4.3 Cross Cultural Awareness Analytical Concept - Third Draft

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
9
10
11
12 CROSS-CULTURAL AWARENESS
13 Volume 1: Analytical Concept
14
15
16 Draft version number 3
17 Granada, 08 JAN 2010
18
19
20
21

22
23 Reproduction of this document and unlimited distribution of copies is authorised for

24 personal and non-commercial use only, provided that all copies retain the author
25 attribution as specified below. The use of this work for commercial purposes is
26 prohibited; its translation into other languages and adaptation/modification requires
27 prior written permission.
28
29
30 Point of Contact:
31 Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina (SP TRADOC)
32 Dirección de Investigación, Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales [Directorate for

33 Research, Doctrine, Organization and Materiel]
34 C/ S. Idelfonso s/n
35 18071 Granada (SPAIN)
36 Phone: +34 958 809000
37
38 As Army Chief Coordinator Obj 4.3: ....... Gen. Francisco Gan Pampols &
39 Col. Jacinto Romero Peña
40 As National Director:................................Ltc. Fernando Rocha y Castilla
41 As Concept Developer:...........................Maj. José A Fernández Alfaro
42 As Experiment Designer:.........................Ltc Victor Bados Nieto
43 As Analysis Designer:..............................Maj. Fernando Gordo García
44 As Senior Lecturer on Methodology
45 for the Behavioural Sciences:................. PhA Professor Humberto Trujillo
46 As Study Line Director 1:.........................PhA Professor Jose A. Alcantud
47 As Study Line Director 2:.........................PhA Professor Marien Duran Cenit
48 As Study Line Director 3:.........................Ltc Jose Maria Martinez Ferrer
49 As Study Line Director 4:.........................Maj Javier García Gómez
50
51
52 An important part of this document has been translated to English by Jose M.
53 Pasadas.
54

CROSS CULTURAL AWARENESS
Draft version number 3 as 08JAN10
55 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
56 Acquaintance with the local culture of the operational environment is paramount

57 for the conduction of current military operations. Today’s conflicts embody a
58 new type of threat which is irregular, singular, elusive and imprecise. Adversary
59 fighters mix, meddle and mask themselves into the local population, who
60 eventually is part of the battlefield.
61 In past conflicts, two or more belligerent parties engaged in the battlefield

62 leaving civilians aside. Population, at large, was not the target or the
63 environment, so they could be tangentially affected by collateral damage.
64 In nowadays conflicts, threats are concealed among the population, which

65 increases the operational complexity and uncertainty, and hampers their
66 identification.
67 In order to overcome this sort of irregular threat, the support provided by the
68 population is crucial and will become our center of gravity. Hence, thorough
69 knowledge about the human environment where operations are carried out is
70 paramount for their eventual success. We need to understand the different
71 components of the target culture: values, custom, behavioral patterns, beliefs,
72 etc. We should also be aware of the motivations for their acts or thinking so that
73 military operations will not generate unsought, or even counterproductive,
74 effects.
75
76 Thus, the concept of “cross-cultural awareness” will be first approached from a
77 theoretical perspective: definition, cultural themes, dimensionality of the term
78 culture, cultural dimensions, manifestations and transmission of culture, etc.
Page 3 of 171
79 Thereafter, we may possess sufficient elements to comprehend its internal

80 dynamics.
81 Since the contribution of the social science is considered to be cardinal, the

82 chapter 6 will describe a generic culture from an anthropological point of view.
83 The main focus will be on determining which cultural factors should be analyzed
84 regardless of our target culture.
85 After knowing the generic factors that encompass the target culture, it will
86 necessary to study and to understand the psychosocial and psychological
87 factors of this culture (as included in chapter 7).
88 The next step in our study of a generic culture (or the target culture), included
89 as chapter 8, will be the analysis of non-kinetic military activities such as CIMIC,
90 Key Leader Engagement as a component of the information operations
91 (INFOOPS), Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Public Information, etc.
92 Those activities, entirely or partly, focus on civil actors in the theatre of
93 operations. If the features of the targets of these activities are not well
94 documented and comprehended, they will render themselves ineffective in the
95 best case scenario or will even be detrimental to the mission.
96 Chapter 9 explain how Cross cultural Awareness affects planning activities and
97 military intelligence processes in order to identify how CCA allows to achieve a
98 shared and better understanding of the operational environment that eventually
99 will increase the ability of our own forces and their civilian and military partners
100 to face the challenge of irregular enemies and non-compliant actors.
101 Finally, chapter 10 is focused on identifying and establishing the methodologies

102 and the education and training tools needed to enable the Armed Forces to
103 develop and implement cross-cultural awareness (CCA) within a specific
104 operational environment.
105
Page 4 of 171
106 A comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the local culture make

107 operational success more likely for many reasons: exploitation of a larger
108 number of opportunities; strengthening of the relationships with foreign armies,
109 organizations or stakeholders; and an improved force protection on the ground.
110 This volume I (analytical concept) has as annex the Volume II, dedicated to
111 complete the core texts of this volume with specific subject, some of then
112 related with the case of study (or scenario) of the Objective 4.3 CCA,
113 Afghanistan.
114
Page 5 of 171
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
Page 6 of 171
139 Table of Contents
140 1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 13

141 1.1. Target audience for the concept ........................................................ 15
142 1.2. Context and Scope of the concept ..................................................... 17
143 2. Baseline Assessment ................................................................................ 18
144 3. The concept of cross-cultural awareness terms and definitions ................ 20

145 3.1. Concept of the culture ........................................................................ 21
146 3.2. Concept of cross-cultural awareness ................................................. 22
147 3.3. Cross-Cultural Awareness ................................................................. 23
148 3.4. Cultural knowledge:............................................................................ 24
149 3.5. Cultural understanding ....................................................................... 24
150 3.6. Cultural competence .......................................................................... 25
151 4. Cultural themes ......................................................................................... 25

152 4.1. Dimensionality of the term “culture”.................................................... 25
153 4.2. Cultural dimensions which shape or influence culture¡Error! Marcador
154 no definido.
155 4.2.a. Physical dimension ..................................................................... 26
156 4.2.b. Social dimension ......................................................................... 27
157 4.2.c. Economic dimension ................................................................... 28
158 4.2.d. Political dimension ...................................................................... 29
159 4.3. Manifestations and transmission of culture ........................................ 29
160 4.3.a. Cultural Narratives ...................................................................... 29
161 4.3.b. Oral and written communication.................................................. 30
162 4.4. Respect for and promotion of cultural values ..................................... 30
163 5. Significance of culture to the military: CCA applied to a military coalition . 32
164 6. Concept of culture from an anthropological point of view .......................... 33

165 6.1. Instrumental concept of culture .......................................................... 33
166 6.2. Cultures and symbols......................................................................... 34
Page 7 of 171
167 6.3. Living cultures and the past ............................................................... 34

168 6.4. Ethnic identity ..................................................................................... 35
169 6.5. The learning of cultures...................................................................... 36
170 6.6. Non-observable aspects of culture ..................................................... 36
171 6.7. Empathy and cross-cultural awareness ............................................. 37
172 6.8. Simbolic assets and mediation ........................................................... 38
173 6.9. Political power and legitimacy ............................................................ 38
174 6.10. Local sense of justice ......................................................................... 38
175 6.11. Cultural perceptions of reciprocity ...................................................... 39
176 6.12. Culture, conflict and the right of humanitarian interference ................ 39
177 6.13. Expectations on the abilities and capabilities of the social sciences to
178 support military services to resolve civil-military conflicts.............................. 39
179 6.14. Generic cultural concepts to be taken into account when intervening in
180 an area with a different culture other than our own, considered from an
181 anthropological perspective. ......................................................................... 40
182 6.14.a. Family ......................................................................................... 40
183 6.14.b. Marriage (rites of passage) ......................................................... 41
184 6.14.c. Symbols ...................................................................................... 41
185 6.14.d. Religion ....................................................................................... 41
186 6.14.e. Age ............................................................................................. 41
187 6.14.f. Law ............................................................................................. 42
188 6.14.g. Formal education and enculturation ............................................ 42
189 6.14.h. Literacy ....................................................................................... 42
190 6.14.i. Coercive power and legitimacy ................................................... 42
191 6.14.j. Leadership .................................................................................. 43
192 6.14.k. Gender ........................................................................................ 43
193 6.14.l. Honor .......................................................................................... 43
194 6.14.m. Loyalty ........................................................................................ 44
195 6.14.n. Interest and reciprocity ................................................................ 44
196 6.14.o. Normative and pragmatic codes ................................................. 44
197 6.14.p. Values ......................................................................................... 44
198 6.14.q. Historical time ............................................................................. 45
199 6.14.r. Communitarism / Individualism ................................................... 45
Page 8 of 171
200 6.14.s. Rituality ....................................................................................... 45

201 6.14.t. Conflict ........................................................................................ 45
202 6.14.u. Others. ........................................................................................ 45
203 7. Factors and psychosocial dimensions of culture ....................................... 47

204 7.1. Introduction ........................................................................................ 47
205 7.2. Essentials aspects to consider ........................................................... 50
206 7.3. Essential indicators to be assessed in the deployment area .............. 51
207 7.3.a. Psychosocial factors ................................................................... 51
208 7.3.b. Psychological factors .................................................................. 56
209 7.3.c. Factors supporting the ideological radicalization (religion, politic,
210 ethnic) and the indoctrination. ................................................................... 57
211 7.3.c.(1) Coercive persuasion indicators ................................................... 57
212 7.3.c.(2) Indicators of group psychological abuse ..................................... 59
213 7.4. Chart of psychosocial and psychological distance ............................. 60
214 8. The integration of cross-cultural awareness in functions and activities of the

215 actors involved in the operational environment ................................................ 61
216 8.1. Introduction ........................................................................................ 61
217 8.2. Objetives: ........................................................................................... 62
218 8.3. Methodology ...................................................................................... 62
219 8.4. Tentative results ................................................................................. 63
220 8.5. Vision of the concept of cross-cultural awareness on the part of the
221 coalition's personnel ..................................................................................... 63
222 8.6. Cultural factors identified for Afghanistan........................................... 74
223 8.6.a. Cultural factors within the internal operational environment: “the
224 locals”. 74
225 8.6.b. Cultural factors within the external operational environment: “the
226 internationals”............................................................................................ 83
227 8.6.c. Cross-sectional cultural values ................................................... 83
228 8.7. Preliminary conclusions: some notes ................................................. 85
229 8.8. General recommendations / observations.......................................... 88
230 9. Integration of cross-cultural awareness into operational and interagency

231 planning, and into the intelligence processes ................................................... 92
Page 9 of 171
232 9.1. Integration of the culture awareness into operational and interagency
233 planning process. .......................................................................................... 92
234 9.1.a. Problems and solutions related to integrating cultural awareness
235 into multinational military planning process. .............................................. 94
236 9.1.b. Problems and possible solutions related to integration of the
237 culture awareness into interagency planning process. ............................ 101
238 9.1.c. Integration of the CCA into the planning process. ..................... 101
239 9.1.d. Elements in the HQ organization that may improve the CCA
240 capability related to planning. .................................................................. 117
241 9.1.e. Conclusions and closing thoughts............................................. 132
242 9.2. Integration of the culture awareness into the intelligence procedures
243 134
244 9.2.a. Role of Intel and Culture for Countering activities of Irregular
245 Adversaries and other Non-Compliant Actors (hereafter CIANCA activities).
246 134
247 9.2.b. Discussions about what we can do to better incorporate cultural
248 into our intelligence procedures. ............................................................. 135
249 9.2.c. Line of Argument:...................................................................... 136
250 9.2.d. Suggested Approach and Recommendations ........................... 136
251 1st Recommendation: The best method of incorporating culture into the
252 planning process is through the systems approach. ............................... 137
253 2nd Recommendation: Intel goes beyond “enemies or adversaries” .... 138
254 3rd Recommendation: The leverage point to integrate Culture into the
255 Intel processes is during the (IPOE) Intelligence Preparation of the
256 Operational Environment). ...................................................................... 139
257 4th Recommendation: Need to appreciate changes in the Intelligence
258 Cycle 141
259 a. Changes in the “Direction” Stage: ............................................. 141
260 b. Changes in the “Collection” Stage: ........................................... 143
261 c. Changes in the “Processing” Stage: ......................................... 146
262 d. Changes in the “Dissemination” Stage: ..................................... 148
263 9.2.e. Conclusion ................................................................................ 149
264 10. Training, education and cross cultural awareness .................................. 150
265 10.1. Introduction ...................................................................................... 150
266 10.2. Cultural Capability ............................................................................ 150
Page 10 of 171
267 10.3. The learning process........................................................................ 151

268 10.4. Educational and training methods .................................................... 153
269 10.4.a. Cognitive training ...................................................................... 153
270 10.4.b. Self-insight training ................................................................... 154
271 10.4.c. Behavioural training .................................................................. 154
272 10.4.d. Experiential training .................................................................. 154
273 10.4.e. Attribution training ..................................................................... 154
274 10.5. Learning cross-cultural awareness in the armed forces ................... 155
275 10.5.a. Education .................................................................................. 155
276 10.5.b. Language proficiency ................................................................ 159
277 10.6. Individual and collective training. ..................................................... 160
278 10.6.a. General training ........................................................................ 162
279 10.6.b. Predeployment training ............................................................. 164
280 11. Conclusions and recommendations. ....................................................... 167
281 Glossary of terms and definitions ................................................................... 168
282 Abbreviations.................................................................................................. 170
283 Bibliography.................................................................................................... 171

284
285
Page 11 of 171
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
Page 12 of 171
319 1. INTRODUCTION
320 The current operational environment is complex, dynamic and fluid. Changes
321 take place simultaneously along with the evolvement of the local, regional or
322 even international situation.
323 Threats become diffuse, abstract and uncertain. Their identification, isolation
324 and suppression are increasingly complicated since adversaries blend into the
325 population, which hampers countering the threat and preventing collateral
326 damage or unsought effects.
327 Therefore, in current operational environments it is the population (the human

328 factor) the aspect subjected to most variation.
329
330 Resulting from the experience gained in previous operations, we1 have become
331 progressively aware of the influence a core factor has on military operations:
332 sensitization to cultural diversity. This factor had more often than not been
333 ignored when planning or executing military operations.
334 Comprehending a given culture is a time-consuming endeavor. First, a definition

335 of the concept of “culture” is required as well as its component elements
336 involved.
337 Further to that, an in-depth analysis of our own culture (customs, beliefs, norms,
338 etc.) should be performed. The purpose is to expand our self-knowledge.
339 Knowing a culture while ignoring our own may render useless for military
340 operations. Although we already possess self-knowledge, a more in-depth
341 analysis of the self is necessary to know the other, who is an active participant
342 in our area of operations.
343 Finally, the components common to any culture shall be analyzed in relation to
344 the target culture in the theater of operations.
345 By applying this procedure we will be able to try to know and understand foreign
346 cultures in contrast to our own. “Contrast” does not imply opposition or setting a
347 “benchmark culture”. It involves an unbiased assessment where respect
348 prevails even if the same values are not shared.
349 When approaching a culture, inquisitiveness should be a must: the same

350 behavioral patterns may be appropriate or highly unsuitable in different cultural
351 contexts. Differences between both cultures must be pinpointed without making
352 value judgments.
1
In this document, the word “we” is referred to the participating nations in MNE 6.
Page 13 of 171
353 Knowing the “other” is critical: mutual cultural ignorance can render unforeseen
354 situations characterized by an escalation of misunderstandings, mistrust and
355 avoidable tensions.
356 Cross-cultural awareness studies and products help to improve the following
357 fields:
358 military operations planning and analysis;
359 synergy among allies, supporting and neutral actors, which boosts
360 legitimacy and credibility;
361 contributions to the comprehensive approach in a multinational or

362 interagency context (it is required the participation of military forces, non-
363 governmental organizations, governmental departments and
364 organizations and other civil organizations).
365 identification and exploitation of opportunities as a result of the

366 adversary’s actions;
367 identification, minimization and management of undesired and

368 unintended consequences, which invariably enhances force protection;
369 Thus, cross-cultural awareness becomes one of the paramount enablers to

370 achieve the final end state.
371 Our aim is to defeat threats that affect the state stability. The support of the
372 population and meeting their needs are overriding requisites, which become our
373 center of gravity (CoG), to achieve the end state.
374 In order to gain and maintain the support of the population all the military
375 personnel, including senior ranks and junior soldiers, should be aware of the
376 role played by cultural factors.
377 It is a paramount importance to know the different approaches to the target

378 culture of the local population, from the countries belonging to a military
379 coalition. Every country has a different culture and an appropriate vision of the
380 cultural factors of the host nation’s population. So, it is an important subject to
381 study.
382
383
Page 14 of 171
384 1.1. Target audience for the concept
385 The Multinational Experiment campaign began in 2001 to develop better ways
386 to plan and conduct coalition operations. The campaign uses a building block
387 approach of seminars and limited objective experiments that is distributed
388 among multinational partners and conducted through a series of integrating
389 events. This approach allows concepts and insights to emerge over the course
390 of the experiment campaign. Since the first experiment in November 2001, the
391 MNE community has developed structures, processes and tools designed to
392 make future multinational engagements in crisis interventions more effective
393 and efficient2.
394 This paper aims at developing a theoretical concept of Cross-Cultural

395 Awareness which may well serve as a standard framework document shared by
396 all the contributing nations involved in the Multinational Experiment 6 (MNE6).
397 Not only may this document be useful for MNE 6 participants or contributing
398 nations along with the U.S. Joint Force Command (USJFC) involved in CD&E
399 (Concept Development and Experimentation), but also for all the stakeholders
400 and actors, either individuals or organizations, affected by a conflict where
401 expeditionary multinational forces are employed.
402 Potential users include but are not limited to the following:
403 Military personnel (all ranks), but particularly
404 o decision-makers at all levels;
405 o personnel posted to HQ in theaters of operations;
406 o personnel responsible for the writing and elaboration of syllabuses

407 and curricula which integrate CCA in the areas of military
408 education and training;
409 o personnel responsible for the military training during the

410 predeployment phase in the staging area.
411 Civilians (analysts, contractors, NGOs, government officials, private

412 military companies, etc.) in the area of operations particularly if they
413 engage in any way with international expeditionary troops; other civilians
414 whose jobs have a bear on the area and, in general, personnel whose
415 routine duties (liaison officers, trainers, etc,…) include relationship with
2
http://www.jfcom.mil/about/experiments/mne5.html
Page 15 of 171
416 international civilian organizations, local military and security forces, local
417 authorities, civilian actors and local population.
418 Concerning Subject Matter Experts (SME) on local cultures, the present
419 paper may help to discern how their expertise and specific knowledge
420 may be useful for implementing the concept of CCA and enhance the
421 effectiveness of military operations by providing appropriate and relevant
422 knowledge and advice on the issue at stake.
423
424
Page 16 of 171
425 1.2. Context and Scope of the concept
426 The present document is the result of the studies carried out by multinational
427 Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) within the Multinational
428 Experiment (MNE) 6 theme: “The Irregular Challenge: A Comprehensive
429 Approach to a Complex Problem”.
430 The MNE 6 Problem Statement is the following:
431 “To establish and ensure a safe and secure environment, coalition forces
432 require the ability to share information, gain situational understanding,
433 synchronize efforts and assess progress in concert with interagency partners,
434 international organizations, and other stakeholders when countering activities
435 by irregular adversaries and other non-compliant actors.”
436 MNE 6 is an extension of the preceding MNE 5 campaign that focused on a

437 multinational Comprehensive Approach3 to crisis management. However, the
438 scenario in MNE 5 was very different from the one used for MNE 6. In MNE 5
439 the situation was a health crisis in Africa, with civilians clearly in the lead,
440 military operations basically in support of the civilian activities and no irregular
441 adversaries as such.
442 MNE 6 seeks to apply the Comprehensive Approach to actual operations.

443 According to this approach, military forces become a contributor (probably the
444 most important one at some stages but in a supporting role at some others) in
445 the resolution of a conflict along with national and multinational government
446 agencies, international and intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental
447 organizations and the private sector. Furthermore, particularly against irregular
448 adversaries and non-compliant actors, local (host nation) authorities, traditional
449 leaders, military and security forces are to be acknowledged as an essential
450 component for success.
451 However, no matter the military´s relative importance at any particular stage of
452 the international intervention, the Comprehensive Approach provides a general
453 framework for the activities of the military forces at all times
454 MNE6’s Outcome 4 provides a more specific view on the context for a proposed
455 solution: “Coalition forces, interagency and relevant partners possess an
456 improved ability to gain shared situational understanding of the
457 operational environment while implementing direct and indirect
458 approaches to countering irregular threats and the activities carried out
459 by other non-compliant actors”.
3. To explain the MNE 5 Project and the document related.
Page 17 of 171
460 And finally, the purpose of the objective 4.3 is to “Develop an improved ability
461 for coalition forces and partners to promote cross-cultural awareness of
462 the operational environment in order to contribute to a shared situational
463 understanding”.
464 In order to improve the shared situational understanding our cross-cultural

465 awareness must be enhanced as well. To that end it is imperative to know and
466 understand the following: the concept of culture and the dimensions and
467 common factors to any culture; how can military operations which target or
468 affect the civil population be improved by implementing the CCA concept; and
469 how CCA affect planning and intelligence processes.
470 Apart from that, appropriate military syllabuses and curricula should be re-
471 elaborated to include CCA. Training also should be duly adapted to the new
472 needs as well.
473 All the personnel, either military or civilian, participating in crises management
474 or conflict resolution activities should be conveniently aware of the principles of
475 the concept of CCA, which implies a thorough self-knowledge and knowledge of
476 the other in the area of operations.
477 Although the concept may be useful at every level, it is particularly focused at
478 the operational/higher tactical level.
479 2. BASELINE ASSESSMENT
480 The document titled “Multinational Experiment 6. Baseline Assessment report.

481 2008” USJFC”4, besides summarizing the research into the current body of
482 knowledge in the subject areas of the MNE 6 problem statement, identifies a
483 number of “gaps”, draws conclusions and makes recommendations and
484 observations applicable to the development of the Objective 4.3 of the MNE 6,
485 that should be taken into account when dealing with CCA
486 All the suggestions made have been considered to establish the different study
487 issues included in the concept.
488 Gaps:
489 1. We require the ability to understand the dynamics of the operational

490 environment, accounting for the social, cultural, political, legal, economic,
491 and physical conditions.
4. Multinational Experiment 6. Baseline Assessment report.
Page 18 of 171
492 2. Few personnel outside of the Special Operations Forces (SOF)

493 community are educated in Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency, or
494 receive cultural awareness training.
495 3. We have failed to develop an effective, culturally attuned narrative in our

496 strategic communication efforts.
497 4. Different organizational cultures, processes, and ways of doing business

498 among various government and civilian agencies exacerbate the
499 problems with personnel manning, organizational challenges, inadequate
500 and contravening doctrine, and lack of effective communication.
501 5. Concerns that hamper Coalition operations are the lack of mechanisms
502 to share information and effect command and control, lack of knowledge
503 of multinational capabilities, doctrine, and the difficulty of integrating and
504 tracking non-military personnel and organizations.
505 6. The Joint Force and other interagency stakeholders must achieve a
506 common operational picture or situational awareness.
507 7. Leaders need better training on capabilities, limitations and organization

508 of Joint, other Government organizations (OGA) and multinational
509 organizations.
510 Conclusions / Recommendations:
511 Cultural awareness at the macro and micro level are of equal importance
512 and it is necessary to develop guidelines to accommodate cultural
513 differences and avoid offensive and ineffective communication.
514 Understanding the nuances of tribal leadership and inter-tribal
515 relationships can be critical to successful interaction.
516 It is crucial to close the collaboration and communication gaps between

517 the public and private sectors. Current institutional and organizational
518 cultures are too rigid in preserving themselves to naturally want to
519 integrate for improved effectiveness as a whole.
520 Forces must train in foreign languages, cultural intelligence, negotiation,

521 and dispute resolution.
522 An effective interagency framework for building partner capacity rooted in

523 a deep understanding of the indigenous culture, unity of effort among the
524 various agencies involved, and sustained interaction and relationships
525 with the host country over time is required.
526 Commanders need to appreciate the underlying interagency issues (such

527 as institutional cultures, policies, resources, and differences in
Page 19 of 171
528 procedures) in order to effect real integration for waging Irregular

529 Warfare.
530
531 3. THE CONCEPT OF CROSS-CULTURAL AWARENESS TERMS AND

532 DEFINITIONS
533 The terms “war”, “conflict” and “cultural knowledge” have long been interlinked.
534 No single military leader has ever started a military campaign or battle without
535 having minimal knowledge about his adversary or the population in the area of
536 operations.
537 Herodotus of Halicarnassus (V c. B.C), the first Western historian, narrates the
538 engagements between Persians and Greeks highlighting the history and
539 customs of both parties.
540 Another remarkable example emphasizing the need to have a thorough

541 knowledge about the adversary and the environment (including the human
542 environment) can be found in Lawrence of Arabia’s The Seven Pillars of
543 Wisdom, which is an autobiographical narrative of the guerrilla campaign waged
544 by the Arab forces under his command against the Turks during the First World
545 War, that includes details of his daily life as well as a complete attention to the
546 local environment besides narrating his war experiences. Lawrence recounts
547 Arabic people’s customs, history, perceptions, attitudes, feelings, etc, which
548 altogether form a brilliant reference framework to know that people
549 Knowing the enemy, the adversary, the opponent or the population of the area
550 of operations is a military principle which sometimes is neglected. That has had
551 a very negative impact upon our actions.5
552 In order to operate effectively among a local population to gain and maintain its
553 support, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and
554 its culture, including its history, tribal/family/social structure, values, religions,
555 customs, and needs.
556 Crisis are solved as much by creating alliances, leveraging non military
557 advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and
5. “Our ethnocentrism, biased assumptions and mirror-imaging have had negative outcomes
during the North Vietnamese offensives (1968 and 1975), the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989),
India’s nuclear tests (1998), the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990), and the Shi’ite transformation of
Iran (1979), to name just a few recent examples.” Does Culture Matter? The military utility of
understanding adversary culture. MCFATE, Montgomery. Office of Naval Research.
Page 20 of 171
558 managing perceptions, and all these tasks demand an exceptional ability to
559 understand people, their culture, and their motivation.
560 So, it is imperative that leaders understand culture at the strategic, operational
561 and tactical levels. Misunderstanding culture or having a lack of adversary
562 cultural knowledge can produce undesirable consequences: for example, at the
563 strategic level can produce policies that exacerbate an insurgency;6 a lack of
564 cultural knowledge at the operational level can lead to negative public opinion of
565 our nations; and ignorance of the culture at a tactical level may affect our own
566 force protection and could endanger local population because of misperception
567 and misunderstanding.
568 3.1. Concept of the culture
569 There exists a vast array of definitions for this term. According the Merriam
570 Webster Dictionary,7 culture is:
571 the integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behavior that
572 depends upon the capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to
573 succeeding generations;
574 the characteristic features of everyday existence shared by people in a

575 place or time;
576 the set of values, conventions, or social practices associated with a

577 particular field, activity, or societal characteristic; and
578 the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial,
579 religious, or social group.
580 The Encyclopaedia Britannica accounted for the first definition of the term. It
581 was elaborated by anthropologist Edward Burnett Tylor and is defined as
582 follows:
583 Culture taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole
584 which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other
585 capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.8
6. Ibid.
7. Accessed (July 2009) <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/culture>
8. Definition by anthropologist Edward Burnett Tylor, 1871. Accessed (July 2009)

<http://www.britannica.com/>
Page 21 of 171
586 Different definitions of term can also be found in civilian and military
587 publications:
588 Culture is the shared concepts that guide what people believe, how they
589 behave and how this behaviour is interpreted.9
590 The shared world view and social structures of a group of people that
591 influence a person’s and a group’s action and choices.10
592 A system of values and beliefs shared by people that interact by

593 organizational structures and control systems, to produce behavioural
594 norms.11
595 The whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and

596 emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes
597 not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental
598 rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs.12
599 All the previous definitions are appropriate and complementary. For our
600 purposes, the following definition has been proposed:
601 Culture is the shared concepts that guide what people believe, how they
602 behave and how this behaviour is interpreted.13
603 3.2. Concept of cross-cultural awareness
604 The term “awareness” is defined as the ability of human beings to gain self-
605 knowledge about personal core traits and about the changes experienced. It is
606 a mental and psychological activity that only human beings can perform leading
607 to a perception of the self in the outer world.
608 The terms of “culture” and “cultural awareness” are very different from each
609 other. Once the implications and characteristics of the term “Culture” are
9
. The significance of culture to the military. Joint Doctrine Note 1/09. Accessed
<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/microsite/dcdc />
10
. Operational Culture for the Warfighter. Principles and Applications. Marine Corps University.
Quantico, Virginia. 2008
11
. Provided during the 1st workshop Objective 4.3.
12
World Conference on Cultural Policies, Mexico City, 26 July - 6 August 1982
13
. Definition by anthropologist Edward Burnett Tylor, 1871. Accessed (July 2009)
<http://www.britannica.com/>
Page 22 of 171
610 assimilated, being aware of our own culture facilitates our understanding of
611 other cultures and make us be able to contrast them.
612 Cultural Awareness is the ability to become aware of our cultural values, beliefs
613 and perceptions without focusing on the self.
614 It is, also, the basic knowledge of cultural issues, the comprehension of their
615 importance and impact.14
616 For a better understanding of the concept of cultural awareness, we should ask
617 ourselves, in order to be aware of my own culture:
618 What are our values, beliefs and perceptions?
619 Why do I have these values, beliefs and perceptions and not different
620 ones?
621 Am I aware of the peculiarities and limits of my culture?
622 Do I know what distinctive features make my culture different from other
623 cultures?
624 Why do we do things in that way?
625 Why do we react in that particular way?
626 3.3. Cross-Cultural Awareness
627 Once awareness about our culture has been gained, a similar study should be
628 carried out about the culture of the host nation and of the contributing nations. It
629 involves an analysis to know the values and behavioral patterns of several
630 parties: the host nation, coalition members and other stakeholders. It also
631 implies efforts to make our own culture (values, beliefs, norms, etc.) known to
632 them.
633 The aim is not to counter good and evil in both cultures, but to be aware of the
634 distinctive features. The foreign culture is not evaluated, nor is one of them
635 proclaimed to be superior. The main idea of cross-cultural awareness is being
636 able to tell the similarities and differences between the different cultures related
14. Quoted from Army Culture and language capability. Cited in Annex V. of The significance of
culture to the military. Joint Doctrine Note 1/09. Accessed
<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/microsite/dcdc />
Page 23 of 171
637 to our own culture, without being biased by the last one; or at least being aware
638 of how our own culture may influence the knowledge of others.
639 Cross Cultural Awareness becomes central when we have to interact with
640 people from other cultures. People see, interpret and evaluate things in different
641 ways. What is considered an appropriate behavior in one culture might be
642 inappropriate in another one. Misunderstandings arise when I use my meanings
643 to make sense of your reality.
644 It has to be said that, in fact, all cultural knowledge, to be fruitful and objective,
645 must be a real “cross-cultural knowledge”. In this sense, we should not only talk
646 about “cross-cultural awareness”, but also, when describing later “cultural
647 understanding” and “cultural competence” as superior levels of cultural
648 knowledge, we should be aware that what we really mean is “cross-cultural
649 understanding” and “cross-cultural competence”. However, it will suffice with
650 this note declaring explicitly that all levels of cultural knowledge should be, by
651 definition, “cross-cultural” levels.”
652 3.4. Cultural knowledge:
653 Cultural knowledge is the first level of knowledge of a culture and allows us to
654 be aware of our own culture. Cultural knowledge is the basic level of knowledge
655 of a culture of the area of operations by identifying core traits and patterns. This
656 knowledge is gained by answering questions related with the culture of the
657 population of the host nation, such as: What are their beliefs, values, ideologies,
658 attitudes, assumptions, expectations, perceptions, motives, intents, behaviors,
659 etc.
660 Cultural awareness makes possible to apprehend the cultural reality as we will
661 be able to know the manifestation of every cultural factor and the relevance of
662 the different cultural dimensions in the given culture. We will be able to answer
663 “what, how, where and when” enquires about each factor.
664
665 3.5. Cultural understanding
666 It is a higher level of cultural knowledge. The concept of “cultural

667 understanding”, compared with “cultural awareness” reveals a higher more in-
668 depth knowledge about culture.
669 Current operational environments are complex and fluid. The cultural factors
670 and dimensions aforementioned do not manifest themselves separately from
671 the actors. There exist a number of relations which sometimes may be difficult
672 to recognize. By performing a systemic analysis of those relations a model
Page 24 of 171
673 representing the reality (the object of our study) may be drawn. After getting a
674 “cultural knowledge”, we already know “what, how, where and when” about
675 each factor, but the systemic analysis will explain “why” changes take place.
676 Therefore, this is a higher level of knowledge which let us understand cultural
677 dynamics and cause-effect relationships triggering shifts in the operational
678 environment as well as study the potential consequences of the actions taken in
679 a given environment.
680 3.6. Cultural competence
681 Finally, as the highest level in the hierarchy of knowledge of culture appears the
682 concept of “cultural competence”, that assumes a higher knowledge of culture
683 compared with both “cultural awareness and “cultural understanding”.
684 This term refers to a capability or personal competence on cultural issues that
685 some specialized military personnel and civilians must acquire before being
686 deployed to an area of operations. This is the level required for personnel acting
687 as cultural advisor to the commanders and staff.
688 Ideally, all military personnel should have “cultural awareness” introduced in
689 their education and embedded in their normal training.
690 Also all military personnel should acquire “cultural understanding” of the
691 appropriate cultures before being deployed to an Area of Operations as part of
692 their pre-deployment training.
693 However, “cultural competence”, being the highest level of cultural knowledge,
694 is only gained through specialized education (knowledge) and training (skills),
695 complemented and expanded through local language proficiency and
696 experience in the target area/culture.
697 Of course, “cultural competence” requires specialization, many resources and is

698 only developed along time, being a level of knowledge reserved to very specific
699 individuals, either military or civilian, that become real experts in a given culture.
700
701 4. CULTURAL THEMES
702 4.1. Dimensionality of the term “culture”
703 The term “culture” encompasses a number of basic dimensions:
Page 25 of 171
704 Learned: Culture is not genetic, is learned within the social and historical
705 environment where any given the person lives.
706 Shared: Culture results from the interactions between human beings, when
707 these share their experiences, attitudes and perceptions.
708 Dynamic: Culture is under constant change due to the influence the
709 environment exerts upon it.
710 Transmitted: The culture is transmitted by individuals and from one generation
711 to another. At the same time they also make it evolve.
712 Representative: It is a distinctive feature of human groups.
713 Symbolic: It is the only symbol which can combine the anthropological factors
714 that form it.
715 Dependent on the environment: Culture is dynamic but is also influenced by the
716 physical, human, political, social, economic and information environment.
717 Patterned: The key anthropological factors constitute a model or set of patterns
718 that guide or compel the subjects to behave in a specific way.
719 Habitual: Human beings are not commonly aware that their attitudes,
720 perceptions, customs or habits are deeply rooted in culture. People tend to
721 consider culture as something habitual and do not notice its influence.
722 4.2. Dimensions which shape or influence culture
723 From an anthropological point of view, the cultural dimensions which shape a
724 culture are the following:
725 4.2.a. Physical dimension
726 Human beings have always been closely linked to the physical environment
727 where they carry out their activities (hunting, search for food, building habitats,
728 etc.). Therefore, knowing this dimension is critical to know the culture. Attention
729 should be paid to the terrain features which have a bearing in shaping their
730 character. Emphasis must be put on those features which seem to be specially
731 outstanding for them.
732 It will be important to study how the community is affected by geographical

733 features such as:
Page 26 of 171
734 Water: It is considered to be the main source of conflict: having or not

735 drinkable water; whether or not it is absolutely necessary for cattle and
736 crops; water coming from other states, etc.
737 Land: Possessing land is another common source of conflict between

738 communities. The conflict may originate from the desire to physically
739 possess a geographical prevailing area while in other cases the land is
740 simply symbolic. In the latter case, the necessity to possess the land is
741 more acute. The land may be linked to religion, beliefs, superstitions or
742 celebrations.
743 Nowadays, thinking of a land which was possessed centuries ago may
744 become a driver to claim property on it though there are no legal grounds
745 for it.
746 In other cases, the nomads in the Sahara or the Mongols think of the
747 land as a communal asset and consider that their random settlements
748 confer them the right to exploit the land and resources.
749 Another source of problems is the establishment of borders, which are

750 not frequently recognized by the inhabitants living on both sides of the
751 frontier. The division of communities by territorial demarcations driven by
752 political interests, either between states or within a state, is another
753 source of conflict.
754 Food: As with water, food is a highly valued asset. Food scarcity has
755 compelled a number of communities to eat plants and animals which are
756 inconceivable in other parts of the world.
757 Food is essential for people and for cattle. For example, when pastures
758 became scare, nomadic communities confronted sedentary ones who
759 cultivated the land.
760 It is also necessary to be aware of tabooes related to food within given

761 cultures (pigs viewed as sinful or cows viewed as sacred).
762 The weather, seasons, housing or energy used are also relevant factors
763 to know a culture.
764 4.2.b. Social dimension
765 The influence of the social structures or of their component elements (men and
766 women, famility, clan, tribe, etc.) have already been dealt with earlier in this
767 paper.
Page 27 of 171
768 The hierarchical position and the type of interaction these elements keep shape
769 the culture of the area. For example, a relation between a man and a woman is
770 perceived differently in Afghanistan and in Central Europe; the prevailing role of
771 the elderly in Afghanistan differs from the role of the elderly in Spain.
772 When addressing the hierarchical position of an individual within a community a

773 number of factors must be taken into account: age, sex, kinship, membership to
774 a social class, ethnic or religious group, or even the role performed within the
775 group.
776 4.2.c. Economic dimension
777 Every community has a set of established ways of obtaining, producing and
778 distributing products and services within its economic system. Although using
779 currencies is supposed to be universal, there are other commercially available
780 systems that can be used.
781 Some economic systems which are managed by the country’s government are
782 based on exchanges valued and regulated by laws. At the same time, there
783 may exist trade exchanges which are not in accordance with the laws enforced
784 though they survive for a number of reasons: social heritage, not paying taxes
785 or illegal practices (particularly drug trafficking).
786 It is important to study the economic factors and their influence upon the
787 culture. For instance, in Afghanistan, poppy cultivation generates a parallel
788 economy which contributes to organizing armed groups to protect cultivation
789 fields, transport and sales. That economy is so important that completely alters
790 the community and affects children, young people and adults.
791 When studying a state or geographical area, it is necessary to know what are
792 the drivers for the primary, secondary or tertiary economic sectors to be the
793 prevailing one as well as its consequences for the population.
794 Several cultures may coexist in the same area: the dominant ones and the
795 minority groups (mainly due to their religion of ethnic character). Minority groups
796 keep a sort of relationships with the dominant groups as if they were two
797 different cultures, including their economic system. It is not odd to observe
798 majority Christian communities maintaining relationships with Hebrew, Muslim
799 or Hindu communities within the same city. Apart from their cultures, they also
800 use different internal transactional systems.
801 The presence of immigrants with different cultural backgrounds is another factor
802 that should be paid due attention when dealing with economic features. These
803 people have an influence upon the culture of the area since they bring new
804 customs, habits, beliefs, rites, etc.
Page 28 of 171
805 4.2.d. Political dimension
806 The local, regional or state political structures have a notable influence upon the
807 culture of the community. Not only should the power structures be studied but
808 also their relationships, leadership, access to power (legitimized leaders, linage,
809 oligarchies, jirgas and shuras, war lords, etc.).
810 4.3. Manifestations and transmission of culture
811 The complexity of a culture is observed in its countless manifestations. For a

812 member of a culture the manifestations are common and even unnoticeable.
813 However, for a foreign observer the simplest aspect is significant and distinctive
814 of the culture, for example, the way of dressing, the gestures, the accent, etc.
815 All these details are relevant and form the outer layer of a culture, which is first
816 noticed during the initial contact between cultures.
817 The difficulty lies in being able to go into detail when addressing a culture’s
818 customs, values, beliefs, behavioral patterns, etc., since they may be unnoticed
819 to an individual from other culture.
820 The identity of a given culture can be transmitted by two means:
821 4.3.a. Cultural Narratives
822 It implies insisting on and exacerbating the differences between “we” and “they”.
823 Cultural narratives are used as the first means of expression when a culture, an
824 ethnic group or just a group of people need to be recognized as different by
825 highlighting differences or by reasserting their present or their past.
826 The aim is to influence the target audience (their own people) with messages
827 and explanations about past or recent events supported by events or situations
828 which have a high emotional charge (past events they are proud of).
829 It normally seems like a story or an explanation of facts which involves symbols
830 and words perceived as high relevant by the audience.
831 Apart from influencing the audience, the cultural narrative may try to actively
832 involve the audience (a clear example is the case of the suicide bombers who
833 try to reassert their commitment with the organization, which also has an
834 economic return for their families. The family has a martyr who has fought and
835 died for the cause).
836 For cultural narratives to be successful they must be credible and consistent.
Page 29 of 171
837 They are extremely complex in terms of being able to provoke undesired
838 responses on the target audience. Since the circumstances are constantly
839 changing, cultural narratives must be carefully analyzed before their release in
840 order not be ignored and prevail.
841 Western terms such as “Cold War” or “Global war on terror” are sample cultural
842 narratives since there are a number of actions, attitudes and behavioral patterns
843 implied which influence the audience.
844 4.3.b. Oral and written communication.
845 Depending on the culture and the historical moment, cultures are mainly
846 transmitted by means of the oral and written communication.
847 There are cultures which have historically relied on oral communication,
848 sometimes reinforced with gestures, body language and physical symbols. This
849 is the most basic form of communication and is particularly used by cultures
850 which lack more complex types of communication (written communication).
851 Oral communication is based on verbal language where the intonation,

852 pronunciation (differentiating element among minor communities in the same
853 area) and the vocabulary used play a major role.
854 Apart from the written communication, there are other types of non-verbal
855 communication whose elements should be analyzed when studying a culture.
856 For example:
857 - Body language (face expressions, gestures, eye contact, etc.).
858 - Appearance (distinctive garments).
859 - Silence can be perceived as a sign of respect or deliberation, or may

860 give rise to tensions.
861 - Physical distance between people. The accepted distance for social
862 interactions varies from culture to culture. Being too close to the other
863 actor may be counterproductive.
864 4.4. Respect for and promotion of cultural values
865 Current international agreements and laws acknowledge the need to protect,
866 promote and respect the cultural values of all the communities.
Page 30 of 171
867 In spite of the fact that there exists an important legal framework (the Geneva
868 Convention) complemented by regulations issued by international organizations
869 such as the UNESCO,15 in case of conflict those cultural values are deprived of
870 value. In case of conflict is not uncommon that those cultural values are not
871 properly respected by some or all of the different competing factions
872 Thus, a number of international documents recognize the need to protect the
873 cultural diversity and cultural heritage, particularly when cultures are in danger
874 of becoming extinct or being severely undermined. The concept of culture is
875 profoundly bound with the already working notions of “cultural diversity”,
876 “cultural identity”, “cultural pluralism”, “intercultural and interreligious dialogue”,
877 and with the concept of “cultural heritage”.
878 - Cultural Heritage

879
880 - Cultural diversity
881 Taking latest UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity (2005,) we find in the
882 preamble, that cultural diversity is indispensable for peace and security at the
883 local, national and international levels, is important for the full realization of
884 human rights and fundamental freedoms, and there is a need to incorporate
885 culture as a strategic element in national and international development
886 policies, as well as in international development cooperation.
887 - Cultural identity
888 The international community considers it its duty to ensure that the cultural
889 identity of each people is preserved and protected. The equality and dignity of
890 all cultures must be recognized, as must the right of each people and cultural
891 community to affirm and preserve its cultural identity and have it respected by
892 others.
893 - Cultural pluralism
894 Cultural pluralism is the policy offshoot of cultural diversity. Since it is
895 inseparable from a democratic context, cultural pluralism is conducive to cultural
896 exchange and the flowering of the creative potential that sustains life in society.
897 - Intercultural dialogue
898 Nowadays, “culture” is seen as a dialogue between individuals, nations and
899 civilizations. It is defined as: Equitable exchange and dialogue among
15
On October 20 2005, UNESCO held the “Convention on the protection and promotion of the
diversity of cultural expressions”.
Page 31 of 171
900 civilizations, cultures and peoples, based on mutual understanding and respect
901 and the equal dignity of all cultures - essential prerequisite for constructing
902 social cohesion, reconciliation among peoples and peace among nations.
903
904 5. SIGNIFICANCE OF CULTURE TO THE MILITARY: CCA APPLIED TO A

905 MILITARY COALITION
906 For servicemen, the culture is a crucial element of the operational environment
907 for the establishment of relationships with the different actors. Not taking into
908 account culture would hamper the interaction of the military with such actors
909 and would have a negative impact on the mission.
910 The benefits resulting from having an appropriate cross-cultural awareness

