foreign entanglements," against which George Washington had warned. Even in World War I, a foolish imperial slugfest
of no concern to America, Woodrow Wilson brought in the U.S. only as an "associated power." Popular and congressional opposition then prevented
Wilson from guaranteeing the allied powers' post-war territorial seizures. Nevertheless, Washington's involvement was a catastrophic mistake, making
possible the Versailles Treaty, which turned out to be only a generational truce before the combatants returned to fight a second and far bloodier round.
The extraordinary circumstances of World War II led to a genuine and justifiable alliance. During the Cold War the U.S. created what were intended to
be temporary alliances. This policy was justified by the vulnerability of America's war-ravaged friends and hostility of the great communist powers,
China and the Soviet Union. But even Dwight Eisenhower warned against turning the Europeans into permanent dependents. It makes no sense for
Washington to retain responsibility for defending a continent with a larger economy and population than America -- and vastly greater resources than
its only serious potential threat, Russia. Much the same has happened in Asia, which Washington filled with allies after World War II. Even as Japan
became the world's second economic power Tokyo relied on the American military. South Korea now has 40 times the GDP and twice the population of
the North, yet Washington is responsible for the South's defense. The problem is not just wasted resources, but tripwires for war. Alliances deter, but
they also ensure involvement if deterrence fails, as it often does. And lending smaller states the services of a superpower's military changes their
behavior, causing them to be more confrontational, even reckless. America and China aren't likely to come to blows over, say, Hawaii, which Beijing has
no intention of attacking. But conflict could erupt over irrelevant allied territorial disputes, such as the Senkaku Islands and Scarborough Reef, claimed
by Japan and the Philippines, respectively, and China. Unfortunately, commitments to marginal allies determine basic U.S. defense strategy. Should
America be prepared to fight one, one and a half, two, or more wars at once? These prospective conflicts invariably involve allies, not America directly.
After all, what state can actually harm the U.S.? Other than Russia (and to a much more limited degree China) with its ICBMs, there is none. If war
comes, it will involve Korea, Japan, the Persian Gulf, or Europe. The greater the number of dependent allies, the larger the number of possible wars.
But when the interests involved are unimportant and the nations involved are capable of defending themselves, why is Washington sacrificing its
people's lives and wealth for other states? The U.S. should start defenestrating AINOs. Most of these nations would remain close. With all of them
commerce should be free, culture should be shared, people should be friends, and governments should cooperate. In some cases military coordination
may be called for, when the U.S. and other nations share vital objectives. However, Washington should stop defending South Korea. With an
overwhelming resource advantage, the South should deter North Korean adventurism and build cooperative regional relationships to preserve security
in Northeast Asia. Despite historic tensions, Seoul should build ties with Japan, another American dependent which should transcend the past and
The U.S.
create a military sufficient constrain a growing China. Washington should base relationships on equality rather than dependence.
also should end its European defense dole. Today, NATO is effectively North America
and the Others. Yet the Europeans collectively are wealthier and more populous than
the U.S. They should take over NATO or set up their own alliance. No doubt there still would be
important occasions for Washington to work militarily with these nations, which share history and values. But they, not America, should secure Europe.
NATO fails—the alliance is in shambles

Grady ‘16 - John Grady, a former managing editor of Navy Times, retired as director of communications for the Association of the United
States Army. His reporting on national defense and national security has appeared on Breaking Defense, GovExec.com, NextGov.com,
DefenseOne.com, Government Executive and USNI News. (“Atlantic Council Report: NATO Alliance at Risk,”
http://news.usni.org/2016/02/29/atlantic-council-report-nato-alliance-at-risk 2/29/2016) STRYKER
In Europe, “you find a kind of the perfect storm”—a resurgent Russia in the east,
thousands of refugees and migrants arriving daily in the south, terrorist attacks in Paris, the rise of
nationalist parties and economies flailing skewing political debates—that NATO is
trying to weather. Those simultaneous crises were at the heart of Friday forum on a new Atlantic Council report looking at six nations
in NATO and the challenges they and the alliance face and what can be done to meet them. In answer to a question, Julianne Smith of the Center for a
New American Security said the time is ripe for closer cooperation between the alliance and the European Union in meeting those challenges and other
what is happening is
threats, such as cyber and communications. “We need the capabilities that both institutions can bring to bear.” But
that NATO is becoming even more a “two-tiered alliance” with the eastern members
looking at Moscow’s willingness to battle Georgia over breakaway provinces, its seizure
of Crimea, and continuing military support of separatists in Eastern Ukraine as a serious
military threat— while southern members confront a rising flood of refugees and
migrants fleeing wars in the Middle East and poverty there, in North and sub-Saharan Africa. Smith said, “There is
no longer the level of solidarity we once saw” in NATO and the European Union
and a growing feeling on the continent that the two are not responsive to the
public’s needs to meet these challenges. As a sign of that fraying, she said later that although sanctions against
Russia will likely be extended later this year some alliance and union “countries are really feeling the pain” and looking for relief of their own. “The
threats against Portugal are not the same” as those Lithuania faces, said Andras Simonyi, a retired Hungarian diplomat now with Johns Hopkins
The idea that the United States will always rise to the
University’s School of Advanced and International Studies.
occasion in meeting the continent’s security needs “made Europe complacent” ever
since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the alliance expanded eastward, he added. What has happened
in their harvesting of the “peace dividend” is that “many militaries in the alliance are in pretty bad
shape,” he said. As an example of reduced readiness, even among nations presumed to

have strong militaries, Jorge Benitez of the Atlantic Council noted that the United Kingdom had
great difficulty fielding a combat-ready armored brigade to a recent exercise in Poland,
having to draw on equipment it had in Canada for training. While the report and panel members agreed that alliance members on the continent needed
there is “no consensus in Europe that a permanent presence
to do more to provide for their own security,
[by the United States or NATO in the Baltics, for example] is a good idea,” Smith said. To many, “a
persistent presence is good enough for us.” The author of the United Kingdom’s section of the report, however, recommended stationing a corps-sized
All agreed that simply
headquarters and three brigades in the Baltics to deter Russian aggression in that part of Europe.
spending 2 percent on defense was not the right approach to enhancing

continental security. The money needs to be spent in a coordinated way and forces stationed where needed, not where it is easiest to send
them, Simonyi said. Benitez said the European Union needed to be more flexible in allowing
nations to spend more to meet internal security challenges. He noted the union only allowed France one year
of increased spending in response of the two terrorist attacks in Paris during 2015 and the same for Italy and Greece to cope with the continuing
refugee/migrant crisis.
Defense experts agree—NATO is underfunded and unprepared

Sputnik ‘16 - (“NATO Defense Experts Slam Alliance’s Military Readiness,” http://sputniknews.com/world/20160226/1035373693/nato-
military-readiness.html 2/26/2016) STRYKER
NATO’s current combat readiness would fail at protecting the Alliance’s eastern
borders, according to the North Atlantic Council's experts report to be published Friday.
MOSCOW (Sputnik) – The expert group comprising six defense officials, including former NATO
chief Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, warned of "chronic underfunding" and "critical

deficiencies" of the Alliance's member states, according to the report, as quoted by the Financial Times newspaper.
The NATO report revealed that only 10 of 31 German Tiger helicopters and some three quarters of
406 Marder armored infantry vehicles were usable. "The deployment of a brigade, let
alone a division at credible readiness, would be a major challenge [for the United Kingdom]," the
report reads.
Counterplans
CP Solvency – Temporary/Parole
Expanding TPS to climate migrants solves the aff.
A third proposal for granting legal protections to environmentally displaced persons

includes broadening TPS. There are several ways in which TPS could be broadened that would be beneficial to
environmental migrants. Although granting TPS is not a permanent solution for any migrant, it is a temporary safe-
zone, and any effort to acknowledge and protect environmental refugees is exponentially
better than the current international regime that offers no protections and/or rights. The first way
TPS could be broadened would be for TPS to cover more countries that are facing
serious and imminent environmental degradation. This could be countries such as the Maldives or Tuvalu
that will eventually disappear due to rising sea levels182 or countries in the horn of Africa that are drying up due to lack of water and
desertification.183 TPScould even be subdivided regionally to acknowledge that refugees from
a specific geographical region are in need of protection—irrespective of internationally recognized
national borders. The categorical breadth of TPS also could be expanded to include
environmental degradation beyond natural disasters. While in no way does this argument mean to devalue
the severity of natural disasters, the devastation that results from slow-onset environmental change such as desertification and
drought can give rise to comparable destruction and suffering.184
The second way TPS

could be broadened would be to extend its duration to allow those who are
victims of environmental change to stay longer in the United States. An increase in
duration would allow people who are fleeing slow-onset environmental degradation
more time to consider possible permanent relocation options and would allow the home
country time to address the environmental issue. Realistically, extending the time allowed in a host country
is not a permanent, long-term solution. This extended grant of time may result in environmental refugees overstaying their TPS
status as well as refugees being suspended longer in limbo, which hinders their rehabilitation.
Temporary CP Solves
Olsson 15- Louise Olsson, B.A of legal science at Örebro University, “ENVIRONMENTAL
MIGRANTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW An assessment of protection gaps and solutions”, September
2015, http://www.diva-portal.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/smash/get/diva2:861312/FULLTEXT01.pdf, //
Suraj P
The contemporary system of Temporary Protected Status is not adequate to completely

cover environmentally induced migration.172 However, it might have the potential of
developing into a system more adequate of protecting at least those migrating as a result
of rapid onset climate events. Today, the system does not provide a strong, legal
obligation to protect the individuals migrating due to environmental
factors. It is rather an optional measure that is discretionary granted
nationals of a certain state.173 The contemporary system in the US is further
inadequate as it is an agreement between the US and a state affected by a crisis, rather
than a duty to the individual. Also, a major concern with the US system of Temporary
Protected Status is that it is only available to designated nationals already in the US at the time
of the disaster, and not to those fleeing subsequent to an environmental event.174 Therefore, the
contemporary system would have little relevance to citizens of many affected countries. The
system does not offer protection to citizens of countries such as Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Maldives
and Bangladesh,175 that would be part of a pre-emptive migration due to slow onset events.
Neither does the system offer protection to those migrating as a result of rapid onset events such
as storms or floods, as they would be present in the state of origin at the time of the disaster.
Thus, in order for the system to at least be capable of protecting people migrating due to rapid
onset events, the prerequisite that the person must be present in the receiving state already, at
the time when the environmental disaster occur, must be erased. Further, the contemporary
system in the EU is inadequate as it requires a qualified majority of the council to vote
for the decision that an environmental disaster requires the invoking of the Temporary
Protection Directive mechanisms. Additionally, the unconditional linking of Temporary
Protected Status to ‘mass influx’ is a tremendous weakness of the EU system if it aims at
protecting displaced individuals. An individual might be in just as much need of protection even
though that person is not part of a ‘mass influx’. Additionally, Temporary Protected Status may
provide some protection for certain groups but does not meet the needs of people who need to
stay longer or permanently. That is one of the reasons why the system ought to be
developed to serve the needs of people migrating due to rapid onset events. People
migrating as a result of slow onset events are more probable of requiring permanent
protection as desertification, drought, or sea level rise for example is most probably
permanent procedures. Despite its many weaknesses, the system of Temporary
Protected Status has a great potential of covering people migrating due to rapid onset
climate events. It provides an opportunity to protect people fleeing due to
environmental disasters, which is a broad term capable of being interpreted differently
and thus adapt to a diversity of situations and needs, and it has in fact proven to be
flexible in the past. It has the potential of granting protection to people in
need, who does not have the opportunity to return to his or her state of origin for
different reasons. A great advantage, which also to some extent can be found in the refugee
regime, is that the regime is forward-looking in its assessment of who should be granted
protection. Rather than focusing on the question of why people moved, a more relevant
approach in the context of environmentally induced displacement is the focus on
whether the migrants has the opportunity to return to the state of origin or if there is a
need to stay where they have relocated. With regard to the assessment of the capability of
return, such assessment should concern the determining of the extent to which the area that the
migrant left are habitable, whether any sustainable source of livelihood remains, the extent to
which national and local governments continue to function effectively, whether their rights
would be protected at home, and other similar issues. If these prerequisites are replied in the
negative, there is an apparent need for the migrant in question to stay where relocated,
and this need should also mirror a right to do so until the time that this changes. This
focus might eliminate some of the difficulties of assessing slow onset disasters, including
the voluntary-forced continuum. The system of Temporary Protected Status also
lack the prerequisite of persecution, which is a requirement that is not met by
environmental migrants, unless they have been exposed to persecution in addition to
the environmental push factor that caused the migration. However, under the
contemporary system of Temporary Protected Status, there is a widespread discretion
concerning who receives protection and who does not. The system consequently needs to
develop into a more reliable system under which people fleeing rapid onset environmental
events unquestionable are granted protection. To accomplish this, there must be legal
obligations requiring states to offer Temporary Protected Status to those in need. One option
might be the construction of a new convention, alternatively a soft law instrument that provides
guidelines on the subject. Accordingly, the current system of Temporary Protected Status has a
vast amount of gaps in its protection of environmental migrants under EU legislation, domestic
legislation, and state practice respectively. However, the system would most probably be
capable of covering those displaced due to rapid onset events if it would be developed
into a more comprehensive system with clear obligations for the receiving states. As the
contemporary system has been shown to be discretionary and vary significantly, there is
a great need to address this issue at a regional and global level. A more systematic
approach to Temporary Protected Status such as a binding international framework is
first and foremost envisaged, though it would require concerted action and political will
among States. However, it would most probably be difficult to establish consensus concerning
a hard law instrument in the context, especially since this study has revealed that there is a vast
amount of different approaches and practice regarding the offering of protection to people
migrating due to rapid onset climate events. A soft law approach might therefore be more viable.
A soft law approach might also be more appropriate because there are factual uncertainties in
the context of environmental migration, and such instrument is often more flexible and would
thus be capable of adapting to the diversity of environmental factors that might induce
migration. A first step might be limited to systematic Temporary Protected
Status for nationals of countries recently affected by natural disasters who
are already present in a given country, which is comparable to the system already
existing in the US, despite the fact that the US system has proven to be rather
discretionary than systematic. However, the international community should in the long
run aim for a more ambitious approach that would include the granting of systematic
Temporary Protected Status also to those arriving at national borders following natural
disaster in their home countries.
CP – Geoengineering – 1nc
Text: The United States federal government should increase its funding
geoengineering to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
CP solves better – geoengineering is key to reduce emissions that create
displaced populations in the first place
Murray 10 – Sheila Murray has a B.A. from Ryerson University, "Environmental Migrants and Canada’s Refugee Policy,"
Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees // shurst
refugee policy that recognizes environmental migrants will have

