ANGELA BLONDEAU and FERNANDO DE LA CANTERA YUZQUIANO, plaintiffs-

appellants, vs. AGUSTIN NANO and JOSE VALLEJO, 61 PHIL 625

Facts:
Respondent Agustin Nano owned accessorias bearing Nos. 905A to905F, Calle Georgi
a, Manila. The land was owned by Jose Vallejounder a Torrens Title. Respondents mort
gaged the properties toplaintiff Angela Blondeau to secure a loan in the amount ofP12,0
00.
The mortgage was executed in the home of the plaintiffs in thepresence of a witness wh
o identified Vallejo as the person whosigned the document. Plaintiff's husband, Fernan
d de la Cantera,found the registration of the properties in due form, including the
power of attorney of Vallejo, in favor of Nano.
Failing to pay, the plaintiff brought an action to foreclose themortgage before the Court
of First Instance of Manila. After filingtheir separate answers, Nano was found in contem
pt of court whileVallejo presented an amended answer stating that his signature tothe m
ortgage was a forgery. Following the trial, judgment wasrendered against Nano but not
against Vallejo. Plaintiffs filed anappeal.
According to Vallejo, the mortgage was void because his signaturewas forged. It was al
so contended that the power of attorney ofVallejo in favor of Nano as well as his posses
sion of the former'stitle papers, were the product of the evil machinations of Nano, andth
at although Nano and Vallejo, while members of same family,lived together, Vallejo was
entirely unacquainted with the activitiesof Nano in dealing with their joint property.
Issue: Whether or not the mortgage was validly executed
Ruling:
Yes. Upon its face, the mortgage appears to be regular and to havebeen duly executed
and accepted by Vallejo.
The Torrens system is intended for the registration of title, ratherthan the muniments of t
itle. The Torrens Act permits a forgedtransfer, when duly entered in the registry, to beco
me the root of avalid title in a bona fide purchaser.
This is a case of a mortgagee relying upon a Torrens title, andloaning money in all good
faith on the basis of the title standing inthe name of the mortgagors only thereafter to di
scover onedefendant to be an alleged forger and the other defendant, if not aparty to th
e conspiracy, at least having by his negligence oracquiescence made it possible for the
fraud to transpire.
As between two innocent persons, in this case Angela Blondeau andJose Vallejo, one o
fwhom must suffer the consequence of a breachof trust, the one who made it possible b
y his act of confidence mustbear the loss, in this case Jose Vallejo.
We sustain plaintiff's mortgage and grant her the relief prayed for inher complaints.

BISHOP OF CEBU VS MANGABON, 6 PHIL 286

Facts:
Mariano Mangabon’s parents and brothers had been in possession of a tract of land in
the district of Ermita until about the year 1877 (possession of at least 20 years).

In 1878, they vacated the land by virtue of an order from the municipality which declared
that the land was included within the zone of materiales Fuertes (fire zone) and the
houses in which they lived upon were of light materials.
They vacated said land without objection. After the land was vacated, Parish Priests of
Ermita Church fenced the land and cleaned the same without any objection on the part
of anyone.

In 1898, Mangabons entered upon the land in question and built thereon a nipa house
and continued to live thereon without the consent of the parish priest of Ermita Church or
the Bishop of Cebu.

Roman Catholic Church, represented by the Bishop of Cebu filed an action to recover
possession of said land; amended complaint for said land to be declared property of the
Catholic Church and that it be restored to the latter.

Property had belonged to the Catholic Church from time immemorial.

Mangabons occupied apart thereof by the mere tolerance of the Catholic Church

Mangabon:
➢▪Claims to be the owner of the land by inheritance.
➢▪He was the legal owner when he was unlawfully ejected by the Bishop of Cebu in 1879.
➢▪He had a right to re-enter; time for prescription has not yet expired since he was
ejected.

TC: Ruled in favor of Bishop of Cebu and ordered Mangabons to vacate the land.
➢▪Occupation of the land by Mangabon in the year 1898 was illegal.
➢▪If he thought he had a right to the land, he should have filed an action with the court to
recover possession and not proceed to occupy the property.
➢▪If the Church acceded and voluntarily returned possession and acknowledged that the
property belonged to him, there would be no necessity to file an action; but in this case,
Church has objected to the occupation which necessitates a filing of a proper action.
➢▪The possession held by Mangabon in 1898 cannot be added to the former possession
which was interrupted in 1877 by the order of the municipality.
o Art. 466 CC: “a person who recovers possession according to law, which is improperly
lost, is considered as having enjoyed it without interruption for all the purposes which may
redound to his benefit”
o It cannot be ascertained that the possession enjoyed by Mangabon was improperly lost
o It has been lost by virtue of an order from the municipality and no proof to the contrary
was presented
o Impossible to say what was the nature of possession prior to the year 1877—whether
it was held by right or by the mere tolerance of the Church
▪▪Acts of violence or secrecy or mere tolerance cannot affect the right of possession
▪▪Mangabon could not have lawfully done what he did—to re-enter upon the land from
which he had been ejected by the city of Manila
▪▪If the order of the municipality was illegal, and that the possession was improperly lost,
Mangabon SHOULD HAVE REQUESTED ASSISTANCE OF COMPETENT
AUTHORITIES to recover it ◊ PLENARY ACTION

➢▪Mangabon filed petition. SC resolved a relevant question of law in deciding whether to

affirm the decision of the TC ◊ availability of accion publiciana

Issue:
➢▪Whether after the promulgation of the CC, accion publiciana, which had for its object
the recovery of possession in a plenary action before an action for the recovery of title
could be instituted, still existed (YES)
Ratio:
➢▪Available actions:
o Accion interdictal – recovery of physical possession within 1 year from the time of
dispossession
o Accion publiciana – better right to such possession brought after lapse of 1 year
o Recovery of ownership – action for title

➢▪If Mangabon instituted the accion interdictal within 1 year from dispossession, he would
have been restored to the possession
o 1 year period has already elapsed so such summary action for possession could not be
maintained

➢▪But even after the lapse of 1 year, he still could have brought an accion
publiciana ◊ involved the right to possess; based upon the fact the he, having been in
possession for 20 years, could not lose the same until he had been given opportunity to
be heard and had been defeated in an action in court by another with a better right

➢▪DOUBT ARISES whether accion publiciana is still available from Art. 460 CC
o Possessor may lose possession:
(1) Abandonment
(2) Transfer to another for a good or valuable consideration
(3) Destruction or total loss of the thing or by the thing becoming unkmarketable
(4) By the possession of another, even against the will of the former possessor, if the new
possession has lasted more than one year

o Questions: Which is lost, possession de facto or also possession de jure? In the first
three, both may be lost, so it would be strange if the fourth merely referred to possession
de jure. However, ownership cannot be lost under the fourth; owner may recover
ownership, and is only barred by statute of limitations

➢▪Evidence that accion publiciana still exists:

o Possession constitutes a right, a right in rem, whenever it is exercised over real property
or property rights
o Where there is a right, there is a cause of action
o It is sufficient that the right existing, there should be an action to protect it. No necessity
of any special declaration in CC
o It is impossible to conceive that a person has a right which need not be respected by
others, and such respect cannot be exacted unless the law provides a remedy for its
enforcement
o If a person has a right over any kind of property, such right would not be complete unles
sit could be enforced as against the whole world
o The action is a recognition of the right; it is a weapon for its protection
o The right does not arise from the action; but vice versa
o Accion publiciana exists, nor for the sake of equity, but because it must necessarily
exist or can exist as provided in Art. 445.

➢▪Action brought by Catholic Church to recover the possession which was unlawfully
deprived by the defendant can be properly maintained

GARCIA VS CA, GOZON, 95 SCRA 380

Facts:

This case is about the issuance of two or more transfer certificates of title to different
persons for the same lot, or subdivisions thereof, due to the fact that the original title was
allegedly not cancelled when the first transfer certificates of title were issued to replace
the original title.

A deed of sale for lots E and G of Hacienda Maysilo and covered by OCT No. 983 was
executed in favor of Ismael Lapus, a bona fide occupant thereof. The deed of sale was
presented for registration and contained entries showing that it was annotated on the
back of the OCT. Contrary to SOP however, the deed of sale was not annotated on the
OCT and that consequently, that title was apparently not cancelled.

As a result of the registration of the deed of sale, TCT No. 4910 (“Lapus Title”) was issued
to Lapus. Upon his death, the two lots were inherited by his daughter Carolina Lapuz-
Gozon, who had the land subdivided into 55 lots and sold some to her now co-
respondents. Lapus and successors-in-interest have been in possession of the lands
even before 1910 of more than 70 years.

In 1962, the Riveras, alleged heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal filed a motion
in land registration cases, alleging that they were deprived of their participation in the
Hacienda Maysilo. Since per the OCT the land seemed unencumbered, the court
adjudicated the land in their favor. The OCT was then cancelled and TCT No. 112235
(“Rivera Title”) was issued to the Riveras. Lots 5 and 7 (E and G) were then assigned
to BartolomeRivera to Sergio Cruz and Pacifico Garcia, and subsequent TCTs were
issued in their behalf.

Garcia had Lot 7 (G) subdivided into lots A and B, retained lot A and assigned B to Antonio
Munoz. Munoz mortgaged lot B to Associated Banking Corp.

On the other hand, Cruz sold Lot 5 (E) to Santiago Go. Go mortgaged Lot 5 to Philippine
National Bank. Both Munoz and Go did not pay their mortgage debts, hence the two
banks foreclosed the properties. PNB bought the mortgaged Lot 5 at the auction, but
notice of lis pendens was already annotated on the title.

Riveras and their successors-in-interest have never set foot on the disputed lots.
Gozon finally learned about the Riveras and others acquiring the land, had her adverse
claims registered on the titles of lots 5 and 7 and filed an action to quiet title and damages.

The trial court ruled in favor of Gozon and co-plaintiffs and voided the TCTs issued to
the Riveras, others. CA affirmed the decision. Garcia and PNB appealed.

Issue: WoN the 1920 Lapus title prevails over the 1963 Rivera title and subsequent titles
derived from it?

Held:

Yes, Lapus title prevails. Lapus was an innocent purchaser for value who validly
transmitted to his successors-in-interest his indefeasible title or ownership over the
disputed lots. That title could not be nullified or defeated by the issuance 43 years later
to other persons of another title over the same lots due to the failure of the register of
deeds to cancel the title preceding the title issued to Lapus. This must be so considering
that Lapus and his successors-in-interest remained in possession of the disputed lots and
the rival claimants never possessed the same.
The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include
the same land, the earlier in date prevails. It is settled that in this jurisdiction the
maxim prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time is preferred in
right) is followed in land resgistration matters.
The contention of PNB that it was a buyer in good faith has no merit because the deed of
sale in favor of Lapus and the titles issued to him and his successors-in-interest are all a
matter of public record in the registry of deeds. When a conveyance has been properly
recorded, such record is a constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and
equitable, included therein. Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has
examined every instrument of record affecting the title. This presumption cannot be
overcome by proof of innocence and good faith otherwise the very purpose of the law
requiring a record would be destroyed. The bank should have made an on-the-spot
investigation of the lot mortgaged.
Decision affirmed.

SAPTO, et al. vs. FABIANA, 103 Phil. 683

Facts:
Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
The subject property was originally owned by Sapto (this Sapto was a Moro, so only one
name) and located in Alambre, Toril, Davao City. He died, leaving three sons
Samuel, Constancio, and Ramon. The latter predeceased his brothers, leaving no heirs.
Samuel and Constancioexecuted a deed of sale for a portion of said property
in favour of Fabiana in consideration of P240.00. The sale was approved by the governor
of Davao but was never registered. The property was transferred to Fabiana and from
then on he enjoyed possession from 1931 until the case was filed.
Constancio died with no issue, leaving Samuel as sole administrator of the property. Upon
the latter’s death, his widow and two children filed the present action for recovery of the
parcel of land sold by their predecessors to defendant. The CFI held that although the
sale between the Sapto brothers and Fabiana was never registered, it was binding valid
and binding upon the parties and the vendors’ heirs. The CFI also ordered the petitioners
to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in favour of the defendant.
Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the CFI’s order of conveyance in favour of Fabiana was valid.
Held:
The SC first affirmed the validity of the sale between the Sapto brothers and Fabiana,
ruling, that even though it was never registered the sale was valid, binding, and effective
upon the heirs of the vendor. According to the court, actual notice of the sale served as
registration. Futher, that the transfer and possession of the property was a clear indication
of the validity of the sale.
Regarding the issue on the validity of the order of conveyance, the SC ruled that it was
valid. In assailing the order, the Sapto heirs claimed that the CFI cannot order the
conveyance because the defendant’s cause of action had already prescribed.
The SC ruled however, that the action for conveyance was actually one to quiet title. In
ruling so, the SC cited American jurisprudence and Art. 480 of the New Civil Code, which
states, that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are
imprescriptible.
The judgement is affirmed, cost against appellants.

SANTOS VS ROBLEDO, 28 PHIL 245

Facts:
On March 5, 1913, counsel for Hermogena Santos filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of this city and alleged therein that on March 1, 1905, Santiago Herrera and his
wife Basilia Tolentino, in an instrument ratified before a notary, deed to the plaintiff a
building lot with three warehouses, the boundaries and area of the said land being
described in the complaint
That Miguel Robledo, who was found to be a creditor of the said Santiago Herrera, prayed
for the execution of the said judgment; that at the instigation of Robledo, the sheriff
proceeded to seize the said lot and sold the same at public auction
That, although the plaintiff had intervened and prayed for the recall of the writ for the
reason that the lot levied upon was her property, the sheriff, under security of the bond
furnished by the creditor Robledo, sold the said lot and Robledo himself purchased it.
Issue: The question raised in the claim made by the plaintiff, Hermogena Santos, is
whether or not the levy and sale of the lot and improvements in dispute, effected on
petition of the creditor, Miguel Robledo, can prevail against the right of ownership she
acquired by virtue of the gift made in her favor by the spouses Santiago Herrera and
Basilia Tolentino.
Held:
According to article 618 of the Civil Code, a gift is an act of liberality by which a person
disposes gratuitously of a thing in favor of another, who accepts it. Herrera and his wife
Tolentino freely and gratuitously disposed of the said lot and its improvements in favor of
the plaintiff; but it does not appear, however, that the latter accepted the gift in the manner
provided by law.
Article 633 of the same code prescribes:
In order that a gift of real property may be valid it shall be made in a public instrument,
stating therein in detail the property bestowed as a gift and the amount of the charges,
which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same instrument bestowing the gift or in a different
one; but it shall produce no effect if no made during the life of the donor.
If made in a different instrument the acceptance shall be communicated to the donor in
an authentic manner, and this proceeding shall be recorded in both instruments.
Based on records, the conveyance of the lot by th the donor to the donee, but the
acceptance of that gift by the plaintiff Santos does not appear therein and the record
reveals no other instrument that evidences such acceptance and notifies the donors
thereof in an authentic manner. Therefore, the provisions of the law not having been
complied with, the gift was invalid and could have no effect whatever, for the Civil Code
prescribes, in article 629, that a gift does not bind the donor nor produce any effect until
it has been formally accepted by the donee in accordance with law.
So, the gift in question, as specified in Exhibit A an instrument that was executed for other
purposes, to wit, conjugal separation and division of conjugal property between the
parties, could not transmit to the donee any positive and effective right in the lot in
litigation, to the prejudice of the donors' creditor.
Furthermore, on March 1, 1905, when the said instrument was executed, Santiago
Herrera had owed Miguel Robledo, from March 12, 1903, the sum of P1,170, with interest
at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. For the collection of this debt the creditor had to bring
suit against the debtor. As the record does not show that the donors had reserved
sufficient funds or property to satisfy the debt, nor that they possessed property other
than the lot given away by them, we must conclude that the conveyance or gift made to
the plaintiff by the spouses Herrera and Tolentino was for the purpose of defrauding the
creditor, Miguel Robledo, by preventing him from collecting his credit.
Article 643 of the Civil Code prescribes:
Should there be no stipulation as to the payment of debts, the donee shall be liable for
them only if the gift has been made to defraud creditors.
The gift shall always be presumed as having been made to defraud creditors when, at the
time of bestowing it, the donor has not reserved to himself property sufficient to pay the
debts contracted prior thereto.
Santiago Herrera was the lawful and absolute owner of the lot in litigation and his
ownership is shown to have been recorded in the property registry of Manila, Tondo
section, first inscription, No. 1340, in August, 1901. The entry discloses that the property
was then free of all charge and encumbrance and that, on January 28, 1913, a note was
therein made of the writ of execution issued against the said lot and warehouses, issued
in the proceeding instituted by the creditor Robledo against the debtor Herrera, the
unquestionable owner of the property levied upon. Moreover, the right of the judgment
debtor to redeem the lot in litigation was purchased by the creditor Robledo for P85 on
February 17, 1913, the date of the sale of the land at public auction.