911 were dealt with in the introduction of the present document.
912 It is considered convenient to remark how important is to study the role cross-
913 cultural awareness plays in multinational coalitions
914 The procedure in order to know a foreign culture will be the same: we are
915 already aware of the cultural factors which determine our own culture. In this
916 case, the second and last step will involve analyzing how the factors common to
917 all cultures affect the personnel from the different contributing nations posted for
918 the mission.
919 A shared cross-cultural awareness may help in making us think and act in
920 similar (or understandable) ways to other partner nations, in having and sharing
921 a common perception of the situation and, eventually, even in being abler to
922 achieve synergy in the conduction of joint multinational operations.
923 This task is far from being easy. Being able to make different cultures think in
924 unison following an in-depth study of the local culture rather seems an
925 entelechy. However, it is a necessary activity.
926
Page 32 of 171
927 6. CONCEPT OF CULTURE FROM AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL POINT OF

928 VIEW
929 Civilians and service people alike are very little aware of the local culture of an
930 area prior to their deployment.
931 This section deals with a number of considerations relating to the concept of
932 culture from an anthropological point of view. The aim is to include the vision
933 provided by the social sciences in order to support the general issue hitherto
934 analyzed.
935 6.1. Instrumental concept of culture
936 The concept of culture is a complex one and defining it involves a number of
937 obstacles, of which one is paramount: people are aware of the fact that culture
938 determines local societies and confers them a sense of identity. Thus, culture is
939 preeminently local. So long as culture is local, it shall be plural. Therefore, we
940 should address “culture” in terms of “cultures”.
941 Culture comprises three components: material culture, language matrices and
942 common values. Material culture consists of typologies and techniques
943 characterizing a cultural area; anthropologists and archeologists share this
944 concept. Among the linguists, there emerge two main currents:
945 (1) those who advocate for a common matrix or universal language DNA;
946 (2) those who advocate that language is a cognitive product and,
947 consequently, is bound up with the cultural environment.
948 There will be as many language matrices as there are languages. Common
949 values are symbolic ideas that emanate from the collective identity and
950 permeate the day to day life of individuals determining their behaviours.
951 Culture is generally conceived as symbolic; thereby it is persistently invented

952 and reinvented. Therefore, culture is not "natural". Considering culture as
953 “natural" has given rise to nationalisms which claim and advocate for the
954 perennial nature of their culture.
955 Culture can be divided, yet arbitrarily, into high culture and popular culture.
956 Within the current dominant cultures there has emerged a literate culture with
957 distinguishing and particular hallmarks. This culture tends to be cosmopolitan in
958 character and is viewed as an ethic and aesthetic benchmark by the middle and
959 upper classes of the other cultures. Cosmopolitanism and aesthetic spiritualism
960 are precisely two of the values embodied by this culture, which can even
961 pervade religious and local cultural values. Popular culture is more stable, i.e., it
Page 33 of 171
962 is traditionalist and based upon local conditioning factors. Hence, it has
963 frequently been equated with “the soul of the people”.
964 6.2. Cultures and symbols
965 Man has been referred to as Homo Simbolicus, which separates him from the
966 natural condition of mankind. Therefore, the presence of instinct cannot be
967 recognized in human beings. Man, as a symbolic subject, does not act
968 instinctively. For example, defending the territory is not bound to instinct, as with
969 animals. It is rather a volitional action driven by symbols such as nation, flag,
970 honor, tribe, etc. Symbols are widely recognized by human beings, except by
971 those suffering from a pathology called asymbolia. However, the recognition of
972 symbols is not universal and depends on the subject’s interpretive training.
973 Individuals fail to make a correct interpretation of all the symbols in every
974 culture. In some cultures, curiosity leads their members to try to interpret a vast
975 number of symbols. In contrast, individuals from other cultures are self-satisfied
976 with their limited interpretation of symbols. Those features are revealed in the
977 degree of ethnocentrism or sociocentrism among different cultures, which may
978 drastically vary from culture to culture.
979 The symbolic culture is embodied in a number of symbols, articrafts or ideas

980 which become the core for emotions, narratives and rationalities. Symbols
981 prevail as long as they are effective. Symbolic effectiveness rates among their
982 most outstanding features. Symbols can be manipulated but their effectiveness
983 does not entirely depend on their symbolic potential. As a consequence, the
984 behavior of the symbols may at times seem to be irrational.
985 From an anthropological point of view, a symbolic culture encompasses both

986 myths and rites. Myths are based on a particular logic which results elusive for
987 human willing. Myths dwell in cultures and rest upon people’s common sense.
988 Rites are easier to manipulate and recreate. Among rites, ceremonies will
989 interest any sort of political or cultural engineering. The legitimacy to exercise
990 political power is attainable provided that ceremonial rites are duly managed
991 and appropriated.
992 6.3. Living cultures and the past
993 Historical narratives set the milestones which forge the collective identity in
994 relation to the past. The narratives ought to be coherent and present a
995 meaningful explanation which makes sense of the political and cultural status
996 quo of a community or people. Narratives are developed from purposefully
997 selected historical passages which can even become myths. The historical
998 myths are inflexible components of the narrative which confer explanatory logic
999 on it. Within contemporary cultures the revival of historical fears, supposedly
1000 vanished, is an enigma.
Page 34 of 171
1001 Social memory refers to collective memories shared by a society. It does not
1002 necessarily have to coincide with historical narratives. Some interest groups,
1003 whose memories are framed within the social memory, have the pretension to
1004 graft their inflected social memory into the historical narrative. This is only
1005 achievable if supported by the political power.
1006 It is worth noting that any interpretation of the present without taking into
1007 account the historical narratives or the social narrative is doomed to failure.
1008 6.4. Ethnic identity
1009 From the middle of the XIX century up to beyond the end of WWII, cultural
1010 differences were interpreted on the grounds of two criteria: biological race and
1011 the psychology of peoples. The relationship between race and culture resulted
1012 in deterministic behavioural patterns: the behaviours displayed were biologically
1013 conditioned. That current was discarded due to racism and politically and
1014 morally condemned following WW II. During a conference under the auspices of
1015 UNESCO in 1950, physical and social anthropologists abolished the
1016 employment of the word and the concept of “race”. It was superseded by "ethnic
1017 group" and/or "ethnicity". Henceforth, local cultures have been referred to as
1018 “ethnic group” when considered as distinct from other ones. Nevertheless, the
1019 term is generally constrained to tribal or formerly tribal societies. When referring
1020 to Western societies, the term and concept "people" is preferred to "ethnicity".
1021 For example, Europe comprises several “peoples” and to a lesser extent “ethnic
1022 groups” while in Sub-Saharan Africa the “ethnic groups" are overwhelmingly
1023 more numerous.
1024 The biologicist concept of race was opposed since its very inception. The
1025 “psychology of the peoples” approach emerged as a model to interpret their
1026 cultural differences. According to their proponents, every people —nation or
1027 region— will have a specific character resulting from their behaviours being
1028 stereotyped. So, the Spaniards, Germans or Hungarians’ behaviours will be due
1029 to their particular idiosyncracy. As with races, this approach relies on a
1030 hierarchical distribution of peoples where Western ones are at the apex, being
1031 prominent those which are better developed from a material or cultural (high
1032 culture) point of view.
1033 Consequently, the terms “ethnic group” or “ethnicity” seem to be in some

1034 degree unsuitable to analyze the values common to a given culture since they
1035 provide the observer with a culturalist but static explanation of cultures and their
1036 frontiers.
Page 35 of 171
1037 6.5. The learning of cultures
1038 The learning of cultures refers to the enculturation process. It involves formal
1039 learning gained through educational institutions as well as informal learning
1040 resulting from cultural immersions. Along history, every culture has used
1041 particular methodologies for the learning of culture, though at present they are
1042 very standardized within the international community. The learning takes place
1043 at schools, whether primary, upper or university, and relies on increasingly
1044 secularized states. The Church’s control over the education has progressively
1045 decreased while at the same time an international secular model is becoming
1046 standard. However, this type of learning is not cosmopolitan in character since it
1047 is constrained by the nation-state’s uniformity where the acquisition of national
1048 values is paramount. The enculturation processes through traditional institutions
1049 such as the family, clan, lineage, volunteer associations, etc. act as
1050 counterbalance for the above type of cultural learning. Those institutions
1051 provide a vision of the inner and outer world binding together cultural
1052 membership and emotions. Although formal learning may be agreed upon by
1053 national or international stakeholders, cultural immersion arising from local
1054 cultures may not be agreed upon or changed. The culture learned comprises
1055 two dimensions:
1056 (1) instrumental rationality and
1057 (2) unreasoned cultural factors.
1058 Arbitrarily speaking, the standard educational culture could be equated with
1059 rational actions while the second type would embody the arrational and
1060 emotional actions, which is not always the case. The worldview arises from the
1061 transition process from one to the other type of learning.
1062 6.6. Non-observable aspects of culture
1063 Interpreting a local culture is no easy task either for a native or a foreigner.
1064 Since cultures are opaque and secret in some degree, they need interpreting.
1065 Interpreting is a rational and intuitive action which evolves from these opposing
1066 acts. In the case of Westerners the intellectual activity is aimed at interpreting
1067 rationally. Envisaging the behaviour of others and interpreting past collective
1068 behaviours is common practice in our societies and a good deal of effort is
1069 devoted to it. For example, military intelligence is no longer limited to knowing
1070 the opposing forces’ movements but it also involves cultural prospective studies
1071 on the enemy. To that end, a rational training is required to explore other
1072 cultures, which are not self-enclosed but encompasses secrets shared by the
1073 community. Culture is even opaque for their members. Those who analyze and
1074 carry out in-depth studies will be able to cast light on problems deeply
1075 entrenched which locals cannot surpass. Revenge could serve as an example
1076 in cultures within which the sense of honor is high. The arrival of foreign
Page 36 of 171
1077 elements can trigger stiff transformations. If fact, we have witnessed the
1078 transformation of societies with a high sense of honor linked to a propensity for
1079 violence into relatively peaceful societies. Consequently, the foreigner can
1080 penetrate into all the ins and outs of the social life and help improve the
1081 perceptions of the local societies. Although locals are the “problem owners”,
1082 they have not necessarily to be the decision makers, especially when in conflict.
1083 A cross-cultural approach requires knowledge about the aspects related to non-
1084 verbal communication, which at times turn out to be more meaningful than the
1085 language proper, for instance, gestures and proxemics. A gesture evokes
1086 cordiality, propinquity or understanding. By knowing the other's gestures we will
1087 be able to show empathy in the course of the first social interactions. First
1088 impressions last, as commonly said. Cultural approximations should be carefully
1089 thought about and researched in order to help interpret the “concealed
1090 dimension” of culture. Proxemics, which allows for the social and cultural
1091 organization of spaces, is also very important to transmit egalitarian or
1092 hierarchical feelings.
1093 However, there are other non-observable aspects of culture apart from gestures
1094 and proxemics. Exclusively adhering to these aspects will turn culture into an
1095 “individual presentation of social life”. However, social networks are revealed to
1096 be the most relevant ones within a given culture, particularly patronage.
1097 6.7. Empathy and cross-cultural awareness
1098 Empathy is a culturally learned capability that allows for the identification with
1099 other cultures. Empathy is a human intrinsic ability which needs developing
1100 since coexistence with people from other cultures is becoming increasingly
1101 common. That ability fosters the understanding of others’ points of view and
1102 favours the establishment of democracies based on negotiation practices.
1103 However, being unaware of the other along with a lack of critical skills hinder
1104 exercising empathy in our decisions and judgments. Therefore, extreme
1105 culturalisms, assumed in a dogmatic-like manner, emerge as obstacles that
1106 hampers the development of empathy and, consequently, of policies to foster
1107 mutual understanding and self-criticism. Empathy will only take root in the
1108 population at large provided that it is promoted by elites who not only advocate
1109 for democratic values but have also assumed self-criticism practices
1110 encouraged by modern social sciences.
1111 Developing cross-cultural awareness and competence ought to lead to a

1112 strengthening of empathy, which should become a priority goal and cornerstone
1113 in our theoretical approach.
Page 37 of 171
1114 6.8. Simbolic assets and mediation
1115 Different cultural factors such as historical narratives, social memory, cultural
1116 stereotypes and material heritage from past cultures make a given society be a
1117 stakeholder of symbolic assets, i.e., it has gained representativeness. For
1118 example, the Spanish society, and particularly the Andalusian, possesses
1119 symbolic assets related to the Arab world due to the Arab presence in Al-
1120 Andalus from a material and ideological point of view. Those symbolic assets,
1121 though they may not be tied to the current social reality, can be instrumental to
1122 positively fostering cultural relationships between cultures on the basis of
1123 common links rather than to making political rhetoric. Therefore, the additional
1124 representativeness is highly valuable for mediation tasks since the stakeholder
1125 of symbolic assets becomes involved in the problem.
1126 6.9. Political power and legitimacy
1127 Political power rests upon two pillars: coercion and legitimacy. Coercion relies
1128 on the employment of force and the legitimacy achieved is rather complex. Not
1129 all types of authority based on coercion become legitimate since legitimacy is
1130 supported by rites and narratives. A coercive power may also rely on foreign
1131 forces, however, legitimacy should arise from the local environment. Legitimacy
1132 should finally generate consensus among the population. To that end it is
1133 critical to control the narratives relating to the origin of the established power.
1134 So the coercive power is compelled to agree terms with the “narrators” or
1135 people of the Book or of the Scriptures. The de facto powers’ fear of the
1136 narrators is derived therefrom. The rites institution may become a relevant
1137 problem since it is not always controlled by the political power due to the fact
1138 that its legitimacy may arise from religion or other social authorities.
1139 6.10. Local sense of justice
1140 The systems of jurisprudence are different in every society and are intimately
1141 linked to a particular sense of justice. Multinational forces have found
1142 themselves compelled to face the challenge of restoring law in a theatre of
1143 operations where they were unaware of which system to restore since the
1144 divergences between the cognitive and judicial systems were acute. Cultural
1145 relativism has been a source of confusion and uncertainty for the actors in out
1146 of the area operations. Employing an international mankind-centred concept
1147 replacing irrational conceptions is paramount to be able to operate. By
1148 proceeding that way, there shall still be need to be acquainted with Non-
1149 Western judicial systems in order to prevent misunderstandings and
1150 suppositions. Non-Western judicial and punitive systems shall be respected as
1151 long as they are not contrary to international law or to the aforementioned
1152 humanitarianism. Beyond being punitive, justice is also related to the restoration
1153 of honor, instrumental oblivion, forgiveness and repentance.
Page 38 of 171
1154 6.11. Cultural perceptions of reciprocity
1155 The expectations arisen with our entrance into the social life of a given society
1156 must be met; otherwise frustration and conflict will result. Reciprocity refers to
1157 responding to a positive action with another positive action, and responding to a
1158 negative action with another negative one, which may be protracted in time.
1159 There are several level of reciprocity, as well as pathways for its application. In
1160 our study reciprocity does not involve strengthening patronage, which is indeed
1161 a form of reciprocity —relationship between patron and client—. We are
1162 referring to more legitimate forms of reciprocity based on the understanding that
1163 “interests are not deceitful”, which should guide the observation of any behavior.
1164 Altruism and philanthropy should be included within this conception. Charity as
1165 an alternative system to the social relief provided by the state should be
1166 analyzed in every society.
1167 6.12. Culture, conflict and the right of humanitarian interference
1168 Recent international mediation efforts in different areas of the world have
1169 become a form of de facto humanitarian interference. At present, discussions
1170 are over whether this kind of interference should be an internationally
1171 acknowledged right, on behalf of which the international community may
1172 intervene to halt or create order in a conflict.
1173 In order to resolve conflicts, the right of interference should be based on a

1174 humanist sense of justice arising from the Universal Declaration of the Human
1175 Rights and subsequent addenda.
1176 But at the same time a synthesis of the anthropological and sociological
1177 research prior to the outbreak of the conflict should be done and made available
1178 to those involved in the decision-making processes.
1179 6.13. Expectations on the abilities and capabilities of the social sciences
1180 to support military services to resolve civil-military conflicts
1181 Expectations should be kept low when considering the capabilities of the social
1182 sciences, particularly cultural and social anthropology, to stabilize and resolve
1183 military conflicts. During the WW II period, the social sciences contributed to the
1184 tasks aimed at the removal of Nazism and its influence as well as to the
1185 resolution of the Pacific war. However, these efforts took place in the final
1186 stages of the conflict or at its termination. Anthropology may render itself
1187 useless to counter insurgencies since the discipline at large does not accept
1188 that role. In the US the largest professional associations straightforwardly
1189 oppose the employment of the Anthropology in “live” conflicts since it seems to
1190 be quite ineffective for warfare. Its main contribution could imply developing a
1191 best practices manual for basic cultural interactions. Anthropology could well
Page 39 of 171
1192 serve as a discipline of cultural engineering to counsel on three main pillars:

1193 legitimacy, reciprocity and justice. All the actions taken should be driven by two
1194 principles:
1195 (1) assurance of the essential democratic and humanitarian principles of

1196 Western societies and
1197 (2) reflection on and respect for Non-Western forms of democracy. The
1198 Social Science will only contribute to the stabilization and pacification processes
1199 provided that the previous principles are observed and a long term approach is
1200 adopted.
1201 6.14. Generic cultural concepts to be taken into account when

1202 intervening in an area with a different culture other than our own,
1203 considered from an anthropological perspective.
1204 Studying a culture is a complex endeavor. Thus, we need to know the basic
1205 factors of any culture so that we can contrast them to gain a more in-depth
1206 knowledge of the culture we are studying.
1207 For most cultures some social patterns are particularly relevant, for example:
1208 traditions,16 ceremonies,17 rites,18 the social role performed by the individuals,
1209 family and clans as integral parts of a tribe or ethnic group, status19 and
1210 relations between men and women. Our study will initially focus on those
1211 factors; however, we should be aware of the relative importance of a number of
1212 patterns and social practices:
1213 6.14.a. Family
1214 Families can be nuclear or extended. Descent can be based on or traced

1215 through the female or male line, i.e, inheritance can be matrilineal or patrilineal.
1216 Family structures can be matrifocal or patrifocal. Society can be matriarchal or
1217 patriarchal. The family is the primary channel of transmission of culture as well
1218 as the nest for cultural enculturation. Likewise, the family is the locus for forging
1219 allegiances, counter-allegiances and for patrimonial inheritance.
16.Transmission of news, literary works, doctrines, rites, customs, etc., from one generation to
another.
17. Acts established by laws, statutes or customs performed to worship divine power, or
reverence and honor to the profane.
18. Set of established rules for religious ceremonies.
19. Position of an individual within a given society or social group
Page 40 of 171
1220 6.14.b. Marriage (rites of passage)
1221 Milestone rites of passage are particularly those relating to birth, puberty,
1222 coming of age, marriage and death. A rite of passage entails progressing from a
1223 stage in one's life to the next one through a short liminal period. In most
1224 societies, marriage has become the paramount rite since it is responsible for
1225 social reproduction. Due to such relevance, the rite involves spending
1226 ostentatious sums of money. However, there exist societies where the "de facto
1227 marriage", mostly the abduction of the bride, is common practice since
1228 ostentation is financially unfeasible.
1229 6.14.c. Symbols
1230 Humans are symbolic beings. By using and managing symbols humans have
1231 deprived their biological condition of some primary features and have created
1232 symbolic systems which include factors such as altruism, patriotism or hatred.
1233 Managing collective symbolic systems is a twofold activity, on the one hand it is
1234 rational and can be planned and, on the other, it is irrational and rather
1235 uncontrolled. Symbols are polysemous, i.e. they can express two or more
1236 meanings. Therefore, the interpretation of symbols cannot be unequivocal.
1237 6.14.d. Religion
1238 Religions are complex symbolic systems which embody metaphorically posited
1239 cultural interpretations of spirituality. Religions have tended to create ritual
1240 performances in order to update the most prominent cultural metaphors. A key
1241 feature of religions is their control of the rite itself as well as of the semiotic
1242 interpretation of the message. Basic religious forms, particularly animism, are
1243 bonded to myths rather than to ideology; on the contrary, complex religions,
1244 especially monotheist religions, are more closely linked to politics than the
1245 former ones since ideology has become a relevant feature.
1246 6.14.e. Age
1247 The passage of generations also outstands among the aspects of culture.
1248 Etarian groups made up of young people normally play a major role in
1249 transforming societies and politics in contrast to old-aged groups, which tend to
1250 set themselves as repositories and guardians of traditions. At turning points,
1251 young-aged groups transitioning to adulthood challenge old-aged groups’ power
1252 in order to establish their own logic. This is common practice in Sub-Saharan
1253 Africa and Latin America where it underlies the chieftainship's insights.
Page 41 of 171
1254 6.14.f. Law
1255 In the wake of the conquest of the rights of man, known as human rights at
1256 present, Western law has become the benchmark for international law. The
1257 concept of individual rights, granted by law, clashes with common practices in
1258 societies where law is composed of moral precepts based on religion —Islam—
1259 or on traditions as it is the case of tribal societies. This is the reason why the
1260 employment of cultural advisors or anthropologists is suggested when law
1261 interpretation is at stake. Intercultural justice studies will make a huge
1262 contribution to the creation of an internationally accepted normative code.
1263 6.14.g. Formal education and enculturation
1264 Apart from formal education, there exists a number of educational patterns
1265 which differ from the scientific and critical reasoning of Western societies. For
1266 instance, Koranic education is fideist, uncritical and disseminates a message in
1267 pursuit of gaining faithful rather than creating citizens. Formal education
1268 belongs to the realm of highly alphabetized societies. Enculturation derives from
1269 the education received within the family and the social domain. It is intrinsically
1270 collective and dependent on the educational ability of the family and the
1271 environment. However, enculturation processes include a corrective factor
1272 which can be called aesthetics and cultural differentiation. It is acquired at
1273 school and within the social and family spheres. This phenomenon is
1274 particularly outstanding among dignitaries.
1275 6.14.h. Literacy
1276 Literacy is a core pillar for developing citizenship. It paves the way for abstract
1277 and critical reasoning, which lets citizens have access to non-local networks
1278 and call in question irrationally held truths. Literacy should start from the
1279 assumption that the language and the Holy Scriptures are not sacred and,
1280 consequently, cannot transmit mysteric elements. Writing and speaking are
1281 used in social speech acts which set the symbolic man free. Therefore, literacy
1282 should be bilingual, in the mother tongue and in another international language
1283 in order to avoid the emergence of sociocentrism.
1284 6.14.i. Coercive power and legitimacy
1285 Political power relies on coercive power and legitimacy, which together
1286 guarantee the exercise of power. From a basic and mistaken perspective,
1287 power can be equaled to coercion. However, from an anthropological point of
1288 view, a core element is legitimacy, which has been gained through complex
1289 processes such as the performance of rites or the employment of myths and
Page 42 of 171
1290 memories. Anthropology takes into account these facts, which become pillars
1291 for legitimacy and the focus of analytical research.
1292 6.14.j. Leadership
1293 Charisma is a core feature of leadership when addressed by Anthropology.

1294 Efforts have been made in order to infer determining social factors related to
1295 charismatic leadership since charisma includes “innate” as well as “acquired”
1296 features. Advanced Western societies have tried to attract leaders by
1297 establishing elite schools. The learning process along with the acquisition of
1298 habits generate social leaders who are granted authority and legitimacy thanks
1299 to their mastering of technical skills.
1300 6.14.k. Gender
1301 A recursive theme is the so called “prescribed marriage”, i.e., forced marriage.
1302 Within highly traditional societies, a couple’s marriage is agreed by the families,
1303 lineages, or clans as part of an allegiance strategy. Within Western societies
1304 marriage relies on will. In theory, a person can freely marry another one. Ideas
1305 such as "romantic love" guide their performance emphasizing both parties'
1306 selves through a passionate desire. This sort of marriage is being progressively
1307 replaced by non-contractual agreements which completely rely on the parties’
1308 will on issues such as the duration of the marriage and their freedom to choose
1309 a partner. Then, the debate concerning gender arises, which highlights the
1310 singularity of the subjects regardless of their gender.
1311 6.14.l. Honor
1312 Honor is a widespread concept in Mediterranean, Arabic and Latin American

1313 societies. It has been linked to women’s sexuality in the form of respect.
1314 Respect for women's sexuality will be at the base of the group’s honorableness;
1315 women shall be kept in the privacy of one’s home. If such honorableness is
1316 breached, shame will be cast on the group. It is thought that honor is guided by
1317 pragmatic codes rather than normative ones, which sheds light on why it is
1318 disappearing with modernity. Honor is also bound to be in possession of terrain,
1319 and to the concept of nation considered as the common territory of a national
1320 "imagined community”. Honorable people have an ethos which relies on
1321 tradition and on keeping one’s word. Breaching the ethos, as it might be the
1322 case with women’s sexuality, will bring with it shame and dishonor.
Page 43 of 171
1323 6.14.m. Loyalty
1324 The pair loyalty/disloyalty is particular of every society’s collective ethos. In

1325 Christian societies, consistency and allegiance to that culture, whose rewards
1326 can be obtained in this and the other world, arise from their very moral
1327 conception which is rooted in a teleologically oriented sort of faith. In societies
1328 where it is not uncommon the instrumental employment of the concept of
1329 loyalty, as it is the case of the Arabic-Bereber society, the concept of disloyalty
1330 or "betrayal" does not enter into conflict with their ethos. A similar approach can
1331 be adopted in relation to the cultural conception of theft or crime.
1332 6.14.n. Interest and reciprocity
1333 Taking self-interest as a starting point, it can be assumed that all the subjects,
1334 regardless of their society of origin, carry out calculated actions for their own
1335 benefit or for that of their peers. Nevertheless, it cannot be inferred that interest
1336 undoubtedly underlies any rational action. Anthropology has revealed that there
1337 exists the so called delayed reciprocity: contracted debts will be paid off in the
1338 long term.
1339 One of the most widely accepted types of reciprocity, which entails outright
1340 sociopolitical interests, is patronage. It reaches every corner in the world,
1341 society or historical time though, nowadays, it is particularly relevant in
1342 Mediterranean and Latin American societies. Patronage is not normative but
1343 pragmatic and relies on the exchange of interests.
1344 6.14.o. Normative and pragmatic codes
1345 In a broad sense, law embodies the world of coded norms. There also exist
1346 norms based on tradition. In agricultural societies the law of custom whose
1347 observance will depend to a great extent on the ethos is also acknowledged.
1348 Anthropology is interested in the field of unrevealed social pragmatic practices,
1349 which accounts for its preference for qualitative observation techniques. Despite
1350 that, the law of custom as well as the normative law are also considered in the
1351 studies.
1352 6.14.p. Values
1353 Cultural values shape the collective ethos. The values of premodern, traditional
1354 societies are posited on religion, as stakeholder of mythical narratives, and on
1355 technology, as the practical application of knowledge. Values become a
1356 “culture” since they are a frame of reference for the individual who share them.
Page 44 of 171
1357 6.14.q. Historical time
1358 Most societies have been subsumed by historical time, i.e., cumulative,
1359 narrative and finalist timeline. However, there have been "cold" societies which
1360 countered the influence of history. Nowadays, the fast pace of developments
1361 due to the globalization tends to create counterbalances by promoting slower
1362 ways of life typical of "cold" premodern societies.
1363 6.14.r. Communitarism / Individualism
1364 Communitarism is particularly common in Eastern societies in a broad sense —

1365 including Slavic, Far East, Hindu or Arabic communities. On the contrary,
1366 individualism is generally associated with Europe, particularly with the
1367 bourgeoisie revolution. The emergence of individuality and its cluster of
1368 protecting rights is a foremost Western feature which clashes with traditional
1369 cultures. The focus is centered on finding out the constraints of both models in
1370 order to perform cultural engineering tasks. Communal assets can become
1371 critical resources in highly agricultural societies while it may also be a major
1372 barrier to social life as it was the case of the Soviet collectivization.
1373 6.14.s. Rituality
1374 Rites are recursive social acts extended to all kinds of societies whose
1375 effectiveness is extra-empirical. However, rites are more common in some
1376 societies than in other ones. Rites of passage are well known and deal with the
1377 progress of an individual through different stages in life. Public rites are
1378 essential for the power to be legitimized. Controlling and managing rites play a
1379 major role in legitimizing power.
1380 6.14.t. Conflict
1381 The conflict theory highlights the role of confrontation in social relationships.
1382 The application of the theory of entropy to social relationships takes into
1383 account the dissipative character of conflicts. However, conflicts could be a
1384 regulating force as long as physical aggression is not exhibited. They may forge
1385 the web of allegiances and counter-allegiances individuals create around
1386 themselves.
1387 6.14.u. Others.
1388 There are other important concepts which could be studied:
1389 o Traditions
Page 45 of 171
1390 o Customs
1391 o Beliefs
1392 o Myths
1393 o Tabooes
1394 o Revenge
1395 o Legitimacy
1396 o Reciprocity
1397 o Cultural Heritage
1398 o Folklore
1399 o Icons
1400 o Concept of allegiance
1401 o Language as a binding element
1402 o Amity and enmity
1403 o Educational systems.
1404 o …
1405
1406
Page 46 of 171
1407 7. FACTORS AND PSYCHOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CULTURE20
1408 7.1. Introduction
1409 At present, it is paramount for international military and civil packages deployed
1410 in a specific area of operations to “conquer” its psychological dimension and,
1411 consequently, the attitudes (thoughts, emotions and behaviours) of the actors
1412 participating in that particular social context.
1413 Without going into minor details, it has been proven that people generally learn
1414 to behave (socialize) in a particular social context by imitating models, adjusting
1415 their attitudes (thoughts, emotions and behaviours) and by following oral
1416 instructions or rules set by others. Such a behaviour and its persistence result
1417 from multiple dynamic interactions between the individuals and the stimuli found
1418 in their context throughout different moments in time. Their behaviour will
1419 depend on the type of interactions as well as on the moments of time when they
1420 occur. Hence, assuming behavior, in general, and thoughts, emotions and
1421 behavioural patterns in particular result from and are maintained under specific
1422 stimuli in a timeline, then the behavior displayed will change if those conditions
1423 are altered. In other words, if successful psychosocial procedures in changing
1424 behaviours and in enhancing psychosocial communication can be implemented,
1425 then it will be possible to know, understand and “control” the targeted social
1426 context.
1427 People behave in different ways according to the stimuli found in the
1428 environmental and social context (generate attitudes, think, have emotions,
1429 display behavioural patterns, perceive, get stressed, communicate, etc.), it will
1430 be consequently essential to be acquainted with the mechanisms and variables
1431 that will likely foster the occurrence of specific behavioural patterns given
1432 particular conditions.
1433 Most research projects and discussions on how humans behave under critical
1434 circumstances have been rather descriptive, i.e., they have been intuitive and
1435 speculative in character focusing on what happens instead of on why such
1436 behavior is displayed. In fact, describing and guessing intuitively is quite
1437 different from explaining. The variables and the mechanisms that promote
1438 specific individual or social behaviours ought to be identified to predict them;
1439 otherwise, influence operations aimed at provoking a particular behavior will not
1440 be planned on a sound basis. In order to plan successful operations, it is
1441 essential to know what (knowledge) and why (understanding) something
20
Written by Dr. Humberto Trujillo. Senior Lecturer on Methodology for the Behavioural
Sciences. Department of Social Psychology at the University of Granada
Page 47 of 171
1442 happens, i.e., applying scientific methods to describe (what) and explain (why)
1443 the psychosocial events towards which the actions are intended.
1444 Self-communication and communication with others are a constant in

1445 people’s lives. Furthermore, the consequences of the communication acts will
1446 be either positive or negative for the participants according to the way and the
1447 conditions in which they take place (see Annex “Basic concepts about
1448 communication and intergroup relationships”).
1449 Individuals can interact better with others when they are aware of the variables
1450 and mechanisms that provoke, keep or change their own behavior (self-
1451 knowledge) as well as that of the other participants. Knowing and explaining
1452 communication events contribute to foster understanding and to be aware of
1453 what causes behaviour patterns, which promotes tolerance and positive
1454 attitudes and avoid prejudices and negative stereotypes. Tolerance cannot just
1455 be demanded or imposed on individuals since it is the necessary consequence
1456 derived from knowing and understanding the reason underlying the acts.
1457 If there are not precise referents (psychosocial, anthropological, cultural, etc.)
1458 which allow individuals to know themselves and the others, these ones will
1459 probably be suffering from a personal crisis (they can be tense, frustrated,
1460 wrathful, irrational, aggressive, humiliated, stressed, etc.) and in such a
1461 condition they are unable to face positively the requirements imposed by the
1462 context (psychosocial, cultural, economic, political, environmental, etc.).
1463 When someone is not capable of properly communicating with the others, he
1464 gets trapped in the so-called “circle of concern”. That is, he will only react in
1465 an impulsive, irrational, uncontrolled and defensive-offensive way against the
1466 stimuli of the environment, which he will consider to be hostile, losing control
1467 over the situation. Conversely, if individuals possess communication skills
1468 based on self-knowledge and knowledge about the others, the “circle of
1469 influence” is automatically widened, which allows them to act proactively
1470 (rationally, inoffensively, moderately) and be effective to achieve desirable aims.
1471 Consequently, conflict and crisis will be less likely to occur between the
1472 participants since the communication act will be positive.
1473 In order to gain and share psychological and cross cultural awareness, it is
1474 essential to unbiasedly know, perceive and understand how and why individuals
1475 behave differently according to the context and the particular point in time.
1476 Intelligence processes and cycles must excel in carrying out this endevour. In
1477 doing so, the intelligence staff should develop specific courses of action to
1478 collect, process and analyse the information in order to provide unbiased and
1479 actionable intelligence products for the decision makers at the strategic,
1480 operational and tactical levels.
1481 The intelligence staff should be highly proficient in transcultural awareness and
1482 trained in applying the necessary psychological skills to carry out the
Page 48 of 171
1483 intelligence cycle avoiding the Charcot effect. The aim is twofold: to prevent
1484 intelligence staff from misinterpreting the cultural and psychosocial facts
1485 resulting from distorted perceptions (cognitive or emotional) based on
1486 stereotypes and biased prejudices; and to prevent them from assuming that the
1487 reality conforms solely to their reports since important aspects may have been
1488 ignored. In other words, the experience of intelligence members in the area of
1489 operations does not guarantee that they are applying the appropriate
1490 procedures or analysing the most relevant aspects.
1491 Failing to take into account the cultural and psychosocial context in specific joint
1492 areas of operations and making mistakes during the intelligence cycle may give
1493 rise to serious problems at the strategic (widely spread insurgent movements),
1494 operational (unfavourable public opinion on the part of groups from the host
1495 nation, failure to communicate, ideological radicalization, recruitment of
1496 terrorists, constraints to gather information, etc.) and tactical level (violent
1497 aggressions against coalition members and civilians carried out by frustrated
1498 and radicalized individuals).
1499 At the gathering information stage of the intelligence cycle it is critical to

1500 accurately select the cultural and psychosocial indicators to be assessed
1501 (essential indicators) so that actionable intelligence can be obtained.
1502 The coalition members contributing to the multinational force ought to be aware
1503 and understand the key cultural elements and the psychosocial attitudes of their
1504 own, of the coalition partners and of the host nation. Most importantly, they
1505 should learn to transmit their own values to the coalition partners and to the
1506 actors in the host nation by applying convenient procedures. By acting this way,
1507 divergent attitudes will not arise (thoughts, perceptions, emotions and negative
1508 behaviour) among the coalition members themselves or among coalition forces
1509 and the local population.
1510 Coalition partners must share knowledge and understanding concerning society
1511 as well as the psychosocial dimensions it comprises, the reasons for the
1512 resulting psychosocial attitudes and the intelligence products.
1513 The joint influence operational planning (psychological operations, deterrent

1514 actions, persuasive communication, intermediation, attitude changing, civil-
1515 military relationships, etc.) must be soundly based on unbiased intelligence
1516 products, i.e., reliable and valid information from a scientific perspective. For the
1517 conduction of joint influence operations we should only apply psychosocial
1518 procedures which have been scientifically validated and have proven to be able
1519 to provoke positive attitudes (thoughts, emotions and behaviours) among the
1520 target population.
1521 Communication activities should be carried out by employing verified

1522 procedures serving the operational and tactical planning, the intelligence cycle
1523 as well as the intermediation and influence operations.
Page 49 of 171
1524 In short, in order to appropriately integrate cross-cultural awareness into the

1525 operational and interagency planning, and in the intelligence processes, a
1526 number of aspects must be considered and a series of actions must be carried
1527 out sequentially in a timely fashion.
1528 7.2. Essentials aspects to consider
1529 Operational planners in the joint area of operations must be aware of how
1530 important it is to know and understand key cultural elements (psychosocial
1531 dimensions of behaviour) and attitudes (thoughts, emotions and behaviours
1532 implied) of all the actors in the area, including coalition partners.
1533 Positive communication and procedures that promote it are critical to interact
1534 with differing social groups and to collect information. Although it seems
1535 obvious, the fact is that it is not always duly considered (see Annex “Basic
1536 concepts about communication and intergroup relationships”).
1537 Appropriate and positive communication is critical to collect the information

1538 which will allow to accurately describe and explain the various psychosocial
1539 events.
1540 It is necessary to describe and explain the attitudes of all the actors intervening
1541 in the target society, including laymen, in order to know and understand it
1542 unbiasedly and contribute to the decision-making process during the
1543 deployment. It is essential to train communication skills to this end.
1544 Knowing something does not necessarily imply understanding it. Understanding
1545 something involves being able to explain the reasons why something occurs.
1546 In the intelligence processes, it is critical to consider the cultural aspects and
1547 the psychosocial attitudes of the actors participating in the deployment area.
1548 Communication skills are paramount to enhance the intelligence processes and,
1549 therefore, to develop actionable intelligence products serving the decision-
1550 making process.
1551 Intelligence staff ought to be trained to use psychological skills relating to the
1552 communication, attention and perception fields which can assure reliable
1553 information, unbiased interpretations and balanced analysis.
1554 Intelligence planners must be aware of all the items aforementioned.
1555 The operational planning as well as the influence operations planning should be
1556 based on the knowledge and unbiased understanding of the key cultural and
1557 psychological attitudes of all the actors, including non-partners, that interact in
1558 the deployment area. The key attitudes will be the essential indicators to be
Page 50 of 171
1559 thoroughly considered in the intelligence process in order to develop unbiased

1560 actionable products, which will contribute to the operational planning and will
1561 allow to scientifically assess the results.
1562 Direct and positive communication with laymen on a daily basis is paramount in
1563 order not to develop distorted perceptions. It can also contribute to prevent
1564 negative and biased attitudes, ideological polarization and identity
1565 radicalization.
1566 It is important to produce operational intelligence shared by interagencies;

1567 special emphasis will be put on using common rules, terminology and analysis
1568 methods in order to strengthen the ties among the members of the intelligence
1569 community. The idea is to develop collaborative links between different
1570 organizations and governmental departments which possess high connectivity,
1571 agile, flexible, adaptative and secure networks capable of being timely
1572 responsive. Moreover, interagencies must reach an agreement to use common
1573 concepts and terms.
1574 7.3. Essential indicators to be assessed in the deployment area
1575 This section focuses on aspects considered essential to develop transcultural

1576 awareness, positive communication and influence activities and to change
1577 attitudes in the area of operations. All these aspects must be known, assessed,
1578 quantified and understood to be able to integrate cross-cultural awareness into
1579 the operational and interagency planning, and into the intelligence processes
1580 carried out in areas of operations where a conflict takes place, specially
1581 asymmetric conflicts and insurgencies.
1582 It must be highlighted that the type of interaction with members of a particular
1583 society will be dependent upon their cultural and psychosocial features.
1584 Interactions and influence operations will be more effective if we know the key
1585 features governing the behaviour of a particular social group. Possessing a
1586 reliable mapping of the particular cultural and psychosocial characteristics of a
1587 society will contribute to do away with uncertainty in the decision-making
1588 process.
1589 7.3.a. Psychosocial factors
1590 Cultural studies have been carried out from three main perspectives: “people’s
1591 psychology (cultural identity and migrations)”, “culture and personality
1592 (psychological anthropology, cultural psychology)” and “transcultural studies”.
1593 However, culture has been recently studied from other perspectives: social
1594 psychology, psychopathologies and evolutionary psychology. Furthermore, it is
1595 important to identify, describe and understand all these indicators since the
1596 procedures and strategies we use to interact and communicate positively will be
Page 51 of 171
1597 conditional on their presence in the prevailing culture in the deployment area,
1598 their scope and the frequency with they are displayed.
1599 Culture has been traditionally defined according to six dimensions: descriptive
1600 (it takes into account all aspects of human life such as knowledge, art,
1601 language, politics, economy, etc.), psychosocial (it focuses on socialization
1602 processes and individual learning), historical (customs, social heritage,
1603 knowledge present in books and objects), structural (how culture is organized,
1604 shared rules and other determining factors –socio-economical, historical,
1605 genetic, environmental, situational, etc.), normative (rules, social role norms,
1606 imperative values), genetic (culture seen as been able to adapt to people’s
1607 environment as a result of persistent social interactions and the human creative
1608 processes).
1609 Culture comprises objective components (material and tangible) related to

1610 manufacturing, commodities, environmental features of the society, symbols,
1611 interpersonal interaction distance, gestures, glances, postures, language, rites,
1612 myths, heroes, etc., and subjective components (immaterial and intangible)
1613 related to ideas, values, perceptions, reasoning, etc.
1614 A set of psychosocial factors should necessarily be considered in order to

1615 understand the prevailing culture within a particular society as well as its
1616 members’ attitudes (beliefs, behaviours and emotions). We address the
1617 following ones:
1618 Beliefs (cognitions): thoughts and expressions about facts or events considered
1619 to be true.
1620 Roles: expected behaviours from different groups of individuals according to

1621 their position in the social hierarchy.
1622 Norms and expectations: rules governing the desirable and undesirable
1623 behaviours, beliefs and emotions of individuals sharing a common culture, that
1624 is to say, rules governing attitudes.
1625 Symbols: all those things having a specific and shared meaning for a cultural
1626 group.
1627 Emotions: affective states and feelings associated with thoughts. It is important
1628 to have information about the dimensions of emotions which are particular for
1629 each culture. That is to say, objective and accurate assessments of a society’s
1630 emotional features should be carried out since they determine the subjects’
1631 attitudes in life. The following dimensions (affective-emotional states) are
1632 addressed along with their basic essential indicators:
Page 52 of 171
1633 1. Dimension-State “Pleasantness-Excitement”. The prevailing emotions

1634 as essential indicators of this affective state are the following: energy,
1635 joy, enthusiasm, satisfaction, happiness, courage, pride.
1636 2. Dimension-State “Pleasantness-Calm”. The prevailing emotions as

1637 essential indicators of this affective state are the following: calm,
1638 certainty, pleasure, affection, desire.
1639 3. Dimension-State “Unpleasantness-Excitement”. The prevailing

1640 emotions as essential indicators of this affective state are the following:
1641 aversion, hatred, ire, rage, hesitation, tension.
1642 4. Dimension-State “Unpleasantness-Calm”. The prevailing emotions as

1643 essential indicators of this affective state are the following: humiliation,
1644 fear, sadness, apathy, exhaustion, boredom, procrastination, frustration,
1645 negligence.
1646 The following are aspects that must also be assessed: oral tradition maintained
1647 by the local population, scholar and general literature, main social rumors (in
1648 certain societies rumors can be regarded as truths if their source is considered
1649 an authority), prevailing opinions concerning socialization processes,
1650 psychosocial traits of officials and local leaders, psychosocial traits of the
1651 decision makers, religious, ethnic, historical and cultural icons and symbols, etc.
1652 Values: insights and desirable endstates in one’s life that act as referents and
1653 guidelines. It is important to have information about the dimensions of values
1654 which are particular for each culture. That is to say, objective and accurate
1655 assessments of a society’s psychosocial features should be carried out. It is
1656 worth mentioning the following ones:
1657 1. Individualism vs. collectivism. It is important to be aware of whether

1658 the focus is either on the individual or on the group. The most
1659 outstanding features of collectivist societies (e.g., Asian and Arabic
1660 societies) are the following ones: great emphasis on groups; respect and
1661 loyalty to power; emphasis on group harmony; think in terms of “we”;
1662 interdependence relationships are not chosen on a voluntary basis; the
1663 values are solely applicable to one group; individual’s interest is more
1664 important than group’s interest; materialist; traditional; slow decision-
1665 making cycles; non-auntonomous affectively; shared responsibility;
1666 loyalty to the group; relationships are more valuable than achievements;
1667 reciprocity; people only trust individuals known to them; abstract entities
1668 (companies) are not reliable for them. Conversely, the most remarkable
1669 features of individualistic societes (Western, North American and
1670 European societies) are the following ones: think in terms of “I”; the
1671 group’s values can be extended to other groups; people’s welfare is
1672 sought; hedonistic; intelectual and affective autonomy; individual
1673 responsibility; success is valued; distinctive from other people; individual
Page 53 of 171
1674 achievements are more important than social relationships; reciprocity is

1675 relative; individuality; agreed relationships within the group; commitment
1676 on a equality basis; status on merit.
1677 2. Hierarchical distance or power distance. It is important to be aware of

