G.R. No. 208802 Dissatisfied, petitioner, et al. appealed to the CA.

14

G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC., Petitioner The CA Ruling

vs.
HEIRS OF ROMEO L. BATTUNG, SR., represented by ROMEO BATTUNG, SR., Respondent
In a Decision15 dated May 31, 2013, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC in toto.16 It held that the
killing of Battung cannot be deemed as a fortuitous event, considering that such killing happened
DECISION right inside petitioner’s bus and that petitioner, et al. did not take any safety measures in ensuring
that no deadly weapon would be smuggled inside the bus.17
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Aggrieved, only petitioner moved for reconsideration18 which was, however, denied in a
Resolution19 dated August 23, 2013; hence, the instant petition.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated May 31, 2013 and the
Resolution3 dated August 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 97757, which
affirmed in toto the Decision4 dated August 29, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan, The Issue Before the Court
Isabela, Branch 22 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 22-1103 finding petitioner G.V. Florida Transport, Inc.
(petitioner), Federico M. Duplio, Jr. (Duplio ), and Christopher Daraoay (Daraoay) jointly and
The core issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the ruling of
severally liable to respondents heirs of Romeo L. Battung, Jr. (respondents) for damages arising
the RTC finding petitioner liable for damages to respondent arising from culpa contractual.
from culpa contractual.

The Court’s Ruling

The Facts

The petition is meritorious.