AVILA VS TAPUCAR, G.R. No. 45847, August 27, 1991, 201 SCRA 148

Facts:

In 1918 the Bahans (Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure) acquired a parcel of land
situated at Tabangao, Victory, Tubay, Agusan del Norte. In 1965, said property was
inherited by private respondents Julito Bahan, Cristina Bahan-Panis, LucitaCarters,
Boy Cartera and Candelaria Bahan-Mendoza as successors-in-interest. On October 11,
1960, petitioner Magdalena Avila bought a parcel of land situated at Tabangao,
Victory, Tubay, Agusan del Norte.

On November 3, 1971, the heirs of Pedro Bahan, represented by Julito Bahan filed Free
Patent Application but it was found to be erroneous because there was a disparity on
the area claimed versus the area actually cultivated by the Bahans. However, said report
was erroneously forwarded to the Bureau of Lands by then Acting Assistant District Land
Officer of Butuan City dated December 23, 1971, recommending the issuance of patent
therefor.

Subsequently, private respondent Julito Bahan together with ten persons who were
alleged to be members of the Free Farmers Federation, gathered coconuts from the land
purchased by petitioner Magdalena Avila but was intercepted by the Chief of Police
of Tubay, Agusan del Norte. On June 27, 1973, private respondents Bahans filed an
action for quieting of title and damages with the Court of First Instance. In their answer,
the petitioners Avila's raised the defense that on October 11, 1960, Magdalena Avila
purchased a parcel of land situated at Tabangao, Victory, Tubay, Agusan del Norte.

In their answer, the petitioners Avilas raised the defense that on October 11,
1960,Magdalena Avila purchased a parcel of land situated at Tabangao,
Victory, Tubay, Agusan del Norte. Subsequently, Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr.
granted Avilas' motion for writ of preliminary injunction enjoining and ordering
the Bahans to refrain and desist from gathering or continue harvesting the fruits on the
contested land until the termination of the case but with the prohibition not to uproot the
7 young banana seedlings newly planted by the Bahans and conditioned upon filing of a
bond in the sum of P1,000.00 by the Avilas.

On October 17, 1974, the Avilas filed an administrative protest against the Bahans before
the Bureau of Lands. Bahan's free patent was cancelled for being erroneous. However,
the writ of injection asked by Avila was cancelled by respondent judge. The Avilas' motion
for reconsideration of the February 8, 1977 order was denied in the Order of March 4,
1977.

Issue: Whether or not the trial judge erred in dissolving said writ of injunction.

Held:

Yes, the trial judge erred in dissolving said writ of injunction.

Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely
evidence of such title over a particular property. It does not give the holder any better right
than what he actually has, especially if the registration was done in bad faith. The effect
is that it is as if no registration was made at all.

Respondent judge's pronouncements that the Bahans' title to the property has become
indefeasible and incontestable is a prejudgment and uncalled for inasmuch as the parties
have not as yet finally rested their cases and the trial is still in progress.

The evidence shows that Free Patent No. 552571 issued to the Bahans is erroneous as
it embraced and comprised in portions thereof lands which belong to the Avilas. The
subsequent registration of the portion of land belonging to the Avilas by the Bahans could
not make the latter owners thereof. It has been held in registration proceedings, a
cadastral court has no authority to award a property in favor of persons who have not put
in any claims to it and have never asserted any right of ownership thereon, and the
certificate of title issued under the circumstances to such persons would be declared null
and void subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value.

TEODORO VS MIRASOL, 99 PHIL 150

Facts:

Mirasol leased a parcel of land in Taft Avenue, Manila to Teodoro for P490 monthly
payable on or before the 5th day of each month. The contract has a term of at least 2
years, beginning 1 October 1952, which may be extended for another period not
exceeding 2 years with written consent of both parties. On 15 October
1954, Mirasol wrote plaintiff that the lease exprired on 1 Oct 1954 and that the latter has
lost interest in renewing the same and the retention by the lessee will mean a great
financial loss, thus giving him notice of termination of contract. Teodoro alleged that it is
not true that he has lost interest in the renewal of the lease contract, that Mirasol allowed
him to choose to continue the lease for another 2 years, and that he has already
paid. Teodoro prays that the court fix a longer term for lease and payment of P10k for
moral damages. Defendant promptly filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the court has no jurisdiction to grant the remedy prayed for and that there is
another action pending between the parties and for the same cause. The trial court
sustained the motion for dismissal. Teodoro filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied. Hence the appeal.
Issue:W/N a prior pending action is required to grant a motion for dismissal

Ruling:

Negative; The defendant evidently desired to give plaintiff sufficient time to leave the
premises because no action for unlawful detainer was filed immediately after the giving
of the notice of the expiration of the lease. But plaintiff took advantage of defendant's
delayed unlawful detainer suit to file this case in the Court of First Instance of anticipation
of the action for unlawful detainer, in order perhaps that he may claim that the action in
the Court of First Instance was prior to the unlawful detainer case, and, therefore, should
enjoy preference over the action filed in the Municipal Court.

It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint that
there is a prior pending action. They provide that there is a pending action, not a pending
prior action. The fact that the unlawful detainer suit was of a later date is no bar to the
dismissal of the present action. The Court therefore finds error in the ruling of the court a
quo that plaintiff's action should be dismissed on the ground of the pendency of another
more appropriate action between the same parties and for the same cause. However, in
the case at bar, the lease contract had already expired and there has already been a
breach thereof, hence the action for a declaratory judgment is no longer proper.

SISON AND SISON v. YAP TICO AND AVANCENA, 37 PHIL 484

Facts:

On April 11, 1912, the plaintiffs borrowed of Eugenio Kilayko the sum they executed and
delivered to the said Kilayko a chattel mortgage covering machinery, crops and a number
of carabaos; that said debt was due and payable on or before the 30th day of May, 1913;
that the mortgagors had to deliver to the mortgagee in the city of Iloilo their entire crop of
sugar for the years 1912-13; that in the compliance with the mortgage the plaintiffs herein
did deliver sugar for said years from time to time in the city of Iloilo at the bodega of the
defendant Yap Tico at the request of the said Kilayko; that, finally a liquidation was made
and there was found to be still due the mortgagee the sum of P650; that sum was sent to
the mortgagee by a representative of the mortgagors and was by him delivered to Kilayko;
that upon the delivery of said sum (P650) the mortgagee on the 14th day of May, 1914,
executed and delivered a cancellation of said mortgagee.
The mortgage in question was transferred by the mortgagee, Kilayko, to the defendant,
Yap Tico, within less than two months after its execution and delivery, and that the
plaintiffs had delivered sugar at the bodega of Yap Tico from time to time covering a
period of nearly two years in partial payment to the plaintiffs that he was the owner of said
mortgage. It is further established beyond question that the plaintiffs had no notice
whatever of said transfer, unless the registration of said assignment had the effect of
giving them notice, until long after full amount of said mortgage had been paid to the
original mortgagee, Kilayko, and said mortgage had been cancelled.

Issue: Whether or not the mortgagor of a chattel mortgage is relieved from liability by
paying the mortgagee after the mortgage has been assigned to a third person, when he
has no actual notice of said transfer.

Held:

No. Until notice of the assignment is given to the debtor, it will not bind him so as to
deprive him of equities arising between the date of the assignment and the date when he
received notice thereof. As to such equities, the assignment takes effect from the time the
debtor receives notice and not from the time of the assignment.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered and decreed that all the property which
was taken possession of by the sheriff under the said foreclosure proceedings be returned
to the plaintiffs if it has not already been done; that the bond theretofore given by the
plaintiffs to secure possession of said property be cancelled.

MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN vs. RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, ET

AL., G.R. No. L-8539 December 24, 1914, 29 PHIL 31

FACTS:

On the 12th day of January, 1906, the said petitioner, Maria del
Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the purpose of having registered, under the Torrens system, four parcels of
land, known as Parcel A, Parcel B, Parcel C, and Parcel D. The only one of said parcels
to which attention need be given in the present appeal is Parcel A. There was a
discrepancy with the boundary in the technical description of the title and the plan
presented in court.
The adjoining owners of the land, one of them are the Heirs ofEnriquez, were informed of
such application, but no one went to question it so they were declared in default. The
same application was published in two newspapers. The court approved the application
and Consuelo was given the titles.
In 1912, the City of Manila applied for the correction of the title because it covered a
public road. It was also in 1912 thatConsuelo went to court to ask for a correction of the
title because there were 2 buildings which were not included in the title, although it was
in the application.
During the hearing, the heirs of Antonio Enriquez, owners of the adjoining land, appeared
in court questioning the title. The Court granted the motions of the City of Manila and
Consuelo and denied Enriquez’ petition.

ISSUE: Was the court correct in denying the opposition of the heirs of Enriquez?

HELD:

No, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
The appellants assert in their argument that "personal notice was absolutely necessary
in order to justify the court below in rendering a decree in favor of the plaintiff and
appellee, in the first instance". The court ruled that personal notice is not absolutely a
prerequisite to the validity of title under the Torrens system. The record also shows that
the clerk of the Land Court made a certificate showing that that notice had been issued
and published in accordance with the law. Section 32 provides, in part, that said
"certificate of the clerk that he had served the notice as directed by the court, by publishing
or mailing, shall be filed in the case before the return day, and shall be conclusive proof
of such service."
Section 38 of said Act No. 496 also provides that: "Every decree of registration shall bind
the land and quite the title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following
section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application,
notice or citations, or included in the general description 'To all whom it may concern.'"
The primary purpose of Torrens Land Law is the registration of the title which the
applicant or petitioner has and to relieve his land of unknown liens or claims, just or unjust,
against it. Therequirement that personal notice shall be a prerequisite to the validity of
registration would absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims, for the reason
that personal notice could never be given to "unknown claimants." The great difficulty in
land titles arises from the existence of possible unknown claimants.
REPUBLIC CEMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MOISES CORREA
AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, 198 SCRA 734

Facts:

Republic Cement Corporation filed a petition in the CFI of Bulacan, for the registration in
its name of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2880 of the Cadastral Survey of
Norzagaray, Bulacan, Plan Ap-16404, located in barrio Minuyan, Norzagaray, Bulacan,
with an area of 207,996 –m2. Spouses Jose Rayo and Susana Mangahas and one Pedro
Legaspi opposed the application. The oppositor spouses claimed that they are the
owners for a period of over 60 years of the east central portion of the parcel of land, title
to which is sought to be registered by Republic Cement, covered by Plans PSU 229592
and 227659, with a total area of 68,389–m2.Oppositor Pedro Legaspi claims that he is the
owner of the eastern portion of the same parcel of land covered by Plan PSU225872, with
a total area of 31,887-m2. The 3 oppositors were later substituted by private
respondent Moises Correa as subsequent purchaser of the aforesaid portions of said
parcel of land.
After the trial, the CFI ordered the registration of the parcels of land bought by Correa but
Republic Cement’s application was dismissed. On appeal, the CA ordered the registration
of Lot No. 2880 in the name of Republic Cement but excluding portions thereof as
described in Plans PSU-229592, 227659 and 225872 which were ordered registered in
the name of private respondent Correa. Afterwhich, Republic Cement petitioned the
Supreme Court, claiming that the CA erred in ordering the registration of the three parcels
of land covered by Plans PSU-225872, 229592 and 227659 in the name of Correa
allegedly because the latter failed to prove the identity of the lands he claims.
Issue/s: Whether or not Correa proved the identity of the lands he claims.

Ruling:

Yes.
The Court held that contrary to the claim of Republic Cement, Correa, through his
predecessors in interest, was able to establish the identity of and title to the land sought
to be registered in his name. The technical description and the survey plan duly approved
by the Director of Lands submitted in evidence by him fully describes the meters and
bounds of the parcels of land involved.

REPUBLIC VS LEE, 197 SCRA 13

Facts:

Respondent filed before the RTC a registration of a parcel of land in her favor which was
opposed by the Dir. Of Lands on grounds that respondent or her predecessor-in-interest
acquired the land under any recognized mode for acquisition of title; they have not been
in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of the land in the concept of an
owner for at least 30 years prior to the filing of application and the land in dispute is a
public domain belonging to Republic of the Philippines. The court rendered judgment in
favor of respondents. Upon appeal by RP, it affirmed the lower court decision thus this
appeal to the Supreme Court.

Republic of the Phil. contends that respondent failed to prove by conclusive evidence that
she has ownership of the land by fee simple title and her testimony as to the ownership
of her predecessor-in-interest is self serving after claiming that she obtained her Deed of
Sale of the property from LaureanaMataban and Sixto Espiritu who obtained their title
from the previous owners of the land, Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan. From the time
of filing the application of registration, the respondent was in possession of the land for
13 years but she sought to tack her possession on the said land from her predecessor-
in-interests who were in possession of the land for 20 years. Conditions provided by Sec.
48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 where one is under a bonafide claim of acquisition
of ownership through their predecessor-in-interest or by themselves have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the agricultural land in
public domain for 30 years shall be entitled to a certificate of title.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is able to provide sufficient and substantial
evidence as complying with the requirement of law for confirmation of her ownership of
the land in dispute?

Ruling:

In is held that it is incumbent upon the respondent to prove that her predecessor-in-
interest is the persons of Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan have been in adverse,
continuous, open, public, peaceful possession in the concept of an owner for 20 years
which she failed to provide a clear and convincing evidence to prove. Her bare allegations
do not constitute substantial proof. Respondent failed to comply with the requirements of
the law to confirm her title on the land applied for registration. Lower court decision was
set aside.

Underlying Principle: All lands not acquired from the government belong to the state as
part of public domain.

HEIRS OF BATIOG LACAMEN VS HEIRS OF LAMAN, G.R. No. L-27088, July 31,
1975

Facts:

Laruan executed a deed of sale in favor of Lacamen which was duly notarized.
Immediately after the sale, Laruan delivered the certificate of title to Lacamen. Thereupon,
Lacamen entered in possession and occupancy of the land, introduced improvements
therein, without securing the corresponding certificate of title. The document was also not
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes whose approval is
necessary in order for the Deed to be valid. This rule bounds the contracting parties
considering that they belong to the illiterate non-Christians. Later on, after the death of
Laruan, his heirs discovered that Laruan’s heirs were able to obtain a new owner’s
certificate of title. Hence, they sued Laruan’s heirs for reconveyance. The Trial Court
rendered a decision in favor of the heirs of Laruan whose decision was affirmed by the
CA.