Any Canadian
acknowledged the direct link between climate change and migration. International obligations
would form around the responsibility of the industrialized world—which has benefited from carbon emissions—to the developing
world, which is least able to adapt to new climate environments. Much of the prevailing political reluctance is justified using the
work of scholars such as Richard Black who say that no
pristine cause of migration can be identified. Even
if the world manages to slow climate change to arguably manageable levels by
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions or through geoengineering,19 there
will continue to be those who are displaced or who have their daily access to
sustenance threatened by climate change. Emissions that exist in the atmosphere today can persist for
decades and will continue to aff ect the global climate. According to the UNHCR, “Nine out of every ten natural disasters today are
climate-related [and] … as many as 20 million people may have been displaced by climate-induced sudden-onset natural disasters in
2008 alone.”20 In May 2009, a United Nations University report made several fundamental observations that are supported by a
variety of studies worldwide: It found that migration due to climate change is already under way, and that climate change can cause
the “collapse of social safety nets,” which in turn fuels conflict and violence. It
also observed that people who
migrate because of “gradually deteriorating living conditions” are regarded as economic
migrants, and as such have no recourse to any of the international instruments that
differentially protect the rights of internally displaced people, asylum
seekers, and refugees.21 In addition, migrant populations place enormous strain on the environments in which they
settle. This in turn can accelerate degradation already precipitated by climate change.
CP – Fund Adaptation – 1nc
Counterplan: The United States federal government should increase efforts
to reduce greenhouse emissions and support adaptation assistance to
environmentally displaced persons.
That solves the aff.
Nicole Marshall 2015 – PhD Candidate in the department of political science at the
University of Alberta ["Environmental Migration in an Era of Accelerated Climate Change:
Proposing a Normative Framework for International Migrant Rights and Domestic Migration
Policy ", Accessible Online at: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/items/46a0b9dd-e055-4afd-82e1-
6009da437ff6/view/c5b1c266-2794-4776-853b-
72a7a57fb0e8/Marshall_Nicole_M_201508_PhD.pdf] @ AG
Where Chapter Four came from a place of significant theoretical analysis which could be critiqued as being disconnected from the
realities faced by EDPs (see, for example, similar critiques from Black 2001 and McAdam 2012), Chapters Five and Six sought to
bring praxis to the project in a meaningful way. In particular, Chapter Five examined the current state of international law as it
relates to Environmentally Displaced Persons and their rights by reviewing key international legal instruments that relate to the
conditions of sovereignty and statehood, the rights of stateless persons, refugees, and those who are internally displaced, as well as
some of the agreements that shed light on the status of climate change and adaptation as it is understood in international law. Its
analysis was detailed, revealing that while there is space for positive growth, the current state of international law is not one that can
easily accommodate special recognition or rights for people who are displaced primarily by environmental events. Part of the reason
for this incapacity, it argued, is due to the lack of a clear definition of EDPs, as Chapter Two clarified; but, perhaps its larger
challenge might stem from what Chapter Four has argued is an inherent flaw in the international system: that it cannot adequately
guarantee positive, or pre-emptive rights.
Recognizing the necessarily central role of the state in securing access to human rights (following Hannah Arendt’s 1968[1951]
poignant analysis that to be stateless is to be vulnerable to the point of extinction, as well as the arguments of Chapter Four) under a
human rights regime that is confined to its Westphalian expression, Chapter Six offered a critical overview of the current state of
domestic policy that relates, or could relate, to Environmentally Displaced Peoples. Its regional
organization was reflective of the geographic nature of climate change in that certain
regions are more susceptible to certain types of environmental events, and thus tend to
produce certain types of EDPs. For example, North America tends to see more Temporary Environmental Migrants
resulting from severe storm events – especially hurricanes – where Europe tends to see more Pressured Environmental Migrants
given its proximity to Africa and the prominence of drought and resulting periods of famine there. Oceania, on the other hand has
most closely considered the experience of what this dissertation has labeled Imperative Environmental Migration (IEM), given its
proximity to the ‘sinking’ islands of the South Pacific. While the chapter is clear that these regional trends are just that – trends –
and not illustrative of any sort of exclusivity on the part of climate change (indeed, we have seen extreme storm events and slow-
moving but devastatingly persistent processes of climate change occur worldwide: for example, the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami,
recent floods in Bangladesh, or the melting of the Polar Regions), a clear regional pattern has emerged in
terms of offering protection to the varied experiences of environmental displacement.
From a universal human rights perspective, the overlapping nature of these policy regimes offers some
protection, where different types of EDPs can received some protection in different
regions; however, when applied in the context of the realities of the international community, policies like the Third Safe
Country policy have substantially diminish its value. Together, then, Chapters Five and Six revealed that while
advancements have been made relating to the status and recognition of EDPs and their
rights in both the legal and policy fields, these fall short of providing a clear set of rights
or recognition, or even a sufficient overlapping human rights regime (unlike that argued for by
McAdam 2012), from an ethical perspective. In response, Chapter Seven sought to draw together the substantial policies and laws
that exist in the international regime in a way that is meaningful to the 299 ethical concerns presented in Chapter Three. Ultimately,
it argued that in order to guarantee the full range of EDP rights that are called for by this
dissertation, the Westphalian system cannot be upheld as it currently stands. Yet, the dismantling of the regime need not be
the first dramatic step: instead, the project argued for a nested approach that would see immediate
global efforts to reduce greenhouse gases; to support adaptation assistance
wherever possible; to maximize migration schemes; and to fully incorporate civil society in all future
adaptation and migration responses. However, it also argued that these efforts would need to be coupled with a longer-
term strategy to address some of the deeper, systemic shortcomings of the international political community. Chapter Seven
suggested that one possible route to resolution might see the
implementation of a non-optional adaptation
assistance program, an end of the traditional Westphalian system of political
governance and an opening of bborders – especially for EDPs if not for everyone – and an ontological
reframing of the human rights regime to more carefully acknowledge our common human experiences and responsibilities, beyond
borders. This last shift, as the project suggested throughout, should be coupled with an ethico-political framing of the challenge of
forced environmental migration itself, if we are to fully conceptualize the complexity and nuances of its nature. While this second set
of demands was substantial, it was also presented as necessary, following the conclusions of Chapters Three through Six.
Fundamentally, the project revealed that the experiences of forced environmental migration have shifted the political and ethical
realities of the international community. Deep-rooted changes must be made if we are to keep pace in an ethically meaningful way.
Ext. Fund Adaptation
Funding adaptation and insuring against climate change rebuilds lost
property and mitigates the risk of climate migration
Keating 17 – international policy reporter for DW, “Is the World Prepared for Climate Refugees?”, 11 March 2017,
https://www.dw.com/en/is-the-world-prepared-for-climate-refugees/a-41227964)//abaime
Insurance against climate change-related weather events already exists. In 2015 at a summit in
Elmau, Germany, the G7 group of wealthy countries set up an initiative on climate risk
insurance for vulnerable areas of the world, covering around 400 million people. The
objective is to stimulate the creation of effective climate risk insurance markets that
could function on their own.
InsuResilience, an initiative of the German development agency GIZ, based in Bonn, is carrying out the G7's plan. It is
running programs to establish climate risk insurance markets across the world.
The insurance would help people rebuild after climate-change realted weather events
that result in loss of life, livelihood and assets. The goal is to make sure those people stay
put and do not become climate refugees. Rapid emergency assistance and
reconstruction is provided by the schemes.
Germany wants to push for global climate risk insurance programs at the Bonn summit
Opportunities in Bonn
The German government has been a leader in pushing for these programs. Last year the
German Development Ministry invested around €2.8 billion in international climate protection and adaptation.
A spokesperson for the ministry told DW that during the Bonn climate summit, Germany will push for a global partnership for
climate risk insurance.
"Increasingly, climate change will also influence flight movements," said Gerd Müller, Germany's minister for economic cooperation
and development. "Because where
grass can no longer grow ... or where the rising sea level has
flooded coastal areas, people will have to find a new home."
Although the COP23 summit is not being held in Fiji (the Fijian government is presiding over the meeting, which is being held in
Bonn for logistical reasons), the country intends to leave its mark on this year's summit by stoking the idea of climate risk insurance.
The newtestimonials from military experts may convince other delegations that the time
has come to establish more such schemes.
CP – Word PIC – “Climate Refugee” – 1nc
Text:
The term “climate refugee” is bad – leads to discrimination and loss of
dignity
Randall 14 - Climate and migration programme manager at Oxfam(Alex, “Don't call them 'refugees': why climate-change
victims need a different label”, 18 September 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/vital-signs/2014/sep/18/refugee-camps-climate-
change-victims-migration-pacific-islands)//abaime
<There are a number of reasons why “climate refugee” status does not make sense for
people who might have to move.
Legally, the idea of a “climate refugee” is contentious. It currently has no standing in

international law. And even if it did, the concept would be fraught with problems.
When people move because of the impacts of climate change, they tend to move within
their own country. This is clear from testimonies of people fleeing recent disasters in the Philippines:
“I lost one of my grandchildren and my younger sister. Early the next morning, rescue workers came with boats and they took us to
an evacuation centre.” – ShelterBox / Reuters
“We were trapped in the house for two days until someone came and rescued us in a boat, and we were taken to the local gymnasium
which was being used as an evacuation centre. We stayed there for a week but it was so crowded that we decided to leave and go back
to the ruins of our house.” – ReliefWeb
These testimonies are a good illustration of the evidence on movement during disasters. People move very short distances, without
crossing international borders and often return to their homes as soon as possible. A modified Refugee Convention would be of no
use to them.
Slowly unfolding disasters like droughts, changing rainfall and desertification create
different patterns of movement. It is often internal, and often from the countryside to
cities. When people do cross a border, it is often to find work. Although climate change
might be among the factors causing their movement, their primary motivator is
employment. For many this can be a vital escape route. Though many see the situation in cities as being equally desperate to
the situations they are fleeing. Take this testimony is from a Colombian farmer affected by changing rainfall patterns:
Rains recently have been very intense – very intense… We don’t want to leave our land: here are our past, our memories, our
ancestors. We don’t want to move to other parts, we don’t know what to do there. We would turn into delinquents. We’d enter into a
cycle of poverty which happens in the cities.
Protecting these people means two things: making sure they can move to find work
legally if they want to, and making sure the places and work are safe. In these
requirements lie a much bigger question of urban development that cannot be fixed by
altering the Refugee Convention.
Rightly
or wrongly the term “refugee” conjures powerful images. Tended camps; people
moving in urgent distress; leaving their homes and walking huge distances. Powerful photos of
the Za’arti refugee camp in Syria spring to mind when you say the word “refugee.” In the Pacific, it also brings to mind images of
people making desperate ocean crossing to gain entry to Australia. The media is awash with photos of people huddled in small boats.
The desperation and drama is inescapable.
Across the world, refugees

encounter racism and discrimination. Host governments often do
little to challenge this. In the UK, we continue to imprison people seeking asylum. The rise of far-right
parties across developed countries has fueled anti-refugee sentiment. In the Pacific, the Australian
government has drawn sharp criticism from human rights campaigners and academics over its treatment of refugees and asylum
seekers.
So the prospect of becoming a refugee comes with a lot of baggage. This is a tragic reality. But it explains why many people do not
like the term “climate refugee” and why they do not see the creation of climate-refugee status as a good solution.
So what is the answer? Many civil society groups within the Pacific talk about migration with
dignity. In practice, this can mean a number of things. It could involve planned relocation, where entire communities move
together. Cultural practices, family connections and customs are maintained and the community is reestablished in a safer location.
Or it can mean migration bit by bit and integration into new communities. Many people from Pacific island nations are already
working and studying abroad. Some see the continuation of this trend as the solution.>
Ext. “Climate Refugee” PIC
The term “climate refugee” is legally wrong
Margolis 17 – economic and political reporter/correspondent for PRI (Jason, “Immigration attorneys warn
against using the term 'climate refugee’”, 22 September 2017, https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-09-
22/immigration-attorneys-warn-against-using-term-climate-refugee)//abaime
<With so much destruction from this season's hurricanes in the Caribbean, there are
going to be a lot of people on the move — looking to start their lives in new places. We’ve
already seen mass movements of people from areas plagued by drought, floods or storms. Many casually refer to these
people as “climate refugees.”
But the problem with the term climate refugee starts with the word “refugee.”
“The term refugee has some very serious legal consequences, and it’s a very rigid legal
definition. It’s usually an individual determination based on a person’s fear of
persecution,” explains Mara Kimmel, an immigration attorney in Anchorage, Alaska.
The legal definition of refugee goes back to the years following World War II when the United Nations defined a
refugee as an individual outside of his or her own country, someone who can’t return
because of a well-founded fear of persecution due to race, religion, nationality, political
opinion or membership in a social group.
“I don’t
think that’s necessarily translatable to a situation where whole communities are
being forced to flee and to relocate because of climate change,” says Kimmel.
“The whole idea of refugee is that you can’t rely on your national government to provide
that protection,” says attorney Robin Bronen, the executive director of the Alaska Institute for Justice in Anchorage. “And
in the context of climate change, we should expect that our national governments are
going to protect us.”
Many countries are already trying to do that, from Pacific island states to the
Netherlands. They’re trying to keep people from having to relocate. But, an untold number of people are already on the move
due to climate change.>
Use of “climate refugee” is problematic – 3 warrants

Dabelko 07 - director of the Environmental Change and Security Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center (Geoff, “It’s
sometimes problematic to attribute migration specifically to climate change”, 25 July 2007, https://grist.org/article/a-word-of-
caution-on-climate-change-and-refugees/)//abaime
<Scholars,policy analysts, and even military officers are breaking down climate change’s
impacts into what they hope are more manageable topics for examination. The migration that
climate change could cause is one such topic. For instance, the Center for American Progress recently posted a piece entitled
“Climate Refugees: Global Warming will Spur Migration.” The International Peace Academy analyzed “Climate Change and Conflict:
The Migration Link” (PDF) in a May 2007 Coping With Crisis working paper. Climate change-induced migration also figured
prominently in the security perspective offered by the CNA Corporation’s Military Advisory Board in its report, “National Security
and the Threat of Climate Change.”
In many respects, these pieces are careful in their discussion of the topic. But allow me a few words of caution on climate change and
migration, based on what we learned from a series of programs on the topic in the late 1990s here at the Environmental Change and
Security Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center.
First, the use of the term “refugee” is convenient but problematic.
In order to achieve refugee status, people must be fleeing persecution or violence and
must cross a national border. Countries are then obligated by international law to admit
them, provide shelter, and so forth. Notably, then, the definition of “refugee” is based on political boundaries and
has nothing to offer internally displaced persons. It also does nothing for people who are "pulled" for
economic reasons or "pushed" for environmental reasons. Because not all people
displaced by climate change will be fleeing violence or crossing a national border, it is
critical to avoid referring to them as refugees if one wants to be taken seriously by the
UN, lawyers, academics, and governments. Governments, in particular, have a fairly
strong interest in keeping the definition narrow because of the obligations they have to
refugees. For this reason, the “knee-jerk” reaction for most of them will be to resist granting refugee status to a new large group
of people.
The second problem is that the

motivations for migration are multiple, and distinguishing
between economic pulls and environmental pushes is very difficult. A farmer suffering from
prolonged drought is both pushed to move from his land and pulled to an urban area or to more fertile ground by the promise of
greater economic opportunity. This is self-evident, of course, but when the situation is reduced to "climate migrants" versus
"economic migrants," the response from climate change skeptics will always be: "They are just economic refugees." One
can
easily see this classification problem with Mexican migrants coming across the border to
the United States to work. Are they climate migrants because their homes have
experienced prolonged drought that may have been exacerbated by climate change? Or
are they economic migrants who are "just coming for our jobs"? The multicausality of
the motivations for moving makes labeling a migrant with any single adjective (political,
economic, environmental, climate, etc.) problematic.
The third difficulty — which follows from the challenge of multicausality — is that it
is extraordinarily difficult to
develop and defend a methodology for calculating the number of climate migrants. A
prominent biologist who spoke at the Wilson Center in the mid-1990s claimed that the number of climate refugees could be in the
tens of millions. When one participant asked him how he determined who was in and who was out of his total, his response was
basically: I read a lot of reports and this is my best guess. Naturally, the air went out of the room, and we might as well have ended
the meeting right then. This
is the danger of asserting that there are millions more climate
migrants than political refugees from war or persecution. For starters, is the number of climate migrants
being compared with the legal category of refugees, or does the comparison also factor in the millions of war-induced internally
displaced persons? If this kind of comparative analysis isn’t done carefully, some will believe that the climate-change migration
numbers have been exaggerated by a flawed methodology. This issue will then be in danger of being unfairly
marginalized.
I say “unfairly” because I believe climate change could have a tremendous effect on human migration. Even though we cannot parse
out a single cause, climate changes are still critical pushes that cause people to move. Migration
— like conflict and
other social phenomena — is by definition multicausal. Just as "environmental conflict"
theories that privileged environmental scarcity as the explanation for civil conflict were
criticized, so too is the "climate refugee" argument open to critique.>
Theory: A precise definition is crucial in debates regarding climate
migration
The notion of environmental refugees includes climate refugees,9 although its breadth makes it impossible to specify or quantify
climate-related migration. In fact, there
does not seem to exist a clear definition of “climate
refugees” as of yet. Many studies leave the term undefined or, while purporting to
analyze “climate refugees,” still implicitly rely on broader concepts. For instance, Derek Bell, while focusing in his
work “on one cause of environmental disruptions, namely, global climate change,” seems to draw on the much broader UNEP
concept of environmental refugees without further differentiation.10 Other studies offer overly complex deanitions that are difacult
to operationalize in practice. Not least, the very term “refugee” is—implicitly or explicitly—disputed, and several authors and
intergovernmental bodies instead suggest terms such as “migrants” or “displaced persons.” In sum, there
is no consensus
deanition of “climate refugees.” In this section, we develop a first approximation. Our definition is based
on practical needs to (a) assist in the development of quantiaed assessments and
scenarios in order to gain insights in expected numbers and origins of climate-related refugees; and (b)
assist in the development of political responses and global governance mechanisms for the
recognition, protection and resettlement of climate refugees, which would need to build on a precise characterization of persons
covered by such a protection regime. Both needs are not necessarily compatible since definitional needs of scenario-builders and of
political decision-makers might not overlap. However, we believe that the
definition advanced in this section is
able to fulfill all the needs of both communities. The definition of climate refugees needs
to address (a) the cause of migration, namely the type of environmental harm or
climate-change impact that would create this category of climate refugees; and (b) the
type of migration, namely whether it is voluntarily or “forced,” temporary or permanent,
and transnational or internal; and, related to this, (c) the appropriate terminology, that
is, whether the term “refugee” is justiaed in the first place.
CP – Sui Generis – 1nc
Text: The United Nations General Assembly should establish a sui generis
regime for the recognition, protection, and resettlement of climate
refugees. This regime should be appropriately financed and supported by
the international community.
For these reasons, we argue against the extension of the definition of refugees in the Geneva Convention to cover climate refugees.
Instead, we
argue for a sui generis regime for the recognition, protection, and
resettlement of climate refugees. This sui generis regime must be tailored to the needs of
the climate refugees, and it must be appropriately financed and supported by the
international community. This section lays out the central elements of such a regime. We adress (1) its core
governing principles, (2) its legal-institutional character, and (3) its organizational setting. The following section will address
financial support and compensation. Principles A sui generis regime for the recognition, protection, and
resettlement of climate refugees must build on a set of core principles tailored for the specific
problem, including its political, legal, and ethical dimensions. We suggest five principles to serve as a basis for the
institutional development of the regime: (1) The Principle of Planned Relocation and Resettlement .
Even though climate change impacts will eventually manifest themselves in unpredictable singular events—such as storms, floods or
droughts—the increase in magnitude and frequency of such events can be predicted, and the consequential need for local
populations to leave regions that suffer from increased risk can be foreseen. The
governance of climate refugees
can thus be better organized and planned than in the case of victims of political turmoil
or war, and can be carried out in planned, voluntary relocation and resettlement programs—sometimes over many years and
decades. Thus, at the core of a regime on climate refugees is not programs on emergency
response and disaster relief, but instead, planned and voluntary resettlement over longer
periods of time. (2) The Principle of Resettlement Instead of Temporary Asylum . Over the long term,
most climate refugees—especially victims of sea-level rise—will not be able to return to
their homes. Thus, the underlying assumption in current refugee governance that refugees may return once state-led
persecution in their home countries has ended, needs to be replaced by an institutional design that conceives of (most) climate
refugees as permanent immigrants to the regions or countries that accept them. (3)
The Principle of Collective
Rights for Local Populations. The Geneva Convention is based on individual persecution. This has included quasi-
collective titles—for example when entire ethnic or religious groups in a country are judged as being persecuted—but essentially the
regime is designed for individual state-based persecution. A
climate refugee regime, however, would need
to be tailored for collectives of people, such as populations of certain villages, cities,
regions, provinces or—as in the case of small island states— of entire nations. (4) The
Principle of International Assistance for Domestic Measures. Climate refugees enjoy in principle the
protection of their own countries, and in many cases, serious climate change impacts will affect only parts of a country. Thus, an
international regime for climate refugees will focus less on the protection of persons outside their states than on supporting
governments, local communities, and support agencies to protect people within their own territory. The
governance
challenge of protecting and resettling climate refugees is thus essentially about
international assistance and funding for the domestic support and resettlement
programs of affected countries that have requested such support. (5) The Principle of
International Burden-sharing. Climate change is a global problem in causation and consequences, and the
industrialized countries bear most of the moral responsibility for its victims. This suggests also for
the protection of climate refugees the adoption of institutional elements from existing
agreements on climate or from similar areas. These could include: the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (which suggests that richer
countries have to bear higher costs for the protection of climate refugees); the principle of reimbursement of full incremental costs
of affected countries incurred through resettlement of climate refugees; and the principle of double-weighted decision-making
procedures, which would give both developing and industrialized countries equal clout in a new institution on climate refugees.
Ext. International Cooperation Solves
Multilateral cooperation solves the aff – and unilateral action fails.
No individual actor in present international system can singlehandedly clean up the

