A PROJECT WORK ON THE TOPIC :

INDO-SRI LANKAN RELATIONSHIP

(FROM 1950 TO 1990)

Submitted to : Submitted by :
Dr. S.P.Singh Rajeev Ranjan
(Faculty of Political Science) Roll No.- 1360
1st Year, B.A,L.LB(HONS.)

CHANKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

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 DECLARATION
The researcher hereby declares that this research paper is prepared by the
researcher with the help of only those sources which are mentioned in the
bibliography part of this paper ,foot notes on the last of each page. This research
paper is not a copy of any one’s research paper as per the knowledge of the
researcher.

This research paper is firstly presented to Mr. S.P. Singh Sir, the
faculty of Political Science in The Chanakya National Law University, Patna.
Before this, this paper has never been submitted to any other teacher/professor or
any other school/college/university.

Rajeev Ranjan

20/04/2016

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank my faculty Dr.S.P.Singh Sir whose guidance

helped me a lot with structuring my project.

I owe the present accomplishment of my project to my friends, who

helped me immensely with materials throughout the project and without
whom I couldn’t have completed it in the present way.

I would also like to extend my gratitude to my parents and all those

unseen hands who helped me out at every stage of my project.

THANK YOU,
RAJEEV RANJAN
Roll No. 1360

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S.No PARTICULARS PAGE

1. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 3

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 5-6

3. CHAPTER 1 7-11

4. CHAPTER 2 12-20

5. CHAPTER 3 21-24

6. CHAPTER 4 25-29

6. CHAPTER 5 30

8. BIBLIOGRAPHY 31

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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Aims and Objectives:

The aim of this research paper is to present a detailed study on relationship

between India and Sri Lanka with particular emphasis on time period between
1950-1990.

Scope and Limitations:

The researcher has used the doctrinal method and has relied on the secondary
sources for the content of the research paper.

Owing to the large number of topics that could be included in the project, the scope
of this research paper is exceedingly vast. However in the interest of brevity, this
paper has been limited to the topics which deal with deciding factors only.

Research Questions:

The three research questions are as follows:

1.How is the relation between both the nations ?

2 Important factors deciding the relationship.
3.How to make this better ?
Chapterisation:

The project has been divided into five chapters :

 The first chapter deals with the relationship between the two countries.
 The second chapter deals with crucial factors deciding the relationship.
 The third one deals with the assassination case of India’s Ex-PM Rajiv
Gandhi

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  The fourth chapter deals with present foreign policy of both the nations.
 The fifth &the last one deals with the conclusion &suggestion part.

Sources of Data:

The researcher has relied on the following secondary sources of data:

 Books
 Websites
 Articles

Method of Writing

The method of writing followed in this project is both analytical and descriptive.

Mode of Citation

The researcher has followed a uniform mode of citation in this project.

Hypothesis Test

The hypothesis of researcher is following- Both the countries are of utmost

significance for each other but the present scenario is not very encouraging. The
situation doesn’t seems to be very good as it is expected to be. Although, they are
not engaged in any war but regular conflicts are there over the issues of Tamilians
or the fishermen. The assassination of India’s Ex-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was
a major blow in the efforts to maintain good relationship between the two nations.
Sri Lanka has been facing internal armed rebellion since long time and that is also
a major cause that it is never in a position to focus on its neighbours especially
India.

Test -The researcher found himself partially true and partially wrong also. As in
the case of assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, Researcher earlier believed that this was
an attempt to destabilize India but later on he came to know that this was an act to
take revenge against the Operation Pawan held by Indian Army in Sri Lanka.

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 CHAPTER-1
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between India and Sri Lanka is more than 2,500 years old. Both countries have
a legacy of intellectual, cultural, religious and linguistic interaction. In recent years, the
relationship has been marked by close contacts at all levels. Trade and investment have grown
and there is cooperation in the fields of development, education, culture and defence. Both
countries share a broad understanding on major issues of international interest. In recent years,
significant progress in implementation of developmental assistance projects for Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) and disadvantaged sections of the population in Sri Lanka has helped
further cement the bonds of friendship between the two countries.

The nearly three-decade long armed conflict between Sri Lankan forces and the LTTE came to
an end in May 2009. During the course of the conflict, India supported the right of the
Government of Sri Lanka to act against terrorist forces. At the same time, it conveyed its deep
concern at the plight of the mostly Tamil civilian population, emphasizing that their rights and
welfare should not get enmeshed in hostilities against the LTTE. The need for national
reconciliation through a political settlement of the ethnic issue has been reiterated by India at the
highest levels. India's consistent position is in favour of a negotiated political settlement, which
is acceptable to all communities within the framework of a united Sri Lanka and which is
consistent with democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights.

Political Relations
President Maithripala Sirisena was elected as the new President of Sri Lanka in the presidential
election held on January 8, 2015. He succeeded former President Mahinda Rajapaksa. On the
same day, Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe was also sworn in as the new Prime Minister of Sri Lanka
on January 9, 2015. Political relations between the two countries have been marked by high-level
exchanges of visits at regular intervals. President Sirisena visited India on a four-day starting 15
February 2015. Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera visited New Delhi in
January 2015 on his first overseas official visit. Earlier, President Mahinda Rajapaksa travelled
to New Delhi in May 2014 to attend the swearing-in ceremony of Prime Minister Modi and
visited Tirupati in December 2014. Then Prime Minister Mr. D. M. Jayaratne attended the 19th
Convocation ceremony of Manipal University in November 2014. The Sri Lankan Defence
Secretary travelled to India in October 2014 and also visited India earlier, in March 2014, to
attend NSA–Level Trilateral Meeting on Maritime Security Cooperation.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Sri Lanka on 13-14 March, 2015. He also travelled to
Anuradhapura, Talaimannar, and Jaffna. External Affairs Minister Ms. Sushma Swaraj was in
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Colombo on 6-7 March to prepare for Prime Minister’s visit. Former President Dr. Abdul Kalam
visited Sri Lanka from 25-27 June 2015 to participate in the “International Energy Symposium
titled Energy Challenges in the Knowledge Economy”. National Security Advisor of India, Mr.
Ajit Doval, visited Sri Lanka in November- December 2014 to participate in the annual
International Maritime Conference ‘Galle Dialogue’. His visit was preceded by that of Defence
Secretary Mr. R. K. Mathur who visited Sri Lanka in October 2014 to participate in the second
Annual Defence Dialogue (ADD). Commerce Secretary Shri Rajeev Kher visited Sri Lanka on
March 4, 2015 for the third round of Commerce Secretary level interactions. Then External
Affairs Minister of India Shri Salman Khurshid, visited Sri Lanka in October and in November
2013. External Affairs Minister Ms. Sushma Swaraj led a 12-member Parliamentary delegation
to Sri Lanka from in April 2012 as Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha.

Rajiv Gandhi, the Ex PM with Sri Lankan Ex President J.R.Jayawardene

Commercial Relations
Sri Lanka has long been a priority destination for direct investment from India. Sri Lanka is
India’s second largest trading partner in SAARC. India in turn is Sri Lanka’s largest trade partner
globally. Trade between the two countries grew particularly rapidly after the entry into force of
the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement in March 2000. According to Sri Lankan Customs,
bilateral trade in 2014 amounted to US $ 4.6 billion, achieving a growth of 23.37% compared to
2013. Exports from India to Sri Lanka in 2014 were US$ 3977 million, while exports from Sri
Lanka to India were US $ 625 million. India is among the top four investors in Sri Lanka with
cumulative investments of over US$ 1 billion since 2003. The investments are in diverse areas
including petroleum retail, IT, financial services, real estate, telecommunication, hospitality &
tourism, banking and food processing (tea & fruit juices), metal industries, tires, cement, glass
manufacturing, and infrastructure development (railway, power, water supply). A number of new
investments from Indian companies are in the pipeline or under implementation. Notable among
them are proposals of Shree Renuka Sugar to set up a sugar refining plant at Hambantota (US $
220 million), South City, Kolkota for real estate development in Colombo (US $ 400 million),
Tata Housing Slave Island Development project along with Urban Development Authority of Sri
Lanka (US $ 430 million), ‘Colombo One’ project of ITC Ltd. (ITC has committed an
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investment of US$ 300 million, augmenting the earlier committed US 140 million). Dabur has
already set up a fruit juice manufacturing plant (US$ 17 million) in May 2013. On the other
hand, the last few years have also witnessed an increasing trend of Sri Lankan investments into
India. Significant examples include Brandix (about US$ 1 billion to set up a garment city in
Vishakapatnam), MAS holdings, John Keels, Hayleys, and Aitken Spence (Hotels), apart from
other investments in the freight servicing and logistics sector.