Respondents alleged that in the evening of March 22, 2003, Romeo L. Battung, Jr. (Battung)
boarded petitioner’s bus with body number 037 and plate number BVJ-525 in Delfin Albano,
Isabela, bound for Manila.5 Battung was seated at the first row behind the driver and slept during I.
the ride. When the bus reached the Philippine Carabao Center in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, the bus
driver, Duplio, stopped the bus and alighted to check the tires. At this point, a man who was seated
at the fourth row of the bus stood up, shot Battung at his head, and then left with a companion. The law exacts from common carriers (i.e., those persons, corporations, firms, or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water,
The bus conductor, Daraoay, notified Duplio of the incident and thereafter, brought Romeo to the
hospital, but the latter was pronounced dead on arrival.6 Hence, respondents filed a complaint7 on or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public20) the highest degree of diligence (i.e.,
extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the safety of its passengers. Articles 1733 and 1755 of the
July 15, 2008 for damages in the aggregate amount of ₱1,826,000.008 based on a breach of
Civil Code state:
contract of carriage against petitioner, Duplio, and Baraoay (petitioner, et al.) before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 22-1103. Respondents contended that as a common carrier, petitioner
and its employees are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
passengers; and in case of injuries and/or death on the part of a passenger, they are presumed bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
to be at fault and, thus, responsible therefor. As such, petitioner, et al. should be held civilly liable passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
for Battung’s death.9
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
In their defense, petitioner, et al. maintained that they had exercised the extraordinary diligence foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
required by law from common carriers.1âwphi1 In this relation, they claimed that a common carrier all the circumstances.
is not an absolute insurer of its passengers and that Battung’s death should be properly deemed
a fortuitous event. Thus, they prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, as well as the payment of
In this relation, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n case of death of or injuries to
their counterclaims for damages and attorney’s fees.10
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and
The RTC Ruling 1755." This disputable presumption may also be overcome by a showing that the accident was
caused by a fortuitous event.21 The foregoing provisions notwithstanding, it should be pointed out
that the law does not make the common carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
In a Decision11 dated August 29, 2011, the RTC ruled in respondents’ favor and, accordingly,
In Mariano, Jr. v. Callejas,22 the Court explained that:
ordered petitioner, et al. to pay respondent the amounts of: (a) ₱1,586,000.00 as compensatory
damages for unearned income; (b) ₱50,000.00 as actual damages; and (c) ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages.12 While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport
of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however,
make the
The RTC found that petitioner, et al. were unable to rebut the presumed liability of common carriers
in case of injuries/death to its passengers due to their failure to show that they implemented the
proper security measures to prevent passengers from carrying deadly weapons inside the bus carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
which, in this case, resulted in the killing of Battung. As such, petitioner, et al. were held civilly
liable for the latter’s death based on culpa contractual.13 Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance[,] and
precaution in the carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as human care
and foresight can provide. What constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with
due regard to all the circumstances.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the
common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time being, from
introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the presumption stands in
the place of evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by proof
that the common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as required by law in the
performance of its contractual obligation, or that the injury suffered by the passenger was
solely due to a fortuitous event.
In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code Commission and Congress to curb
the recklessness of drivers and operators of common carriers in the conduct of their business.
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation company
makes it an insurer of the passenger’s safety, but that its liability for personal injuries sustained by
its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of diligence that the law
requires.23 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Therefore, it is imperative for a party claiming against a common carrier under the above-said
provisions to show that the injury or death to the passenger/s arose from the negligence of the
common carrier and/or its employees in providing safe transport to its passengers.
In Pilapil v. CA,24 the Court clarified that where the injury sustained by the passenger was in no
way due (1) to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting, or (2) to the
negligent or willful acts of the common carrier’s employees with respect to the foregoing – such
as when the injury arises wholly from causes created by strangers which the carrier had no control
of or prior knowledge to prevent – there would be no issue regarding the common carrier’s
negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable care, as well as competent employees in relation
to its transport business; as such, the presumption of fault/negligence foisted under Article 1756
of the Civil Code should not apply:
First, as stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only a
disputable presumption. [The presumption] gives in where contrary facts are established
proving either that the carrier had exercised the degree of diligence required by law or the
injury suffered by the passenger was due to a fortuitous event. Where, as in the instant
case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due to any defect in the means
of transport or in the method of transporting or to the negligent or wilful acts of [the
common carrier’s] employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to
provide safe and suitable [care] as well as competent employees, with the injury arising
wholly from causes created by strangers over which the carrier had no control or even
knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not
and ought not to be held liable. To rule otherwise would make the common carrier the insurer
of the absolute safety of its passengers which is not the intention of the lawmakers. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
In this case, Battung’s death was neither caused by any defect in the means of transport or in the
method of transporting, or to the negligent or willful acts of petitioner’s employees, namely, that of
Duplio and Daraoay, in their capacities as driver and conductor, respectively. Instead, the case
involves the death of Battung wholly caused by the surreptitious act of a copassenger who, after
consummating such crime, hurriedly alighted from the vehicle.25 Thus, there is no proper issue on
petitioner’s duty to observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of the passengers
transported by it, and the presumption of fault/negligence against petitioner under Article 1756 in
relation to Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code should not apply.
II.
On the other hand, since Battung’s death was caused by a copassenger, the applicable provision
is Article 1763 of the Civil Code, which states that "a common carrier is responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or
of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission." Notably, for this
obligation, the law provides a lesser degree of diligence, i.e., diligence of a good father of a family,
in assessing the existence of any culpability on the common carrier’s part.
Case law states that the concept of diligence of a good father of a family "connotes reasonable
care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would have observed when
confronted with a similar situation. The test to determine whether negligence attended the
performance of an obligation is: did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence."26
In ruling on this case, the CA cited Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 27 (Fortune) in
ascribing negligence on the part of petitioner, ratiocinating that it failed to implement measures to
detect if its passengers were carrying firearms or deadly weapons which would pose a danger to
the other passengers.28 However, the CA’s reliance was plainly misplaced in view of Fortune’s
factual variance with the case at bar.
In Fortune, the common carrier had already received intelligence reports from law enforcement
agents that certain lawless elements were planning to hijack and burn some of its buses; and yet,
it failed to implement the necessary precautions to ensure the safety of its buses and its
passengers. A few days later, one of the company’s buses was indeed hijacked and burned by
the lawless elements pretending as mere passengers, resulting in the death of one of the bus
passengers. Accordingly, the Court held that the common carrier’s failure to take precautionary
measures to protect the safety of its passengers despite warnings from law enforcement agents
showed that it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the attack
against one of its buses; thus, the common carrier was rightfully held liable for the death of the
aforementioned passenger.
In contrast, no similar danger was shown to exist in this case so as to impel petitioner or its
employees to implement heightened security measures to ensure the safety of its passengers.
There was also no showing that during the course of the trip, Battung’s killer made suspicious
actions which would have forewarned petitioner’s employees of the need to conduct thorough
checks on him or any of the passengers. Relevantly, the Court, in Nocum v. Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company,29 has held that common carriers should be given sufficient leeway in assuming that the
passengers they take in will not bring anything that would prove dangerous to himself, as well as
his copassengers, unless there is something that will indicate that a more stringent inspection
should be made, viz.:
In this particular case before Us, it must be considered that while it is true the passengers of
appellant’s bus should not be made to suffer for something over which they had no control, as
enunciated in the decision of this Court cited by His Honor, fairness demands that in measuring
a common carrier’s duty towards its passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance
that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to
their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything
dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to be
lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be
subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and
nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may
be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger’s baggage when such is not outwardly
perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being
transgressed. Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by the service manual invoked by the
trial judge, in compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had
already declared that the box contained mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have
justified invasion of a constitutionally protected domain. Police officers acting without judicial
authority secured in the manner provided by law are not beyond the pale of constitutional
inhibitions designed to protect individual human rights and liberties. Withal, what must be
importantly considered here is not so much the infringement of the fundamental sacred rights of
the particular passenger herein involved, but the constant threat any contrary ruling would pose
on the right of privacy of all passengers of all common carriers, considering how easily the duty to
inspect can be made an excuse for mischief and abuse. Of course, when there are sufficient
indications that the representations of the passenger regarding the nature of his baggage
may not be true, in the interest of the common safety of all, the assistance of the police
authorities may be solicited, not necessarily to force the passenger to open his baggage,
but to conduct the needed investigation consistent with the rules of propriety and, above
all, the constitutional rights of the passenger. It is in the sense that the mentioned srvices
manual issued by appellant to its conductors must be understood.30 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In this case, records reveal that when the bus stopped at San Jose City to let four (4) men ride
petitioner's bus (two [2] of which turned out to be Battung's murderers), the bus driver, Duplio, saw
them get on the bus and even took note of what they were wearing. Moreover, Duplio made the
bus conductor, Daraoay, approach these men and have them pay the corresponding fare, which
Daraoay did. 31 During the foregoing, both Duplio and Daraoay observed nothing which would
rouse their suspicion that the men were armed or were to carry out an unlawful activity. With no
such indication, there was no need for them to conduct a more stringent search (i.e., bodily search)