1678 the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and
1679 institutions accept that power is distributed unequally. Hierarchical
1680 societies (e.g. Asian, Latin American or some Arabic societies) tend to be
1681 collectivist, conservative and tense, avoid uncertainty and accept power
1682 inequalities. Non-hierarchical societies (e.g. Western societies) do not
1683 accept large power inequalities, are responsible and defend social
1684 justice.
1685 3. Masculinity vs. femininity. It is important to be aware of whether culture

1686 imposes differences between men and women. In masculine cultures
1687 (e.g. Asian, Arabic and Latin American ones) people make an emphasis
1688 on gender stereotypes, success, wealth and competitiveness. In female
1689 cultures (e.g., in North Europe) the difference between gender roles are
1690 more blurred; cooperation is valued; and people are not so competitive.
1691 4. Uncertainty avoidance. It is important to be aware of the extent (high or

1692 low) to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain
1693 situations. In cultures with high uncertainty avoidance (e.g. Arabic and
1694 African societies) peeple feel anxious about unknown circumstances;
1695 they seek assurance, are prone to suffer from personal crisis and can
1696 easily be psychologically affected; they are very likely to get tense; in
1697 order to defend themselves from uncertainty, people resort to
1698 conservative and inflexible rules and guidelines. In cultures with low
1699 uncertainty avoidance (e.g. Western societies), people are more relaxed,
1700 assume risks, do not adhere to strict and inflexible rules and are not so
1701 conservative.
1702 5. High vs. low fatalism. The most remarkable features of high fatalism
1703 societies (Asian and Arabic ones) are the following: events are
1704 considered to be inevitable; uncertain about human power to make a
1705 difference; short-notice planning; reactive rather than preventive; they do
1706 no account for time or resources in their planning activities; actions are
1707 ill-considered and not well-informed; agreements are considered hopes
1708 rather than an aim or something to abide by; life and events are
1709 unpredictable; striving to change things is considered to be arrogant and
1710 silly; events are considered to be so complex that cannot be controlled.
1711 On the contrary, in low fatalism societies (Western, North American and
1712 European) it is thought that most goals can be achieved making an effort
1713 and using appropriate resources.
Page 54 of 171
1714 6. Neutrality vs. affectiviy. Neutral societies (Asian and Arabic ones)
1715 disapprove of intense public emotional communication. Affective
1716 societies (Western ones) approve of showing emotions conforming to the
1717 place and social role.
1718 7. High context vs. low context. In high context societies (e.g. Arabic
1719 ones) most of the information is either in the physical context or in the
1720 person, while very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the
1721 message. Communication acts are indirect and implicit, and assertions
1722 do not imply a commitment. Understaments are used to avoid
1723 confrontation and oral messages are not accurate. In low context
1724 societes (e.g. European ones) communication is direct, concise, explicit
1725 and accurate. Assertions and proposals involve commitment.
1726 8. High vs. low group identification. The most outstanding features of
1727 high group identification societies (e.g., in the Middle East and Asia) are
1728 the following ones: socially interdependent; group identity is more
1729 important than technological breakthroughs; traits and values are not
1730 individual; individual experiences are not relevant; they seek protection
1731 and help within the group; initiative is overwhelmed by the group; they
1732 stereotype and discrimiante individuals from other groups; individual
1733 ideas are not important; decisions are made under the pressure exerted
1734 by the group; emotionally unstable; they are prone to religious and
1735 political radicalization; the individual is not important. However, low group
1736 identification societies are characterized by the opposite features.
1737 9. High vs. low sense of honor. The most remarkable features of
1738 societies with high sense of honor (e.g., Arabic ones) are the following
1739 ones: high ego; an individual’s honor affects his/her family and viceversa;
1740 honor is a personal value; hospitality is honourable; physical jobs are not
1741 honourable and people performing this kind of jobs are not respected;
1742 honor is linked to dignity; in order not to lose dignity punishment is
1743 preferred to admitting wrongdoing; recognizing one's limitations is
1744 shameful; direct critism is not honourable; decisions which may offend
1745 someone are delayed; positive critism makes individuals feel insulted
1746 and degraded cognitively and emotionally; revenge is a must; showing
1747 respect and caring about dignity is more important than choosing the
1748 best option available. Societies with a low sense of honor (e.g. Western
1749 societies) are characterized by the opposite features. It is even believed
1750 that delaying important decisions shows reluctance to change, inability to
1751 learn and lack of courage.
1752 10. Polychronic vs. monochronic time. In societies with a polychronic

1753 perception of time (e.g., Western ones), several things can be done at
1754 the same time without being regarded as impolite or rude. In societies
Page 55 of 171
1755 with a monochronic perception of time (e.g., Asian ones), things are done
1756 sequentially.
1757 11. High vs. low contact. High contact societies (e.g., Asian and African
1758 ones) are characterized by high physical contact between people with a
1759 few exceptions (women, authorities, leaders). Conversely, in low contact
1760 societies (e.g. Central and North Europe) there is little physical contact
1761 between people.
1762 12. High vs. low importance of time. Societies which attribute low
1763 importance to time (Asian and Latin American ones) consider it flexible
1764 and think it must be devoted to personal interactions rather than to
1765 achive certaing goals. Agendas and schedules are threatening and
1766 counterproductive. Societies which give high importance to time (e.g.,
1767 Western ones) consider it a tangible and valuable consumable. Time
1768 must be spent intelligently.
1769 13. Etnocentrism. High ethnocentrism: the group’s culture is placed at the
1770 top of an imagined hierarchy; other cultures or nations are denigrated;
1771 the information coming from other groups is selectively processed on the
1772 basis of prejudices; high identity polarization; suspicion prevails;
1773 negotiations are avoided; when in conflict reconciliation is not sought; the
1774 actions carried out by one’s group members are considered legitimate
1775 regardless of the cost of the conflict; knowing the other is not important;
1776 intolerant behaviours are displayed to the other. Low ethnocentrism:
1777 the ethnic group is not relevant; the information from other ethnic groups
1778 is processed in full; nobody is considered a dissident; no identity
1779 polarization; authoritative impositions are rejected; negotiations are
1780 considered to be useful; reconciliation is important; criticism is exercised;
1781 knowing the other is important; the cost of the conflict is a matter of
1782 concern; tolerant behaviours are displayed to the other.
1783 7.3.b. Psychological factors
1784 It is important to have information about the dimensions of a society’s reasoning

1785 logic. The following ones can be highlighted:
1786 1. Holistic vs. analytical thinking. Societies using analytical thinking (e.g.,
1787 Western ones) applies Aristotle’s logic to classify the features of people
1788 and events. Events are considered to be due to particular causes.
1789 People focus on the problem, try to simplify and use deductive thinking.
1790 Societies using holistic thinking (e.g. Arabic ones) consider events and
1791 behaviours comprehensively, including secondary traits. When facing a
1792 problem, they take into consideration many details and the solutions are
1793 complex. Inductive thinking is preferred.
Page 56 of 171
1794 2. Concrete vs. hypothetical thinking. The main features of societies

1795 (e.g., Arabic ones) that employ concrete thinking are the following ones:
1796 people’s own experiences are the base for their planning and decisions;
1797 inductive thinking is preferred; they feel uncertain about predictions, learn
1798 by heart, admire literate people, do not make suggestions, accept
1799 events, need emperical data derived from experience; speculations are
1800 misread and regard them threatening; speculations can become a reality
1801 for individuals; they apply rigid and inflexible reasoning patterns.
1802 Societies employing hypothetical reasoning (e.g. Western ones) prefer
1803 deductive reasoning, try to plan actions and anticipate results, rely on
1804 predictions, make suggestions and proposals and speculate. Indidivials
1805 do not always need emperical data derived from experience. Flexible
1806 reasoning patterns are applied.
1807 7.3.c. Factors supporting the ideological radicalization (religion, politic, ethnic)
1808 and the indoctrination.
1809 Next, we are going to deal with some indicators related to psychological
1810 manipulations.These are particular relevant in areas of asymmetric conflict
1811 where there may likely emerge recruiters and indoctrination leaders in charge of
1812 training individuals for insurgencies. Operational planners and intelligence staff
1813 must be aware of how important it is to identify, assess and quantify this set of
1814 indicators. The information about the scope of these indicators must be shared
1815 with all the members of the coalition and civil actors.
1816 The following two sections describe aspects of psychological manipulation

1817 applied to “coercive persuasion” and “psychological abuse”.
1818 7.3.c.(1) Coercive persuasion indicators
1819 Taxonomy of psychological manipulation indicators according to the dimension

1820 of behaviour they affect (environmental, emotional, cognitive, consciousness
1821 alterations).
1822 - Environmental indicators
1823 Isolation. The purpose is to capsulise the subject physically, socially and
1824 psychologically. The links with the outer world will be broken so as to
1825 uproot and detach him from the protective social network he belongs to.
1826 So, the individual grows apart from his closer people, values, past and,
1827 consequently from his own history.
1828 Information control. This procedure is closely linked to the previous one.
1829 The access to information from mass media y some books is limited.
1830 Furthermore, the information about foreign affairs is assigned new
Page 57 of 171
1831 meaning without clearly providing evidence for such a procedure. Young
1832 children’s education is overseen and controlled.
1833 Existential dependence. When the subject delegates his self-

1834 responsibilities to the coercive group, this one becomes responsible for
1835 the subject’s vital necessities (food, clothes, language, expressions, up
1836 to minor details in one’s life). Survivability depends on being a member of
1837 the group.
1838 Psychophysical undermining. Three procedures are normally applied to

1839 achieve the end sought: (1) poor or unbalanced diet; (2) restricted sleep
1840 time; and (3) physical and psychological undermining by depriving the
1841 subject from his energy due to physical efforts.
1842 - Emotional indicators
1843 Activation of emotional delight. The subject receives affect massively so

1844 as to lead him to an idyllic emotional state. As a result the present is
1845 extended historically. The subject negates his past and his conversion
1846 and belonging to the new group is considered a rebirth.
1847 Activation of emotional fear, guilt and anxiety by granting rewards and
1848 punishment selectively. By alternating rewards and punishment, and an
1849 extensive use of confession, the subject progressively internalize guilt as
1850 a mechanism of full control. A loop consisting of guilt-confession-grief is
1851 created, which allows for the easy manipulation for the subject.
1852 - Cognitive indicators
1853 Denigration of critical thinking. The subject’s reasoning ability is attacked

1854 subtly and, on occasions, overtly.
1855 Employment of deception and lies. During the recruitment stage the
1856 goals of the group are concealed. When the individual becomes a
1857 member the information is provided tendentiously.
1858 Condescension and group identification. The subject becomes an

1859 element of the group to homogenize his ideas with those of the other
1860 members’. The purpose is to break links and mould a new identity for the
1861 individual.
1862 Attention control. It involves keeping the subject busy with indoctrination
1863 tasks to have his attention focused on the coercive group.
1864 Language control. Many coercive groups develop their own jargon
1865 (gangs of youth, sects, terrorist groups, mafias). Expressions are given a
1866 new symbolic meaning which gives coherence to the group and a sense
Page 58 of 171
1867 of group membership to the subject. Moreover, words can be loaded with
1868 emotions.
1869 Authority alteration. In a coercive group the authority is held by the leader
1870 and his doctrine.
1871 - Indicators related to dissociative alteration of consciousness
1872 The most frequently used procedures to provoke alteration of consciousness

1873 are the following ones: (1) chants, mantras and the so called “speak in
1874 languages”; (2) meditation, prayers and other activities intended to prevent
1875 subjects from thinking; (3) rites intended to negate one’s past; (6) isolation and
1876 sensory deprivation; (5) sensory overload; (6) psychophysical undermining; (7)
1877 monotonous and repetitive tasks; (8) the use of drugs.
1878 7.3.c.(2) Indicators of group psychological abuse
1879 Psychological abuse refers to practices that treat a person as an object to be

1880 manipulated and used, rather than as a subject whose mind, autonomy, identity,
1881 and dignity are to be honored. According to the frequency and intensity of such
1882 practices it can be distinguished between highly manipulative groups and
1883 benign groups. Psychological abuse can be empirically described according to
1884 the breadth and scope of practices such as subjection, exploitation, mind
1885 control and anxious dependence.
1886 A tool for the assessment and quantification of these indicators by key
1887 observers can be found in the following article: Trujillo, H.M., Ramírez, J.J. &
1888 Alonso, F. (in press), “Evidences of coercive persuasion for indoctrination of
1889 jihadist terrorists: Towards violent radicalization”, Universitas Psychologica.
1890 In short, the final product will be a shared and standard instrument which can be
1891 employed by the coalition members to assess a number of aspects: the
1892 psychosocial conditions of the host society as well as the psychosocial,
1893 psychological and cultural aspects of the different packages and actors forming
1894 the coalition in the area of operations.
1895
Page 59 of 171
1896 7.4. Chart of psychosocial and psychological distance
1897 This section shows an example of what can be called “chart of idiosyncratic
1898 distance” between different groups or societies. The colours stand for a broad
1899 psychosocial and psychological profile of three groups or societies. The color
1900 red symbolizes the profile of the Afghan society, blue the profile of Latin
1901 societies and green the profile of Anglo-Saxon societies. The assessment is
1902 carried out on a scale ranging from “one” (none) to "ten" (very much).
Collectivism
Hierarchy
Emotional
neutrality
Uncertainty
Context avoidance
communication
Masculinity
Group
Identity
Excitement 10 5 1 Honor
Holistic Unpleasantnes
thinking
Etnocentris
Monochroníc m
Time
Contact
Low
Concrete
importance
reasoning
1903
1904
Page 60 of 171
1905 8. THE INTEGRATION OF CROSS-CULTURAL AWARENESS IN

1906 FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE
1907 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1908 Note: This chapter presents tentative results and conclusions since the field
1909 work is still under way. In order to have a detailed account of the work done by
1910 research line 2, find attached the annex to Volume 1 “Working Progress Report
1911 DEC 2009 MNE-6 Line 2”.
1913 In an area where military operations are to be carried out, the local culture can
1914 be analyzed from a number of perspectives: a generic approach (which
1915 provides a definition of culture and the identification of a set of cultural
1916 dimensions, etc.); an anthropological point of view (special emphasis is put on
1917 cultural factors common to every culture); and from a psychological point of
1918 view (cross-sectional activity which encompasses all the dimensions). The
1919 knowledge gained from such an analysis may exert an influence on the very
1920 military operations.
1921 Among the different activities performed by military units, civil-military

1922 operations (CIMIC), psychological operations (PSYOPS), key leader
1923 engagement (KLE) and public information (PI) require a closer relationship with
1924 the civil population.
1925 As the semantics of CIMIC activities varies from nation to nation, for the
1926 purposes of the present study we shall adopt the standard definition approved
1927 by the NATO nations. According to the AJP 9, CIMIC is defined as "the co-
1928 ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO
1929 Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities,
1930 as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and
1931 agencies."21
1932 In a similar fashion, PSYOPS22 is defined as “Planned psychological activities

1933 using methods of communications and other means directed to approved
1934 audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting
1935 the achievement of political and military objectives.” KLE23 is one part of the Info
1936 Ops contribution to an operation and it is vital that all key actors and their inter-
21
AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine. See https://nsa.nato.int
22
AJP-3.10.1(A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations. See https://nsa.nato.int
23
AJP-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations. See https://nsa.nato.int
Page 61 of 171
1937 relationships are identified. Having detailed knowledge of key leaders’

1938 personalities, leadership styles, ambitions, motivations, objectives (short and
1939 long term), current stances, dependencies, psychological profiles and personal
1940 histories will be essential to provide the context to plan appropriate information
1941 activities. A vital component in all plans will be to recognise the complex,
1942 adaptive relationships and dependencies that exist between actors. And finally
1943 Public Information24 is the information released or published for the primary
1944 purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their
1945 understanding and support.
1946 8.2. Objetives:
1947 Research Line 2 is expected to yield the following results:
1948 vision of the concept of cross-cultural awareness on the part of the

1949 coalition's personnel;
1950 identification of the most relevant cultural factors bonded to military (and
1951 civil) activities that should be considered when deployed to an
1952 operational environment;
1953 identification of the most relevant cultural factors to be considered in the

1954 case of Afghanistan;
1955 identification of potential ways to contribute to the development of the

1956 field manual;
1957 provision of conclusions and recommendations which eventually may

1958 suggest the amendment of military and civil organizations’ doctrine
1959 publications and operating procedures.
1960 8.3. Methodology
1961 Two different types of interviews have been used to carry out the present
1962 research work (which complements the life history interviews made by the
1963 anthropologists responsible for objective 4.3). In the case of Spanish forces,
1964 personal structured interviews have been employed involving military personnel
1965 who have served in the operational environment. In foreign countries, they
1966 opted for written questionnaires. Each model of interview is intended to provide
1967 answers to a set of questions; however, both of them converge on three tenets:
1968 importance of possessing cultural knowledge; the meaning of culture for the
24
AAP-6(2009) Nato Glossary of Terms and Definitions. See https://nsa.nato.int
Page 62 of 171
1969 personnel participating in the mission; and identification of the most relevant
1970 cultural factors.
1971 8.4. Tentative results
1972 This chapter shows tentative results for the following sections:
1973 1. the concept of cross-cultural awareness held by the coalition’s personnel;
1974 2. identification of the most relevant cultural factors to be considered in the

1975 case of Afghanistan;
1976 3. tentative observations and recommendations, as December 31 2009.
1977 The tentative results yielded by the present research work focus on the
1978 perceptions of the relationships between the military forces and their operational
1979 environment. During the exploratory phase, a selection of the set of relevant
1980 factors was carried out through pre-test interviews in order to conceptually
1981 scope the research work. Military personnel with experience in international
1982 missions, particularly Afghanistan, were interviewed.
1983 For a better understanding of the process applied to determine the cultural
1984 factors, the politologic approach and the data collection design, refer to the
1985 annex attached “Working Progress Report DEC 2009 MNE-6 Line 2”.
1986 8.5. Vision of the concept of cross-cultural awareness on the part of the
1987 coalition's personnel
1988 This section shows a number of visions of the concept of cross-cultural

1989 awareness held by the coalition’s military personnel. First, the interviewees are
1990 required to explain the meaning of cross-cultural awareness and, then, to list
1991 the cultural aspects they deem essential to carry out their duties successfully.
1992 Concerning the first question, the results suggest that the term “culture” should
1993 not prevent the use of other complementary terms. The concept of adaptation
1994 may render itself more meaningful and descriptive than “culture” when
1995 considering the military personnel’s answers. Hence, that very concept may
1996 also be useful viewed as the rational adaptive responses by human beings and
1997 peoples to their environment (Lewellen, 2008) as it has been understood in the
1998 anthropological literature and research works. The concept of adaptation better
1999 encompasses all the dynamic interactions which the actors are subjected to in
2000 the operational environment.
2001 Among all those relationships, our interests focus on the interactions between
2002 the coalition’s personnel and the local population in different spheres. To this
Page 63 of 171
2003 respect, the rapprochement between actors may occur at three different levels:
2004 be, recognize and talk (Mercedes Vilano), which serves as the ontological and
2005 epistemological framework for understanding the interactions between subjects.
2006 The interviewees underline that “they should be aware of the cultural
2007 differences and, consequently, they should integrate them into their procedures
2008 as well”. When in the operational environment, it is paramount to know who is
2009 who and to gain self-knowledge prior to attempting to approach the other.
2010 During the rapprochement process, showing consideration to the other is vital if
2011 a valid relationship is to be built within a framework which encompasses
2012 acceptance and respect (recognize —at the very best implies accepting the
2013 other as equal, which only occurs within highly homogenous groups). Some
2014 interviewees point out that "if you know nothing about them, it is impossible to
2015 interact". A further step is talking, which implies a communicative act where
2016 there exists some sort of balance between the speakers. The perception of the
2017 interviewees is that trying to adapt to the local culture is positive, otherwise trust
2018 will be undermined and dialogue impossible. Similarly, undermining “our being”
2019 will be detrimental to the interactions (as it was addressed when dealing with
2020 conflicting relationships). Therefore, the interviewees link the concept of
2021 adaptation to that of cross-cultural awareness, almost in an intuitive fashion: “be
2022 aware of cultural differences and try to adapt to the local culture", as it was
2023 pointed out by an interviewee.
2024 This intuitive knowledge seems to be general in character since similar answers
2025 are found in questionnaires from other countries: «Cultural awareness means
2026 for me knowledge about existing cultural rules and customs which are different
2027 for each society, national, ethnical and religious group. This knowledge helps to
2028 understand and accept behaviors of “others” that are from other groups. Thanks
2029 to cultural awareness I know that other people can have different points of view
2030 for essential values and I can try to understand them instead of judge them
2031 according to my own principles». Recognizing the other is derived from the
2032 need to know their behaviours and local customs. Thus, knowledge becomes
2033 an instrumental tool within the cycle be-recognize-talk. It grants validity to the
2034 relationships between the subjects and fosters acceptance of the other and a
2035 balance which eventually promotes mutual respect. Therefore, the starting point
2036 is a balance between the interacting subjects. In our case it implies: knowing
2037 our own culture (be), knowing the culture of the other (recognize) and according
2038 to the interactions required (talk).
2039 The above differs from the importance attributed by subjects to knowing the
2040 culture of the other when it is considered as a means to make activities more
2041 effective or subjects more efficient (found in the questionnaires of the other
2042 case studies). It considered important, though not the most important, to
2043 perform their activities. Furthermore, a certain level of isolation can be
2044 identified in their course of duty, which injects noise to the interviews. The
2045 isolation is more observable within the personnel in the operations sections. It
2046 seems to be due to the perceived need to rationalize the operation’s mandate
Page 64 of 171
2047 and the procedures to achieve objective results. Environmental factors such as
2048 culture are obviated. Only the personnel whose duties involve getting in contact
2049 with the local population consider it is essential to possess the deepest
2050 knowledge possible on everything related to culture (even a deeper knowledge
2051 than required since it is regarded highly useful as pointed out by interviewees
2052 from different countries other than Spain). The rest of the personnel are
2053 satisfied with possessing elements or instruments which let them adapt to the
2054 environment. It seems that the relevance attributed to cultural awareness is
2055 closely linked to the needs perceived to perform their duties.
2056 However, there exists a differentiating element which sometimes becomes an

2057 insurmountable obstacle though may be the key to know and accept the
2058 differences: the language. Nevertheless, direct communication shall not
2059 necessarily be a hindrance when recognizing the other. Language may make it
2060 difficult to take the last step in the cycle be-recognize-talk (dialogue) but it does
2061 not prevent it since interpreters can be used. They are acknowledged as
2062 linguistic mediators who may distort the message conveyed (incomplete or bad
2063 translations; they do not speak the local language but a similar one as it is the
2064 case of Dari and Farsi). Interviewees agree on the fact that knowing the
2065 language facilitates valid interactions. However, they admit that learning the
2066 language is difficult, not only due to the learning process itself but also
2067 because a language encompasses a number of cultural meanings which are
2068 difficult to be acquired by the learner, particularly specific usages.
2069 Apart from knowing the culture of the other, the interviewees include the
2070 following aspects as highly relevant to interact with the local population: history,
2071 rules and values, religions, customs, the population’s needs, and social, family,
2072 tribal or any other structure it may exist. Similarly, it is deemed critical to know
2073 the semiotics of behavior: protocols, etiquettes, symbols, gestures and body
2074 language. The questionnaire answers (Poland) reveal that posture.
2075 Some interviewees (questionnaires) highlight the fact that the knowledge gained
2076 is not sufficient. It seems that it is necessary the subjects have a certain degree
2077 of adaptive intelligence and social skills so that the more intense interactions
2078 required for the mission may become valid relationships. So, a set of military
2079 activities require specific individual skills which the learning process is able to
2080 strengthen though unable to produce. According to this, some interviewees hold
2081 the belief that tolerance would meet the requirements to establish valid
2082 relationships. In these cases, the cycle be-recognize-talk is interrupted just
2083 before the dialogue phase though it is not prevented. The results derived from
2084 such an approach is mutual respect, which does not necessarily imply
2085 acceptance of the other. So, when tolerance just suffices there are not many
2086 opportunities for a relationship to be valid. Such a relationship is not necessarily
2087 conflicting but just courteous or neutral —it only facilitates coexistence with
2088 the other.
Page 65 of 171
2089 Anyhow, all the interviewees deem it is important to possess instruments

2090 (knowledge) which facilitate their duties in the operational environment. None of
2091 them ignore that there exists a local population with their own habits, customs,
2092 history, rules or values. They are also aware of the fact that knowing all these
2093 aspects and the differences against their own ones will ease the interactions
2094 with locals when deemed necessary (the level of knowledge will vary according
2095 to the subject's needs or duties in the operational environment). The need to
2096 know the other varies according to the subject’s post, rank or
2097 subjectivity/individuality. Consequently, this is the first part of the cycle be-
2098 recognize-talk. The individuals’ subjective conscience (be) in relation to their
2099 culture or position within the operational environment exerts an influence on the
2100 perceived instrumental need to know the other, i.e., the perception of their
2101 culture is essential to accept or simply tolerate the other. Postures range from
2102 the most realistic ones based on power and on the need not to show superiority
2103 (though assumed) as a self-protection means to the most cosmopolitan ones,
2104 where mutual interests benefit and ease the interactions as well as the
2105 necessary efforts to acquire the instruments needed to create valid
2106 relationships.
2107 At the dialogue phase, it is important to possess valid instruments in order to

2108 generate valid relations and, consequently, increase the level of trust.
2109 Therefore, a dynamic system is built where the concept of cross-cultural
2110 awareness starts to exert an important influence on the mission success. At this
2111 level, individual decisions are meaningful and can alter the structure since they
2112 are able to shift the positions of the actors in the course of the action so that
2113 they can adapt to the operational environment. From the interviewees’ point of
2114 view, attitudes matter at this level. They think that valid relationships are created
2115 when an “open mind” is kept resulting from a subjective state which implies
2116 respecting and accepting the other. For the current research work, the subjects'
2117 minds cannot be accessed. We can only measure their perceptions of the
2118 interactions in the operational environment. The ontological framework of
2119 understanding (be-recognize-talk) does only let us envisage subjects’ attitudes
2120 in order to understand their perceptions.
2121 Secondly, concerning the most outstanding factors of culture, the results vary
2122 according to the way of asking. In the Spanish case, by using semi-structured
2123 interviews the interviewees were not inquired directly. The factors were
2124 extracted from their story about their experience in the operational environment
2125 —mainly through anecdotes. In the case of other countries, a direct question
2126 was included in the questionnaire so, interviewees could freely list the factors.
2127 It worth noting that great importance was placed upon women's role within the
2128 family and the social system as well as upon children. Firstly, there appears to
2129 be a contradiction concerning women since it must be accepted their
2130 disadvantage and invisibility. Concerning children, most people were puzzled by
2131 how parents ignore children until the age of 5 or 7 (when they are considered to
Page 66 of 171
2132 be useful). This was partly justified, in an empathy effort, by the high infant
2133 mortality rate. It must also be highlighted that confusion surrounds the
2134 categories Muslim/Arab, which is probably derived from misleading information.
2135 This confusion is not particular to the military forces. Military personnel cannot
2136 be placed under a different category other than their country’s population when
2137 considering the general knowledge about the culture of the other.
2138 The concepts underlying the cultural factors obtained are the followings ones:
2139 Interviews in Spain:
2140 Family
2141 Marriage (initiation and transit rites)
2142 Symbols
2143 Religion (Fatality)
2144 Age
2145 Lawful / unlawful
2146 Education
2147 Literacy
2148 Power
2149 Leadership
2150 Gender
2151 Honour
2152 Loyalty
2153 Amity / Enmity
2154 Transaction costs
2155 Values and norms
2156 Time (historical)/Time management
2157 Individual/collective. Individual /group-community
2158 Legitimacy
2159 Needs
2160 Tradition (customs)
2161 Tradition / Discourse
2162 Respect / Acknowledgement/Credibility
2163 Conflict
Page 67 of 171
2164 Extrapolation (transfer of knowledge)

2165 Social control
2166 Insurgency / Subversion
2167 Representation
2168 Governance
2169 Status/Role
2170 Public Good
2171 Role of military uniform
2172 Impact of being armed or not armed
2173 Hierarchy within military structures
2174 Perceptions of military culture
2175 Sexuality
2176 Social capital
2177 Employment
2178 Language (in the sense of human interaction)
2179 Security
2180 Knowledge transfer
2181 Attitude
2182 Perceptions
2183 Social services
2184 Corruption
2185 Development
2186 Social change/Evolution
2187 Solidarity
2188 Benefits
2189 Inside/Outside
2190 Networks
2191 Reliability
2192 Sincerity
2193
2194
Page 68 of 171
2195 Questionnaires in the USA
2196 Tribal breakdown

2197 Mannerism
2198 Education
2199 Religion (religious conflict; religious belief and practices)
2200 History; significant historical figures
2201 Poverty
2202 Agriculture
2203 Infraestructure
2204 Food
2205 Family life
2206 Culture
2207 Art
2208 Government
2210 Local traditions
2211 Steriotypes
2212 Gender
2213 Rol
2214 Respect of elders
2215 Motivations
2216 Economy
2217 Law
2218
2219 Questionnaires in Poland
2220 Local customs

2221 Local holidays
2222 Way of thinking
2223 Attitude toward some controversial topics existing in western culture
2224 Symbols
2225 History
Page 69 of 171
2226 Special nation features;

2227 Living conditions standards
2228 Approach to work and duties
2229 Approach to religion, tribe, women and family issue
2230 Sense of belonging to nation community
2231
2232 The lists are not closed since the research work is on course. However, they
2233 may be considered pillars and will not be substantially altered. New items may
2234 be included, particularly relating to the clusters of concepts which are going to
2235 be pre-designed around the cultural factors addressed in this research work. In
2236 order to design the clusters of concepts more information is required, which will
2237 be obtained from research and from the analysis of the data collected.
2238 Concepts are divided as follows.
2239 1. Political concepts
2240 Lawful / unlawful

2241 Law
2242 Power
2243 Governance
2244 Government
2245 Leadership
2246 Legitimacy
2247 Representation
2248 Security
2249 Conflict
2250 Insurgency / Subversion
2251 Sense of belonging to nation community
2252 Education
2253 Literacy
2254 Needs
2255 Transactional costs
2257 Public Good
Page 70 of 171

2259 Corruption
2260 Poverty
2262 Culture
2264 Respect / Acknowledgement/Credibility/ Reliability
2271 Special nation features;
2273 Attitude
2274 Perceptions
2275
2276 2. Social concepts
2277 Family
2278 Family life
2280 Age
2281 Gender
2282 Marriage (initiation and transit rites)
2283 Sexuality
2284 Honour
2285 Loyalty
2286 Amity / Enmity
2287 Social control
2288 Social change/Evolution
Page 71 of 171
2289 Solidarity
2290 Inside/Outside
2291 Networks
2293 Sincerity
2295 Stereotypes
2296 Rol
2297 Motivations
2298 Approach to religion, tribe, women and family issue
2299 Culture
2303 Education
2304 Literacy
2305 Needs
2307 Attitude
2308 Perceptions
2309
2310
2311 3. Economic concepts
2312 Education
2313 Literacy
2314 Transactional costs
2315 Needs
2317 Public Good
2318 Social capital
Page 72 of 171
2319 Employment
2320 Knowledge transfer
2322 Corruption
2323 Development
2324 Benefits
2325 Poverty
2326 Agriculture
2328 Food
2329 Economy
2330 Living conditions standards
2331 Approach to work and duties
2332 Culture
2335 Art
2337 Attitude
2338 Perceptions
2339
2340 4. Historical concepts and concepts related to the belief system
2341 Symbols
2342 Religion (Fatality)
2344 Time (historical)/Time management
2349 Status/Role
Page 73 of 171

2354 Language (in the sense of human interaction)
2355 Mannerism
2357 History
2358 Significant historical figures
2359 Culture
2360 Art
2361 Local traditions
2363 Local customs
2364 Local holidays
2365 Way of thinking
2366 Attitude toward some controversial topics existing in western culture
2367 Special nation features
2368 Attitude
2369 Perceptions
2370
2371 8.6. Cultural factors identified for Afghanistan
2372 8.6.a. Cultural factors within the internal operational environment: “the locals”.
2373 This section deals with the most relevant cultural factors resulting from the
2374 interaction between a number of actors: military forces and local leaders;
2375 military forces and local population; sensitive population groups and local
2376 NGO's; other key actors. Among the set of cultural factors we will identify those
2377 which generate conflict or a clash, and the cultural factors which must be taken
2378 into account to improve interaction and communication:
2379 Factors arising from the relationships between the force and the local
2380 leaders (formal and informal) —this topic will be further elaborated.
Page 74 of 171
2381 Factors arising from the relationships with local institutions.

2382 Factors arising from the relationships of the forces with local populations
2383 and with local NGO’s.
2384 Factors arising from the relationships with other key actors:
2385 businessmen, the police and the Afghan Army.
2386
2387 The factors identified in relation to the relationships and interactions of the
2388 forces with local leaders refer to the concepts aforementioned. Conflict and
2389 clashes emerge in relation to issues such as the vision of the state, how power
2390 and leadership is exercised by local leaders, and how political support and
2391 legitimacy are obtained:
2392 vision of the State;

2393 legitimacy;
2394 political support;
2395 exercise of power;
2396 exercise of leadership (formal and informal).
2397
2398 Concepts such as State, legitimacy, power and leadership reveal the keys to
2399 extract and understand the cultural factors intrinsic to the relationships between
2400 subjects. When external actors (international) view these concepts within the
2401 Afghan context, there emerge the most important cultural factors which are to
2402 be taken into account for the present analysis. Hence, definitions for State,
2403 power, legitimacy, support and leadership should be developed by political
2404 anthropology. Let the definition of State be an example.
2405 From the point of view of the political science, Afghanistan is far from being
2406 even a sketch of a modern state. None of the features which characterizes
2407 democracy are visible. A modern state encompasses a series of related
2408 categories and political phenomena which are consistent. The institutional and
2409 hierarchical framework of the state is based on the society and, consequently, is
2410 endowed to access, control and guide it. That gives rise to a set of political
2411 categories. The State is sovereign and embodies the supreme power in society.
2412 State sovereignty is called “national” since it is derived from society as a nation,
2413 a community linked by strong identity, symbolic and cultural links. Therefore, the
2414 nation is the source of legitimacy of the State; it is auctoritas, which grants
2415 authority to exercise potestas. Society is interwoven into the State through a
2416 complex administrative network. The State is the source of law and has the
2417 monopoly of violence. Furthermore, it has the capacity to guide and foster
2418 large scale social transformations such as the nation’s modernization. Modern
Page 75 of 171
2419 states are based on highly literate societies, being pluralism one of their most
2420 outstanding features. This implies a high degree of cultural secularism.
2421 However, if the State is to be democratic and number of features should be
2422 added. The State, in general, and the government, in particular, are subjected
2423 to the principle of majority. States and governments' actions on the society alike
2424 are limited since there exists a number of individual and collective rights. The
2425 State should be characterized by the separation of balanced powers.
2426 None of these features can be found in Afghanistan. The statement is

2427 corroborated by interview responses on part of the personnel deployed to that
2428 area. This creates a number of concatenated problems. Firstly, there is a huge
2429 lack of support to build such a State. Given the current conditions, conflict
2430 inevitably arises with the population being provided assistance. It cannot be
2431 built the kind of Afghanistan the Afghan themselves do not want to. That makes
2432 the endevour be highly complex and ultimately may render it impossible to carry
2433 out. On the other hand, we should not build the exact kind of Afghanistan the
2434 Afghans are willing to have so long as we are certain about their identity.
2435 Anyhow, the new State's ability to create and maintain its authority and power
2436 over the society and to be seen as capable and solid will be decisive for its
2437 continuity. The main three objectives will be having the monopoly of violence,
2438 becoming the only source of law and creating a mildly effective administration.
2439 In order to achieve the above objectives, the infant Afghan State should be able
2440 to control the main networks of social power or to impose, at least, a set of
2441 negotiation or cooperation conditions. The new State has to transform and
2442 reorient the power structures in society by providing coherence under its
2443 leadership, by incorporating and changing the elites in order to create a solid
2444 feeling of allegiance and loyalty to the nation.
2445 Political anthropology has also studied the State. The State emerges and
2446 evolves when there is a resource surplus. Therefore, it is typical of societies
2447 which practice intensive agriculture. Surpluses are controlled by an elite.
2448 Leadership is, consequently, exercised by an individual or elite group which
2449 rests upon bureaucracy, supra-familiar loyalties above linage or clan, a classy
2450 structure and an economic redistribution based on tributes or taxes.
2451 “Legitimacy derives from the group’s political culture, people’s expectations
2452 about the nature of power and on how to get the power”. Political support is a
2453 broad concept which includes everything intended to remain in power. Coercion
2454 (force) and legitimacy are two basic types of support (Lewellen, 2008).
2455 In the case of Afghanistan, it can be highlighted the varied visions of the State
2456 according to the degree of support provided by the social groups. Two groups
2457 can be distinguished: those who believe in the State (pro-government) and
2458 those who do not (non pro-government). This distinction is pertinent since it has
2459 a bearing on the relationships with the force depending on the degree of pro-
2460 Western progress or radicalization of the population.
Page 76 of 171
2461 Fundamentally, Afghanistan is a failed state which is being rebuilt upon a

2462 puzzle made up of social structures such as the family, the clan or the tribe.
2463 Social realities based upon ethnicity, family tribes must be undermined so that
2464 the State may have, at least, a mildly solid foundation.
2465
2466 The centrality of these types of organization hinders the development of a
2467 community’s sense as well as the pursuit of common welfare. Moreover, the
2468 State must promote a process of modernization to create a modern state.
2469 The principle of authority rests upon individuals such as religious or tribal
2470 leaders, institutional leaders or even the elderly. In all these instances, the
2471 power distance is large, i.e., the subject’s power position relative to the
2472 leaders. Populations and the bulk of social groups made up of less powerful
2473 individuals accept that power is distributed unequally. This reality affects the
2474 forces deployed in a number of ways. Firstly, relationships must be built up with
2475 the leaders in order to interact with the population and to achieve the objectives
2476 of the PRT. So, CIMIC activities addressed to the local leaders are critical within
2477 this type of societies: social groups accept power inequalities and display
2478 unquestioning obedience to the leaders. In such an environment, if valid
2479 relationships are created, the overall population will accept them.
2480 Legitimacy and political support are also important. A core objective of the
2481 mission is to provide civil support (State officials) in Afghanistan. The political
2482 support on the part of the PRT is crucial. In fact, it is one of the objectives of the
2483 mission: “support the Afghan government”. They are the visible face of
2484 governance; the military forces provide support and gain prestige for the
2485 government. The underlying problem is that, on most occasions, local
2486 authorities are not concerned with the idea of public welfare, so they use the
2487 State’s instruments, which strengthen the legitimacy, to carry out actions on an
2488 individual fashion. Local leaders, and many other key actors, who must be
2489 identified and contacted to act jointly are part of the problem rather than part of
2490 the solution. Traditional informal leaders are quite often mixed up with formal
2491 leaders or legitimate authorities. Legitimacy may originate from many sources.
2492 Anyhow, all the sources of the leader or public authority’s legitimacy contribute
2493 to strengthen the leader’s capacity to act. This is one of the main reasons why
2494 the personnel who interact with the local leaders should have the best
2495 education possible (knowledge and experience) as their individual decisions
2496 are going to be crucial to build up a valid relationship.
2497 We must draw a distinction between individual interests and the population's
2498 interest, which quite frequently may turn out to be a difficult task. Traditional
2499 leaders and authorities who enjoy some sort of legitimacy will use their
2500 privileges to make decisions on behalf of the population, and the latter one will
2501 not object to it. New leaders are normally literate to some extent, while
2502 traditional ones generally lack education. The former ones are aware of the fact
2503 that they must be involved in the process and are also prone to change. The
2504 latter ones are reluctant to change since they feel constrained to become
Page 77 of 171
2505 members of the new state structure and find it difficult to discriminate the
2506 benefits they may obtain from aid projects. Traditional leaders are less aware of
2507 the structural needs and tend to use PRT (Quick Impact Projects) to increase
2508 their own prestige and decision capability. On the other hand, as already
2509 mentioned, locals will be reluctant to accept any action which has not been
2510 previously approved of by the traditional leader. Cultural knowledge and
2511 experience are, once again, key factors to build up a valid relationship.
2512 The following are some of the factors identified causing cultural clashes:
2513 corruption / presents;

2514 professionalism / responsibility;
2515 solidarity / egoism;
2516 common welfare / private property;
2517 needs;
2518 loyalty;
2519 amity / enmity;
2520 promises.
2521
2522 The list above should be analyzed from the local population and military
2523 personnel’s perspectives. In order to increase the knowledge about local
2524 leaders and how to approach them, it is crucial to be aware of how differently
2525 both groups understand the concepts listed since those differences give origin
2526 to cultural clashes. By increasing the knowledge about the different
2527 interpretations of the concepts by the population from the source culture
2528 (military forces) and the population from the host culture, there will emerge
2529 better opportunities to build up valid relationships.
2530 Firstly, corruption is culturally deep rooted. For local leaders, some actions
2531 may be just an exchange of privileges or presents while for Western military
2532 forces it is outright corruption. Military forces consider that giving presents to
2533 local leaders is a matter of bribery or blackmail. The local population's
2534 assessment drastically differs from the previous one. Presents are a key
2535 element which serves as a recognition of the leader's decision capacity,
2536 whether the action is beneficial or detrimental to the local population's interests.
2537 All in all, presents are the rewards for holding a post (what they deserve for
2538 carrying out their duties).
2539 Interviewees consider that there are high rates of corruption and it affects every
2540 domain of the local society. However, from the locals’ point of view exchanging
2541 privileges implies providing help to close relatives or friends: the family or the
Page 78 of 171
2542 clan. It is assumed that close people deserve help, but it is not to be provided to
2543 the general community. The community will get help in exchange for work or
2544 services provided to the traditional leader, or by being loyal to him. So, the aim
2545 will be to preferably benefit relatives. From this point of view corruption is
2546 perceived as benefitial for a close group which is given privileges. It contributes
2547 to create networks which will support the leader in case his legitimacy or power
2548 is put at stake. It is very similar to the studies on family, clan and tribal networks
2549 in Africa by J—F. Bayart (El estado de África: la política del vientre, Bellaterra,
2550 1999) [The State in Africa: the Politics of the Belly].
2551 Corruption is conceived as any abuse of a public post aimed at obtaining private
2552 benefit or profit. The corruption in Afghanistan has been reported by
2553 international agencies and the international actors on the ground. According to
2554 the World Bank Institute, Afghanistan ranks among the first four most corrupt
2555 countries in the world, which is one of the biggest obstacles to investments in
2556 the country (Investment Climate Assessment for Afghanistan 2005). Analysts
2557 relate corruption and the opium market though the availability of resources from
2558 international aid programs is aggravating the problem. There exists the risk of
2559 generating corruption associated to the State or to the exercise of politics.
2560 Beyond economic or security costs —threats, insecurity, intimidation—,

2561 corruption may take a heavy toll in terms of how difficult it may be for the
2562 Afghan state to exercise power in the short term. Lately, a number of
2563 institutional and political changes have been introduced by Afghan authorities in
2564 order to counter that problem (anti-corruption agency, new norms for the
2565 administration, judicial prosecution of corruption offenses). The aim of the study
2566 does not solely rely on describing corruption as an everyday activity. It is also
2567 an attempt to understand how corruption is perceived by the Afghan population
2568 and by the rest of actors. Today's corruption rates undermines the image of the
2569 state as well as the trust on it —particularly though not exclusively the
2570 corruption related to drug trafficking. Corruption can be observed in a wide
2571 number of domains: health, services such as electricity or water supply,
2572 education, justice, local organizations, etc.
2573 In a survey by Integrity Watch Afghanistan (2006), the interviewees associated

2574 corruption with the civil servants’ low income. So it was common practice to pay
2575 the mushkiltarashi (tip) for the services provided. These corrupt practices are so
2576 widely spread that there exists a number of different words to refer to different
2577 types of corruption. In Dari the term fisad-i-edari refers to administrative
2578 corruption and bakshish to “tip”. Wasita is used when the idea is to facilitate a
2579 contact, jazia is used for extorsion, ekhtelas for fraud, fisad-i-siyas for political
2580 corruption and fisad-i-akhlaqi for moral corruption. Eighty-one percent of the
2581 interviewees consider that by applying the sharia (Islamic law) corrupt practices
2582 could be prevented since Islam bans making a profit out of a public host.
Page 79 of 171
2583 A complex summary of this issue by the Anticorruption Center can be accessed
2584 at http://www.u4.no/training/incountry-open/afghanistan-materials-2009/may4-
2585 session1-iwa.pdf.
2586 Local leaders are generally unable to perceive the community’s needs, so they
2587 do not even bother to collect the taxes. They are funded by corrupt practices
2588 and presents, as already mentioned. The community’s welfare, the public
2589 sphere, solidarity, responsibility for the community’s well being, need for the
2590 other, etc. are issues with a very different meaning for the Afghan population
2591 and for the coalition's forces. The Western and the local perspectives clash
2592 when dealing with social issues.
2593 On the other hand, the locals’ perception of material and social needs also differ
2594 from the Western perceptions. Cultural clashes sometimes occur because real
2595 needs are ignored and local leaders give priority to secondary needs instead of
2596 primary ones: water, food, health, security, education, infrastructures (local
2597 leaders lack self critical awareness). The task becomes more complex when it
2598 is not possible to explain which are the most urgent needs to meet. So, it will be
2599 necessary to have a wide cultural knowledge related to economy, for instance.
2600 The loyalties of the local leaders to the coalition’s forces are dependent on a
2601 material exchange. All in all, loyalties are “rented” and are perceived in that way
2602 by the interviewees. The loyalties last so long as they enjoy what the military
2603 forces provide them. There is no loyalty to the PRT seen as an institution. The
2604 relationships between the subjects are highly individualized and do not conform
2605 to objective criteria. Thus, it is very easy for traditional leaders or other key
2606 actors to break agreements as they only conceive of loyalties to individuals.
2607 Friendship is also subjected to interest. The interviewees cannot notice true
2608 friendship or altruism in the society. The affective signals —displayed by local
2609 leaders— such as shaking hands are interpreted as interested actions.
2610 Friendship cannot be productive since the local population is under the pressure
2611 exerted by the Taliban.
2612 It is worth noting the cultural factors which should be taken into account in order
2613 to ease communication and interaction. We also highlight the virtues of local
2614 leaders with whom establishing relationships and cooperating is feasible.
2615 These are the cultural factors which are to be taken into account to promote
2616 more positive relationships and interactions:
2617 Firstly, factors seen unidirectionally (from the force to the local leaders):
2618 respect;
2619 recognition;
2620 support (gain prestige and legitimacy for the leaders);
Page 80 of 171
2621 economic factors: development (“expectation to get something”).