environment, and thus, positively contribute to people’s health. Instead, this enormous task requires the
effort of state and nonstate actors alike including intergovernmental organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, and private entities. And just as no single entity can solve global health
and environmental problems, there is no single solution to these complex issues. In the above discussion I have attempted to put
forward two potential solutions that can simultaneously help us generate a cleaner environment and healthier people. At the core of
this argument is an acknowledgement that multilateral cooperation can generate global public
goods of the health and environment sort. More specifically, the discussion has attempted to demonstrate that
international treaties and international institutions can aid the global
community in meeting the health and environmental needs of present and future
generations. However, neither treaties nor institutions are foolproof, and there are unfortunately many of these entities in
existence that have failed to meet their mandate. This is problematic in and of itself and also because failed attempts at multilateral
cooperation can generate mistrust for such entities and sour individual and state attitudes regarding future attempts. An
examination of the of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the Kyoto Protocol indicates that treaty
structure is of utmost importance. The Montreal Protocol’s permanent emissions limits, effective
carrots and sticks approach, attempts to prevent leakage, and common-but-
differentiated responsibility mechanisms have made the MP a relative success by
lessening the use of ozone depleting substances and thus the related health problems,
such as cataracts and skin cancer, that ODS produce. In other words, the MP is a model environmental treaty
that future treaties should emulate. By contrast, the KP’s failure to fully incorporate effective incentives in a timely
manner, extreme approach to sticks/punishments, inability to prevent leakage, and its limited emissions time frame (2008–
2012/2012–2020), have restricted the effectiveness of the KP. As KP negotiators look forward to renegotiating the Kyoto Protocol in
2015 (for a 2020 implementation date), they would do well to reexamine the lessons learned from Montreal.
International institutions can also aid states and nonstate actors seeking to invest in a
cleaner environment and the positive health externalities that this process generates. A
brief investigation into the newly formed International Renewable Energy Agency demonstrates
that institutional structure is a critical factor that can dictate the success or failure of an
institution. IRENA’s success, as measured by its ability to attract one hundred and four members (with fifty-five additional
states in the ratification process) in fewer than three years, can be attributed to a number of factors. The most important factor,
however, rests in IRENA’s ability to cater to the self-interest of state and nonstate actors that seek to diversify their energy sources
and increase foreign direct investment. By connecting states seeking to diversify their energy dependencies with companies that can
assist them in this process, IRENA simultaneously meets the needs of states in the global North and global South as well as energy
corporations and other UN intergovernmental organizations. In contrast to realist claims that institutions either do not matter or are
merely puppets of the great powers, this investigation suggests that institutions can enable the global community to meet the
environmental and health needs of developed and developing states when properly structured. The complex relationship between
health and the environment will require new and innovative thinking if we are to provide for the needs of current and future
generations. With this in mind, one final suggestion is warranted. The
complex United Nations system, with
myriad intergovernmental programs and specialized agencies, has
recognized the intricate link between
health and the environment. UN entities including the World Health Organization and
UN Environment Program continue to stress the interconnection between health and
the environment, but now more than ever, we need to see greater interagency
cooperation between these like entities to generate novel, pioneering, and practical
solutions to climate change and the resultant health issues that stem from a hotter,
erratic, and less predictable global environment. A failure to do so would be very unhealthy.
Only international cooperation solves
Martin et. al 18 (Susan F., Donald G. Herzberg Professor Emeritus in International Migration at Georgetown University,
Environmental change and human mobility from: Routledge Handbook of Environmental Displacement and Migration, pg.
410//waters)
In terms of research, several World Bank reports provide insights into the environmental change-mobility
nexus. The “Turn Down the Heat” Series (World Bank 2012, 2014; PIK 2013) showed that the Middle East and North
Africa will likely face accelerated migration flows to urban areas and social conflict
because of climate change. Latin America and the Caribbean will experience climate
impacts that can trigger displacement and migration from agricultural communities, while
Southeast Asia will see significant coastal impacts on natural resources that put
pressures on coastal cities.The Shock Waves report (Hallegatte et al. 2015) showed that migration and
remittances can play a key role in managing shocks. Yet migration requires resources and assets that the
poorest lack, and remittances tend to benefit non-poor people more than poor people.The “High
and Dry” study (World Bank 2016f: 19) explored the “thirsty origins of migration and conflict” due to increases in water variability
and expanding water deficits with climate change. It showed that a 1 percent reduction in precipitation is associated with a 0.59
percent increase in the urbanization rate.The “Confronting Drought in Africa’s Drylands” report (Cervigni & Morris 2016) found that
investments in drylands can only secure resilient livelihoods for about half of the people in their place of habitual residence in the
region. Another recent report investigated the impact of natural disasters on the poor and showed that
increasing resilience of affected populations “is good economics” over the long-term
(Hallegatte et al. 2017: 11).Work is underway at the World Bank to characterize how much, where, and when internal
migration patterns could be influenced by slow-onset climate change impacts, in an effort to
inform upstream dialogue and the longer-term planning for climate resilient development.
KNOMAD’s activities are embedded in the broader World Bank actions on climate change and development. KNOMAD’s
thematic working group on environmental change and migration has focused its work
on several dimensions of the nexus, including the determinants of movements and the
impacts of mobility on those who move, those who are left behind and those in host communities. It has been
investing in its three objectives, namely a) increasing understanding of the impact of environmental change on migration through a
combination of stock taking of the literature, expert consultation, research and stakeholder dialogue; b) increasing policy-relevant
knowledge and information on environmental change and migration; and c) ensuring that knowledge on the relationship between
environmental change and migration is available to policy-makers within the World Bank, other international organizations, govern-
ments and nongovernmental organizations.
Action on climate refugees can't be done by the U.S. alone -- interstate

dialogue is key
Chazalnoel et al. 18 (Mariam Traore, Associate Expert in the Migration, Environment and Climate Change program of
the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In this capacity, she has coordinated IOM’s global inputs to the UNFCCC
process for COP20 and COP21 and led trainings, side events, press conferences and exhibitions related to migration in a changing
climate. A moment of opportunity to define the global governance of environmental migration from: Routledge Handbook of
Environmental Displacement and Migration, pg. 428//waters)
The global policy landscape is at a crossroads, with the implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement
on climate change, the development of the first intergovernmental agreement on migration within the
United Nations (i.e. the Global Compact for safe, orderly and regular migration) and the Global Sustainable
Development Goals agenda, which together encompass many different dimensions of environmental migration.
There is thus an urgent need to encourage the consideration of environmental migration
issues in a “mirror” process (i.e. to include migration in climate and environmental policy tracks and to include climate
and environmental questions in migration policy tracks) within each of these in order to achieve meaningful global governance of
environmental migration to be achieved. However, it is important to remember that both environmental issues and migration
questions are highly politically sensitive topics, as they touch upon national sovereignty of states. At the same time, such
challenges cannot be solved by states in isolation, and so these political
sensitivities should not be allowed to become an obstacle to constructive interstate dialogue.
In a context where states’ interest and opinions do not necessarily align, both the
Global Compact for Migration
and the work undertaken within the UNFCCC negotiations process offer an important window
of opportunity for states to analyze, compare and understand existing knowledge, practices and possible ways
forward in non-binding spaces; and to do so not only at the global level, but also through regional, national and local
consultations. Doing so offers states the opportunity to propose actionable commitments as
well as means of implementation and follow-up frameworks, while simultaneously acknowledging formally the
necessity to address environmental drivers of migration and offering guidance on how to do so, including on ways to maximize
potential benefits. Achievements
made at the global policy level would, in turn, increase
legitimacy and generate additional financial means to address environmental migration
on the long term at the national level.
AT//No Enforcement
Yes enforcement -- implementing agencies solve
Dealing with the resettlement of millions of climate refugees over the course of the century will require not only a new legal regime,
but also one or several international agencies to deal with this task. Given different causes of climate- related flight that range from
extreme weather events to water scarcity and drought, it is unlikely that one single agency could be assigned the exclusive, or main,
task of dealing with climate refugees. Instead, a
more appropriate and likely model will be the
designation of a network of agencies that serve as “implementing agencies,” under the
authority of the meeting of the parties to the climate refugee protocol, in their respective
area of expertise and depending on type and circumstances of populations in need of
assistance and relocation. A crucial role might lie with the UN Development Programme
(UNDP) and the World Bank, both of which could serve as implementing agencies for
the climate refugee protocol. UNEP, even though it lacks a strong operational mandate, may provide invaluable
further assistance in terms of scientiac research and synthesis, information dissemination, strategic legal and political advice, and
other core functions of this program.70 A
small coordinating secretariat to the protocol on climate
refugees would be needed, possibly as a subdivision of the UNFCCC secretariat in Bonn.
In addition, the UNHCR will play a role, even though it would be unlikely to be the main agency given the special
characteristics of the climate refugee crisis. Yet the expertise of the High Com- missioner in view of emergencies, as well as its legal
and technical expertise in dealing with refugee crises, will be indispensable also for the protection of climate refugees.71
CP – UNFCCC – 1nc
Text: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change should
create and sufficiently maintain a Climate Change Displacement
Coordination Facility.
The CP solves – UNFCC is best suited to address climate change migration
C. EXISTING BODIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Having concluded that an expansion of the existing Refugee Convention or a rights-based multilateral treaty will not sufficiently
protect climate change migrants, this section explores the potential role of various U.N. bodies in addressing climate migration.191
1. General Assembly. — While

the General Assembly represents the primary democratic body
within the U.N., it is ill suited to address climate migration within its narrow mandate.192
Despite its limited role, one scholar has argued that the General Assembly should take a lead role in addressing climate
migration.193 Professor Benoit Mayer argues that the Security Council should pass a resolution “recognizing the security challenge
posed by climate-induced migration and the necessity for international action.”194 Then, according to Mayer, the General Assembly
While it is true that the General
could create a global fund, agency, and panel dedicated to the issue.195
Assembly has the authority to create subsidiary bodies,196 such bodies are often tasked
with implementing specific treaties or providing support to governments.197
The traditionally limited scope of the General Assembly makes such an expansive role
unlikely. No other scholar has suggested a sizable role for the U.N. General Assembly,
likely due to its traditionally passive role.198 It is true that a General Assembly–led program presents some
democratic advantages, since resolutions require a majority vote,199 but the UNFCCC has similar democratic advantages and
already addresses climate change.200
2. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. — While

the UNHCR currently protects refugees
from conflict and political oppres-sion, it cannot actively protect climate change
migrants under its mandate to implement the 1951 Refugee Convention.201 Moreover,
the UNHCR itself seems unwilling to directly tackle climate migration; a Senior Policy
Advisor at the UNHCR recently stated as much in an interview with the International
Bar Association.202
While climate change displacement clearly has human rights impli-cations and conjures
up images of traditional refugees, it does not necessarily follow that human rights and
refugee law should address climate-related displacement, as this would further fragment
the re-sponse of the international community to climate change. Given the real and persuasive
arguments against associating climate change displace-ment directly with existing refugee law,203 this Note argues that the issue
should be dealt with through the UNFCCC process.
3. UNFCCC. — The
UNFCCC is best suited to address climate change migration
through the newly proposed (but not yet fully considered) Climate Change Displacement
Coordination Facility.204 The UNFCCC represents the primary international
mechanism for addres-sing climate change:205 It operates as the framework Convention
under which all other climate change agreements are situated.206 As noted above, most commenters
who have considered this issue have argued for one of two things: adapting the 1951 Refugee Convention or negotiating a new
multilateral treaty.207 This is likely because most authorities believed that the UNFCCC process could not handle this issue given
the historical failure of the UNFCCC system to properly address emissions. Further, commenters have correctly noted that the
Framework Convention was never intended to handle human rights issues of this scope. As Professors Docherty and Giannini put it,
“[T]he UNFCCC primarily concerns state-to-state relations; it does not discuss duties that states have to individuals or communities,
such as those laid out in human rights or refugee law” and “is also preventive in nature and less focused on the remedial actions . . .
needed in a refugee context.”208
While Professors Docherty and Giannini were correct at the time of writing, recent
developments make clear that
the UNFCCC considered a “Climate Change Coordination Facility” at the 2015 Paris
COP21.209 Ultimately, the Paris Agreement focused primarily on emissions limits (through
the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions process) and Loss and Damage; it
left displacement for future consideration.210 However, given the current
international momentum, the UNFCCC is best suited to address climate
migration.
First, by treating displacement as a climate change issue, the UNFCCC has essential
institutional capital that would aid negotiations.211 Further, by situating displacement
within the UNFCCC, countries can negotiate emissions targets and other climate-related
issues in one place, providing maximum negotiation flexibility.212 Finally, while the
UNFCCC has not historically addressed human rights issues,213 the UNFCCC has
begun to tackle Loss and Damage and the fact that displacement was on the agenda
suggests the global community is moving in that direction.214 Given the timing of these developments
in Paris, no commenter has explored what a Displacement Facility might look like in practice215 —that is precisely what this Note
seeks to do.
4. U.N. Security Council. — Given

its expansive role in the international system to protect “peace
and security,” the Security Council could play a role in addressing climate
displacement.216 Various commenters have addressed the Council’s role in tackling climate change, though all of them focus
exclusively on reducing emissions.217 First, the Council could clearly address discrete security threats caused (to whatever degree)
by climate change displacement, just as it would in dealing with any other global crisis that threatens peace and security.218 A few
commenters have argued that the Council could go further and act as a compliance arm of the UNFCCC to enforce emissions targets,
or perhaps create entirely new emissions targets independent of the UNFCCC.219 Importantly,
any Security
Council action would first require a finding that climate change represents a threat to
peace and security,220 a step the Council has yet to take. However, the Council has already “expressed
concern” that instability and sea level rise could create peace and security issues221 and migration has sparked Security Council
action in the past.222
Political difficulties notwithstanding, the Security Council could play a substantial backstop or enforcement role in addressing
climate change displacement. As the previous analysis shows, practical and legal difficulties abound in amending the 1951 Refugee
Convention or negotiating a rights-based multilateral treaty modeled after existing refugee law; neither would adequately protect
climate change migrants given the scope of climate migration on the horizon. Part III provides a way forward through a cooperative
UNFCCC solution.
Ext. UNFCCC S
The UNFCCC can solve climate migration – it must be expanded
I. SCOPE OF DISPLACEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Though some scientific uncertainty exists at the margins, the factual link between human activity and climate change is now widely
This Part reviews the scientific connection between human activity, climate
accepted.22
change, and the predicted scope of forced migration. Section I.A discusses the relationship between
climate science and migration, with a particular focus on climate change “migrants” and current predictions for the scope of the
migration problem.23 Section I.B examines existing refugee law, namely the 1951 Refugee Convention.24 Section I.C intro-duces
the framework for entities in the U.N. system that could address climate migration. In sum, Part I provides the backdrop, both in
terms of climate change migration and the existing legal landscape, that informs the solution proposed in Part III.
A. CLIMATE SCIENCE AND THE PREDICTED SCOPE OF CLIMATE MIGRATION
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) deter-mined that it is