Development Partnership: The conclusion of the armed conflict saw the emergence
of a major humanitarian challenge, with nearly 300,000 Tamil civilians housed in camps for
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). In June 2009, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh
announced a grant of INR 5 billion (SLR 12 billion) for relief and rehabilitation in Sri Lanka.
The Government of India put in place a robust programme of assistance to help these IDPs return
to normal life as quickly as possible as also consistently advocated the need for them to be
resettled to their original habitations as early possible. India's immediate humanitarian assistance
to IDPs included supply of 250,000 family relief packs, establishment of an emergency medical
unit which treated over 50,000 IDPs and carried out over 3000 surgeries from March to
September 2009, supply of over one million roofing sheets between August 2009 and May 2011
as well as 400,000 bags of cement for constructing temporary housing and provision of 95,000
starter packs of agricultural implements. Since the requirement of demining was a major
constraint on the speed of resettlement, the Government of India fully financed seven Indian
demining teams, engaged in various sectors in northern Sri Lanka to help expedite resettlement.

As agriculture is the primary means of livelihood in the areas affected by the conflict, to
jumpstart the revival of the local economy, Government of India supplied seeds as well as
provided 500 tractors alongwith other agricultural implements to farmer organizations in
northern Sri Lanka. To cater to the transportation needs of persons being resettled and to aid
revival of their livelihoods, India has also provided 10,000 bicycles to IDPs and returnees in
Northern Province. With the shift from relief and rehabilitation to reconstruction and
development, the Government of India turned its attention to the housing requirements of the
IDPs. During the visit of President Mahinda Rajapaksa to India from 8-11 June 2010, an
announcement was made by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh that India would support a
programme to reconstruct 50,000 houses in Sri Lanka. In order to ensure early operationalisation
of this commitment, a Pilot Project involving construction of 1,000 houses was launched,
covering all the five districts of Northern Province, through a groundbreaking ceremony during
the visit of then Minister of External Affairs of India Shri S.M. Krishna to Sri Lanka in
November 2010 at Ariyalai near Jaffna. The Pilot Project has been completed in July 2012 and
houses handed over to beneficiaries. An MOU with the Government of Sri Lanka on the
modalities of implementation of the remaining 49,000 houses under the Project was signed on 17
January 2012 during the next visit of Minister of External Affairs. This paved the way for launch
of the second phase of the Project for construction and repair of 43,000 Housing Units in
Northern and Eastern Provinces on 2 October 2012 on the occasion of Gandhi Jayanti. By

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January 2013, than 6,000 housing units under this phase were already under construction. The
Housing Project is under full grant assistance of the GOI with a total outlay of INR 1,372 crore
(approx. US $ 270 million or SLR 30.6 billion) making it one of the largest grant assistance
projects implemented by the Government outside India. Among donorfunded humanitarian
assistance projects in Sri Lanka, this Project is unmatched and unprecedented in its scale, reach
and impact. Sri Lanka is one of the major recipients of development credit given by the
Government of India. Under a line of credit of $167.4 million, the tsunami damaged Colombo
Matara rail link has been repaired and upgraded. It was handed over during the visit of the
Parliamentary delegation in April 2012. Another line of credit of $800 million for track laying
and supply of rolling stock to support construction of Medawachchiya to Madhu, Madhu to
Talaimannar, Omanthai to Pallai, Pallai to Kankesanthurai railway lines and setting up of
signaling and telecommunications systems in Northern Sri Lanka is already operational. The
completion of work undertaken under this line of credit is expected by December 2013. India is
also involved in projects for renovation of Palaly Airport, Kankesanthurai Harbour, construction
of Cultural Centre in Jaffna, interconnection of electricity grids between the two countries,
construction of a 150bed hospital in Dickoya and setting up a coal power plant in Sampur as a
joint venture between National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) and Ceylon Electricity
Board (CEB). Work on the wreck removal of the project for rehabilitation of the Kankesanthurai
Harbour as a fully GOI grantfunded project (cost: INR 85.5 crores/SLR 2.05 billion) was
completed in January 2012. India also continues to assist a large number of smaller development
projects in areas like education, health, transport connectivity, small and medium enterprise
development and training in many parts of the country through its grant funding. Projects for
providing fishing equipment to cooperatives in the East, supply of equipment to Jaffna Teaching
Hospital and to Kilinochchi and Mulaittivu General Hospitals, renovation of Duraippah Stadium,
reactivation of Achuvely Industrial Zone, assistance in repair of schools in Northern Province
and supply of fishing equipment to old IDPs in Mannar district have already been completed or
are in various stages of implementation under this scheme.

Cultural Relations:
Cultural cooperation is a very important aspect of the bilateral relationship and the Cultural
Cooperation Agreement signed by the Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka on
29 November, 1977 at New Delhi forms the basis on which the periodic Cultural Exchange
Programmes between the two countries are signed and implemented. The Programme of Cultural
Cooperation (PCC) for 2010-2013 seeks to enhance the level of cooperation in a wide variety of
fields such as performing arts, visual arts, libraries, museums, archives & cultural
documentation, archaeology, handicrafts, sports and youth affairs, publications and professional
exchanges and mass media. The Indian Cultural Centre in Colombo actively promotes awareness
of Indian culture by offering classes in Indian music, dance, Hindi and Yoga. Every year,
cultural troupes from both countries exchange visits. India is also committed to the restoration of
important icons of cultural heritage of Sri Lanka and is setting up an Indian Gallery at the

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International Buddhist Museum in Kandy and working on the restoration of the
Thiruketheeswaram Temple in Mannar. India and Sri Lanka also commemorated the 2600th year
of the attainment of enlightenment by Lord Buddha (Sambuddhatva Jayanthi) through joint
activities. An International Buddhist Conference on the theme "Cultural Interface between India
and Sri Lanka based on Buddhist History, Art, Literature and Philosophy" organized by the
Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) was inaugurated by President Rajapaksa at Kandy
from 19-20March 2011.

A 16 feet high idol of Lord Buddha in the Sarnath style from the Gupta Period has been installed
at the entrance of the International Buddhist Museum complex in Sri Dalada Maligawa in
Kandy. Marking the grand finale to commemorate the 2600th anniversary, the exposition of
Sacred Kapilavastu Relics in Sri Lanka took place from 19 August 2012 to 11 September 2012.
It is for the second time since their discovery that the Sacred Kapilavastu Relics have travelled to
Sri Lanka from India's National Museum.The first Exposition was in 1978. During the 25 days of
exposition at ten venues, approximately three million Sri Lankans (nearly 15 percent of the total
population of Sri Lanka) paid homage to the Sacred Relics. Education is another important area
of cooperation between India and Sri Lanka. Both countries agreed to launch an India Sri Lanka
Knowledge Initiative during the visit of President Rajapaksa to India in June 2010. After an
announcement in January 2012 of nearly threefold increase in scholarship support, India now
offers about 290 scholarship slots annually to deserving Sri Lankan students. The expanded
scholarship programme benefits not only regular undergraduate studies but also provides
opportunities for higher research. In addition, under the Indian Technical and Economic
Cooperation Scheme and the Colombo Plan, India offers nearly 200 slots annually to Sri Lankan
nationals for short and medium term training courses in a wide variety of technical and
professional disciplines. Tourism also forms an important link between India and Sri Lanka and
India is the largest source market for Sri Lankan tourism. In 2012, out of the total 1005,605
tourists, 176,340 were from India constituting 17.54%. Sri Lankan tourists too are among the top
ten sources for the Indian tourism market. In 2012, nearly 200,000 visas were issued by the High
Commission in Colombo to facilitate travel between Indian and Sri Lanka. The India Sri Lanka
Foundation, set up in December 1998 as an intergovernmental initiative, also aims towards
enhancement of scientific, technical, educational and cultural cooperation through civil society
exchanges and enhancing between the younger generations of the two countries.