2622
2623 Secondly, factors seen unidirectionally (what the forces perceive that would
2624 have a positive impact on the interactions):
2625 prominent role of men;

2626 religion.
2627
2628 As previously mentioned, those two factors are considered cross-sectional. The
2629 following are the factors or virtues of local leaders with whom cooperation
2630 seems to be more prosperous:
2631 pro Western and less radicalized leaders;

2632 less corrupt leaders;
2633 hospitable leaders;
2634 more reserved leaders;
2635 leaders needing support, legitimacy and prestige.
2636
2637 Although these leaders are less corrupt, they always expect something in
2638 exchange. They also adhere to individual loyalties. In sum, they are directly
2639 benefited.
2640 Cultural factors relating to the local state institutions
2641 The local institutions the PRT more frequently establishes relationships with
2642 are:
2643 City Hall;

2644 Airport Authority;
2645 Independent Election Committee.
2646
2647 Factors to be highlighted concerning institutional relationships:
2648 corruption;
2649 low professionalism;
2650 individualization of the relationships;
Page 81 of 171
2651 lack of international protection (lack of support).

2652
2653 Factors arising from the relationships of the forces with local populations and
2654 with local NGO’s.
2655 Concerning the relationships with NGO’s, which are regarded as scarce and
2656 sporadic, the factors or issues to be highlighted are the following:
2657 corruption;
2658 low professionalism (They only requested funds for training courses).
2659
2660 Concerning local population
2661 Relationships with the children via Spanish lessons; the factors to be
2662 highlighted are the following:
2663
2664 highly positive attitude;

2665 very interested students;
2666 foster closeness;
2667 foster trust with families;
2668 values and new visions are transferred via the lessons.
2669
2670 Cultural factors arising from the relationships with other key actors:
2671 businessmen, the police and the Afghan Army.
2672 Factors to be highlighted:
2673 corruption;
2674 low professionalism.
2675
Page 82 of 171
2676 8.6.b. Cultural factors within the external operational environment: “the
2677 internationals”.
2678 In this section the relationships of the force with the following agents are
2679 highlighted:
2680 relationships of the force with international NGO’s;

2681 relationships of the force with the IO's;
2682 relationships of the force with other coalition's members.
2683
2684 Not many issues are to be dealt with in this section.
2685 Firstly, almost no relationships have been established with international NGO’s
2686 since, due to security conditions, very few NGO’s operate in Afghanistan. The
2687 relationships are normally created for security and logistics purposes.
2688 Conflicting environments are not very favourable to establish relationships
2689 between military forces and NGO’s.
2690 Secondly, there are not any cultural factors to be highlighted when dealing with
2691 the relationships between the military forces and the international organizations.
2692 8.6.c. Cross-sectional cultural values
2693 In the case of PSYOPS, the issues related to religion and gender have been
2694 somewhat banned. Is spite of the fact the ban over women’s issues has been
2695 lifted, there is much concern when dealing with these topics. In fact, maculinity,
2696 seen as an exaggeration of functional attributions, is crucial for the relationships
2697 between the forces and the locals. The differences between men and women
2698 are well tolerated by locals as well as by foreign military forces basing on
2699 respect and the inability to effectively intervene. Military personnel try to behave
2700 as locals do: as if women were invisible. It is puzzling the authority exercised by
2701 men over women and how women are unable to pull down the walls enclosing
2702 them. Anyhow, as already mentioned, the population is loyal to their leader.
2703 Thus, social structures revive the patriarchal structures of the family.
2704 The common cultural factors within the relationships of the force with the
2705 operational environment reveal the following conflicting factors:
2706 fatalism;
2707 time;
2708 amity / enmity;
2709 religion;
Page 83 of 171
2710 gender; masculinity vs. femininity;

2711 good doers and wrong doers;
2712 change / evolution.
2713
2714 Some of these factors can be explained through their underlying concepts. The
2715 rest is in the initial stage of preparation.
2716 Fatalism is characterized by the following features: events are inevitable;

2717 uncertainty about human power to make a difference; short-notice planning;
2718 reactive rather than preventive actions. They do not account for time or
2719 resources in their planning activities; actions are ill-considered and not well-
2720 informed; agreements are considered hopes rather than an aim or something to
2721 abide by; life and events are unpredictable; striving to change things is
2722 considered to be arrogant and silly; events are considered to be so complex
2723 that cannot be controlled. Corruption is not serious. In sum, rationality is
2724 completely absent. Everything is subjugated to God’s will.
2725 The concept of time is particularly surprising. The dimension importance of time
2726 is crucial. Western societies give high importance to time and consider it a
2727 tangible and valuable consumable. Time must be spent intelligently to achieve
2728 scheduled objectives. However, Afghans regard time as flexible and think it
2729 must be devoted to personal interactions rather than to achieve certain goals.
2730 Agendas and schedules are threatening and counterproductive.
2731 The consequences derived from both visions of time are varied. Interviewees
2732 seem to lack the patience required to adjust to Afghans’ timings. “They have all
2733 the time. They love discussing over any issue”. Similarly, this vision of time
2734 generates punctuality problems considering the coalition’s forces are under
2735 pressure to carry out changes quickly in order to accomplish the objectives of
2736 the mission plan.
2737 Evolution refers to the teleological approach to Western progress, which implies
2738 putting forward an argument intrinsically related to social evolution. Interviewees
2739 state, “Afghans are underevolutioned”, “they live in the time of Jesus"; "they are
2740 in the Medieval Ages". So, interviewees implicitly deem that they are in a more
2741 advanced evolutionary stage than the local population. This prejudice severely
2742 hinders the recognition of the other and, consequently, the opportunity to have a
2743 balanced dialogue or to build up a valid relationship.
2744 Positive factors or traits of the Afghans:
2745 nice;
2746 hospitable;
Page 84 of 171
2747 close;
2748 grateful.
2749
2750 8.7. Preliminary conclusions: some notes
2751 It is worth noting that there exists confusion about the concept of culture: people
2752 talk about cultural underdevelopment when, in fact, they refer to something
2753 different. We come across conflicting visions of the world along with narratives,
2754 which may be real or not, or just confusions about cultural usages. Therefore,
2755 the problems we face are not so much related to the culture itself, which can be
2756 exercised by those who are an integrating part of it, but to the adaptability to an
2757 strange cultural environment without losing one’s culture of origin. It should be
2758 borne in mind that it is neither an acculturation process nor an enculturation
2759 one.
2760 Cross-cultural awareness is not a new finding for Spanish forces since they
2761 spontaneously associate the concept to interpersonal relationships. Respect is
2762 the most outstanding factor in human relationships. If mutual trust is increased,
2763 the relationships will, consequently, be strengthened. However, it is necessary
2764 to create valid relationships which do not undermine the subjects' positions and
2765 encourage them to change and adapt so that trust can be channeled effectively.
2766 Therefore, adaptation should occur on both sides and arises from knowledge
2767 though not necessarily in a symmetric fashion. Increasing the knowledge about
2768 the operational environment contributes to enable the creation of valid
2769 relationships.
2770 A vast number of interviewees state they have become better people since they
2771 have taken part in out of the area missions. Nonetheless, for that change to
2772 take place accumulative individual experiences outweigh the interactions in the
2773 area of operations. Officers have a more positive vision of the Afghans than
2774 non-commissioned officers, who tend to be more skeptical. That is probably due
2775 to the deepest knowledge of the environment on the part of officers, particularly
2776 officers responsible for CIMIC activities.
2777 Most importantly, these perceptions are critical to understand the process called
2778 "be-recognize-talk" since the present research collects the subjects' perceptions
2779 in relation to their experiences in the operational environment. Perceptions are
2780 subjective and exert an influence on the subjects’ individual decisions, but the
2781 interactions in the operational environment change the perceptions. It is
2782 expected that as a result of the interactions valid relationships can be built up
2783 avoiding, consequently, conflicting relationships.
Page 85 of 171
2784 Moreover, Afghans can perfectly discern between the military forces' duties and
2785 responsibilities and those of the local and national authorities'.
2786 All the interviewees (whether Spanish, Polish, American or Norwegian) agree
2787 that they need cultural awareness to carry out their duties. Relevance is both
2788 attributed to cultural awareness and cross-cultural training for personnel who
2789 are going to take part in missions, though it is not the only element to be taken
2790 into account.
2791 When asked if their own culture (homeland) has an influence on the way the
2792 tasks are carried out, most of them assert it doesn't (written surveys given to
2793 Polish and Americans). However, from life history interviews given to Spanish
2794 personnel the conclusion drawn is that a subject’s life history determines his
2795 choices and behaviours.
2796 It is also worth noting that interviewees generally agree that their own culture
2797 does not affect to the way they perform their tasks. However, it is deemed that
2798 the culture of their institution affects task execution. They perceive the culture of
2799 the institution as a more determining factor for their job than the culture within
2800 which they have been brought up.
2801 Interviewees reveal a number of interesting issues in relation to cultural clashes,

2802 frictions or conflicts. On the one hand, frictions occur in extreme cases, such as
2803 when corruption is perceived to be general, or very diverging notions of loyalty,
2804 legitimacy, honor, family, time and man-woman relationships are at stake.
2805 However, clashes are summed up in the values which from a Western
2806 perception are non-negotiable: human rights and gender issues. However, from
2807 the Afghan perspective the facts that there are servicewomen in the Armed
2808 Forces and the limited use of force turn the coalition into a somewhat unreliable
2809 actor and, eventually, become vulnerabilities.
2810 Essential factors to improve communication and relationships:
2811 enhance security;

2812 empathy;
2813 common sense;
2814 respect (without relinquishing our own values); respect for their religión;
2815 human knowledge;
2816 stand in the other’s shoes:
2817 • know the other;
2818 • understand the other;
2819 • teach the other;
Page 86 of 171
2820 be extremely polite;

2821 avoid superiority;
2822 show closeness;
2823 patience (during conversations);
2824 know behavioural norms (courtesy); etiquette;
2825 attitudes: observing, flexible;
2826 trust (respect for customs to gain trust);
2827 accept food offerings;
2828 speak some words in their language;
2829 treat women as if they were invisible (that means respect for her);
2830 allow time for conversations;
2831 carry out check-points in a discrete fashion.
2832
2833 Means to gain wills:
2834 don’t do anything they do not want to;

2835 be sensitive towards their needs;
2836 do not impose things from a Western point of view;
2837 they should not perceive their traditions or customs are at risk;
2838 grant security and development;
2839 support Afghan leadership; gain prestige for the leaders;
2840 know the needs to be met (meet basic needs): AECID and CIMIC.
2841
2842 All in all, the objective is to offer the society more than the insurgency does. In
2843 this sense, will is rented as it is loyalty. Will can only be gained temporarily by
2844 offering material goods though trying not to influence their way of life.
2845
Page 87 of 171
2846 8.8. General recommendations / observations
2847
2848 This section presents a number of preliminary and tentative recommendations

2849 and unfinished observations. It should be seen on these grounds. In no way can
2850 the results derived from the research under way be determined by these
2851 conclusions.
2852 Trust within the local population depends on the following factors:
2853 • personal relationships;
2854 • the (Spanish) mission policy.
2855 Data collection is an essential process to provide all the necessary
2856 information facilitating communication with the local population. Likewise,
2857 establishing protocols is equally important in order not to harm the
2858 achievements when the troops are relieved. It involves that the new force
2859 package should be provided the necessary training so that results can be
2860 transferred to them.
2861 Available information helps to initiate contacts and prevent frictions since
2862 the relationships with the local population are determined by relational
2863 dynamics which are in constant change. Thus, it is necessary to know
2864 how relational dynamics work from a historical point of view. The role of
2865 mass media is crucial for the development of all the activities. It is
2866 imperative to know all the communications infrastructures and the people
2867 controlling them.
2868 Relational dynamics are to some extent responsible for the success of
2869 the mission since they contribute to the establishment of trust patterns.
2870 To that end it is crucial to respect local customs. It is constantly stressed
2871 that forcing changes may trigger negative reactions on part of the
2872 population since they probably remain unaware of the working rudiments
2873 in modern societies. Observation and displaying open attitudes, along
2874 with previous experiences, is what really matters apart from
2875 understanding the differences unbiasedly. Absorbing structures and
2876 making comparisons should be avoided. Experiences are highly
2877 valuable. They are important for self-develpment.
2878 Renew trust: perform the same actions.
2879 The success of the projects is only possible if negotiated and agreed with
2880 the local leaders and population. This demands in-depth knowledge of
2881 the cultural, social, religious, and gender relationships practices. Errors
2882 may have dramatic consequences. Transaction costs should be taken
2883 into account since every single project needs negotiating with all the
Page 88 of 171
2884 parties involved who may deem their sphere of power is being invaded.
2885 Ignoring transaction costs and avoid negotiating results in failed projects.
2886 The most important aim is to be able to communicate periphery and the
2887 center, to make them trust each other to enable governability. This
2888 involves disseminating information and balanced development projects
2889 which include traditionally isolated areas. Therefore, if the central areas
2890 ignore the peripheral ones, all the activities are transversely affected.
2891 It is necessary to free the personnel, who is going to work on the ground,
2892 of prejudices to allow for objective interactions. Also, it will contribute to
2893 strengthen communication operations.
2894 Be aware of the fact that CIMIC activities are sometimes carried out from
2895 a Western perspective.
2896 The force commander's concern about cross-cultural awareness issues.
2897 Gain wills. Recommendations to gain wills in the operational environment
2898 (local population and leaders) can be provided. However, meeting the
2899 local needs does not necessary imply meeting Western people’s
2900 expectations.
2901 Possess a list of recognized leaders. Keep an updated database.
2902 Influence is gained by knowing the local leaders’ relationships matrices.
2903 Negotiations with local leaders are more effective if carried out privately
2904 face to face. Relationships are more effective with fewer people at
2905 meetings: the key leader and a CIMIC officer.
2906 Posses updated databases. It should be acknowledged that it is
2907 impossible to create databases for a number of issues in Afghanistan (for
2908 instance, there is not a register for cities, towns and villages).
2909 Experience in other missions is crucial to acquire cross-cultural
2910 awareness. Real learning occurs when taking part in missions and
2911 provides resources.
2912 There does not exist a one pattern fit all missions. Although the learning
2913 gained in previous missions provides resources such as flexibility,
2914 missions cannot be compared against each other.
2915 It is crucial to have an anthropological field manual when elaborating the
2916 documents for the mission.
2917 Have women posted on CIMIC and PSYOPS posts.
2918 Relevance of interpreters when trying to gather information about the
2919 local population and culture.
2920 Relevance of the interpreter selection process.
2921 Relevance of having a minimum knowledge of the local language.
Page 89 of 171
2922 From the CIMIC and PSYOPS operations, one of the main contributions
2923 of the concept of cross-cultural awareness is the identification of people’s
2924 needs.
2925 Not only shall we take into account the different approaches in the
2926 domain of transcultural relationships, it should also be acknowledged that
2927 every force package comes from a different part of Spain.
2928 The utility of a simplification of reality: the need to know the stereotypes.
2929 Selection of the CIMIC and PSYOPS personnel according to the social
2930 competences required.
2931 All military personnel do not have the ability and skills to perform a
2932 specific role in an international mission.
2933 When perceptions are negative, it is highly troublesome to interact face
2934 to face, to recognize the other and to achieve a balance between the
2935 actors so that dialogue can take place.
2936 Being able to recognize oneself in relation to the other, and to recognize
2937 the other fosters openness.
2938 Spanish are supposed to be innately empathic. However, it is necessary
2939 to go through a specific training program in the field of cross-cultural
2940 awareness.
2941 It is important to be aware of the fact that every force package lives in a
2942 different situation. It is difficult to provide the same recommendations or
2943 to have the same vision of the situation every time. Within the same
2944 operational contexts, situations may vary: elections, enhanced or
2945 disminished security conditions, etc.
2946 Relationships are effective when there is an exchange.
2947 Do not show arrogance or superiority. Avoid aggressive attitudes.
2948 Informality (seen as flexibility) in relationships yields positive results.
2949 These are the differences identified between different force packages:
2950 the degree of empathy, closeness, mimesis, and ability to contact the
2951 other.
2952 Teach Spanish as a means to close gaps and enhance communication.
2953 This activity is not attached the importance it deserves. The participation
2954 of the Instituto Cervantes may be required. A foreign language is a useful
2955 means to transfer knowledge and meanings apart from being outrightly
2956 accepted by the population.
2957 CIMIC and PSYOPS personnel among others should have a deep
2958 knowledge of the vulnerabilities and the customs.
2959 Information and nuances are lost through interpretation.
Page 90 of 171
2960 On the whole military personnel are normally imbued with the same fed
2961 back perceptions. This is due to the high degree of socialization and
2962 coexistence in the base during four months, which generates a feedback
2963 process concerning perceptions and stereotypes. The force has the
2964 information provided by the CIMIC and PSYOPS cells, which accounts
2965 for twelve to fifteen people.
2966 Prevent aggressive attitudes. For instance: the way patrols and escorts
2967 are executed.
2968 Most relevant aspects military personnel has to face:
2969 • means and types of relationships with local leaders;
2970 • the social structure of the local population. Be thoroughly aware of
2971 the origins of such a social structure.
2972 Difficulty to transmit all the nuances and subtleties to the relief forces.
2973
2974
Page 91 of 171
2975 9. INTEGRATION OF CROSS-CULTURAL AWARENESS INTO

2976 OPERATIONAL AND INTERAGENCY PLANNING, AND INTO THE
2977 INTELLIGENCE PROCESSES
2978 9.1. Integration of the culture awareness into operational and

2979 interagency planning process.
2980 As can be derived from the MNE 6 Problem Statement (“To establish and
2981 ensure a safe and secure environment, coalition forces require the ability to
2982 share information, gain situational understanding, synchronize efforts and
2983 assess progress in concert with interagency partners, international
2984 organizations, and other stakeholders when countering activities of irregular
2985 adversaries and other non-compliant actors), operational and interagency
2986 planning is a critical piece in solving it.
2987 It has been told many times, “plans may be nothing, but planning is everything”,
2988 and countering irregular threats are no exception to this. In fact, planning full
2989 spectrum operations in the present operational environments, to wage a “three-
2990 block war” (using the now classic expression of General Charles Krulak),
2991 operating against irregular enemies in hybrid conflicts in distant and not well
2992 known areas, always “amongst the people” (as was also insightly expressed by
2993 Rupert Smith) may be more challenging, but not less critical for achieving
2994 success.
2995 But first we must focus briefly on how and why we are studying the relationship
2996 between cultural awareness and planning.
2997 The outcome nº 4 of the MNE 6 (“Coalition forces, interagency and relevant
2998 partners possess an improved ability to gain shared situational understanding of
2999 the operational environment during employment of direct and indirect
3000 approaches against irregular adversaries and other non-compliant actors.”)
3001 defines further the scope of the present study, identifying the actors of planning
3002 as “Coalition forces, interagency and relevant partners”. The relevant partners
3003 may be initially identified as international organizations mandated to operate in
3004 the AoO (Area of Operations), the host nation Government and his Armed and
3005 Security forces and other international (Non-governmental organizations,
3006 NGO,s) and host nation (regional, local or traditional leaders) actors.
3007 Objective 4.3 refines additionally our field of interest to the shared situational
3008 understanding and identifies a clear aim: to “Develop an improved ability for
3009 coalition forces and partners to promote a cross-cultural awareness of the
Page 92 of 171
3010 operational environment in order to contribute to a shared situational

3011 understanding”.25
3012 The specific problem to be solved/deficiency identified has been previously

3013 formulated stating that “currently, multinational contingents have not an
3014 adequate knowledge concerning: culture and values of society in AOR,
3015 perceptions of population towards intervening forces, emotional needs of local
3016 population”; also, “no shared knowledge across the Coalition forces exists”.
3017 In order to solve the problem, the hypothesis to be validated in the experiment
3018 is that: “If coalition members put into practice the procedures and tools
3019 facilitated by the cross-cultural awareness concept in order to enhance and
3020 unify the knowledge and awareness about the cultural values which govern the
3021 society in the host nation, it will contribute to gain a shared situational
3022 understanding of the operational environment increasing, accordingly, the
3023 coalition’s operational capability.”
3024 The Study issue 3 of the objective 4.3 is, then: “How can we integrate cultural
3025 awareness into operational planning and inter-agency planning, and into the
3026 Intelligence procedures?” The present paragraph tries to answer such question
3027 concerning the operational planning and inter-agency planning, while the next
3028 one will deal with the Intelligence procedures.
3029 In order to do so, the following Essential Elements of Analysis (EEA,s) have
3030 been identified:
3031 EEA 4.3.3.1: Analyze the challenges of multinationality in military planning

3032 through cultural awareness
3033 EEA 4.3.3.2: Analyze the challenges of interagency planning through cultural
3034 awareness, in particular researching how best to achieve real integration of
3035 military and non-military actors into interagency planning
3036 EEA 4.3.3.3: Analyze the military Operational Planning Process researching in
3037 which milestones of planning the concept of CCA should be introduced and
3038 how, identifying the leverage points of CCA within the planning process.
25
A shared situational understanding is considered critical in the operational environment of an
irregular threat. As the US Army Field Manual FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency rightly identifies,
Unity of effort between different actors is essential for success (pages 2-1 to 2-16); and the
desired unity of effort is impossible to achieve without a previous “shared situational
understanding”. Also, considering just the military, the experience shows that most of the time
operations will have to be highly decentralized. In these circumstances, a “shared situational
awareness” down to the lowest levels is needed in order that “strategic” corporals and privates
can make the right decisions, that may have strategic implications (ibid., Appendix A “A Guide
for Action”, page A-2).
Page 93 of 171
3039 EEA 4.3.3.4: What elements in the HQ organization (e.g: Human Terrain
3040 Teams, HTT/Foreign Area Officers, FAO/Foreign or Host nation liaison officers/
3041 internal expertise) may improve the CCA capability related to planning.
3042 All along this paragraph 8.1 these EEA,s will be studied thoroughly in order to
3043 identify procedures and tools related to the cultural awareness that may
3044 improve the shared situational understanding in the area of planning. In order to
3045 accomplish our goal, consideration will be given in the present study to the
3046 issues raised by planning in Coalition (subparagraph 8.1.1) and planning in an
3047 interagency framework, in concert with non-military actors (subpar. 8.1.2) with
3048 the focus on improving the ability to share the understanding of the operational
3049 situation through planning; in each of the subparagraphs, problems related to
3050 cultural awareness will be identified and some initiatives to counter or at least
3051 mitigate them will be presented. Later, our attention will be directed on how
3052 precisely cultural awareness may be integrated in the current planning process
3053 (subpar. 7.1.3), examining the phases of operational planning and identifying
3054 the moments when cultural awareness may be put to best use to improve the
3055 final planning products and what planning elements and aspects may be more
3056 influenced by cultural awareness. After that, elements (meaning different types
3057 of personnel) that may provide “cross cultural awareness” in any Headquarters
3058 during planning will be analyzed (subpar. 8.1.d). Finally, after the analysis,
3059 some closing conclusions and remarks will be offered (8.1.e).
3060 9.1.a. Problems and solutions related to integrating cultural awareness into
3061 multinational military planning process.
3062 The difficulties of operating of a multinational force, compared to a purely

3063 national one, are a traditional common place in military circles. Great military
3064 leaders of the past have commanded successfully multinational forces since
3065 Hannibal to Marlborough, but it is acknowledged that this requires an additional
3066 expenditure of effort, tact and patience by all concerned if the Coalition forces
3067 are not to fall apart and are going to be military effective. Marshal Ferdinand
3068 Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces in France during the First World
3069 War declared after the war that his post had made him losing some respect for
3070 Napoleon as military leader as, after all, he just had to fight against Coalitions,
3071 what must had made his work a lot easier. More recently, the memoirs26 of the
3072 U.S. General Wesley C. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)
3073 during the 1999 Kosovo conflict and, as such, top NATO military Commander at
3074 the strategic level, recounts tellingly how complex (and even bitter sometimes)
3075 is directing operations of a multinational Alliance, particularly as most of the
3076 times any modern Coalition Commander is also a dual-hatted “National
3077 Contingent Commander (NCC)”.
26
CLARK, Wesley K., Waging Modern War, Public Affaires LTD, London, 2001.
Page 94 of 171
3078 On the other hand, in the current operational environment of expeditionary

3079 warfare, there is general a recognition that “going alone” is not an option, as
3080 unilateral interventions have shown recently, mainly for legitimacy reasons, but
3081 also for the benefits of sharing the political risk, the economic cost and the
3082 military burden of a protracted intervention. The fact that operating today as a
3083 multinational force is so difficult but at the same time indispensable, is reflected
3084 in the common statement in military circles that there is only one thing worse
3085 that working in Coalition, that is having no allies at all.
3086 A general doctrinal discussion on multinational military operations, from a

3087 national United States perspective (used to be the leader or having a primary
3088 role in Coalitions) may be found at US Joint Publication JP 3-16 Multinational
3089 Operations (March 2007); the same topic is dealt with from the perspective of a
3090 permanent military Alliance with more than fifty years in business at NATO´s
3091 Allied Joint Publication AJP-01 (C) Allied Joint Doctrine, chapter 4; NATO
3092 devotes great efforts to standardization through the “NATO Standardization
3093 Agreements”, known as “STANAG,s” that refer both to materiel and technical
3094 and tactical procedures.27 Interesting insights about multinational command in
3095 recent operations from a long standing military culture can also be gained in the
3096 monographic issue of the French Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces
3097 Doctrine spécial: "Multinational Operations And Forces Command : French
3098 Commanders".28 Alongside many other initiatives like FINABEL, a common
3099 project opened to most European Union armies or the European Air Group
3100 (EAG), a mature standardization initiative is ABCA initiative, an American-
3101 British-Canadian-Australian program (also joined by New Zealand in 2006), that
3102 dates back to 1964 and focuses in “optimizing ABCA´s Armies interoperability in
3103 order to deliver success on coalition operations”. One particularly relevant
3104 product is the ABCA´s Coalition Operations Handbook (edition 4, April 2008),
3105 that covers many aspects concerning Coalition operations, including planning.29
3106 As multinational operations are covered in detail in the above cited references,
3107 in the present study attention will be devoted specifically to aspects that impact
3108 directly into planning and achieving a shared situational understanding between
3109 different national contingents.
27
Information about NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) may be found at
http://www.nato.int/nsa/nsa_home.htm
28
Available at
http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/no_spe_chefs_francais/sommaire_c
hef_francais_us_PRINT.htmloctrine
29
For information on ABCA see http://www.abca-armies.org/. ABCA´s Coalition Operations
Handbook is available at http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/coin/repository/COH.pdf
Page 95 of 171
3110 Most, if not all, of the military from any nation can be said to have some
3111 common traits that may be defined as an international “military culture”, where
3112 values of duty, discipline, courage, sacrifice or comradeship, amongst others,
3113 are shared and differentiate the military from other groups. However, on the
3114 other hand, national armed forces not only have mostly different national
3115 procedures, standardized (and even then only to a certain extent) only when
3116 being part of permanent military Alliances like NATO, but they also have a
3117 distinct “national military culture” that makes them different from the rest, being
3118 a particular sub-group of their respective national culture.30 Spanish, French,
3119 Pakistani, New Zealand or any other military are immersed in their respective
3120 national cultures at least as much as they are influenced by any organizational
3121 “international military culture”.31 They may have quite definite views concerning
3122 status and ranks (e.g. some Armed Forces do not have Non Commisioned
3123 Officers, NCO,s as such), standards of dress and external discipline,
3124 relationship with civilians partners or civilian population or have a distinct
3125 appreciation of jointery. Also, their particular military history and recent
3126 operational experiences (as well as the political directives from the sending
3127 nation) will reflect on their attitude to the centralization/decentralization of
3128 decision-making at different levels of command (e.g. some Armed Forces may
3129 find the concept of “Mission Command” absolutely alien to them), the risk to be
3130 assumed by the national troops and, in general, the posture concerning the
3131 operation, expressed in the “national caveats”, that are the plain statement of
3132 what a national contingent is going and not going to do (in planning jargon, their
3133 “constraints” (things to be done in any case) and “restraints” (things not to be
3134 done), regardless of the integration in the Coalition chain of command.32
3135 Also, cross cultural awareness concerning national “military cultures” is most
3136 critical when we are dealing with local military allies. It is a truism in COIN that
3137 international forces in fact are only buying time until effective local security
3138 forces (which in fact include both military and police) can be fielded to
30
For a discussion on British military culture vs British culture as a whole see the United
Kingdom Armed Forces Development, Concepts and Doctrine Center (DCDC) Joint Doctrine
Note 1/09 The Significance of Culture to The Military, January, 2009, pages 3-1 to 3-3.
31
Furthermore, the situation may be even more complex: a US Marine most probably will
maintain that there are lots of differences between his “military culture” and that of a US airman.
Also, even inside the Army, light infantrymen may find themselves somehow alien to the view of
artyllerymen or communications branches, just as submariners are not the same as Navy pilots.
Even inside the same branch of the Army, every member of a British Regiment would consider
evident the distinction of his/her own Unit from the rest.
32
For additional discussions on some of this problems of multinationality see ALTMAN KLEIN,
Helen, PONGONIS, Anna and KLEIN, Gary, Cultural Barriers to Multinational C2 Decision
Making, available at
http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2000_CCRTS/html/pdf_papers/Track_4/101.pdf
Page 96 of 171
3139 definitively defeat the insurgency. Local forces are bigger in numbers than
3140 international forces, can fight as long as any insurgent and culturally are much
3141 closer to the population, while being able to take away from the insurgents any
3142 nationalist excuse and improving dramatically the legitimacy of the fighting. In
3143 the US Army Field Manual FM 3-24 about Counterinsurgency is plainly evident
3144 in chapter 6, devoted to “developing Host-Nation Security Forces” that in this
3145 particular task of assessing, organizing, building, training, equipping and
3146 advising local forces, if any thing, cross-cultural awareness is perhaps more
3147 critical than ever for success.33
3148 Effective Coalition Commanders in all eras have recognized the differences
3149 between the various national contingents under his command and have used
3150 them in ways that allow them to bring to bear their respective strengths while
3151 minimizing their weaknesses. For example, in recent times, the Australian
3152 Commander of INTERFET, the Australian –led force that deployed to east
3153 Timor in 1999 to facilitate the transition between the Indonesian rule and the UN
3154 transitional Administration, General Peter Cosgrove, used his trusted Australian
3155 elite Light Infantry units in the dangerous and remote border area in more
3156 kinetic operations while the different Asian contingents in the force were
3157 deployed in the more populated Eastern areas where existed a more benign
3158 environment that called mainly for humanitarian aid and reconstruction tasks;
3159 so, every contingent developed the kind of activities that best suited their
3160 specific characteristics and attitude toward the operation.34
3161 An additional comment should be made about language, that is not only
3162 applicable to operating inside a military Coalition but also for interagency
3163 operation and planning. The Language factor must never be underestimated
3164 concerning the internal workings of the differerent international actors. Usually
3165 there is an “official language” of the operation, most of the time English
3166 (however, operating in South America or Africa the official language has
3167 become Spanish or French in some UN peacekeeping missions). However, it
3168 shouldn´t be assumed that all the participants are fluent and have perfect
3169 understanding of the official language; operational reality shows the other way
3170 around. If things are not managed properly, this may result in an imperfect
3171 understanding of the Commander´s intent as well as missing important
3172 information even in written orders, not to mention those imparted in oral
3173 briefings. At least, the communication will be imperfect and most probably
3174 frustrating both for the native and fluent speakers, who feel left alone and resent
3175 the apparent “indolence” and lack of professionality of the other part, and also
33
US Army Field Manual FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, December 2006, Chapter 6, pages 6-1
to 6-22
34
KILCULLEN, David, The Accidental Guerrilla, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, page
2006.
Page 97 of 171
3176 for the non fluent non-native speakers, who feels confusion and rage for not
3177 being able to bring to bear all his/her military proficiency and experience while
3178 resenting any patronizing from his/her more fluent counterparts.
3179 Some procedures to mitigate language problems in deployed HQ,s/formations

3180 (solutions may come only from sending nations, deploying only fluent speakers
3181 of the “official language” of the operation) may be having a clear picture of the
3182 language ability of the concerned personnel, keeping at all times language as
3183 simple and standard as possible and, to the extent possible and reasonable,
3184 complementing oral communication with written texts.
3185 It has to be said, anyway, that the language problem is usually looked at from
3186 the perspective of the operational HQ or tactical organization that receives an
3187 element not fluent in the “official language” of the operation (English in most
3188 cases). However, it is assessed that the main responsibility concerning
3189 “language” falls into the sending organization/nation, who should make sure
3190 that, among other requirements, all elements sent to a multinational
3191 HQ/formation are proficient in the language concerned. This requires, in
3192 general, giving proper attention to the teaching of foreign languages inside the
3193 Armed Forces, selecting the right people for the jobs in multinational HQ,s and
3194 formations and taking care of providing a proper pre-deployment training (all
3195 this is related to the Study issue 4 of the present document). If this is done,
3196 problems in Theatre will be far less and multinational work will be made much
3197 easier.
3198 Another critical problem to de dealt with is the problem with security
3199 accreditation, as there may exist different levels of access to information, with,
3200 in the worst case, personnel in the HQ/formation not having access to some
3201 documents or CIS systems for not having the proper clearance; the problem
3202 only exacerbates when related to Intelligence products, but is not only confined
3203 to that. This subject must be carefully studied, clearly defining the security level
3204 required for having full access to all HQ documents and CIS systems and
3205 stating it plainly in each of the job descriptions of the HQ/formation; also, this
3206 information concerning security clearances should be provided in advance to all
3207 sending nations that provide personnel to the HQ/formation in order that only
3208 properly cleared personnel is deployed. For example, NATO has an already
3209 established system of layered security clearances (NATO Unclassified, NATO
3210 restricted, NATO confidential, etc,…) properly defined with a procedure in place
3211 for obtaining the proper security clearances, however, for each operation, the
3212 concerned Coalition should be aware of this problem establishing the proper
3213 security accreditation system. Also, besides trying to solve any problem in
3214 advance, in-processing procedures must allow rapid detection of security
3215 clearance problems with quick-fix expedients in place for resolution of
3216 exceptional cases.
Page 98 of 171
3217 All the problems that have been described before for multinational
3218 HQ,s/formations are compounded if the particular HQ is not established before
3219 the operation but is what is called a “composite HQ”, meaning that has been
3220 created specifically for the occasion using a wide variety of sources of
3221 multinational personnel; in the most favorable case, the “composite HQ” will
3222 come from a pre-existing HQ that deploys with a hard core of its own personnel
3223 with a variable number of “augmentees” from different origins. However, it ´s not
3224 always possible to have the whole personnel of such “composite HQ” going
3225 through a collective pre-deployment training, as most of the personnel probably
3226 will arrive directly into the Theatre. In this case, the eventual advantages of
3227 previous knowledge between members of the staff and the practice of already
3228 known Standardized Operating procedures (SOP,s) doesn´t exist, making the
3229 cultural problems more acute and the identified possible solutions more urgent
3230 and necessary. However, as a whole, cultural awareness is then just one of the
3231 problems that “composite HQ,s” have to face to become effective.35
3232 In any case, it can be concluded that being part of a multinational Coalition, be it
3233 as a Commander of a multinational force, a National Contingent Commander
3234 (NCC), a member of a multinational Headquarters (HQ) or at any other level
3235 inside the multinational force, requires not just political acumen, rapport,
3236 respect, trust, patience and tact but also a high degree of knowledge of partners
3237 and cultural sensitivity.36 All this traits will naturally reinforce each other.
3238 To counter the above mentioned problems and gain greater effectiveness, any
3239 military organization and his Commander needs to take a number of initiatives
3240 related to cultural awareness. The following indicators concerning the
3241 proficiency of any multinational HQ/Formation dealing with internal cultural
3242 issues are listed:
3243 1: Working in a multinational environment is acknowledged as an ability to be

3244 trained and an area in which cross-cultural awareness is to be developed by
35
The degree of difficulty to achieve effectiveness in a composite HQ may vary according to the
existence of a “lead nation” that provides most of the HQ and controls all the vital positions in
the HQ or a “framework nation” that provides the backbone of the HQ, although critical slots are
given to other nations. If the composite HQ has an identifiable “parent HQ” (either national or
multinational), its SOP,s are available for use although most probably they will need some
adjustments.
36
United Kingdom Development, Concepts and Doctrine Center (DCDC), Joint Doctrine Note
JDN 1/09 The Significance of Culture to the Military, Shrivenham, 2009, page 3-5, talks about
“acumen, patience and tact but also a high degree of cultural sensitivity”. Available at:
www.dcdc.dii.r.mil.uk. The US Joint Publication JP 3-16 Multinational Operations (March 2007),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf uses the terms: Respect,
rapport, knowledge of partners and patience (pages I-3 and I-4). Finally, the NATO Allied Joint
Publication AJP-01 (C) Allied Joint Doctrine (March 2007), pages 4-5 and 4-6 identifies “rapport,
respect and trust, knowledge of partners and patience”.
Page 99 of 171
3245 personnel who is going to work in a multinational HQ/formation. As such, is

3246 included in the pre-deployment training.37
3247 2: A record is kept and updated of the different national origins of the personnel
3248 involved in planning, with National Contingent Commanders clearly identified.
3249 3: A complete list of national caveats is compiled, kept and updated and is
3250 available to the relevant personnel in the planning team.
3251 4: The planning system used in the HQ/ operational organization/unit is properly
3252 recorded and updated in the appropriate written SOP,s/documents. The
3253 planning system is kept as standardized as possible, considering international
3254 standards such as the established by the UN/NATO/ABCA planning systems.
3255 When applicable, terms are properly defined in a Glossary.
3256 5: A complete set of written SOP,s/documents describing the planning process

3257 in the HQ/ operational organization/ unit are available and pointed to the
3258 attention of newcomers during the introductory training.
3259 6: During planning, situations potentially affected by national caveats are

3260 identified and plans take account of such caveats accordingly.
3261 7: Planning involves personnel from all Troop contributing nations of the
3262 Coalition (as practicable and sensible).
3263 8: National Contingent Commanders are updated properly during the planning
3264 process on aspects considered sensitive from a national perspective.
3265 9: Official Language of the mission is kept as simple as possible in all planning
3266 documents and briefings.
3267 10: Acronyms and other jargon language (e.g. referring to the planning process
3268 as “OPP” or to helicopters as “choppers”) are kept to a minimum and, were
3269 applicable, properly explained, particularly during oral briefings, where terms
3270 are referred by the complete standard name and not as acronyms.
3271 11: Officers responsible for planning are aware of possible language problems
3272 in the personnel from his/her team and act accordingly
3273 12: Coalition has in place a system defining different security categories and
3274 describing the procedures for individuals achieving such security clearances.
37
This indicator only relates to the pre-deployment training. The inclusion of this particular
aspect in the military education and general training is dealt with by Study issue 4.
Page 100 of 171

3275 13: The security level for taking part in planning and having access to all
3276 planning tools and products is clearly established in every job description and
3277 communicated in advance to all sending nations. In processing system includes
3278 checks to detect any problem concerning security clearances and quick-fix
3279 expedients are in place for extraordinary cases.
3280 14: Off-duty opportunities are available for allowing better mutual knowledge
3281 and understanding of the members of the planning team from different national
3282 origins
3283 15: Specific cultural or religion needs are acknowledged and dealt with by the
3284 HQ/formation (as far as practical and sensible): e.g diets taking into
3285 consideration religious or cultural needs, prayer facilities in the HQ, etc,…
3286 16: A proper record of national festivities and commemorations and other
3287 “nation specific” information relevant is kept and updated in the HQ/formation,
3288 checked with the NCC/National Support Elements as appropriate; such info is
3289 readily available to the Command Group of the HQ/formation.
3290 9.1.b. Problems and possible solutions related to integration of the culture
3291 awareness into interagency planning process.
3292 Note: To be developed later.
3293 9.1.c. Integration of the CCA into the planning process.
3294 The purpose of this paragraph is to identify how, in the given context of irregular
3295 threats and multinational interagency action (in search of the apparently elusive
3296 “Comprehensive approach”) the military planning may be improved through
3297 “cultural awareness”.
3298 However, before beginning, some previous reflections seem in order: the first
3299 one refers to the fact that MNE-6 refers to a very specific operational
3300 environment: planning against irregular threats.38 We shouldn´t loose sight that,
3301 in this respect, the planning system that we will describe and use in this
3302 paragraph is mostly the “traditional planning”, optimized against conventional
38
This is important to note because of the completely different environmental situations that
provide the framework for MNE-6 compared with the previous MNE-5. In fact, compared to the
relatively benign scenario of MNE-5 (a health crisis in Sub Saharan Africa, with the military in
support of a whole “comprehensive approach” under civilian leadership), MNE-6 seems to have
chosen something close to a “worst case scenario” (closely related to real-life situation in
Afghanistan), at least from the planning point of view. MNE-5 situation was complex but
relatively benign; MNE-6 is not less complex but a lot more dangerous as a result of the
presence of irregular threats and non-compliant actors.
Page 101 of 171

3303 enemies and that is still struggling when facing irregular threats or trying to plan
3304 “full-spectrum operations” effective for just the kind of complex situations usually
3305 encountered in scenarios like Iraq or Afghanistan. It may be considered a fact
3306 that none of the currently employed planning systems seems to have the
3307 definite capability to deal properly with irregular or hybrid39 threats, and all
3308 military organizations acknowledge that the their planning systems need to
3309 evolve in order to be really effective in the present operational conditions. In
3310 fact, what we should be looking for (and none seems to have achieved it so far)
3311 is a planning system capable of dealing with “full spectrum operations” and that
3312 can be applied properly and efficiently on every part of the continuum of conflict,
3313 either in “military support to civilian authorities” and “peace support operations”
3314 or in fully kinetic force-on force engagements and counterinsurgency, and all at
3315 the same time.
3316 Furthermore, the combination of the current trends of expeditionary warfare, by

3317 definition in far away lands not well known by Western forces; the increasingly
3318 importance of local populations and institutions in the “war amongst the people”;
3319 the acknowledged need of integrating military actions with other non-military
3320 actors to achieve a desired “comprehensive approach”, so difficult but so
3321 indispensable in stabilization operations; and at the same time facing irregular
3322 enemies, spoilers and non compliant actors, is stressing the current military
3323 planning systems (and, in fact, the whole military system in different ways)
3324 beyond any doubt. In particular, none of the existing planning systems consider
3325 adequately the presence of other actors in the Theatre different from “us and
3326 our allies” (“Blue” actors) and “the enemy/enemies” (“Red” actors); there´s not
3327 even a universally agreed term to designate such actors (e.g. “Situation forces”
3328 or SITFOR or, gaining recently more acceptance, “Green actors”). Not having
3329 even a standardized name, such actors are completely ignored in most
3330 traditional planning systems or are referred in very general terms when
3331 discussing the general situation of the operational environment, while in real-life
3332 they are unanimously acknowledged as critical elements when confronting an
3333 irregular threat or carrying out a stabilization operation.
3334 Numerous initiatives to improve the so called “traditional model” of planning are
3335 being developed (the effects-based planning being perhaps the most
39
In modern parlance, a hybrid threat may, at the same time, take a conventional or an
irregular form, almost simultaneously, even recurring to terrorism or associating itself with
criminal organizations. The Lebanese organization Hezbollah is usually presented as an
example of “hybrid threat”.
Page 102 of 171