“extremely likely” (defined as a likelihood of ninety-five- to one-hundred- percent) that
human activity is the primary cause of climate change.25 This section introduces essential climate
science to underscore the scope of forced migration, discusses definitional issues, and underscores numerical estimates of forced
migration.26 While the definitional debate might seem semantic, pinning down an exact definition is crucial to defining the scope of
the solution.27
1. Climate Science and Forced Migration. — Climate

change, as defined by the IPCC, refers to any
identifiable change in climate over time, “whether due to natural variability or as a
result of human activity.”28 Nearly all reputable scientists believe that climate change is
both occur-ring and caused by humans.29 However, accepting that greenhouse gas emissions represent the
“dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th Century,” as the IPCC found,30 is not necessarily the linchpin of the
analysis. Even if climate change was caused by natural variations in climate,31 which the IPCC resolutely disputes, the world would
still face a migration crisis.32
In the most recent IPCC report on adaptation to climate change, the panel noted two
types of forced migration that will occur: migration as a response to extreme weather
events (likely to increase due to climate change33 ) and migration due to “longer-term
climate variability and change” (presumably from sea level rise) that will envelop small
island nations.34 Climate change can create instability in other ways, including changing
precipitation patterns (leading to desertification), melting polar ice caps, and increasing
the frequency of extreme weather events (including storms, heat waves, droughts,
etc.).35 Some have even argued that forced migration due (in part) to climate change has
already occurred, specifically in Somalia in the 1990s36 and in Syria during the fall of
2015.37 The cause of these events remains hotly contested,38 which highlights complex causation issues associated with pinning
a particular weather event on climate change39 or singling out an individual’s choice to migrate.40 In sum, even if
climate change is not the sole or primary cause of instability following a weather event,
it makes bad situations much worse and will undoubtedly lead to migration of
startling magnitude. This is precisely the problem that this Note seeks to address.
2. Defining Climate Migrants and the Academic Terminology Debate. — Providing a clear definition for those displaced by climate
This Note adopts the
change has proven surprisingly difficult,41 due in large part to causation issues.42
terminology “Climate Change Migrants,”43 which refers to “those whose movement is
triggered” in substantial part “by the effects of climate change.”44 This broad definition
is meant to capture both internal and external climate migrants, as well as movement
occurring due to slow-onset impacts (such as sea level rise), sudden environmental
disasters, and resource scarcity or conflict stemming in part from climate change.
However, the definition is limited to capture those who move due to the effects of
climate change, as opposed to all environmental disasters, primarily in order to cabin
the issue within the confines of the UNFCCC.45 While tedious discussion of defining the group affected by
climate migration might seem overly pedantic, the definition delineates the substantive scope of the solution.
As the definition adopted herein includes internal displacement, it is key to recognize the distinction between internal and external
displacement. “Internally displaced people,” or those who move within their own country, will likely make up a large majority of
climate-related displacement, at least at first.46 This definitional choice improves the utility of the proposal by including the
majority of early migrants but nevertheless confines the issue to climate change migration in the interest of political feasibility.
Currently, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement indicate that
“[n]ational authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection
and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction.”47
That is, if people were forced to relocate within Bangladesh, Bangladesh would bear the primary responsibility for protecting their
human rights.48 Defining the group to include all environmental migration could be perceived as infringing on domestic law by
attempting to control how countries address a broad scope of internal displacement (rather than displacement caused primarily by
climate change). While the nonbinding Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement cover internal displacement,49 nothing
comparable exists for cross-border climate migration.50
To avoid encroaching on the role of states in addressing internal displacement,51 some

commenters have defined climate change migrants narrowly to focus only on cross-
border displacement. For instance, the Nansen Initiative, created by Norway and Switzerland, focuses exclusively on
cross-border climate change migration.52 It attempts to form a nonbinding coalition of states and
develop best practices (a “soft-law approach”53 ) to protect cross-border climate
migrants.54 Similarly, Prof-essors Bonnie Docherty and Tyler Giannini define the group narrowly to include cross-border
migration from “sudden or gradual environmental disruption . . . consistent with climate change.”55 Since the vast
majority of displacement will likely be internal (at least in the short term),56 such a
definition eliminates a sizable percentage of the affected group. Furthermore, focusing exclusively on
cross-border displacement limits the scope “implicitly within the preoccupations of the ‘developed’ world, with all of the attendant
security concerns—and perhaps even the xenophobic reactions—that such a stance entails.”57
Having defined the scope broadly, this section now briefly turns to terminology issues. Authors have used a variety of terms to
describe the affected group, including “climate refugees,”58 “environmental refugees,”59 “climate change migrants,”60 etc. While
various commenters have advocated for the term “climate refugees,”61 the term has received substantial pushback. Using the term
“refugee” could cement and ossify an outdated term, as has occurred with the 1951 Refugee Convention,62 and unintentionally
water down the already tenuous rights of existing refugees.63 Instead, this Note uses the term “climate change migrants,”64 which
more accurately describes the situation both legally and practically. Legally, using the term “refugee” implies rights and privileges
under international law that simply do not exist—nearly all climate migrants will not qualify for traditional refugee status.65
Practically, since the majority of displacement will remain internal,66 using the term “refugee” could unnecessarily confuse the
matter.67 Finally, the multicausal nature of climate change disasters and individual migration decisions cautions against using the
term “refugee.”68
3. NumericalEstimates of Climate Change Migration. — While exact estimates of the

number of people displaced by climate change vary considerably, the numbers will
prove staggering if one includes internal migration.69 The U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights estimates that “between 50 and 200 million people may move by the
middle of the century, either within their countries or across borders, on a permanent or
temporary basis.”70 Earlier estimates ranged from 200 to 250 million people by the middle of the century.71 Importantly,
the majority of those displaced will likely move gradually and internally, and causation remains difficult to pin down.72 Even
climate change scholar Professor Jane McAdam calls these “alarmist figures,” noting the complex causation issues associated with
giving a clear estimate.73 For example, suppose a family lives on a small island in the Pacific Ocean and ocean water rises high
enough to make the groundwater undrinkable.74 That family might first move inland multiple times before finally leaving the
country entirely.75 And when that family moves permanently, the process of displacement will prove gradual and sporadic.76
The use of a broad and inclusive definition to capture internal displacement allows for causation uncertainty. Just as causation
issues abound in defining the group of climate change migrants,77 causation makes estimating the precise group likely to be
displaced nearly impossible.78 The decision to abandon one’s home is often complicated and multifaceted, except perhaps when
sea level rise makes an island nation completely uninhabitable.79
B. INTRODUCING THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION: LIMITED COVERAGE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MIGRANTS
While some climate migrants will move across borders (similar to traditional refugees),
the vast majority of them will not receive protection under existing law.80 This section
introduces sources of international law and explores existing refugee law. Major sources of international law typically include
customary law or a treaty,81 which is defined as “an international agreement concluded between states in written form and
governed by international law.”82 A convention, like the UNFCCC,83 typically refers to a large multilateral treaty84 that addresses
a specific topic—like climate change in the case of the UNFCCC—and often involves international bodies and modifying protocols.85
Soft law, which plays a large role in this Note, “is generally used to describe international instruments that their makers recognize
are not treaties.”86 In other words, soft law refers to nonbinding “pledges,” rather than binding treaties or “contracts.”87 Soft-law
mechanisms include things like guiding principles, such as the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement88 and the Nansen
Initiative.89
The primary international mechanism that protects the legal rights of displaced persons
is the 1951 Convention Related to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention” or “1951
Convention”),90 which the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) carries out.91 The
1951 Convention defines refugees as:Any person who . . . owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country . . . .92
Generally speaking, the 1951 Convention grants those defined as refugees access to the
judicial system, public education, and a right to work.93 Perhaps most importantly, the
1951 Convention includes non-refoulement protection, which provides that “[n]o Contracting State shall
expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”94 These five
protected statuses (race, religion, nationality, and membership of a social group or political opin-ion) derive from the foundational
Universal Declaration on Human Rights.95
The vast majority of climate change migrants will have no recourse under
international law. Under Article I, refugees must have a “well-founded fear” of
persecution coming from their own government on the basis of “race, religion,
nationality, or membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”96 This
would prove problematic, as climate change affects all people in a nation regardless of
these factors.97 Climate migrants from less-developed nations will also have a difficult
time proving that persecution came from within their nation,98 especially because
those nations most likely to bear the burden of sea level rise will be those that did not
cause the bulk of emissions driving climate change in the first place.99 The original
treaty was drafted just after World War II to address refugees fleeing into Europe;100
the original drafters did not contemplate climate change or environmental
displacement.101 Finally, the 1951 Convention focused entirely on refugees that flee one
country for another, making it inapplicable to internal displacement that will make up
the bulk of early climate migration.102
A small subset of climate migrants could fall under the 1951 Convention, but these cases
will prove few and far between. In the event of a natural disaster, victims might flee if
“their government has consciously withheld or obstructed assistance in order to punish
or marginalize them on one of the five grounds” associated with establishing refugee
status.103 They might also find protection if a natural disaster or other climate-related event (such as drought or resource
scarcity) causes violent social conflict.104 In both instances, though, the 1951 Convention would only apply to climate migrants
because the circumstances created violent conflict or oppression, on its own terms, with no relation to climate-related disasters.C.
RELEVANT BODIES OF THE U.N. SYSTEM AND THEIR MANDATES
Various bodies of the U.N. system could potentially address forced climate migration,
though none of them can do so effectively without a dramatic change to current law. These U.N. bodies receive their
mandates from the U.N. Charter (for example, the General Assembly and Security
Council), treaty law (UNFCCC and UNHCR), and even General Assembly Resolutions
(UNHCR, in part). This section briefly sketches the mandates of these U.N. bodies.
1. General Assembly. — The General Assembly functions as the primary democratic body of the
United Nations, but its role remains functionally limited by its narrow mandate in the U.N. Charter. Under the Charter, the
General Assembly may discuss and make recom-mendations (to Members of the United Nations or the Security Council) on any
matter within the scope of the Charter or related to international peace and security.105 Thus, whereas the Security Council has a
far larger role in the international system,106 the General Assembly is often functionally limited to making recommendations and
initiating studies.107
2. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. — While

some climate change migrants will move
across borders, the UNHRC has limited capacity to help them.108 The UNHCR is
primarily responsible for “providing international protection” for refugees, as defined by
the 1951 Refugee Convention.109 For the UNHCR to address climate migration completely, those displaced by
climate change would have to qualify as refugees under the Refugee Convention,110 which is almost certainly not the case.111
3. UNFCCC. — The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,112

implemented by the Conference of the Parties, represents the primary international
legal text devoted to combatting climate change. The UNFCCC is a framework convention under which
future agreements are signed (for example, the Kyoto Protocol113 ). In December 2015, the UNFCCC parties
met for COP21 in Paris, setting a goal of limiting global warming to two degrees Celsius
over preindustrial temperatures (with surprising aspirational language seeking to limit warming to one-and-one-half
degrees Celsius).114 The agreement also includes provisions on Loss and Damage, which refers to damage caused by the adverse
effects of climate change, by extending the Warsaw Mechanism.115 The agreement only mentions displacement in passing; the
Coordination Facility was left for another day.116
4. U.N. Security Council. —

The U.N. Security Council is primarily responsible for maintaining
international peace and security, which could arguably apply to climate migration.117
The Council includes fifteen voting member states, including five permanent member
states that retain veto power over all Security Council actions.118 Although the U.N.
Charter ostensibly limits the Security Council to maintaining international peace and
security, the Council itself determines what falls within its purview.119 The Charter provides that
the Security Council must act within the “Purpose and Principles of the United Nations,”120 but most commenters agree that the
Council enjoys nearly unlimited discretion to make an Article 39 determination.121 Thus, if the Security Council found that climate
migration represents a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,”122 it may then employ Chapter VII powers,
including economic sanctions (Article 41) and potentially the use of force (Article 42).123
The Security Council has considered climate change on a few different occasions,
including two formal debates (in 2007 and 2011) and two “Arria-Formula” meetings.124 During nearly all of the
debates, the Council has found itself divided—the United States, United Kingdom, and France have all supported an expanded role
To date, the Security
for the Council; Russia and China (backed by much of the developing world) oppose such action.125
Council has taken no direct action on climate change apart from a 2011 Presidential
Statement, which reaffirmed the UNFCCC as the primary body addressing climate
change.126 The Statement also expressed concern both “over the possible adverse effects of climate change that may, in the long
run, aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security” and for “possible security implications of loss of territory
of some States caused by sea-level-rise may arise, in particular in small low-lying island States.”127 This understanding could pave
the way for future Security Council action.
As the foregoing analysis shows, current refugee law and the existing U.N. system are incapable of addressing climate change
migration in their present form. Part II presents and analyzes various (though ultimately flawed) academic proposals for addressing
this pressing issue.
Args against the UN assume the UNHCR – that’s not the CP

II. FINDING A WAY FORWARD: PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE MIGRATION
Given the wealth of scientific evidence supporting anthropogenic climate change and displacement estimates, the world is staring
yet the existing international law protections remain
down a migration crisis of unfathomable scope;128
inadequate. Section II.A investigates the existing refugee laws and the possibility of amending the 1951 Refugee Convention to
include those displaced by climate change, concluding in large part that this option is wrongheaded.129 Section II.B considers the
scholarly literature recommending a new multilateral treaty to address climate migration,130 including expanding migrants’ rights
and fund-ing.131 Given the glacial pace of climate talks on mitigation,132 section II.C delves into existing U.N. bodies and their
mandates to flesh out a potential role for the current structure of the United Nations,133 concluding that the UNFCCC Conference
of the Parties is best posi-tioned to address climate change migration.
A. THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION: CURRENT INADEQUACY AND POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS
The 1951 Refugee Convention represents the seminal international legal mechanism
protecting refugees, providing them with access to the judicial system, public education,
a right to work, and protection against nonrefoulement.134 This section first illustrates
the inadequacy of tra-ditional refugee law in protecting climate change
migrants before addressing the possibility of amending the 1951 Convention.
1. Existing Refugee Law and a Legal Gap for Climate Change Migrants. — Despite a few potential (very narrow) scenarios,135 the
vast majority of climate change migrants will almost certainly not fit the 1951 Refugee Convention’s definition, which requires that
applicants have a “well-founded fear” of persecution coming from their own government on the basis of “race, religion, nationality,
or membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”136
While a small subset of commenters suggests that climate migrants fit under existing
law,137 the majority of commenters reject this view.138 In fact, the New Zealand High
Court recently held that a Kiribati man fleeing to New Zealand could not claim refugee
status under the 1951 Convention,139 finding the claims “novel” but “unconvincing.”140
While this decision would not bind other courts,141 it reflects the majority opinion. Some commenters have argued
that the simplest solution to the climate migration issue would be to amend the existing
1951 Convention,142 which has been amended previously to account for changing
global consensus. In 1967, the parties to the 1951 Convention amended the agreement to eliminate a temporal limitation
that only covered persecution prior to 1951 but left the core elements of the refugee definition unchanged.143 However, such an
action has run into staunch criticism144 and might prove just as difficult as negotiating an entirely new treaty.145
In lieu of a global solution, regional organizations could expand the 1951 Refugee
Convention’s definition on a local basis, although such an expansion would be limited in
application. Two regional bodies have taken this path. The African Union146 has expanded the definition to include those
leaving their country of origin “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing the
public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality.”147 Similarly, the Cartagena Declaration, a
nonbinding declaration adopted by nations in Central America, expands the refugee definition to include “persons who have fled
their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal
conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”148 Under either
expanded definition, a natural disaster could arguably constitute a circumstance that “disturb[s] the public order,”149 but neither
was explicitly intended to cover environmental displacement.150
Despite this, neither of the above expansions ultimately provides a silver

bullet. Unhelpfully, both of these frameworks only apply regionally (to Africa and
Central America, respectively), not to Small Island Developing States. And although the African
Union definition is binding on signatory states, the Cartagena Declaration is not. These regional mechanisms aside,
the text of the 1951 Convention and the majority view of the academic literature suggest
climate migrants will find little protection in existing law.
2. Amending the 1951 Refugee Convention. — Onelogical option for protecting climate change migrants
is simply to expand the existing definition to include those displaced by climate
change.151 The 1951 Refugee Convention protects individuals forced to flee from their home country due to “well-founded fear”
of persecution on the basis of “race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”152 As
discussed above, this definition is unlikely to cover climate change migrants in its current form.153
On first glance, amending the existing treaty might appear to present the path of least
resistance. The 1951 Convention already has a well-developed system protecting refugees that provides for access to the judicial
system, public education, the right to work, and nonrefoule-ment.154 Further, countries already have domestic law implementing
these provisions.155 Additionally, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, which protects those displaced by war or conflict,
could provide the same support to those displaced by climate change.156 One could even argue that the massive causation issues
associated with climate migration actually lend support to a more inclusive definition of refugees, similar to the one used in the
African Union, which would in-clude a broader array of people beyond even climate change migrants.157
Despite these perceived advantages, amending the existing 1951 Convention will
likely run into staunch criticism. First, many fear that amending the existing treaty
“would devalue the current protection for refugees.”158 Amending the
Convention to include a broad and inclusive definition could also open up the floodgates
and overwhelm an already over-stretched system.159 Indeed, the Office of the U.N. High Commis-sioner
for Refugees has already spoken out against expanding the 1951 definition.160 While not controlling, the UNHCR’s position
arguably serves as a fair voice of the refugee community. Amending the treaty would also provide protection only for a very narrow
subset of migrants—those who move across borders—as the vast majority of migration will initially remain internal.161
Amending the 1951 Convention, then, would face an uphill battle and if successful,
would only protect a small number of migrants.
While some perceived advantages could inure from placing climate migrants within the
existing refugee system, such a decision would likely prove both too much and too little.
It would prove too much because causation issues and pushback from the human rights
community would stifle any attempt at an amendment; it would prove too little because
it would provide only marginal relief by focusing solely on cross-border displacement.
For both reasons, the vital protection of climate change migrants must come from
outside the 1951 Convention.
The UNFCC solves best and doesn’t cause conservative backlash