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 CHAPTER-2
FACTORS DECIDING THE RELATIONSHIP

Fishermen issue
Given the proximity of the territorial waters of both countries, especially in the Palk Straits and
the Gulf of Mannar, incidents of straying of fishermen are common. Both countries have agreed
on certain practical arrangements to deal with the issue of bona fide fishermen of either side
crossing the International Maritime Boundary Line. Through these arrangements, it has been
possible to deal with the issue of detention of fishermen in a humane manner. It often can be
found in the news that either Sri Lanka detained some of the Indian fishermen roaming in their
region or India detained some Sri Lankan fishermen found within the territory of India. So, it is
an issue which generally disturbs the diplomatic process and it needs to be handled very
carefully.

Katchatheevu issue
Katchatheevu, also Kachchatheevu or Kachchativu is a uninhabited island administered by Sri
Lanka and is a disputed territory claimed by India.1 The island originated from a volcanic
eruption that occurred in the 14th century, the island was originally owned by the Ramanad
Kingdom of Ramanathapuram district (Tami Nadu) before Indian independence. In 1974 India
recognized Sri Lankan ownership of the island on a conditional agreement. It has a Catholic
shrine and has been declared a sacred area by the Government of India.
The island was historically part of the
Ramnad Raja’s zamindari, and later it became part of the Madras Presidency. The island was
always of strategic importance and special significance for fishing operations in the area. In or
around 1921 Sri Lanka started claiming territorial rights over the island. Ownership of the island
was controversial up until 1974 as during British Rule the island was administered by both
countries. India recognized Sri Lankan ownership. The legality of the transfer was challenged in
the Indian Supreme Court since the recognizing was not ratified by the Indian parliament. This
recognition of an island that is culturally important to fishermen of Tamil Nadu state in India has
led to some agitations by Tamil Nadu politicians that it should be claimed to Indian sovereignty.
The island is also important for fishing grounds used by fishers from both countries. The Indo Sri
Lankan agreement allows Indian fishermen to fish around Katchatheevu and to dry their nets on
the island.

1
"Retrieve Katchatheevu islet from Sri Lanka: Jayalalithaa tells PM Modi". http://www.firstpost.com/. Firstpost.
Retrieved 20 April,2016.
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As part of the Sri Lankan civil war, this arrangement led to many difficulties with the Sri Lankan
Navy that is deployed to prevent smuggling of weapons by the rebel group LTTE. The island has
a Catholic shrine that attracts devotees from both countries.2 In 2009 the Tamil Nadu
Government declared that the area is controlled by Sri Lanka against the original pact of
allowing Indian fishermen to access the water of Sri Lanka. This tension and the atrocious
killings of Tamil fishermen by Sri Lankan forces created a diaspora in and across India, and the
governments of both countries held conversations. and finally the Sri Lankan government
allowed a full access term to Indian fishermen till the Jaffna Line and released the fishermen
jailed for a while. The main problem continues to grow as more fisherman move into the Sri
Lankan sea area for illegal poaching. In 2010 the Sri Lankan government issued a notice to the
Tamil Nadu government saying the Indian court cannot nullify the 1974 agreement.3 In June
2011 the new Tamil Nadu government led by Jayalalithaa filed a petition in the Supreme Court
seeking the declaration of the 1974 and 1976 agreements between India and Sri Lanka on ceding
of Katchatheevu to Sri Lanka as unconstitutional.4 The court ruled in the Berubari case that the
cession of Indian territory to another country had to be ratified by parliament through
amendment of the Constitution. Katchatheevu was ceded to Sri Lanka in violation of the court
under the 1974 and 1976 agreements without the approval of two Houses of Parliament.
However, the Indian government has stated that “No territory belonging to India was ceded nor
sovereignty relinquished since the area was in dispute and had never been demarcated” and that
the dispute on the status of the island was settled in 1974 by an agreement, and both countries
took into account historical evidence and legal aspects.5

St.Anthony's Catholic Shrine

St. Antony's shrine is one of a kind which shares the borders of both countries India and Sri
Lanka, and declared holy place by both Governments. There stands the only religious structure,
St. Antony's Catholic Shrine which holds 100+ year old traditions, and was built by an Indian
Catholic (Tamilian) called Srinivasa Padaiyachi. No one is required to possess an Indian passport
or Sri Lankan visa for visiting Kachchatheevu. The church festival runs for three days. The
priests from both India and Sri Lanka conduct the mass and car procession. As many as 35
country boats and 106 mechanized boats ferry the pilgrims, mostly from Rameswaram; there is
not a drop of drinking water on the island, and the only structure is a beautiful church named
after St. Antony, patronsaint of seafarers, to whom the feast is dedicated. It was put up by a
prosperous fisherman in the early 20th century.

2
"The Hindu : 'Cannot return Kachchativu' ".
3
Gamini Gunaratna, Sri Lanka News Paper by LankaPage.com (LLC)Latest Hot News from Sri Lanka (2011-04-
17). "Sri Lanka : Sri Lankan minister says Indian court cannot nullify accord on Kachchativu Island".
Colombopage.com. Retrieved 2016-04-20.
4
Special Correspondent (2011-06-10). "Today's Paper News : Resolution passed on Katchatheevu". The Hindu.
Retrieved 2016-04-20
5
Special Correspondent (2014-02-08). "Kachatheevu was not ceded to Sri Lanka & can’t be retrieved – Government
Of India". The Hindu. Retrieved 2016-04-20.
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Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War
The Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War was the deployment of the Indian Peace
Keeping Force in Sri Lanka intended to perform a peacekeeping role. The deployment followed
the Indo Sri Lankan Accord between India and Sri Lanka of 1987 which was intended to end the
Sri Lankan Civil War between militant Sri Lankan Tamil nationalists, principally the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the Sri Lankan military. The original intention was the
Indian Peace Keeping Force would not be involved in large scale military operations. However,
after a few months, the Indian Peace Keeping Force engaged the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam in a series of battles. During the two years in which it was deployed, the IPKF fought
numerous battles against the LTTE. The IPKF began withdrawing in 1989, and completed the
withdrawal in 1990.
The LTTE and other Tamil militant
groups developed strong relationships with political parties in South India, such as Dravidar
Kazhagam (led by K. Veeramani), Pure Tamil Movement (led by Perunchithiranar) and Kamaraj
Congress (led by Nedumaran) during the late 1970s.6 These Tamil parties firmly backed the
militants' cause of creating a separate Tamil Eelam within Sri Lanka. Thereafter, LTTE
developed relations with M. G. Ramachandran and M. Karunanidhi, who served as Chief
Minister of Tamil Nadu, succeeding one another. Although Sri Lanka was a key member of Non
Aligned Movement in its initial stages, the Government of Sri Lanka's policies became pro
western as J. R. Jayewardene was elected prime minister with his landslide victory in 1977
parliamentary election. Subsequently he introduced a new constitution and Open economy to Sri
Lanka. Sri Lanka is the first SouthAsian country to adopt Liberal open economy.7 Moreover,
President J. R. Jayawardene did not enjoy the same warm relationship with Indian Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi that he had enjoyed with her father, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.
Thus, with the outbreak of Black July ethnic riots, the Indian government decided to support the
insurgent groups operating in Northern Sri Lanka. From mid 1983, on the instructions of Indira
Gandhi, RAW began funding, arming and training several Tamil insurgent groups. 8