3336 spectacular, but not the only one) but so far no complete agreement has been
3337 reached yet on what to change and how.40
3338 It also has to be kept in mind that the expression “planning process” is an
3339 “umbrella term” where a lot of different planning methods, each of them with
3340 different steps and intermediate products can be found. Even the name itself is
3341 far from standard: just talking about terms in English language, in NATO there is
3342 the “Operational Planning Process” (OPP), a US Marine will talk about the
3343 specific “Marine Corps Planning Process” (MCPP) while the US Army would
3344 refer to the “Military Decision Making Process” (MDMP); a British planner would
3345 be familiar with “the Estimate” and so on.
3346 Also, when considering the steps of the planning process, the variety is even
3347 wider.41 For example, in the MNE-5 CONOPS with Implementing Procedures for
3348 the Effects-Based approach to multinational Operations, Chapter 5, the
3349 planning steps are identified as: “Transition State Analysis (TSA)”, “Red and
3350 Green Teaming (RG)”, “Effects Development (ED)”, “Action Development and
3351 Resource Matching (ADRM)” and “Synchronization and Plan Refinement
3352 (SPR)”, that some “traditional” planners may find almost esoteric.42 Rather
3353 different and more classic are the NATO´s OPP five stages: “Initiation”,
3354 “Orientation”, “Concept Development”, “Plan Development” and “Plan Review”
3355 described in Chapter 6 of AJP-01 (C) Allied Joint Doctrine.43 Also, the US Joint
3356 Forces use for their “Joint Operation Planning Process” six steps in the JP 5-0
3357 Joint Operation Planning: “Initiation”, “Mission Analysis”, “Course of Action
3358 (COA) Development”, “COA Analysis and Wargaming”, “COA Comparison”,
3359 “COA Approval” and “Plan or Order Development”.44
3360 Going into the specifics of the different planning systems, the order of the
3361 planning actions sometimes changes; different emphasis is given to particular
40
One example of these efforts is the US Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500 Commander´s
Appreciaton and Campaign Design, that incorporates elements of the Systemic Operational
Design (SOD). Available at XXX
41
This is in strong contrast with the Intelligence cycle, whose stages (Direction, Collection,
Processing and Dissemination) may be considered fairly standard internationally.
42
Effects –Based approach to Multinational Operations. Concept of Operations (CONOPS) with
Implementing Procedures, Version 2, 20 th January 2009. This is a product of MNE-5 and is
unclassified, although not approved for public release, so, all references in the present study will
be very general.
43
AJP-01 (C), op. cit., pages 6-3 and 6-4.
44
US Joint Publication JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), pages III-19 and
III-20. Available at XXX
Page 103 of 171

3362 aspects; one specific aspect of planning may be framed in diverse steps in the
3363 different planning systems; some systems consider the “effects” while others
3364 don´t; the respective role of the Commander and the staff in the planning
3365 process, and the latitude given to subordinate HQ,s, in theory as well as in
3366 practice, may be quite different in accordance with different national military
3367 cultures; and, last but not least, it´s not uncommon that the same planning
3368 product, act or element receives different names in various planning systems,
3369 while sometimes the same or a very similar name is applied to widely (or
3370 perhaps even worse, subtly) different concepts.45
3371 However, despite its very real lack of standardization (not to be undervalued
3372 when working in a Coalition multinational HQ,s) in the present work it is
3373 assessed that, when coming to what is actually performed in each planning
3374 system, basically there is a general pattern recognizable and common, from the
3375 reception of superior orders to begin the planning until the decision of the
3376 Commander is made and the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Plan or order
3377 is elaborated.
3378 It is common to compare the military planning symbol with a problem-solving

3379 method. No matter how many steps or stages are considered, in fact, all that it
3380 is done in the planning process is, first, identifying the problem to be solved and
3381 what are the circumstances in which the problem happens (“problem framing”).
3382 This is referred in most planning systems as a combination of “Situation
3383 Analysis” and “Mission Analysis” and these combined analysis take place
3384 almost at the same time, as they influence each other; however, in fact
3385 “Situation Analysis” never ends, as the operational environment is evolving
3386 along time during the planning process, and any change needs to be properly
3387 considered along the planning46; however, “Mission Analysis” is a discrete part
3388 of the planning process that has a beginning and an end. During this stage is
3389 particularly important to review the “Higher Commander´s Guidance”, as it
3390 contributes to provide a shared situational understanding from the beginning,
3391 ensuring also vertical linkage between different levels of command. Particularly,
45
Among many other examples, the US Army FMI 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency (March
2009), in pages 3-7 and 3-8 calls “Lines of Effort” to what is commonly referred elsewhere as
“Lines of Operations” (even by the US Joint Doctrine, as reflected in US Joint publication JP 5-0
Joint Operation Planning, 26 December 2006, Glossary, page GL-16; or by the US Army itself,
that talks about exactly the same elements calling them “Logical Lines of Operations” in the FM
3-24, pages 5-3 to 5-7). Also, the United Kingdom, in its Joint Warfare Publication JWP 5-00
Joint Operations Planning 2nd Edition (December 2008), has changed the meaning of the term
“Line of Operations” from the previous edition (March 2004) and what formerly were the
“Decisive points” (aligned with the NATO Doctrine in force) are now the similar (but not
identically defined) “Decisive conditions”.
46
Also, one of the characteristics of culture is that it is “dynamic”, so it requires frequent review
and cultural analysis becomes an iterative part of campaigning.
Page 104 of 171

3392 the end of the “Mission Analysis” happens once the problem has been defined
3393 properly, usually by the Commander (in what may be known as “Mission
3394 statement”) and he /she gives a broad guidance to the staff in order to develop
3395 some options to solve the problem (the usually called “Commander´s Planning
3396 Guidance”, CPG). The “Commander´s Planning Guidance” is the final result of
3397 the initial step of the process, that of “problem framing”.
3398 Under the Commander´s guidance (or “Commander´s problem framing”), these
3399 options that would solve the problem or, in other words, these different ways of
3400 accomplishing the mission (or, expressing it in other ways: of arriving to the
3401 preferred endstate/ achieving the assigned objectives / producing the desired
3402 effects) are commonly known as own “courses of actions” (COA,s), and are
3403 developed in detail by the staff. Of course, the enemy has a vote, and part of
3404 the HQ must put themselves in the shoes of the enemy/ spoiler of the process
3405 to develop the possible opposing force (OPFOR) COA,s. This is also called
3406 “Red Teaming”.
3407 The whole idea is that, inside the parameters defined by the Commander´s
3408 Planning Guidance” (that in fact constitute a “shared situational understanding”
3409 that includes the Commander and the staff), the staff is to develop different own
3410 COA,s in order for the Commander to choose one of them, the best solution of
3411 the problem amongst different ones. Of course, any of our COA,s should be
3412 able to solve the problem, that is, would accomplish the mission/ arrive at the
3413 endstate despite what the enemy does: this is ensured by wargaming our
3414 COA,s against all of the OPFOR COA,s. Once this is done and after comparing
3415 the different COA,s with one another, the staff is in position to brief the
3416 Commander about the different COA,s, informing him/her of the relative
3417 strengths and weaknesses, risks, etc,…of each COA.
3418 Finally, the Commander will choose a single COA, a way of solving the stated
3419 problem, giving additional guidance if needed, so the chosen COA may be
3420 developed by the staff into a workable Concept of Operations (CONOPS)/ plan
3421 or order.
3422 Having established the general framework of the planning process, admittedly
3423 in a traditional way, let´s see how we can integrate “cultural awareness” in such
3424 process or, put in another way, let´s consider how we can improve both the
3425 planning thinking and the final planning products using the cultural awareness.
3426 First, it is clear from the previous description of the planning process that the
3427 role of the Commander is critical for successfully integrating culture into
3428 planning; the Commander, by his/her personal interventions along the planning
3429 process is in the best position to make sure that culture is properly
3430 acknowledged and considered during planning. A Commander with “cultural
3431 awareness/understanding” will make his/her HQ culturally sensitive and is the
3432 best driving force for effectively incorporating culture into planning.
Page 105 of 171

3433 What may be gained by integrating “cultural awareness” into planning? The
3434 already cited UK JDN 1/09 identifies four general advantages (“contributes to
3435 protection of strengths, minimising of weaknesses, exploitation of opportunities
3436 and mitigation of threats”)47 that are easy to be agreed; other sources speak in
3437 more general terms that the consideration of culture leads to better informed
3438 decision-making at all levels.
3439 However, most of the literature concerning cultural awareness and the military
3440 stresses that we have to be cautious managing our expectations about the
3441 usefulness of introducing culture factors into planning. Culture is about human
3442 beings and, as such, is both dynamic and environment and context-dependant,
3443 which means that we may get a better general understanding of the actors in
3444 our operational environment, but we won´t be able to just “crack the code” of
3445 behaviour just by studying culture. Human beings are predictable only to a
3446 certain extent and, changing the context, we may get different reactions from
3447 people of the same culture; furthermore, personal preferences will always exist
3448 alongside general trends caused by the adscription to a determined culture.48
3449 So, when integrating culture into planning, we will get an improved
3450 understanding of local situation, interests, objectives and endstates of local
3451 actors and the roots of conflict, but we won´t get the ability to predict accurately
3452 all actions and reactions to our moves. Knowing its limits, “cross cultural
3453 awareness” will be more useful for the planner who won´t be then disappointed
3454 in his/her expectations.
3455 The extent to what “cultural awareness” is something new or has always been
3456 present in planning is something debatable. If we use the five “Operational
3457 Culture dimensions of the Battlespace” considered by the US Marine Corps
3458 sponsored publication Operational Culture for the Warfighter (physical
3459 environment, economy, social structure, political structure and belief systems)49,
3460 it can be said that at least three of them (physical environment, economy and
3461 political structure) have been fairly consistently included in the traditional
3462 “Situation analysis”. The other two not so much, although the social and moral
3463 dimensions may have been considered by insightful Commanders and their
47
JDN 1/09, page 4-3.
48
Concerning the applicability of cultural awareness for the effects-based approach, JDN 1/09
uses the following expression in page 4-3: “Cultural analysis can help visualise potential
secondary and tertiary effects, although these can never be predicted”. Also, in SALMONI,
Barak A. and HOLMES-EBER, Paula, Operational Culture for the Warfighter, Principles and
Applications Marine Corps University. Quantico, Virginia. 2008, the same idea is also stressed:
“Marines must not consider people programmed into cultures, and thus locked into certain kinds
of behaviours. Such an approach creates simplistic stereotypes…” (page 21). See also íbid.
page 47 and 287-289.
49
SALMONI and HOLMES-EBER, ibíd, pages. 51-52.
Page 106 of 171

3464 HQ,s developing the existing planning systems. However, what may be really
3465 new is the systematic consideration of all cultural dimensions, inter-related
3466 between them and with the rest of the planning factors. Here there is new
3467 ground, that should be properly recorded in the planning publications and
3468 documents.50
3469 How is “cross cultural awareness” best integrated into the planning process? A
3470 tentative general answer may be that the best way to integrate “cross cultural
3471 understanding” in the planning process is to follow a holistic approach. On the
3472 one hand, “culture” as a planning factor should be introduced systematically in
3473 the applicable doctrine (of the sending nations of the Coalition, as well as in the
3474 Coalition/Alliance doctrine, if it exists), as well as in all general planning
3475 procedures (again, of the sending nations and of the Coalition) and in the
3476 Standard Operating procedures (SOP,s) of the different HQ,s.51 It is important
3477 to note that culture must be present all along the planning process, not being
3478 just locked in a specific stage, like the initial “Situation Analysis”. Also culture
3479 should be taken into consideration by all planners in the HQ and not just (and
3480 only) by specific cells (like INTEL, Info Ops, CIMIC or the appointed Cultural
3481 advisor). May be that not everybody in the HQ may be capable of a thorough
3482 cultural analysis, but the results and implications of cultural analysis are
3483 applicable to all in the HQ, who should use their basic “cultural awareness” or
3484 “cultural understanding” to try to identify potential impacts of culture in their
3485 particular area of expertise.52On the other hand, specific “cultural experts” (if
3486 they are available) or other sources of “cultural expertise” should be involved in
3487 the planning from the beginning. Paragraph 7.1.4 discusses who may be such
3488 “cultural experts” or different sources of “cultural expertise” in an HQ.
3489 Furthermore, integration of culture into planning can´t be reduced to some “low
3490 intensity operations” or peacekeeping missions. It may be a matter of
3491 discussion the degree of importance of culture related to other considerations in
50
For a discussion on the historical use of culture in military operations see SALMONI and
HOLMES-EBER, ibíd, pages. 16-22. Writing in 2006, William D. WUNDERLE assesses about
the US Army, one of the most prolific producers of new and updated doctrine that “current Army
Doctrine does not consider the impact of culture on internal mission planning, nor does it
provide its commanders with a comprehensive and structured approach to cultural
considerations in the operational planning process”. WUNDERLE, William, Through the Lens of
Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle East
Countries”, pages 65-66. Available at XXX
51
Interesting proposals on how culture may be integrated in the US Army and the US Marines
specific planning processes may be found, respectively, at WUNDERLE, op cit., pages 78-81
and HOLMES-EBER, Paula and KANE, Brian, Incorporating Culture into the Marine Corps
Planning Process, available at XXX
52
HOLMES-EBER and KANE, ibid., page 2 and 4.
Page 107 of 171

3492 high intensity operations; however, if we embrace concepts as “full spectrum

3493 operations” and “the “three-block war”, already introduced in most military
3494 doctrines, such discussion is largely irrelevant: Culture should be a
3495 consideration to be included in all military operations.
3496 To what extent current doctrine integrates cultural awareness explicitly into
3497 planning? So far, only some recent planning documents and doctrine include
3498 the explicit consideration of cultural factors in a systematic way. In fact, for
3499 example, in NATO planning documents, like the Guidelines for Operational
3500 Planning (GOP), that are as recent as from 2005, or the different Functional
3501 Planning Guides, cultural considerations are almost absent or described in a
3502 very general way.53 So, there is a lot of work to be done in this respect.
3503 When is “cross cultural awareness” first introduced into the planning process? It
3504 may be concluded that it is (or it should be) present right from the beginning, in
3505 the first stage, during the “problem framing” covered by the “Situation Analysis”
3506 and “Mission Analysis” and influencing heavily the Commander´s Planning
3507 Guidance. It is in this first stage when the products of the Intelligence
3508 Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), or, in more updated terms, the Intelligence
3509 Preparation of the Operational Environment” (IPOE) should bring to bear all the
3510 cultural considerations relevant for planning purposes. Besides our own forces
3511 and allies, the different relevant actors should be identified and classified either
3512 as “Red” (Opposing Forces or OPFOR, to be defeated: e.g irregular threats) or
3513 “Green actors” (neutral actors in the area of operations, that should be gained to
3514 our side and isolated from the influence and control of the “Red”); also, there
3515 may be actors difficult to classify in such basic categories, and a Commander
3516 decision may be needed in order to frame them either as “Red” or “Green”54
3517 (e.g. non-compliant actors, or segments of the enemy that may be persuaded to
3518 change sides, etc,…).55 For each relevant actor, its “involvement, relationships,
53
For example, “Green Teaming” is not included in the extant documentation. NATO has
already identified this general deficiency and is developing a new set of GOP,s, that will receive
a new name (Comprehensive Operations Planning Guidelines?) trying to capture its more
holistic and comprehensive approach. Apparently, also the traditional Operational Planning
Process (OPP) may receive modifications. A better consideration of the interagency dimension
and the introduction (to an unspecified extent, so far) of the Effects-Based Approach to
Operations (EBAO), that rely heavily on cross cultural awareness, are expected to be included
in the new version.
54
It looks difficult to think in additional basic categories different from Blue (friendly), Red
(hostile) and Green (neutral), although of course there may be lots of nuances and along the
operation actors may change form one basic category to other.
55
A discussion on “Red/Green Teaming” may be found at Effects –Based approach to
Multinational Operations. Concept of Operations (CONOPS) with Implementing Procedures,
Version 2, 20 th January 2009, page 1-5.
Page 108 of 171

3519 beliefs, motives, perceptions, interests and desired outcomes is integral to

3520 understanding the operational environment (or framing the problem), and
3521 throughout campaign planning”.56 Most relevant for planning are the
3522 identification of the relationships between the “Red” and the “Green” actors, the
3523 cultural ties and divisions between the opponent and the population that can be
3524 properly exploited, as well as the view of the “Blue” forces from the “Green”
3525 perspective, the popular perceptions about the intervention force; these
3526 elements are critical for our own Information Operations and for the whole
3527 Campaign Design. It can´t be overemphasized that the actors must be studied
3528 not in isolation but considering carefully all their internal and external
3529 relationships from a system of systems approach.
3530 The identification of all relevant cultural factors, including the presence of
3531 diverse cultures, subcultures and local nuances, and their evolution over time,
3532 considering trans-AOR links should be considered also. Using cultural analysis
3533 templates, databases and other specific analysis tools57, gaps may be identified
3534 in order to be filled through Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR,s). IPOE
3535 won´t be discussed more here as is adequately covered in the following
3536 paragraphs dealing with cross cultural awareness integration inside the
3537 Intelligence procedures.
3538 Traditionally, the main factors (or “mission variables”) to be considered initially
3539 in the planning process during the mission planning phase were described by
3540 the US Army as METT-T (Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and
3541 Support Available, and Time available). However, recently the acronym METT-T
3542 has been transformed into METT-TC adding “Civil considerations”58 to the
3543 variables, which is a fundamental step in the right direction enshrined in the
3544 doctrine. Also, for framing the problem adequately, it´s not enough to introduce
3545 “culture” as a discrete “variable”, but all the “mission variables” must be put in a
3546 cultural perspective: e.g. the vital concept of “time” is usually considered by
56
UK JDN 1/09, page 4-2.
57
The UK JDN 1/09 offers one example of cultural template to be further developed on Annex
4-A, pages 4A-1 to 4A-3. A full discussion of applicable tools may be found in the Appendix B
“Social Network Analysis and Other Analytical Tools” from US Field Manual FM 3-24
Counterinsurgency (December 2006), available at XXX. Also, the US initiative “Human Terrain
System”, fully discussed in paragraph 7.1.4, has developed a “Map-HT toolkit”, a combination of
hardware and software specifically designed to provide cultural support to operations that
include templates for analysis, charts, graphics, etc.
58
See US Army FMI 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency (March 2009), which develops
extensively the “Civil Considerations” in pages 1-6 to 1-16. However, other sources list the
recently added “C” as “Culture” instead of “Civil Considerations”, or develop an additional MC
“Military culture” (METT-TC-MC) such as SALMONI and HOLMES-EBER, op. cit, pages. 6-7.
Page 109 of 171

3547 Westerners very differently from other cultures59; also, we should consider not
3548 only our operational “Area of responsibility” but also the implications of what the
3549 adversary (or the local population or even other Allies) see as a similar
3550 concept.60
3551 The general approach proposed here is that, rather than having new planning
3552 elements introduced (which is what some versions of the EBAO propose,
3553 although this new “planning elements” still have to achieve universal
3554 understanding and recognition), the traditional planning elements may be best
3555 developed and applied when considering “cross cultural awareness”.61 Usually,
3556 most planning elements are developed studying the available data (or making
3557 assumptions when data are absent) in order to make deductions that may be
3558 further advanced becoming conclusions that are translated into the different
3559 “planning elements”.62 In fact, cross cultural awareness should be embedded in
3560 this process of developing “planning elements” through deduction and analysis.
3561 Also, cross cultural awareness may have an impact in the specific definition of
3562 each of the “planning elements” during the planning process. In particular,
3563 against an irregular threat and in a “war amongst the people” most will be
3564 heavily influenced by culture. The definition of traditional planning elements are
59
In a breakthrough from previous conventional thinking, FMI 3-24.2 considers the following
timelines during planning: higher, operational, planning, enemy and populace (HOPE-P) (page
4-19). Previously there just discussion about “our own operational timeline” (time to carry out
the operation) and the planning timeline (time available for planning) and perhaps about the
enemy timeline, but there was no mention of “populace timeline”.
60
In particular, this is an underlying concept critical for considering either an “Afghanistan
Strategy”, an “Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) Strategy” or a regional “Central Asia Strategy”. A
“Regional Command North Strategy” or a “Helmand Strategy” (or rather, purely national
strategies related to areas where national contingents usually operate) make no sense without a
proper framework provided by the higher Coalition military levels and political authorities and
the consideration of how other actors define their own “areas of responsibility”. Also, this
“parochial” view also forgets that insurgents do not have to use the same Areas of
Responsibility (AOR,s) as the Coalition. In fact, other actors don´t do it: UNAMA regional
divisions in Afghanistan do not match exactly ISAF´s four Regional Commands, which has an
impact on coordination.
61
The definition of the main planning elements used in the following discussion (as NATO
understand them) may be found in NATO´s AJP-01 (C) Allied Joint Doctrine (March 2007),
pages 4-16 to 4-26 and 6-1 to 6-18. However, as was expressed before, different military
organizations and national Armed Forces may have specific “planning elements” or particular
definitions for some of the planning terms. Such “planning elements” developed in the first
stages of planning include the “end state”, the “objectives”, the “limitations”, the “planning
assumptions” or the “Center of Gravity” (CoG), etc,….
62
This is the traditional NATO standard “3-column model analysis” (data/assumptions,
deductions, conclusions)
Page 110 of 171

3565 still considered fundamentally valid but their specific formulation will have to be
3566 refined in each particular planning case “through the lens of cultural
3567 awareness”.63 For example, an eventual “Green (neutral actors: e.g. local
3568 population) CoG” may be found useful besides the traditional “own” and
3569 “enemy” CoG,s, although this does not affect the definition of what a CoG is.
3570 Also, cultural factors are vital when determining the “critical capabilities”, “critical
3571 requirements” and “critical vulnerabilities” of any particular CoG, but first a
3572 thorough understanding of what these terms mean is needed.
3573 In any case, it can´t be overemphasized the usefulness of culture at this stage
3574 of planning, when studying the limitations of the different actors, the
3575 “constraints” and “restraints” that limit their actions, as well as when determining
3576 what their “end state” and “objectives” are. In particular, the interim mental
3577 construct that we have to do when some data are missing, the development of
3578 the so-called “planning assumptions” or the assessment of risks made at this
3579 stage of planning would be incomplete (and may produce serious
3580 consequences) without considering the cultural factors.
3581 Also, other traditional analysis like “time-space-force” mostly reflecting a “force
3582 on force” situation clearly need to evolve to widen their scope incorporating
3583 culture-related factors, evolving perhaps into “time-space-force-population” at
3584 least in some operational environments (like COIN).
3585 Furthermore, besides applying culture to study the enemy properly (this
3586 particular content is not developed here as is studied in detail in a later
3587 paragraph detailing the integration of cross cultural awareness in the
3588 Intelligence processes), culture (in a wide sense) should also be applied for
3589 understanding better the circumstances of our own forces. In the “initial
3590 assessment of capabilities” there should exist a proper consideration of the
3591 specific context of each of the Coalition national contingents (including the
3592 expressed national caveats), as well as the Host nation allied forces.
3593 Even the Commander´s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR,s) may need
3594 an improvement (at least as they are normally understood in NATO): the
3595 CCIR,s are of three types; Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR,s), usually
3596 associated with the enemy and managed by Intelligence staff; Essential
3597 Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI,s), associated with operational security
3598 (OPSEC) and deception; and Friendly Forces Information requirements
3599 (FFIR,s), referred to our own troops (and allies). It looks that proper
3600 consideration of the relevance of information requirements related to the local
3601 population and culture may require an adjustment in the present categories of
3602 the CCIR,s.
63
Borrowing the expression from William D. WUNDERLE, op. cit.
Page 111 of 171

3603 In any case, the final result of integrating “cross cultural awareness” in this initial
3604 stage should be a “problem framing”/“Situation Analysis”/“Mission Analysis”64
3605 that provides, amongst many other outcomes, a “cultural understanding” in the
3606 Commander and the HQ staff that will be put to good use all along the rest of
3607 the planning process. All critical cultural data should be identified and, if
3608 possible, known in this initial step, previously to elaborating the “Mission
3609 statement”65 and to the “Commander´s Planning Guidance” being issued; these
3610 critical initial planning products should be crafted having previously acquired the
3611 mentioned “cultural understanding”.
3612 It is important to note that, at this stage, the “Commander´s Planning

3613 Guidance”66 (CPG) provides a shared situational understanding inside the
3614 Headquarters. Later, when this CPG evolves into the “Commander´s Intent”
3615 inserted into the final product of the planning process, the written order or plan,
3616 it provides also a “shared situational understanding” for subordinate HQ,s/Units
3617 that receive the order or plan, allowing them to make their own planning
3618 knowing how the Superior Commander understands the operational
3619 environment and the mission to be accomplished.67
3620 While the Commander and the staff are trying to identify what is to be done and
3621 why, a part of the HQ, the Intelligence staff, would be trying to do the same
3622 concerning the enemy. This “Red Teaming” should identify what the enemy can
3623 do (capabilities) and what the enemy intends to do (intentions). It is clear that
3624 factoring culture is absolutely essential in ascertaining something as intangible
3625 as the intentions of an irregular opponent. Also, as it is generally acknowledged
3626 that irregular warfare is “population-centric”, where most (if not all) of the
3627 activities are planned considering mainly its impact on the local population; so,
3628 in order to develop our own and the enemy “Courses of action” (COA,s),
3629 someone in the HQ should be studying the eventual response from neutral
3630 actors to our own and the enemy´s actions same (Green Teaming).
3631 So, considering always the estimated COA,s opened to the enemy (usually the
3632 most dangerous and the most probable cases are considered) and the
64
In the Effects –Based approach to Multinational Operations. Concept of Operations
(CONOPS) with Implementing Procedures, Version 2, 20 th January 2009, we would be talking
about “Transition State Analysis” (TSA) activity of the Effects-Based Planning Process.
65
Almost universally, mission statement declares in a succinct way what to do, who is going to
do it, where, when and why. “How” to do it is not in the “Mission statement”, but is developed
later through the different Courses of Action.
66
A similar US Army term is “Commander´s visualization”
67
Also, the dissemination of the order or plan to collateral units or agencies contributes again to
have a “shared situational understanding”.
Page 112 of 171

3633 estimated responses of the critical neutral actors, our own COA,s are developed
3634 along the directions provided by the “Commander´s Planning Guidance” and
3635 consistently with the “Mission Statement”. Different COA,s reflect different
3636 options for the Commander to choose how best to accomplish the mission and
3637 reach the end state.
3638 Developing the different own COA,s bring the use of additional “planning
3639 elements”, such as “Lines of Operations”, “Decisive Points”, “Phases”,
3640 “Synchronisation, Synergy and Leverage”, “Campaign Rhythm”, “Troops to task
3641 analysis”, etc,… Cross cultural awareness in critical in combining such elements
3642 properly in order to have a proper “operational design” of the campaign
3643 materialized by the different COA,s.68 COA,s development69 should take into
3644 consideration all the culture-related information that has been analysed in the
3645 previous stage. Not a single “planning element” can be properly defined without
3646 relating it to culture. Also, culture is a most useful tool in order to develop
3647 “contingency plans” (the “branches” and “sequels” that represent the “what
3648 if…”). In particular, it can improve decisively the quality of the “risk assessment”
3649 assumed and helps to develop the “risk management” in any of the COA,s,
3650 through the identification and mitigation of undesirable and unintended
3651 consequences.70 Cultural considerations may shape the balance of fires,
3652 influence activities and manoeuvre, as well as the specific means or activities
3653 selected for materializing the COA,s.
3654 Finally, during planning should be identified relevant and proper assessment
3655 tools to monitorize and measure the progress of the campaign, the so called
3656 “Measures of Effectiveness” (MOE,s) and “Measures of Performance” (MOP).
3657 Again, culture is critical in selecting such indexes of success, that may be
3658 related to cultural-related issues such as “to what extent Coalition forces (or the
68
As the UK JDN 1/09 puts it: “The determination, evaluation and selection of courses of action
should specifically include consideration of perceptions, behaviour patterns and likely actions
and reactions of significant groups and individuals”. Op. cit, page 4-2. Also, actions like fostering
our own cultural similarities with neutral actors and the exploitation of cultural differences
between the enemy and focused neutral actors are enabled by incorporating culture into
planning.
69
The traditional concept of “COA development” is equivalent in EBAO terms to the sum of
“Effects Development” plus “Action Development and Resource Matching” and “Synchronization
and Plan Refinement” stages.
70
Also, “cultural awareness” is repeatedly identified in a variety of sources as a “force
protection” multiplier, as it helps to prevent or at least mitigate local people objections or
adverse reactions to own actions which contravene local culture norms. E.g. identifying in
advance the need to have female soldiers in “cordon and search operations” or that certain
actions (like detaining enemy leaders inside a mosque) may be more properly performed by
host nation forces instead of Coalition troops, or should be avoided at all as counterproductive
to our efforts.
Page 113 of 171

3659 Host Nation supported Government) retain popular support” or “to what extent
3660 Coalition Information Operations are being successful”.
3661 Also, particular operational activities like the Information Operations (Info
3662 Ops)71, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), the Commander´s engagement with
3663 key local leaders (a critical activity when facing irregular threats)72 and even
3664 Targeting are heavily dependant on having proper “cross cultural awareness”.
3665 Here not more will be elaborated on this as this is covered in Study issue 2.
3666 Furthermore, cross cultural awareness is also needed in order to place the
3667 military contribution properly in the context of a wider international/interagency
3668 intervention, so as to be able to plan adequately the synchronization of military
3669 actions with other from other friendly actors (Host nation Government or Armed
3670 Forces, international organizations, etc,…). This is usually reflected in
3671 “synchronization matrixes” of which there may be two: one that puts the military
3672 actions in an inter-agency /comprehensive approach context, and other that
3673 relates in time all kinds of military activities with each other.
3674 Also, when developing the “troops to task analysis” into a proper “Task
3675 Organization” for each COA, assigning tasks to the different national
3676 contingents of the Coalition, national sensitivities (caveats, etc,…) should have
3677 been clearly identified and addressed appropriately through the involvement of
3678 the National Contingent Commander in planning as appropriate.
3679 If anything, in an EBAO framework for planning, cross cultural awareness is

3680 even more evident and explicit as determining effects to be produced on the
3681 different actors and identifying the actions needed to cause the desired effects
3682 requires a profound knowledge of the cited actors that can only be achieved
3683 mastering the cultural environment. Without a solid cross cultural awareness (in
3684 fact, nothing less than a profound cultural understanding of the operational
3685 environment is required), it is not realistic to try to determine the planning and
3686 application of both physical and psychological effects in selected actors.
3687 Before engaging in “wargaming” and “comparison”, any COA, to be considered

3688 viable for further analysis, should pass the test of “suitability”, “feasibility”,
71
Cross cultural awareness not only helps to understand the local society but also is an
indispensable tool for developing ways of promoting the local knowledge of our own culture and
motivations, allowing us to explaining ourselves to the population.
72
For an effective “Key leader engagement” it is necessary to identify who is really a key leader
and why, what´s his/her real sphere of influence, motivations, beliefs, supports and opposers
and which may be the proper inducements for him/her to engage constructively with our own
forces. This applies to formal and informal structures of power (like, for example, the one that
sustains the influence of the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq). All this requires real cultural
understanding of the environment.
Page 114 of 171

3689 “acceptability”, “exclusivity” and “completeness”; if it fails such test, the COA
3690 should be modified or rejected. It is clear that cultural considerations are
3691 essential in most, if not all, of the cited criteria, particularly concerning
3692 “suitability”,“feasibility” and “acceptability”.73
3693 Once developed, all of our own COA,s should be “wargamed” against the
3694 OPFOR COA,s, while considering the impact on the “Green actors”.74 It is quite
3695 evident that, particularly in stability operations and against irregular threats,
3696 cross cultural awareness improves decisively the ability to calculate and plan
3697 military outcomes, so it is essential for assessing and evaluating the different
3698 own COA,s. If applicable, modifications will be made to own COA,s after the
3699 wargaming in order to ensure that they defeat any COA from the enemy while
3700 accomplishing the mission and achieving the endstate, having been developed
3701 in accordance with the Commander´s Planning Guidance/Commander´s intent.
3702 After the wargaming, the different COA,s are compared with each other in order
3703 to produce a prioritized recommendation of COA,s for the Commander to
3704 choose one of them. As it has been told previously, cultural considerations are
3705 central in assessing each COA.
3706 Later, with the Commander´s decision about which COA will be further
3707 developed into a CONOPS, Plan or Operation order (OPORD), accepting,
3708 rejecting or modifying the COA recommended collectively by the HQ staff, the
3709 planning process may be considered complete.
3710 As we have seen, cross cultural awareness should be present all along the
3711 process as it decisively adds quality and effectiveness to planning; not giving
3712 proper consideration to culture in planning produces the most serious
3713 consequences, as is unanimously testified by operational Commanders with
3714 experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.
3715 Summarizing, the initiatives/findings/recommendations in the present paragraph

3716 are listed in the form of indicators that may inform us about the level of
3717 performance and effectiveness of the integration of cultural awareness into
3718 planning:
3719 1: “Culture” as a planning factor is integrated systematically in the applicable

3720 doctrine (of the sending nations of the Coalition, as well as in the
73
See WUNDERLE, op. cit., page 79.
74
US Army FMI 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency identifies four actors to be considered in
wargaming: US COIN forces, Host nation COIN Forces, Population and Insurgents.
Traditionally, wargaming only involved “Blue” (own) and “Red” (enemy) forces.
Page 115 of 171

3721 Coalition/Alliance doctrine, if it exists), as well as in all general planning

3722 procedures (again, of the sending nations and of the Coalition) and in the
3723 Standard Operating procedures (SOP,s) of the different HQ,s.
3724 2: Cultural considerations are included routinely in HQ training and planning

3725 exercises.
3726 3: Cultural considerations are included in the HQ planning documents (SOP,s,

3727 templates, checklists) in a systematic manner by all planning areas (not just in a
3728 specific “cultural area”)
3729 4: Cultural considerations are assessed and cultural analysis is taken into
3730 consideration during the planning process in a systematic manner by all
3731 planning personnel (not just by the “cultural advisor” or equivalent)
3732 5: Specific “cultural experts” (if they are available) and other sources of “cultural
3733 expertise” are identified and involved routinely in planning from the beginning.
3734 6: All relevant actors in the operational area are properly identified and analyzed
3735 during planning (“Green Teaming” takes place in planning and not just “Blue”
3736 (own) and “Red” (enemy).
3737 7: “Green” (neutral/population) perceptions and attitudes about the force are
3738 considered during the planning process.
3739 8: Cultural considerations are considered when defining the different particular
3740 planning elements (CoG,etc,…) of the operation.
3741 9: The Commander´s Planning Guidance/Commander´s Intent, includes and/or

3742 reflects relevant cultural considerations identified (as appropriate).
3743 10: The Commander´s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR,s) include

3744 cultural considerations (as appropriate).
3745 11: Cultural considerations are assessed when developing/assessing the

3746 COA,s (development, wargaming and comparison)
3747 12: Cultural considerations are assessed in the COA “viability test” (“suitability”,
3748 “feasibility”, “acceptability”, “exclusivity” and “completeness”).
3749 13: Cultural considerations and/or criteria are used by the staff when offering
3750 advice to the Commander on which COA to choose to be further developed as
3751 CONOPS/plan/order.
3752 14: Cultural considerations are assessed when defining the appropriate Criteria
3753 for Success (CfS), Measures of Effectiveness (MoE,s) and Measures of
3754 Performance (MoP,s) to monitorize the campaign progress.
Page 116 of 171

3755
3756 9.1.d. Elements in the HQ organization that may improve the CCA capability
3757 related to planning.
3758 After having studied how precisely “cultural awareness” may be integrated into
3759 planning, it seems appropriate to discuss the relationship between “cultural
3760 awareness” and planners. It has to be said that, as a whole, we are studying
3761 this matter from the particular point of view of planning and planners, but that
3762 the capability-building area will be studied at length by the Study issue nº 4 of
3763 the present document.
3764 A relevant point is the level of “cultural capability” needed for the personnel
3765 involved in planning, distinguishing between the levels of “cultural awareness”,
3766 “cultural understanding” and “cultural competence”. As presented previously in
3767 this document, a model of “cultural capability” is assumed where, in an ideal
3768 world, almost all of the military personnel should have a “cultural awareness”
3769 proportional to develop his/her tasks; a sizable part of the Armed Forces should
3770 also have additional knowledge about culture, with additional culture-oriented
3771 education and training, acquiring “cultural understanding”; and, finally, specific
3772 individuals in relevant and previously identified slots should have top knowledge
3773 about culture, being specialist and having full “cultural competence”.
3774 It is generally admitted that culture is a very specific factor to analyze, quite
3775 complex and with local nuances that may be difficult to appreciate in full. At the
3776 operational level (the one that is mainly concerned in the present study) it can
3777 be reasonably expected that most, if not all, members of the planning team are
3778 capable of recognizing that culture is relevant to planning and have a certain
3779 cultural knowledge of the operational environment as a result of the pre-
3780 deployment training and previous education and experience; also, they may be
3781 assumed to be capable of integrating the result of cultural analysis made by
3782 experts into planning. In fact, we are talking of the members of the planning
3783 team having fully achieved the level of “cultural and cross cultural awareness”.
3784 Also, some of them, as a result of his/her experience and training, may be
3785 assumed to have “cultural understanding”. However, how precisely is defined
3786 “cultural understanding” may mean that almost all or almost none of the
3787 planners have such level of cultural capability; however, as a “rule of thumb”, it
3788 is thought that although it can´t be assumed that all planners will have a full
3789 “cultural understanding”, having a robust collective “cultural understanding”
3790 within the HQ as a whole is needed if operating against an irregular threat. Of
3791 course, we are talking about initial capabilities at the beginning of the
3792 deployment (worse-case scenario), as cultural capability will improve as the HQ
3793 stays in the area of operations. In any case, “cultural competence” (the highest
3794 level of cultural capability) is out of the question for almost all of the planners,
Page 117 of 171

3795 given the normal length of the tours of duty and the long term education and
3796 training that it requires.
3797 In any case, there must be a Coalition agreement on the meaning (e.g. detailed
3798 requirements) of the levels that define the cultural capability of personnel75 and,
3799 in particular, also about the particular level (e.g.
3800 awareness/understanding/competence) required from planners. Also, the
3801 cultural capability to be achieved (referring to the previously agreed levels) by
3802 any HQ/formation (including the presence of the “cultural experts/advisors” with
3803 “cultural competence”, where applicable), should be properly reflected in the
3804 doctrine, procedures and SOP,s related to planning, as well as in the peacetime
3805 Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E)/job descriptions of the HQ,s
3806 and/or in the proper Statement of Requirements (SOR) of the operational
3807 Commanders for each specific operation.
3808 To implement this system of standardized cultural capability levels, parallelism

3809 may be developed, for example, from the already existing system in NATO
3810 (Standardization Agreement STANAG 6001) that defines the language
3811 competence by means of defining specific language proficiency levels, named
3812 “Standardised Language Profiles” (SLP), further developed into specific areas
3813 (listening, speaking, reading and writing) and defining numeric levels in each of
3814 the areas (level 0: no proficiency: 1: survival; 2 : functional; 3: professional;
3815 4:expert; 5: highly-articulate native), giving a final 4-digit code that defines the
3816 SLP achieved (e.g. an SLP 3.2.3.2 would mean level 3 in listening, 2 in
3817 speaking, etc,…). This SLP system has been used routinely in all kinds of
3818 NATO activities for years and all NATO jobs have an associated SLP
3819 requirement; the SLP system it offers a model, although of course, levels of
3820 knowledge concerning culture may be more problematic to define; in any case,
3821 standardized levels of competence have also been defined and applied to many
3822 other areas in NATO (like NBC or security clearances).
3823 That brings the subject of having “cultural experts/advisors”, mastering “cultural
3824 competence” at the different HQ,s. The issue has already been identified and
3825 the US Field Manual FM 3-24 about Counterinsurgency (December 2006)
3826 clearly states that: “A force optimized for COIN operations would have political
3827 and cultural advisors at company level. The current force structure gives Corps
3828 and Division Commanders a political advisor. Lower echelon Commanders
3829 must improvise”.76
75
It is suggested the use of cultural “awareness/understanding/competence” as levels, that
have to be defined in detail and subject to measurement/assessment. This aspect is developed
by Study issue 4 of the present document.
76
US Army Field Manual FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (December 2006), Annex A “Guide for
Action”, paragraph 4-16, page A-3. How to get such specific advisors down to Company level is
Page 118 of 171

3830 One open debate is about the role of this “cultural expert” inside the HQ. He/she
3831 may be a personal advisor to the Commander, being inside the “Command
3832 Group” and less involved in the day-to-day works of the HQ staff, having a
3833 higher profile and more probability to influence the decisions of the
3834 Commander. However, this role makes his/her advice more dependant on the
3835 relationship with the Commander, who may choose to ignore or relegate his/her
3836 advice; also the cultural advisor may be less accessible for the rest of the HQ
3837 staff, who may need his/her advice for details of planning and execution of the
3838 operation well below the interest of the Commander, not having an alternate
3839 source on cultural advice. The advantages and disadvantages of the “cultural
3840 expert” roles as personal advisor of the Commander or his/her full integration
3841 into the staff are complementary and a decision should be made for each
3842 operation and level of command.77 Of course, if in the particular HQ considered
3843 the source of cultural expertise is provided by one member of the HQ staff
3844 (either J5, J2, J9 or other) this discussion is pointless as it is already solved.
3845 However, it should be clear that this may be a decision critical for the effective
3846 integration of culture into the operation.
3847 Of course, as many as possible of these experts are needed, but the problem is
3848 that most probably they will be in short supply as it is clear that “cultural
3849 experts/advisors” in one particular area of the world can only be obtained by
3850 having identified such area in advance (in fact, long time before the military
3851 intervention actually happens) as worthy of being studied and by previously
3852 investing a lot of time, resources and personal effort in developing such cultural
3853 expertise. That means that, from an institutional point of view, besides their
3854 personal commitment, such experts are the result of a long term organizational
3855 investment. Furthermore, as in the present strategic environment interventions
3856 may happen in almost all places in the world (no one would have suspected in
3857 2000, only one year after Kosovo and five years of an intense commitment in
3858 the Balkans, that NATO would be soon concerned about a remote place in
3859 Central Asia like Afghanistan), the potential demand for cultural experts
3860 demands attention to almost all regions of the world, which means that there
3861 exists the need for availability of the widest pool of experts in as many different
3862 areas as possible. To compound the problem, most operations against irregular
also answered in the FM 3-24: choosing “a political and cultural advisor from among their
troops.” Clearly, such personnel wouldn´t have the “cultural competence” required, but may be
there is no other option in the short term. In any case, at least the FM 3-24 is aware of the need
of having cultural capability down to the lowest level, although it may not provide a satisfactory
solution on how to provide it.
77
One European country plans to use “cultural advisors” in the HQ restricting his/her role to
advise concerning the impact of culture into Information operations, which looks a rather
restrictive use of such a high value asset as a “cultural advisor”; in this model, the whole HQ
would not benefit from his/her expertise
Page 119 of 171

3863 threats will be protracted, so the cultural capability in the HQ,s must be
3864 supported during extended periods of time.
3865 An additional problem is how to qualify for having a degree relevant for
3866 providing “cultural awareness” to the receiving HQ. In this respect, there are two
3867 approaches; one, sponsored by the United States because of its need to have
3868 experts on the Soviet Union during the Cold War, is that of having specific
3869 “ethnic-cultural degrees” embedded in the University system, that provide, for
3870 example, Russian, Indonesian or German experts “ready to use” by the
3871 military. This seems ideal for developing “cultural experts” in a particular area;
3872 however, in most nations around the world, besides the language field, which is
3873 quite specific, the University degrees are organized by thematic fields and not
3874 focused in specific areas or cultures; the aim is having at the end of the degree
3875 an expert anthropologist or social scientist, not a particular expert in South
3876 American (or else) anthropology; it is up to the individual to achieve this
3877 “specialisation inside the specialisation” later.
3878 In this respect, the US Army and the US Marines have pioneered the way with
3879 the establishment of Centers specifically devoted to cultural awareness like the
3880 US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center78, located
3881 at the US Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and the
3882 US Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning
3883 (CAOCL)79. Both were created as a result of serious deficiencies in cultural
3884 awareness being evident in Irak and Afghanistan campaigns, the US Army
3885 Center being opened in 2004 and the US Marines´ one in mid-2005. These
3886 Centers ensure that there exists an institutional “cultural capability” that
3887 supports the education of personnel, the pre-deployment training and,
3888 eventually, may even provide a reachback cultural support for deployed HQ,s,
3889 not only but also for planning purposes (although currently they are not given
3890 such mission).80
3891 It has to be said that although the present study relies very often in the well
3892 documented current US initiatives, the United States is not the only nation that
3893 recognizes the importance of operational culture. Alongside the US Centers,
78
For a brief reference to the US Army TRADOC Culture Center, see HAJJAR, Remi, Military
Review, November-December 2006, The Army´s new TRADOC Culture Center, pages 89-92
available at
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20061231_art015.
pdf. The official webpage is at http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/tcc/default.asp
79
The official webpage is at http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/caocl
80
However, it is known that cultural support is provided through weekly videoconferences from
the US Marines CAOCL to deployed Brigade-level Units without organic “cultural experts”
(FAO,s/RAO,s).
Page 120 of 171