III: A REASONED SOLUTION: UNFCCC, REGIONAL COOPERATION, AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Early negotiation documents for the Paris COP21 discussed a “Climate Change
Displacement Coordination Facility,” housed within the UNFCCC, to protect the rights
of those displaced by climate change. This Part builds on the broad strokes from these early discussions to
illustrate how a Displacement Coordination Facility would operate in practice to best protect the rights of migrants.223 The
negotiation docu-ments represent the inspiration for this work, but no details were provided in the documents and no commenter
has developed an insti-tutional framework around this issue.
Section III.A advances the argument in favor of a regional approach to cross-border displacement, with a particular focus on the
importance of self-determination. Section III.B outlines the short-term vision for the Facility, which would focus on soft-law
approaches, funding internal displacement through the Green Climate Fund, and long-term displace-ment research. Section III.C
embraces the long-term goal: allowing the Facility to act as a clearinghouse for regional and bilateral agreements (and potentially to
evolve into a more formal refugee system as necessary). Finally, section III.C also outlines a role for the U.N. Security Council to
address climate change displacement. This Part concludes that soft-law and regional/bilateral agreements would best protect the
rights of climate change migrants in a politically feasible way.
A. THE CASE FOR A REGIONAL APPROACH AND SELF-DETERMINATION FOR CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT
Before addressing the structure and purpose of the Coordination Facility, including funding mechanisms to address internal
displacement, this section introduces a key aspect of the proposal related to cross-border displacement: regional self-determination.
Regional agreements, as opposed to a large-scale multilateral agreement, would grease the wheels of negotiation and avoid the
lowest-common-denominator solu-tion that occurs in international negotiations.224
Regional agreements, rather than a large multilateral agreement based on common but
differentiated responsibilities,225 would allow displaced persons a chance to retain
some level of cultural integrity. While common but differentiated responsibilities should
certainly play a role, those displaced from small island nations should have some say (at
least through their government) in their ultimate relocation in order to preserve their
cultural integrity.226 Some might argue that cultural identity and integrity represent an idealistic (bordering on naïve)
benchmark and that climate migrants will ignore such considerations when they are faced with the realities of mass displacement.
However, these background principles of international law should not be so readily
discarded. The concept of self-determination remains a central tenet of international
law—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states, “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”227 The
Coordination Facility should honor this by fostering regional or bilateral agreements that allow for self-determination.228
Detractors would argue that under the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, those most responsible for climate
change should bear the largest burden in addressing its adverse effects.229 Under such a formulation, the United States, for
instance, should perhaps accept the most refugees based on historical emissions.230 Some have even argued for a type of cap-and-
trade for refugee quotas.231 Pigeon-holing climate change migrants into certain parts of the world based on quotas (perhaps based
on historical emissions) could satisfy one’s sense of fairness, but it might not represent the preferences of those actually displaced,
which ought to remain a primary concern.232 This has been underscored by commenters such as Professor Jane McAdam, who
notes that “a protection-like response may not necessarily respond to communities’ human rights concerns, especially those relating
to cultural integrity, self-determination and statehood.”233
Any international effort to help those displaced by climate change should encompass the
option for regional and bilateral treaties to allow migration of populations within SIDS
to move en masse to another territory. Admittedly, the concept of en masse migration presents difficulties
associated with retaining nationality and whether en masse migration would then allow for some quasi-statehood designation.234
Analysis of these difficulties is beyond the scope of this Note. But the core point
nonetheless remains: Those living on SIDS should have the option to negotiate regional
or bilateral agreements that would allow people to retain their cultural identity. En masse
migration certainly presents feasibility concerns, but self-determination and preserving cultural heritage are goals the international
community should not readily abandon at the first sign of difficulty.
Countries like the United States, presumably hoping to avoid an influx of immigrants, might attempt to eschew responsibility for
accepting displaced people by providing funds to the Green Climate Fund to aid migration (either internal or external) instead of
accepting migrants through a bilateral treaty. This type of xenophobia is admittedly a concern, and a regional approach clearly relies
on negotiation of regional and bilateral mechanisms that may ultimately require a backstop.235 This also raises the question of self-
determination for those accepting migrants and whether state and local governments would have a say in the matter.236 Political
concerns aside, cultural integrity should represent the underpinning of the Coordination Facility’s work, and supporting regional
and bilateral agreements would allow individual small island nations to guide their own paths.
B. SHORT TERM: REGIONAL COOPERATION AND “SOFT-LAW” APPROACHES
This section addresses the short-term work of the Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility, which should focus primarily
on a few key goals. First,
the Facility should work with the Nansen Initiative to support
regional soft-law agreements to address early displacement.237 This would
also include providing support to negotiating states in the form of guiding principles,
which could involve combining existing mechanisms (for example, the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement and the Nansen Initiative’s Cross-Border Displacement Principles). The Facility should also
conduct studies on which areas are most suitable for accepting displaced
climate change migrants to allow for en masse migration. Finally, the Facility
should use existing UNFCCC mechanisms to address internal displacement
by filling the funding gap through the Green Climate Fund.
Even if a Coordination Facility is created, some migration may begin to occur before binding regional or bilateral treaties are
negotiated between states. In the event that this occurs, the Facility should act as a co-ordi-nation body, in conjunction with the
Nansen Initiative,238 to promote a “soft-law” approach to addressing climate change displacement.239 Since the Nansen
Initiative has created substantial institutional structure, including guiding principles,240 starting from scratch would prove
superfluous.
The Facility should build on these existing structures, adopting identical or
similar guiding principles when necessary, and work with the Nansen Initiative to
support those displaced by climate change in the early stages. Since the Nansen Initiative is a
nongovernmental organization,241 a cooperative relationship between the Nansen Initiative and the UNFCCC’s Climate Change
Displacement Coordination Facility would enhance the legitimacy and scope of both operations. Since the Facility would ideally
encourage en masse migra-tion to retain cultural integrity, the Facility should begin early research on which areas are suitable for
accepting large populations (i.e., those with adequate land and water resources without too many current residents).
While one might argue that the UNFCCC should not actively address climate change displacement since it was never designed to
handle human rights issues of this scale,242 this ignores the political reality of the current situation. While the Paris Agreement
essentially agrees to continue discussing Loss and Damage,243 global leaders seem to be honing in on a one-stop international body
to address all climate-related issues, which would include displacement and other adaptation problems.244 Further, the Paris
negotiations recently demonstrated the value of allowing parties to compromise on adaptation issues for con-cessions on emissions
mitigation.245
Additionally, the Coordination Facility would not simply replace or supplement the
Nansen Initiative. The Nansen Initiative, which is a nongovernmental organization,
focuses entirely on cross-border displace-ment. This “soft-law” method could combine the Nansen
Initiative’s approach to cross-border displacement with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement246 to create a holistic
set of guiding principles to address climate displacement. Finally,
the Coordination Facility could operate
as the clearinghouse under which nonbinding agreements are negotiated to ensure
that climate change migrants are adequately protected. A clearinghouse structure would
provide states with self-determination and an institutional structure to support negotiations and protect the rights of migrants.
Since most migration will begin internally, the Facility initially should focus on
addressing funding issues associated with internal displacement. The funding gap could
potentially be met through existing UNFCCC mechanisms, namely the Green Climate
Fund, which was designed (in part) to help vulnerable communities adapt to climate
change.247 While the Green Climate Fund has been inadequately funded thus far,248 it
represents the primary UNFCCC mechanism designed to handle adaptation issues.
While the Paris Agreement’s Loss and Damage provisions “[do] not involve or provide a basis for any
liability or compensation,”249 developed countries seem willing to discuss adaptation measures like Loss and Damage (so long as it
does not expressly create international legal liability).250 Finally, the UNFCCC has thus far acted mainly
in the mitigation context to reduce emissions.251 Instead of wait-ing for a natural
disaster to occur or the seas to rise, the Coordination Facility should proactively
strengthen local communities where displace-ment is likely to occur by
improving resilience and planned migration/disaster response to avoid
some displacement altogether.252
Further, domestic U.S. politics make it extremely unlikely that a top-down, rights-based
treaty that requires acceptance of climate change migrants will be ratified, at least in the
near future. The United States is currently in the midst of a wave of anti-
immigration sentiment,253 which arguably borders on racism and xenophobia.254
Additionally, many of those who staunchly oppose accepting refugees from war-torn
Syria also deny climate change.255 At best this combination creates an additional
barrier to a rights-based approach; at worst it represents a source of cli-mate change
denial. Whatever underlies these positions (and whatever their merit), it is unimaginable that the U.S. Senate would provide
advice and consent on a treaty that requires acceptance of climate migrants.256 Accordingly, the Facility should
narrow its short-term focus to studying the viability of certain areas for resettlement,
along with supporting soft-law and regional/bilateral negotiation support. This approach might
even find favor with those who are dubious of U.S. participation in climate change negotiations.257 The solution proposed herein
attempts to protect climate change migrants from having to flee to the United States without a right to enter an already
overburdened immigration system. The
proposed solution creates no obligation to accept large
populations of climate change migrants, at least in the short term, and would thus
prove more politically palatable to conservative factions in the United
States.
C. LONG TERM: REGIONAL AND BILATERAL TREATIES AND A ROLE FOR THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
This section explores a long-term role for the Displacement Coordination Facility. First,
the UNFCCC’s Facility
should act as a clearinghouse for regional and bilateral agreements to address cross-
border displacement. Second, the Facility should lay the groundwork for a potential
expansion to a rights-based treaty if regional agreements do not develop quickly enough.
Lastly, the UNFCCC’s Coordination Facility could act in concert with the U.N. Security
Council to serve as a stopgap and enforcement wing to protect the rights of displaced
people.
1. Long-Term Strategy: Binding Regional Agreements. — In the long term, the UNFCCC
should act as the primary umbrella organization under which regional and bilateral
agreements between states are negotiated to address climate change displacement.258
Further, the UNFCCC could even establish a panel of member states to review and approve
regional or bilateral agreements for the protection of those involved.259 Regional
agreements provide the most flexibility for those displaced by climate change, including
ways for them to retain their cultural identity,260 but the Facility must provide some additional assurance
that a regional or bilateral agreement guarantees the rights of displaced migrants. The solution should be informed
by current failures to protect the rights of displaced migrants. For instance, Australia has utilized the
controversial practice of intercepting migrants coming into the country by boat and paying nearby countries to accept them into
asylum camps.261 The conditions at these camps have been widely criticized, supporting the notion that the Facility should play
some role in protecting climate change migrants on the ground where necessary.262
The primary critique of this regional/bilateral approach is that it relies essentially on states to volunteer to accept entire large groups
of climate change migrants. Admittedly, without an international treaty creating this obligation explicitly, as the 1951 Refugee
Convention does, this approach assumes a lot.263 However, the benefits of autonomy and cultural integrity necessitate that the
global community gives countries an opportunity, within a structured UNFCCC environment, to negotiate regional agreements. In
addition to the benefits of a regional approach, the political environment likely would not support a top-down multi-lateral treaty
like the 1951 Refugee Convention.264 Moreover, the Facility could lay the proper groundwork for a potential expansion. The Facility
could study which areas are most suitable for large-scale migration and support regional and bilateral agreements before shifting
toward a more difficult-to-negotiate rights-based agreement.
Solves the aff by resettling climate-refugees and providing a strategy to

combat climate change
There are others that believe another possible course of action to be a Protocol
negotiated under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”) on the Recognition, Protection, and Resettlement of Climate-refugees,
based on the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” and respective
capabilities (“CBDR–RC”).143 Their position is considered to be more advantageous than the creation of a new treaty,
because the principle of CBDR–RC and full incremental costs are already included in the UNFCCC, thus another protocol would not
need to establish a completely new legal basis.144 They believe
that the Protocol should include a strict
definition of climate-refugees that could, in turn, lead to a more international
acceptance, and specific “visa requirements” that would allow climate-
refugees to migrate with dignity.145 It should also provide for a duty to take action
and prevent a person from becoming a climate-refugee, involving a burden-sharing
mechanism, recognition of the causal relationship between climate change
and statelessness, and if the case, the grant of citizenship for stateless climate-
refugees by the host nations.146 Moreover, affected countries should be under an
obligation to implement adaptation measures, while the biggest emitters and wealthiest
countries provide financial aid and expertise.147 The distribution of financial resources
should be regulated under a newly established fund called the “‘Climate Refugee
Protection and Resettlement Fund’ which should be financed by the parties to the
UNFCCC and be based on the principle of full incremental costs.” 148 Having in place a
binding instrument and a legal status for climate-refugees will impose obligations and
award rights for host countries, climate-refugees, countries of origins, and the
international community, especially through the principle of responsibility for the
largest GHG emitters. Climate-refugees will not be left behind, according to the
commitment “leave no one behind” made by the international community during the
World Humanitarian Summit held in Istanbul in 2016.149 Also, it could help tackle some
of the key challenges present in UNHCR humanitarian operations as they relate to the
energy access and environmental management for the affected population, namely
funds and technical expertise (i.e., a cooperation between energy experts and humanitarian experts). “from the
protection of nearly 25 million refugees and IDPs to hundreds of millions of internal or international climate migrants,” there are
other actors in place that can assist and help UNHCR in its reorganization process.150 As such, besides UNHCR, there will be other
existing institutions that can play an important role in protecting climate-refugees, such as but not limited to United Nations
Development Program (“UNDP”), World Bank, United Nations Environment Program (“UNEP”) and UNFCCC.151 Even
though UNHCR lacks the technical expertise and funds to deal with energy access and
implementation of sustainable energy projects for refugees, in the case of climate-
refugees this divide can be filled, as new technical expertise and funds can be made
accessible from the new actors involved.
The CP is a long-term solution that can prevent future climate refugees by
developing an avenue to prevent global climate change from accelerating
Although climate change is a global phenomenon, its consequences “are not equally
distributed among” nations.221 For example, sea level rise and ocean warming will predominantly affect low-
lying coastal areas and islands, “[t]he Arctic region is warming twice as fast as any other
region” and China is more “threatened by rising seas and flood waters” than any
other nation.222 Moreover, climate change will disproportionately impact
developing countries, which “have onethird of the world’s residents and yet
contribute only 7% of total global emissions.”223 Developing countries also lack the
necessary means to address the devastating impacts of climate change.224 This is an
example where energy justice can help inform policy choices. Additionally, “[c]limate
change is gradually divorcing us from our land and eroding our subsistence way
of life,” forcing people to migrate and seek refuge elsewhere.225 Climate-refugees
originate from and typically migrate to the poorer regions and countries, those that have
contributed less to the effects of climate change, with most of the migration occurring
within the respective borders and only sometimes occurring cross-border or
internationally.226 When crossing an international border, climate-refugees have
been more likely to migrate to developing countries than to developed
ones.227 The developing nations also bear the burden of providing for them, in spite of
the fact that they “are heavily dependent on agriculture, lacking resources and
possibilities to prevent further environmental crisis,” and are therefore unfit to
accommodate the increasing number of climaterefugees.228 Additionally, the capacity of
developing nations to accommodate climate-refugees is affected by poor
government policy, increasing population, excessive exploitation of natural
resources, and a lack of community adaptation mechanisms to natural disasters.229
Not only is climate change induced displacement a long-term phenomenon that will continue to produce climate-refugees, it has the
capacity to degrade or to contribute to an already unstable environment in many host states. Questions of energy justice help us
understand the vital intergenerational equities. For example, a painful irony is that “infrastructure decisions made today may still be
important decades from now.”230 Additionally,
as ethicist Henry Shue has argued, “future
generations will be more severely damaged by climate change than present generations
– indeed, they will be its greatest victims, especially in the relatively near future
before physical and psychological adaptations can set in for the lucky.”231 If this is
true, an image of the autonomy of each human, present or future, will lead us on a path that favors mitigations over adaptation; an
image that discounts the worth or happiness of future humans will lead us to favor adaptation and put less effort into mitigation
work. The international community, therefore, has a moral responsibility and duty “to ensure that today’s children and future
generations inherit a global environment at least no worse than the one we received from our predecessors – and that responsibility
extends to preventing climate change and making strategic investments in something known as ‘adaptation’ to increase the . . .
resilience of our communities.”232 For example, in terms of host countries, some adaptation measures, as small as “introduction of
improved cookstoves and basic solar lanterns . . . and solar photovoltaic (PV) mini-grids” can help reduce emissions, costs,
environmental degradation, deforestation, and resource tensions with local communities.233 Additionally, “[e]nergy investments
help integrate displaced populations and provide a legacy asset for local communities.”234 Despite
the energy projects
employed by the international community, it is becoming clearer that these
projects can present a long-term solution only with the support of the host
countries and governments – in what is being referred to as a quid pro quo match. Thus,
host countries that do not have a legal obligation to provide for climate-
refugees may agree to take a different approach when their “ambitions to
increase the sustainability of their energy systems and . . . energy access for
their own populations” are met.235 Another option is to give refugees a larger role in decision making and
invite them to be partners instead of mere recipients in the path towards achieving sustainable energy. For example, UNHCR has
worked with refugees from Dollo Ado, Ethiopia in designing and producing fuel-efficient cook-stoves.236 Moreover, we cannot talk
about achieving energy justice for climate-refugees without also addressing climate justice, namely how energy “access is to be
achieved.”237 In other words, “how does the international community ensure access to clean
energy for the poorest residents of the poorest nations?”238 In this context, there is
little argument against the belief that developed nations should take the leadership role
in combating climate change and increase the energy access in developing nations.239
Nonetheless, in achieving both climate justice and energy justice, the international emphasis should turn on
“clean energy technology that addresses the needs of developing economies and
the energy poor.”240 Alleviating deprivation — whether energy, economic, poverty, etc. — in some parts of the world, would
in turn be for the benefit of all nations, as “the world is a far smaller place than once it was.”241 A global approach to
climate change induced displacement will respond to both equity concerns – as the
nations responsible for climate change will pay for its consequences – and efficiency
concerns, including both the developed North together with the affected nations and
most of the global South.242 Moreover, a global approach for climate change
induced displacement should be adopted in sync with climate change
mitigation strategies, opening the path towards the creation of an
international fund that is comprised by national contributions based on
“the level of emissions of greenhouse gases and/or on the reduction of these
emissions.”243 These beliefs can also be sustained by the principle of CBDR–RC, as also discussed in the previous section,
demanding that states “address the consequences of climate change together, while still differentiating between states in different
situations.”244 In the same time, the CBDR–RC principle requires that “[t]he special situation and needs of developing countries,
particularly the leastdeveloped and those most environmentally vulnerable” be given “special priority.”245 Two interpretations of
the CBDR–RC have been advanced, namely “whether differentiation of responsibility may be based either on historical emissions, or
on financial capabilities.”246 The one based on historical emission is similar to the “Polluter-Pays Principle” and would serve as an
incentive to reduce pollution, while the financial capability interpretation as “solidarity or generosity” — being voluntary by nature —
could weaken the “moral sense implied by the notion of ‘responsibility.’”247 Nonetheless, climate-refugees provide us with the
certainty that “the future will probably be as messy as the past, and all predictions are likely to be wrong, but one thing is clear:
there is no return to the neat idea of closed-off nation-states with homogenous national
communities.”248 It is time to accept, adapt and take responsibility of the new
reality.
Past international treaties have failed because countries have

different agendas—the plan fiats out of it through a new convention
that is in terms with each country
DeGanaro 15- Cary DeGanaro- Executive Office for Immigration Review, University of Colorado
School of Law, “LOOKING INWARD: DOMESTIC POLICY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE REFUGEES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND BEYOND”, 2015, https://heinonline-
org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/ucollr86&id=1073, //
Suraj P
The Montreal Protocol's success in eliminating ozonedepleting substances convinced