on the aforesaid men. By all accounts, therefore, it cannot be concluded that petitioner or any of
its employees failed to employ the diligence of a good father of a family in relation to its
responsibility under Article 1763 of the Civil Code. As such, petitioner cannot altogether be held
civilly liable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 31, 2013 and the
Resolution dated August 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97757 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for damages filed by
respondents heirs of Romeo L. Battung, Jr. is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 211485, May 30, 2016
MAGALLANES WATERCRAFT ASSOCIATION, INC., AS REPRESENTED BY ITS
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, NAMELY: EDILBERTO M. BAJAO, GERARDO O. PLAZA,
ISABELITA MULIG, EDNA ABEJAY, MARCELO DONAN, NENITA O. VARQUEZ,
MERLYN ALVAREZ, EDNA EXCLAMADOR, AND CESAR
MONSON, Petitioner, v. MARGARITO C. AUGUIS AND DIOSCORO C.
BASNIG, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari, filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks
to reverse and set aside the March 14, 2013 Decision1 and the January 17, 2014
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01170-MIN, which
affirmed with modification the January 11, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 33, Butuan City (RTC) in SEC Case No. 11-2004 (Civil Case No.
5420).
Petitioner Magallanes Watercraft Association, Inc. (MWAI) is a local association of
motorized banca owners and operators ferrying cargoes and passengers from
Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, to Butuan City and back. Respondents Margarito C.
Auguis (Auguis) and Dioscoro C. Basnig (Basnig) were members and officers of
MWAI - vice-president and secretary, respectively.3
On December 5, 2003, the Board of Trustees (Board) of MWAI passed Resolution
No. 1, Series of 2003, and thereafter issued Memorandum No. 001 suspending the
rights and privileges of Auguis and Basnig as members of the association for thirty
(30) days for their refusal to pay their membership dues and berthing fees because
of their pending oral complaint and demand for financial audit of the association
funds. Auguis had an accumulated unpaid obligation of P4,059.00 while Basnig had
P7,552.00.4
In spite of the suspension of their privileges as members, Auguis and Basnig still
failed to settle their obligations with MWAI. For said reason, the latter issued
Memorandum No. 002, Series of 2004, dated January 8, 2004, suspending their
rights and privileges for another thirty (30) days.5
On February 6, 2004y respondents filed an action for damages and attorney's fees
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC. In
its January 11, 2007 decision, the trial court ordered Auguis and Basnig to pay their
unpaid accounts. It, nonetheless, required MWAI to pay them actual damages and
attorney's fees.6
Aggrieved, MWAI appealed before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its March 14, 2013 decision, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision.
According to the appellate court, the RTC correctly held that MWAI was guilty of
an ultra vires act. The CA noted that neither MWAI's Articles of Incorporation nor
its By-Laws7 contained any provision that expressly and/or impliedly vested power
or authority upon its Board to recommend the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on
its delinquent officers and/or members. It further noted that MWAI lacked the
authority to suspend the right of the respondents to operate their bancas, which
was granted through a Certificate of Public Convenience. The appellate court
pointed out that the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) expressly reminded
MWAI that it was the sole government agency which had the authority to suspend,
cancel and'or revoke the franchise of the two. The CA explained that the suspension
of their berthing privileges resulted in the failure of the latter to operate
their bancas—contrary to the express reminder of the MARINA. Hence, the CA
concluded that MWAI acted beyond the scope of its powers when it suspended the
rights of Auguis and Basnig as members of MWAI to berth on the seaport of
Magallanes and operate their bancas.
It also ruled that MWAI was bound to indemnify respondents because they suffered
financial losses as a result of the illegal suspension of their berthing privileges and
their right to operate their bancas. The appellate court agreed with the RTC that
MWAI was liable for damages in favor of the respondents. The CA, however, deleted
the award of actual damages for their failure to adduce evidence to prove the
claimed loss of actual income. It, nonetheless, awarded them temperate damages in
recognition of the pecuniary loss they suffered. Moreover, the CA saw it fit to grant
a reduced amount of attorney's fees because Auguis and Basnig were compelled to
litigate or incur expenses to protect their interests. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The
assailed Decision dated 11 January 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
10th Judicial Region, Branch 33 of Libertad, Butuan City in SEC Case No. 11-2004
(Civil Case No. 5420) is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:
 1. DELETING the award for actual damages. In lieu thereof,
temperate damages in the amount of P40,000.00 and P20,000.00
are respectively awarded to appellees Dioscoro C. Basnig and
Margarito C. Auguis;
2. IMPOSING legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the
finality of this decision until its full satisfaction; and
3. REDUCING the attorney's fees to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.8cralawred
MWAI moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the CA in its January
17, 2014 resolution.
Undaunted, it filed this present petition with the sole
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT AWARDED TEMPERATE DAMAGES WITH A LEGAL RATE OF
INTEREST OF 12% PER ANNUM FROM THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION
UNTIL FULLY PAID AS WELL AS REDUCED ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR OF
THE RESPONDENTS.9cralawred
MWAI insists that the award of temperate damages and attorney's fees was
baseless. It faults the CA in finding that it was guilty of an ultra vires act when it
suspended respondents' berthing rights because its by-laws obliged Auguis and
Basnig as members to: (1) obey and comply with the bylaws, rules and regulations
that may be promulgated by the association from time to time; and (2) to pay its
membership dues and other assessments. Thus, MWAI argues that respondents
cannot claim either actual or temperate damages because the suspension of their
rights and privileges was anchored on its by-laws.
Petitioner also contends that respondents are not entitled to attorney's fees either
because the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule. It points
out that it was through respondents' own fault that their rights were suspended.
Hence, they cannot be considered as having been compelled to litigate.
In their Comment,10 dated July 16, 2015, respondents countered that they were
entitled to temperate damages as the suspension of their operations was arbitrary,
baseless and contrary to law and public policy. They claimed that attorney's fees
were rightfully awarded because they were compelled to litigate as a consequence
of MWAI's ultra vires act.
In its Reply to the Comment,11 dated January 5, 2016, MWAI reiterated the
arguments it presented in its petition for review.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Corporate powers include implied and incidental powers
Central to the resolution of the propriety of the award of temperate damages and
attorney's fees is the contested authority of MWAI to suspend rights and privileges
of its members for the latter's failure to pay their obligations. If the suspension of
rights and privileges of members is not among the corporate powers granted to
MWAI, then the same is an ultra vires act which exposes MWAI to possible liability.
Section 45 of the Corporation Code provides for the powers possessed by a
corporation, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 45. Ultra vires acts of corporations. - No corporation under this Code shall
possess or exercise any corporate powers except those conferred by this Code or by
its articles of incorporation and except such as are necessary or incidental to the
exercise of the powers so conferred.cralawred
From a reading of the said provision, it is clear that a corporation has: (1) express
powers, which are bestowed upon by law or its articles of incorporation; and (2)
necessary or incidental powers to the exercise of those expressly conferred. An act
which cannot fall under a corporation's express or necessary or incidental powers is
an ultra vires act. In University of Mindanao, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas12] (University of Mindanao), the Court
explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Corporations are artificial entities granted legal personalities upon their creation by
their incorporators in accordance with law. Unlike natural persons, they have no
inherent powers. Third persons dealing with corporations cannot assume that
corporations have powers. It is up to those persons dealing with corporations to
determine their competence as expressly defined by the law and their articles of
incorporation.
A corporation may exercise its powers only within those definitions.
Corporate acts that are outside those express definitions under the law or
articles of incorporation or those "committed outside the object for which a
corporation is created" are ultra vires.
xxxx
[Emphasis supplied]
The CA concluded that the suspension by MWAI of respondents' rights as members
for their failure to settle membership dues was an ultra vires act as MWAFs articles
of incorporation and by-laws were bereft of any provision that expressly and
impliedly vested power or authority upon its Board to recommend the imposition of
disciplinary actions on its delinquent officers and/or members.
The Court disagrees.
Under Section 3(a) and Section 3(c) Article V of MWAI's By-Laws, its members are
bound "[t]o obey and comply with the by-laws, rules and regulations that may be
promulgated by the association from time to time" and "[t]o pay membership dues
and other assessments of the association."13 Thus, the respondents were obligated
to pay the membership dues of which they were delinquent. MWAI could not be
faulted in suspending the rights and privileges of its delinquent members.
The fact alone that neither the articles of incorporation nor the bylaws of MWAI
granted its Board the authority to discipline members does not make the suspension
of the rights and privileges of the respondents ultra vires. In National Power
Corporation v. Vera,14 the Court stressed that an act might be considered within
corporate powers, even if it was not among the express powers, if the same served
the corporate ends, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
For if that act is one which is lawful in itself and not otherwise prohibited, and is
done for the purpose of serving corporate ends, and reasonably contributes to the
promotion of those ends in a substantial and not in a remote and fanciful sense, it
may be fairly considered within the corporation's charter powers.
This Court is guided by jurisprudence in the application of the above standard. In
the 1963 case of Republic of the Philippines v. Acoje Mining Company, Inc. [G.R.
No. L-18062, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 361] the Court affirmed the rule that a
corporation is not restricted to the exercise of powers expressly conferred
upon it by its charter, but has the power to do what is reasonably
necessary or proper to promote the interest or welfare of the corporation.
[Emphasis supplied]
In University of Mindanao, the Court wrote that corporations were not limited to the
express powers enumerated in their charters, but might also perform powers
necessary or incidental thereto, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A corporation may exercise its powers only within those definitions. Corporate acts
that are outside those express definitions under the law or articles of incorporation
or those "committed outside the object for which a corporation is created" are ultra
vires.
The only exception to this rule is when acts are necessary and incidental to
carry out a corporation's purposes, and to the exercise of powers conferred
by the Corporation Code and under a corporation's articles of
incorporation. xxx
xxxx
Montelibano, et al. v. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. stated the test to determine if
a corporate act is in accordance with its purposes:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is a question, therefore, in each case, of the logical relation of the act to the
corporate purpose expressed in the charter. If that act is one which is lawful in
itself, and not otherwise prohibited, is done for the purpose of serving corporate
ends, and is reasonably tributary to the promotion of those ends, in a substantial,
and not in a remote and fanciful, sense, it may fairly be considered within charter
powers. The test to be applied is whether the act in question is in direct and
immediate furtherance of the corporation's business, fairly incident to the
express powers and reasonably necessary to their exercise. If so, the
corporation has the power to do it; otherwise, not.cralawred
[Emphases Supplied; citations omitted]
Based on the foregoing, MWAI can properly impose sanctions on Auguis and Basnig
for being delinquent members considering that the payment of membership dues
enables MWAI to discharge its duties and functions enumerated under its charter.
Moreover, respondents were obligated by the by-laws of the association to pay said
dues. The suspension of their rights and privileges is not an ultra vires act as it is
reasonably necessary or proper in order to further the interest and welfare of MWAI.