Issue: WON estoppel by laches applies.

Held:

Laruan’s sale of the subject lot to Lacamen could have been valid were it not for the sole
fact that it lacked the approval of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes considering that
there was impressed upon its face full faith and credit after it was notarized. However,
notwithstanding the invalidity of the sale, the fact that when the Lacamens succeeded to
the estate of their father, the Laruans kept silent, never claiming that the lot is their own.
Even granting that no prescription lies against their father’s record title, their inaction for
almost 30 years commands the imposition of laches. Hence, the Lacamens were declared
as the owners of the land.
GRANDE, ET AL VS CA, ET AL, 115 PHIL 521

FACTS:
The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased
mother, Patricia Angui, who likewise, inherited it from her parents. In the early 1930’s, the
Grandes decided to have their land surveyed for registration purposes. The land was
described to have Cagayan River as the northeastern boundary, as stated in the title.
By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of the current of the river, and
an alluvial deposit of almost 20,000 sq.m. was added to the registered area. The Grandes
filed an action for quieting of title against the Calalungs, stating that they were in peaceful
and continuous possession of the land created by the alluvial deposit until 1948, when
the Calalungs allegedly trespassed into their property. The Calalungs, however, stated
that they were the rightful owners since prior to 1933.
The CFI found for the Grandes and ordered the Calalungs to vacate the premises and
pay for damages. Upon appeal to the CA, however, the decision was reversed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alluvium deposited land automatically belongs to the riparian
owners?

HELD:
Art. 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land belong to the owners of the adjacent land.
However, this does not ipso jure become theirs merely believing that said land have
become imprescriptible. The land of the Grandes only specifies a specific portion, of
which the alluvial deposits are not included, and are thus, subject to acquisition by
prescription. Since the Calalungs proved that they have been in possession of the land
since 1934 via two credible witnesses, as opposed to the Grande’s single witness who
claims that the Calalungs only entered the land in 1948, the Calalungs have been held to
have acquired the land created by the alluvial deposits by prescription. This is because
the possession took place in 1934, when the law to be followed was Act 190, and not the
New Civil Code, which only took effect in 1950.

REPUBLIC VS ALON, 199 SCRA 397

Facts:

➢ Private respondents were registered co-owners of two big tracts of land.

➢ Both lots were resurveyed, and the result was an expansion of the original areas
of the lots.

➢ Thereafter, the owners caused the subdivision of the 2 expanded lots into smaller
lots. The 2 lots ultimately subdivided into 10 lots covered with individual titles (all
with the approval of Land Reg. Comm.).

➢ A civil case was instituted by the Republic in CFI Silay City for the purpose of
nullifying and cancelling the survey/subdivision-consolidation plans, and
 certificates of title issued to private respondents on the theory that they embraced
increases in or expansions of the original areas obtained by said respondents in
violation of law, and said expanded areas form part of the unclassified public forest,
not subject to private appropriation.

➢ Private respondents’ claim of title to the expanded areas was founded on the
proposition that the same were alluvial in character and therefore accrued to them
as riparian owners in accordance with Article 457 of the Civil Code.

TC: Held that TCT of one subdivided portion of each lot be cancelled.

o Private respondents initially sought to appeal. However, they later filed a motion
to withdraw their appeal, "electing (instead) to file a petition for original registration
of the expanded area questioned by the plaintiff . . . (since) a favorable action on
said petition will . . . make (the case) moot and academic . Defendats were
claiming the areas "as riparian owner . . . by virtue of Art. 457 of the Civil Code in
relation to Art. 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters and/or Section 48, CA 141 as
amended by RA 42 and 6246 and by virtue of the open, public, uninterrupted
possession of applicant and his predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years
under claim of ownership."

o Republic filed a civil case for a motion for writ of possession, but was denied
by the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the private respondents are riparian owners thereof within the
contemplation of the Civil Code

Ruling:

Both the decision and the order (of the trial court) declared that at the very least the evidence of
the private respondents established prima facie that they are owners of the expanded areas in
question –– pursuant to Article 475 of the Civil Code and in virtue of open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the land for more than 50 years in concept of owners –– but that the
procedure under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) by which they succeeded
in obtaining title over said areas was incorrect, and that title should issue in their favor only in
virtue of regular, original registration proceedings in accordance with the same law in the course
of which, as pointed out in Republic v. Heirs of Abrille, supra, "the following requisites should all
be satisfied:Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor.

1. Filing of application for registration by the applicant.

2. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court.

3. Transmittal of the application and the date of the initial hearing together with all the
documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land
Registration Commission.

4. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place of hearing
in the Official Gazette.

5. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known to have
interests in the property by the sheriff.

6. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice or
not.
 7. Hearing of the case by the Court.

8. Promulgation of judgment by the court.

9. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and instructing the
Land Registration Commission to issue a decree Entry of the decree of registration
in the Land Registration Commission;

10. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of

Deeds; and

11. Transcription of the decree of registration book and the issuance of the owner's
duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon
payment of the prescribed fees.

This is indeed what the respondents have done. They have commenced original registration
proceedings for the registration of their title over the expanded areas. Their institution of said
proceedings pursuant to the decision and order of the Trial Court did not, of course, foreclose
the right and option of the Republic to oppose their claim of ownership over those expanded
areas, and show the areas to be in truth unclassified forest.

As things stand now, the private respondents have in their favor a judicial pronouncement that
they have shown, prima facie at least, that the expanded areas are not of public domain and they
have acquired rights of ownership over them; in a word, they have acquired rights of ownership
over them, in a word, they have overcome the presumption that the land is within an unclassified
public forest; on the other hand, there is no categorical declaration in the judgment in Civil Case
No. 838 that the expanded areas belong to the State, surely a condition for its entitlement to a
writ of possession thereof.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. CONSORCIA CABANGIS, ET

AL
G.R. No. L-28379 March 27, 1929

FACTS

Lots 36, 39 and 40, which are subject to cadastral proceeding of the City of Manila were
formerly a part of a large parcel of land belonging to the predecessor of the herein
claimants and appellees.

From the year 1896 said land began to wear away, due to the action of the waves of
Manila Bay, until the year 1901 when the said lots became completely submerged in
water in ordinary tides, and remained in such a state. On 1912, the Government
undertook the dredging of Vitas Estuary in order to facilitate navigation, depositing all the
sand and silt taken from the bed of the estuary on the low lands which were completely
covered with water, surrounding that belonging to the Philippine Manufacturing Company,
thereby slowly and gradually forming the lots, the subject matter of this proceeding.

Nobody had declared lot 39 for the purposes of taxation, and it was only in the year 1926
that Dr. Pedro Gil, in behalf of the claimants and appellees, declared lot No. 40 for such
purpose.

The claimants-appellees contend that inasmuch as the said lots once formed a part of a
large parcel of land belonging to their predecessors, whom they succeeded, and their
immediate predecessor in interest having taken possession thereof, said lots belong to
them.
ISSUE

Whether or not the government owns the land

RULING

Yes. The Government owns the reclaimed land in the sense that it has become property
of public dominion, because in letting it remained submerged, the claimants-appellees
may be said to have abandoned the same. Having become part of the sea or seashore,
it became property for public use. When the government took steps to make it land again,
its status as public dominion remained unchanged. As provided by Article 5 of the Law of
Waters,

ART. 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State,
or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the
property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of
the grant of authority.

Therefore, the claimants- appellees are not entitled to the land.

ALO V. ROCAMORA, 6 PHIL 197

Facts:

Counsel for Telesforo Alo brought a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on
the 12th ofJuly, 1904, against Clodoaldo Rocamora, and asked that judgment be given in
his favor, condemning the defendant to return a parcel of land situated in the barrio
of Giloctog, municipality of Barili of thati sland (Cebu).

The allegations contained that the plaintiff, is the owner of the said parcel of land, upon
which grew 94 cocoanut trees; and setting forth the boundaries thereof, he having
acquired the same from Hilario Ogsimar in 1888 by purchase.

That in 1897 the defendant, Rocamora, appropriated this land against the will of the
plaintiff, and without just cause or legal title to the same, and that when called upon to
return it he refused to do so and has continued to retain the said land to the present time,
thereby prejudicing the interests of the plaintiff to the extent of 1,000 pesos, Conant.

The defendant in his answer denies each and all of the allegations contained in the
different paragraphs of the complaint.

CFI: After hearing the evidence introduced by the parties, the court held that the plaintiff
was not entitled to a judgment against the defendant, and directed that the case be
dismissed.

Issue: WON the plaintiff (Alo) can recover the land.

Ruling: YES. Judging from the terms of the complaint, the action brought by the plaintiff
is that known in law as"accion revindicatoria ."

Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides:

If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall
be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith, if it should be personal property.
 Should it be real property, it shall belong to the person acquiring it who first recorded
it in the registry.

Should there be no entry, the property shall belong to the person who first
took possession of it in good faith, and, in the absence thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith

There can be no doubt that under article 606 of the Civil Code titles of ownership of real
estate which are not properly recorded or entered in the Registry of Property shall not
prejudice the rights of third persons; but the supreme court of Spain in construing this
article of the code held in its judgment of December 16, 1892, that "from the fact that the
ownership of the piece of property is not recorded in the registry in favor of the person in
possession thereof, it can not be inferred that such person is not the owner of the
property, provided it be shown that he acquired the same, that the property is not
registered in the name of another, and that he has been in the quiet and
peaceful possession hereof."

The plaintiff in this case was not in the physical possession of the land for the reason that
he lived upon other property owned by him, but it has been shown that he exercised acts
of ownership and possession over the land in question through his agents, Pedro
Gonzalez and Hilario Ogsimar, the former owner, who continued to live upon the property
and to dispose of its products in the exercise of a legitimate and perfect right. Article 431
of the Civil Code provides as follows:j "Possession of things or rights is exercised either
by the same person who holds and enjoys them or by another in his name."lib

QUIMSON AND SANTOS vs. ROSETE, 87 Phil 159

FACTS:

The case involves dispute over a parcel of land sold to two different persons.
Tomasa Quimson and Francisco Rosete. The property originally belonged
to DionisioQuimson (deceased), who executed a deed of conveyance in favor of his
daughter Tomasa Quimson. However, he continued possession and enjoyment of the
property. Dionisio also sold the land to Sps Magno Agustin and Paulina Manzano with an
agreement to repurchase within 6 years. Two years later, it was also sold to
Francisco Rosete, with a pacto de retro, within 5 years. Dionisio repurchased the
property from the Sps with the money that Rosete paid him for the
land. Roseteexcercised possession and enjoyment in a peaceful and quiet manner, even
after the death of Dionisio. When Tomasia and Rosete sought the registration of the
property and inscription of the deed of sale, Tomasaarrived earlier (930am)
than Rosete (1030am).

Tomasa filed a complaint with the Justice of Peace of San Marcelino Zambalez
•CFI: Tomasa is the rightful owner
•CA: Reversed

Issue: Who owns the property, Tomasa Quimson or Francisco Rosete?

RATIO:
ART. 1473. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees,
the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who first recorded it in the registry.
 Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall belong to the person
who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence of this,
to the person who represents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
Tomasa is the owner because it was sold to her by her father for P250 and upon the
execution of the public instrument, she gained symbolic possession of the property.
1.The findings that a deed of conveyance was made by Dionisio Quimson in favor of his
daughter could have no other meaning, in the absence of any qualifying statement
that the land was sold by the father to his daughter.
•Documents show that Tomasa paid P250 as consideration, acknowledged before the
notary public the notary public having executed the instruments of his own free will.

2.The possession mentioned in the article 1473 (for determining who has better right
when the same piece of land has been sold several times by the vendor ) includes not
the materials but also the symbolic possession, which is acquired by the execution of a
public instrument.
•Florendo v Foz: When the sale is made by means of a public instrument, the execution
thereof is tantamount to conveyance of the subject matter. Such execution by the vendor
is per se a formal or symbolical conveyance of the property sold, that is, the vendor in the
instrument itself authorizes the purchaser to use the title of ownership as proof that latter
is thenceforth the owner of the property."
•Sanchez v Roman: The proposition that 1473 refers to the materials possession and
excludes the symbolic does not seem to be founded upon a solid ground. Execution of
the public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the realty sold (art. 1462, Civil Code)
and its possession by the vedee (art. 438). Under these conditions the sale is considered
consummated and completely transfers to the vendee all of the thing. thevendee by virtue
of this sale has acquired everything and nothing, absolutely nothing, is left to the vendor.

3.Re possession: If [the vendor] continues taking material possession of it, it is simply on
account of the vendee's tolerance and, in this sense, his possession is vendor's
possession.
•Rosete's possession fell far short of having ripened into title by prescription when
the Tomasa commenced her action.

ROXAS VS ENRIQUEZ, 29 PHIL 31

Doctrine:
Upon the publication and posting of the summonsand its service upon and mailing to th
e person, if any,upon whom it is herein directed to be speciallyserved, the court shall ha
ve full and completejurisdiction over the plaintiff and said property and ofthe person and
every one claiming any estate, right,title, or interest in or to or lien upon said property, or
any part thereof, and shall be deemed to haveobtained the possession and control of sa
id property,for the purpose of the action, and shall have full andcomplete jurisdiction to r
ender judgment therein,which is provided for in the law

Facts:
On 12 Jan. 1906, petitioner Maria del ConsueloFelisa Roxas presented a petition i
n the Court ofLand Registration (CLR) to registere under theTorrens system four p
arcels of land, known asParcel A, Parcel B, Parcel C, and Parcel D, all ofwhich wer
e located in the city of Manila.

The petition contained a statement of the namesof the adjoining owners of the land
in question,Parcel A, as well as their addresses, and the heirsof Antonio Enriquez.

After the examiner made a careful examinationof the said land, he prepared a repo
rtrecommending the said parcels’ registration inthe name of Roxas. Accordingly, th
 e clerk of theCLR sent a copy of the notice of hearing to eachof the persons mentio
ned in the Order ofpublication by registered mail. The clerk alsohad the same publi
shed in a newspaper of gen.Circulation.

Later, Atty. Modesto Reyes, in behalf of the cityof Manila, called the court’s attentio
n to the factthere was an alleged “error of closure” in theplan of Parcel A, and aske
d the court to correctthe same. However, no such correction was evermade.

Due to the failure of the defendants to appear toimpugn the application within the p
eriod fixedby law, the court declared them in default andhad Parcel A registered as
the absolute propertyof Roxas.

Roxas then sold Parcel A and all buildingsthereon to the Masonic Temple Asso
c of Manila.The latter then requested the judge of the CLR toissue a new certificate
to it. During the varioushearings for such, the heirs of Don Enriquezobjected to the
same.

Notwithstanding, the CLR ruled in favour Roxasand the Monastic Temple. Still, the
objectorsfiled a motion for new trial on the ground thatthey had no notice of the pen
dency of theoriginal action to confirm the title of saidproperty.

Issue: W/N the CLR erred when it did not givepersonal notice to each of the appellants.