many that an international treaty would be the best way to solve climate change and
greenhouse gas emissions.226 As Professor William Boyd explained in his article exploring the evolution of
environmental law, both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were modeled off the Montreal
Protocol, and most scholars believed that they would be similarly successful in reducing
emissions across the planet. 227 But the major issues with creating a legal regime based
upon international law are that the process is slow and cumbersome, consensus is
elusive, and enforcement is difficult. The international climate regime is
composed of individual sovereign nations, each with its own goals and
agenda. 228 For this reason, international climate governance since the Montreal Protocol
has failed to address the biggest issues of environmental law. 229 Professor Boyd argues that despite
the global nature of climate change, a global solution with a top-down climate change framework is unrealistic and unattainable. 230
Rather, problem solving in environmental governance should consist of "multiple actors coordinating through a variety of
organizational forms. '231 National
regulatory systems thus fit nicely into such a
crossjurisdictional system, making it possible to solve a global problem where it might
otherwise be impossible. 232 Although Professor Boyd's article assessed the structure of
global environmental law in the context of emissions rather than migration, it provides a
useful lens through which to view new patterns of climate change-induced migration. An
international, treaty-based system is likely unattainable in the near future, despite the imminent increase in substantial climate-
induced migration. 233
One important question to ask is, "What examples of national,
sovereign state law, bilateral agreements, and regional instruments could provide a
roadmap for developing interlocking systems of complementary and temporary
protections? ' 234 This approach, like Professor Boyd's, recognized that the international community may not be able to
craft and implement a timely solution to challenges such as climate migrants. 235 As Professor Jane McAdam suggested, focusing
too narrowly on establishing a global treaty may allow difficult conversations-such as what the treaty would look like and who should
bear the greatest responsibilities-to impede progress. 236 This would, in turn, shift the focus away from implementing alternative,
more immediate solutions. 237 Professor McAdam points to the complexity and unsettled nature
of the nexus between climate change and human migration as one of the major
impediments to creating a comprehensive international mechanism to deal with this
problem. 238 Some scholars continue to argue that an international treaty is
the best mechanism to address climate migrants. 239 For example, Professors Bonnie Docherty
and Tyler Giannini from Harvard Law School called for a new climate change refugee
convention. 240 They rejected a climate-migrant solution based on existing international treaties, arguing that these
treaties were not created for the purpose of addressing climate migrants and therefore
would not adequately fit their needs.241 They emphasized that a new convention was
needed because it could be interdisciplinary, bring attention to the problem, and
promote the involvement of many actors in creating a flexible solution to fit the
problem. 242 While their argument successfully identified the failures of other
proposals, it failed to take into account the political challenges and long lag-time of
implementing an international treaty in a fractured global community with competing
interests. Negotiating a new treaty takes a substantial amount of time. Additionally, to
reach an agreement, the parties might have to concede issues or take on obligations that
they oppose. This could put their compliance with those obligations at risk. On the other
hand, a variety of interlocking bilateral and multilateral agreements would be more
flexible and give each party a sense of ownership over its own obligations. Thus, because
the process is lengthy and cumbersome, the United States cannot wait for the
international community to reach consensus on climate migrants. Moreover, because
they do not sufficiently address domestic conditions and politics, the United States
cannot rely on international treaties to solve this problem. For these reasons, the United
States must take responsibility and create its own solution for climate migrants.
Only by addressing climate refugees internationally grants international
funding, technical expertise, and operational treatment that the aff can’t—
solves better
THE ENERGY BAR ASSOCIATION, May 2nd 2018, 172, http://www.eba-
Often, the strength of nativist, nationalistic fears cannot be ignored and will not
disappear if disregarded. However, accommodating climate-refugees in the
international legal and natural order and stemming their growth is in the self-interest of
all nations because of the serious threat that doing nothing poses to world stability.
Therefore, we stress that concepts of energy justice can help fill and address the legal gaps and substantive needs faced by climate-
refugees, as those concepts offer a platform, a vocabulary and a history of shared values while at the same time suggesting necessary
key solutions. Starting from the argument that climate change and climate change induced
displacement are permanent phenomena and the recognition that many of today’s
refugees are also climate-refugees, an amendment or a new legal framework is
already needed to reflect the reality and afford legal recognition to this new
emerging type of refugees. As the home countries of climate-refugees become uninhabitable, their status becomes that
of stateless persons. A fundamental fact is that the GHG emissions causing climate change
have already been and are still being emitted by the energy systems of the
leading members of that international community. Considerations of energy
justice require creating an opportunity to offset those emissions by recognizing a status
and correlative rights and obligations under international law. Procedural justice provides the
right tools to address the international decision-making process, emphasizing the climate change role of bridging the divide between
energy and humanitarian framework for refugees. Adding climate change as a recognized cause of
forced displacement may unlock further benefits, such as funding, technical
expertise, operational treatment, because it connects better than ever
different sectors and actors, brought together for the benefit of the humanitarian
sector — long in need of a reform. On the other hand, distributive justice brings attention to the current and future
unjust and unequal distribution of energy services and impacts of climate change, urging us to have a discussion
that for far too long has been postponed, because of the short term technical vision of
our energy system. Climate-refugees need to be put in their rightful place as a
global issue that would spur global involvement and acknowledgment.
Climate-refugees may well become the wake-up call that the humanitarian system
needs.
CP – Solvency – for Either UN CP
The UN has the expertise and capacity to create and enforce reform
Finally, a fifth encouraging

factor for global migration governance is the deepening of
expertise and capacity in migration management within UN organizations.
Significant progress has been made through “mixed migration task forces” established
in Somalia, Yemen, Kenya, and North Africa jointly by UN organizations or UN country teams to pool expertise and resources.
These task forces acknowledge the “mixed” nature of migration flows (i.e., that influxes include
economic migrants, refugees, and other types of migrants) and identifies specific actions by different
organizations. In addition, the combined annual budgets of UNHCR and IOM increased
from $1.15 billion in 2000 to $4.84 billion in 2015.48 Such resources enabled both
organizations to deepen their policy work and operations in crises. The result is that
both UNHCR and IOM are active participants in negotiations on the global stage,
providing concept notes, background reports, and recommendations at most major
forums and consultations. Their influence is discussed below by examining their roles in the Global Migration Group
and the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.
UN convention definition should be expanded

One narrative that has informed some of the legal-normative writing about the rights of “climate
refugees” is the idea of using the existing international refugee regime to protect
populations displaced as a result of climate change. According to the UN High Commisssion for
Refugees, a refugee is defined as a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country.” (CSR, Art. 1.A.2).11 Kolmannskog (2008) and Westra (2009) identify a
number of conditions under which environmental factors may be used as
grounds for protection under the Convention. One is the principle of non-refoulement, which
holds that people cannot be returned to places where their lives or freedoms are under
threat. In theory, returning populations to homelands that have been rendered effectively
uninhabitable would violate non-refoulement, thereby creating obligations on the part
of national governments (Kolmannskog 2008). A second concerns the nature of persecution,
where it can be established that environmental degradation (e.g., draining of marshlands, etc.) is
being intentionally used to harm populations on the basis of “race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion,” such groups may conceivably claim protection on the grounds of political persecution
(Kol- mannskog 2008; Westra 2009).
The Convention therefore provides some scope for protecting populations whose
homelands have been rendered permanently uninhabitable, but these provisions apply
only to individuals seeking refugee status, which effectively precludes efforts to encourage voluntary
resettlement in advance of displacement (cf. Biermann and Boas 2008a). Moreover, the idea of revising the Convention to include
new categories of refugee raises difficult ethical and political questions about the rights of populations currently recognized under
the 1951 Convention (i.e., those facing persecution) and about the terms on which national governments may be expected to grant
new rights of citizenship and asylum (Kolmannnskog 2008; Biermann and Boas 2008a).
International action solves

Srilakshmi, '18 – 4th year law student at the NALSAR University of Law (Patruni, "Moving towards the recognition and
protection of climate change refugees under international human rights law," OHRH, 4-9-2018, http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/moving-
towards-the-recognition-and-protection-of-climate-change-refugees-under-international-human-rights-law/)//SB
The recent hurricanes that hit the coast of the Caribbean have renewed the fears of a global climate refugee crisis. However,
there is a lack of clarity on who exactly constitutes a climate refugee and
what human rights protections they are entitled to. The UNHRC has stated that almost 36 million people
have been displaced by environment and climate related disasters in 2009, the number is expected to reach 50 million by 2050.
Most reports have referred to the displaced persons as ‘environmental refugees’.
Unfortunately, the
main convention dealing with the plight of refugees, the 1951 Refugee
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, restrict the meaning of refugees to those displaced by
political crises and war. However, there exists international law instruments which
recognise and protect climate change refugees. The Organization of African Unity Convention provides
comprehensive human rights protection to internally displaced persons, this includes those who have been displaced by climate
change. In addition, the 1984 Cartagena Protocol on Refugees also has a wide definition of refugees, it includes those people whose
livelihood, health and security is affected by circumstances beyond their control, causing disturbance in public order.
Unfortunately, both these instruments only have a regional application. In addition, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights protects the human rights of persons to security in case of a lack of livelihood due to circumstances
beyond her control under Article 25. However, the UDHR does not expressly protect climate
refugees and would also be difficult to enforce.
There have been other positive moves towards the recognition and protection of
environmental refugees. In 2008, the Human Rights Council recognized that the human being is
the centre of sustainable development and the right to development must be viewed in the context of fulfilling the
needs of future generations. A year later, backed by a study by the OHCHR, the council adopted another
resolution where it acknowledged the impact of climate change on human rights. In this
particular resolution, the council noted the challenges that climate change poses to the fulfilment of Millennium Development Goals
and the eradication of poverty. It pointed out that climate
change impacts rights such as the right to life
and the right to adequate food, especially of the most vulnerable people of the society.
During the 50th Anniversary of the Statelessness Convention in an expert meeting a Bellagio, the UNHCR focussed on the same
issue. These endeavours led the debate to resurface during the Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st
century at Oslo.
Some states have been more activist in protecting climate change refugees. Recently, New
Zealand proposed an exclusive ‘visa’ for climate refugees on humanitarian grounds. In 2014, two cases refused the allowing of
climate refugees. These decisions were overruled by the New Zealand immigration tribunal on the basis of the humanitarian ground
(the situation in Tuvalu) provided for under New Zealand’s Immigration Act as opposed to a climate change threat. Unfortunately,
there is lack of political will on the part of some states to expand the definition of ‘refugees’. In its draft form, the Paris Agreement
included the recommendation of a ‘climate change displacement coordination facility’ for planned relocation of those affected by
climate change. But this proposal was vehemently opposed by Australia. The US and the European community have also been slow
in giving out compensation and funds for disaster relief and clean technology.
Despite some of the positive steps in regional instruments, the possibility of using the
UDHR as well as some positive steps from jurisdictions such as New Zealand, there remains an
imminent need to draw up a new treaty providing comprehensive protection
to climate refugees by fixing responsibility on the larger states who are historically
responsible for climate change. Apart from such treaty, larger states like the US,
Australia should enter into bilateral agreements with small island states
providing for a rule based humanitarian protection for refugees. Another option would be to extend
the definition of refugee in the Refugee Convention to include climate refugees. Countries should also come together to promote
sustainable practices of traditional communities and contribute to climate resilient infrastructures and ways of life in these states.
Building up upon a structured environmental and human rights framework

is key
Geboers et al. 17- Lotte Geboers holds an interdisciplinary bachelor’s in liberal arts and Sciences
from Utrecht University, with a specialization in International & Conflict studies, Matijn Straatsma has a
Bachelor’s degree in Liberal Arts and Sciences from Utrecht University, Ayşe Wijmenga has a B.A in
Liberal Arts and Sciences from Utrecht University, “Protecting and preventing climate refugees An
interdisciplinary study on climate refugee issues and the United Nations”, January 2017, // Suraj P
The aim of the present interdisciplinary study has been to identify what role the United
Nations can play concerning climate refugee issues. The UN is a promising
candidate in dealing with climate refugee issues, because it has played a key
role in the development of both the environmental and human rights
framework, and because it comes closest to a form of global governance. We have
tried to get a picture of what various sub-organizations of the UN can do to solve these
issues. It is clear that all these organizations may play a significant role in solving
climate refugee issues, but that collaboration between them is needed. The present situation thus
necessitates a more comprehensive understanding of climate refugee issues. This study provides such an understanding. While
collaboration between suborganizations of the UN has taken place, they have not been able to integrate and complement each other’s
mandates, but mainly collaborated by working separately on the same project. Nonetheless,
they do not exclude
each other: there is room for more intensive cooperation. This can be done in several
ways. Connecting the UN human rights framework to the UN climate change
convention framework explicitly relates the quality of the environment to an individual’s
enjoyment of human rights. Furthermore, allowing for the FAO to attend and take place
in climate change conferences can bring the attention of Member-states to the
importance of damage control to adapt to climate change. There are also rewarding
possibilities for collaborations on the ground. The OHCHR and UNHCR can collaborate with the FAO to
prevent individuals from being displaced by environmental degradation - which is in itself a human right. These are only a few
suggestions on how the sub-organizations could collaborate. A global problem such as climate change asks for global approaches to
refugee protection and enforcement mechanisms to ensure this protection. However,
before it is possible to
design effective protection instruments, a consensus should be reached on how to define
the climate refugee, what his or her legal rights are and what the role of the
international society is to protect and prevent climate refugee flows. The most important
international agreement that UN Member-states should comply with, is to reduce
emissions to safer levels, to prevent an intensification of climate change. The UN as
intergovernmental, overarching organization should take the lead in preventing climate
change and climate refugees. Consequently, the debate on how to adapt and mitigate to
climate change needs to continue.
Disadvantages
Link – Population DA / Base DA / Any Signal Arg
The plan exacerbates already-scarce resources
While the number of people fleeing their homes due to environmental crises grows, they
continue to be denied refugee status. This is particularly challenging as, for many countries, the
effects of climate change are generally felt across large geographic areas and have forced
many to migrate regionally and internationally. For example, residents of the Horn of Africa, primarily from
Somalia, have temporarily settled in refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia; citizens of island states, such as Tuvalu, Nauru, and
Kiribati, in the South Pacific Ocean have tried to relocate to Australia and New Zealand; and Bangladeshis have migrated to India
and Nepal.94 All of these migrants
are not granted legal status and are either eventually
deported or remain as undocumented immigrants. Additionally, there is evidence to
suggest that internal migration due to climate change may ultimately create more
economic and political refugees. The former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Gutierrez, stated that
“climate refugees can enhance the competition for resources—water, food, grazing
lands—and that competition can trigger conflict.”95 Hence, climate change migration can
cause population pressures, landlessness, rapid urbanization, and unemployment,
which put refugees in danger of backlash and worsen existing urban struggles.
The plan triggers massive fears tied to xenophobia and resource shortages
There is considerable uncertainty as to where these streams of global environmental