Also, the imposition of the temporary ban on the use of MWAI's berthing facilities
until Auguis and Basnig have paid their outstanding obligations was a reasonable
measure that the former could undertake to ensure the prompt payment of its
membership dues.15 Otherwise, MWAI will be rendered inutile as it will have no
means of ensuring that its members will promptly settle their obligations. It will be
exposed to deleterious consequences as it will be unable to continue with its
operations if the members continue to be delinquent in the payment of their
obligations, without fear of possible sanctions.
Award of Temperate Damages improper
Having settled the propriety of respondents' suspension of privileges, the Court
finds that the grant of temperate damages in their favor is baseless. Temperate
damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty.16 As such, its award is premised on the fact that actual damages could
have been recovered were it not for the fact that the precise amount of damages
could not be accurately ascertained. In other words, if a party-claimant had not
suffered any damages, no damages either actual nor temperate, are recoverable.
Damages resulting from a person's valid exercise of a right, is damnum absque
injuria.17 In Diaz v. Davao Light and Power Co., Inc.,18 the Court further
expounded, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petitioner may have suffered damages as a result of the filing of the complaints.
However, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from
the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in
which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such
cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone; the law affords
no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal
injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. Whatever
damages Diaz may have suffered would have to be borne by him alone since it was
his acts which led to the filing of the complaints against him.cralawred
Considering that the suspension of Auguis and Basnig was in the lawful exercise of
MWAFs rights and powers as a corporation, no remedy for any consequent damage,
which they could have suffered, is available. They shall bear the losses they may
have suffered as a consequence of their lawful suspension. Further, the Court notes
that in suspending the rights and privileges of the said respondents, MWAI merely
denied them access from its berthing facilities and in no way suspended or revoked
their certificates of public convenience.
Anent the award of attorney's fees, the Court likewise finds it without basis. It is a
settled rule that attorney's fees shall not be recovered as cost where the party's
persistence in litigation is based on his mistaken belief in the righteousness of his
cause.19
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The March 14, 2013 Decision and the
January 17, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01170-MIN
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for damages against petitioner
Magallanes Watercraft Association, Inc. is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 156037 May 28, 2007
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
SEBASTIAN M. BAKING, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated
May 30, 2002 and Resolution dated November 5, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 57435, entitled "Sebastian M. Baking, plaintiff-appellee, versus Mercury Drug Co. Inc.,
defendant-appellant."
The facts are:
On November 25, 1993, Sebastian M. Baking, respondent, went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for
a medical check-up. On the following day, after undergoing an ECG, blood, and hematology
examinations and urinalysis, Dr. Sy found that respondent’s blood sugar and triglyceride were
above normal levels. Dr. Sy then gave respondent two medical prescriptions – Diamicron for his
blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his triglyceride.
Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Alabang Branch) to buy the
prescribed medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a
prescription for Dormicum. Thus, what was sold to respondent was Dormicum, a potent sleeping
tablet.
Unaware that what was given to him was the wrong medicine, respondent took one pill of
Dormicum on three consecutive days –November 6, 1993 at 9:00 p.m., November 7 at 6:00
a.m., and November 8 at 7:30 a.m.
On November 8 or on the third day he took the medicine, respondent figured in a vehicular
accident. The car he was driving collided with the car of one Josie Peralta. Respondent fell
asleep while driving. He could not remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact.
Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical and mental state at the
time of the collision, respondent returned to Dr. Sy’s clinic. Upon being shown the medicine, Dr.
Sy was shocked to find that what was sold to respondent was Dormicum, instead of the
prescribed Diamicron.
Thus, on April 14, 1994, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 80 of
Quezon City a complaint for damages against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-
20193.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision dated March 18, 1997 in favor of respondent,
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, the Court hereby renders
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter to pay mitigated
damages as follows:
1. ₱250,000.00 as moral damages;
2. ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses;
3. plus ½% of the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision, affirmed in toto the RTC judgment. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated November 5, 2002.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accord with law or
prevailing jurisprudence.
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the petition lacks merit and, therefore, should be
denied.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the
proximate cause of respondent’s accident; and
2. Whether the award of moral damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and cost
of the suit is justified.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
To sustain a claim based on the above provision, the following requisites must concur: (a)
damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by
the plaintiff.3
There is no dispute that respondent suffered damages.
It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest. The health
and safety of the people will be put into jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise the
highest degree of care and diligence in selling medicines. Inasmuch as the matter of negligence
is a question of fact, we defer to the findings of the trial court affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Obviously, petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent in selling to respondent Dormicum,
instead of the prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life
and death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very cautious in dispensing
medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine she gave respondent was indeed the
one prescribed by his physician. The care required must be commensurate with the danger
involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business
which the law demands.41awphi1.nét
Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s negligence in
driving his car.
We disagree.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have
occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a
combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent. 5
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioner’s employee been careful in
reading Dr. Sy’s prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was
unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision.
Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the same Code which states:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
 xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the
latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the
selection of his employee or in the supervision over him, after such selection. The presumption,
however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee.6 Here, petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee will make it solidarily liable for
damages caused by the latter.
As regards the award of moral damages, we hold the same to be in order. Moral damages may
be awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury in the cases specified or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. 7
Respondent has adequately established the factual basis for the award of moral damages when
he testified that he suffered mental anguish and anxiety as a result of the accident caused by the
negligence of petitioner’s employee.
There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of
moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. However, it must
be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered.8 Taking into consideration the attending
circumstances here, we are convinced that the amount awarded by the trial court is exorbitant.
Thus, we reduce the amount of moral damages from ₱250,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 only.
In addition, we also deem it necessary to award exemplary damages. Article 2229 allows the
grant of exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the public good. As mentioned
earlier, the drugstore business is affected with public interest. Petitioner should have exerted
utmost diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. On the part of the employee
concerned, she should have been extremely cautious in dispensing pharmaceutical products.
Due to the sensitive nature of its business, petitioner must at all times maintain a high level of
meticulousness. Therefore, an award of exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 is in
order.1awphi1.nét
On the matter of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, it is settled that the reasons or
grounds for the award thereof must be set forth in the decision of the court.9 Since the trial
court’s decision did not give the basis of the award, the same must be deleted. In Vibram
Manufacturing Corporation v. Manila Electric Company,10 we held:
Likewise, the award for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses should be deleted. Well-
enshrined is that "an award for attorney’s fees must be stated in the text of the court’s decision
and not in the dispositive portion only" (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (Solidbank) v.
Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 193 [1995] and Keng Hua Paper Products, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 286 SCRA 257 [1998]). This is also true with the litigation expenses where the body of
the decision discussed nothing for its basis.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57435 are AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that (a) the
award of moral damages to respondent is reduced from ₱250,000.00 to ₱50,000.00; (b)
petitioner is likewise ordered to pay said respondent exemplary damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00; and (c) the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses is deleted.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184905 August 28, 2009
LAMBERT S. RAMOS, Petitioner,
vs.
C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution is whether petitioner can be held solidarily liable with his driver, Rodel
Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent C.O.L. Realty the amount of P51,994.80 as actual damages
suffered in a vehicular collision.
The facts, as found by the appellate court, are as follows:
On or about 10:40 o’clock in the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan (Avenue), corner
Rajah Matanda (Street), Quezon City, a vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis
Sedan bearing Plate Number XDN 210, owned by petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and
driven by Aquilino Larin ("Aquilino"), and a Ford Expedition, owned by x x x Lambert Ramos
(Ramos) and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo ("Rodel"), with Plate Number LSR 917. A passenger of
the sedan, one Estela Maliwat ("Estela") sustained injuries. She was immediately rushed to the
hospital for treatment.
(C.O.L. Realty) averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car at a
speed of five to ten kilometers per hour along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed the
center lane of Katipunan Avenue when (Ramos’) Ford Espedition violently rammed against the
car’s right rear door and fender. With the force of the impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees
towards the direction where it came from.
Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable cause to
indict Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property. In the meantime, petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for the
expenses incurred in the repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela in the aggregate
amount of P103,989.60. The demand fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a
Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro
Manila (MeTC), Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 33277, and subsequently raffled to
Branch 42.
As could well be expected, (Ramos) denied liability for damages insisting that it was the Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition, which
negligence of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realty’s) driver, which was the proximate cause of the accident. raises the following sole issue:
(Ramos) maintained that the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street
despite the concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the
THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, AND
intersection.
THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AND JUSTIFY THE SAME IS INSUFFICIENT.