6
"LTTE: the Indian connection". Sunday Times. 1997. Retrieved 2016-04-20.
7
"Sri Lanka – an Overview". Fulbright commission. Retrieved 2016-04-20.
8
David Brewster. "India’s Ocean: the Story of India’s Bid for Regional Leadership. Retrieved 2016-04-20.
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Operation Poomalai
India became more actively involved in the late 1980s, and on June 5, 1987, the Indian Air Force
airdropped food parcels to Jaffna while it was under siege by Sri Lankan forces. At a time when
the Sri Lankan government stated they were close to defeating the LTTE, India dropped 25 tons
of food and medicine by parachute into areas held by the LTTE in a direct move of support
toward the rebels.9 Negotiations were held, and the Indo Sri Lanka Peace Accord was signed on
July 29, 1987, by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene.
Under this accord, the Sri Lankan Government made a number of concessions to Tamil demands,
including a devolution of power to the provinces, a merger subject to later referendum of the
Northern and the Eastern provinces into the single province, and official status for the Tamil
language (this was enacted as the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka). India
agreed to establish order in the North and East through a force dubbed the Indian Peace Keeping
Force (IPKF), and to cease assisting Tamil insurgents. Militant groups including the LTTE,
although initially reluctant, agreed to surrender their arms to the IPKF, which initially oversaw a
ceasefire and a modest disarmament of the militant groups. The signing of the Indo Lanka
Accord, so soon after JR Jayawardene's declaration that he would fight the Indians to the last
bullet, led to unrest in south. The arrival of the IPKF to take over control of most areas in the
North of the country enabled the Sri Lanka government to shift its forces to the south (in Indian
aircraft) to quell the protests. This led to an uprising by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in the
south, which was put down bloodily over the next two years.

Operation Pawan
Operation Pawan was the codename assigned to the operation by the Indian Peace Keeping
Force (IPKF) to take control of Jaffna from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), better

9
Weisman, Steven R. (5 June 1987). "India airlifts aid to tamil rebels". STEVEN R. WEISMAN (New York Times).
Retrieved 2016-04-20.
15 | P a g e
known as the Tamil Tigers, in late 1987 to enforce the disarmament of the LTTE as a part of the
Indo Sri Lanka Accord. In brutal fighting lasting about three weeks, the IPKF took control of the
Jaffna Peninsula from the LTTE, something that the Sri Lankan army had tried but prevented
mainly due to Indian political interventions. Supported by Indian Army tanks, helicopter
gunships and heavy artillery, the IPKF routed the LTTE, at the cost of 214 soldiers.10

Background
The Tamil Tigers had fought to establish a Tamil homeland, separate from Sri Lanka, in the
northern and eastern portion of Ceylon (Tamil Eelam). This effort led to a series of armed
conflicts with the Sri Lankan military. In the late 1980s India, feeling considerable pressure from
its Tamil minority, began to intervene, on both a diplomatic and military basis. Negotiations led
to the Indo Sri Lanka Accord, signed in Colombo on 29 July 1987, under which the Sri Lankan
government agreed to give the nation's provinces more power and autonomy and withdraw its
troops to their barracks. The Tamil rebels were to surrender their arms as well. Most Tamil
groups, including the Tigers, had not participated in the talks. Only reluctantly did they agree to
surrender their arms to the Indian Peace Keeping Force as provided by the Accord. Even so,
many rebels did not surrender their weapons, and the situation quickly flared into an active
confrontation. The Tigers declared their intent to continue armed struggle for an independent
Tamil Eelam and refused to disarm. The IPKF soon found itself engaged in a bloody police
action against the Tigers, which culminated in the rebels being cornered on the Jaffna Peninsula,
at the northern end of the island. The IPKF set out to complete its mission of disarming the
LTTE by taking Jaffna by force.

The operation
By 7 October, the Chief of Army Staff (CoAS), had issued directives to the IPKF, laying down
its operational parameters.[3] It was to:
 Seize/destroy LTTE radio and TV transmission equipment in the Jaffna Peninsula
 Seize or jam the LTTE communications network
 Carry out raids on LTTE camps, caches and strongpoints
 Detain and interrogate personnel manning LTTE offices in the East to gain information.
In case of resistance, force to be used.
 Actions to further consolidate the hold of the IPKF in the region

10
Chattopadhyaya 2003, p. 112
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The first IPKF operation was launched on 9 October 1987. Codenamed Operation Pawan ,
it was expected to neutralise the LTTE operational capability in and around Jaffna. This included
the capture or neutralisation of the LTTE's chain of command11 which was expected to leave the
rebel movement directionless in the face of the impending assault on the LTTE strongholds by
the IPKF. On the nights of 9 and 10 October, the IPKF raided and captured the LTTE radio
station at Tavadi and TV station at Kokkuvil, while the printing presses of two LTTE sponsored
newspapers were destroyed.12 These operations also led to the capture of nearly two hundred
Tiger rebels.13 In retaliation, the LTTE ambushed a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)
convoy near Tellipallai, killing four Jawans, as well as an IPKF post at Tellipallai with automatic
weapons and mortar fire on an IPKF post. Later that day, the Tigers hijacked a 10 Para
Commando jeep on patrol, killing all five occupants.14 On 10 October, the Indian 91st Brigade,
consisting of three battalions and led by Brigadier J. Ralli, also began its push into Jaffna.15

The Jaffna University Helidrop

The first battle signalling the real beginning of Operation Pawan was the heliborne assault on the
Jaffna University headquarters of the LTTE by a detachment of Indian Para Commandos and
Sikh Light Infantry on the night of 12 October. This was planned as a quick commando raid to
capture the top LTTE leadership and local commanders who, according to Indian Intelligence,
were supposed to be in the building at the time;16 and was thus expected to cut short the Battle
for Jaffna. The plan was to land a company of 17 men from 10 Para Commandos to secure the
football field. A second wave was to follow with a company of the 13th Sikh LI. The heliborne
troops were to link up with 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) of 72 Brigade and the Sikh LI
troops advancing on the ground.17 The operation ended in disaster as the LTTE, having
intercepted IPKF radio transmissions, set up an ambush. The helidropped troops came under
intense fire from LTTE positions, forcing the Mi8 helicopters to abandon the insertion midway
through the operation. During the ensuing battle, which lasted throughout the night, twenty nine
of the entire Sikh LI contingent of thirty troops, and two of the seventeen commandos, were
killed before detachments of the 65th Armoured Regiment were able to extract the Paras
from their defensive positions. After the Sikh LI's radioman was shot by LTTE snipers early on,
the unit lost contact with the Indian High Command at Palay Air Base. The sole survivor of the
Sikh LI detachment, Sepoy Gora Singh, was taken prisoner by the Tigers under the command of
Pawan Kashyap. It was not until his subsequent release during the conflict that the fate of the
unit was known.