refugees will flow. But it is a safe bet that they will lap up on the shores of
prosperous developed Western nations. which are already becoming
increasingly xenophobic. The UNHCR, with a lean staff of 7600 workers, is already stressed by refugee
crises of some 37 million in Africa and the Middle East. Add millions of people displaced by climate
change, and you have a crisis of governance and management that will sorely tax the
wisest solons at the UN and other governmental agencies. Already Western nations are
feeling the pain of including refugee populations in their midst. Australian immigration minister
Philip Ruddock urged the fiftieth-anniversary meeting of the UNHCR to curtail the rights of those seeking asylum because of either
political or environmental causes.9 Ruddock and others have pointed out the
enormous increase in the flight of
people from the states of their birth in the final decades of the twentieth century and are
fearful that this mass movement is likely to grow exponentially in the twenty-first
century. Increasingly migrants “are resorting to unauthorized methods of entry.
often at great risk to their lives.”10
Resettling climate migrants in the US is dangerous for them -- xenophobia
and racism turn the case
Warren 17 (Phillip J., J.D. Candidate 2017 at Columbia Law School, Forced Migration after Paris COP21, Evaluating the
Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?div=59&handle=hein.journals%2Fclr116&id=&page=//waters)
Further, domestic U.S. politics make it extremely unlikely that a top- down, rights-based
treaty that requires acceptance of climate change migrants will be ratified, at least in the near
future. The United States is currently in the midst of a wave of anti-immigration
sentiment,253 which arguably borders on racism and xenophobia.254 Additionally, many of those
who staunchly oppose accepting refugees from war-torn Syria also deny climate change.>' At best this combination
creates an additional barrier to a rights-based approach; at worst it represents a source of climate change
denial. Whatever underlies these positions (and whatever their merit), it is unimaginable that the U.S. Senate would provide advice
and consent on a treaty that requires acceptance of climate migrants.256 Accordingly, the Facility should narrow its
short-term focus to studying the viability of certain areas for resettlement, along with
supporting soft- law and regional/bilateral negotiation support. This approach might even find favor
with those who are dubious of U.S. participation in climate change negotiations.257 The solution proposed herein
attempts to protect climate change migrants from having to flee to the United States
without a right to enter an already overburdened immigration system. The proposed solution
creates no obligation to accept large populations of climate change migrants, at least in the short term, and would thus
prove more politically palatable to conservative factions in the United States.
C. Long Term: RegionalandBilateralTreatiesandaRolefor the U.N. Security Council This section explores a long-term role for the
Displacement Coordination Facility. First, the UNFCCC's Facility should act as a clearinghouse for regional and bilateral agreements
to address cross- border displacement. Second, the Facility should lay the groundwork for a potential expansion to a rights-based
treaty if regional agreements do not develop quickly enough. Lastly, the UNFCCC's Coordination Facility could act in concert with
the U.N. Security Council to serve as a stopgap and enforcement wing to protect the rights of displaced people.
A Wild DeDev Card
Global climate refugee flows are inevitable and only de-growth solves
Climate refugees are a problem of development policy beyond the scope of a single
country or agency. The problems are fraught with emotion. human agency. and
political controversy. How will people be relocated and settled? Is it possible to offer
environmental refugees temporary asylum? Will these refugees have any collective
rights in the new areas they inhabit? And, lastly, as currently vast areas of the world are
being rendered unfit for human habitation, who will pay the costs of all the affected countries
during the process of resettlement? The need for planning for climate refugees comes at a time when
many countries are devoting little thought to this emerging issue. Indeed some critics point out that
nations have yet to challenge the concept of economic growth itself. The problems of climate refugees
cannot be addressed without confronting the socially acceptable definitions of growth and the
largely unquestioned faith in its benefits. Limits to growth are actually emerging. notes Richard Heinberg. an expert with the Post
Carbon Institute and author of The End of Growth: Adapting to Our New Economic Reality.11 Fossil fuels like oil are
nonrenewable, and they are finite; as the world’s primary sources of oil and gas run out, fossil fuel
companies are turning to increasingly risky and expensive methods of extraction. Wind
and solar power can help generate electricity, especially in rural communities, but they are not good options for
dealing with issues like urban crowding. the transportation of populations. and expanding food supplies. Preserving and protecting
green areas of countries coupled with stabilizing urban growth may be one key to preparing for future problems .
Even before
countries can deal with the onslaught of climate refugees, they will have to power down
the ways they pollute and use up the landscapes and open places. Adds Peter Victor, an economist at Ontario’s York
University, the idea of progress once had many measures but now relates only to the economy.12 If we are to deal
with large- scale exchanges of population around the planet. we have to
recognize that economics does not dominate the larger ecosystem. The limits
of the natural world come into play. Ideas such as these need to be kept in perspective as
nations debate what to do with climate refugees. Hopefully, the current attitudes of
northern developed countries will change from self-interest to financial support of
climate change adaptation programs in the poorer nations in the south.15 We are now seeing the
decoupling of economic growth and greenhouse emissions. Nearly two dozen countries
increased their GDP since 2000 while their emissions have stayed flat or gone down. including developed and developing countries
alike, the World Resources Institute reported in 2016.14 This
is the result of larger consumption of
alternatives to high carbon energy like coal and oil. Articles abound in economic journals about the success
of wind and solar power in this regard. Such optimism may be premature. however. Bill McKibben. journalist and cofounder of the
climate advocacy organization 350.Org. notes that while one greenhouse gas decreased in the United
States. another. far more nefarious one may have increased. Methane. the by-product
of natural gas, is a much more potent greenhouse gas—it captures more of the sun’s rays. And the boom
of hydraulic fracturing (or “fracking”) for natural gas in the States and around the world has led to concerns that
methane emissions may be the new culprit of climate change.15 Regardless, the global economy has
largely been running business as usual—as of April 2016. countries around the globe were still planning to build hundreds of new
coal-fired power plants.16 Without more aggressive action to reduce fossil fuel usage. including
preventing new sources of fossil fiel emissions, the reductions we have seen thus far will
not be enough to prevent catastrophic climate changes. And the decoupling process will
require much more effort in poor countries with large populations living in energy
poverty. Under “business as usual,” coal companies are trying to build new coal plants in a misguided effort to lift developing
nations out of poverty. Yet often the coal plants require massive, and expensive, new distribution infrastructure and pollute the
communities they intended to help. The
idea that petroleum and coal is “cheap” in these
communities is not only a farce, but it also ignores the larger problems that
emissions bring.17
K
Link – Securitization
Discourse that surrounds climate refugees is inherently securitizing,
portraying them as necessary to be 'managed' or 'controlled'
Johnson 18 (Craig A., Professor of Political Science at the University of Guelph, where he has been based since 2002. He
holds a Ph.D. in International Development from the London School of Economics and Political Science (2000), and has taught at
the London School of Economics, the School of Oriental and African Studies, University College London and the University of
Oxford, Climate, migration and displacement from: Routledge Handbook of Environmental Displacement and Migration, pg. 344-
345//waters)
When it is planned and supported through public policy, economic migration has been shown to provide an important means of
diversifying and strengthening poor people’s assets, livelihoods and income, thereby reducing household and systemic vulnerability
to climate change (Bier- mann and Boas, 2008a; Johnson and Krishnamurthy, 2010; de Haan, 1999; Deshingkar, 2005; McLeman
and Smit, 2006; Perch-Nielson et al., 2008; de Sherbinin et al., 2008, 2011b; Bog- ardi and Warner, 2009; Barnett and Webber,
2010; Foresight, 2011; de Haas, 2012; Adger et al., 2014; Suckall et al., 2016). However, governments frequently discourage
migration, using labour codes, land use restrictions and other policy instruments as a means of controlling the movement and
settlement of itinerant populations (cf. Bakewell, 2008; de Haas, 2012). Moreover, national and international
debates
about immigration and asylum policy have become increasingly hostile towards the
rights of migrants,“asylum seekers” and refugees (Neumayer, 2006; Zetter, 2007; Johnson, 2013; Humble, 2014).
Arguably one of the most prominent themes that appears in the extant literature on climate, migration and displacement is the
notion that climate-induced displacement is a threat to political stability and
international security (e.g. Homer-Dixon, 1991; Kaplan, 1994; Reueney, 2007; WBGU, 2008). At the heart of this
literature is a (largely speculative) assertion that population pressures and a changing
climate pose the risk of triggering new and violent conflicts along ethnic, religious and nationalist lines
(Homer-Dixon, 1991; Kaplan, 1994; Kahl, 2006; Christian Aid, 2007; Reuveny, 2007;WBGU, 2008). In the words of the German
Advisory Council:
climate change could exacerbate existing environmental crises such as drought, water scarcity and soil degradation, intensify land-
use con icts and trigger further environmentally induced migration. Rising global temperatures will jeopardize the bases of many
people’s livelihoods, especially in the developing regions, increase vulnerability to poverty and social deprivation, and thus put
human security at risk. Particularly in weak and fragile states with poorly performing institutions and systems of government,
climate change is also likely to overwhelm local capacities to adapt to changing environmental conditions and will thus reinforce the
trend towards general instability that already exists in many societies and regions.
Similarly, and more squarely directed towards the American security regime,Werz and Conley (2012: 7–8) warn that
“Environmentally induced migration, resource con icts, and unstable states will not only have an impact upon the nations where
they occur, but also on the United States and the broader international community.”
At the heart of this analysis are a number of causal assumptions about the factors affecting processes
of state breakdown, “environmental conflict” and social unrest. One is an assumption that migration – and
especially movements of people across national borders – will unleash new and otherwise dormant ethnic
tensions rooted in race, religion, language and other social markers (Kaplan, 1994; Homer-Dixon, 1991; Reuveny, 2007;
WBGU, 2008). A second is the “state breakdown thesis” that internal and international
migration flows will overwhelm the ability of governments to undertake basic functions,
including ones most important to development agendas (e.g. transportation, communication, water and sanitation) (Kaplan, 1994;
Homer- Dixon, 1991; Kahl, 2006; Reuveny, 2007; WBGU, 2008). A third is that climate change will undermine the agricultural and
natural resource base, forcing vulnerable rural populations into cities, whose capacity to provide even the most basic forms of public
services is already highly constrained (Satterthwaite et al., 2010; Revi et al., 2014).
For many observers, the

framing of climate-induced displacement as a national security threat
has evoked considerable scepticism and alarm. A number of analysts, for instance, have
questioned the ability of social science research to isolate the environmental
determinants of migration in the absence of the historical and socio-economic factors that affect migration decisions
and processes (e.g. Nordas and Gleditsch, 2007; Barnett and Adger, 2007; Hartmann, 2010; Gemenne, 2011; Adger et al., 2014;
Bettini, 2015; Boas, 2015). In their crudest forms, environmental migration models appear to suggest that climate phenomena are
the only or primary factors motivating migration when in fact a host of factors (including seasonality, wage rates, persecution, life
cycles and institutions) may have equal or more bearing on the decision or not to migrate (Black, 2001; Castles, 2002; Boano et al.,
2008; Hulme, 2008; Perch-Nielson et al., 2008; IOM, 2009; Black et al., 2011b; Gemenne, 2011; Adger et al., 2014; Bettini, 2015).
At the very least, the lines of causality are more complex than they are sometimes
construed in the literature, highlighting the need to scrutinize far more carefully the theories and assumptions being
used to understand climate, migration and displacement (cf. Barnett and Adger, 2007; Nordas and Gleditsch, 2007; Hartmann,
2010; Gemenne, 2011; Bettini, 2015; Boas, 2015).
Others have argued that climate-displacement narratives (e.g. ooding and displacement due to sea level
rise) are being used (somewhat disingenuously) as a means of “securitizing” wider policy objectives,
such as immigration controls, asylum policy and foreign aid (Levy, 1995; Hart- mann, 2010; Bettini, 2013, 2015; Oels, 2013; Boas,
2015; Boas and Rothe, 2016).The argument here is that migration is being subsumed by other objectives and being portrayed as a
failure to adapt, particularly if it entails migration across international borders. For Bettini (2015: n.p.),
The idea we should “solve” climate migration is rooted in a view of mobility as

pathological, as the result of a failure to develop, to adapt to climate change, or to be
more resilient.
Framed in this way, populations facing the threat of environmental displacement are
seen as victims or threats, whose actions, movements and decisions need to be managed
and controlled (cf. Levy, 1995; Hartmann, 2010; Bettini, 2013, 2015; Oels, 2013; Boas and Rothe, 2016). An
alternative perspective that is rooted far more squarely in the human
security paradigm is one that focuses less on questions of national security
and stability and more on the factors affecting social agency and decisions
regarding migration and adaptation to climate change.
Link – Neoliberalism
Neoliberal policies have created the environmental destruction that
has left entire communities in a precarious position
Given such acute vulnerability to climate-induced environmental change experienced

across the Global South, the climate crisis must be understood as inseparable from the
turmoil caused by the first two dynamics of forced migration—neoliberalization and
securitization. Regarding neoliberalization, such links are apparent in the
deregulation and privatization of state sectors and industries that occurred
throughout the Global South in the late 1970s that contributed to the underdevelopment
of national economies and industries. As such, neoliberalization has helped generalize
individual and community vulnerability to climate-induced changes and decrease
resilience. It has done so not only by increasing poverty, but also by re-
entrenching colonial relations of dependency that have locked many countries
into natural resource-based economies, and by undermining the development of
adequate infrastructure that might help communities cope.92 A majority of climate
refugees comprise people largely from the Global South who are already marginalized in
their communities and geographies, and whose livelihoods are most vulnerable to
climate change. Even further, many lack the resources to resettle elsewhere after being forcibly
displaced by climate-induced environmental disasters.
Framing climate change refugees as “victims” deflects from the systemic

issue itself – the aff allows for continued environmental destruction by
characterizing the crisis as a “social problem” that can be fixed through
accepting migrants
Faber and Schlegel ’17 – August 14, 2017 -- Daniel Faber is director of the Northeastern
Environmental Justice Research Collaborative and Christinia Schlegel has a Master’s from Tufts
University in Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning, “Give Me Shelter from the Storm:
Framing the Climate Refugee Crisis in the Context of Neoliberal Capitalism,”
https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2017.1356494 // shurst
Whether or not environmental migration is defined as a social problem is related to how social events are
framed. Frames, according to Erving Goffman, are schemata of interpretation that allow people to locate, perceive, identify, and
label events taking place around them. Climate refugees may exist in an objective reality, but
until they are recognized as such, social action to address the causes and/or
symptoms of their plight is not possible. The framing of “environmental refugees” and then “climate
refugees” as a social problem goes back to the 1980s, when concerned scientists and environmental activists first argued
that environmental degradation and climate change could lead to mass displacement
and social upheaval. Speculative and highly future-conditional, the perspectives on climate refugees ranged from the so-
called maximalist position (climate change as the primary cause of refugee creation) to the “minimalist” position (climate change is
just one of many migration factors). The
maximalist position takes on a largely alarmist tone,
viewing the growing waves of climate refugees as perhaps the most powerful
manifestation of the global ecological crisis. There are two political tendencies in the maximalist camp. On the
one hand, there
are scholars, non-governmental organizations, policy-making bodies, and
international institutions that express sympathy for the plight of climate refugees and
offer many policies and programs to aid in their formal recognition and assistance. The United Nations, for one, has
portrayed “environmental refugees” as helpless victims of climate change in urgent need
of foreign assistance. On the Left, the plight of climate refugees is often framed a
consequence of ecological imperialism and the massive carbon debt owed by the advanced capitalist countries to
the global South. The enormous hardships confronting climate refugees require the transfer of resources to developing countries to
help them cope with climate change. On the Right, the terms “environmental refugee” and “climate refugee” are
frequently used in public discourse to frame the displaced as a potential national security threat .
Homer-Dixon encapsulates the fear when he writes that ecological degradation will produce “waves of environmental refugees that
spill across borders with destabilizing effects on both national and international order.” Likewise, Pentagon-sponsored research
warns of the threat posed to U.S. national security by climate refugees, with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency predicting that 3
percent of the world’s population will be displaced or affected by climate change before 2050. This discourse of climate-induced
migration as a national security threat has now entered the arena of high politics. It has been discussed before the UN Security
Council and UN General Assembly. In a 2013 speech in Berlin, Germany, then U.S. President Barack Obama even warned the world
of “new waves of refugees” caused by climate change. Although
denying the realities of climate change,
President Donald Trump has repeatedly scapegoated immigrants of color into the U.S.
as undermining the safety and well-being of American citizens. For Hartmann, the portrayal of
climate refugees as a security threat is alarming and could “pose a threat to the kind of peaceful international cooperation and
development initiatives needed to respond equitably and effectively to climate change.” It can also serve to militarize the provision of
development assistance and distort climate and human rights policy. Australia’s “offshore detainment centers” for refugees from the
Pacific island Nauru and elsewhere, for instance, are located on remote islands and run by private contractors. Established in 2001
to secure Australia’s borders and labeled—horribly—as “The Pacific Solution,” these militarized encampments are known for their
brutal treatment of the refugees. In fact, human rights advocates have concluded that the Australian government’s policy has been
explicitly designed to deter future refugees by inflicting incalculable damage on the hundreds of women, men, and children in the
camps. The maximalist position is often criticized for being overly deterministic, neglecting to fully consider the complex
interrelated causes that push migration For some political ecologists, the concept of environmental or climate refugee is problematic
in that it naturalizes the political-economic triggers of environmental decline, and also … masks the role of institutional responses
to it … In the case of extreme natural events such as droughts, storms and floods, whether or not people are forced to migrate
permanently from their homes usually depends on pre-existing social relations (who is most vulnerable) and post-disaster responses
(what kind of aid/relief is provided and who receives it) questions whether or not there is a determinable relationship between a
given environmental “driver” and some typology of human migration. Instead, he claims that “it is analytically meaningless to talk of
the ‘environment’ as an independent variable, as any configuration of ‘environmental’ factors in terms of their societal implications
are fundamentally structured and inflected by social, political and economic conditions.” Therefore,
use of the term poses
the danger of strategic essentialism, where an ill-defined empty signifier may be
appropriated by various social actors for purposes other than the protection of the
forced migrants and offering assistance to them. As stated by Hartmann, the extent of displacement by
climate change is … dependent on the existence and effectiveness of adaptation measures that help individuals and communities
cope with environmental stresses. Whether or not such measures are in place in turn depends on political economies at the local,
regional, national and international levels that are often conveniently left out of the discussion of so-called “climate refugees.”
Absent a discussion of the larger political-economic context, “climate
refugee” as a concept has the potential to help “depoliticize the causes of
displacement,” and mask the role of class exploitation and social injustices
perpetuated under capitalism. In such an instance, the term could even relieve wealthier countries of their
obligation to offer asylum and assistance, further states that this is not to deny that environmental changes due to global warming
could in some instances exacerbate already existing economic and political divisions. However, whether or not violent conflict and
mass migrations result depends on so many other factors that it is far too simplistic to see climate change as a major cause or trigger.
She argues that the goal of the Left should be to assist communities in their efforts to adapt to climate change by strengthening
institutions that democratically and equitably manage resources.
Neoliberalism – Root Cause
Neoliberal capitalism is responsible for the climate refugee crisis – the aff
can’t resolve the broader system that causes their scenarios – turns the case
Faber and Schlegel ’17 – August 14, 2017 -- Daniel Faber is director of the Northeastern
Environmental Justice Research Collaborative and Christinia Schlegel has a Master’s from Tufts
University in Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning, “Give Me Shelter from the Storm:
Framing the Climate Refugee Crisis in the Context of Neoliberal Capitalism,”
https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2017.1356494 // shurst
First of all, global capitalism is rendering climate-related stresses and “natural” disasters more frequent and severe in nature. The
inability of the global capitalist system to significantly reduce the emission
of greenhouse gases is causing a planetary crisis. According to the National Climate Assessment,
global warming is triggering ever more extreme weather and climate events. Over the last 50 years much of the U.S. has seen
increases in prolonged periods of excessively high temperatures, heavy downpours and, in some regions, severe floods and droughts.
Likewise, the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions has found thousands of record-breaking weather events worldwide, bolstering
long-term patterns of increasing heat waves, heavy precipitation, droughts and wildfires. A combination of observed trends,
theoretical understanding of the climate system, and numerical modeling demonstrates that global warming is increasing the risk of
these devastating types of events. Today the vast majority of people affected by natural disasters
suffer from climate-related disasters. For instance, between 1980 and 2007, there were 6500
climate-related natural disasters (an average of 343 events per year). During this time some 98 percent of all
those affected by natural disasters—243 million people annually—were linked to climate
change. This represents a 70-percent increase over the previous decade (1984–1994), which saw an
average of 174 million people affected by natural disasters each year. Since 2008 natural disasters have
displaced an average of 25.4 million people each year—the equivalent of one
person per second. In 2015 the number of natural disasters rose to 574 and killed over 32,550 people. Even more
insidious than the spectacular kinds of headline natural disasters typically associated with climate change are the often-invisible
forms of “slow” or “attritional violence” against nature that is scattered across time and space The everydayforms of
environmental degradation installed by unjust and unsustainable systems of capitalist
production are especially vulnerable to the more mundane (but just as consequential manifestations)
of climate change. In Syria, where a five-year drought drove 1.5 million rural people and farmers off the parched
landscape and into the cities, only to have their needs largely ignored by the Assad regime, climate change may be
one factor in the larger civil war that has caused nearly five million refugees to flee the war-
torn country. Secondly, neoliberal capitalist development is resulting in the increased social
and ecological impoverishment of the world’s popular classes and subaltern populations,
rendering them more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. The age of globalization has
witnessed the triumph of a distinctly hard-nosed brand of neoliberal capitalism. Facilitated by the free trade agreements
(market liberalization), an end to most governmental regulatory “interference” with business practices
(deregulation), the takeover of former public services and state agencies by domestic and/or international capital
(privatization), the growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) and finance capital provided by bilateral and
multilateral lending agencies, and reductions in social welfare and environmental protection measures in both the global North
and South (fiscal conservatism), neoliberal capitalism is increasingly facilitating the capitalization of
nature and confiscation of environmental space in the global South. In addition to the appropriation of
natural resource wealth, globalization is also facilitating the increased displacement of pollution and other negative externalities—
the export of ecological hazard in all circuits of capital—to historically marginalized communities in the global North and South
alike. World labor forces, natural resources and energy, technology and machinery, biosystems, and other “productive
inputs” are becoming more integrated into the circuits of global capital (economically)
and the structures of transnational corporations and banks (organizationally). Laboring
in service of this new global order, but receiving few of its benefits, are the popular classes
and subaltern populations of the global South—the poor peasants, workers, ethnic minorities, and indigenous
peoples. Lacking access to adequate technical and financial assistance from the
state, secure land rights, fair price mechanisms for locally produced commodities, and favorable loan packages, their
social and ecological impoverishment is the legacy of neo-colonial
dependent development, and increases vulnerability to climate change. The
acquisition of land and natural resources by transnational capital, as well as large landowners,
corrupt government officials, security forces, and various domestic economic elites allied with multinational corporations and
international banks, restricts access to the means of livelihood such as rivers and oceans, agricultural and
grazing lands, forests, fisheries, and drinking water. Utilizing financial assistance provided by multilateral lending agencies, large-
scale development projects typically transfer access and control over natural sources from popular classes at the local level to the
state, elite land speculators, or private companies and multinational corporations. The displacement
and
ecological impoverishment of popular classes around the world by global
capitalist development is resulting in the relocation of these populations
into increasingly precarious and dangerous areas in which to live and work.
Such areas include the edges of rivers and waterways that can be prone to flash flooding, or steep hillsides subject to landslides, or
perhaps arid regions plagued by drought and heat-related stresses. Lacking protections afforded by the state, as well as the forms of
capital required for true resiliency, these are among the global populations most vulnerable to climate change stresses. Over 2.8
billion people live in areas of the world that are prone to more than one of the physical
manifestations of climate change: severe storms, floods, droughts, or sea level rise. Climate change burdens
households, communities, and societies that are the most ecologically vulnerable and also lack the political-economic capacity to
cope and adapt to ecological disruption. Climatechange weakens the livelihoods of poor people the
most by eroding their scarce assets in the form of physical capital (damage to shelter and
infrastructure); human capital (increased malnutrition and disease); social capital (displacement and disruption of
beneficial social networks); natural capital (loss of ecosystem productivity, such as in agriculture and fisheries), and
financial capital (loss of income and property). The point here is not to reduce all processes of climate-related displacement
to the logic of capital but rather to recognize the importance of the larger political-economic and social context. Because
marginalized peoples lack sufficient conditions of resilience and recovery (such as flood insurance) and receive little support from
the state under neoliberal capitalism, their capacity to withstand and recover from shocks and restore these assets is minimal,
whether created by conflict, collapse of market prices, land degradation, political oppression, or climate change itself. When faced
with the collapse of these assets and compelled to move, we could just as easily speak of these migrants as being “neoliberal
refugees” as much as “climate refugees.” Poverty, as manifested in resource scarcity, poor living conditions such as overcrowding or
lack of sanitation, and insufficient disaster response mechanisms, arguably has the greatest magnifying effect on disaster risk. This is
especially true for poorer women. The poor and the powerless often have no alternative but to settle in disaster-prone zones and
areas more susceptible to climate-related stresses where land is cheaper and more plentiful. Lacking the adaptive and financial
capabilities of richer communities, the poorest populations and nations in the global South are shouldering the greatest stress: 95
percent of all lives lost from weather-related disasters are in developing nations. A community’s coping ability may yet be the most
important determinant of climate-induced migration. Limitations on coping ability manifest in a variety of ways, from the
socioeconomic, political, and cultural fabric of the affected community to national financial limitations, potentially weak or
ineffective government, uneven development, heavy dependence on trade, exploitive economic arrangements, remoteness, and even
regional social capital and established migration networks. This is most apparent in the case of the Small Island Developing States
(SIDS), where off-island aid after a natural disaster is essential and commonplace due to their small size and limited resources.
Whether these measures exist hinges on the economics and politics at play at the local, regional, national, and international
levels.Some of the greatest humanitarian emergencies emerge where people lack the means to migrate from zones in ecological
crisis, as was evidenced in past climate emergencies in the South Pacific and across Southeast Asia. Thirdly, corporate-led
globalization is creating increasingly degraded and denuded landscapes,
reducing the resiliency of existing ecosystems and therefore magnifying the impacts
of climate change. The full integration of the global South into the world economy as a supplier of cheap raw
materials and consumer goods has led and is leading to the colonization and ecological
devastation of lands and natural resources on which hundreds of millions of people depend. Those peoples in the South
who draw their livelihood directly from communal access to land, water, forests, coastal mangroves, and other ecosystems are being
hit the hardest by the construction of large dams, mining and oil industry operations, and the capitalization of agriculture and
fisheries. Forcibly removed off their land by government policies, economic acquisition or military force, the displaced masses of the
global South migrate to ecologically fragile areas, including rugged hillsides prone to erosion, barren desert regions lacking in water,
and pristine tropical rainforests. Once resettled, they try to eke out an existence by exploiting the limited resource base to which they
have access. After a few years of abuse, the resource base eventually collapses, as in much of Central America. In the fragile
highlands of El Salvador, for instance, hundreds of thousands of desperately poor family farmers displaced by the expansion of
export coffee estates are attempting to survive in a landscape already irreversibly destroyed by erosion, gully formation, and
deforestation. Coupled with the overexploitation of land by capitalist export agriculture and the mining sector (just recently
banned), more than 77 percent of the country suffers serious soil erosion.Denuded watersheds and degraded landscapes of this sort
typically magnify the impacts of climate change, converting what would have been a heavy but harmless rainstorm into a devastating
flood. All around the world, neoliberal capitalist development is resulting in the severe degradation of ecosystems and social
structures that would normally offer greater protections against the manifestations of climate change and extreme weather events,
especially for the most vulnerable.
Migration management just perpetrates their impacts – refugees are caught