(Ramos) further claimed that he was not in the vehicle when the mishap occurred. He asserted
We resolve to GRANT the petition.
that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
driver, Rodel.
There is no doubt in the appellate court’s mind that Aquilino’s violation of the MMDA prohibition
against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the
Weighing the respective evidence of the parties, the MeTC rendered the Decision dated 1 March
accident. Respondent does not dispute this; in its Comment to the instant petition, it even
2006 exculpating (Ramos) from liability, thus:
conceded that petitioner was guilty of mere contributory negligence. 6

"WHEREFORE, the instant case is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Counterclaims of the
Thus, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that:
defendant are likewise DISMISSED for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis.

The Certification dated 30 November 2004 of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
SO ORDERED."
(MMDA) evidently disproved (C.O.L. Realty’s) barefaced assertion that its driver, Aquilino, was
not to be blamed for the accident –
The aforesaid judgment did not sit well with (C.O.L. Realty) so that he (sic) appealed the same
before the RTC of Quezon City, raffled to Branch 215, which rendered the assailed Decision
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
dated 5 September 2006, affirming the MeTC’s Decision. (C.O.L. Realty’s) Motion for
Reconsideration met the same fate as it was denied by the RTC in its Order dated 5 June 2007. 1
This is to certify that as per records found and available in this office the crossing of vehicles at
Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street to Blue Ridge Subdivision, Quezon City has (sic)
C.O.L. Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the view that Aquilino was
not allowed since January 2004 up to the present in view of the ongoing road construction at the
negligent in crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street since, as per Certification of
area.
the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) dated November 30, 2004, such act is
specifically prohibited. Thus:
This certification is issued upon request of the interested parties for whatever legal purpose it
may serve."
This is to certify that as per records found and available in this office the crossing of vehicles at
Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street to Blue Ridge Subdivision, Quezon City has (sic)
not allowed since January 2004 up to the present in view of the ongoing road construction at the (C.O.L. Realty) admitted that there were barricades along the intersection of Katipunan Avenue
area.2 (Emphasis supplied) and Rajah Matanda Street. The barricades were placed thereon to caution drivers not to pass
through the intersecting roads. This prohibition stands even if, as (C.O.L. Realty) claimed, the
"barriers were broken" at that point creating a small gap through which any vehicle could pass.
Barricades were precisely placed along the intersection of Katipunan Avenue and Rajah
What is clear to Us is that Aquilino recklessly ignored these barricades and drove through it.
Matanda Street in order to prevent motorists from crossing Katipunan Avenue. Nonetheless,
Without doubt, his negligence is established by the fact that he violated a traffic regulation. This
Aquilino crossed Katipunan Avenue through certain portions of the barricade which were broken,
finds support in Article 2185 of the Civil Code –
thus violating the MMDA rule.3

However, the Court of Appeals likewise noted that at the time of the collision, Ramos’ vehicle
was moving at high speed in a busy area that was then the subject of an ongoing construction
(the Katipunan Avenue-Boni Serrano Avenue underpass), then smashed into the rear door and
fender of the passenger’s side of Aquilino’s car, sending it spinning in a 180-degree turn.4 It
therefore found the driver Rodel guilty of contributory negligence for driving the Ford Expedition
at high speed along a busy intersection.
Thus, on May 28, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision,5 the dispositive
portion of which reads, as follows:
"Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation."
Accordingly, there ought to be no question on (C.O.L. Realty’s) negligence which resulted in the
vehicular mishap.7
However, it also declared Ramos liable vicariously for Rodel’s contributory negligence in driving
the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection. On this score, the appellate court
made the following pronouncement:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 5 September 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 215 is hereby MODIFIED in that respondent Lambert Ramos is held solidarily liable
with Rodel Ilustrisimo to pay petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation the amount of P51,994.80 as
actual damages. Petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation’s claim for exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and cost of suit are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
As a professional driver, Rodel should have known that driving his vehicle at a high speed in a
major thoroughfare which was then subject of an on-going construction was a perilous act. He
had no regard to (sic) the safety of other vehicles on the road. Because of the impact of the
collision, (Aquilino’s) sedan made a 180-degree turn as (Ramos’) Ford Expedition careened and
smashed into its rear door and fender. We cannot exculpate Rodel from liability.