11
"Operation Pawan. The Battle for Jaffna" (http://www.bharatrakshak. com/LANDFORCES/
Army/History/1987/Chapter03.html)
12
"Jain Commission Interim Report. Indo Sri Lankan Agreement: Evolution and its Aftermath. Chapter II Indian
Peace Keeping Force. Sourced from Tamil Nation". Tamilnation.org. Retrieved 2016-04-20
13
"Nobody sounded even a Last Post for our dead in Colombo" (http://in.rediff.com/news/2000/apr/01lanka.htm)
Gen Harikat Singh to Josy Joseph. rediff.com
14
"Accord, Airlift, and Discord" (http://www.bharatrakshak. com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/Chapter2.html)
Bharatrakshak. com
15
https://web.archive.org/20070117004935/http://www.bharatrakshak. com:80/LANDFORCES/
Army/History/1987/Chapter03.html.
16
"The Tamil Militants Before the Accord and After" Hellmann Rajanayagam D. Pacific Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 4.
(Winter, 19881989), pp. 603619
17
"Tamil Armed Resistance & the Law". Tamil Nation.
17 | P a g e
Battle for Jaffna
As the battle for Jaffna progressed, the IPKF advance came under intense and vicious opposition
from the Tigers. Fighting in builtup and an asyet unevacuated Jaffna, the Indian High command
insists that the slow advance was, in addition to Tiger resistance, more a result of reluctance on
the part of the IPKF to use heavy weaponry to clear LTTE defences.18 Furthermore, all the
approach roads had been laced with Claymore mines or explosives by the Tigers in its years of
fighting with the Sri Lankan army.19The Tigers also made extensive use of IEDs (improvised
explosive devices)which could be remotely detonated from over a kilometre away. During this
time, Eastern Command of the Indian Navy, supported by the Coast Guard was key in
establishing a 300 miles (480 km) long blockade around northern Sri Lanka from October 1987
to disrupt the Tigers' supply and communication routes.[10] It was at about this time that the
MARCOS forces (Marine commandos) of the Indian Navy first went into action. Detachments of
the IMSF (Indian Marine Special Forces, as the MARCOS was then known), along with a
battalion of the 340th Independent Brigade of the Indian Army, provided beach reconnaissance
around Jaffna and Batticaloa.20 The 340th Brigade was one of the first IPKF units to be
deployed, and served until operations in the Trincomalee area were complete. The IMSF, at this
time, also provided security patrols along the coast road west of Jaffna until the 41st Brigade
took charge in November.

18
"Descent Into Danger. The Jaffna University Helidrop" (http://www.bharatrakshak.
com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/Chapter3.html) Bharatrakshak. com
19
https://web.archive.org/20051001130821/http://indiannavy.nic.in:80/pawan.html
20
India. Marine Commando Force (http://www.specialoperations.com/Foreign/India/MCF.htm) Special
Operations.Com
18 | P a g e
On October 15/16, the IPKF advance stopped its advance to stabilize the front. Palay, the major
operations headquarters for the 54th Infantry Division, was also secured from Tiger attacks.
Atthis time the Indian Air Force undertook a massive airlift to reinforce the 91st with three
brigadesand heavy equipment, including T72 tanks and BMP1 fighting vehicles. Air traffic
controllers worked round the clock to flyin troops and equipment. Indian Airlines is said to have
contributed to the airlift, using its Boeing 737s to deliver troops. This short interval also saw the
introduction of Mi8 medium helicopters and the first use of the Mi25 gunships of No. 125 Sqn,
along with HAL Cheetah light helicopters. By end of October the IAF had flown 2200 tactical
transport and 800 helicopter sorties. Now reinforced, the IPKF resumed the battle for Jaffna. The
tanks and armoured fighting vehicles are said to have been effective protection against
antipersonnel mines. However, even with this defence, the IPKF advance was torturous in the
face of the Tigers' sniper fire. They would take up positions on rooftops, in trees and even in
coconut palms. Equipped with powerful telescopic infrared sights, they were able to selectively
take out officers and radiomen, taking a heavy toll and bringing the advance to a grinding halt.
Helicopters flying below 2000 feet were also vulnerable, with at least five being shot at and
damaged before the Mi25s took up their offensive role. The IPKF adapted quickly, with its
officers taking off the pips of their ranks, wearing slouch hats and carrying oversize back packs.
However, as the advance got bogged down, the battalions, instead of maneuvering around the
defenders, were forced to commit more troops under orders from New Delhi. In addition, the
LTTE increasingly began to deploy antitank mines, taking a further heavy toll on IPKF forces. A
frustrated IPKF cut off the power to Jaffna in an attempt to counter this. IPKF communication
lines were extensively mined by the LTTE, which further compounded the sometimes perilous
situations that the Indian troops faced. It was not before the IMSF commandos broke out of the
besieged Jaffna port and cleared the heavily mined Navanturai Coastal Road, that a crucial
linkup between 1 Maratha Light Infantry in Jaffna fort and the advancing troops of 41st Brigade
could be between 1 Maratha Light Infantry in Jaffna fort and the advancing troops of 41st
Brigade could be established that secured the Nallur area.[6] On 21 October, the commandos
conducted a successful amphibious raid against a LTTE base at Guru Nagar. It was also toward
the end of the Jaffna campaign that the IPKF started the use of Mi25s for close air support21
when they flew against LTTE positions in Chavakacheri village on 23 October 1987.

21
"Crocodiles into the Attack" (http://www.bharatrakshak. com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/Chapter5.html). No. 125
19 | P a g e
Culmination
Ultimately however, after two weeks of bitter fighting, the IPKF had wrested control of Jaffna
and other major cities from the LTTE, but operations were to continue well into November, with
major operations coming to an end with the fall of Jaffna Fort on 28 November. Throughout the
duration of Operation Pawan, the casualties suffered by the IPKF had been put at varying
numbers between 600 22 and 1,200. In addition to the LTTE's defensive operations alluded to
above, the IPKF's problems were compounded by the fact that the Tigers, using classic guerrilla
tactics, blended in with the local population. The IPKF also came face to face with child soldiers
of the LTTE, something it had not expected. This was only the beginning of the IPKF's three
year campaign to neutralise the LTTE. By the time Jaffna fell, the LTTE had merely exfiltrated
out of the town, moving south to the jungles of Vavuniya. Its hard core fighters moved to the
safety of the jungle by skirting the Jaffna coast from Point Pedro to Elephant Pass, sheltered by
the crisscross of waterways in the impenetrable Nittkaikulam jungle. In the Jaffna sector,
although the LTTE had shifted out of the town itself, it nevertheless harassed the 54th Division's
efforts to consolidate its positions using IEDs and antipersonnel mines. In turn, the IPKF was
able to disrupt the LTTE's activities with regular raids that led to the capture of large caches of
rebel weaponry.23 Brigadier Manjit Singh was later replaced by Brigadier JS Dhillon, under
whom the 54th underwent considerable modifications of its operations routine. Small highly
mobile units became the staple of the 54th's operations.24
The IPKF at this point still consisted mostly of an overstretched 54th Division. Following the
Jaffna operation, the 36th Infantry Division, along with two additional brigades, took over the
Vavuniya sector and the Trincomalee Batticaloa axis. This relieved the 54th Division which, led
by Brigadier Manjit Singh, could now focus on consolidating the Jaffna sector. The 4th
Mountain Division and the 57th Infantry Division were deployed still later in February 1988 to
take charge of Vanni and Batticaloa from the 36th.

Criticism
India's foreign intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing trained the LTTE to keep a
check on SriLanka, which had helped Pakistan in the Indo Pak War by allowing Pakistani ships
to refuel at Sri Lankan ports. When Prime Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi sent the Indian Peace
Keeping Force (IPKF) in1987 to restore normalcy in the region, the disastrous mission of the
IPKF was blamed on the lack of coordination between the IPKF and RAW. Its most disastrous
manifestation was the Heliborne assault on LTTE HQ in the Jaffna University campus in the
opening stages of Operation Pawan. The site was chosen without any consultation with the RAW
and the dropping paratroopers became easy targets for the LTTE where a number of Indian
soldiers were killed. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi is also blamed as a fallout of operation
Pawan in Sri Lanka.25

Helicopter Squadron. Bharatrakshak. com

22
"Shifting to the Jungles" (http://www.bharatrakshak. com/LANDFORCES/ Army/History/1987/Chapter04.html)
Bharatrakshak. com
23
Sachi Sri Kantha. The RAW Factor (http://www.sangam.org/articles/view/?id=287)
24
John Pike. "Research and Analysis Wing RAW". Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 2016-04-20
25
nesohr.org (http://nesohr.org/humanrightsreports/ StatisticsOnCiviliansAffectedByWar.pdf?
PHPSESSID=8204ff9bfa58e205f71a95c3899f8835) R&AW created a terrorist organisation to stop Sri Lanka
from developing quickly economically and forging ties with other nations in the West or China. RAW funded and
20 | P a g e
 CHAPTER-3

ASSASSINATION OF RAJIV GANDHI

Before going into the details of assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, it is very important to mention
here that prior to this an attempt was made in Sri Lanka also, with the motive to kill him,
however he got saved somehow but in the next attempt, we lost him.