Ratio: NO
Held:

Contrary to the position of the appellants, personalnotice was not absolutely necessary i
n order to justifythe court’s action of rendering a decree in favor ofRoxas. The Court stat
ed that personal notice of thependency of the original petition had been given andthat a
publication of the same had been made inaccordance with the provisions of sections 31
and 32of Act No. 496. After the expiration of the periodduring which notice must be give
n, the original causewas set down for hearing.

Furthermore, Section 32 (Act No. 496) provides that:"The court shall, so far as it deems
it possible,require proof of actual notice to all the adjoiningowners and to all persons wh
o appear to have aninterest in or claim to the land included in theapplication." It will be n
oted also that the petitionerin registration cases is not by law required to giveany notice
to any person.

Lastly, the proceedings for the registration of land,under Act No. 496, are in rem and not
in personam.A proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, maybe instituted and carr
ied to judgment withoutpersonal service upon the claimants within the stateor notice by
name to those outside of it. Jurisdictionis secured by the power of the court over the res.
Logically speaking, to require personal notice to allpossible claimants would impossible
for how couldpersonal notice be ever given to “unknownclaimants.”

Thus, in actions in rem, personal notice to owners ofa res is not necessary to give the c
ourts jurisdiction todeal with and to dispose of the same, and meant thatthe CLR did not
err in registering the land in favorRoxas.

LEGARDA VS SALEEBY, 31 Phil. 590-591

Facts:

The parties to this case own adjacent lots in the City of Manila. In between their properties
run a stone wall for several years. On October 25, 1906, plaintiffs were issued an original
certificate provided for under the torrens system pertaining to said property and the same
included the wall in question. However, the predecessor of the current defendant was
able to register the adjacent lot on March 25, 1912 and the wall was also included.
The plaintiffs were able to discover said fact and instituted a petition with the Court of
Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including
said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. Without notice to the defendant, the
lower court denied the petition. The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory
that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and
that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose
it.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant has acquired title to the stone wall by subsequently
registering it.

Held:

No, the defendant does not acquire title to the stone wall by subsequently registering it.
The purpose of the Torrens System to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any
question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. Once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of
the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his
land. After the registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no
innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The decree ordering the registration of
a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same
parties. A title once registered cannot be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and
notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system cannot be defeated by
prescription. The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice.
No one can plead ignorance of the registration. In case of double registration under the
Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land.
In the present case, it is very clear that the plaintiffs were the first ones to register the
stone wall under the Torrens System. This bars others from impugning their title. The
current defendant cannot invoke the “innocent purchaser” principle as all persons are
imputed with the knowledge of registration under the Torrens System. When land is once
brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent
transfers thereof is notice to all the world.

VALISNO vs. PLAN, 143 SCRA 502

Facts:

Petitioners purchased 2 parcels of land from the family of Blanco’s and subsequently
declared ownership over the land for taxation purposes and took possession thereof by
assigning a caretaker over the property who built his house thereon. Respondent Cayaba
claims to be the owner of the property by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and
Bienvenido Noriega’s favor from the heirs of Verano and ousted the caretaker from the
property and constructed an apartment thereon. Petitioners filed an action for recovery of
possession of the land. The court decided in favor of the petitioner but on appeal, the CA
reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioner on grounds that the
description of the property in the complaint is different from the subdivision plan provided
by the respondents with their respective area and boundaries appearing to be completely
different. The court did not find any compliance to the requirement of the law that the
property in dispute must be clearly identified. Under the Civil Code, Articles 433 and 541,
the actual possessor of the property has the presumption of a just title and he need not
be compelled to show or prove why he possesses the same. It was clear that the
respondent is the current possessor of the property having constructed the apartment on
the property in dispute. Contrasting the evidence of the respondent and petitioner, the
court choose the respondent’s evidence as they were able to provide a vicinity plan that
shows the land position in relation to the adjoining properties with known boundaries and
landmarks. Petitioner merely presented a sketch prepared by Dr. Blanco constituting as
mere guess works. Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition for registration of the
property before the CFI which was opposed by the petitioner. Respondent moved for the
dismissal of the opposition that the same is barred by a prior judgment of the court. The
CFI dismissed the opposition on ground of res judicata thus this appeal before the SC.
With the petition given due course by the SC, it orders both parties to submit their briefs.
Only the petitioner submitted their own brief within the given period thus the SC
considered the case submitted for decision with the brief of the respondent. The petitioner
filed a motion to amend the application to include Bienvenido Noriega as a co-applicant
to the petition.

Issue: Whether or not to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner?

Ruling:

The SC held that the Land Registration Act does not provide for pleading similar to a
motion to dismiss but the Rules of Court allows its application in land registration
proceeding as only suppletory when it is practicable and convenient. Therefore, the court
may sustain a motion to dismiss in land registration proceeding as the case at bar. Noted
by the court in the ordinary civil case, the counterclaim can be taken as a complaint where
the defendant becomes the plaintiff. The original plaintiff thus becomes defendant in the
counterclaim and he may choose to answer the counterclaim or be declared in default or
file a motion to dismiss the same. The respondent clearly opted for the last choice. The
SC held that res judicata operates in the case at bar with its requisites present in the
case: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court
having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on
the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties,
of subject matter and of cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's
co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a
difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a co-owner is to defend in court
the interests of the co-ownership. Although the first action was captioned for the recovery
of possession, possession is sought based on ownership, thus the action was one in the
nature of accion reinvidicatoria. The second action is for registration of title where the
registration is sought based on one’s ownership over the property. The difference
between the two is that the plaintiff seeks to exclude other persons from ownership over
the property in the first action while it seeks to exclude the whole world in the second
action. The cause of action however remains the same. The employment of two different
actions does not allow one to escape against the principle of res judicata where one and
the same cause of action cannot be litigated twice. Although the first action was litigated
before a competent court of general jurisdiction and the other over a registration court is
of no significance since that both courts should be of equal jurisdiction is not a requisite
for res judicata to apply. For convenience, the SC should decide whether to dismiss the
application for registration or the opposition thereto. Because the conflicting claims of
both parties have been settled and decided by the court previously, it upheld the finality
of its decision and dismissed the petition.

REPUBLIC VS LAO, 405 SCRA 291

Facts:

Lao filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City application for registration of a parcel of land.
She allegedly acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and
Ma. Victoria Valenzuela who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn,
inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same
from Edilberto Perido by transfer. She prayed that the land be registered in her name
under Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act) based on her and her predecessor-in-
interests’ open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession
and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. She
presented witnesses and evidence constituting of deed of sale, survey plan, the technical
description of property and tax declarations in her and her predecessors’ names. The
court approved the application. The petitioner represented by the Solicitor General
appealed the decision before the CA which re-affirmed the lower court decision, hence
this petition for review before the SC. The petitioner contends that there is no sufficient
evidence to warrant the issuance of the title to the respondent as she fails to comply with
the required periods and acts of possession mandated by law and her failure to prove
that the land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent sufficiently provided evidence that she meets the
qualifications required by law on the manner of possession (continuous, adverse,
notorious, etc..) and the period of time (30 years) necessary to have a bonafide claim of
ownership under C.A. 141?

Whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application was
disposable and alienable land of the public domain?

Ruling:

The court held that Commonwealth Act 141 requires that before one can register his title
over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that he, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier; in adverse possession over the land for at least 30 years and
the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Petitioner was right to contend that the respondent did not prove by incontrovertible
evidence that she possessed the property in the manner and time required by law. She
did not provide the exact period when her predecessors-in-interest started occupying the
property. No extrajudicial settlement of the property from its previous owners was shown
and she did not show any relationship between the parties where she obtained her deed
of sale. She further did not present any certification from appropriate government agency
to show that the property is re-classified as disposable and alienable land of the public
domain. It is incumbent for an applicant of a land registration to provide these
incontrovertible evidences to support her claim for her application. In the absence of these
evidences, her application shall fail. Hence the petition was granted and her application
was denied.

DOLFO VS REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE, 341 SCRA 58

Facts:
Petitioner, Amelita Dolfo, alleged that she is the registered owner of a real property
with TCT No. T-320601 issued by RD of Trece Martires City. Yangtze Properties
and Dolfo had a Contract to Sell on the said property.
Petitioner and Yangtze Properties, Inc. (Yangtze) filed a motion for leave to file
and/or admit complaint-in-intervention in LRC Cases Nos. B-94-60, B-89-14 and B-90-6
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite. The first case is for
reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. 362 purportedly covering the subject real
property, while the last two were cases for registration of title. (Did not mention where
these cases came from)
RTC: trial court denied the aforementioned motion on the grounds that: 1) it is a
procedural error to file a complaint for intervention in cases involving original application
for land registration, the proceedings therein being in rem; and 2) there had already been
an order of general default entered by the court against those who failed to oppose the
applications. The trial court noted petitioner's failure to exercise any act of dominion over
the subject property consistent with her allegation of ownership.
MR denied. “The trial court gave greater weight to the report of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) that petitioner's certificate of title was issued without any legal basis and
the report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that the signature of
Antonia Cabuco, the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite signatory on the
certificate, was a forgery.”
CA affirmed. (denied due course)
SC affirmed CA (petition denied)
Issue:
A. Whether a motion to intervene is allowed allowed in a land registration case.
B. Whether the best proof of ownership due to presumption of validity of title issued under
Torrens Title System is applicable to this case.

Held:
A. No. It is now settled that a motion to intervene in a land registration case cannot be
allowed. A party wishing to be heard should ask for the lifting of the order of general
default, and then if lifted, file an opposition to the application for registration. This is so
because proceedings in land registration are in rem and not in personam, the sole object
being the registration applied for, not the determination of any right connected with the
registration. The provisions of 14 and 25 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree)
show that the applicant and the oppositor are the only parties in cases of original
applications for land registration, unlike in ordinary civil actions where parties may include
the plaintiff, the defendant, third party complainants, cross-claimants, and intervenors.
Indeed, to allow petitioner to intervene in the LRC cases would not avoid multiplicity of
suits in view of the case for annulment and cancellation of TCT No. T-320601 now
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Bacoor, Cavite. It is premature for
petitioner to intervene in the LRC cases because her certificate of title, supposedly her
best proof of ownership over the property described therein, is questionable. Besides,
inasmuch as the authenticity of her certificate of title is also being questioned in the LRC
cases, the evidence that she will present to the prove the contrary would be the same
evidence she will present in the case for annulment of title. At this point, where there is
already a decree of registration issued in favor of private respondents, it is moot and
academic to allow petitioner to participate in the LRC cases for the purpose of preventing
possible double titling of property. As the trial court correctly stated, petitioner is not left
without remedy even if she was not allowed to intervene. If it is shown that her certificate
of title is genuine and that she is the true owner of the litigated property, the proceedings
in the land registration cases would then be null and void because the trial court has no
jurisdiction on the matter. Otherwise, she could sue for damages.
B.No. The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence,
is the best proof of ownership of a piece of land does not apply where the certificate itself
is faulty as to its purported origin. In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the
premise that her title to the subject property is indefeasible because of the presumption
that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this presumption is overcome by the
evidence presented, consisting of the LRA report dated May 24, 1996 that TCT No. T-
320601 was issued without legal basis and the NBI report dated June 20, 1996 that the
signature of Antonia Cabuco was a forgery. Although petitioner submitted documents
purporting to show the genuineness of Antonia Cabuco'ssignature, she has not refuted
the findings contained in the LRA report that her certificate of title has no legal basis.

REPUBLIC VS CA, 335 SCRA 693

Facts:

On January 18, 1985, petitioner filed with the RTC of Cavite City a
complaint nullify TCT No. (555) RT-2957 and its derivative titles, and to revert the lands
covered by these titles to the public domain. The complaint alleged that said TCT was a
falsely reconstituted title, issued by an unauthorized recorder at the Office of the Register
of Deeds. It further alleged that the lot covered by said title was foreshore land and cannot
be privately appropriated.

Issue: Whether or not the lands covered by the titles in question were foreshore lands.

Held:

It was ruled in cases by the ten CFI of Cavite that the questioned lands as not foreshore
lands. These judgements were affirmed in toto by the CA.

OH CHO VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 75 Phil. 890

Facts:

The applicant Oh Cho, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of a residential lot located in the
municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas from 1880 to filing of the application
for registration on January 17, 1940.

Director of Lands opposed Oh Cho’s registration of the lot based on the applicant's lack
of title to the lot, and on his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public
domain.

The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be
applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A.
No. 141).

Issue: Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to the registration of the lot.

Ruling: No, Oh Cho is not entitled to the registration of the lot.

The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the
Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest
had acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws,
orders and decrease promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by
possessory information under the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that
were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant below to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for
such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
(Cariño vs.Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not
come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessors
in interest begun in 1880.

It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant immediate
predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had
they applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of
his immediate predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to
have been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's
immediate predecessors in interest should comply with the condition precedent for the
grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land
of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's
immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the
lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may
thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in
interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a
person as the applicant who is disqualified

NELAYAN VS NELAYAN, 109 PHIL 183

Facts:
Plaintiffs filed versus Cecilia Nelayan and the Director of Lands a complaint with the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur for "Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance ", alleging
that they (plaintiffs) have been since time immemorial, in actual possession as owners,
respectively, of various parcels of land described therein; that such possession has been
public, uninterrupted and in the concept of owner; that on October 23, 1952, Original
Certificate of Title No. 518 was issued in the name of defendant Cecilia Nelayan as a
result of her application for free patent over the parcels of land in dispute; that said
certificate of title is null and void with respect to the parcels claimed by plaintiffs.
Appellants contend, while appellees deny (1) that the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, notwithstanding the certificate of title under free patent already issued to defendant
Nelayan, still had the right to exercise its jurisdiction to try the case; (2) that the complaint
stated a good cause of action against the defendant; and lastly, (3) that the lower court
erred in denying plaintiffs’ motion for leave to accept the amended complaint.
Issue: WON the land has been validly acquired
Held:
Once a free patent is issued, the land acquires the character of registered property under
section 122 of Act No. 496, and is deemed brought within the operation of said Act (Tomas
Roco, Et. Al. v. Juan Gimeda, 55 Off. Gaz. [37] 7922), and an aggrieved party is accorded
the same or similar remedies as are extended in ordinary registration proceedings, such
as a petition for review under Section 38 of Act 496 in the Court of First Instance within
one year from the issuance of the patent.

MANARAPAAC VS CABAUATAN, 21 SCRA 743

Facts:

➢ Plaintiffs filed complaint against defendants, alleging that they have been, since
time immemorial, in possession of two parcels of land, which were fraudulently
included in the free patent application of defendant.
 ➢ Cabanatan filed a motion to dismiss. Such was granted by the lower court holding
that the free patent having been issued on November 3, 1959 and the first
complaint was filed on December 7, 1960, the action for review of the decree, was
therefore filed more than one year after the issuance of the patent. Hence, this
appeal.

Issue: Whether or not dismissal was proper

Ruling:

No.

From the averment of facts in the complaint, it clearly appears that plaintiffs have been, since
time immemorial in possession as owners of the disputed land, have declared the land for tax
purposes in the names of two of them and have built their houses on the land, but that through
fraud and irregularity, defendant succeeded in securing a certificate of title. The foregoing recital
of facts are sufficient averment of ownership. Possession since time immemorial, carries the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain, or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest. Whether this presumption should hold as a fact or
not, is a question appropriately determinable only after the parties have adduced, or at least, are
given the opportunity to adduce, their respective evidence.

The complaint likewise states a sufficient cause for action for recovery of possession of the land.
Settled is the rule that the remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another’s name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to
set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review,
to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for conveyance or, if the property has
passed into the hands of innocent purchaser for value, for damages.