SO ORDERED.
Having thus settled the contributory negligence of Rodel, this created a presumption of
negligence on the part of his employer, (Ramos). For the employer to avoid the solidary liability
for a tort committed by his employee, an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting
adequate and convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his employee, he or she
exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a family. Employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent
on them.
(Ramos) feebly attempts to escape vicarious liability by averring that Rodel was highly
recommended when he applied for the position of family driver by the Social Service Committee
of his parish. A certain Ramon Gomez, a member of the church’s livelihood program, testified
that a background investigation would have to be made before an applicant is recommended to
the parishioners for employment. (Ramos) supposedly tested Rodel’s driving skills before
accepting him for the job. Rodel has been his driver since 2001, and except for the mishap in
2004, he has not been involved in any road accident.
Regrettably, (Ramos’) evidence which consisted mainly of testimonial evidence remained
unsubstantiated and are thus, barren of significant weight. There is nothing on the records which
would support (Ramos’) bare allegation of Rodel’s 10-year unblemished driving record. He failed
to present convincing proof that he went to the extent of verifying Rodel’s qualifications, safety
record, and driving history.
So too, (Ramos) did not bother to refute (C.O.L. Realty’s) stance that his driver was texting with
his cellphone while running at a high speed and that the latter did not slow down albeit he knew
that Katipunan Avenue was then undergoing repairs and that the road was barricaded with
barriers. The presumption juris tantum that there was negligence in the selection of driver
remains unrebutted. As the employer of Rodel, (Ramos) is solidarily liable for the quasi-delict
committed by the former.1avvphi1
Certainly, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as
to their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the
employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and
impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. These, (Ramos) failed to do.8
Petitioner disagrees, arguing that since Aquilino’s willful disregard of the MMDA prohibition was
the sole proximate cause of the accident, then respondent alone should suffer the
consequences of the accident and the damages it incurred. He argues:
20. It becomes apparent therefore that the only time a plaintiff, the respondent herein, can
recover damages is if its negligence was only contributory, and such contributory negligence
was the proximate cause of the accident. It has been clearly established in this case, however,
that respondent’s negligence was not merely contributory, but the sole proximate cause of the
accident.
xxxx
22. As culled from the foregoing, respondent was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
Respondent’s vehicle should not have been in that position since crossing the said intersection
was prohibited. Were it not for the obvious negligence of respondent’s driver in crossing the
intersection that was prohibited, the accident would not have happened. The crossing of
respondent’s vehicle in a prohibited intersection unquestionably produced the injury, and without
which the accident would not have occurred. On the other hand, petitioner’s driver had the right
to be where he was at the time of the mishap. As correctly concluded by the RTC, the
petitioner’s driver could not be expected to slacken his speed while travelling along said
intersection since nobody, in his right mind, would do the same. Assuming, however, that
petitioner’s driver was indeed guilty of any contributory negligence, such was not the proximate
cause of the accident considering that again, if respondent’s driver did not cross the prohibited
intersection, no accident would have happened. No imputation of any lack of care on
Ilustrisimo’s could thus be concluded. It is obvious then that petitioner’s driver was not guilty of
any negligence that would make petitioner vicariously liable for damages.
23. As the sole proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s own driver, respondent
cannot claim damages from petitioner.9
On the other hand, respondent in its Comment merely reiterated the appellate court’s findings
and pronouncements, conceding that petitioner is guilty of mere contributory negligence, and
insisted on his vicarious liability as Rodel’s employer under Article 2184 of the Civil Code.
Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz:
Article 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory
negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter’s negligence is imputed to his superior and will
defeat the superior’s action against the third person, assuming of course that the contributory
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made. 10
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan
Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it
was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages
suffered by respondent from the accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.11
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah
Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what
the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides
within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that
the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such
crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the
ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the
Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code,
that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel’s contributory negligence, since it
cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause
of the accident. Rodel’s contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos
seeks to recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a
result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor. In other words, an
assertion of contributory negligence in this case would benefit only the petitioner; it could not
eliminate respondent’s liability for Aquilino’s negligence which is the proximate result of the
accident.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 28,
2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 99614 and its Resolution of October 13, 2008 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215 dated
September 5, 2006 dismissing for lack of merit respondent’s complaint for damages is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156034 October 1, 2003
DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
C & A construction, inc., respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court are the June 14,
2002 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59034, which reversed the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46, in Civil Case No. 95-75565, and its
November 7, 2002 resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts reveal that respondent C & A Construction, Inc. was engaged by the
National Housing Authority (NHA) to construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area in
Vitas, Tondo, Manila.4 The project was completed in 1994 but it was not formally turned over to
NHA.
On October 9, 1994, M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner Delsan
Transport Lines, Inc., anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo
pump and clearing the cargo oil tank. At around 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, Captain
Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express received a report from his radio head operator in
Japan5 that a typhoon was going to hit Manila6 in about eight (8) hours.7 At approximately 8:35 in
the morning of October 21, 1994, Capt. Jusep tried to seek shelter at the North Harbor but could
not enter the area because it was already congested.8 At 10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep decided to
drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles away from a Napocor power barge. At that
time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Capt. Jusep ordered his crew to go full
ahead to counter the wind which was dragging the ship towards the Napocor power barge. To
avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel. 9 He succeeded in avoiding the
power barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship was maneuvered full astern, it hit
the deflector wall constructed by respondent.10 The damage caused by the incident amounted to
P456,198.24.11
Respondent demanded payment of the damage from petitioner but the latter refused to pay.
Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 46, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-75565. In its answer, petitioner claimed
that the damage was caused by a fortuitous event.12
On February 13, 1998, the complaint filed by respondent was dismissed. The trial court ruled
that petitioner was not guilty of negligence because it had taken all the necessary precautions to
avoid the accident. Applying the "emergency rule", it absolved petitioner of liability because the
latter had no opportunity to adequately weigh the best solution to a threatening situation. It
further held that even if the maneuver chosen by petitioner was a wrong move, it cannot be held
liable as the cause of the damage sustained by respondent was typhoon "Katring", which is an
act of God.13
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was reversed and set aside. 14 It
found Capt. Jusep guilty of negligence in deciding to transfer the vessel to the North Harbor only
at 8:35 a.m. of October 21, 1994 and thus held petitioner liable for damages.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition contending that Capt. Jusep was not negligent in
waiting until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994 before transferring the vessel to the North
Harbor inasmuch as it was not shown that had the transfer been made earlier, the vessel could
have sought shelter.15 It further claimed that it cannot be held vicariously liable under Article
2180 of the Civil Code because respondent failed to allege in the complaint that petitioner was
negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees.16 Granting that Capt. Jusep was
indeed guilty of negligence, petitioner is not liable because it exercised due diligence in the
selection of Capt. Jusep who is a duly licensed and competent Master Mariner. 17
The issues to be resolved in this petition are as follows – (1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was
negligent; (2) If yes, whether or not petitioner is solidarily liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code for the quasi-delict committed by Capt. Jusep?
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict. The test for determining the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and
caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he
is guilty of negligence.18
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Capt. Jusep was negligent in
deciding to transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As early as 12:00
midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a report from his radio head operator in Japan19 that a
typhoon was going to hit Manila20 after 8 hours.21 This, notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35
in the morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter at the North Harbor, which
unfortunately was already congested. The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof
that the ship could not have sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the transfer was done
earlier. It is not the speculative success or failure of a decision that determines the existence of
negligence in the present case, but the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under
the circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that the typhoon was to hit Manila in 8
hours, complacently waited for the lapse of more than 8 hours thinking that the typhoon might
change direction.22 He cannot claim that he waited for the sun to rise instead of moving the
vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the report because of the difficulty of traveling at
night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise. Furthermore, he did not transfer as soon as the
sun rose because, according to him, it was not very cloudy23 and there was no weather
disturbance yet.24
When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm, Capt. Jusep
showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have
observed in the same situation.25 Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have had greater
chances of finding a space at the North Harbor considering that the Navotas Port where they
docked was very near North Harbor.26 Even if the latter was already congested, he would still
have time to seek refuge in other ports.
The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
danger in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. 27 Clearly, the
emergency rule is not applicable to the instant case because the danger where Capt. Jusep
found himself was caused by his own negligence.
Anent the second issue, we find petitioner vicariously liable for the negligent act of Capt.
Jusep.1awphi1.nét Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code an employer may be held solidarily
liable for the negligent act of his employee. Thus –
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed in Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxxxxxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxxxxxxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises
a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid
liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. 28
There is no question that petitioner, who is the owner/operator of M/V Delsan Express, is also
the employer of Capt. Jusep who at the time of the incident acted within the scope of his duty.
The defense raised by petitioner was that it exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt.
Jusep because the latter is a licensed and competent Master Mariner. It should be stressed,
however, that the required diligence of a good father of a family pertains not only to the
selection, but also to the supervision of employees. It is not enough that the employees chosen
be competent and qualified, inasmuch as the employer is still required to exercise due diligence
in supervising its employees.
In Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,29 it was held that due diligence in supervision requires the
formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper
instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with the
rules. Corollarily, in Ramos v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court stressed that once negligence on the
part of the employees is shown, the burden of proving that he observed the diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees shifts to the employer.
In the case at bar, however, petitioner presented no evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines
for the proper performance of functions of its employees and that it strictly implemented and
monitored compliance therewith. Failing to discharge the burden, petitioner should therefore be
held liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep.
So also, petitioner cannot disclaim liability on the basis of respondent’s failure to allege in its
complaint that the former did not exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees. In Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos,31 it was held that it is not
necessary to state that petitioner was negligent in the supervision or selection of its employees,
inasmuch as its negligence is presumed by operation of law. Allegations of negligence against
the employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the complaint are enough to make
out a case of quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.32
Considering that petitioner did not assail the damages awarded by the trial court, we find no
reason to alter the same. The interest imposed should, however, be modified. In Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,33 it was held that the rate of interest on obligations not
constituting a loan or forbearance of money is six percent (6%) per annum. If the purchase price
can be established with certainty at the time of the filing of the complaint, the six percent (6%)
interest should be computed from the date the complaint was filed until finality of the decision.
After the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the amount due
shall earn interest at 12% per year, the interim period being deemed equivalent to a forbearance
of credit.34
Accordingly, the amount of P456,198.27 due the respondent shall earn 6% interest per annum
from October 3, 1995 until the finality of this decision. If the adjudged principal and the interest
(or any part thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per
annum computed from the time the judgment becomes final and executory until it is fully
satisfied.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED.1awphi1.nét The June
14, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59034 ordering petitioner Delsan
Transport Lines, Inc., to pay respondent C & A Construction, Inc., damages in the amount of
P456,198.27, plus P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the award of P456,198.27 shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from October 3, 1995,
until finality of this decision, and 12% per annum thereafter on the principal and interest (or any
part thereof) until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190022 February 15, 2012
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS CORPORATION, JAPHET ESTRANAS and BEN
SAGA, Petitioners,
vs.
PURIFICACION VIZCARA, MARIVIC VIZCARA, CRESENCIA A. NATIVIDAD, HECTOR
VIZCARA, JOEL VIZCARA and DOMINADOR ANTONIO, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Nature of the Petition
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 dated July 21, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90021, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated
March 20, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Palayan City, and
Resolution3 dated October 26, 2009, which denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
On May 14, 2004, at about three o’clock in the morning, Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo) was 4) P40,000.00 for wake/interment expenses;
driving a passenger jeepney headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crops, with his companions,
namely, Cresencio Vizcara (Cresencio), Crispin Natividad (Crispin), Samuel Natividad (Samuel),
5) P300,000.00 as reimbursement for the value of the jeepney
Dominador Antonio (Dominador) and Joel Vizcara (Joel). While crossing the railroad track in
with license plate no. DTW-387;
Tiaong, Quezon, a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train, then being operated by respondent
Japhet Estranas (Estranas), suddenly turned up and rammed the passenger jeepney. The
collision resulted to the instantaneous death of Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin, and Samuel. On 6) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
the other hand, Dominador and Joel, sustained serious physical injuries. 4
7) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing installed at the railroad crossing.
Additionally, the "Stop, Look and Listen" signage was poorly maintained. The "Stop" signage
8) P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
was already faded while the "Listen" signage was partly blocked by another signboard.5