The 1st attempt was made when he was on his tour to

Sri Lanka .It was at the time when the Guard of Honour was commanded by Lieutenant Mendis
who invited the Indian Prime Minister to review the guard as per tradition. Rajiv Gandhi was
escorted by Lieutenant Mendis along with Sri Lankan finance Minister Ronnie de Mel, and Sri
Lankan security personnel. Vijitha Rohana,a Sri Lankan Navy officer swung his ceremonial
Lee–Enfield rifle at the Indian Prime Minister aiming at the back of his neck. Gandhi managed to
duck and miss the full brunt of the blow, even though the rifle struck him. Rohana was quickly
restrained by Lieutenant Mendis and the Chief Petty Officer of the detachment along with other
security personnel. He was arrested by the CID.

Image: When Rajiv Gandhi was assaulted in Sri Lanka

Vijitha Rohana faced a court martial headed by K.R.L. Perera, Group Captain Buddhi
Siriwardhen and Colonel Vijaya Wimalaratne. He was charged with attempted murder and acting
contrary to navy discipline and insulting a state leader. Prosecuted by Senior State Counsel

armed the terrorists to wreak havoc in the country. Breaking with the Past By Shirin R. TahirKheli, p54.
21 | P a g e
Captain Raja Fernando, his defense team was made up of Sarath Wijesinghe, Susil
Premajayantha, Stanley Thilakaratne, Brigadier (Rtd.) Donald Hewagama, D.S. Wijesinghe,
Tivanka Wickramasinghe, Jayantha Weerasinghe, M.L.M. Ameen, Mahinda Jayawardena, WW.
Somaratne, Kitsiri Jayasuriya, Geetha Jayasekera, Dimal Philips, Priyantha Fernando, Sandya de
Silva, Rohana Jayasekera and Nalin Laduwahetty. The defence implied that Rohana was not
aiming to kill since he could have stabbed the premier with the bayonet affixed to his Lee–
Enfield rifle at the time. The court martial found him guilty of attempted culpable homicide not
amounting to murder and insulting the Indian Prime Minister. He was sentenced to six years in
prison, however President Premadasa gave him a presidential pardon after two and a half years.

The Assassination
The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the ex Prime Minister of India, occurred as a result of a
suicide bombing in Sriperumbudur, near Chennai, in Tamil Nadu, India on 21 May 1991. At
least 14 others were also killed. It was carried out by Thenmozhi Rajaratnam, also known as
Dhanu. The attack was blamed on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a militant
organization from Sri Lanka; at the time India had just ended its involvement, through the Indian
Peace Keeping Force, in the Sri Lankan Civil War. Subsequent accusations of conspiracy have
been addressed by two commissions of inquiry and have brought down at least one national
government .

Rajiv Gandhi was campaigning for the upcoming elections. On 21 May, after successfully
campaigning in Visakhapatnam, his next stop was Sriperumbudur Tamil Nadu. About two hours
after arriving in Madras (now Chennai), Rajiv Gandhi was driven by motorcade in a white
Ambassador car to Sriperumbudur, stopping along the way at a few other election campaigning
venues. When he reached a campaign rally in Sriperumbudur, he got out of his car and began to
walk towards the dais where he would deliver a speech. Along the way, he was garlanded by
many wellwishers, Congress party workers and school children. At 22:21 the assassin, Dhanu,
approached and greeted him. She then bent down to touch his feet and detonated an RDX
explosive laden belt tucked below her dress. Gandhi, his assassin and 14 others were killed in the
explosion that followed. The assassination was caught on film by a local photographer, whose
camera and film was found at the site though the photographer also died in the blast.

Nalini, one of the accused of the assassination

22 | P a g e
Security lapses
The Supreme Court held that LTTE's decision of eliminating Rajiv was prompted by his
interview to Sunday magazine (August 21–28, 1990), where he said he would send the IPKF to
disarm LTTE if he came back to power again. Rajiv also defended the signing of the Indo Sri
Lanka accord in the same interview. The LTTE decision to kill him was perhaps aimed at
preventing him from coming to power again. Thereafter, the Justice J S Verma Commission was
formed to look into the security lapses that led to the killing. The final report, submitted in June
1992, concluded that the security arrangements for the former PM were adequate but that the
local Congress party leaders disrupted and broke these arrangements.26 The Narasimha Rao
government initially rejected Verma’s findings but later accepted it under pressure. However, no
action was taken on the recommendations of the Commission. Despite no action, the findings
throw up vital questions that have been consistently raised by political analysts. Sources
have indicated that Rajiv was time and again informed that there was a threat to his life and that
he should not travel to Tamil Nadu. In fact, the then governor of Tamil Nadu Bhism Narayan
Singh, broke his official protocol and twice warned Rajiv about the threat to his life if he visited
the state. Dr Subramanian Swamy said in his book, Sri Lanka in Crisis: India's Options (2007),
that an LTTE delegation had met Rajiv Gandhi on March 5, 1991. Another delegation met him
around March 14, 1991 at New Delhi.

Journalist Ram Bahadur Rai wrote that:

The message conveyed to Rajiv Gandhi by both these delegations was that there was no threat
to his life and that he can travel to Tamil Nadu without fearing for his life. I did a series of
articles after his assassination that pointed out how, after these meetings, Rajiv became
complacent about his security and broke security rules in more than 40 rallies.

Remains of the cloth wore by Rajiv Gandhi at the time of assassination

26
Patel, Tejas. "Rajiv assassination mystery unsolved". Article. Asian Tribune. Retrieved 20 April, 2016.
23 | P a g e
Investigation
Immediately after the assassination, the Chandrasekhar government handed the investigation
over to CBI on May 24, 1991. The agency created a Special Investigation Team (SIT) under D R
Karthikeyan to determine who was responsible for the assassination. The SIT probe confirmed
the role of LTTE in the assassination, which was upheld by the Supreme Court of India. The
interim report of Justice Milap Chand Jain, looking into the conspiracy angle to the assassination,
indicted the DMK for colluding with the LTTE. The report concluded that DMK provided
sanctuary to the LTTE, which made it easy for the rebels to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi. Jain
commission also reported doubt about Subramanian Swami's dealings. It says CBI has to
investigate him for foreign connections angle in the assassination. It cast doubt why he was
suddenly cancelling his presettled programme of going to Delhi from Madras and without any
information to his colleagues and stayed in Madras on May 21, 1991. The Commission report
stated that the year 1989 signified "the perpetuation of the general political trend of indulging the
Tamil militants on Indian soil and tolerance of their wideranging criminal and antinational
activities." The report also alleged that LTTE leaders in Jaffna were in possession of sensitive
coded messages exchanged between the Union government and the state government of DMK.
"There is evidence to show that, during this period, some of the most vital wireless messages
were passed between the LTTE operatives based in Tamil Nadu and Jaffna. These messages,
which were decoded later, are directly related to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi," the report
stated. The Congress subsequently brought down the United Front (UF) government of I K
Gujral after the report was leaked in November 1998. The party also demanded the removal of
DMK from the UF government, arguing that it had played a key role in the death of Rajiv
Gandhi. After examining the SIT investigation report, Justice Verma Commission report and the
Jain Commission report, one can conclude that the assassination was not a hit and run affair but a
meticulously planned operation that involved actors beyond the LTTE.