LI SENG GUIAP AND CO. VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 59 PHIL. 687

Facts:

On August 16, 1932, Li Seng Giap & Co., a partnership composed of individuals who are
not citizens of the Philippine Islands nor of the United States, but aliens, instituted these
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, for the registration in its
name in the registry of deeds, of the three parcels of land described in the plans, Exhibits
A and B, and technical descriptions attached to its application, in accordance with the
provisions of Act No. 496 and of Chapter VIII of Title II of Act No. 2874.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the said application alleging as his grounds
that the three parcels of land in question were public lands belonging to the Government
of the United States under the administration and control of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, and that, being an alien, the applicant partnership cannot invoke the
benefits of the provisions of section 45 of the said Act No. 2874. The aforecited section
is contained in Chapter VIII of Title II of the said Act invoked by the applicant. The Director
of Lands has made no reference to Act No. 496 in his opposition for the reason that the
Act in question merely prescribes, in general terms, the manner or procedure to be
followed by an applicant in the obtainment of the certificate of title applied for, or in the
denial or issuance thereof, as the case may be, by the court or by the Government
agencies therein mentioned.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the applicant, Li Seng Giap &
Co. being a partnership made up of individuals who are neither citizens of the Philippine
Islands nor of the United States, is not entitled, for this reason, to register the land
described in its application under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.

Ruling:

The parcels of land involved in this case, which as hereinbefore stated, have reverted to
the State after April 17, 1895, by virtue of the Maura Law, are not of private ownership.
Neither were they so on or after the aforesaid date. The applicant herein did not show
any title thereto either by possessory proceedings or otherwise, which may be considered
as having been issued by the Government. The only basis on which it now claims the
right to have them registered in its name is its alleged possession thereof together with
that of Sebastian Palanca and of the former possessors, as if to say, that it is entitled to
the registration thereof in its name, inasmuch as the parcels of land in question already
belong to it, having acquired them by prescription through the continuous, open, exclusive
and notorious possession thereof, under claim of ownership, at least since the Spanish
regime in the Philippine Islands. However, the truth is that the law expressly provides that
no public land may be acquired by prescription, and that such mode of acquisition does
not hold as against the Government. This provision is contained precisely in the very law
invoked by the applicant, that is section 54, paragraph 6, of Act No. 926. In the case
of Ongsiaco vs. Magsilang (50 Phil., 380, 386), this court said:
It is upon grounds of public policy that the rights of individuals, particularly of aliens,
cannot prevail against the aforesaid right of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and
more particularly when, as in the present case, far from violating any constitutional law, it
deals precisely with the enforcement of the provisions of the first organic law of the
country and those of the Jones Law (section 9), to the effect that lands of the public
domain should not be disposed of or alienated to persons who are not inhabitants or
citizens of the Philippine Islands.

HEIRS OF AMUNATEGUI vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, 126 SCRA 69

Facts

These are two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the CA which
declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private
persons. These petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect
title and its registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land
sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz,
and has an area of 645,703 square meters.

Petitioners Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration. In
due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui filed an opposition to the application of Roque
and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot
No. 885 of Pilar Cadastrecontaining 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered
in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the
Prov. Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title
claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and
part of the public domain. Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition
insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned.
Applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot
No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled
to have said lot registered in his name.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters
to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters was
adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share
to Melquiades Borre.

A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending
that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons for over 30 years and
therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the subject of
registration and confirmation of title in the name of a private person in accordance with
Act No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act. Another petition for review on certiorari
was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of
Jose Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute
sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint
was dismissed on the basis of the CA’s decision that the disputed lot is part of the public
domain. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the CA in passing upon the
relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to
declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land.

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest
land because it is not thickly forested but is a “mangrove swamp”.

Issue: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the
names of the private applicants.

Ruling:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified
as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as “forest” is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. Possession of forest lands, no matter how
long, cannot ripen into private ownership. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of
Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code
are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land,
much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land
must have been a virgin forest as stated
by Emeterio Bereber’switness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must
have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the
Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s finding that timber licenses
had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble
to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District
Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as “public forest.”

The court affirmed the finding that property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain,
classified as public forest land. Petitions were DISMISSED.

BARANDA VS GUSTILO, 156 SCRA 757

Facts:

A petition for reconstitution of title was filed with the CFI (now RTC) of Iloilo involving a
parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by OCT No.
6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia. The OCT was cancelled and TCT No. 106098 was
issued in the names of petitioners Baranda and Hitalia. The Court issued a writ of
possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor
on the ground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court
found out that TCT No. 257772 was fraudulently acquired by Perez, Gotera and Susana.
Thereafter, the court issued a writ of demolition which was questioned by Perez and
others so a motion for reconsideration was filed. Another case was filed by Baranda and
Hitalia (GR. NO. 62042) for the execution of judgement in the resolutions issued by the
courts. In the meantime, the CA dismissed a civil case (GR. NO. 00827) involving the
same properties. (NOTE: This time three cases na ang involve excluding the case at bar.)

The petitioners prayed that an order be released to cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to

cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-
106098 and once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia. In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting Register
of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void,
cancelled the same and issued new certificate of titles in the name of
petitioners. However, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a
notice of lis pendens was annotated in the new certificate of title. This prompted the
petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new
certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion
for reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.

Issue: What is the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice
of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.

Held:

Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register
of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real
or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... If the
instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the
presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising
him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."

Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the
proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage
or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does
not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such
instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by
the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."

The function of ROD is ministerial in nature

The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds
encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting
Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of
the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated
in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land.
In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other
instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of
Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds
Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No.
1529.

No room for construction for the laws on functions of ROD

The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The statute
concerning the

function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is

clear and leaves no room for construction.

REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA VS PENSON, 71 Phil. 109

Facts:

The lot in question, Lot 862, was owned by Inocencio Ligon, Ester Ligon and
Loreto Ligon. Half of said lot is owned by Inocencio while the rest was owned by Ester
and Loreto. A civil case was filed by Sabina Geraldo and Carlos
Davis against Inocencio Ligon to collect the amount of P2.780. The decision was in favor
of Sabina Geraldo and Carlos Davis and the sheriff sold Inocencio’s portion of the lot in
question in the execution of the sentence. The highest bidder of the portion
was MamertoLigon.
Subsequently, Mamerto Ligon was able to cancel the title of the whole of Lot 862 and
another title was issued in his favor. Mamerto sold the lot to a certain
Juliana Pengson. Pengson also sought to cancel the title issued to Mamerto and that
another title be issued in her name. The Registrar of Property Titles of Nueva Ecija
discovered that only half of Lot 862 was sold to InocencioLigon and
that Mamerto Ligon was not the owner of all the Lot purchased by him and had no right
to sell it in its entirety. Juliana Pengson filed a case with the Fourth Chamber of the Court
of First Instance of Manila and the same court ruled that Juliana Pengson can only
register half of Lot 862.

Issue: Whether or not Pengson can register Lot 862 in its entirety on her name.

Held:

No, Pengson cannot register Lot 862 in its entirety on her name.
It is obvious that the Registrar cannot cooperate to consummate this injustice, Ester and
Loreto Ligon would be illegally dispossessed of the half of this lot that corresponds to
them if Pengson’s request is to be approved. Although the Registrar’s duty is ministerial,
the same cannot consciously sanction such injustice such act. It must be taken into
account that, as a result of the facts exposed, Mamerto Ligon, when buying the property
as the property of Inocencio Ligon, knew that the latter owned only half of Lot 862. Nor
can the case of de la Cruz v. Fabie be applied in the present case as the other owners of
the lot in question is not guilty of negligence.

SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY VS LAURENTE, 26 SCRA 52

Facts:
The transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 7567) in question covered a parcel of land situated
in Camansi, Danao, Cebu. The same was issued in 1928 by the Register of Deeds of
Cebu in favor of H. M. H. Nemazee, the proprietor of the original applicant, Danao Coal
Mining Syndicate, Ltd. There is annotation of incumbrances on the transfer certificate
of title covering a parcel of land. In a quitclaim deed, dated 14 January 1960, the heirs
of Nemazee transferred and quitclaimed in favor of Southwestern University their rights,
title, interest and participation in, including their mining and leasehold rights over, said
land. Subsequently, Southwestern University petitioned the lower court to order the
cancellation of the aforequoted annotation of incumbrances on the ground that the
condition and agreement constituting the same were cancelled and rendered inoperative
by the outbreak of World War II as well as by the death of all the listed beneficiaries.
On 12 September 1960, one Cenon Laurente moved the lower court to reconsider its
order of cancellation, specifically of the second portion of the annotation
of incumbrances in question. He alleged that Southwestern University had filed an
ejectment suit4 before another branch of the same court against him and several other
occupants of the land covered by TCT No. 7567, over which land, he claimed, he might
possibly have an interest as a purchaser of a certain parcel of land. The motion for
reconsideration was denied, the court maintains that inasmuch as the law specifically
provides notice to parties in interest, such notice if any, should be limited to the parties
listed or annotated on the certificate of title. Hence, if such parties are already dead, as
had been alleged and substantiated by petitioner SouthwesternUniversity, then notice to
said parties would be superfluous ornotice would not be necessary. The Court acting
within its limited jurisdiction as a Court of Land Registration, can only act on what appears
on the face of the certificate of title, and cannot go beyond what appears therein as
movant Cenon Laurentewould now want this Court to believe. Notice by Publication is
not necessary in connection with this petition which has been duly filed in accordance
with Section 112 of Act 496.

Issue: W/N Laurente is a party interest entitled to notice

Ruling:

Cancellation of registered interests that have terminated and ceased may be ordered by
the land registration court under, and in conformity with, section 112 of Act No. 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The new owner, Southwestern University,
of the land herein involved took the right step by petitioning the court under said section
to have the registered interests — the deceased persons' rights of use and occupancy of
the surface of said land — ordered cancelled on the ground that the same had terminated
and ceased. Notice was no longer necessary for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the
petition insofar as the second portion of the annotation of incumbrances was concerned.
With the death of all the registered adverse claimants thereof, there were no more parties
in interest to be notified. Appelant Laurente was not and can notnow be considered a
party in interest entitled to notice. He was, as he is now, a stranger representing no
adverse claim as to render the petition for cancellation controversial and, thereby, divest
the lower court of its jurisdiction. Before a claimant can be considered as possessing a
genuine adverse interest that would deprive the Registration Court of jurisdiction to
proceed under section 112 of Act 496 in the absence of notice to him, there must be a
showing of the prima facie truth and validity of such adverse interest. Laurente has failed
to make such a showing. A mere verbal agreement will not do here; there must be a public
instrument in order to affect a stranger (such as the holder of the certificate of title or his
successors in interest). For Article 1280, No. 1, of the Civil Code of 1889 (in force in 1920
when Laurente claims to have acquired title) prescribes:
The following must be reduced to writing in a public instrument:

1. Acts or contracts whose object is the creation, transmission, modification or extinction

of rights which affect immovable property.
What is worse is that Laurente allowed more than 20 years to elapse without asserting
the alleged conveyance in his favor, when a period of 10 years sufficed under Act 190
(then in force) to bar any claim to or over real property. Nor has Laurenteadequately
explained such laches on his part. All the foregoing circumstances cast a dense pall of
doubt over the genuineness and validity of Laurente's adverse claim, and fully justify its
rejection by the lower court.

EGAO vs. CA, 174 SCRA 484

Facts:

The respondents filed a motion for quieting the title and recovery of possession and
ownership against the petitioners. Apparently, they claim they are the owners of the parcel
of land by virtue of the deed of sale they entered into with Roberto Marfori to whom the
petitioners allegedly sold their land to. The Egaos acquired their land title by virtue of a
free patent and transferred their ownership in favor of Marfori by virtue of a deed of sale.
However, the Certificate of Title was not transferred in Marfori’s favor. Upon purchase of
the land from Marfori, the respondents introduced improvements thereon and paid taxes
for the property. However, the petitioners illegally occupied portions of the land. Petitioner
answers that they are the true owner of the land by virtue of the Certificate of Title issued
by the Register of Deeds pursuant to their Free Patent. The lower court ruled in favor of
Egao. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court on grounds that the
main issue should be whether Egao can validly sell the land to Marfori who subsequently
transferred the ownership to the respondents. The CA holds both Egao and Marfori to be
in pari delicto for violating the 5-year restriction provided by Commonwealth 141 against
encumbrance and alienation of public lands acquired thru free patent or homestead
patent. They cannot therefore obtain affirmative relief. It also declares the respondents
as innocent purchasers for value who the obtained the duplicate of the OCT still in the
name of the Egaos from Marfori and ownership was transferred to them by physical
possession of the property. It thus promulgated judgment holding the respondents the
absolute owners of the land in dispute, to cancel the OCT of the petitioner and its transfer
thereof to the respondents and to surrender peaceful possession of the land to the
respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners validly transferred their ownership to Marfori to resolve the
rights of the respondents over the land in dispute

Ruling:

The SC holds that based on the adduced evidence, the Egaos sold the lot to Marfori within
the 5-year restriction period provided by law on Free Patent based on the Deed of Sale
entered into by the parties. Although the petitioners denied the validity of the Deed of Sale
the court held that it was notarized and a notarial document has in its favor the
presumption of regularity. When the land was sold to the respondents, they know that the
OCT is still registered under the name of the petitioners. Thus, they are not considered
to be innocent purchaser as contrary to the ruling of the CA. Where a purchaser neglects
to make the necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man on his guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his
vendor's title, and relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor,
purchases the property without making any further investigation, he cannot claim that he
is a purchaser in good faith for value. A private individual cannot bring an action for
reversion or any action which would have an effect of canceling a free patent and the
certificate of title issued on the basis thereof since the land covered will form part again
of the public domain. Sec. 124 of the Public Land Act provides that deeds of sale of
patented lands, perfected within the prohibited five (5) year period are null and void thus
the Egaos have no title to pass to Marfori and nobody can dispose that which does not
belong to him. The respondents are not innocent purchasers for value with no standing
to question the rights of the petitioners over the land and to file an action to quiet the title.
The petitioners remained to be the registered owners and entitled to remain in physical
possession of the disputed property. Respondents are ordered to deliver the OCT to the
petitioners without prejudice to an action for reversion of the land to be instituted by the
Solicitor General for the State.