On September 15, 2004, the survivors of the mishap, Joel and Dominador, together with the b) MARIVIC VIZCARA:
heirs of the deceased victims, namely, Purificacion Vizcara, Marivic Vizcara, Cresencia
Natividad and Hector Vizcara, filed an action for damages against PNR, Estranas and Ben 1) P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Cresencio Vizcara;
Saga, the alternate driver of the train, before the RTC of Palayan City. The case was raffled to
Branch 40 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 0365-P. In their complaint, the respondents
alleged that the proximate cause of the fatalities and serious physical injuries sustained by the 2) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
victims of the accident was the petitioners’ gross negligence in not providing adequate safety
measures to prevent injury to persons and properties. They pointed out that in the railroad track 3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
of Tiaong, Quezon where the accident happened, there was no level crossing bar, lighting
equipment or bell installed to warn motorists of the existence of the track and of the approaching
train. They concluded their complaint with a prayer for actual, moral and compensatory 4) P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
damages, as well as attorney’s fees.6
c) HECTOR VIZCARA:
For their part, the petitioners claimed that they exercised due diligence in operating the train and
monitoring its roadworthiness. They asseverate that right before the collision, Estranas was 1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Samuel Vizcara;
driving the train at a moderate speed. Four hundred (400) meters away from the railroad
crossing, he started blowing his horn to warn motorists of the approaching train. When the train
was only fifty (50) meters away from the intersection, respondent Estranas noticed that all 2) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
vehicles on both sides of the track were already at a full stop. Thus, he carefully proceeded at a
speed of twenty-five (25) kilometers per hour, still blowing the train’s horn. However, when the 3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
train was already ten (10) meters away from the intersection, the passenger jeepney being
driven by Reynaldo suddenly crossed the tracks. Estranas immediately stepped on the brakes to
avoid hitting the jeepney but due to the sheer weight of the train, it did not instantly come to a 4) P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
complete stop until the jeepney was dragged 20 to 30 meters away from the point of collision. 7
d) CRESENCIA NATIVIDAD:
The Ruling of the Trial Court
1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Crispin Natividad;
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision8 dated March 20, 2007, ruling in favor of
the respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads: 2) P200,000.00 as moral damages;

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants 3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
Philippine National Railways Corporation (PNR), Japhet Estranas and Ben Saga to, jointly and
severally pay the following amounts to:
4) P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
1. a) PURIFICACION VIZCARA:
e) JOEL VIZCARA
1) P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Reynaldo Vizcara;
1) P9,870.00 as reimbursement for his actual expenses;
2) P35,000.00, for funeral expenses;
2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;

3) P5,000.00 for re-embalming expenses;