3894 other institutional efforts do exist, less well known but sometimes the repository
3895 of more than a century of knowledge. One of those is the French Army Ecole
3896 Militaire Spécialisée dans l´Outre-Mer et l´Etranger (EMSOME), 102-years-old
3897 center, created when France had global interests supported by a strong military
3898 presence all around the globe, that provided figures like General Gallieni (1849-
3899 1916) and Lyautey (1854-1934), both insightful thinkers as well as skilful
3900 operational practitioners that, in the circumstances of their time, understood
3901 perfectly the implications of culture on military operations. The fruits of such
3902 approach and the long French experience in facing irregular warfare in its
3903 colonies is also evident in the classical works about counterinsurgency of
3904 Colonel Roger Trinquier and Lieutenant Colonel David Galula.81
3905 However, going beyond Schools and Centers, in the case of the United States,
3906 the materialization of cultural support to operational HQ,s has been achieved in
3907 particular by the US Army Foreign Area Officers (FAO) and the more recent US
3908 Marines FAO,s and Regional Area Officers (RAO). Also, in 2004 the US
3909 Department of Defense issued a Directive (5501.2) requiring all the Services to
3910 establish programs similar to the Army´s FAO, which they are implementing
3911 now. In the US Army, the specialization as FAO includes the transition from the
3912 original branch of service to a full time FAO career track.82 A FAO education
3913 includes attending the Defence Language Institute (DLI) for language training
3914 (6-18 months), followed by a year of in-country immersion and, when back in
3915 the United States, a master´s program in regional security studies; in all, it takes
3916 3-4 years to get a FAO. Their area of expertise is one the following nine: Latin
3917 America, Europe, South Asia, Eurasia, China, Middle East and North Africa,
3918 Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
3919 A change has recently affected the FAO,s employment: previously they were
3920 considered “strategic assets”, kept at the Pentagon, the Joint Staff, embassies
3921 and so on; now, since 2006, they suffered an expansion of up to 30% and try to
3922 fill more “operational” slots. However, even so, due to their current numbers in
3923 the US Army, FAO,s are still kept at HQ,s above Corps level, so, realistically,
3924 some of them may be found at Combatant Commanders HQ,s (like CENTCOM
3925 or EUCOM) or the Army Service Component Commands (ASCC)/Land
3926 Component but hardly any will appear at tactical HQ,s below Numbered
81
For a French view on Operational Culture see the article of Colonel Henri BORÉ in the
Military Review, March-April 2009, “Complex Operations in Africa: Operational Culture Training
in the French Military”, pages 65-71. Available at
pdf.
For official information about the EMSOME see
http://www.cofat.terre.defense.gouv.fr/Accueil/Decouverte/ODF/Specialisees/EMSOME/Index.ht
m
82
In the US Marines being a FAO/RAO is not a primary Military Occupation Specialty (MOS),
like in the US Army, but a secondary one.
Page 121 of 171

3927 Army/Corps level.83 In the case of the US Marines, the FAO,s/RAO,s might be
3928 found also further down in the Division sized-Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
3929 while the Brigade/ Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) has to rely on external
3930 non-organic cultural support through weekly videoconferences with the US
3931 marines CAOCL.
3932 A FAO is supposed to be an expert not just in culture but also in language and
3933 politics of his/her target region; this, coupled with a military background (which
3934 allows him/her to know the military planning system) turns the FAO into an
3935 almost ideal “cultural adviser plus” for any HQ or Commander. It is not just a
3936 mere cultural adviser but much more, and it can be said that, by definition, a
3937 FAO possesses “cultural competence” and is able to integrate culture into
3938 planning. However, it has to be kept in mind that the level of cultural
3939 specialization is not equivalent to that of civilian experts (usually much more
3940 specific in their knowledge): at a tactical HQ, being an expert in Latin America is
3941 not the same as being an expert in Bolivia or the Chaco region; also, in areas
3942 like “Northeast Asia” o even “Europe”, the environment may change
3943 dramatically from nation to nation (compare the United Kingdom and Poland, for
3944 example); also, the number of languages actually used in “Southeast Asia” is
3945 certainly staggering. This, coupled with the limited availability of FAO,s, makes
3946 the military-strategic/ Combatant Command / Land Component operational
3947 HQ,s an ideal place for FAO,s but, on the other hand, limits their impact on
3948 planning at the tactical levels.84
3949 An interesting experience from a medium-size European power is the “Effects

3950 based officers” under development by the Danish Armed Forces, where culture
3951 is incorporated into planning through a cultural expert with a solid base on the
3952 foreign language of the concerned area. The “Effects based officer” should be
3953 proficient in language, culture and military staff abilities85. The slot for such
3954 officer has been created in the Danish Battlegroups deployable to Theatres, so
3955 it remains at tactical level. Being at tactical level, he/she must be familiar with a
83
See the paragraph “Cultural and Foreign Language Capabilities” in the 2009 US Army
Posture Statement at
http://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_papers/cultural_foreign_language_capabilities.html
84
The US Marines have a more “operational view” concerning the employment of
FAO,s/RAO,s, at operational HQ,s than the US Army, with a number of FAO,s/RAO,s appearing
at G-5 (Plans) and G-2 (Intel) slots at tactical Units (e.g. at the HQ,s of the Marine Expeditionary
Forces, MEF,s, a Marine Air-Ground Task Force, MAGTF, of Division plus size). Some sources
even cite Marine FAO,s “advising staffs down to battalion level”, although the acknowledged
difficulties of having the proper number of FAO,s/RAO,s prevents this from becoming a full
standard policy.
85
About 1.500 hours of the training are devoted to language, 275 to culture and 325 to military
subjects, including staff work.
Page 122 of 171

3956 particular area of the world that is identified in advance by the Danish Armed
3957 Forces; as it takes time to educate and train such experts (up to two years), it is
3958 critical the proper identification of the areas of future military employment. Also,
3959 the “Effects based officer” is explicitly included as part of the Battlegroup staff;
3960 as such, he/she fully attends the Battlegroup pre-deployment training, besides
3961 being deployed with his/her Batlegroup during its whole tour of duty. He/she is
3962 not a mere advisor to the Commander, in order to involve him/her heavily in the
3963 staff work; his/her responsibility in the HQ is being in charge of the “non-kinetic
3964 effects”. The present status of the initiative, as of Autumn 2009, is that the first
3965 “Effects based officers” are still being trained (there are slightly less than 30 in
3966 all) and have not been deployed in operations; according to the Danish current
3967 model, the training will be followed by a four-year contract (expanded into
3968 successive additional contracts if needed), with six months of service every
3969 year.86
3970 However, as a whole, it can be concluded that the already cited need to have
3971 available “cultural experts” about most regions of the world to support planning
3972 at the different operational HQ,s clearly exceeds the possibilities of most Armed
3973 Forces. A rational compromise for optimizing the resources devoted to
3974 developing cultural experts by nations that rate themselves as “medium powers”
3975 may be prioritizing certain regions of critical interest (thinking always in the long
3976 term) and having a “niche capability” of cultural experts in particular areas;
3977 admittedly, this is not an option for global powers like the United States.
3978 In any case, developing a “cultural capability” inside the Armed Forces some
3979 decisions have to be taken: who will have the “cultural understanding” in the
3980 military (more than just the “cultural awareness” that should be common to all
3981 military)? A particular branch (Military Intelligence, Civil Affairs, Special Forces,
3982 etc,…)? The “cultural experts” will be just that or they will be “diplomatic-
3983 soldiers” like the US FAO,s? Will they be a specialization open to all branches
3984 (like the US Foreign Area Officers (FAO)? This specialization will become a
3985 primary one (like in the US Army) or a secondary one (like in the US Marines)?
3986 How many “military cultural experts” (and in which areas) are to be produced
3987 and how to manage their professional careers? Will the “cultural experts” be
3988 organic of formation HQ,s or they will be centralized and kept as a centralized
3989 pool of experts (pre-assigned or not to specific HQ,s)? The Study issue 4 of the
3990 present document will deal in depth with such questions.
3991 In any case, it is assessed that the Armed Forces of no country, including the
3992 United States, can afford to develop a “cultural capability” completely of its own
3993 concerning the provision of “cultural support” to operational planning, due to the
86
This description of the Danish model of “Effects-based Officers” is based in information
provided by Lt. Col. Steen Bornholt Andersen, Commanding Officer of the Royal Danish
Defence College during the MNE-6 Budapest workshop (21-25 September 2009).
Page 123 of 171

3994 cost and the amount of personnel involved in such specialization; so, an
3995 important part of the “cultural competence” (the higher level, compared with
3996 awareness and understanding) human resources will have to be produced by
3997 external sources, mainly the Academia. However, even outsourcing part of the
3998 “cultural capability” (mainly, the top of the pyramid of the cultural capability), the
3999 military have to define their prospective needs to their civilian partners in order
4000 to have the capability in place when needed; also, the military need to take
4001 appropriate institutional actions to enrol the civilian support.
4002 Academics may have a far superior level of regional specialization compared
4003 with the FAO,s, as well as a life-long experience in their particular field. So, they
4004 not only widen the scope of “cultural experts” available but also bring unique
4005 cultural knowledge. However, at the same time their use introduce new
4006 problems (compared with the FAO,s) when trying to integrate civilians into
4007 military tasks; the ethical controversies in the Academia around being involved
4008 in military operations (exacerbated in an environment of irregular threats) will be
4009 further developed when discussing the US Human Terrain System model.87
4010 However, even having the best disposition from the concerned academics,
4011 integrating civilian expertise into military planning is challenging because of the
4012 already cited differences between military and academic institutional cultures,
4013 methodologies and procedures. Furthermore, even after solving such problem,
4014 depending on a non-organic “cultural capability”, with all the benefits and
4015 disadvantages common to any outsourcing (also evident in other military areas,
4016 like logistics, or aspects, as the use of private military companies, PMC,s,
4017 show), presents to the Armed Forces a dilemma on how many “cultural
4018 resources” (mainly, personnel and institutions like the FAO,s and their
4019 generation & supporting system) should be retained by the military in order to
4020 have a sustainable “organic” cultural capability.88 Probably, each nation needs
4021 to find a particular answer to this question, depending on its particular level of
4022 ambition and estimated needs.
4023 We have explored how military and civilian expertise may support planning, also
4024 highlighting their specific advantages and disadvantages. However, the
4025 possibility of blending both sources of expertise and offering the result to
4026 operational Commanders and HQ,s is something new that the US Army is trying
87
The “potential tensions between the military and some academics” is identified in the British
JDN 1/09 already cited, page 5-2.
88
The article of Major Ben CONNABLE in the US Army Military Review (issue March-April
2009, pages 57-64) All our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human System Terrain is
Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence presents clearly the circumstances of
this dilemma in the particular case of the United States Armed Forces. Available at
pdf .
Page 124 of 171

4027 in a most interesting way with the initiative “Human Terrain System”, from which
4028 a lot of lessons can be gleaned.89
4029 The Human Terrain System (HTS) program is focused in providing to the
4030 deployed Commanders and HQ,s at the Brigade level and above (that is, at the
4031 tactical/formation level and at higher operational HQ,s; the emphasis, however,
4032 is at the Brigade level as currently the “Brigade Combat Teams” (BCT,s) are the
4033 building blocks of the US Army combat power) an improved ability to
4034 understand highly complex local socio-cultural environments. The HTS mission
4035 statement is “to provide Commanders in the field with relevant socio-cultural
4036 understanding necessary to meet their operational requirements”. HTS is
4037 specifically devised to support the planning and decision–making and takes into
4038 consideration the continuous rotation of Units. The HTS approach is “to place
4039 the expertise and experience of social scientists and regional experts, coupled
4040 with a reach-back, open source research, directly in support of deployed Units
4041 engaging in full-spectrum operations.” So, the HTS teams deployed with the
4042 different Brigade HQ,s are part of a network whose whole resources (including
4043 analysts and experts kept at the United States as a reach-back capability) may
4044 be centrally managed to provide support to any of the deployed HTS teams
4045 when required. The program initiated in 2004 with the first Human Terrain Team
4046 (HTT) deployed to Afghanistan in 2007; currently there are several HTT,s
4047 “embedded” in BCT,s HQ,s in Afghanistan and Iraq.
4048 As a whole, the HTS is composed of deployed elements (the HTT,s at the
4049 Brigade HQ,s and the Human Terrain Analysis System (HTAS), quite similar,
4050 but at the Division level) and reach-back resources. Ths HTS has also
4051 developed a Map-HT toolkit, a combination of hardware and software
4052 specifically designed to support HTS operations.
4053 The Research Reachback Center (RRC), operating 24 hours a day, seven days
4054 a week, is based in the US and staffed by military and civilian personnel. It
4055 manages the Human Terrain database and is the interface between the
4056 deployed HTT,s and the Subject Matter Expert Network (SMEnet). The SMEnet
4057 is composed of knowledgeable experts who provide additional research or
89
For a brief reference to the US Army sponsored “Human Terrain System” see KIPP, Jacob;
GRAU, Lester; PRINSLOW, Carl; and SMITH, Don Military Review, September-October 2006,
The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century, pages 8-15 available at
pdf. Most of the information presented in this and the following paragraphs comes from The
Human Terrain Official website at http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/ . An alternate and critical
view about the HTS may be found in the already cited article of Major Ben CONNABLE in the
US Army Military Review (see note 20).
Page 125 of 171

4058 assessments on request, normally from their home location; the SMEnet is
4059 supposed to contain only open-source information.90
4060 We will describe the HTT in more detail, as they are the element that actually is
4061 providing “cultural competence” to the operational HQ. The HTT is made up of
4062 five people, although there are plans for expansion of up to nine members: a
4063 Team Leader, a Human Terrain Research Manager, a Field Social Scientist
4064 (with competence at Cultural/ Regional Studies) and a number of Human
4065 Terrain Analysts. Two of them, the Team Leader and the Human Terrain
4066 Research Manager, are expected to be US military reserve or retired, capable
4067 to interfacing in optimal terms with both their civilian counterparts and the
4068 Brigade HQ staff. The rest are civilians.
4069 The HTT Team leader profile is a former military or reservist, with experience in
4070 Brigade level HQ,s and general “cross-cultural awareness”, although not
4071 necessarily being a cultural expert; he/she is the Commander´s main cultural
4072 advisor and is responsible for supervising the HTT´s efforts and integrating the
4073 cultural data into the HQ´s planning and managing of operations; among other
4074 qualifications, he/she should have a bachelor´s degree and, preferably,
4075 regional experience or language capability and at least 20 years of military
4076 experience.
4077 The HT Research Manager, also with a military background, helps the Team
4078 leader on his/her duties, supervises analysis and should be capable of detailed
4079 interaction with the Brigade HQ staff, making sure that the HTT products can be
4080 of operational use to the planners. He also manages the information inside the
4081 HTT.
4082 The Field Social Scientists, civilians, are expected to represent the voice of the
4083 local community in the Brigade staff, what, translated into planning parlance, is
4084 called “Green teaming” (as opposed to “Red teaming”; for planning purposes,
4085 adversary actors are “red” and neutral non-opposing forces are “green”). They
4086 should have a PhD in anthropology or related fields (international relations,
4087 sociology, political science, history, economics, area studies,…) and, again,
4088 preferably, regional experience or language capability. They have the “cultural
4089 competence” inside the HTT and plan in detail the research and the analysis to
4090 satisfy the needs of the HQ to be carried out by the HT Analysts, elaborating
4091 later their preliminary analysis and consolidating them into a consistent and
4092 relevant product deliverable to the HQ.
4093 The HT Analysts are also civilians, although with a desirable military
4094 experience, and are the ones that actually conduct primary research
90
The extent to which the SMEnet is actually in place and used receives different assessments
in different sources.
Page 126 of 171

4095 (interviews, open-source, on-line library research) and interact with local
4096 population and organizations, preparing reports, charts and graphs under the
4097 directions of the Field Social Scientist. Ideally, they should have a regional
4098 language capability and ability to perform linguistic translation of documents.
4099 The HTT Teams are organized on an ad-hoc basis for the support of a specific
4100 Brigade: their members receive a 4-month pre-deployment training (including
4101 military staff planning and procedures) at Fort Leavenworth before being
4102 deployed later for 6-9 months. So, the lifetime of any HTT is just one year: after
4103 the end of the deployment, the 12-month contract of their components expires.
4104 Apparently, the HTS is an excellent quick-fix expedient for providing operational
4105 cultural support to deployed HQ,s. It is a civilian-military joint enterprise that is
4106 able to get unique civilian cultural expertise and provide it in a usable form to
4107 the supported HQ through the military (or ex-military) members of the team.
4108 Most of the shortcomings mentioned before concerning the different ways of
4109 providing cultural support to operational HQ,s (scarce number and eventual
4110 limited expertise of FAO,s; difficult civilian-military interface) are solved by the
4111 HTS, that also introduces a specific reachback capability through the RRC and
4112 the SMEnet.
4113 Some critics (a few military and many academics) have criticized the HTS with a
4114 wide variety of motivations. There is the charge that, in reality, the HTS is not
4115 actually delivering the operational impact that it boasts. This may be true91, but,
4116 however, it is assessed that it can´t be reasonably expected that a system as
4117 recently fielded as HTS runs smoothly and provides an immediate
4118 overwhelming operational impact. Also, there is little doubt that any operational
4119 HQ will be more than satisfied to have an HTT in support; it may not be perfect,
4120 but is a cultural support asset, of which there are not a lot, and is potentially a
4121 very effective one.
4122 Other say that HTS is just an expensive quick-fix short term expedient, but that
4123 is detracting resources from other US Armed Forces efforts to have an “organic”
4124 (as opposed to “contracted”) cultural capability.92 This may be a legitimate
4125 charge concerning how much resources are devoted to each of the cultural
4126 efforts (in particular, generation of the capability vs operational support) as it
91
For example, see the editorial from Nature, the international weekly journal of science,
editorial (11 December 2008): “Failure in the field. The US military´s human-terrain programme
needs to be brought to a swift close”, that deems HTS a “in theory, a good idea” but criticizes
the current system of screening the potential employees of the program and the actual training
provided by the contractor, BAE systems, while also condemning the US Army management for
lack of oversight. It can be found at
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v456/n7223/full/456676a.html
92
See the already cited article of Major Ben CONNABLE in the Military Review in note 20.
Page 127 of 171

4127 has to be stressed that the HTS doesn´t produce cultural experts, it just
4128 manages civilian and military expertise that should be available previously, and
4129 forward it to the operational HQ,s. In any case, the HTS can´t be the only
4130 initiative concerning “cultural capability” in the Armed Forces, there must be
4131 other initiatives or programs concerning the development of a “cultural
4132 capability” (the domain of the Study issue 4 of the present document), which the
4133 HTS (and other similar initiatives) will only put to good use. Also, it has to be
4134 remembered that civilian experts will always be “non organic” and, at least in
4135 theory, HTS provides an effective way of integrating them into the cultural
4136 support for the operations.
4137 Other critics point to the ethical problems posed by using academics to support
4138 directly military operations. In fact this may be the main problem concerning the
4139 potential use of civilian experts in direct support to operations. The American
4140 Anthropological Association (AAA) invoked professional ethical standards to
4141 condemn the HTS in 2007: they stated that HTS was violating some ethical
4142 principles like “the object of study will receive no harm as a result of the
4143 anthropological research”; or that the research should be conducted with a
4144 “voluntary informed consent” from the populations concerned; the AAA
4145 considered that in the context of military operations such principles couldn´t be
4146 guaranteed. Also, the AAA was concerned about the impact on non-HTS
4147 anthropologists of such close association with the US Armed Forces.93 In the
4148 webpage of the HTS some of this charges are refuted. The US Army insist that
4149 this is an open-source program, that nothing is secret or covert (civilian experts
4150 are encouraged to write about their experiences although, with the proper
4151 reservations about classified information) and that non-kinetic courses of action
4152 are easier to develop through HTS; that HT Teams do not collect actionable
4153 military intelligence, nor they participate in lethal targeting; and that all contact
4154 with local population is made with “voluntary informed consent” (a concept in
4155 any case of limited applicability in a war-torn area). Some have suggested that
4156 civilian social scientifics shouldn´t be deployed to combat areas and emphasize
4157 their importance for training and education, as well as for the “reachback
4158 support”, that has far less public profile and is also assessed as less
4159 controversial; but then, of course, the direct support with civilian means to
4160 tactical HQ,s at the Brigade level is out of the question. In a final analysis, the
4161 fact remains that currently there is no consensus inside the scientific community
4162 on the ethical assessment of HTS, which in turns reflects on the quality and
4163 numbers of the academics joining the program. It has been unfortunate that
4164 HTS is perceived as closely associated with a conflict as controversial as the
4165 intervention in Iraq (and to less extent, also Afghanistan); often judgements and
4166 charges on the HTS do not depend on the actual conditions and merits of the
93
American Anthropological Association’s Executive Board Statement on the Human Terrain
System Project, November 6, 2007. http://www.aaanet.org/pdf/EB_Resolution_110807.pdf
Page 128 of 171

4167 program but are in fact ideologically and politically biased. What lies ahead is
4168 not clear but the development of the HTS in the next future, with its great
4169 advantages and its problems of implementation, will have a strong influence on
4170 how civilian experts provide cultural support to military operations when this
4171 support is most needed.
4172 There are also additional sources of cross cultural awareness for planning, like
4173 the presence of Political Advisors (POLAD,s) at operational HQ,s and higher.
4174 Usually they are civilian diplomats from national Foreign Services and may
4175 combine having a general “cultural awareness” about the area (or even “cultural
4176 understanding” if they know the region properly or have previous experience)
4177 with a well developed political insight and training and experience in developing
4178 rapport, particularly with local civilians or civilians from other agencies and
4179 organizations, from which he/she can get unique information. As a whole, this
4180 gives the POLAD exceptional possibilities concerning bringing a considerable
4181 “cultural capability” to the HQ most useful for planning purposes, that may be
4182 further advanced along time as is not uncommon that the tours of duty of the
4183 POLAD,s are longer that those of their military counterparts.
4184 In the HQ,s there are also particular specialists, like liaison officers (LNO,s),
4185 Public Information (PI)/Public Affairs (PA) or Civil Affairs (CA)/ Civil-Military
4186 Cooperation (CIMIC) officers who, through their contact with local populations
4187 or actors, may also provide “cross cultural awareness” to the HQ. However, it
4188 looks applicable to all these specialists what the British JDN 1/09 says about
4189 CIMIC: “…there should be no assumption that CIMIC personnel necessarily
4190 have expertise in a specific local culture. However, when deployed, CIMIC
4191 practitioners will inevitably gain cultural insight through their interaction with
4192 civilian populations and organisations and may over time become a useful
4193 source of cultural information.”94
4194 Last but not least, in most operational HQ,s will be found Liaison Officers
4195 (LNO,s) from the Host nation that have a life-time first-hand experience of the
4196 area of operations, the local population, the potential enemy and his/her own
4197 armed forces. An important caveat is that it can´t be taken for granted that the
4198 Host nation LNO,s have “cross cultural awareness” concerning the international
4199 military personnel. The actual extent of the involvement of host nation LNO,s
4200 into planning may depend on different considerations, like the LNO personal
4201 attitude; the Terms of Reference/agreement with the Host nation concerning the
4202 LNO; his/her personal agenda, as well as the (open or covert) orders from
4203 his/her sending Unit/ organization; the ability of the receiving HQ in making the
4204 LNO “one of us”; the risk assumed concerning eventual security breaches;
4205 etc,…Again, taking the appropriate precautions and measures, the host nation
94
UK JDN 1/09, page 4-5.
Page 129 of 171

4206 LNO,s may be a tremendous source of cultural support for planning, an

4207 excellent complement for the rest of the sources of “cultural capability” in the
4208 HQ.
4209 An additional resource to be used in operations, besides the personal presence

4210 of any cultural expert in the HQ, is the reach back support from military
4211 institutions specifically concerned with culture (like the US Army TRADOC
4212 Culture Center or the US Marines CAOCL). For a number of reasons (lack of
4213 real 24-hour availability; difficulties in getting a complete
4214 awareness/understanding of the particular situation of the concerned HQ;
4215 absence of the eventual trust and credibility achieved by the cultural advisor in
4216 the eyes of the rest of the HQ staff by the frequent interaction, etc,…), it can be
4217 assessed that this is just a complimentary measure to further sustain the effort
4218 of the already deployed “cultural experts” present in operational or tactical HQ,s;
4219 in some occasions, it may be just an eventual stop-gap measure due to the lack
4220 of cultural experts in the deployed HQ,s. Of course, reach back is a lot better
4221 than having no cultural advice at all, but, clearly, cultural support for
4222 expeditionary operations by means of a reach back capability is not the solution
4223 of the problem, although it can effectively contribute to supplement the role of
4224 deployed cultural experts in different HQ,s.95
4225 Finally, at a tactical level, interpreters (or other locally employed civilians) may
4226 provide a source of cultural knowledge when there is no other external resource
4227 available. Conversely, having cross cultural awareness and being also aware of
4228 their personal circumstances will help in optimizing management of the
4229 interpreters.96
4230 Concerning the elements in the HQ organization (including internal and external
4231 expertise) that may improve the CCA capability related to planning, the
4232 summary of the initiatives/findings/recommendations are presented listing them
4233 in the form of indicators:
4234 1: There is a Coalition agreement on the meaning (e.g. detailed requirements)

4235 of the levels that define the cultural capability of personnel97 and, in particular,
4236 also about the particular level required from planners.
95
Most probably, the reach back support is much more effective in supporting a deployed
cultural expert, as “cultural experts” (deployed and non-deployed) will be talking between them
in a shared language, that having the HQ staff interfacing directly with a distant non-deployed
cultural expert.
96
UK JDN 1/09, op.cit., pages 3-4 and 4-6.
97
It is suggested the use of cultural “awareness/understanding/competence” as levels, that
have to be defined in detail and subject to measurement/assessment.
Page 130 of 171

4237 2: There is a Coalition agreement on the cultural capability to be achieved as a

4238 whole by the different HQ,s/formations deployed in the area of operations.
4239 3: A system is in place to measure the achievement of the stated levels of

4240 cultural capability by the different HQ,s/formations.
4241 4: A procedure is in place to record the levels of cultural capability of the

4242 personnel in the HQ.
4243 5: The respective level of cultural capability of all the personnel in the
4244 HQ/formation is properly reflected in the Statement of Requirements (SOR) of
4245 the HQ/formation, as well as in the procedures and SOP,s related to planning,
4246 and in the appropriate job descriptions of the HQ,.
4247 6: Special needs concerning “cultural capability” have been identified in the
4248 SOR, in particular the presence of a “cultural expert/advisor”, (or a
4249 POLAD/etc…) as an augmentee with the proper “cultural competence”
4250 adequately defined.
4251 7: The slot of “cultural adviser” (or POLAD/etc,…) is filled in the HQ with
4252 personnel with the appropriate qualifications and experience as defined in the
4253 SOR.
4254 8: Civilian personnel in the HQ that can provide cultural capability to the
4255 planning process (cultural advisors/POLAD/etc,…) are appropriately involved in
4256 planning, having the opportunity to provide cultural assessments.
4257 9: There is a system established for providing cultural support from higher HQ,s
4258 (fully manned with political/cultural advisors) to lower echelons, including
4259 periodic coordination meetings and distribution of products, as well as the
4260 possibility of requiring/providing assistance in specific cases.
4261 10: The system of cultural support from higher HQ,s (fully manned with
4262 political/cultural advisors) to lower echelons is operational and provides cultural
4263 analysis and products, as well as general and specific support (when needed)
4264 to lower echelons in a timely manner.
4265 11: There is a system established for providing reach back cultural support to
4266 deployed HQ,s/formations from the sending nations/Coalition permanent
4267 organizations based at the metropolitan territory.
4268 12: The system of cultural support through a reach back capability is operational
4269 and provides cultural analysis and products to the deployed HQ,s/ formations in
4270 a timely and precise manner, with the level of detail adequate to the needs of
4271 the HQ/formation.
Page 131 of 171

4272 13: There are LNO,s from the Host Nation Armed&Security Forces in the
4273 HQ/Formation.
4274 14: The Host nation LNO,s are appropriately involved in planning, having the
4275 opportunity to provide cultural assessments.
4276
4277 9.1.e. Conclusions and closing thoughts
4278 It has to be stated that one important step concerning the improvement of
4279 planning processes by introducing cultural awareness into them is adjusting
4280 realistically our own expectations.98 Even improving the planning process by
4281 considering the cultural impact of planning in a multinational and interagency
4282 environment, planning still will be more cumbersome and time consuming if
4283 involves anything different from just pure military actors from one nation. In any
4284 case, we must assume that although considering culture will not solve all
4285 planning problems, without doubt, integrating cross cultural awareness into
4286 planning is clearly a pre-requisite indispensable for achieving the desired
4287 “shared situational awareness”, shared amongst different military echelons, with
4288 Coalition and intera-gency partners and, hopefully, even with host nation actors
4289 and the population as a whole, at least to a certain extent.
4290 Culture is complex and dynamic; gaining and maintaining a shared situational
4291 awareness requires a determined long-term endeavor, and this should be kept
4292 in mind at all times by all those involved. The process may be tiring at times and
4293 often we may be putting a lot of effort just for gaining incremental gains;
4294 however, at the same time, through cultural awareness we may be also
4295 avoiding costly mistakes that in the long run may be crucial for the internal
4296 effectiveness of the Coalition and even for the success of the whole
4297 international intervention.
4298 Also, when considering the impact of cross cultural awareness into planning, it
4299 has to be remembered that current military planning systems are optimized
4300 against conventional threats and enemies and that the standard military training
4301 and equipment is still mainly focused on “force-on-force” combat. Again, this
4302 won´t be solved through cultural awareness, although culture may help in
4303 finding better ways to accomplish the mission using the present planning
4304 systems. We are still a long way from having militaries ready and able for the
4305 full spectrum of operations; in fact, some people think that´s not possible at all,
4306 while others discuss the utility of considering irregular enemies as one of the
98
As WUNDERLE puts it “cultural awareness is not the “be all and end all” of military planning.
Op. cit. page. 81.
Page 132 of 171

4307 main efforts in designing and training the future forces. All this means that,
4308 concerning planning in an environment of irregular threats and enemies, the
4309 ideas suggested here are just a starting point to begin the transition from
4310 current “conventional” planning to a new way of planning, keeping what it has to
4311 be kept, introducing new elements and discarding some others. The practical
4312 difficulties in introducing the Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) in
4313 NATO and the somehow tortuous way that the Effects Based Operations (EBO)
4314 has been developed in the United States reflect this is not an easy task.
4315 Anyway, we should kept in mind that what is needed is a standard planning
4316 system that can be applied effectively in all the levels of the spectrum of military
4317 conflict and is as effective against irregulars as against more conventional
4318 enemies: a real full spectrum operations planning system.
4319 Additional obstacles to integrating effectively cultural awareness into planning

4320 are real-life constraints. Planning is as good as planners are. So, the limited
4321 length of the tours of duty of most military and some civilian personnel deployed
4322 in the Area of operations are real limits to the development of a cultural
4323 capability in the HQ,s and Units deployed. In four, six or nine months is really
4324 difficult going further than having a really minimal cultural awareness, not to
4325 mention the effect that the continuous change of interfaces produce in the local
4326 counterparts; cultural understanding can´t realistically be achieved in such a
4327 short time and cultural competence is clearly out of the question unless it has
4328 been previously acquired. Creative solutions concerning personnel
4329 management are in order, such as staggering the replacements of determined
4330 Units or elements, extending the tours of duty of selected personnel, alternating
4331 deployments in Theatre with assignments at home related to the job developed
4332 when deployed, repeated deployments to the same area to do the same job or
4333 a combination of former.99 Optimized pre-deployment training, use of
4334 standardized procedures and proper management of knowledge with a focus in
4335 transitions will also help.
4336 However, perhaps the final reflection must be that most probably none of
4337 initiatives and recommendations described in the previous paragraph
4338 concerning the integration of cross cultural awareness into planning will be
4339 successful (or even have the possibility of happening) unless the Commanders
4340 and in fact most, if not all, of the Officers, Non Comissioned Officers (NCO,s)
4341 and soldiers have developed a proper cultural and cross cultural awareness
4342 previously to their deployment. The ability to recognize culture-related problems
4343 and their eventual impact should have been acquired previously, in order to
4344 develop proper solutions during the planning and the execution of the operation,
99
However, there is no perfect solution, as any element already deployed in Theatre, repository
of the acquired cultural knowledge, will have the problem of integrating itself into the recently
arrived Unit/HQ because it has not shared the pre-deployment training period, critical for
cohesion building.
Page 133 of 171

4345 using the planning tools and considerations that this Study Issue 3 has intended
4346 to offer. Cultural performance of personnel and organizations in Theatre must
4347 be anchored in a cultural capability previously acquired through education and
4348 training, precisely the contents developed on the Study Issue 4 of the present
4349 document. Planning solutions can only be successful having personnel properly
4350 educated and trained in cultural awareness/understanding/ competence, as
4351 required.100
4352
4353 9.2. Integration of the culture awareness into the intelligence

4354 procedures
4355 9.2.a. Role of Intel and Culture for Countering activities of Irregular Adversaries
4356 and other Non-Compliant Actors (hereafter CIANCA activities).
4357 Intel is far more than important for these operations. CIANCA is mainly an Intel
4358 endeavour. Effective, accurate, and timely intelligence is essential to conducting
4359 any form of warfare, but is absolutely essential here, where the success or
4360 failure of the mission depends on the effectiveness of the Intel effort.
4361 The more unconventional the adversary, the more we need to understand the
4362 society and underlying cultural dynamics. Intel here is about people: their
4363 values, beliefs, and decision-making, so there is a requirement to function more
4364 in a cultural context. The many complex political and social issues have given
4365 rise to a new awareness that a cultural understanding of a society is imperative
4366 if CIANCA is to succeed.
4367 “…understanding one’s enemy requires more than a satellite photo of an arms
4368 dump. Rather, it requires an understanding of their interests, habits, intentions,
4369 beliefs, social organizations, and political symbols—in other words, their culture”
4370 (McFate 2005, 43).
4371 Current intelligence procedures have a tendency to focus too much on

4372 traditional adversaries in combat situations. They generally fail to incorporate
4373 critical contemporary factors into the planning processes. The intelligence effort
4374 needed to CIANCA has little in common with those procedures. Notably absent
4375 from planning is an analysis of the impact of culture on the way potential
4376 adversaries fight, the need to better incorporate intangible factors into our
4377 intelligence procedures. It is a different type of war and needs to take a different
4378 approach to dealing with it.
100
This is also the conclusion of WUNDERLE, op. cit., page 57.
Page 134 of 171

4379 To remain relevant and effective, we cannot dismiss culture as a potential

4380 influence on military effectiveness; our intelligence procedures must incorporate
4381 a better understanding of culture.
4382 9.2.b. Discussions about what we can do to better incorporate cultural into our
4383 intelligence procedures.
4384 The capacity to adapt to a different kind of warfare has been and will continue to
4385 be the key to success. The challenge is to adapt without compromising
4386 conventional war fighting ability.
4387 Within the current discussions on culture and counterinsurgency, there has
4388 been a tendency to confuse the practical application of culture applied to
4389 operations, with the more abstract notion of culture applied to the formulation of
4390 a strategy for counterinsurgency. Cultural awareness for military operations on
4391 the ground (the “how-to” practical application of cultural awareness) is very
4392 distinct from cultural awareness needed to formulate a strategy.
4393 Various authors opt for the second one, a need for a culture-centric warfare
4394 approach to plan a strategy. Approaching strategies from a culture-centric
4395 viewpoint merits consideration, but it is something beyond the scope of this
4396 study issue.
4397 Another different vision (belonging to the “how to” approach), emphasizes to
4398 enlarge the use of ethnographic information101 and cultural intelligence102 with
4399 intelligence products designed for combat. Such solution is not enough for what
4400 this type of conflict requires from the military Intel.
4401 Just to clarify the difference between them, because are not doctrinal:
4402 Ethnographic information is just information. Cultural intelligence are
4403 intelligence products. Ethnographic information can be analyzed into Cultural
101
Ethnographic Information: Information about indigenous forms of association, local means of
organization, and traditional methods of mobilization. Clans, tribes, secret societies, religious
brotherhoods, all represent indigenous or latent forms of social organization available to our
adversaries throughout the non-Western, and increasingly the Western, world. These create
networks that are invisible to us unless we are specifically looking for them; they come in forms
with which we are not culturally familiar; and they are impossible to ‘see’ or monitor, let alone
map, without consistent attention and the right training.
102
Cultural Intelligence: An analysis of social, political, economic, and other demographic
information that provides understanding of a people or nation’s history, institutions, psychology,
beliefs (such as religion), and behaviours. It helps provide understanding as to why a people act
as they do and how they think. Cultural intelligence provides a baseline for designing successful
strategies to interact with foreign peoples whether they are neutrals, people of an occupied
territory, or enemies.
Page 135 of 171

4404 intelligence by anthropologists, political scientists, intelligence analysts, and

4405 subject matter experts.
4406 The possibility we suggest in this paper (belonging to the “how to” approach as
4407 well) is different.
4408 9.2.c. Line of Argument:
4409 There is no need to develop a new planning system, but it is required to identify
4410 steps in the current Intel procedures where cultural issues are considered. The
4411 existing Intel procedures can be modified to better account for intangible factors
4412 such as culture.
4413 At the some time it is imperative that operational commanders forge a deeper
4414 cultural competence and seek advice for subject matter expertises during some
4415 phases of military operations, mainly employing a systems approach.
4416 Effective management of the cultural factor does not mean an adherence to a
4417 restrictive intelligence process or phase of an operation. Culture consideration
4418 is a dynamic process that must be an integral part of operational planning.
4419 It does not mean that we should plan based solely on cultural intelligence
4420 considerations. It simply means we would possess the best cultural awareness
4421 to assess our commanders to tailor their actions to achieve their objectives.
4422 9.2.d. Suggested Approach and Recommendations
4423 In the following pages I will try to explain the suggested approach providing
4424 some recommendations on key questions for getting a practical application of
4425 integration of the cultural awareness.
4426 The Operational Environment (OE)103 where current operations are developed
4427 is complex, changing, dynamic, evolving as the local, regional and even
4428 international conditions progress. (Analytical Concept CCA)
4429 Current Intel procedures must take into account a lot of intangible factors of the
4430 OE. As the OE has become more complex, the impacts of these factors have
4431 increased exponentially. Culture is one of these intangibles that are becoming
4432 increasingly more important to any analysis.
103
The operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and
influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the
commander.
Page 136 of 171

4433 Culture is dynamic104, and as a dynamic entity requires a complex

4434 understanding.
4435 Cultures are complex systems, as such they are best analysed by employing a
4436 systems approach.
4437 Perhaps the biggest intelligence challenges presented arise from the difficulties
4438 friendly forces face in identifying insurgents and in understanding complex
4439 cultural environments.
4440 The approach and recommendations presented in this paper are not
4441 extraordinary, nor do they comprise a complete list. Indeed, entire fields such as
4442 techniques, concepts and procedures, are left for future consideration, although
4443 they are of obvious and vital importance. Also not addressed here is the
4444 training, education, and organizational implications required for its
4445 implementation.
4446 For each recommendation I will try to establish what is feasible to be immediatly
4447 done and what is a challenge for the future.
4448 1st Recommendation: The best method of incorporating culture into the
4449 planning process is through the systems approach.
4450 Systems Approach: It is necessary to look at the world as a strongly

4451 interconnected system because of the complexity and interconnectedness of
4452 the globalized system.
4453 In order to be able to understand the interaction between systems and actors it
4454 is necessary to break them down into their elements. Last tendencies explain
4455 the interconnectedness of the OE as a globalized system with a framework of
4456 six basic subsystems: (PMESII) Political, Military, Economic, Social,
4457 Infrastructure and Informational systems. Moreover, we have defined six
4458 dimensions of culture as a synthetic method, a broad framework for
4459 understanding a social system. PMESII Analysis breaking the S (Sociocultural
4460 system) down into the 6 dimensions of the culture is the best method of
4461 incorporating culture into the systems approach.
4462 These systems improve the military planners understanding of scenarios,

4463 creating a holistic systems approach (also called system of systems analysis. A
4464 systems approach integrates the analytic and the synthetic method,
4465 encompassing both holism and reductionism.
104
Dynamic: Culture is constantly changing due to the influence of the environment where they
develop (090731_Analytical Concept CCA_draft 1.0)
Page 137 of 171

4466 Intel supports the entire Operations Planning Process including the planning,
4467 execution and assessment of operations. In general, planning objectives and
4468 analysis of the operational environment are closely related.
4469 This Systems Analysis, employing links analysis, allows identifying key
4470 relationships, dependencies and vulnerabilities, leverage points to influence,
4471 capabilities, perceptions, decision-making and behaviour.
4472 It is important to note that systems analysis does not provide an automated
4473 predictive or prescriptive solution to a problem, i.e. it will not, in the context of
4474 operational planning provide “the optimal course of action.” nor is it a scientific
4475 solution to replace the “art of decision-making”.
4476 This recommendation is consistent with objective 4.1 MNE-6 (Knowledge

4477 Development), where systems approach plays an essential role.
4478 Knowledge Development (KD) is a continuous, adaptive and networked activity

4479 carried out at strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. It provides
4480 commanders and their staff with a comprehensive understanding of complex
4481 environments, including the relationships and interactions between systems and
4482 actors within the engagement space.
4483 Both Systems Analysis and KD combine a doctrine and operational concept that
4484 challenge the current operacional planning process and needs time to be
4485 implemented.
4486 2nd Recommendation: Intel goes beyond “enemies or adversaries”
4487 There are missing ingredients when we refer to the culture of the actors. We
4488 need to consider the human dimension consisting of various significant
4489 sociological, cultural, demographic and psychological characteristics of the
4490 friendly and adversary populace including adversary, potential adversary
4491 and local foreign populations. It is necessary to reflect wording that
4492 recognizes that military forces interact with more than just adversaries.
4493 Trying to embrace the whole human dimension for the Intel scope is consistent
4494 with the idea of studying the OE through the systems approach. Such
4495 recommendation requires important organizational and doctrinal implications
4496 and a huge CCIRM cell dealing with broader information. It is still a challenge
4497 for the future.
Page 138 of 171

4498 3rd Recommendation: The leverage point to integrate Culture into the Intel
4499 processes is during the (IPOE) Intelligence Preparation of the Operational
4500 Environment).
4501 IPOE, (traditionally called IPB105 modified to integrate cultural understanding,

4502 employing a systems approach), is the process in which the adversary and
4503 other relevant aspects of the operational environment are analyzed through a
4504 systems approach to identify possible adversary courses of action and to
4505 support operation planning, execution, and assessment.
4506 It is the appropriate decision-making tool to integrate the above explained

4507 systems approach. Through a systems approach we can better factor Culture
4508 into the IPOE process.
4509 The standard considerations come under the rubric of METT-T: Mission,
4510 Enemy, Troops and support available, Terrain and weather, and Time. Even in
4511 some cases, particularly in urban environments, METT-T becomes METT-TC,
4512 for Civilian cultural considerations. However CIANCA requires more than
4513 considering culture as a separated factor.
4514 Additionally, others argue the need to create a specific CIPB (Cultural
4515 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield). Such solution leaves aside important
4516 interactions between systems and actors arisen out of the system approach.
4517 Isolating culture from the overall process by placing it in a specific cell such as
4518 Intel, or at a specific stage such an initial CIPB, limits the value of cultural
4519 awareness, almost to the point of making it marginal and irrelevant to the overall
4520 planning process.
4521 Unlike the traditional IPB, where military planners could account for most of the
4522 battlefield variables and structural aspects by developing rigid doctrinal
4523 templates that encapsulated how the enemy would think, manoeuvre, and fight,
4524 CIANCA IPOE will not have templates that can be laid over a piece of terrain
4525 that describes the adversaries’ disposition, composition, strength and
4526 capabilities. Doctrinal (and the resulting situational) templates must be re-
4527 evaluated and updated for each threat and potential threat within a given area
4528 of operations. The planners challenge will be to describe the adversaries’
4529 capabilities in asymmetric terms.
4530 IPOE does not supersede traditional IPB. Both IPOE and IPB are intended to
4531 support each other while avoiding a duplication of analytic effort. They differ in
4532 terms of their relative purpose, and level of detail.
105
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.
Page 139 of 171

4533 The purpose of IPOE is to support the JFC by determining the adversary’s
4534 probable intent and most likely COA for countering the overall friendly joint
4535 mission, whereas IPB is specifically designed to support the individual
4536 operations of the component commands.
PMESII
Political
Military
Strategic/Operational Economic
JFC Sociocultural
Infrastructure
IPOE Information
Operational/Tactical METT-TC
Service Component
MISSION
IPB
ENEMY
TROOPS AND SUPPORT