GARCIA VS CA, 95 SCRA 380

Facts:

This case is about the issuance of two or more transfer certificates of title to different
persons for the same lot, or subdivisions thereof, due to the fact that the original title was
allegedly not cancelled when the first transfer certificates of title were issued to replace
the original title.
A deed of sale for lots E and G of Hacienda Maysilo and covered by OCT No. 983 was
executed in favor of Ismael Lapus, a bona fide occupant thereof. The deed of sale was
presented for registration and contained entries showing that it was annotated on the
back of the OCT. Contrary to SOP however, the deed of sale was not annotated on the
OCT and that consequently, that title was apparently not cancelled.
As a result of the registration of the deed of sale, TCT No. 4910 (“Lapus Title”) was issued
to Lapus. Upon his death, the two lots were inherited by his daughter Carolina Lapuz-
Gozon, who had the land subdivided into 55 lots and sold some to her now co-
respondents. Lapus and successors-in-interest have been in possession of the lands
even before 1910 of more than 70 years.
In 1962, the Riveras, alleged heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal filed a motion
in land registration cases, alleging that they were deprived of their participation in the
Hacienda Maysilo. Since per the OCT the land seemed unencumbered, the court
adjudicated the land in their favor. The OCT was then cancelled and TCT No. 112235
(“Rivera Title”) was issued to the Riveras. Lots 5 and 7 (E and G) were then assigned
to Bartolome Rivera to Sergio Cruz and PacificoGarcia, and subsequent TCTs were
issued in their behalf.
Garcia had Lot 7 (G) subdivided into lots A and B, retained lot A and assigned B to Antonio
Munoz. Munoz mortgaged lot B to Associated Banking Corp.
On the other hand, Cruz sold Lot 5 (E) to Santiago Go. Go mortgaged Lot 5 to Philippine
National Bank. Both Munoz and Go did not pay their mortgage debts, hence the two
banks foreclosed the properties. PNB bought the mortgaged Lot 5 at the auction, but
notice of lis pendens was already annotated on the title.
Riveras and their successors-in-interest have never set foot on the disputed lots.
Gozon finally learned about the Riveras and others acquiring the land, had her adverse
claims registered on the titles of lots 5 and 7 and filed an action to quiet title and damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Gozon and co-plaintiffs and voided the TCTs issued to
the Riveras, others. CA affirmed the decision. Garcia and PNB appealed.

Issue:
W/N the 1920 Lapus title prevails over the 1963 Rivera title and subsequent titles derived
from it?
Held:

Yes, Lapus title prevails. Lapus was an innocent purchaser for value who validly
transmitted to his successors-in-interest his indefeasible title or ownership over the
disputed lots. That title could not be nullified or defeated by the issuance 43 years later
to other persons of another title over the same lots due to the failure of the register of
deeds to cancel the title preceding the title issued to Lapus. This must be so considering
that Lapus and his successors-in-interest remained in possession of the disputed lots and
the rival claimants never possessed the same.
The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include
the same land, the earlier in date prevails. It is settled that in this jurisdiction the
maxim prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time is preferred in
right) is followed in land resgistration matters.
The contention of PNB that it was a buyer in good faith has no merit because the deed of
sale in favor of Lapus and the titles issued to him and his successors-in-interest are all a
matter of public record in the registry of deeds. When a conveyance has been properly
recorded, such record is a constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and
equitable, included therein. Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has
examined every instrument of record affecting the title. This presumption cannot be
overcome by proof of innocence and good faith otherwise the very purpose of the law
requiring a record would be destroyed. The bank should have made an on-the-spot
investigation of the lot mortgaged.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIZPAH R. REYES, 175 SCRA 597

Facts:
Spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land in Lipa City
registered in their names under a TCT. Both are now deceased and were survived by the
following children: the accused Mizpah R. Reyes and the complainants. In 1983, the
complainants discovered from the Register of Deeds (RD) that the subject property had
already been transferred in the name of Mizpah Reyes, single, under a TCT. They alleged
that the conveyance was through a deed of sale executed and signed by their parents.
Upon examination in the RD of the document, they found that the signature of their
parents were falsified and that accused also made an untruthful statement that she was
single although she was married. The N.B.I. found that the signature of Julio Rizare was
genuine but that of Patricia Pampo was forged. The complainants filed 2 informations
against Reyes for falsification and for allegedly making an untruthful statement of fact in
the deed of sale. The trial court granted the motion of Reyes to quash the informations
stating that the lapse of more than twenty (20) years before the two informations were
filed, the crimes for which the accused, Mizpah Reyes, are charged have already
prescribed. The People now filed an appeal in the CA who affirmed the decision of the
RTC. The CA ruled that the prescriptive period started when the deed of sale was
registered in the RD and not when the falsification was discovered. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari.
Issue: W/N the petitioner’s action against Reyes has already prescribed.
Held:
Yes, the action has already prescribed. The rule is well-established that registration
in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its
contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. Under the rule of
notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. This presumption cannot be overcome
by proof of innocence or good faith. The notarized deed of sale was registered on May
26, 1961. The criminal informations for falsification of a public document having been filed
only on October 18, 1984, or more than ten (10) years from May 26, 1961, the crime for
which the accused was charged has prescribed. The Court of Appeals, therefore,
committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's order quashing the two
informations on the ground of prescription

BUDLONG VS PONDOC, 79 SCRA 24

Facts:

On October 27, 1934 the sisters Isabela Pondoc and CrispinaPondoc donated to
Andrea Budlong in a notarial instrument their two-thirds share in the said lot in
consideration of the donee'spersonal services to the donors. Andrea accepted the
donation in the same instrument. Two years after the execution of the donation, or on
October 27,1936, Original Certificate of Title No. 4718 was issued for the said lot.

The title shows that the lot is owned by the following co-owners:
Crispina Pondoc 113;
Isabela Pondoc 1/3;
Francisco Garrote 1/6, and
Isabela Garrote-Pondoc 1/6.

The donee, Andrea Budlong did not intervene in the cadastral proceeding. She was not
substituted for the donors in thatproceeding. Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc died
without any descendants in 1935 and 1937. Francisco Garrote left Bohol thirty years
before 1966 and had never returned to that province. Isabel Garrote-Pondoc died
and was survived by her five children named Juan, Fabio, Apolinaria, Benedicta and
Felicidad all surnamed Pondoc y Garrote Andrea Budlong has been in possession of the
lot. She declared it for tax purposes in her name. She planted the lot to coconuts,
bamboos, bananas and a mango tree. Early in 1965 Andrea wanted to register the deed
of donation. The register of deeds in a letter dated April 1, 1965asked Juan Pondoc to
surrender the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 4718. Andrea Budlong filed in the Court of
First instance of Bohol an action for the partition of the said lot. She was allowed to sue
as a pauper. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that
Andrea Budlong was guilty of laches and that the registration of the lot extinguished
her rights under the deed of donation.

Issue: Whether or not the done ceased to be a co-owner because hername does not
appear in the certificate of title

Held:

Section 70 of Act No. 496 that registered land, and ownership therein, shall in all respects
be subject to the same burdens and incidents attached bylaw to unregistered land", and
that nothing in Act No. 496 "shall in any way be construed "to change the laws of descent,
or the rights of partition between coparceners joint tenants and other cotenants" "or to
change or affect in any other way any other rights or liabilities created by law
andapplicable to unregistered land, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or
in the amendments hereof".

LEGAL INCIDENTS OF REGISTRATION LAND1 Registered land is subject to the same

legal burdens and incidents asunregistered land and, therefore, fake unregistered land, it
is subject to attachment and execution for the payment of debts. The rights and liabilities
which are created by law and are made applicable to unregistered land, are applicable
to registered land, except as otherwise provided in Act No. 496.2. The rights arising from
the relation of husband and wife are applicable toregistered lands.3. Registered land is
subject (a) to any alien of any description established by law on land and the b thereon,
or the interest of the owner in such land or buildings, (b) to the laws of descent, and (c)
to the rights of partition between coparceners joint tenants, will other cotenants except
asotherwise expressly provoked in Act No. 496.The deed of donation made
Andrea Budlong a co-owner of Lot No.5447. She became the successor-in-interest of the
donors, Isabela Pondocand Crispina Pondoc. The fact that in OCT No. 4718, which was
issued subsequent to the donation, the donors appear to be the co-owners and
not Andrea Budlong did not extinguish at all the rights of Andrea as a co-owner. Section
70 of Act No. 496 is crystal clear. It unmistakably provides that the conversion of
unregistered land into registered land does not affect the rights of the CO-owners nor the
legal rights and liabilities applicable to unregistered land.

ROXAS VS DINGLASAN, 28 SCRA 430

FACTS:

Felisa Kalaw was the registered owner with Certificate of Title No. 9125 of Lot No. 15679
with an area of 26,530 square meters, situated at Lipa City.

Felisa sold to Francisca Mojica by means of a public instrument an undivided portion of

11,530 square meters of the lot for the price of P938.50. In the same month and year,
she sold to Victoria Dinglasan by means of a private instrument the remaining portion of
15,000 square meters for the price of P5,851.40. Long before and at the time of the sales,
Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan were in possession of the Lot.

The vendor's Certificate of Title No. 9125 was not delivered to the vendees because it
was in the possession of another person to whom the lot had been mortgaged by Felisa
Kalaw.

Prior to December 29, 1961, Pedro Dinglasan, by falsifying a public document of

conveyance, succeeded in having Certificate of Title No. 9125 in the name of Felisa Kalaw
canceled and a new transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10392 issued in his name.

On December 29, 1961, Pedro Dinglasan mortgaged the lot to Leonora T. Roxas as
security for a loan of P7,000.00 with interest of 6% per annum, payable within a period of
ninety (90) days. The mortgagor's title having been delivered to the mortgagee, she
caused the instrument to be registered on the back of the said transfer certificate of title.

On April 3, 1962, the mortgagee, Leonora T. Roxas, instituted the instant foreclosure suit
against the mortgagor, Pedro Dinglasan, the latter having failed or refused to pay the
obligation on its due date.

On April 18, 1962, Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan moved to intervene. They
prayed that they be declared the true and absolute owners of the parcel of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10392; that whatever document executed by Pedro
Dinglasan in transferring the ownership of the land in his name be declared null and void;
and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10392 be ordered canceled and another title
issued in the intervenors' names.

After trial, the lower court rendered its decision finding that the mortgage was validly
constituted and its foreclosure was in order.

ISSUE: Whether or not Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan are owners of the
questioned parcels of land.

RULING: No.
The complaint in intervention was to vindicate ownership of the land in the intervenors.
The deeds of sale involving the parcel of land covered by Certificate of Title No. 9125 in
the name of the vendor, Felisa Kalaw, not having been registered, the said intervenors
did not acquire ownership of the land. It is well settled that in case of sale of a piece of
land titled under the Torrens System, it is the act of registration, and not tradition, that
transfers the ownership of the land sold.

The vendees-intervenors not having acquired the ownership of the land, their action to
vindicate ownership must fail because such action can prosper only upon proof by plaintiff
that he is the owner. As pointed out, the intervenors did not acquire ownership of the land
because their deeds of sale were not registered.

Moreover, the intervenors were negligent. As the vendor did not deliver to them her
duplicate certificate of title, they should have consulted a good lawyer who could have
advised them to protect their rights by filing with the Office of the Register of Deeds an
adverse claim under Section 110 of Act No. 496, as amended. Had they filed an adverse
claim, Pedro Dinglasan would not have been able to obtain cancellation of Felisa Kalaw's
certificate of title and the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in his name. They
were, thus, negligent, and their negligence was the proximate cause of their loss.

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY CO. VS CA, 327 SCRA 359

Facts:
Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over
Lot No. 4399 located in Lapu-Lapu City. Crisanta died, so the Cadastral court issued a
decision directing the issuance of a decree of title in the name of her 8 children, namely:
Juan, Celedonio,Emiliano, Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe, Roberta and Fausta, all
surnamed Aying. However, the certificate was lost during the war. All the heirs of the
Aying siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute
Sale conveying the lot in issue to the Aznar Brothers Realty Company. The deed was
registered with the ROD of Lapu-Lapu City on March 6, 1994 under Act. No. 3344 (the
law governing registration of unregistered land) and since then, the realty company
religiously paid the real property taxes on the property. Later, Aznar Brothers Realty
Company filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the Original Title since the original title of
the lot was lost during the war. This was granted by the court and the ROD of Lapu-Lapu
was directed to issue a reconstituted title in the name of the Aying Siblings. Thus, OCT
No. RO-2856 was issued.
The Aznar Brothers Realty Company then sent out notices to vacate the lot to the persons
occupying the property, reasoning that they were the rightful owner. The occupants
refused to vacate, hence an ejectment case was filed against them before the MTC. The
MTC ordered the occupants to vacate. Eventually, this case reached the Supreme Court
and a decision was rendered in favor of the realty company declaring them as the rightful
possessor of the land.
Meanwhile, persons claiming to be the descendants of the eight Aying siblings,
numbering around 220 persons submitted an amended complaint before the RTC and
alleged that they are co-owners of the land being the descendants of the registered
owners under OCT No. RO-2856; that they had been in actual, peaceful, physical, open,
adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession in concept of owner of subject parcel
of land since time immemorial; and that the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the
realty company by the alleged heirsof Crisanta Maloloy-on is a fraud and is null and void
ab initio because not all the co-owners of subject property affixed their signature on said
document and some of the co-owners who supposedly signed said document had been
dead at the time of the execution thereof; that Aznar Brothers Realty Company held the
land in bad faith, knowing fully well that it did nothave any right to the land and used force,
threat and intimidation against them thus, suffering moral damages.
Aznar Brothers Realty Company denied that the Ayings are the lawful owners of the land
and alleged it had been in actual possession of subject land as owner thereof by virtue of
the extra-judicial partition of real property and deed of absolute sale executed in its favor;
that in fact, it had been paying taxes thereon religiously. The realty company further
alleged that they are barred by prescription to file an action for recovery of property which
should be instituted within 4 years from discovery of the fraud. It took the Aying heirs 27
years to file their action against the realty company.
Issue: Whether or not the realty company’s defense, that they acquired the entire parcel
of land with the mistaken belief that all the heirs have executed the document, entitle them
to ownership over the land by prescription.
Ruling:
No, Aznar Brothers Realty Company cannot be entitled ownership over the land based
on mistaken belief. The law provides that if property is acquired through mistake or fraud,
the person obtaining it is considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes. Based on this rule, a trustee cannot acquire by
prescription ownership over property entrusted to him until and unless he repudiates the
trust. However, in constructive implied trusts, prescription may supervene even if the
trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of said trust is not a
condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period.

FIDELITY AND SURETY CO, VS CONGERO, 41 PHIL 396

Facts:

Prior to June 26, 1913, Pastora Conegero was the holder of Torrens certificate of title, No. 147,
covering a parcel of land in the city of Iloilo. A cadastral survey covering this and other land in the
city of Iloilo was undertaken by the Government; and in the course of the cadastral proceedings
the court found it convenient or desirable to order that the certificate of title No. 147 be
cancelled and that a new certificate of title should be issued to Conegero. She surrendered
certificate No. 147, and two new certificates were issued: one to herself (No. 194), and another
to her children (No. 195). The cancellation of certificate No. 147 was effected under the authority
of an order of the Court of Fist Instance of Iloilo, dated July 26, 1913; and the mandate of the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office, directed to the register of deeds in Iloilo, directing
the change, is dated October 1, 1914. While she was yet the holder of certificate No. 147, she
mortgaged the land covered by it to El Hogar Filipino to secure a debt, and the encumbrance
thereby created was noted on her duplicate certificate of title.

On March 30, 1916, Pastora Conegero entered into an agreement with one Samuel Thomas
whereby, in consideration of the sum of P1,637.49, she bargained and sold the property
described in title No. 147. At the time this sale was made the Torrens certificate covering the land
was not produced or delivered to the purchaser in the city of Manila where the contract was
made; and in fact at that time certificate No. 147, referred to in the description of the land in said
contract, was non-existent, having been cancelled as already stated.

Soon after the contract of sale had been executed by Pastora Conegero in favor of Samuel
Thomas, the latter's attorney sent the document to Francisco Enage, register of deeds in Iloilo, in
order that the transfer might be registered and that a new certificate might in due course be
issued to Samuel Thomas. To this communication, Mr. Enage replied, returning the document
and informing the writer that the registration thereof could not be effected for the reason that
certificate No. 147 had been cancelled and has been supplanted by certificate No. 194 in the
name of Pastora Conegero.