3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
 4) P10,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
f) DOMINADOR ANTONIO
1) P63,427.00 as reimbursement for his actual expenses;
2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4) P10,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
and
2. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9
The Ruling of the CA
Unyielding, the petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. Subsequently, on July 21,
2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, affirming the RTC decision with modification with
respect to the amount of damages awarded to the respondents. The CA disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, instant appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION, as follows:
(1) The award of P5,000.00 for re-embalming expenses and P40,000.00 for
wake/interment expenses to PURIFICACION VIZCARA is deleted. In lieu thereof,
P25,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded;
(2) The award of moral damages to PURIFICACION VIZCARA, MARIVIC VIZCARA,
HECTOR VIZCARA and CRESENCIA NATIVIDAD is hereby reduced from
P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 each while moral damages awarded to JOEL VIZCARA
and DOMINADOR ANTONIO are likewise reduced from P50,000.00 to P25,000.00;
(3) The award of exemplary damages to PURIFICACION VIZCARA, MARIVIC
VIZCARA, HECTOR VIZCARA and CRESENCIA NATIVIDAD is hereby reduced from
P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 each while exemplary damages awarded to JOEL
VIZCARA and DOMINADOR ANTONIO are likewise reduced from P25,000.00 to
P12,500.00; and
(4) The award for attorney’s fees in favor of the Appellees as well as the award of
P300,000.00 to Appellee PURIFICACION as reimbursement for the value of the
jeepney is DELETED.
10
SO ORDERED.
In the assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC’s finding of negligence on the part of the
petitioners. It concurred with the trial court's conclusion that petitioner PNR's failure to install
sufficient safety devices in the area, such as flagbars or safety railroad bars and signage, was
the proximate cause of the accident. Nonetheless, in order to conform with established
jurisprudence, it modified the monetary awards to the victims and the heirs of those who
perished due to the collision.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 of the decision of the CA. However, in a
Resolution12 dated October 26, 2009, the CA denied the same.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following
grounds:
I
THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT
WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PETITIONERS;
II
THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE
FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE;
III
THE CA ERRED IN FINDING NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONERS
OR ERRED IN NOT FINDING AT THE LEAST, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF THE RESPONDENTS.13
The petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and
recklessness of the driver of the jeepney. They argue that as a professional driver, Reynaldo is
presumed to be familiar with traffic rules and regulations, including the right of way accorded to
trains at railroad crossing and the precautionary measures to observe in traversing the same.
However, in utter disregard of the right of way enjoyed by PNR trains, he failed to bring his
jeepney to a full stop before crossing the railroad track and thoughtlessly followed the ten-
wheeler truck ahead of them. His failure to maintain a safe distance between the jeepney he was
driving and the truck ahead of the same prevented him from seeing the PNR signage displayed
along the crossing.14
In their Comment,15 the respondents reiterate the findings of the RTC and the CA that the
petitioners' negligence in maintaining adequate and necessary public safety devices in the area
of the accident was the proximate cause of the mishap. They asseverate that if there was only a
level crossing bar, warning light or sound, or flagman in the intersection, the accident would not
have happened. Thus, there is no other party to blame but the petitioners for their failure to
ensure that adequate warning devices are installed along the railroad crossing. 16
This Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a person's
act or omission constituting fault or negligence. It states:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there was no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the injury when they were not even aware of the forthcoming danger. It was established during the
provisions of this chapter. trial that the jeepney carrying the respondents was following a ten-wheeler truck which was only
about three to five meters ahead. When the truck proceeded to traverse the railroad track,
Reynaldo, the driver of the jeepney, simply followed through. He did so under the impression
In Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court,17 negligence was defined as the omission to do
that it was safe to proceed. It bears noting that the prevailing circumstances immediately before
something which a reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the
the collision did not manifest even the slightest indication of an imminent harm. To begin with,
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
the truck they were trailing was able to safely cross the track. Likewise, there was no crossing
man would not do. It is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person,
bar to prevent them from proceeding or, at least, a stoplight or signage to forewarn them of the
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
approaching peril. Thus, relying on his faculties of sight and hearing, Reynaldo had no reason to
such other person suffers injury.18 To determine the existence of negligence, the time-honored
anticipate the impending danger.27 He proceeded to cross the track and, all of a sudden, his
test was: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
jeepney was rammed by the train being operated by the petitioners. Even then, the
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then
circumstances before the collision negate the imputation of contributory negligence on the part
he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by
of the respondents. What clearly appears is that the accident would not have happened had the
the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of
petitioners installed reliable and adequate safety devices along the crossing to ensure the safety
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor
of all those who may utilize the same.
in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent
in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. 19
At this age of modern transportation, it behooves the PNR to exert serious efforts to catch up
with the trend, including the contemporary standards in railroad safety. As an institution
In the instant petition, this Court is called upon to determine whose negligence occasioned the
established to alleviate public transportation, it is the duty of the PNR to promote the safety and
ill-fated incident. The records however reveal that this issue had been rigorously discussed by
security of the general riding public and provide for their convenience, which to a considerable
both the RTC and the CA. To emphasize, the RTC ruled that it was the petitioners’ failure to
degree may be accomplished by the installation of precautionary warning devices. Every railroad
install adequate safety devices at the railroad crossing which proximately caused the collision.
crossing must be installed with barriers on each side of the track to block the full width of the
This finding was affirmed by the CA in its July 21, 2009 Decision. It is a well-established rule that
road until after the train runs past the crossing. To even draw closer attention, the railroad
factual findings by the CA are conclusive on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court.
crossing may be equipped with a device which rings a bell or turns on a signal light to signify the
They are entitled to great weight and respect, even finality, especially when, as in this case, the
danger or risk of crossing. It is similarly beneficial to mount advance warning signs at the railroad
CA affirmed the factual findings arrived at by the trial court.20
crossing, such as a reflectorized crossbuck sign to inform motorists of the existence of the track,
and a stop, look and listen signage to prompt the public to take caution. These warning signs
Furthermore, in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put into issue. must be erected in a place where they will have ample lighting and unobstructed visibility both
Questions of fact cannot be entertained.21 To distinguish one from the other, a question of day and night. If only these safety devices were installed at the Tiaong railroad crossing and the
law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. accident nevertheless occurred, we could have reached a different disposition in the extent of
A question of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the the petitioner’s liability.
alleged facts.22 Certainly, the finding of negligence by the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA, is
a question of fact which this Court cannot pass upon as this would entail going into the factual
The exacting nature of the responsibility of railroad companies to secure public safety by the
matters on which the negligence was based.23 Moreover, it was not shown that the present case
installation of warning devices was emphasized in Philippine National Railways v. Court of
falls under any of the recognized exceptions24 to the oft repeated principle according great
Appeals,28 thus:
weight and respect to the factual findings of the trial court and the CA.

[I]t may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a
At any rate, the records bear out that the factual circumstances of the case were meticulously
reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which
scrutinized by both the RTC and the CA before arriving at the same finding of negligence on the
duties pertain both to the operation of trains and to the maintenance of the crossings. Moreover,
part of the petitioners, and we found no compelling reason to disturb the same. Both courts ruled
every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points
that the petitioners fell short of the diligence expected of it, taking into consideration the nature of
where such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings, and erect at
its business, to forestall any untoward incident. In particular, the petitioners failed to install safety
such points, at sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of
railroad bars to prevent motorists from crossing the tracks in order to give way to an approaching
every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of
train. Aside from the absence of a crossing bar, the "Stop, Look and Listen" signage installed in
the railway, and warn persons of the necessity of looking out for trains. The failure of the PNR to
the area was poorly maintained, hence, inadequate to alert the public of the impending danger.
put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphore is evidence of negligence
A reliable signaling device in good condition, not just a dilapidated "Stop, Look and Listen"
and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it,
signage, is needed to give notice to the public. It is the responsibility of the railroad company to
because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed. 29
use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working order. Failure to do so would be an
indication of negligence.25 Having established the fact of negligence on the part of the
petitioners, they were rightfully held liable for damages. The responsibility of the PNR to secure public safety does not end with the installation of safety
equipment and signages but, with equal measure of accountability, with the upkeep and repair of
the same. Thus, in Cusi v. Philippine National Railways,30 we held:
There was no contributory negligence on the part of the respondents.

Jurisprudence recognizes that if warning devices are installed in railroad crossings, the travelling
As to whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the respondents, this court rule in
public has the right to rely on such warning devices to put them on their guard and take the
the negative. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as
necessary precautions before crossing the tracks. A need, therefore, exists for the railroad
a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to
company to use reasonable care to keep such devices in good condition and in working order, or
conform for his own protection. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the
to give notice that they are not operating, since if such a signal is misunderstood it is a menace.
part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate
Thus, it has been held that if a railroad company maintains a signalling device at a crossing to
cause of the injury.26 Here, we cannot see how the respondents could have contributed to their
give warning of the approach of a train, the failure of the device to operate is generally held to be
evidence of negligence, which maybe considered with all the circumstances of the case in
determining whether the railroad company was negligent as a matter of fact. 31

The maintenance of safety equipment and warning signals at railroad crossings is equally
important as their installation since poorly maintained safety warning devices court as much
danger as when none was installed at all. The presence of safety warning signals at railroad
crossing carries with it the presumption that they are in good working condition and that the
public may depend on them for assistance. If they happen to be neglected and inoperative, the
public may be misled into relying on the impression of safety they normally convey and
eventually bring injury to themselves in doing so.

The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable.

Finally, the CA correctly ruled that the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable in the
instant case. The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but
the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is
chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the
antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the
supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm
by the exercise of due diligence.32 To reiterate, the proximate cause of the collision was the
petitioners’ negligence in ensuring that motorists and pedestrians alike may safely cross the
railroad track. The unsuspecting driver and passengers of the jeepney did not have any
participation in the occurrence of the unfortunate incident which befell them. Likewise, they did
not exhibit any overt act manifesting disregard for their own safety. Thus, absent preceding
negligence on the part of the respondents, the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 21, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90021 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.