Tactical TERRAIN AND WEATHER
Above Brigade/
TIME
Battalion
IPB CIVILIAN CONSIDERATIONS
4537
4538 The IPOE process emphasizes a holistic approach by analyzing and integrating
4539 a PMESII systems perspective with the specific IPB perspectives of the
4540 component commands and below.
4541 This holistic approach creates an analytic synergy that helps IPOE analysts
4542 assess the adversary’s options
4543 IPOE is the baseline to conduct the Campaign Design. Applying a systems
4544 approach provides a holistic understanding of all the actors as systems with
4545 critical vulnerabilities, capabilities, resources and centres of gravity. Each
4546 element of campaign design should be assessed with the systems approach.
4547 IPOE is still a challenge for the future, because first of all there is a demand for
4548 the analysts to organise the information according to the PMESII structure, what
4549 requires a new methodology and a long time to be established.
4550 At the some time IPB is more than a need for the tactical level. IPB works but it
4551 is difficult to accomplish comprehensively for that level. Even if IPOE is
4552 established at JFC level, IPB will be working at tactical level.
Page 140 of 171

4553 4th Recommendation: Need to appreciate changes in the Intelligence Cycle
4554 Intelligence is a process, not simply a product. Nearly all doctrinal explanations
4555 of this process contain four/five separate steps, which form an iterative cycle.
4556 For this paper we consider four stages: Direction, Collection, Processing,
4557 and Dissemination. These stages are conducted concurrently and
4558 continuously rather than sequentially.
4559 IPOE is a dynamic process that both supports, and is supported by, each of the
4560 steps of intelligence operations that comprise the intelligence cycle.
4561 a. Changes in the “Direction” Stage:
4562 During this stage, one essential aspect to be addressed is the Commander’s
4563 Direction (CD). This is the direction given by the Commander to his Intel Staff.
4564 Commanders direct their Staff, giving them clear directions concerning the
4565 information and intelligence needs. If cultural factors are explicitly addressed in
4566 the CD, it is much easier for the staff to commit stated and implied tasks.
4567 Cultural awareness needs to be included in CD and the staff needs to

4568 understand and embrace its importance for planning.
4569 The staff must translate those needs into questions that will permit a timely
4570 decision making process for successful mission accomplishment.
4571 These questions are the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
4572 (CCIR). CCIR include Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) and
4573 Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR). Enemy/adversary and
4574 environmental questions, named the Commanders Priority Intelligence
4575 Requirements (PIR) are also an important part of the CCIR.
4576 Cultural considerations should be included in the CCIR as any factor, and
4577 should be addressed to any cell, it s not a particular Intel task.
4578 Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) are normally formulated on the

4579 commander’s behalf by his J2 Staff. Because of the complexity of the
4580 culture, most of the cultural requirements will be PIR.
4581
4582 Of course, in a perfect world, the advance planning should be prepared and
4583 a cultural data base reference should be kept as a living document for any
4584 area where there may be a good chance of operations.
Page 141 of 171

4585 Based on the PIR, the CCIRM106 process focuses on Collection Management
4586 and the Collection Plan.
4587 The PIR are broken down into greater detail, known as the Information
4588 Requirements (IR). Information Requirements could be identified as Specific
4589 Intelligence Requirements (SIR) and broken down again into more detailed
4590 questions known as Essential Elements of Information (EEI).
4591 Cultural considerations should be strongly considered inside PIR, IR, SIR
4592 and EEI, if the Intel Staff is trained.
4593 Regarding to the CCIRM, there is a need to extent the coordination for
4594 sharing information, and to develop other information sources. It is highly
4595 likely that international, governmental and non-governmental organisations are
4596 already engaged in the area of interest. They represent a potentially vast
4597 source of information and knowledge about different aspects of the area. Very
4598 often no organic system will be available, and the Information requests are to be
4599 passed as Request for Information (RFI) to other organisations, including
4600 traditional sources, government agencies, academia, embassies, NGOs, allies,
4601 etc.
4602 Direction Stage. Summary of Recommendations:
4603 • Cultural awareness needs to be included in CD and the staff needs to

4604 understand and embrace its importance for planning.
4605 • Cultural considerations should be included in the CCIR as any factor
4606 • Because of the complexity of the culture, most of the cultural

4607 requirements will be PIR
4608 • The advance planning should be prepared and a cultural data base
4609 reference should be kept as a living document for any area where there
4610 may be a good chance of operations.
4611 • Cultural considerations should be strongly considered inside PIR,

4612 IR, SIR and EEI, if the Intel Staff is trained.
4613 • There is a need to extent the coordination for sharing information and to
4614 develop other information sources.
106
CCIRM: Collection Co-ordination and Intelligence Requirements Management, the
management function that enables the timely flow of intelligence by coordinating the information
collection effort and facilitating the provision of intelligence.
Page 142 of 171

4615 Based on the initial IPOE/IPB arise CCIR. It does not matter if we still
4616 manage traditional IPB or Systems Analysis. These recommendations for
4617 the direction stage are affordable to be established.
4618 b. Changes in the “Collection” Stage:
4619 It is the process in which information and intelligence are collected in order to
4620 meet the commander’s information and intelligence requirements which were
4621 identified in the Direction stage of the intelligence cycle.
4622 The focus of collection efforts in CIANCA differs greatly from that of
4623 conventional warfare, where the balance of intelligence data is derived from
4624 technical means. Useful intelligence is most often obtained through personal
4625 contact with the population.
4626 Due to the emphasis placed on understanding the civil population, human
4627 intelligence (HUMINT) need to assume an increased importance and often
4628 provides the most valuable sources of information.
4629 Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) also gains a measure of importance that it
4630 does not have against a conventional treat.
4631 The intelligence to support CIANCA operations must be collected on the

4632 ground. This is essential in ascertaining adversary intentions and identifying the
4633 adversaries. But HUMINT requires a different understanding of it.
4634 CCIRM cell has to make an effort to implicate the whole force in the
4635 collection plan.
4636 In conventional operations, HUMINT is the domain of specially designated,

4637 organised, trained and equipped forces. However, in CIANCA it is necessary
4638 to stress the importance of Basic HUMINT activity107 as well (some units
4639 who have the most familiarity and contact with the population, CIMIC,
4640 engineers, PSYOPS…) to notice changing conditions in their areas. Some of
4641 the changes might match indicators and warnings from the intelligence section
4642 that precede an insurgent action.
4643 But even though HUMINT has an essential role for collection, its capacity
4644 to acquire cultural information is limited. It is necessary a high cultural
4645 competence to carry on. Usually our forces will be undermanned, lacking in
4646 cultural awareness, and short of native linguists. It also involves a fundamental
4647 change in HUMINT collection.
107
Basic HUMINT Activity: HUMINT collection requiring only basic skills and can be
conducted by non-specialised military personnel as part of their normal duties
Page 143 of 171

4648 There are two typical ways of getting this cultural information collection
4649 capacity: through the introduction of Indigenous forces, and HTT (Human
4650 Terrain Teams).
4651 Indigenous forces offer the most logical and appropriate source of
4652 additional manpower. They bring skills that are not replicated easily by our
4653 forces; these include cultural sensitivity, language fluency, and familiarity with
4654 the population. Nevertheless, they must be thoroughly vetted to ensure that
4655 they do not harbour personal agendas, biases, or vendettas that could
4656 influence their decisions and recommendations.
4657 HTTs are being specifically designed to address cultural awareness

4658 shortcomings at the operational and tactical levels by giving brigade
4659 commanders an organic capability to help understand and deal with “human
4660 terrain”. Each HTT is comprised of experienced cultural advisors (mostly
4661 anthropologists) familiar with the area in which they will be operating
4662 HTTs will be embedded in brigade combat teams, providing commanders with
4663 an organic ability to gather, process, and interpret relevant cultural data. In
4664 addition to maintaining the brigade’s cultural data bases by gathering and
4665 updating data, HTTs will also conduct specific information research and
4666 analysis as tasked by the brigade commander
4667 Although the HTT concept is great, it faces two main problems.
4668 First, the question of ethics, they wonder whether using cultural knowledge for
4669 covert military operations will threaten the disciplinary integrity of anthropology
4670 itself by creating “mercenary anthropology” in which cultural knowledge itself is
4671 used as a weapon.
4672 Second, HTTs need a complete HTS108 (Human Terrain System) that
4673 requires time and a lot of resources to be effective.
4674 Despite the fact that the pros of employment of Indigenous forces or HTT
4675 to improve our capacity to acquire cultural information, some cons
4676 emerge that make difficult its implementation.
4677 Indigenous forces and HTT (Human Terrain Teams) are effective solutions
4678 to improve cultural information collection capacity. However its
4679 implementation presents many difficulties.
108
HTS is built upon seven components, or “pillars”: (1) human terrain teams (HTTs), (2) reach-
back research cells, (3) subject-matter expert-networks, (4) a tool kit, (5) techniques, (6) human
terrain information, and (7) specialized training.
Page 144 of 171

4680 There is an increased need for collaboration and information sharing, for
4681 developing information capabilities and procedures to share relevant
4682 information with non-military entities.
4683 CIANCA requires joint, interagency, international and HN (HOST Nation)

4684 collaboration for collection operations. Appropriate liaison channels need to
4685 be established. HN Intel collaboration is essential but could be risky because of
4686 infiltration of foreign Intel services.
4687 In addition it is necessary to develop a repository of information accessible

4688 through shared work spaces to support further analysis and planning. That
4689 implies a centralized and synchronized intelligence collection between all
4690 elements deployed in a theatre for providing a more complete picture of
4691 networking through intelligence fusion. It ensures that information is collected
4692 and stored in a manner that can be managed and shared efficiently using
4693 common schemes. This makes mutual support a necessity. It makes easier the
4694 systems approach.
4695
4696 Collection Stage. Summary of Recommendations:
4697 • Human intelligence (HUMINT) need to assume an increased importance.
4698 • CCIRM cell has to make an effort to implicate the whole force in the
4699 collection plan.
4700 • It is necessary to stress the importance of Basic HUMINT activity.
4701 • Indigenous forces and HTT (Human Terrain Teams) are effective solutions
4702 to improve cultural information collection capacity. However its
4703 implementation presents many difficulties.
4704 • There is an increased need for collaboration and information sharing,

4705 for developing information capabilities and procedures to share
4706 relevant information with non-military entities.
4707 • It is necessary to develop a repository of information. It implies a

4708 centralized and synchronized intelligence collection between all
4709 elements deployed in a theatre.
4710 These recommendations are feasible to a greater or lesser extent. Basic

4711 HUMINT activity is something easy to be trained, however collaboration and
4712 information sharing and repositories require time, policies, procedures and
4713 means.
Page 145 of 171

4714 c. Changes in the “Processing” Stage:
4715 Processing is defined as: The conversion of information into intelligence through
4716 collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation.
4717
4718 In this stage, analysts have to shift their focus from military capabilities to social
4719 networks, culture, and people. Incorporating cultural effects is crucial. As it is
4720 said in the 1st Recommendation, the systems approach is the best method
4721 of incorporating culture into the Intel processes, and particularly at this
4722 stage of the Intel cycle.
4723 This Systems Analysis, allows identifying key relationships, dependencies and
4724 vulnerabilities, leverage points to influence, capabilities, perceptions, decision-
4725 making and behaviour.
4726 To be able to perform PMESII analysis is necessary to be in possession of

4727 PMESII analysts, adequately-trained in this methodology and with cultural
4728 competence.
4729 The military cannot expect its intelligence personnel to be cultural experts in
4730 every potential theatre. There are three tendencies to solve the problem, the
4731 introduction of Indigenous forces as cultural advisors, HTT (Human
4732 Terrain Teams), and the Foreign Area Officer (FAOs)109.
4733 The pros and cons of employment of Indigenous forces or HTT were depicted
4734 previously. FAO could be an excellent solution, but like HTT requires time
4735 and resources. Furthermore these personnel, as other subject matter
4736 experts, should be adequately-trained in PMESII analysis.
4737 It is urgent to tackle how to best include cultural awareness and system of
4738 systems analysis in the education of Intel analysts so that this becomes
4739 an additional factor like the knowledge of the enemy or geography.
4740 Because analysts take months to understand the adversary, analyse the
4741 systems, know culture, and track thousands of networks, commanders should
4742 maintain analyst’s continuity.
109
FAOs acquire a regional specialization, language and cultural expertise, and personal
contacts that the average military officer can never achieve due to frequent moves between jobs
and locations. Trained FAOs can be reassigned from embassy and attaché positions to tactical
and operational headquarters to assist with cultural assessments, training, and integration. As
members of the planning staff, FAOs could provide tremendous insight into the cultural
ramifications of operations within a particular area
Page 146 of 171

4743 Intelligence doctrines should be updated to include cultural intelligence110

4744 as defined in this paper. Cultural intelligence should fall under the category of
4745 an intelligence product. It is not an intelligence discipline or source (such as
4746 human intelligence), but it is a product of analysis and evaluation of various
4747 information sources including single source intelligence.
4748 Another question concerns to the Intel principle of Perspective: (Think like the
4749 Adversary) Intelligence analysts must seek to understand the adversary’s
4750 thought process, and should develop and continuously refine their ability to
4751 think like the adversary. Cultural awareness will help Intel analysts avoid
4752 mirror-imaging.
4753 The intelligence literature often cautions intelligence analysts to be wary of

4754 mirror imaging. Although the term is a misnomer (a mirror image is a reverse
4755 image), the concept is that individuals perceive foreigners, both friends and
4756 adversaries, as thinking the same way as we do. This is the consequence of a
4757 combination of cognitive and cultural biases resulting from a lifetime of
4758 enculturation, culturally bound heuristics, and missing, or inadequate,
4759 information.
4760 “Trying to think like them” all too often results in applying the logic of one’s own
4761 culture and experience to try to understand the actions of others, without
4762 knowing that one is using the logic of one’s own culture.
4763 Through cross cultural awareness, it is possible to combat the effects of

4764 ethnocentrism without trying to “think like them.”
4765 Here again, there is an increased need for collaboration and information
4766 sharing. Appropriate liaison channels and release authority for exchanging
4767 intelligence need to be established.
4768 But much more here than anywhere, Intelligence in CIANCA needs an
4769 international repository of cultural information that can be readily shared
4770 by all intelligence analysts, and contribute to the interagency planning.
4771 Doing this requires uniformity in software and procedures and key
4772 questions that should be agreed, as a common ontology and taxonomy.
4773 Ideally this repository should also have a reach-back capability.
4774 Processing Stage. Summary of Recommendations:
4775 • The systems approach is the best method of incorporating culture into the
4776 Intel processes, and particularly at this stage of the Intel cycle.
110
See footnote 2
Page 147 of 171

4777 • It is urgent to tackle how to best include cultural awareness and system of
4778 systems analysis in the education of Intel analysts so that this becomes an
4779 additional factor like the knowledge of the enemy or geography.
4780 • Commanders should maintain analysts’ continuity.
4781 • Intelligence doctrines should be updated to include cultural intelligence
4782 • Cultural awareness will help Intel analysts avoid mirror-imaging.
4783 • Intelligence in CIANCA needs an international repository of cultural

4784 information that can be readily shared by all intelligence analysts, and
4785 contribute to the interagency planning.
4786 Recommendations about Systems Analysis and Repositories are still a

4787 challenge for the future, but others are pretty achievable.
4788 d. Changes in the “Dissemination” Stage:
4789 Dissemination is defined as ‘The timely conveyance of intelligence, in an

4790 appropriate form and by any suitable means, to those who need it
4791 This stage is the less influenced by the cultural awareness, but two key
4792 components here, timeliness and appropriateness, once more, demands an
4793 increased need for collaboration and information sharing.
4794 For timeliness there must be a process in place to exchange information

4795 with external sources and assess the validity of information supplied by
4796 mission partners. This process should include foreign disclosure officers,
4797 delegated with the proper authority to disclose classified military information to
4798 foreign government and international organizations in accordance with legal and
4799 policy guidelines.
4800 For appropriateness, the cultural repository above mentioned provides

4801 the best solution.
4802 Dissemination Stage. Summary of Recommendations:
4803 • There must be a process in place to exchange information with external

4804 sources and assess the validity of information supplied by mission partners
4805 • For appropriate dissemination, the shared cultural repository provides the
4806 best solution.
4807 These recommendations about collaboration, information sharing and

4808 repositories require quite a bit time, policies, procedures and means.
Page 148 of 171

4809 9.2.e. Conclusion
4810 There is no clear substitute for the people going out to the countries that they
4811 study and meshing themselves and get the feeling of how the people behaves
4812 and how the places works and smells. There is no cookie cutter solution to
4813 integrating culture awareness into the Intel procedures. Every situation and
4814 circumstance will be different. However this paper is addressed to provide a
4815 general approach to integrate culture awareness into the Intel processes for a
4816 CIANCA scenario.
4817 Even if it is still a challenge for the future, through systems approach and
4818 collaboration and information sharing we will get the necessary “step ahead”
4819 to include Culture in Intel to transform Situational Awareness into Situational
4820 Understanding.
4821 This approach absolutely matches MNE-6 “Statement of the problem”:
4822 “To establish and ensure a safe and secure environment, coalition forces
4823 require the ability to share information, gain situational understanding,
4824 synchronize efforts and assess progress in concert with interagency
4825 partners, international organizations, and other stakeholders when
4826 countering activities of irregular adversaries and other non-compliant
4827 actors.”
4828
4829
4830
4831
4832
4833
4834
4835
Page 149 of 171

4836 10. TRAINING, EDUCATION AND CROSS CULTURAL AWARENESS
4838 This chapter is focused on identifying and establishing the methodologies and
4839 the education and training tools needed to enable the Armed Forces to develop
4840 and implement cross-cultural awareness (CCA) within a specific operational
4841 environment.
4842
4843 10.2. Cultural Capability
4844 At present, most military operations are conducted by multinational forces in

4845 environments which are radically different from their homeland. This reality
4846 compels the military personnel, regardless of rank or job position, to interact
4847 with people with varied cultural backgrounds.
4848 Iraq and Afghanistan serve well as an example of how ignoring the prevailing
4849 culture in the area of operations in the planning and execution of military
4850 operations can jeopardize the mission’s success and the security of the forces.
4851 Up to now, the cultural reality has not been analyzed in depth in the military
4852 context. Military analysts have frequently focused on examining the most
4853 outstanding behavioural traits of a culture (e.g. in an Islamic country: not
4854 addressing a woman outright, not showing a shoe sole, not using the left hand,
4855 etc.) or on knowing the social structures (relevant and influential families, tribal
4856 leaders, etc.).
4857 Experiences have proven that cultural realities should be given due attention.
4858 Latest COMISAF´s Counterinsurgency Guidance111 may serve as an example of
4859 how important is to understand culture to achieve the mission. Quoting
4860 COMISAF: “we need to understand the people and see things through their
4861 eyes. It is their fears, frustrations and expectations that we must address. We
4862 will not win simply by killing insurgents…”. And if you want to understand people
4863 and see things through their eyes… you must know their culture.
4864 Consequently, culture must be considered another military capability112.
111
Latest version, 1st July, 2009, p.1.
112
The Spanish Armed Forces’ Joint Staff defines “military capability” as follows: Set of
components (personnel, facilities, weapon systems and combat service support assets)
Page 150 of 171

4865 10.3. The learning process
4866 In order to develop any military capability, whether cultural or not, having
4867 personnel adequately prepared is an essential prerequisite. It is important to
4868 highlight that, although this annex is only focused on educating and training
4869 CCA, obtaining a capability is something more that having trained personnel.
4870 The other elements involved in a capability (doctrine, procedures, etc…) must
4871 also be considered.
4872 In general, the armed forces preparedness is reached by linking theoretical

4873 knowledge, procedural skills and attitudes through a learning process. From a
4874 methodological point of view, learning involves a behavioural change, which
4875 may be persistent or not, owing to cognitive or experiential inputs. In addition to
4876 that, learning is itself a psychological process which has been approached from
4877 different perspectives. One of the most widespread theories explaining the
4878 learning process was developed in 1956 by Benjamin Bloom and colleagues.
4879 Bloom’s Taxonomy states that learning takes place within three different
4880 domains: cognitive, psychomotor and affective113, and in all these domains
4881 learning is progressive and hierarchical.
4882 The cognitive domain refers to mental skills, knowledge. Is the most known
4883 and developed of the three domains and the proper one to learn concepts and
4884 datas. In terms of cultural preparation, in this domain, for example, the definition
4885 of culture, other cultural aspects, culture dimensions, etc… would be learnt.
4886 The psychomotor domain refers to skills. Employing appropriate gestures to

4887 greet, address or show gratitude to people with different cultural backgrounds
4888 belong to the learning taking place within the present domain.
4889 Finally, the affective domain refers to the learner’s attitude towards to what
4890 he/she has learnt within the other two domains. It is expected that the learner
4891 carry out an appraisal and assessment of the process.
4892 The following table shows examples of the type of learning within each domain
4893 using cultural studies as examples.
4894
intended to generate effects at the strategic, operational or tactical level to accomplish the
missions assigned by applying appropriate procedures in accordance with doctrinal tenets.
113
B. Bloom develops mainly the cognitive domain. To learn more about this domain read
“Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, handbook I: the cognitive domain”. B.S. Bloom (1956),
New York, David McKay Co Inc
Page 151 of 171

Category Description Examples
Knowledge Recalling data or information. Learners can recall the different definitions of
culture.
Comprehension Understanding the meaning Learners can summarize the different

of the information received. definitions of culture.
State the problem in one´s
words.
Application Applying/using what was Learners can apply “comprehended” cultural

learned into novel situations. aspects to a specific environment: e.g.
Afghanistan.
Analysis Separating material or Once the social structure in an area in

concepts into component Afghanistan is known, learners can analyze it
parts to improve and draw applicable conclusions to the
understanding. operation.
Synthesis Integrating pieces of Once the social and political structure of an

information to build up a area is known, learners can design its power
whole. structure.
Evaluation Making judgments about the Learners can assess women’s roles in an
value of observable facts. area in Afghanistan and in his country of
origin.
4895 Table 1. Cognitive Domain
Imitation Observing and patterning Once learners are taught to sit and talk to
behavior after someone else. Afghans, they must be able to adopt the same
posture.
Manipulation Being able to perform certain Searching a person in the presence of a training
actions by following officer (who provides feedback).
instructions and practicing.
Precision Carrying out a task making Searching a person without the presence of a
minor mistakes. Acquiring training officer.
the necessary skills and
executing proficiently.
Articulation Coordinating a series of Negotiating employing appropriate gestures,

actions combining skills. body language, vocabulary, etc.
Naturalization Having high level Interacting with locals mastering the situation
performance become natural, and acting naturally.
“without needing to think
much about it”.
4896 Table 2. Psychomotor Domain
Page 152 of 171

4897
Receiving Showing interest to stimuli, Learners are interested in the role of culture in
being willingness to military operations.
hear/learn
Responding Active participation on the Learners volunteer, take part in discussions,

part of the learner (asking etc.
questions in class,
participating in class
discussions, etc.)
Valuing The worth or value a person Learners assess how valuable it is to know
attaches to what he has basic vocabulary used by locals in the area of
learnt. operations.
Organization Creating new behavioural Learners are prone to carry out tasks such as
patterns out of what has check-points applying the CCA approach since
been learnt. it is regarded appropriate.
Complex values Contents learnt become Learners are likely to apply the contents learned
routines. naturally, without thinking much about it.
4898 Table 3. Affective Domain
4899 The three domains aforementioned are involved in the development of the
4900 cultural capability though the Armed Forces have traditionally focused on the
4901 cognitive and psychomotor domains. However, the affective domain cannot be
4902 neglected when dealing with intrinsically complex cultural realities. To establish
4903 a new mindset in the military where cultural issues are important when
4904 planning and executing operations, the affective domain must receive the
4905 appropriate importance.
4906
4907 10.4. Educational and training methods
4908 Educating and training people in CCA has some peculiarities with regards
4909 training or educating other military activities. There are five basic different
4910 approaches that trainers may take when training CCA: cognitive, self insight,
4911 behavioural, experiential and attribution training.
4912 10.4.a. Cognitive training
4913 In this training, people are given information about what to expect when
4914 deploying in another country. This information can deal with diverse cultural
4915 topics such as expectations, social structures, political structures, history,
Page 153 of 171

4916 religion etc… (this information can be provided by lectures, group

4917 discussions…). The advantage of this approach is that a great deal of
4918 information can be presented economically. However, its big disadvantage is
4919 that it is so focused on the cognitive domain.
4920 Many countries use this kind of approach when preparing their personnel before
4921 being deployed in a real operation.
4922 10.4.b. Self-insight training
4923 In this approach, people learn about their own culture and their possible
4924 reactions to other cultures, but not considering the cultural factors of these other
4925 cultures. The great advantage of this approach is that people can repeat this
4926 kind of training without considering the country of deployment (due to the
4927 training is always the same). A disadvantage is that the relation between
4928 gaining self-insight into one´s own culture and the adjustments needed to find
4929 success in a specific culture is not necessary a direct one.
4930 10.4.c. Behavioural training
4931 It can be considered an extension of the cognitive training. Trainers help

4932 trainees to acquire overt and specific behaviours that are relevant in other
4933 culture and replace behaviours that may be offensive. The great disadvantage
4934 of this approach is that trainees must be unwilling to consider modifying some
4935 behaviour that has become habitual with them (a difficult task as people
4936 normally are reluctant to change behaviours). However, the advantage is that
4937 trainees have the opportunity to practice actual behaviours.
4938 10.4.d. Experiential training
4939 In this kind of training, trainees participate in simulations of another culture that
4940 are created by the training staff (simulating scenarios where the language of the
4941 host nation is used, where people behave the same way as hosts do etc…).
4942 The advantage of this approach is that people can obtain realistic preview of the
4943 consequences that their actions may have. But, the great disadvantage is that a
4944 lot of specialized and well prepared personnel is required to implement the
4945 simulation.
4946 10.4.e. Attribution training
4947 Attribution (or isomorphic attribution) consists in using other culture´s

4948 perspective when analyzing behaviours (and not using own culture´s
4949 perspective). The aim of this kind of training is to encourage trainees to come to
Page 154 of 171

4950 the same conclusions about facts as people of the host nation (or other culture)
4951 do.
4952 The selection of any of the approaches aforementioned (or a mix of them) is a
4953 trainer´s decision accordingly with the objectives expected to achieve at the end
4954 of the training and the experience of the trainer. Nevertheless, as new attitudes
4955 has to be established in learners when being trained in CCA, the behavioural,
4956 experiential and attribution training are the most recommended approaches.
4957
4958 10.5. Learning cross-cultural awareness in the armed forces
4959 All the approaches suggested above, should be considered when learning CCA
4960 within the traditional fields of the military preparation: education and training.
4961 Although separate, both fields are linked and support mutually. Even more,
4962 some nations do not make such a difference between both areas. This
4963 separation has been made in order to express that to be culturally capable
4964 some knowledge is needed (mainly, although not exclusively, obtained through
4965 education), some skills are required (mainly gained by training) and a new
4966 attitudes should be gained (through both education and training).
4967 10.5.a. Education
4968 Military education varies from country to country, particularly the issues
4969 affecting levels and duration. However, there tends to be two stages: (1) initial
4970 education for personnel joining the Armed Forces for the first time; and (2)
4971 advanced education for experienced personnel. Consequently, for the purpose
4972 of our study two stages are set:
4973 Initial education. It is compulsory (whatever the military rank is obtained

4974 at the end of this stage) and takes place in military academies and
4975 recruiting centers.
4976 Advanced education. It is not compulsory and can serve a number of

4977 purposes: enhance initial education, enable personnel for promotion,
4978 specialization, etc.
4979 5.1.1 First Stage (initial education)
4980 At this stage, essential concepts relating to culture must be learnt (definitions of
4981 culture, cultural aspects, culture dimensions, outstanding facets and traits, etc.).
4982 Culture should be approached from an anthropological perspective without
Page 155 of 171

4983 focusing on a specific region or country114. The breadth and scope of the
4984 contents will be dependent on the time available and the learner’s educational
4985 background115.
4986 Also in this stage, due attention to understand and analyse “own culture” must
4987 be given. Anthropologists often refer to own culture as lenses through which a
4988 person interprets the world. Finding out what this lenses are made of in order to
4989 be aware of how they influence our interpretations, would facilitate the
4990 understanding of other interpretations/cultures.
4991 So, every nation shall establish the learning objectives116 in accordance with
4992 their military education system. To achieve these objectives the appropriate
4993 teaching tools (lectures, group discussions, computer-based exercises, cases
4994 studies etc.) shall be established taking into consideration the kind of approach
4995 which is going to be used (paragraph 4).
4996 Whatever these tools are, the teaching methods that facilitate reflection, critical
4997 thinking and inquisitive mindset are more successful in generating learning,
4998 particularly adult learning117 (group discussions, case studies…)
4999 Recalling Bloom´s Taxonomy, and according to the categories presented in

5000 Table 1 and the learning objectives established, knowledge and comprehension
5001 categories are achievable at this stage.
5002 Concerning the affective domain, a similar process will take place
5003 (establishment of objectives and activities to reach them). According to the
5004 categories presented in Table 3, reception and response will be the goals to
5005 achieve.
5006 The following tool box may serve as an offer to improve knowledge, skills and
5007 attitudes in this stage (Figure 1 shows the relationship between these tools and
5008 the learning domain):
114
Nonetheless, reference to a particular culture or environment may be suitable to make some
concepts understood.
115
It consequently appears to be convenient to devote some time at Officers and NCO’s
education centers to explain the most outstanding features of cultures so that the learner can
know and understand their relationships. On the contrary, for enlisted it will suffice to make
them aware of how important those elements are for the execution of current operations.
116
Learning objective: concise and measurable description of the knowledge or abilities
acquired by a learner as result of teaching or training.
117
Sparks, D&Hirsh (1997). A new vision for staff developement. Oxford, OH: National Staff
Development Council.
Page 156 of 171

5009 1. Integration of a subject called cross-cultural awareness (CCA) into

5010 military curricula for initial education (its relevance embodied in the
5011 credits awarded is to be determined).
5012 2. In case proposal 1. is not feasible, CCA may be strengthened by

5013 promoting subjects included in the Arts and Social Science curricula
5014 such as history, politics, economy, law, etc., which are already taught
5015 at the initial education and training stage.
5016 3. Promoting teachers and instructors exchanges with foreign military

5017 academies and schools.
5018 4. Encouraging student exchanges with foreign military academies and

5019 schools.
5020 5. Audiovisuals for teaching CCA. In the case of students of Officers and
5021 NCOs academies/schools, and to enhance the learning process, they
5022 should write a project before the audiovisual sessions and hold a
5023 discussion after them. By proceeding this way, students will be highly
5024 involved in the learning process and it will be possible to assess the
5025 level reached in the affective domain. In the case of lower levels,
5026 using audiovisuals and a follow-up debate could serve well the
5027 purpose.
5028 6. Reading field manuals (native or foreign) and other documents

5029 relating to cultural aspects of the operational environment. Annex II
5030 includes a number of experiences (or cultural narratives) collected by
5031 personnel from different countries where knowledge about the target
5032 culture may be derived.
5033 7. Using cases study as an initial approach (followed by group

5034 discussions etc..).
5035 8. Using Problem based learning.
5036 The general knowledge achieved at this stage could be referred to as “cultural
5037 awareness”.
Page 157 of 171

5038
TOOL BOX LEARNING DOMAINS
Subject in
curricula
COGNITIVE
Students
exhange
Instructors
exhange PSICOMOTOR
Audiovisual
material
Reading CCA AFFECTIVE

related
documents
Problem
based
learning
5039
5040 Figure 1. Relationship between the learning tools and the learning domains
5041
5042 5.1.2. Second Stage (advanced education)
5043 The present stage is not constrained by time as it was the case with the initial
5044 education stage; thus, a higher degree of knowledge and specialization is
5045 feasible. It is sought the application of the previous cultural awareness to
5046 particular countries and regions or the improvement of cultural knowledge.
5047 In conjunction with the cognitive learning from the previous stage, the
5048 categories of application and analysis of the Bloom´s taxonomy would be
5049 achievable goals. Such improved understanding of the target culture could be
5050 called cultural understanding.
5051 If the cultural knowledge gained is deep enough, the highest level of cultural
5052 capability can be achieved. To get to this level of cultural expertise or cultural
Page 158 of 171

5053 competence it is recommended to have an appropriate linguistic skill in

5054 addition to the knowledge and skills acquired at the both stages. Experience in
5055 the area of operations (interacting with natives during long tours of duty) will be
5056 another prerequisite for personnel to achieve this level of cultural expertise.
5057 All this cultural knowledge shall be acquired through courses, workshops,
5058 fieldwork etc. (duration and contents may vary) focusing on particular regions,
5059 countries, or areas where the forces are deployed or are likely to deploy in the
5060 future. According to each nation capability, these courses should be developed
5061 not only in military centers, but also taking advantage of the university and other
5062 academia centers.
5063 The access to these specific courses may be limited to a reduced number of
5064 learners, but in order to keep on gaining cultural knowledge, it should also be
5065 integrated into the enabling courses designed for promotion where further
5066 knowledge concerning the planning and execution of operations is gained and
5067 where the number of attendants is higher.
5068 In the case of high order courses which already include the analysis of regions
5069 or countries (e.g. postgraduate or Staff courses), cultural analysis could be
5070 fostered and strengthened.
5071 10.5.b. Language proficiency
5072 It has not been stated that language proficiency is an essential requirement for
5073 CCA though language embodies part of the cultural reality. Only when it has
5074 been made a reference to cultural expertise or competence, a recommendation
5075 has been made on the need to have linguistic skills. The intention was to make
5076 a difference between cultural competence and language skills. Language and
5077 culture are closely linked but we may achieve different levels of knowledge
5078 about them separately (a person may know Afghan history, its customs, morals,
5079 etc… while being constrained by a lack of language proficiency in Pasthun or
5080 Dari).
5081 Learning a language is a time-consuming activity and depends, to a great

5082 extent, on personal skills or abilities. It would be an unattainable goal to have
5083 military personnel proficient in the language used in the area of operations in
5084 short periods of time.
5085 However, learning some basic vocabulary could be a short-term and feasible
5086 objective. This type of learning should take place during the individual and
Page 159 of 171

5087 collective training phase118, since it is the process designed to prepare the
5088 personnel to be deployed in a particular area of operations.
5089 Regardless of the aforementioned, military personnel should be prepared, at the

5090 same time, to be able to communicate with other military (e.g other coalition
5091 members) or civilians (eg. people from IOs or NGOs) in the area of operations.
5092 Nowadays, most of the verbal communication is carried out in English even if
5093 the personnel do not belong to a NATO’s member nation. Thus, the relevance
5094 of the English language is worth highlighting (as obvious as it may seem).
5095 For that purpose, time should be allocated to learning English at both education
5096 stages. Every nation should establish the appropriate English proficiency level
5097 for its forces taking into account that the learning process of English generally
5098 starts well before joining the Armed Forces119.
5099
5100 10.6. Individual and collective training.
5101 The knowledge gained at the education stages must be applied to the execution
5102 of tasks and missions during the training stages. Again, each nation organizes
5103 training in their Armed Forces differently, but there must be something in
5104 common: training can be individual or collective whenever is focused on a
5105 single person or on a unit.
5106 Individual training120 can be defined as a set of activities designed to prepare

5107 the soldier morally, technically and physically to perform specified duties or
5108 tasks individually or collectively (up to team level). On the other hand, collective
5109 training121 is defined as the set of activities designed to prepare Units (platoon
5110 and higher echelons) to accomplish their missions.
118
Language learning may also be integrated into the education domain though it will depend
on the nation’s ability to foster it.
119
STANAG 6001, “Language proficiency levels” is applicable to language learning in NATO
participating nations. Nevertheless, this document may serve as a reference to measuring
proficiency skills in a language.
120
Manual de adiestramiento MA 1-001, Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina español (enero
de 2005), Anexo B “Categorías de Instrucción y Adiestramiento”, pag. B-2. [Training Manual MA
1-001, Spanish TRADOC (January 2005). Annex B “Training categories”, p. B-2.
121
Manual de adiestramiento MA 1-001, Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina español (enero
de 2005), Anexo B “Categorías de Instrucción y Adiestramiento”, pag. B-3. [Training Manual MA
1-001, Spanish TRADOC (January 2005). Annex B “Training categories”, p. B-3.
Page 160 of 171

5111 As it may be observed in these definitions, the main difference between both
5112 types of training relies on the unit size. In the case of the Spanish Army,
5113 individual training applies to individual soldiers up to team-sized units, while
5114 collective training applies to platoon and higher echelons. Although this
5115 distinction is not necessary universal, it is worth noting that the training intended
5116 for individuals or small groups differs from that intended for larger units.
5117 Hence, laying a gun may be carried out by a single layer or by a small crew,
5118 which will fall under the category of individual training. However, a fire mission
5119 belongs to the field of collective training since only a full artillery battery can
5120 carry out such a mission.
5121 In spite of the difference, henceforth the term “training” will be used
5122 indistinctively as cultural preparation affects both individual soldiers and units
5123 and it is not the purpose of this paper to discuss which activities correspond to
5124 individual or collective training.
5125 Apart from the unit size, training is also different when is carried out as a
5126 routinary activity for the sake of unit preparedness, general training, or when is
5127 designed to train a particular unit which is going to deploy in a specific area of
5128 operations, specific training.
5129 Resorting to Bloom’s Taxonomy again, training is closely linked to the

5130 psychomotor domain (the learning of skills and abilities) but not in an exclusive
5131 manner. Escalating the hierarchy of categories presented in table 2, the level of
5132 manipulation is attainable (performing a task making minor mistakes). Reaching
5133 higher levels is not considered to be necessary as possessing advanced
5134 cultural knowledge would be a prerequisite.
5135 Military personnel must also develop the intellectual domain in order to become
5136 aware of why they are required to operate in a given way and to facilitate the
5137 application of the skills acquired into novel situations. That is to say, the level of
5138 application (table 1) should be reached.
5139 Finally, within the affective domain the level of assessment (appraisal of what
5140 has been learnt) should be reached. Training activities should aim at promoting
5141 learners’ participation to make them be willing to perform new tasks. They
5142 should be guided to be able to value the training they are receiving (assessment
5143 level).
Page 161 of 171

5144 10.6.a. General training
5145 The foremost principle at this stage is the need to integrate cultural
5146 knowledge into all the training activities122 carried out by a military unit.
5147 Those in charge of planning the training should avoid limiting the “cultural
5148 training”123 to the lowest ranks personnel (soldiers, sergeants, lieutenants…).
5149 Every service person should be able to apply cultural knowledge to their duties
5150 according to their military rank or job position. Hence, the commander,
5151 planners, military specialists (CIMIC, Intelligence, etc.) or riflemen should
5152 routinely integrate culture into their daily training activities.
5153 A team leader should be able to search a house or perform a checkpoint in

5154 such a way that his behaviour minimizes rejection by locals. On the other hand,
5155 the unit leader or a CIMIC specialist should be trained to negotiate with a local
5156 leader applying cultural knowledge to gain his trust and make the process be
5157 effective. So, it is proven that “cultural training” may vary124 depending on the
5158 job position, but all members of a unit need to be trained.
5159 The objectives in this stage are:
5160 1. Integrate culture in all the training activities performed by the unit.
5161 2. Get all the unit’s members involved in the “cultural training” activities.
5162 As already aforementioned, the contents included in the training programs

5163 should be closely linked to the job position within the unit and, since it is
5164 intended to be general by character, it does not have to be focused on a
5165 particular region or country.
5166 However, if cultural knowledge is to be integrated into all the training activities a
5167 benchmark culture is required to plan and execute all these activities. And
5168 culture cannot be dissociated from its environment.
5169 The dilemma may be sorted out by employing a “fictional” scenario for these
5170 activities. A “fictional” scenario is created ad hoc to facilitate training, using
122
Training activities include a vast number of exercises: planning exercises, command post
exercises, force exercises, etc.
123
There does not exist a definition for “cultural training”. However, it refers to the integration of
cultural knowledge/understanding into training activities.
124
Special emphasis is put on “vary” as distinctively different. It is not the intent to discuss
whether the leader should be more proficient than a subordinate though it must be highlighted
that cultural knowledge should be given due importance in the training activities.
Page 162 of 171

5171 fabricated names, conflicts, participants, terrain, etc., which may resemble
5172 reality to a greater or lesser extent.
5173 This is a widespread practice among Armed Forces which prevents

5174 misunderstanding with other countries (it seems rather inappropriate to use data
5175 relating to a particular country or region). A further advantage is that cross-
5176 cultural awareness may be developed and strengthened through the effort
5177 needed to define the “fictional” culture125.
5178 Given that the teaching tools suggested in the educational area have been duly
5179 resorted to, personnel assigned to a unit must have achieved the goals below
5180 mentioned when initiating “cultural training”:
5181 1. General knowledge about culture gained at the initial education stage (all
5182 personnel).
5183 2. Knowledge of how to integrate culture into the planning procedure

5184 (personnel who have taken advanced courses for promotion).
5185 3. Specific cultural knowledge about a definite region or country (personnel

5186 who have taken part in the specialization courses held after advanced
5187 education).
5188 4. Experience in previous operations (personnel who has been deployed in

5189 real operations).
5190 Personnel having gained knowledge labelled 2 , 3 and 4 could be responsible

5191 for the creation of fictional scenarios.
5192 To facilitate cultural training, the following resources could be useful:
5193 1. Training manuals where cultural knowledge is applied to task-based

5194 activities (if these field manuals are not available, cards devised by the
5195 units themselves out of their experience in previous operations may be
5196 used).
5197 2. Opposing Forces (OPFOR) and “Green elements” (GREENEL)126 at

5198 Training Centers, which renders high fidelity to the exercises. These
125
However, relevant features of given cultures may be used due to the overwhelming burden
of creating an ad hoc culture.
126
OPFOR includes all the elements present in the Area of Operations that opposes or hinder
the accomplishment of the mission. But in a real scenario, other actors are present in the area
as: local population, personnel from IOs/NGOs etc…that do not dificult the mission but of great
importance when planning and executing an operation. GREENEL refers to all this personnel.
Page 163 of 171

5199 elements should be aware of the TTPs127 (tactics, techniques and

5200 procedures) applied by the OPFOR as well as of the GREENEL’s
5201 customs, beliefs, values, etc.
5202 3. Smart cards (pocket size) dealing with cultural aspects such as basic
5203 vocabulary lists, local security forces’ rank insignia etc....
5204 4. Computer based exercises, presenting situations where the “player” is to

5205 make decisions yielding results. Training may be improved by the
5206 application of test, trial and assessment procedures.
5207 5. A further consideration would be resorting to “reservists” (in the case of

5208 countries where it is feasible) who due to his professional activities
5209 already possess a vast knowledge of the target culture. Reservists could
5210 refine the OPFOR/GREENEL preparedness and become observers in
5211 evaluation teams to assess training.
5212 After this period of training a basic level of cultural knowledge (level 1) should
5213 be reached: all unit members take into account cultural knowledge when
5214 dealing with training activities.
5215 10.6.b. Predeployment training
5216 After being assigned to a particular mission, the unit must undergo a new
5217 training period. Then, there is a move from general training to predeployment
5218 training where a real scenario is used instead of a fictional one. Furthermore,
5219 the new planning process should consider culture through all the stages.
5220 An assessment of time available is also paramount at this stage (ranging from
5221 days to months) since the training and activities programs rely on it. The
5222 commander should also assess the unit’s cultural capability (including local
5223 language) gained via educational and general training programs as well as
5224 experience from other missions.
5225 Both assessments should serve as a basis for planning all the training activities.
5226 The training may not have been fully completed when the unit is projected to the
5227 area of operations. However, before properly initiating the mission, the unit
5228 performs a number of tasks (reception of materiel and personnel from the
5229 homeland, etc) in the host nation, which contributes to be readily prepared to
5230 assume the assigned responsibilities.
127
Information relating to TTPs is generally classified since it is derived from experiences in
actual operations. Consequently, every nation should determine the procedure to employ it in
training.
Page 164 of 171

5231 All these activities fall under NATO’s RSOM128 process (reception, staging and
5232 onward movement). Staging is the part of the process where units should be
5233 able to carry out their training in the area of operations.
5234 Therefore, two training stages can be differentiated according to the location
5235 where the training is carried out: homeland predeployment training and
5236 predeployment training in the area of operations.
5237 At the conclusion of both stages, the unit should have reached the level of
5238 application (level 2): all the unit’s members take culture into account when
5239 dealing with predeployment training.
5240 6.2.1. Homeland predeployment training
5241 The resources used during the general training may be used at this stage
5242 though locals may also be involved since the area of operations is already
5243 known. It may be complicated to have locals available, yet the host nation’s
5244 local security forces (if any, police and Armed Forces) may provide
5245 observers/trainers to the contributing nations129.
5246 Further to the advantage of counting on locals for training purposes, requesting
5247 the host nation’s contribution also helps to build up trust and make our culture
5248 known to them (as those host nation instructors are able to assess/value how
5249 important is their culture to an army that is going to deploy in their country) .
5250 At this stage, all personnel will be given essential courses on local languages to
5251 meet their needs, again in accordance with the job position in the Unit (a CIMIC
5252 officer may need to have a broader knowledge of the language than an
5253 infantryman).
5254 The aim involves learning vocabulary which facilitates interaction with locals:
5255 greetings, good-by saying, thanks giving, numbers, names of goods such as
5256 bread, water, etc. The linguistic knowledge gained will depend on the time
5257 available and the individual’s abilities.
128
PD 3-402 Publicación Doctrinal [Doctrinal publication]. Recepción, transición y movimiento a
vanguardia (RSOM)[Reception, staging and onward movement –RSOM-] defines RSOM as the
process by which units, equipment and materiel arriving at the theatre of operations as
individual components of a movement plan become a force capable of accomplishing the
assigned mission.
129
The Afghan National Army (ANA) has offered native instructors to the Spanish Armed
Forces’s Operations Command so that they can contribute to the training received by personnel
deploying to Afghanistan. Statement by Maj. Gen. Jaime Domínguez Buj, Operations
Command’s Commander. Granada, 17 September 2009.
Page 165 of 171