Prabhakaran, head of LTTE at that time

Supreme Court judgment

As per the Supreme Court of India judgment, by Judge Thomas, the killing was carried out due
to personal animosity of the LTTE chief Prabhakaran towards Rajiv Gandhi. Additionally, the
Rajiv Gandhi administration had antagonised other Tamil militant organisations like PLOTE for

24 | P a g e
reversing the military coup in Maldives back in 1988. The judgement further cites the death of
Thileepan in a hunger strike and the suicide by 12 LTTE cadres in a vessel in October 1987. The
judgment while convicting the accused, four of them to death and others to various jail terms,
states that absolutely no evidence existed that any one of the conspirators ever desired the death
of any Indian other than Rajiv Gandhi, though several people were killed. Judge Wadhwa further
states there is nothing on record to show that the intention to kill Rajiv Gandhi was to overawe
the Government. Hence it was held that it was not a terrorist act under TADA (Act).[12][13]
Judge Thomas further states that conspiracy was hatched in stages commencing from 1987 and
that it spanned several years. The Special Investigation team of India's premier special
investigation agency CBI was not able to pinpoint when the decision to kill Rajiv Gandhi was
taken.

CHAPTER-4

Foreign policy; then and now

In a large country like India, relations with neighbouring countries will have their immediate
fallout on contiguous Indian states. Thus, India Pakistan relations will affect Jammu and
Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Gujarat; the India Nepal equation will have its fallout on
Bihar, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Sikkim, and West Bengal; India China relations will
impinge upon Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Jammu and
Kashmir; India Bangladesh relations will have its fallout on West Bengal, Mizoram, Meghalaya,
Tripura, and Assam; India Bhutan relations will affect West Bengal, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh,
and Assam; India Myanmar relations will have its fallout on Arunachal
Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram; India Sri Lanka relations will have its
consequences on Tamil Nadu; and India Maldives relations will spill over to the Minicoy
islands. We have not yet evolved a political mechanism by which the interests of the contiguous
Indian states are safeguarded while formulating and implementing the neighbourhood policy.
In the days of one party dominance, New Delhi very often followed a neighbourhood policy,
which it considered to be in India’s national interest, but which adversely affected the
neighbouring Indian states.

Two illustrations given below substantiate this point. In October 1964, New Delhi signed the
Sirimavo Shastri Pact, which converted the people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka into
merchandise to be divided between the two countries; thousands of them were conferred Indian
citizenship and repatriated to India. This inhuman agreement was severely criticised by
Rajagopalachari, Krishna Menon, Kamaraj Nadar, Ramamurthy, and Annadurai. In the same
way, New Delhi concluded the maritime boundary agreements with Sri Lanka In 1974 and 1976,
which ceded the island of Kachchatheevu to Sri Lanka and bartered away the traditional fishing

25 | P a g e
rights enjoyed by Indian fishermen. These agreements were opposed by the DMK government,
but New Delhi went ahead.

The Rise of Regional Parties

With the end of one party dominance and the formation of coalition governments, regional
parties began to play a national role. They began to make their inputs into India’s neighbourhood
policy. Three examples prove this point. When Deve Gowda was Prime Minister and IK Gujral
the Minister for External Affairs, India Bangladesh
relations forged ahead. Gujral was sensitive to the feelings in West Bengal and associated the
West Bengal Government with the formulation of the India’s Bangladesh policy, especially in
the sharing of Ganges waters. Second, the inclusion of the Sethusamudram project in the
manifesto of the UPA government was due to the persistent efforts made by the DMK
Government headed by Karunanidhi. Third, India’s Sri Lanka policy during the final stages of
the Fourth Eelam War had the backing of its DMK ally. New Delhi permitted Karunanidhi to
indulge in political gimmicks so that he could pose himself as the champion of the Overseas
Tamils, but it should be stated that the DMK did not put any serious obstacles in the way of New
Delhi pursuing its Sri Lanka policy.

Current Developments in Tamil Nadu

The tumultuous developments taking place in Tamil Nadu should be analysed within the
above mentioned context. Cutting across party lines, there is sympathy for the Sri Lankan
Tamil cause. People are angry and bitter that innocent Tamil civilians were massacred during
the last stages of the Fourth Eelam War. They also feel strongly that the Sri Lankan Government
has gone back on the assurances about devolution of powers to the provinces. The spontaneous
upsurge amongst the student community is a shining example of this righteous indignation.
What vitiates the political scenario is the competitive nature of Tamil Nadu politics and the
gimmicks performed by the two Dravidian parties in their desire for one-upmanship. In this
competitive outbidding, Karunanidhi is on a weak wicket. He wants to atone for his past
misdeeds; he has resurrected the Tamil Eelam Solidarity Organisation (TESO) and has called
for Hartal in support of the Tamil cause. Jayalalitha is trying to extract maximum leverage
from Karunanidhi’s predicament. From being a sharp critic of the Tigers, today she is
championing the cause of Tamil Eelam and is advocating a referendum among Sri Lankan
Tamils in the island and the Tamil diaspora. She has injected politics into sports and has
given the stamp of approval against the participation of Sri Lankan players in the Indian Premier
League. She has suggested that the venue of CHOGM be shifted from Colombo to another
country. She wants Mahinda Rajapaksa to be branded a war criminal and be tried in the
International Court of Justice. She wants New Delhi to declare Sri Lanka an “unfriendly state”
and has demanded the imposition of an economic embargo. All these statements have
provided exciting fare to her fanatical followers within the state, as well as in the Sri Lankan
Tamil diaspora. But the tragedy is, all the above impractical suggestions will in no way bring
about ethnic reconciliation in Sri Lanka. On the contrary, it will lead to the accentuation of ethnic

26 | P a g e
tensions. Worse, India’s relations with Sri Lanka, already subjected to severe strains, will further
take a nose dive.
The above given details are taken from the article of Prof. V. Suryanarayan
Former Director, Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Madras and this
article was published in 2013 so some changes in the present conditions are very much possible.

Sri Lanka has always been described as the Pearl of the Indian Ocean. It is never easy for a
small island nation to remain a completely sovereign while being located just a few dozen miles
off the coast of a behemoth-like country with 1 billion people. Thus, the power relations are
distorted in all aspects. No wonder Sri Lankan scholars and journalists refer to India as “big
brother.” The cultural and religious affinities are present in a vibrant history of economic and
social interactions. But concurrently Sri Lanka has also tried to remain independent from the
politics and conflicts of India, ensuring that a unique identity was developed for the islanders. Sri
Lankan Nationalism has been at the forefront of trying to protect that identity. The long running
relationship between the two countries has had quite a few hiccups. The latest has been over the
furthering of the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement. It has been under negotiations since
2003 as the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), now renamed the
Economic and Technological Cooperation Agreement (ETCA). From the very beginning the
CEPA has been controversial in Sri Lanka. There has massive civil society protests against any
government’s attempt to finalize the agreement. The current national unity government has also
faced the same issue with ETCA. Trade between the two countries is obviously one sided. In
2014, while Sri Lanka exported $700 million worth to India while India exported $3.1 billion
worth to Sri Lanka. It is a massive trade gap for Sri Lanka, but it can do little about it. Indian
products have a huge price advantage over Sri Lankan’s. Ingrained in the memory of many
middle aged Sri Lankans are the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Accords. The accords involved altering
Sri Lanka’s constitution by adding the away. So now when the government says a new
agreement could allow Indians to enter the workforce in the shipbuilding and IT industries, they
see another invasion.
However it is worthwhile to take a brief look into the fledging Sri Lankan
shipbuilding and IT industries. The shipbuilding is limited to basically two main operations. First
is the Colombo Dockyard Company which is considered to be one of the leading dry-dock
complexes in the South Asian region with a significant annual revenue. Second is the Sri Lankan
Navy small vessel construction for its use in littoral waters. Expanding these operations in the
short term will be tough due to the lack of skilled labor. On the other hand the IT industry has
been booming and expanding ever since the mid 2000s. Today, Sri Lanka has up to 80,000 IT
professionals as a whole. Firms like WSO2, Millenium and Leap-set/CAKE Labs are
entrepreneurial, earning millions of dollars in revenues, with operations even in Silicon Valley.
However, entrepreneurs do confess that there is a dearth of skilled graduates for recruitment
within Sri Lanka. The government wants to increase the IT export revenue five fold by 2020
requiring massive expansions. Yet where the investments will come is an issue. The Sri Lankan
IT industry resists opening up to foreign investors and labor, fearing that it could destroy
budding local entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, Sri Lanka already has its own version of Uber, Pick
me, Uber’s biggest local competition. Liberal minded intellectuals and government politicians
are calling the ETCA agreement a step forward to making Sri Lankan industries more