within “sacrifice zones” of capitalism that make natural disasters inevitable
– only addressing the root cause can allow people to experience the world
through their own bodies and prevent refugees from being perceived as
separable from land
Scott and Smith ’17 – Summer 2017, Dayna Nadine Scott is an Associate Professor at
Osgoode Hall Law School and the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University and
Adrian Smith is a professor of Law and Legal Studies at Carleton University – “Sacrifice Zones
in the Green Energy Economy: The New Climate Refugees” // shurst
Our intention in undertaking the analysis in this Comment is thus twofold. We want to suggest both that those
displaced
and dispossessed by green energy enthusiasm can be conceived of as
"climate change refugees," caught within sacrifice zones of global
capitalism, and that the international legal order is producing 'solutions'
that-in the mitigation context-border on the absurd. Thus, as we have argued elsewhere, by
integrating planned relocation as a key strategy within climate migration management and examining how it would apply in the
context of the Site C dam, we gain a valuable perspective on the production of subjectivities in relation to climate migrants in the
dominant international legal order. Briefly, for the purposes of this Comment, we outline two central ways the climate
migration management approach constructs the abstract subject of the climate migrant. First, it discounts the
possibilities of meaningful connections to specific places. Second, it obscures the actual "loss and
damage" that transpires when people have to relinquish long-standing practices of being and living on the land. On the first point,
we demonstrate how the prevailing
climate migration management approach tends to treat
places as if they are generally interchangeable. As McAdam and Ferris explain, "the availability of livelihoods
in the destination" plays a central role in a community's perception of the move-whether it was voluntary or not-and their overall
well-being post-relocation. 48 As we have previously argued: The implication is not only that any place is as good as any other, as
long as all the amenities are provided, but also that any livelihood will do. It completely discounts the possibility that people will
suffer a loss in relation to their inability to be on the land, or to undertake a specific livelihood in a specific place. 49 In stark
contrast, Indigenous peoples of the Peace Valley invoke the characteristics of unique places with spiritual and cultural significance
for them-places of deep connection to their pasts and futures. 50 They explain how fishing is a traditional practice that depends on
specific places, species, and means; they detail how these specific fishing spots are crucial to the community's cultural and
subsistence activities. 51 Clearly, the traditional practices of gathering berries and sacred medicines, holding ceremonies, and
visiting ancestral burial grounds are practices specific to place. 52 On the second point, regarding embodied practices of living on the
land, we are guided by Nishnaabeg scholar Leanne Betasamosake Simpson's notion that people experience the world through their
bodies. 53 She states, "the process of coming to know is the pursuit of whole body
intelligence."54 This learning "takes place in the context of family, community and relations" and is realized collectively.55 It
"comes through the land." 56 The climate migration management approach cannot capture, nor
meaningfully consider, these ongoing, embodied practices of living on the land. Instead, it
completely abstracts laboring bodies from consideration. Even as livelihoods are
recognized as important in the processes of planned relocation, they are
somehow seen as distinct and separable from land. The World Bank's Involuntary
Resettlement objective, as an example, is "to assist displaced persons in improving or at least restoring their livelihoods and
standards of living in real terms relative to pre-displacement levels. . . ."57 We argue this makes livelihoods reducible to incomes and
constructs them as independent of land. It
is as if embodied practices of living on the land can be
replaced; as if ways of earning a living are not connected to ways of being.
Alternative – Energy Justice
Energy justice is a prerequisite to the aff – it plays a “decolonial” role in
challenging climate displacement
Mastor et al ’18 – 5/2/18, Roxana Mastor has a J.D. from Vermont Law School with
expertise in energy and the environment, “Energy Justice and Climate Refugees,” pages 144-145,
http://www.eba-net.org/assets/1/6/Duff_Dworkin_Landa__Mastor_FINAL_(2).pdf // shurst
The complexity of the energy system has evolved more rapidly than a social and moral framework to manage the “profound
ramifications” of a highly centralized, power plant-based energy system dependent on fossil fuels.44 Nevertheless, the
energy
system is no longer thought to be only the result of technological decisions, but rests on
moral determinants through the concept of energy justice.45 Hence, we view energy justice as
encompassing both benefits and burdens, both rights and obligations to construct and maintain a global energy system that
promotes “happiness, welfare, freedom, equity, and due process” for both producers and consumers.46 The emphasis on energy
justice can be perceived as an ultimate attempt to give solutions and answers to questions that go beyond “contemporary energy
planning and analysis” and instead implicate “aspects of equity and morality.”47 There are at least two reasons why concepts of
energy justice deserve a role in a discussion about how energy systems affect climate-
refugees. The energy system has extraordinary impacts on issues that have
moral implications, such as the dependence on fossil fuels that have caused
environmental hazards including air and water pollution among others.
Awareness of those impacts is a critical part of coherent thinking about policies to pursue. The second reason to consider concepts of
energy justice is that centuries of careful thought about ethics and justice have yielded vocabularies and theories that can help in
making energy policy decisions. In this sense, energy
justice is not just a tool for implementing
extrinsically chosen policies, but rather, considering its varying concepts of justice can have a
‘decisional’ role in the choice among competing policy actions. This is what makes
choosing among the concepts of energy just tice more than a ‘mere’ abstract and abstruse debate about academic philosophy.
Evaluating neoliberal-market narratives and their effects on climate change

is a prerequisite to solving the refugee crisis
Dylan ’16 – Arielle Dylan, PhD, is a professor at St. Thomas University, 1/1/16, “Rethinking
Sustainability on Planet Earth: A Time for New Framings,” Electronic Green Journal at UCLA //
shurst
Flannery (2005) has referred to us as “the weathermakers,” and he argues fittingly that the
“future…hangs on our
actions.” Before discussing remedial strategies, it is necessary to have a full
understanding of the severity of the climate crisis. The rate at which global heating is occurring
is faster than climate models predicted, which leaves less time to respond and has some wondering whether it is indeed too late
(Diamond, 2005). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published
their Fourth Assessment
Report in 2007 which predicts a global temperature increase of 2.4 to 4.6°C above pre-
industrial levels if our emissions of greenhouse gases are not reduced. Any
temperature increase of 3°C or more “would eventually result in the world’s oceans rising by around seven meters,
dramatically redrawing the geography of the Earth” (Hamilton, 2010, 8) and permanently
displacing millions of people, adding to the climate refugee crisis. Many climate
scientists, including James Hansen, believe the present 392 ppm is already beyond a safe level, and urge us to lower this number
below 350 ppm to avoid irreversible environmental “tipping points.” Sadly, even if in a surreal scenario we as a species were
suddenly to stop emitting CO2 tomorrow, the world would still continue to get warmer for several decades due to the methane being
released from anthropogenic, Dylan: Rethinking Sustainability on Planet Earth: A Time for New Framings 1 amplified permafrost
melt; through a positive feedback process, climate change is perpetuated. According to Hawken (2010) the potency of methane is
twenty times that of CO2, which spells catastrophic environmental outcomes, if business as usual holds sway, and lost climate
stability for centuries (2007). Although China is now the greatest emitter of CO2, industrialized
nations of the
global north have historically contributed the most CO2, precipitating our current
climate crisis. In fact, the US which comprises only four percent of the world population is
responsible for a full 25 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions (Schönfeld, 2010). For this
reason Schönfeld (2010) calls climate change not only anthropogenic and androgenic, but
also amerigenic. Canada has been censured on the global climate stage and has the dubious distinction of being both among
the highest emitters per capita of greenhouse gases and home to the “most destructive project on Earth,” the tar sands (Hatch &
Price, 2008). Canada, Australia, and the US have contributed 30 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. Yet these same
countries, together with other industrialized nations failed miserably at the 2009 Copenhagen meetings designed to establish a
reasonable international climate response and agreement. Although climate change will affect us all, the bleakest effects will be
experienced most keenly by millions of poor people in the poorest nations (McKibben, 2010; Foley, 2004).

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Climate Refugees Aff / Neg – HJPV

Suchetas Boklis – Alpharetta

Jordan Frese – GBS

Adrian Gushin – Rowland Hall

Sophia Hurst – Greenhill

Tanuj Koli – MBA

Suraj Peramanu – Chattahoochee

Shreya Ram – Wayzata

Sarah Waters – Niles West

Who and How Many?

The UNHCR also does not have the capabilities to deal

Despite such tangible events within the

interagency coordinating, but many of the issues returned upon

President Trump taking office (2015, 4).

The sixth extinction. The

Climate refugees undergo human trafficking and other forms of

exogenous weather fluctuations affect one facet of migration: asylum applications,

temperatures in source countries is predicted to lead to an increase in asylum

devastating, as there would be a "first-strike, pre-emptive force". He added:

Continued unsustainable refugee flows crater the European economy

<Europe and the US are experiencing a massive anti-establishment wave, which is

To put the populist wave in perspective, they

Otherwise, populism carves up NATO

the central role Nuclear Sharing plays in providing credibility and

indeed Britain’s nuclear security.

immediately or in the near future, because of sudden or gradual alterations in their

individual officials have less discretion to act arbitrarily or out of bias.

Climate change magnifies precarious economic positions and displaces

Demographic trends are undermining ecosystem health, causing surging

Human-caused environmental change and environmental degradation – desertification, deforestation, land

The number of climate refugees is increasing as escalating climate change

Along with the myriad socioeconomic and political dynamics, global

200M more climate refugees by 2050

The Cartagena Declaration specifies that refugees

Law should be expanded to incld climate

Should expand legal rights to climate refugees

Climate refugees are afforded zero legal protection

There is no convincing scientific evidence that human release of . . . greenhouse gasses is

As the Trump administration rescinds adaptation and relocation funding ― both at

Having already contributed so much to the problem, U.S.

The tunnel is part of a larger issue of the

As to inequalities resulting in migration, it is a well-established finding that class as a

Displaced climates refugees spur political instability and regional conflict

It is argued that an increased likelihood of droughts, floods, famine, disease, loss of

Climate migration contributes to conflict in a variety of ways

Climate migration uniquely leads to conflict – many warrants

This section argues that climate

Acknowledging climate refugees is key – millions would be saved

The question of climate migration is surely underemphasized in contemporary writings

Displaced Climate Refugee exponentially increase global emissions and

The US has an ethical obligation to accept climate migrants – migration is

The Historical Principle

a) The activities of country X cause a change in environmental conditions of country Y.

a) Country X’s activities cause livelihood destruction of some residents in country Y.

b) Destruction of livelihoods is a morally wrong action.

c) Morally wrong actions require restorative measures.

Therefore, country X’s action required restorative measures towards country Y.

Indo-China border dispute goes nuclear

FROM A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVE, few places in the world

Is a legal definition outdated?

They predict that many

Climate refugees are going to the EU – results in a substantial influx of

Trouble on the Farm

differentiated responsibilities” found in the UNFCCC.170