TOPIC: CHOICE OF LAW

SPOUSES ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA vs. CA and TRANSWORLD

AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter,
Liana purchased 3 airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent
TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles. The tickets
of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their
daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed
reservations.

On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in but were placed on the
wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them
had already taken all the seats available on the flight. Out of the 42 names on
the wait list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to
Los Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others were not able
to fly. Those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-
listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his
daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who
presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding.

Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter,
could not be accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were
constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from
American Airlines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an
action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage before the RTC-
Makati. The lower court ruled in favor of petitioners . CA held that moral
damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of
contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter
of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of
airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of
Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith
could be imputed on respondent TransWorld Airlines. Thus petitioners raised
the case on petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE;
WON TWZ acted with bad faith and would entitle Zalameas to Moral and
Examplary damages.
RULING:
The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been
proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written
law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate
may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its
customer service agent, in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations
of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. No official publication of
said code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court’s finding that
overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has
no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is
not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci
contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was
issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and
nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable
law in this case would be Philippine law.

Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith,

entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia
Airways v. Court of Appeals, where passengers with confirmed bookings were
refused carriage on the last minute, this Court held that when an airline issues
a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a
contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he
would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens
itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had
deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers
of their seats in case all of them would show up for the check in. For the
indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last
minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages.

For a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty — a

duty to provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must
be paramount to self-interest or enrichment.
Respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers
beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have
confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have
incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly
inform its passengers about these policies so that the latter would be prepared
for such eventuality or would have the choice to ride with another airline.

Respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged
policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. Neither did it present any
argument of substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the
overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding
priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that petitioners had the right to
rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in
New York, that their tickets represented confirmed seats without any
qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them when it could
easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as
passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent
TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of petitioners under their contracts
of carriage. Such conscious disregard of petitioners’ rights makes respondent
TWA liable for moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by respondent
TWA in similar fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for
exemplary damages, as well.

In the case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, this Court explicitly held
that a passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he had
to buy for a flight to another airline. Thus, instead of simply being refunded
for the cost of the unused TWA tickets, petitioners should be awarded the
actual cost of their flight from New York to Los Angeles.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the

respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED

MINIMUM CONTACT

F2 ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

United States v. Noriega

117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997)
RULE:
A criminal defendant, abducted to the United States from a nation with which it has an extradition
treaty, does not thereby acquire a defense to the jurisdiction of the United State's courts. He may be
tried in federal district court for violations of the criminal law of the United States.

FACTS:
Manuel Antonio Noriega appealed his multiple convictions stemming from his involvement in cocaine
trafficking; and the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence. In attacking his convictions, Noriega asserted that the district court should have dismissed
the indictment against him due to his status as a head of state and the manner in which the United
States brought him to justice. Noriega also contended that the district court committed two reversible
evidentiary errors. Alternatively, he sought new trial based on his discovery of: (1) the government's
suppression of its pact with a non-witness; and/or (2) certain allegations, lodged after his conviction,
that a group associated with the undisclosed, cooperating non-witness bribed a prosecution witness.

ISSUE:
Should the indictment be dismissed due to the defendant’s status as a head of state?

ANSWER:
No.

CONCLUSION:
The court affirmed. The court rejected defendant's contention that the indictment should have been
dismissed due to his status as a head of state and the manner in which the United States brought him
to justice, because he was denied head-of-state immunity. The court also rejected defendant's
alternative contentions that he was entitled to a new trial based on his discovery of the government's
suppression of its pact with a non-witness, and certain allegations, lodged after his conviction, that a
group associated with the undisclosed, cooperating non-witness bribed a prosecution witness.

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in
Civil Case No. 37089 therein. 1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his
first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children:
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children:
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after
all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;
(b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis,
and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares. 1äw phï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His
will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various
amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed
the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of
their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock
amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition,
the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided
the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate
children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions
to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on
April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied
the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply —
Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied
by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually
pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present
case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference
back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a
conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place
where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in
the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not
be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue
that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation
to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent,
in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b)
the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art.
16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees
that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For
it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.