The register of deeds, however, noted in his entry book the fact that such a deed had been
presented to him at 10 a.m., on April 18, 1916, and placed a memorandum to the same effect on
the document itself.

In 1916 Pastora Conegero mortgaged the property described in certificate No. 194 to the Fidelity
and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands to secure a credit of P2,000 guaranteed by the
surety company. This mortgage was registered and noted on the original certificate of title, No.
194, by the register of deeds at Iloilo on March 29, 1917.

Samuel Thomas commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to compel Pastora
Conegero to produce certificate No. 194 for cancellation, and to secure the issuance of a new
certificate of title in his name. Notice of lis pendens was filed on November 5, 1917. On November
9, 1917, Pastora Conegero executed a third mortgage, to Southworth and Goyena, to secure a
note for P500.On March 22, 1918, the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands
brought this action to foreclose its mortgage, naming Samuel Thomas and Southworth and
Goyena as codefendants with Pastora Conegero.

Issue: Whether or not the entering of this memorandum in said book operate as an effective
registration of the title, or transfer of title, and thereby held that it had this effect.

Ruling:

No. At the time the absolute deed of sale in favor of Thomas was presented to the register of
deeds in Iloilo in the case before us the Torrens title upon which that deed was supposed to
operate was non-existent, having been judicially canceled with the consent of the owner. There
can be no constructive registration in a situation of this kind.

Under section 50 of Act No. 496, "no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument,
except a will, purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or
bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of
authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be
the operative act to convey and affect the land." The steps by which registration is accomplished
are fully set out in section 57 of the same Act; and by reference thereto, it will be seen that
registration of the transfer of registered land depends upon several vital conditions, among which
is the requirement that the grantor's duplicate certificate, upon which the title is founded, shall
be produced before the register of deeds for cancellation; and that he shall also have before him
the original certificate, likewise to be cancelled. This prerequisite condition was not complied
with when the deed to Thomas was presented for registration. On the other hand, the
conveyance of the land covered by certificate No. 194, by way of mortgage to the Fidelity and
Surety Company, was effected in compliance with all legal requirements. As a consequence it
must be held that the title acquired by the Fidelity and Surety Company is superior to that
acquired by Samuel Thomas.

**The Supreme Court ruled that when the land which is the subject of a sale is registered in the
name of the purchaser, registration takes effect retroactively as of the date the deed was noted
in the entry book by the Registrar of Deeds, and not when final registration was accomplished.

TENIO OBSEQUIO VS CA, 230 SCRA 550

FACTS:
The subject matter of the present petition is a parcel of land located at Andanan, Bayugan,
Agusan del Sur.This lot was previously registered in the name of herein respondent
Eufronio Alimpoos and which he acquired through a homestead application, The said land
is now registered in the name of herein petitioner, Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio, as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1421.
Private respondents filed a complaint in the court a quo against herein petitioners
Consorcia Tenio and her husband, Orlando Obsequio, and the heirs of Eduardo Deguro
for recovery of possession and ownership. They alleged that sometime in 1964, they
mortgaged the land to Eduardo Deguro for P10,000.00; that to guaranty the loan they
delivered to the latter the original certificate of title to the land; that in the meantime, they
continued to cultivate the same and, at the end of the harvest season, they gave two-
thirds (2/3) of the harvest to Eduardo Deguro; that on June 25, 1965, Eduardo Deguro
and his wife, without the knowledge and consent of herein private respondents, prepared
a document of sale and through misrepresentation and other manipulations made it
appear that private respondents sold the land to them.
This deed of sale was annotated at the back of the said certificate of title. After the death
of Eduardo Deguro, his heirs sold the land to Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio. It was allegedly
only in 1982, when Eufronio Alimpoos received a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold of
his land from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), that he learned that the land
was already titled in the name of another.
Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio, on the other hand, maintains that she purchased the land in
question from the heirs of Deguro in good faith, for valuable consideration and without
knowledge of any flaw or defect whatsoever.
RTC – in favor of herein petitioners
CA - reversed the decision of the lower court
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are the true owner of the land
RULING:
Yes. Reconveyance of the land in question to the original owner is not in order. Under
Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, as amended by Section 53 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, an original owner, of registered land may seek the annulment of a transfer
thereof on the ground of fraud. However, such a remedy is without prejudice to the rights
of any innocent holder for value with a certificate of title.
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property, and pays a full
and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the
claim or interest of some other person in the property.In consonance with this accepted
legal definition, petitioner Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio is a purchaser in good faith. There
is no showing whatsoever nor even an allegation that herein petitioner had any
participation, voluntarily or otherwise, in the alleged forgery.
Nor can we charge said petitioner with negligence since, at the time of the sale to her, the
land was already registered in the name of Eduardo Deguro and the tax declaration was
also issued in the latter's name. It was also clearly indicated at the back of the original
certificate of title that Eduardo Deguro acquired ownership over the said land by virtue of
the deed of sale executed in his favor.In fact, it is not disputed that one of his heirs was
actually residing therein. There is no annotation, defect or flaw in the title that would have
aroused any suspicion as to its authenticity. Such being the case, petitioner has the right
to rely on what appears on the face of the certificate of title.
The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate
and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the
face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further,
except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry.Where innocent
third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire
rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total
cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to
impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property
registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether
the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor
and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the
condition of the property.
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility
once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece
of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of
being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair
to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would
be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not
necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence
would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are
now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing
the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of
titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.
Moreover, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the deed of sale which
constituted the basis for the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name of
Eduardo Deguro, considering that not only was the contract notarized but that it was also
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in compliance with
Section 118 of the Public Land Act.

BASS VS DE LA RAMA, G.R. No. 47662

Facts:

The present action was instituted in or about April, 1939, by Joaquin V. Bass against
Esteban de la Rama and Hijos de I. de la Rama to obtain judgment ordering the
defendants "to deliver the land in question to the plaintiff and to pay to the latter damages
in the sum of P1,220,700" claimed to be the value of the sugar realized from the produce
of one-fourth of the said land during the time it has been in the possession of the
defendants.

Pedro Ferrer was the owner of an undivided one-fourth of a parcel of land conveyed his
interest our participation to Hijos De La Rama by way of mortgage to secure his payment
of P12,500 with 12% per annum. The mortgage was duly recorded and annotated on the
title. On 1923, Joaquin Bass levied execution on the land by virtue of the writ of execution
issued by CFI Manila. Notice of the levy was registered but was not annotated in the title.
Pursuant to the levy, the land was sold at a public auction but the sale was not annotated
in the title. The right of redemption within the statutory period was also not stated.

In 1929, the land was sold in a public auction after the mortgage was foreclosed,
adjudicating it to H. de la Rama and a new certificate of title was issued. The sale was
subsequently confirmed.

Issue: Whether or not H. de los Rama acquired a valid title to the land in question thru
the foreclosure of its mortgages

Held:
Anent the first special defense, appellant assigns as error the failure of the trial to hold
that appellees should have made him a party in the foreclosure proceeding. It is intimated
that by virtue of the sheriffs's sale of February 15, 1924, appellant became a junior
encumbrancer and as such have been impleaded as cross-defendant in the cross-
complaint of foreclosure of mortgage interposed by Hijos de I. de la Rama in case No.
2911, as required by section 255 of act No. 190. In this connection the trial court held that
the levy on execution and the subsequent sale at public auction in favor of appellant, not
having been noted on the certificate of title, could not serve as notice to the whole world
of appellant's equity in the land in question; in other words, they were not binding against
appellees. That holding of the trial court is also assigned as error by appellant.

the entry of an instrument in the entry book of the of the register of deeds produces no
legal effect unless a memorandum of such instrument is noted on the certificate of title.
In the instant case the notice of levy on execution and the sheriff's sale in favor of
appellant of Pedro Ferrer's participation in the land in question were never annotated on
the certificate of title. Hence they were not binding against the mortgage Hijos de I. de la
Rama and it was not necessary for the latter to implead appellant as junior encumbrancer
in the foreclosure of its mortgage. As a result, the equity or right acquired by appellant in
Pedro Ferrer's participation in the land in question was wiped out by the foreclosure of
the pre-existing mortgage thereon.

DBP vs. ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA, 162 SCRA 450

Doctrine: Entry (in the primary entry book) alone produces the effect of registration,
whether voluntary or involuntary transactions, as long as the registrant has complied with
all requirements for purposes of entry and annotation.

Facts:

Two parcels of land were registered in the names of Spouses Andres Bautista
and Marcelina Calison. The parcels of land were subject of an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale of which DBP was the highest bidder. On June 13, 1980, the DBP presented a
sheriff’s certificate of sale in its favor of the two parcels of land. The transaction was
entered in the Registry’s Primary Entry Book as Entry No. 8191. DBP paid the requisite
registration fees on the same day. However, annotation of the sale on the certificates of
title cannot be effected because the originals of the certificates were missing and
cannot be found. On advice of the RD, DBP instituted proceedings to reconstitute the
titles before CFI. On June 15, 1982, CFI ordered the reconstitution of the titles. For
reasons not stated in the records, the certificates were reconstituted only on June 19,
1984. On June 25, 1984, DBP sought annotation on the reconstituted titles of the
certificate of sale subject of Entry No. 8191. The Acting Register of Deeds, being in doubt
of the proper action to take, took the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration
by consulta. The Acting RD raised the following questions: (a) whether the certificate of
sale could be registered using the old Entry No. 8191 made in 1980 notwithstanding the
fact that the original copies of the reconstituted certificates of title were issued only on
June 19, 1984; and (b) if the first query was answered affirmatively, whether he could
sign the proposed annotation, having assumed his duties only in July 1982. CLR issued
a resolution holding that Entry No. 8191 had been rendered "... ineffective due to the
impossibility of accomplishing registration at the time the document was entered because
of the non-availability of the certificate (sic) of title involved. For said certificate of sale to
be admitted for registration, there is a need for it to be re-entered now that the titles have
been reconstituted upon payment of new entry fees," and by-passed the second query
as having been rendered moot and academic by the answer to the first. DBP assailed the
resolution of the CLR before the CA. CA elevated the case to SC because the case
involves pure questions of law.
Issue: Whether the CLR committed error in holding that Entry No. 8191 became
ineffective due to the impossibility of registration at the time the document was entered
and that there is a need to re-enter the transaction in the primary entry book to effect
annotation in the certificates of title.

Ruling:

Yes. That view fails to find support from a consideration of entire context of said Section
56 which in another part also provides that the instrument subject of a primary entry "...
shall be regarded as registered from the time so noted ...," and, at the very least, gives
such entry from the moment of its making the effect of putting the whole world on notice
of the existence the instrument on entered. Such effect (of registration) clearly attaches
to the mere making of the entry without regard to the subsequent step of annotating a
memorandum of the instrument subject of the entry on the certificate of title to which it
refers. Indeed, said Section, in also providing that the annotation, "... when made ... shall
bear the same date ..." as the entry, may be said to contemplate unspecified intervals of
time occurring between the making of a primary entry and that of the corresponding
annotation on the certificate of title without robbing the entry of the effect of being
equivalent to registration. Neither, therefore, is the implication in the appealed resolution
that annotation must annotation entry immediately or in short order justified by the
language of Section 56.
Furthermore, it is amply clear that the four-year hiatus between primary entry and
proposed annotation in this case has not been of DBP's making. Though it was under no
necessity to present the owner's duplicates of the certificates of title affected for purposes
of primary entry, since the transaction sought to be recorded was an involuntary
transaction, and the record is silent as to whether it presented them or not, there is
nonetheless every probability that it did so. It was the mortgagee of the lands covered by
those titles and it is usual in mortgage transactions that the owner's duplicates of the
encumbered titles are yielded into the custody of the mortgage until the mortgage is
discharged. Moreover, the certificates of title were reconstituted from the owner's
duplicates, and again it is to be presumed that said duplicates were presented by DBP,
the petitioner in the reconstitution proceedings.
It is, furthermore, admitted that the requisite registration fees were fully paid and that the
certificate of sale was registrable on its face. DBP, therefore, complied with all that was
required of it for purposes of both primary entry and annotation of the certificate of sale.
It cannot be blamed that annotation could not be made contemporaneously with the entry
because the originals of the subject certificates of title were missing and could not be
found, since it had nothing to do with their safekeeping. If anyone was responsible for
failure of annotation, it was the Register of Deeds who was chargeable with the keeping
and custody of those documents.
It does not, therefore, make sense to require DBP to repeat the process of primary entry,
paying anew the entry fees as the appealed resolution disposes, in order to procure
annotation which through no fault on its part, had to be deferred until the originals of the
certificates of title were found or reconstituted.

LILIA Y. GONZALES vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and

RURAL BANK OF PAVIA, INC., G.R. No. L-69622 January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 587

Facts

Lot No. 2161, the subject property in dispute wasunder the ownership of Hortencia Bu
ensuceso’sparents before it was sold in Public Auction to theProvince of Iloilo due to del
inquency in the paymentof the real estate taxes. Years later, Hortenciadiscovered that t
he title of the property was stillunder the name of her parents which prompted her topay
the back taxes resulting to the execution of aDeed of Repurchase through the Provincial
Treasurerfollowed by the purchase of the property from herparent’s name to her own a
s provided for in the newtitle. Later, the said property was mortgaged to theRural Bank o
f Pavia wherein she failed to pay theaccount. Consequently, a Certificate of Sale wasex
ecuted in favor of the bank.

Thereafter, Matias Yusay filed an action againstthe Buensuceso and the bank seeking t
he annulmentand cancellation of the title in the name of theHortencia and the issuance
of a new title in favor ofhim as he alleged that the land was originallymortgaged to him b
y the original owners way beforethe land was sold in public auction. He claimed thatthe t
ransaction between Buensuceso and the bank isdone in bad faith.

After the land was sold, Hortencia Buensuceso isalready out of the picture and the disp
ute is to besettled between the bank and the petitioner.

Issue

Whether or not the respondent bank acted in badfaith.

Whether or not the title is defective due priorengagement making the title that follows as
null andvoid.

Held

1.
The answer is in negative, the bank acted ingood faith. When the certificate of title in th
name ofHortencia Buensuceso was submitted to privaterespondent bank for purposes o
f their loanapplication, it was free from any lien andencumbrance. The mortgage was du
ly constituted andregistered with the Register of Deeds on May28,1971. The ejectment
case which was filed bypetitioner against the said spouses which petitionerclaims shoul
d have put the respondent bank on itsguard was annotated at the back of the subject titl
eonly on March 29,1973. There was therefore nothingon the face of the title of the Horte
ncia Buensucesowhich would arouse the suspicion of the respondentbank. The certifica
te of title was in the name of themortgagors when the land was mortgaged by them tore
spondent bank. Such being the case, saidrespondent bank, As mortgagee, had the right
to relyon what appeared on the certificate of title and, in theabsence of anything to excit
e suspicion, was under noobligation to look beyond the certificate andinvestigate the titl
e of the mortgagor appearing on theface of said certificate.