27 | P a g e
competitive. Nationalists are calling it a threat to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and identity. However,
Sri Lanka’s identity is already defined by a number of communities who have migrated to the
island over the centuries. The Moors, Malay, South Indian estate workers, Gujarati and Chinese
traders just to name a few. Sri Lanka’s current fiscal status quo is starving for Foreign Direct
Investments (FDI). The island state risks to lose its fiscal autonomy if it has to default on its debt
servicing and falls under the thumb of the IMF. If properly utilized by the government, ETCA
can be used to present Sri Lanka as having a liberal attitude toward trade and foreign investment.
Nationalism has played a decisive role in Sri Lanka ever since it became Asia’s first democracy
in 1933. Politicians know exactly how to use it to serve their own interests. Nationalism of the
Sinhalese majority turned chauvinism sparked the civil war and massive nationalization of
private enterprises and property. It drowned the country’s dreams of becoming the “Gateway to
Asia” despite its geographic location. Today, government action towards recreating that dream is
being opposed by nationalism once again. Some politicians are manipulating nationalism,
claiming to be defending the sovereignty that Sri Lanka is not losing, only to return to power.

Sri Lanka’s new foreign policy has something good for India:

One of the election platforms of the recently sworn-in Sri Lankan prime minister, Ranil
Wickremesinghe, has been to revise Sri Lankan foreign policy, which has been excessively
oriented toward China in recent years, instead favoring a more balanced posture.
Under the previous regime of Mahinda Rajapaksa, both India and the West were increasingly
alienated while the Chinese had free play in the country, crystallized in terms of investment in
infrastructure or financing offers. Wickremesinghe is expected to reverse this by devising a
foreign policy that is more broadbased, with renewed outreach to India, the United States,
Europe, and Japan. As Sri Lanka continues this process, New Delhi–with Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi’s new focus on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)–could become Colombo’s most
important partner as it strives to revamp its economy and emerge from over a decade-long
period of international isolation. As Wickremesinghe stated after his victory in the recent
elections, “It’s a new chapter in Sri Lankan politics itself. Therefore, we should have close
relations with India.” With bilateral trade at $5.2 billion in 2013-14, Modi, during his visit to Sri
Lanka earlier this year, pitched an expansion of the India-Sri Lanka free trade agreement (FTA)
and came out in favor of balancing bilateral trade, which currently favors India.

Sri Lankan PM Ranil Wickremesinghe with Indian PM Narendra Modi

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 Apart from an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation for peaceful use, Modi also pushed for a
coal-based power project and over and Undersea transmission line projects connecting India and
Sri Lanka. Experts say this could well lead to a “renewed wave“ of Indian investment in the
country. As India steps up its investment in the Indian Ocean, financing projects like the Sittwe
port in Myanmar, and Chabahar port in Iran, Sri Lanka rises in importance. So far, New Delhi
has focused on reconstructing the war-ravaged Tamil dominated northern areas of the country.
Future focus will be on investment in the maritime realm. Experts say that with the right amount
of investment, Colombo and Mumbai, today the busiest ports in South Asia, could become
regional hubs rivaling Singapore.
However, with its
own infrastructure overhaul requirements, India cannot entirely fulfill the needs of Colombo.
Invariably Sri Lanka will have to look toward investments from bigger powers. The U.S., Japan
and Australia are the most important countries that Colombo can turn to. All three countries are
highly interested in deepening their footprints in the IOR. The keen interest of Western powers in
the region is evidenced by the fact that immediately after Maithripala Sirisena assumed the
presidency earlier this year, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visited the country, representing
the first U.S. secretary of state visit since 2005. Ahead of Kerry’s visit, a delegation of Sri
Lankan naval officers were on board the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier, underscoring the
burgeoning naval relationship between the two countries and their move toward increased
maritime security cooperation. Sri Lanka will also have noticed that Japan, in its bid to counter
China’s growing involvement in the Asian infrastructure market, announced a capital package of
$110 billion dedicated to infrastructure development projects in Asia. A significant part of the
funds would be allocated to projects that will be executed in collaboration with the Asian
Development Bank. Sri Lanka would certainly want a share of this. Finally, in an interview with
The Australian, Wickremesinghe also indicated his intent to restore relations with Australia by
addressing the issue of asylum-seeker boats. This new thrust in Sri Lankan foreign policy augurs
well for India as it steps up its efforts toward building partnerships across the IOR. Sri Lanka’s
proximity to these powers will help India’s aspirations for multilateral leadership in the Indian
Ocean gather more mass.

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 CHAPTER-5

Conclusion & Suggestions

Before preparing this project, the researcher was of view that like all other neighbor countries
(except Pakistan),the relationship between India and Sri Lanka is normal. But after the
completion of this project, the researcher came to know that it is not as normal as it appears to
be. If the relationship would have been good, then unnecessary detention of Indian fishermen in
Sri Lanka and Sri Lankan fishermen in India would not have been as usual as it is.
However, there is no war like
situation but at some times it appeared to be a cold-war like situation. Indian intervention in the
Sri Lankan civil war was criticized up to a great extent and that is also a very important cause of
conflict between these two neighbors. Operation Pawan, although for the benefit of Sri Lankans
was very much disliked and it is a general conception today that Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination
was a result of this operation. Assault of Rajiv Gandhi by a Naval officer, during his visit to Sri
Lanka is another incident to prove that there was a sense of dislike for Indians in the minds of Sri
Lankan. So, all these incidents prove that the relationship between these two nations is not on a
very positive note and lot of efforts are required by both the nations.

Suggestion : As far as researcher understands this topic, he thinks that India till now, had tried
to play the role of a ‘Big Brother’ to Sri Lanka and that is the ideology which needs to be
changed because irrespective of geographical expansion or scientific development, every country
has its own sovereignty and if any one tries to interfere unreasonably then conflict can arise,
which is the case with India and Sri Lanka. If you want good relationship with anyone then
firstly & mostly, you will have to give respect and that is the basis of a good relationship.
Another factor is to restore the trust between both the nations which is very important. By giving
more & more facilities to the tourists, it can also be improved because a large number of tourists
visits India for the religious tours as Buddhism is the primary religion of Sri Lanka and it has
been emanated from India. So, by mutual cooperation and by promoting trade and tourism, both
the countries can make a very good bond between themselves.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Books
1. Russell R. Ross and Andrea Matles Savada (1988).
"Tamil Militant Groups". Sri Lanka: A Country Study. Retrieved
2016-04-20
2. David Brewster. "India’s Ocean: the Story of India’s Bid for
Regional Leadership. Retrieved 2016-04-20
3. The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Hennayake S.K.
Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 4. (April 1989), pp. 401-415.
4. O'Ballance, 91

Articles

1. Weisman, Steven R. (5 June 1987). "India airlifts aid to tamil rebels".

STEVEN R. WEISMAN (New York Times). Retrieved 2016-04-20.
2. Patel, Tejas. "Rajiv assassination mystery unsolved". Article. Asian
Tribune. Retrieved 20 April, 2016.
3. Sachi Sri Kantha. The RAW Factor

WEBSITES:

1. http://news.yahoo.com/india-seals-nuclear-energy-pact-srilanka-
hopes-11360011.html
2. http://www.bharatrakshak. com/LANDFORCES/
Army/History/1987/Chapter03.html
3. http://nesohr.org/humanrightsreports/
StatisticsOnCiviliansAffectedByWar.pdf

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