The answer is in negative. It is well-settled that a Torrens Tittle cannot be collaterally

attacked. Theissue on the validity of the title can only be raised inan action expressly ins
tituted for that purpose. ATorrens Title can be attacked only for fraud withinone year afte
r the date of the issuance of the decree ofregistration. Such attack must be direct and n
ot bycollateral proceeding. The title represented by thecertificate cannot be changed, alt
ered, modified,enlarged or diminished in a collateralproceeding.After one year from the
date of thedegree, the sole remedy of the landowner whoseproperty has been wrongfull
y or erroneouslyregistered in another's name is not to set aside thedecree, but, respecti
ng the decree as incontrovertibleand no longer open to review, to bring an ordinaryactio
n in the ordinary court of justice forreconveyance or, if the property has passed into theh
ands of an innocent purchaser for value, fordamages. The title of Asuncion Sustiguer w
asobtained on February 26, 1971 while that of theHortencia’s on March 3, 1971. The co
mplaint in thisacto, was filed only on April 18, 1974, clearly morethan one year from the
date of the decree ofregistration.
The decision of the lower court is affirmed.

PINEDA VS CA, 409 SCRA 438

Facts:

Spouses Benitez mortgaged a house and lot covered by TCT 8361 in favor of Juanita
Pineda and Leila Sayoc. Pineda and Sayoc did not register the mortgage with the
Register of Deeds.With the consent of Pineda, Spouses Benitez sold the house(only) to
Olivia G. Mojica. On the same date, Mojica filed a petition for the issuance of a second
owners duplicate of TCT 8361 alleging that she purchased a parcel of land and the
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-8361 was lost. This was granted.

Subsequently, the Spouses Benitez sold the lot covered by TCT 8361 to Mojica. With the
registration of the deed of sale and presentation of the second owners duplicate of TCT
8361, the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT 8361 and issued TCT 13138 in the name of
Mojica. Mojica, then, obtained a loan from one Teresita Gonzales by executing a deed of
mortgage over the property in question. Gonzales registered the same with the Register
of Deeds in Cavite City.

On, May 8, 1985, Pineda and Sayoc filed a complaint with the RTC against Spouses
Benitez and Mojica and they prayed for the cancellation the second owners duplicate of
TCT 8361. Spouses Benitez admitted that they sold the property in question to Mojica but
that the same was consented to by Pineda and Sayoc and that the spouses had no
knowledge that another TCT was issued to Mojica. Moijca denied any conspiracy with the
spouses and that she verified with the Registry of Deeds that the title to the property was
free of all liens and encumbrances. Mojica added that on learning of the
Spouses Benitezs mortgage with Pineda and Sayoc, she signed the Acknowledgment of
Indebtedness. Mojica contended that since Pineda, for herself and Sayoc, conformed to
this agreement, Pineda and Sayoc had no personality to file the complaint.

The trial court annulled the second owners duplicate of TCT 8361. Subsequently, Mojica
defaulted in paying her obligation to Gonzales causing the latter to foreclose the mortgage
over the property and the same purchased it at a public sale. Mjoicafailed to redeem the
property. Meanwhile, the spouses Benitez and Mojica appealed to the CA. The CA
affirmed the lower court’s decision. Pineda and Sayoc then filed a motion to compel
Gonzales to surrender TCT 16084. Gonzales averred that averred that she was not
impleaded in the case. The trial court declared void the original and the owners duplicate
of TCT 16084 in the name of Gonzales. The trial court ordered the reinstatement of TCT
8361 in the name of the Spouses Benitez.The CA reversed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not Gonzales’ TCT is void.

Held:

No, Gonzales’ TCT is not void.

It is settled that the first registration of mortgage over a property bars other registration of
mortgage over the same property. In the present case, Spouses Benitez first mortgaged
the property in question to Pineda and Sayoc. However, this mortgage was not registered.
Subsequently, the spouses sold the property to Mojica. This sale is perfectly valid as the
spouses remained as the owner of the property in question and they may dispose the
property as they see fit. Mojica, however, is guilty of bad faith as she alleged that the
duplicate TCT over the property she bought was lost even if the same is false.
Accordingly, the new TCT issued in her favor and pertaining to the property in question
is void. The nullity of the new TCT, however, cannot affect the registered mortgage
executed between Mojica and Gonzales. There was no liens or encumbrances present in
the new TCT and Gonzales was not required to look farther from the same. Being thus
an innocent mortgagee for value, its right or lien upon the land mortgaged must be
respected and protected, even if the mortgagor obtained her title thereto thru fraud.
Seeing as the latter mortgage in favor of Gonzales was registered first, said mortgage
must prevail over the first but unregistered mortgage in favor of Pineda and Sayoc.

PELAYO VS CA, G.R. No. 141323

Facts:

David Pelayo through a Deed of Absolute Sale sold and transferred to Melki Perez
two parcel of agricultural lands. Loreza Pelayo and another one whose signature is
eligible witnessed such execution of the deed. Loreza signed only on the third page in the
space provided for witnesses, as such, Perez’sapplication was denied. Perez
asked Loreza to sign on the first and second pages of the deed of sale but the
latter refused. He then filed a complaint for specific performance against
the Pelayo spouses. The spouses moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack
of marital consent as provided by Art. 166 of the Civil Code.

Issue: W/N the deed of sale was null and void for lack of marital consent.

Ruling:
Negative; Under Art. 173, in relation to Art. 166, both of the New Civil Code, which
were still in effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed, the lack
of marital consent to the disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract
void ab initio but merely violable. Art 166. Provides unless the wife has been declared
a non compass mentis or a spendthriff, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in
a lepresarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal property withour the wife’s consent. It she refuses unreasonably to give her
consent, the court may compel her to grant the same. Under Art. 173, the wife may during
the marriage and within 10 years the transaction questioned, ask the court for the
annulment of any contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair interest in
the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, her heir, after
the dissolution of the marriage may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated
by the husband.

ABALOS vs. MACATANGAY, G.R. NO. 155043, September 30, 2004.

FACTS:

Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land with
improvements. Arturo made a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in favor of
Macatangay, binding himself to sell to latter the subject property and not to offer the same
to any other party within 30 days from date. Full payment would also be effected as soon
as possession of the property shall have been turned over to Macatangay. Macatangay
gave an earnest money amounting to P5,000.00 to be deducted from the purchase price
of P1,300,000.00 in favor of the spouses.

Subsequently, Arturo and Esther had a marital squabble brewing at that time and
Macatangay, to protect his interest, made an annotation in the title of the property. He
then sent a letter informing them of his readiness to pay the full amount of the purchase
price. Esther, through her SPA, executed in favor of Macatangay, a Contract to sell the
property to the extent of her conjugal interest for the sum of P650,000 less the sum
already received by her and Arturo. She agreed to surrender the property to Macatangay
within 20 days along with the deed of absolute sale upon full payment, while he promised
to pay the balance of the purchase price for P1, 290,000.00 after being placed in
possession of the property. Macatangay informed them that he was ready to pay the
amount in full. The couple failed to deliver the property so he sued the spouses.

RTC dismissed the complaint, because the SPA could not have authorized Arturo to sell
the property to Macatangay as it was falsified. CA reversed the decision, ruling the SPA
in favor of Arturo, assuming it was void, cannot affect the transaction between Esther and
Macatangay. On the other hand, the CA considered the RMOA executed by Arturo valid
to effect the sale of his conjugal share in the property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of property is valid.

RULING:

No. Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the effectivity of the Family
Code. There being no indication that they have adopted a different property regime, their
property relations would automatically be governed by the regime of conjugal partnership
of gains. The subject land which had been admittedly acquired during the marriage of the
spouses forms part of their conjugal partnership.

Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. This
right is clearly granted to him by law. More, the husband is the sole administrator. The
wife is not entitled as of right to joint administration.

The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as administrator of the conjugal

partnership, cannot validly alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wife’s consent. Similarly, the wife cannot dispose of any property
belonging to the conjugal partnership without the conformity of the husband. The law is
explicit that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent,
except in cases provided by law.

More significantly, it has been held that prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,
the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which
constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it
appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and
settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or “remanente
liquido” (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership
after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal
assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or
after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of
conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses
or their respective heirs.

GABRIEL VS REGISTER OF DEDS OF AGUSAN, 22 SCRA 1154

Facts:

Petitioner Gabriel filed two adverse claims in the Register of Deeds of Manila and Rizal, against
the properties registered in the name of oppositor-appellant, Juanita R. Domingo, alleging that
the properties to the late Antonia Reyes Vda. de Domingo, but due to commission of fraud and
deceit by Juanita the properties were registered instead in her name, thus depriving herein
adverse claimant who is likewise an heir of Antonia Reyes Vda. de Domingo of her lawful rights,
interests and participations over said properties.
Domingo presented an opposition, claiming that the Adverse claim was instituted for (1)
Harassment;(2) Had no legal basis; and (3) Had done and will do irreparable loss her.

the Register of Deeds of Rizal denied registration of the Notice of Adverse Claim, by pointing out
that such procedure was not proper contending that petitioner's case does not come under the
provisions of Section 110 of Act 496. if at all, he claims petitioner should have availed Section 98
thereof.

Gabriel appealed to the LRC stating that the question at bar concerns the fraudulent registration
by oppositor, of the properties subject of the Adverse claims, and not their fraudulent acquisition.

LRC granted the appeal of Gabriel stating that the two notices of adverse claim filed both
registries substantially comply with the above legal requirements it, becomes incumbent upon
the Register of Deeds to perform his ministerial duty without unnecessary delay

Oppositor Domingo moved for a reconsideration of above order, contending, in the main, that a
Register Deeds exercises some degree of judicial power to determine upon his own responsibility,
the legality of instruments brought before him for registration

Issue: WON the two notice of adverse claims are registrable

Held:

In addition to the well-taken disquisitions of the L.R.C., it should be observed that section
110 of Act No. 496, which is the legal provision applicable to the case, is divided into two
parts: the first refers to the duty of the party who claims any part or interest in registered
land adverse to the registered owner, subsequent to the date of the original registration;
and the requirements to be complied with in order that such statement shall been titled to
registration as an adverse claim, thus showing the ministerial function of the Register of
Deeds, when no defect is found on the face of such instrument; and the second applies
only when, after registration of the adverse claim, a party files an appropriate petition with
a competent court which shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of
such adverse claim, and to enter a decree, as justice and equity require; and in this
hearing, the competent court shall resolve whether the adverse claim is frivolous or
vexatious, which shall serve as the basis in taxing the costs. In the instant case, the first
part was already acted upon by the L.P.C. which resolved in favor of the registrability of
the two adverse claims and this part should have been considered as closed. What is left,
is the determination of the validity of the adverse claims by competent court, after the
filing of the corresponding petition for hearing, which the appellant had not done.
Anent the second assignment of error, the Land Registration Commission did not state
that it was mandatory for a Register of Deeds to register invalid or frivolous documents,
or those intended to harass; it merely said that whether the document is invalid, frivolous
or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of
competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see whether the documents sought to
be registered conform with the formal and legal requirements for such documents.

ALMIROL VS. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN (G.R. NO. L-22486, MARCH 20,
1968)
Facts:
Teodoro Almirol bought a parcel of land in Esperanza, Agusan from Arsenio Abalo.
He then went to the Register of Deeds (RD) of Agusan to have the Deed of Sale
registered and to secure a transfer certificate in his name. However, the RD refused.
It was based on the ground that the said property was conjugal and it is necessary
that both spouses sign the document. However, since the wife was dead when the sale
was made, the husband cannot dispose the whole property without first liquidating and
transferring it in his name and the heirs by means of extrajudicial settlement. The consent
of the heirs must also be procured.
Aggrieved, Almirol went to the RTC of Agusan to have the ROD be compelled to
register the Deed of Sale and issue the transfer certificate of title.
However, the RTC dismissed the petition saying that the adequate remedy is the
one provided for under Sec. 4 of RA 1151 – that is to submit and certify the question to
the Commissioner of Land Registration. Hence, petition.
Issue:
Whether a petition for mandamus is the remedy to compel the respondent to register
the deed of sale in question.
Held:
No. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire on
his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over real
properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed
Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the registerof deeds to determine; thi
s function belongs properly to a courtof competent jurisdiction.
The CFI correctly dismissed the petition for mandamus.Section 4 provides that "wh
ere any party in interest does notagree with the Register of Deeds . . . the question shall
besubmitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration," whothereafter shall "enter an o
rder prescribing the step to be taken ormemorandum to be made," which shall be "concl
usive andbinding upon all Registers of Deeds."
Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:
Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. — When the
Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum
to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for
registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with
reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of
Land Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the
question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in
interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the
records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and
hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made.
His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds:
Provided, further, That when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of
the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be
appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice
thereof.

TOLEDO-BANAGA VS CA, 302 SCRA 331

Facts:

Petitioner Banaga filed an action for redemption of her property which was earlier
foreclosed and later sold in a public auction to the respondent. The trial court declared
petitioner to have lost her right for redemption and ordered that certificate of title be issued
to the respondent which the petitioner caused an annotation of notice of lis pendens to
the title.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision and allowed the petitioner to redeem her
property within a certain period. Banagatried to redeem the property by depositing to the
trial court the amount of redemption that was financed by her co-petitioner Tan.
Respondent opposed in that she made the redemption beyond the period ordered by the
court. The lower court however upheld the redemption and ordered the Register of Deeds
to cancel the respondent’s title and issue a new title in favor of the petitioner. In a petition
for certiorari before the CA by the respondent, another notice of lis pendens was
annotated to the title. CA issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the execution of
the court order.

Meanwhile, Banaga sold the property to Tan in the absolute deed of sale that mentions
the title of the property still in the name of the respondent which was not yet cancelled.
Despite the lis pendens on the title, Tan subdivided the lot into a subdivision plan which
she made not in her own name but that of the respondent. Tan then asked the Register
of Deeds to issue a new title in her name. New titles were issued in Tan’s name but carried
the annotation of the two notices of lis pendens. Upon learning the new title of Tan the
respondent impleaded her in his petition. The CA later sets aside the trial court’s decision
and declared the respondent as the absolute owner of the property for failure of the
petitioner to redeem the property within the period ordered by the court. The decision was
final and executory and ordered the Register of Deeds to reinstate the title in the name of
the respondent. The Register of Deeds refused alleging that Tan’s certificate must be
surrendered first.

The respondent cited the register of deeds in contempt but the court denied contending
that the remedy should be consultation with the Land Registration Commissioner and in
its other order denied the motion of respondent for writ of possession holding that the
remedy would be to a separate action to declare Tan’s title as void. In its motion for
certiorari and mandamus to the CA, the court set aside the two assailed orders of the trial
court and declared the title of Tan as null and void and ordered the Register of Deeds to
reinstate the title in the name of the respondent. Petitioners now argued that Tan is a
buyer in good faith and raised the issue on ownership of the lot.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Tan is a buyer in good faith?

Held:

The court held that Tan is not a buyer in good faith because when the property was sold
to her she was aware of the interest of the respondent over the property. She even
furnished the amount used by Banaga to redeem the property. When she bought the
property from Banaga she knows that at that time the property was not registered to the
seller’s name. The deed of sale mentioned the title which was named to the
respondent. Moreover the title still carries 2 notices of lis pendens. Tan therefore cannot
feign ignorance on the status of the property when she bought it. Because Tan was also
impleaded as a party to the litigation, she is bound by the decision promulgated to the
subject of such litigation. It is a settled rule that the party dealing with a registered land
need not go beyond the Certificate of Title to determine the true owner thereof so as
to guard or protect her interest. She has only to look and rely on the entries in the
Certificate of Title. By looking at the title Tan would know that the certificate is in the name
of respondent. Being a buyer in bad faith, Tan does not acquire any better right over the
property. The adjudication of the ownership in favor to the respondent includes the
delivery of the possession by the defeated party to the respondent.

LACKING: casica vs villanueva, republic vs ca, meneses vs el commonwealth