5258 Further to the language skills, it will be necessary to practice communicating

5259 using interpreters. The unit’s leader along with all the personnel who will
5260 routinely interact with locals shall be well acquainted with that procedure. So far
5261 as possible, the interpreter employed for training purposes will deploy with the
5262 unit.
5263
5264 6.2.2. Predeployment training in the theatre of operations.
5265 This kind of training basically comprises the same activities already carried out
5266 at previous stages with the advantage of being able to employ local population,
5267 local interpreters, etc. as supporting personnel. This should be considered a
5268 service provided in the staging areas.
5269 These staging areas serve to finally prepare units to be ready to accomplish
5270 their mission. Although units must arrive in these areas with the appropiate
5271 preparation, nations must considered how useful can be extend the training
5272 period in these staging areas before moving to its final destination area.
5273 This stage is also intended to let the forces become acclimatized to the area of
5274 operations: physical environment (climate, food, etc.) and the human
5275 environment which, of course, includes culture.
5276
5277
Page 166 of 171

5278 11. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
5279 To be developed after Sub LOE 1.2 (Jun 2010)
5280
Page 167 of 171

5281 Glossary of terms and definitions

5282
5283 Along with Strategic planning Guide Multinational Experiment 5:
5284 Conflict: A situation when two or more parties find their interests
5285 incompatible, express hostile attitudes, or take action, which damages
5286 the other parties’ ability to pursue their interests.
5287 Crisis: Situation where the equilibrium between antagonist forces or

5288 interests within or between states is broken, potentially leading to
5289 violence.
5290
5291 Provided by this draft:
5292 Culture: Culture is the shared concepts that guide what people believe
5293 (knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities),
5294 how they behave and how this behaviour is interpreted.
5295 Culture Awareness: It is the ability to become aware of our cultural

5296 values, beliefs and perceptions without focusing on the self.
5297 Cross culture awareness: see paragraph…
5298
5299 Along with decision of MNE Executive Steering Group Meeting, Granada,
5300 Spain. Decision Sheet 20090331:
5301 Environment: In the underlying work environment refers to the area of

5302 intervention, including all actors and orders between those actors and
5303 can be characterized by general features.
5304 Irregular adversary: The following characteristics associated with an

5305 “Irregular Adversary” are proposed to allow sufficient flexibility for
5306 experiment design and scenario development to ensure adequate
5307 evaluation of experiment objectives and outcomes and may include but
5308 are not limited to:
5309 1. Not constrained by generally accepted conventions of international

5310 behaviour, such as the Geneva Conventions with respect to agreed
5311 international standards covering the conduct of warfare. Often violate
5312 status as a regular combatant, feign civilian or non-combatant status
5313 or commit hostile acts in disobedience of the laws of war. Normally not
Page 168 of 171

5314 a member of the regular armed forces, police or other internal security
5315 forces and lack the political discipline imposed by national sovereignty
5316 and accountability. May operate independently or outside the
5317 framework of a political state and often feel no allegiance to a nation
5318 or accepted political ideology.
5319 2. Have a long term focus and use protracted efforts “below the
5320 threshold of war” to disrupt the ability of the government, the civilian
5321 security forces and the armed forces to carry out their tasks and to
5322 prevent the economy and political and public life from functioning
5323 normally. Employ a general strategy of avoidance and are often
5324 indistinguishable from the civil population. A key tenant may be
5325 focused on population control/popular support. Combat forces are only
5326 partially and occasionally visible and when directly confronted with a
5327 stronger military opponent, they transform, reorganize, and weave into
5328 various physical environments and human activities. 3. Exploit
5329 increasingly inexpensive but lethal weapons in an erosion strategy
5330 aimed at weakening political resolve by inflicting mounting casualties
5331 over time, often with external support from sovereign governments,
5332 transnational organizations or building of alternate or 'shadow'
5333 governments, as alternatives to standing sovereign governments, to
5334 demonstrate strength while delegitimizing the standing government.
5335 They are frequently characterized by particularly extreme violence with
5336 a degree of brutality, which ensures maximum media coverage,
5337 against both military and civilian targets. At the same time, they are
5338 adept at presenting their own suffering and commitment in the media
5339 to influence the international community.
5340 Note: Transnational is defined as extending or going beyond national

5341 boundaries.
5342 Non-compliant actors: An individual or group that performs activities or

5343 exhibits behaviours to counter the achievement of the Coalition strategic
5344 vision/objectives and their implementation.
5345
5346
Page 169 of 171

5347 Abbreviations
5348 CCA: Cross Culture Awareness
5349 CULAD: Cultural Adviser
5350 DAP: Data Analysis Plans
5351 DCP: Data Collector Plans
5352 EXCON: Exercise Control
5353 HICON: High Control
5354 HTS: Human Terrain System
5355 HTT: Human Terrain Team
5356 INFOOPS: Information Operations
5357 INTEL: Intelligence
5358 LEGAD: Legal Adviser
5359 LOCON: Low Control
5360 LOE: Limited Objective Experiment
5361 MIL/MEL: Military Incidence List / Military Event List
5362 NCA: Non-compliant actors
5363 OPG: Operational Planning Group
5364 OPP: Operational Planning Process
5365 POLAD: Political Adviser
5366 PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team
5367 PSYOPS: Psychological Operations
5368 SME: Subject Matter Experts
5369
5370
5371
Page 170 of 171

5372 Bibliography
5373 Operational Culture for the Warfighter. Principles and Applications.
5374 SALMONI,Barak A. and HOLMES-EBER, Paula. Marine Corps
5375 University. Quantico, Virginia. 2008
5376 The significance of culture to the military. Joint Doctrine Note 1/09.
5377 http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/microsite/dcdc /
5378 Impact of cultural Awareness upon battle command. Center for Army
5379 Lessons learned. Fort Leavenworth. Kansas. 2005.
5380 Multinational Experiment 6. Baseline Assessment report. 2008. USJFC

5381 Suffolk, VA
5382 Bridging the culture gap: A cultural framework as a basis for cultural
5383 awareness training. VAN MEER, J.P, VELDHUIS, G.J. &SCHWERZEL,
5384 J. http://www.cgsc.army.mil
5385 Framing the Cultural Training landscape: Phase I Fidings. ALRICH, Amy.
5386 Institute for Defense Analysis. 2008
5387 U.S. Navy Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness
5388 Strategy. Chief of Naval Operations. Washington DC. 2008
5389 Defence Language and Cultural Awareness training Policy. DGTE-

5390 TEPOLTrgPol1@MOD.UK
5391 The importance of Cross-cultural awareness for today’s operational

5392 environment. Colonel ARCURI, Antonhy. US Army War College.
5393 Pensnsylvania.
5394 Multinational Experiment 5. Experiment design document. 2006-2009
5395 Encyclopaedia Britannica. http://www.britannica.com/
5396 Encyclopaedia Merriam Webster. http://www.merriam-

5397 webster.com/dictionary/culture
Page 171 of 171

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
9
10
11
12 CROSS-CULTURAL AWARENESS
13 Volume 2: Annexes
14
15
16 Draft version number 3
17 Granada, 31 DEC 2009
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25 Reproduction of this document and unlimited distribution of copies is authorised

26 for personal and non-commercial use only, provided that all copies retain the
27 author attribution as specified below. The use of this work for commercial
28 purposes is prohibited; its translation into other languages and
29 adaptation/modification requires prior written permission.
30
31
32 Point of Contact:
33 Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina (Spanish TRADOC)
34 Dirección de Investigación, Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales [Directorate for

35 Research, Doctrine, Organization and Materiel]
36 C/ S. Idelfonso s/n
37 18071 Granada (SPAIN)
38 Phone: +34 958 809000
39
40 Authors of the annexes:
41 Annex A: Carlos Echeverría Jesús. Professor of International Relations at

42 National Distance Learning University., UNED, Madrid (Spain).
43 cecheverria@poli.uned.es
44 Annex B: Josep Baqués. Universitat de Barcelona (Spain).
45 Annex C: Alicia Cebada Romero. Director of the Crisis Management

46 Programme (CITpax); Professor of Public International Law, Carlos III
47 University of Madrid (Spain)
48 Annex D: Mª Conception Pérez Villalobos. Professor of Constitutional Law.

49 University of Granada (Spain)
50 Annex E: PhA Professor Humberto Trujillo, Senior Lecturer on Methodology for

51 the Behavioural Sciences, University of Granada (Spain)
52

Draft version number 3 as 31DEC09
53 INDEX
54
55 ANNEX A: AFGHAN PERCEPTION OF NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES ..................................... 6
56 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 6
57 2. RESORTING TO HISTORY TO UNDERSTAND PERCEPTIONS .......................................... 7
58 3. AFGHAN PERCEPTIONS OF NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES.............................................. 8

59 3.1. Pakistan .................................................................................................................................... 9
60 3.2. Islamic Republic of Iran ....................................................................................................... 12
61 3.3. Tajikistan ............................................................................................................................... 14
62 3.4. People’s Republic of China ................................................................................................... 17
63 3.5. Uzbekistan. ............................................................................................................................. 17
64 3.6. Turkmenistan. ....................................................................................................................... 20
65 3.7. Kyrgyzstan. ............................................................................................................................ 21
66 4. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................. 23
67 ANNEX B: THE AFGHAN MELTING POT OF ETHNIC GROUPS AS A VARIABLE

68 EXPLAINING THE REASONS FOR THE CONFLICT..................................................................... 25
69 1. INTRODUCTION. ......................................................................................................................... 25
70 2. AFGHANISTAN OR PASHTUNISTAN? .................................................................................... 26
71 3. AFGHAN MACEDONIA. .............................................................................................................. 28
72 4. INTERETHNIC RELATIONSHIPS IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT

73 OF THE STATE. ...................................................................................................................................... 31
74 5. INTERETHNIC VICISSITUDES IN THE 20TH C.: PRE-SOVIET PHASE. ........................... 34
75 6. THE SOVIET INVASION: A WASTED OPPORTUNITY. ...................................................... 36
76 7. INTERETHNIC CONFRONTATIONS DURING THE AFGHAN CIVIL WAR ................... 38
77 8. CONCLUSIONS. ............................................................................................................................ 41
78 ANNEX C: INTERCULTURAL AWARENESS IN TRANSITION PROCESSES ........................... 43
79 1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 43
80 2. TWO DILEMMAS IN THE TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE ........................ 44

81 2.1. The human rights dilemma................................................................................................... 45
82 2.1.a. PEACE / JUSTICE ............................................................................................................. 45
83 2.1.b. PEACE / HUMAN RIGHTS .............................................................................................. 51
84 2.2. Local ownership dilemma ..................................................................................................... 53
85 3. FINAL REFLECTIONS ................................................................................................................ 57
86
3
87 ANNEX D: THE POLITICAL-LEGAL DIMENSION OF INTERCULTURAL AWARENESS. A

88 PROPOSAL FOR APPLICATION IN STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS 59
89 1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 59
90 2. ELEMENTS THAT IDENTIFY A STATE'S LEGAL-POLITICAL CULTURE ................... 64

91 2.1. A universal legal culture? ..................................................................................................... 64
92 2.2. Legitimacy of Power. Political systems ................................................................................ 68
93 2.2.a. CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON POWER AND
94 LEGITIMACY.................................................................................................................................. 68
95 2.2.b. LEGITIMACY IN WESTERN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS ....................... 70
96 2.2.c. LEGITIMACY IN ISLAMIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS .................................................... 73
97 3. THE LEGITIMACY OF LAW: LEGAL SYSTEMS .................................................................. 75
98 3.1. Rule of Law systems .............................................................................................................. 75
99 3.1.a. EMPIRE OF THE LAW..................................................................................................... 76
100 3.1.b. DIVISION OF POWERS ................................................................................................... 77
101 3.1.c. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND PROTECTION FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ....... 78
102 3.2. Islamic Law ............................................................................................................................ 79
103 3.2.a. BRIEF HISTORICAL REFERENCE ................................................................................ 79
104 3.2.b. LEGAL SOURCES ............................................................................................................ 80
105 3.2.c. SCHOOLS OF LAW .......................................................................................................... 81
106 3.2.d. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ISLAMIC LEGAL SYSTEM ......................................... 83
107 3.2.e. ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM ................................................................................. 85
108 4. THE APPLICATION OF LEGAL-POLITICAL CULTURE IN OPERATIONS ................... 87
109 4.1. General considerations on stability and reconstruction operations .................................. 87
110 4.2. Preparing the Operation. Knowledge of legal culture........................................................ 90
111 4.3. Stability. Elements of intelligence on governability............................................................ 92
112 4.3.a. STRUCTURE OF POWER ................................................................................................ 92
113 4.3.b. STATE STRUCTURE ....................................................................................................... 94
114 4.3.c. STRUCTURES GENERATED IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES ......................................... 94
115 4.4. Reconstruction. Rules and state structures to be complied with ....................................... 95
116 4.5. POSSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES IN
117 OTHER CULTURAL SYSTEMS ...................................................................................................... 99
118 ANNEX E: BASIC CONCEPTS ABOUT COMMUNICATION AND INTERGROUP
119 RELATIONSHIPS ................................................................................................................................. 101
120 1. PERCEPTION AMONG PEOPLE ............................................................................................. 101
121 2. BEHAVIOURAL MOTIVES: ENDOGENOUS VS. EXOGENOUS....................................... 103
122 3. INTERGROUP CONFLICT ....................................................................................................... 104
123 4. INTERGROUP PREJUDICES AND RELATIONSHIPS ........................................................ 105
124 5. STEREOTYPES ........................................................................................................................... 107
125 6. CONTROL OF THE INTERGROUP CONFLICT .................................................................. 107
126 7. IMPORTANCE OF PERSUASION............................................................................................ 109
127 8. ERRORS IN ORAL COMMUNICATION ................................................................................ 110
4
128 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................. 111

129
130
5
131 ANNEX A: AFGHAN PERCEPTION OF NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES1
132
133 1. INTRODUCTION
134 Afghanistan, a war-torn region for the last three decades, is located in Central
135 Asia with a population of 31 mill., ranks 174 out of 180 countries according to
136 Human Development Index (HDI) reports by the United Nations Development
137 Programme. Sixty percent of the population is illiterate and over a million were
138 killed during the war against the former Soviet Union (1979-1989). All these
139 factors, in combination with the country’s tribal nature, religious distribution
140 (82% Sunni and 17% Shia) and the harmful influence of the cultivation of opium
141 and the on-the-scene production into heroine and derivatives project an image
142 of endemic vulnerability aggravated by other regional war-provoking conditions
143 such as: its convoluted vicinity to Pakistan and Iran; its location in relation to
144 energy networks projects where Central Asian hydrocarbon producers may be
145 involved ¬¬–particularly Turkmenistan’s gas-; its unsought participation in the
146 Indo-Pakistani conflict; and its land connection to China through the narrow
147 Wakhan corridor.
148 It is worth noting that in the wake of the Taliban regime’s quick overthrow in
149 2001, it was thought that the situation could only improve. Since October 7
150 2001, 69 fatalities were accounted for the multinational forces while carrying out
151 mopping-up operations against Taliban and Al-Qaeda groups, which was
152 viewed as a sign that the mission had almost been accomplished.
153 Subsequently, the first presidential elections were held in 2004 and 2005, and
154 the armed resistance against President Hamid Karzai and his foreign
155 supporters escalated concurrently. The armed groups wittily exploited the
156 scenario’s structural weaknesses such as its vicinity to Pakistan and a complex
157 tribal structure which, in conjuntion, makes it difficult to create a conventional
158 state with control over Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. The 41 presidential
159 canditates in last August elections were just a portrait of the complexity of the
160 Afghan society arising from its very ethnic structure: 42% Pashtun, 27% Tajik,
161 9% Uzbek, 9% Hazara, 4% Turkmen while the remaining 6% is comprised of
162 Balochi, Kyrgyz, Pamir and Pashai. At the constitutional debate in 2003-2004,
163 Hazaras, Uzbeks and Tajiks, the most relevant ethnic groups after dominant
164 Pashtuns, argued in favour of an increased decentralization, the idea
165 reemerged during the past Governor Elections and still persists. Besides the
166 aforementioned ethnic complexity, the alteration of customary tribal balances
167 causes instability. As a matter of fact, some analysts reckon that support given
1
Written by Dr. Echeverría Jesús, Carlos. Professor of International Relations at UNED.
cecheverria@poli.uned.es
6
168 to Taliban resistance by individuals and groups is due to their perceived

169 disatisfaction. In the Southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, the power
170 abuse by officials posted by the government, mostly Popalzai and Barakzai -
171 Durrani Pashtuns-, and their relationship with drug trafficking have victimized
172 rival tribal groups, which eventually have adhered to Taliban postures.
173 In order to further the anthropological approach, we should delve into the
174 analysis of the Afghan perception of their vicinity to Iran, Pakistan, China,
175 Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in terms of interests and threats. The
176 analysis shall also address the variation of the perception, if any, or how it may
177 evolve in the future according to a given set of events.
178
179 2. RESORTING TO HISTORY TO UNDERSTAND PERCEPTIONS
180 The centrifugal forces from neighbouring countries which exert an influence on
181 Afghanistan can be better understood when considered within their historical
182 context. The current weak nature of the Afghan state is rooted in the creation of
183 a Pashtun tribal confederation –Durrani– in 1747 whose capital city was
184 established in Kandahar and its sphere of influence reached as far as New
185 Delhi. At the beginning of the XIX century, the power was still centralized in
186 Kandahar to a certain extent though there emerged forces that turned
187 Afghanistan into a territory at the mercy of surrounding empires. This prevented
188 the country from developing the same way other countries did. From outside
189 Afghanistan’s current borders it was decided to turn the area into an
190 interposition state to keep the Russians and the British at stand-off distance,
191 and to establish a connection to Imperial China. The Wakhan corridor —a
192 narrow valley connecting the Afghan province of Badajshan with China— was
193 not part of the Emirate of Kabul though it belongs to today’s Afghanistan, which
194 at first sight may puzzle an observer.
195 During the XIX c. the Pashtuns countered the British forces penetration until the
196 latter ones conquered North East India —current Pakistan— and divided them
197 establishing the Durand Line in 1893. Following the Second Anglo-Afghan War,
198 the British enthroned Emir Abdul Rehman, known as the Iron Emir, who
199 centralized power in his person. He initiated a number of revolts and rebellions
200 and the British eventually granted independence to his territories in 1919.
201 In addition to the vagaries of fate and the determining influence of external
202 agents on Afghanistan’s historical and political evolution, a central factor was,
203 and still is, its being part of the Islamic sphere. It is not worthless to mention that
204 the Pashtuns think of themselves as the rightful heirs to Kais, one of prophet
205 Muhammad’s partners. Thereby, the Afghan society which is comprised of the
206 Pashtun majority along with Tajik, Uzbek, Turkmen, Shia Persians, Kyrgyz and
207 Balochi find themselves tightly-bound by Sunni Islam. Although these ethnic
7
208 groups are well represented in other countries, none of them aspires to
209 secession. The Hazaras are indigenous Afghans and cannot be found forming
210 tribal organizations beyond Afghanistan’s borders. They are the only ethnic
211 group to be considered an alienated community. However, it is their Shia nature
212 the fact that explains why the Hazaras have traditionally been, and to a certain
213 extent still are, regarded second class citizens. Exclusive nationalisms or ethnic
214 sectarianism are not present in Afghanistan yet there remains latent a collision
215 between Shias and Sunnies, even in Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, which will play a
216 major role affecting the Afghan perceptions of their neighboring countries.
217 When considering the relationships between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is

218 worth noting the fact the the Pashtuns form the prevailing majority —42% in
219 Afghanistan and 20% Pakistan—, the artificiality of the Durand Line and the
220 strengthening of discrepancies between both states during the Cold War. Since
221 1948 the Afghan governments have never officially recognized the borders
222 between the two states, which has fueled Pakistan’s mistrust of Kabul and fear
223 of the creation of Pashtunistan by Afghans. During the Cold War, Pakistan was
224 a cornerstone for Western countries as it was Iran until the late seventies when
225 ruled by Shah Reza Palhevi. On the contrary, Afghanistan was under the Soviet
226 Union’s sphere of influence and was provided with remarkable military
227 capabilities to counter Pakistan’s military power. The Indo-Pakistani
228 relationships have always been treacherous and both countries have fought
229 three wars since they were granted independence in 1947. Pakistan has
230 traditionally supported Afghan Islamic leaders to assure a rear area against the
231 Indian threat. This explains why they have kept close links with Islamic leaders
232 who stood out when countering the Soviet invasion in 1979 —particularly
233 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Hezb-e-Isamili’s leader in the North East provinces near
234 Kabul— and with Taliban leaders since 1996 in order to make Afghanistan an
235 Islamic stronghold. The pervasiveness of the Indo-Pakistani conflict is such that
236 India accused Pakistan of supporting with intelligence a terrorist attack against
237 its embassy in Kabul killing 60 people on July 7 2008. The incident was
238 considered an attempt to counter the influence of India on a territory Pakistan
239 deems to be its own area of responsibility. In 2009, a similar suicide attack was
240 carried out on the same objective.
241
242 3. AFGHAN PERCEPTIONS OF NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES
243 After having remarked some of the most outstanding features of Afghanistan in
244 terms of history, geography, and religious and cultural context, we are going to
245 analyze how Afghans perceive their relations with coterminous countries —
246 some of whom have played a major role in determining Afghanistan’s present or
247 are willing to shape its future. Afghan leaders display a tendency to oppose,
248 criticize and accuse their neighbours of meddling in their internal affairs. During
8
249 the past election campaign in August 2009, the former Taliban commander
250 Abdul Salam "Rocketi" leveled fierce criticism at the Russian Federation, Iran
251 and Pakistan as he deems these countries counter the development of the
252 country. Many Afghans share the same perception and view themselves as
253 victims of foreign powers.
254 3.1. Pakistan
255 Pakistan is perceived as an artificial divide between Pashtuns, as a country

256 where millions of Afghans fled during the Soviet invasion —the displaced
257 Afghan population was the most numerous in the world— and as a safe haven
258 for Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda who fight against Karzai’s government and the
259 multinational forces. Afghan Taliban, who are considered to be less
260 “destructive” than Pakistani ones, are perceived differently since the latter are
261 also viewed as foreign or extraneous elements.
262 From an operational point of view, Pakistan is a sanctuary for Afghan Taliban
263 and their supporting Pashtun groups —including Al Qaeda— as it was Laos and
264 Cambodia for the Vietcong during the Vietnam war. It is from Pakistan that the
265 Mullah Omar and his leadership structure lead the Afghan Taliban —the whole
266 or part of the leadership structure is located in Quetta, Pakistani Balochistan,
267 and the Taliban commanders may be in Helmand— and the evolution of the
268 conflict. This situation along with the difficulties faced by Karzai’s government to
269 be consolidated has prompted a distinction between two types of Taliban
270 groups: the Afghan and the Pakistani. The latter ones, who were led by
271 Baitullah Mehsud —deceased August 2009— are regarded an emerging threat.
272 This distinction is further strengthened by the Afghan Taliban’s code of conduct
273 broadcast on Al Jazeera on July 27 2009, The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
274 Rules for Mujahideen. It talks of limiting suicide attacks and centralizes power
275 into the hands of Mullah Omar, including deciding over the future of the
276 hostages.
277 The emerging perception which distinguishes between Afghan and Pakistani
278 Taliban would fit into the context relating to the Afghan opposition to foreign
279 dominance on the country. In the present case, it would also apply to alien
280 “insurgent” groups. Some sectors, which to a certain extent are Pashtun and do
281 not necessarily support president Karzai, take advantage of the concession
282 policies. However, from a nationalist perspective they argue that the war is
283 being unnecessarily protracted by multinational forces and the conflict could be
284 resolved by negotiating with the Afghan Taliban.
285 The concession policies to the Taliban implemented by president Karzai are
286 similar to those enforced by Pakistan in the Swat Valley —which eventually
287 turned out to be counterproductive and were abolished— or by other Muslim
288 countries in order to attract radicalized supporters. Basing on the idea of
9
289 reconciliation forged in 2005, The Afghan Parliament passed an amnesty bill
290 banning to try military leaders in Afghanistan for their involvement in previous
291 wars. Nowadays, former Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami’s militants hold official
292 positions within the Afghan Administration or are members of the Parliament. It
293 is worth noting that Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami members had preliminary
294 conversation with Syrian Government in 2008 in the city of Mecca in order to
295 bridge the divide between Afghan groups. This renewed the Saudi influence
296 upon the Taliban regime and its attempts to bring Pakistan and Afghanistan to
297 its sphere of influence.
298 Pakistan has traditionally supported weak Afghan governments in order to

299 distribute power among the lords of war to control or shape the situation. At
300 present, it is common practice to fund insurgent groups and allow for it. Along
301 the 2640 km borderline between Afghanistan and Pakistan several clans, such
302 as the lord of war Jalaluddin Haqqani and his sons, attract local leaders and act
303 as liaison between them and Taliban and Al Qaeda’s leaders. Influential
304 Pashtun sectors belonging to the Pakistani Intelligence Services (ISI) may well
305 have participated in the attempt by Richard Holbrooke, President Obama’s
306 Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, to contact Islamist leader
307 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in order to attract Taliban sectors to the negotiations2.
308 On the other hand, on June 12 2009 CNN informed that a Pakistani Army’s top
309 official had admitted keeping contacts with Mullah Omar, which was a
310 demonstration by Pakistan to mediate between the Taliban and the USA.
311 Within a context distinguishing between Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns on the
312 one hand, and Afghan and Pakistani Taliban on the other, on May 7 2009 the
313 presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan met at the White House coinciding with
314 the announcement, by Pakistani officials, of the breaking of the truce with
315 Pakistani Taliban in the Swat Valley. The Taliban attempts to control the Buner
316 Valley spurred the Pakistani government to mobilize about 15000 troops to
317 counter 4000 Taliban. It cannot yet be judged whether this offensive is a
318 demonstration that the Pakistani government —Pakistan’s Popular Party— has
319 become aware of the risks which entails fostering radicalism and is making
320 efforts to uproot it, even though it is four months since the military offensive was
321 launched. The Army has to face a highly interwoven net of jihadist groups that
322 emerged due to the permissive posture of the government and, in some cases,
323 with its own support. The most relevant group is the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
324 (TTP), which was created during a secret meeting held on December 13 2007
325 and operates in the North East frontier province. It is worth noting that apart
326 from the Pakistani military offensive against radical elements launched last May,
327 another one was started in mid October (2009) against Pakistani Taliban in
328 South Waziristan, 300 South to the battered capital or the North East frontier
2
See “Afganistan. Richard Holbrooke redécouvre Gulbuddin Hekmatyar” Arabies July-August
2009, p. 12.
10
329 province. Pakistani forces are also concerned about Peshawar and are making
330 efforts to counter fierce terrorist activities in the city and neighbouring towns
331 such as Hayatabad, where 18 Taliban were killed by Pakistani forces on
332 November 25 2009 while orchestrating an attack on a coalition’s logistic
333 convoy3.
334 Drugs play a prominent role in the Afghan economy. Its associated destabilizing
335 effects on neighbouring countries may lead Pakistan to adopt postures of the
336 past since Pakistani criminal groups are involved in the poppy production in four
337 Afghan provinces (Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan and Zabul) where farmers are
338 pressed to continue producing opium. During the summer 2009, the fiercest
339 combats against Taliban groups took place in Helmand —a foremost opium
340 production area bordering Pakistan along 220 km— and Kandahar. In 2008 a
341 Marines’ expeditionary unit with 2400 troops secured a very small but strategic
342 area in Garmser, South to Helmand, cut supply lines and reopened to city to
343 commerce. A year later, Operation Khanjar, a major offensive against Taliban
344 groups, was launched last June supported by Pakistan. This country increased
345 the alert level of the forces deployed on the other side of the border (along the
346 river Helmand in Balochistan) to prevent the Taliban from retreating. In
347 Helmand 105000 hectares are used to grow opium, which accounted for two
348 thirds of the overall production in Afghanistan in 2008. According to UN’s
349 information, there were 157000 hectares dedicated to that crop in Afghanistan.
350 It is estimated that opium, morphine and heroine exports ran into $2400 mill. in
351 2008. The Taliban collect between 200 – 340 mill. on “taxes” levied on the
352 production, processing and trafficking of the products. The fights against drugs
353 are changing focus to aim at the traffickers’ stores, located mainly in the
354 provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, instead of attacking the fields cultivated
355 by farmers.
356 Pakistan and Afghanistan’s state structures overlay pre-existing Pashtun tribal
357 structures. It should be remarked that this community is governed by jirgas
358 while the other Afghan communities are governed by Shuras. A jirga covering
359 an area comprised of Pakistani and Afghan terrain has become particularly
360 useful for the negotiations between both governments.
361 Nonetheless, the negotiations with Afghan Taliban held out good hopes though
362 they had previously been rather ineffective in other regions. In Badghis, the
363 agreement reached in 2008 with Taliban leader Ghulan Dastegir turned out to
364 be a fiasco. President Karzai afforded him the freedom to take over the Bala
365 and Dastegir Districts but soon after he started to lead the insurgent movement
366 in the area. On July 12 2009 Al Jazeera broadcast video statements by Osama
367 Bin Laden warning Pakistani population against negotiating with the
3
SADDIQUE, Abubaker: “Militant Violence Creates Climate of Fear in Peshawar” Eurasia
Insight. 29 November 2009, at <www.eurasianet.org>.
11
368 government or making any concessions. A similar message was broadcast on

369 June 3 2009.
370 3.2. Islamic Republic of Iran
371 Although Iran, as the only Shia state, has not been recognized as a real country
372 by Afghanistan, including the Sunni, it should be pinpointed that Persia has
373 played a major role in forging that country and its society. For example,
374 Afghanistan uses the Persian calendar. Concerning the Shia sector of the
375 Afghan society, it should be taken into account that the Hazaras are the only
376 truly indigenous society in Afghanistan —the other ethnic groups are also
377 present in neighbouring countries— and have not to date been manipulated by
378 Teheran. With the passage of time, the Hazaras’ marginality could be exploited
379 by Iran to its own benefit, in case this ethnic group is not already being
380 exploited.
381 Iran draws a web of links with the Shia Hazaras and the Tajiks (Sunni with
382 Persian heritage)4 though the determining factor for their relationships is its
383 proximity to Pakistan and Iran's enmity with the Taliban regime since it
384 supported by Saudi Arabia. Both countries are considered regional rivals. Iran
385 kept a close relationship with Afghanistan during the period 1992-1996, until
386 president Barhanuddin Rabani was overthrown by the Taliban, radicalized
387 Sunni fostered and encouraged from Pakistan. Iran does not approve of the
388 incentives proposed in 2009 to negotiate with Afghan Taliban sectors under the
389 auspicies of President Karzai and Pakistan. As a result, the Pashtuns would be
390 reinforced and Pakistan’s influence in the region would be broadened.
391 The Afghan Hazaras’ spiritual leader is Ayatollah Mohseni, who owns Tamadon
392 television and broadcasts messages to give relevance and coordinate this
393 marginalized minority group. On the other hand, Iran has concurred with
394 President Karzai’s concessions to the Afghan Shia limiting women’s rights short
395 before the elections, which has been welcomed by Mohseni.
396 The Hazara presidential candidate, Razaman Bashardost, ranks in third position
397 after the partial vote recount. Despite being Shia, Bashardost is not Teheran’s
398 candidate though he is appreciated by Iran for his persistence on forcing the
399 coalition forces to withdraw from Afghanistan apart from being Shia. Iran also
400 reckons other candidates: Shia Karim Jalili —Hazara involved in armed
401 actions—, Tajik Mohamed Qasim Fahim, and Mohamed Mohaqeq, the leader of
402 the Hazaras' party Hizb-e-Wahdat. The fact that Fahim was eventually
4
As a matter of fact, Tajikistan has cultural bonds with Afghanistan and Iran rooted on the
Persian origin of their languages. However, the bonds are hindered by the fact that ruling class
in Tajikistan and Afghanistan is Sunni.
12
403 addressed vice president by Karzai has been good news for the Iranian regime.
404 Concerning the forgone leader at the elections, former Secretary of State
405 Abdullah Abdullah, he is Tajik from his mother’s side and Pashtun from his
406 father's side. But Iran’s support derives from the fact that Abdullah was close to
407 Commander Ahmed Shah Mahsud, the North Alliance’s leader.
408 Iran promised to attend the meeting on Afghanistan in The Hague on March 31
409 2009 and concurs with the USA on supporting Karzai to stabilize the country
410 against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. However, the Iranian government advocates
411 for the withdrawal of the American forces from Afghanistan. On the other hand,
412 the USA and Afghanistan constantly accuse Iran of allowing for smuggling
413 people and material in and out the country to support the insurgency. For
414 example, on May 4 2009 a vast number of insurgents from Pakistan and Iran
415 penetrated the borders, reaching the province of Farah. Iran is also affected by
416 the drug trafficking activities along the border and should be concerned about
417 the advance of the Taliban in adjoining territories to its border instead of
418 seeking to undermine the USA, which could produce a boomerang effect. For
419 example, Ganjabad, a city located near the Iranian border, has been under
420 Taliban control for a long time. Besides that, it is taken for granted that Iran
421 funds the insurgents in Herat and the terrorist attacks are carried out by groups
422 loyal to Ghulam Yaya, a powerful local Taliban leader. On June 10, the USA
423 announced the death of Mullah Mustafa and sixteen comrades in an operation
424 conducted in Shahrak in the province of Ghowr. According to American
425 sources, Mustafa kept links with the Taliban and the Iranian regime through the
426 Revolutionary Guard Corps or Pasdaran’s Qods Force. In 2009, the US
427 Department of State accused Iran of sponsoring terrorists via the clandestine
428 Qods Force. Mustafa is considered to be responsible for the attacks on the
429 main road along the Ghowr’s borders and the province of Herat. Despite the
430 aforementioned, Iran is aware of the threat embodied by drug trafficking and the
431 social radicalization. The Summit held in Teheran on May 24 2009 for
432 presidents of Iran (Mahmud Ahmadineyad), Afghanistan (Hamid Karzai) and
433 Pakistan (Asif Ali Zardari) to agree on a common posture to counter drug
434 trafficking and terrorism is a sign that the threat is acknowledged. However, Iran
435 is loath to stop armed actions against the USA in coterminous countries. In fact,
436 Mahmud Ahmadineyad exploited the Summit to his own benefit before the
437 presidential elections instead of making progress on anti-drug and anti-terrorism
438 policies. The Iranian president should also ponder on his country’s
439 vulnerabilities to attacks: on May 28 2009 a suicide bomber attacked Shia
440 mosque "Ali Ebne Abitaleb" killing thirty people in Zahedanin, Sistan-
441 Balochistan (South East Iran). The Salafi jihadist group, Yundala (founded in
442 2005 and close to Al Qaeda), claimed responsibility for the attack.
443 Drug trafficking along the Iranian-Afghan border is a threat for both countries. In
444 the summer 2006, 3000 servicemen and policemen were estimated to have
445 been killed countering drug mafias along the border in twenty years. The border
446 is considered to be “the most dangerous in the world”. By the end of 2007 the
13
447 figure reached 3600. Heroine trafficking is especially common in the area. In
448 2003, 73% of the heroine consignments in the world were seized there. In fact,
449 the borderline between Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Turkmenistan, a
450 deserted area, is the main route for drug trafficking. Iran is making huge efforts
451 to control the area and is building a 1000 km barrier with ditches and
452 observation posts.
453 In spite of the aforementioned, Iran could start collaborating with the US, which
454 is a hypothetical and distant scenario, to provide logistics support to
455 Afghanistan5 in the pursuit of common objectives, particularly countering the
456 Taliban. We must bring the attention to the fact that Germany is considering to
457 establish a supply route to Afghanistan through Iran according to news channel
458 IRNA. It was announced that unidentified German military sources suggested
459 that German corporations had contacted Iranian authorities in order to design
460 railways and land routes to transport non-military goods to Afghanistan. As with
461 Russia, Teheran may cede to logistic issues provided that the relationships with
462 the US do not deteriorate because of Iran's nuclear aspirations. The Afghan
463 perception of Iran would inevitably improve if the cessions were made —
464 especially on part of the society willing to enhance security and political stability.
465 3.3. Tajikistan
466 The second largest community in Afghanistan is the Tajik, which accounts for
467 27% of the overall population. As stated earlier in our study, the ethnic divisions
468 have not resulted in secession aspirations. However, the affinities and
469 relationships of Afghan Tajik with the Tajik from Tajikistan —born after the
470 Soviet Union breakdown— are undeniable. There are Tajik who live far from the
471 Afghan border with Tajikistan, for example Badghis, where some of them are
472 involved in opium growing and criminal organizations according the an United
473 Nations on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) Report issued in August 2009. At
474 present, these militias are loyal to the government though they easily forge new
475 loyalties. As a matter of fact, in early September Spanish forces were attacked
476 by militias led by Gousendin shia Khan. During the engagement thirteen
477 terrorists were killed.
478 In the nineties Tajikistan suffered a civil war (1992- June 1997) killing 100000,
479 which resembles Afghanistan’s fate. The effects are still felt.6 The reconciliation
5
TYNAN, Deirdre: “Afghanistan: Could Afghan Resupply Efforts Promote US-Iranian
Cooperation?” Eurasia Insights 21 May 2009, at www.eurasianet.org.
6
The Russian Federation launched “peace operations” for the first time in Tajikistan within the
framework provided by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In compliance with an
agreement between Russia and Tajikistan signed in 1999, Russian forces are permanently
stationed on Tajik terrain in order to control the sensitive border with Afghanistan.
14
480 process which started in the wake of the hostilities made it possible that a third
481 of the Tajik Administration’s civil servants belong to the Islamic Block. As with
482 Uzbekistan, in Tajikistan a number of jihadist groups emerged in the same
483 period fostered by Al Qaeda and Mullah Omar. It was in Tajikistan where the
484 bases of the North Alliance, led by Commander Ahmed Shah Masud, were
485 located to counter the Afghan Taliban regime. Masud was killed by two Al
486 Qaeda’s suicide terrorists on September 9 2001, two days before 9/11. This
487 action probably strengthened the ties between Osama Bin Laden and Mullah
488 Omar.
489 The members of the North Alliance, who fought with the coalition from October
490 2001 to overthrow the Taliban regime, consider Tajikistan a point of reference.
491 This country is subject to the same vicissitudes as Afghanistan as if it were a
492 common territory. Thus, not only are the drugs grown in Afghanistan
493 undermining Tajikistan in security or corruption terms but the AIDS is spreading
494 alarmingly. On December 24 2008 a consignment of over half a tone of hashish
495 and heroine (30 kg) was seized in Tajikistan, the largest consignment ever in
496 the country. Tajiskan’s Drug Control Agency (DCA) was established in 1999. In
497 spite of its efforts, Victor Ivanov, Russian drug control chief, claimed that 60% of
498 the heroine smuggled into Russia comes from Tajikistan through the bridge
499 connecting the country and Afghanistan, which was built by the US. Over 300
500 trucks cross the bridge every day. Consequently, Takijistan became an active
501 member of the Shangai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) from its inception. On
502 March 27 2009, this organization held a summit in Moscow in order to create an
503 “anti-drug and anti-terrorism belt”. Members pertaining to the G-8 and to the
504 NATO also attended the summit. Three months later, on June 14, the SCO held
505 a regular summit in Yekaterinburg. Tajik president, Imomali Rahmon, proposed
506 to nominate Dushanbe (Tajikistan's capital city) as venue for the next
507 international conference on drug trafficking sponsored by the UN. He also
508 suggested proclaiming 2011 as International Year against Drugs.7 On May 15,
509 the Tajik government launched “Operation Poppy 2009” in the Rasht Valley,
510 150 km East to Dushanbe. The operation was aimed at fighting opium
511 cultivation as well as the jihadist threat. Jihadist leader Addullo Rakhimov
512 (nicknamed Mullo Abdullo) arrived from tribal areas in Pakistan due to the
513 offensive by Pakistan’s Army and revived the jihadist movement. Rakhimov
514 operated in the Rasht Valley during the Tajik civil war. When the war ended he
515 opposed the reconciliation offered by President Rahmon and left for
516 Afghanistan, where he supported Masud's North Alliance. Then he moved to
517 Pakistan8.
7
MOJUMBAR, Aunohita: “Afghanistan: Karzai declared President, but is Abdullah the real
winner?” Eurasia Insight 2 November 2009, at <www.eurasianet.org>.
8
“Tajikistan: Are Islamic Militants Trying To Make a Comeback in Central Asia?” Eurasia Insight
26 May 2009, at www.eurasianet.org.
15
518 As the second largest ethnic group in the country, Tajik elements are well
519 represented within the Afghan establishment. So, as August 2009 Karzai’s main
520 election rival is Tajik: Abdullah Abdullah. Moreover, Barhanuddin Rabani, who
521 was president between 1992 and 1996, is Tajik. He supports Abdullah and
522 survived to an attack intended to kill him in the province of Kunduz on August
523 13 2009, just a week before the presidential elections. Abdullah, whose father is
524 Pashtun and his mother Tajik, was Commander Ahmed Shah’s spokesman
525 when fighting the Soviet forces. Later, he became a notable member of the
526 North Alliance and was Secretary of State from 2001 to 2006, when Karzai
527 removed him from office. President Karzai is trying to implement a skillful
528 balance of power into the government and Tajik Muhammad Qasim Fahim is his
529 potential vice-president. Qasim Fahim was Secretary of Defense for a short
530 period of time since Karzai removed him from office in 2004. Fahim is accused
531 of committing war crimes. He allegedly killed a crowd of prisoners of war during
532 the Afghan civil war. He is a very wealthy man and led the coalition that
533 overthrew the Taliban in 2001. On June 26 2009, he was attacked in the
534 province of Kunduz just as it was the case with Rabani. The roles played by
535 Abdullah and Qasim during the electoral campaign serve well as an example of
536 the divide of the Tajik opposition9.
537 Tajik form a majority in some provinces like Badghis, where there are also
538 Hazaras. Both communities rival the Pashtun. The Afghan-Tajik border has
539 been opened to assure the supply of non-military material to the international
540 forces deployed in Afghanistan. Similarly, since last spring Uzbekistan has
541 allowed to use its territory to provide coalition forces with nonmilitary goods
542 since last spring. Tajikistan has also granted the use of its airbase in Ayni
543 (Farkhor) to Indian and Russian aircraft. Its determination to contribute to the
544 battle against jihadists is commendable. This country has been resolute in
545 countering the jihadist threat since several people were killed by an attack led
546 by Hizb-ut-Tahrir on the border with Kyrgyzstan on May 12 2006. The attack
547 unveiled the need to secure the border and to reinforce security.
548 Finally, relating to the cooperation of Tajikistan to stabilize Afghanistan it should

549 be highlighted the fact that in February 2009 this Central Asian country signed
550 an agreement with the USA allowing the transit of non-military military cargos
551 across its territory by road or train. A number of analysts argue that the
552 exclusion of military supplies from the agreement is due to the insecurity in
553 some areas of the country, which may let radical groups seize arms, munitions
554 or other materiel10.
9
MOJUMBAR, Aunohita: “Afghanistan: Karzai declared President, but is Abdullah the real
winner?” Eurasia Insight 2 November 2009, at <www.eurasianet.org>.
10
TYNAN, D.: “Afghanistan: Central Asian States Now Allowing Military Cargo Bound for US,
NATO Forces” Eurasia Insight 13 October 2009, at <www.eurasianet.org>.
16
555 3.4. People’s Republic of China
556 It is paramount for China to prevent their Muslim, the Uygur, becoming
557 radicalized islamists and to eliminate the elements that led to bloody
558 confrontations in Xinjiang in July 2009 —about 200 killed—. In August some
559 more incidents took place though not as dreadful as the previous ones.
560 However, the province’s governor was dismissed. The province is on the border
561 with Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries11 and is mainly populated by
562 Muslims. For the Chinese authorities, blocking the supplies, propaganda and
563 drugs coming into China through the Wakhan corridor is a matter of security.
564 Yet Afghanistan deems it necessary to halt the flow of Uygur activists from other
565 countries into Afghanistan. The SCO endeavours to achieve the
566 aforementioned goals. China, as a full member, and Afghanistan as an observer
567 are performing an active role. In order to achieve the aim, consolidate its
568 presence and counter the influence exerted by Russia and, more recently, the
569 USA, China is strengthening its presence in the Central Asian republics and in
570 Afghanistan itself through an array of means such as: commerce, investments,
571 labor and diplomacy.
572 China is determined to build the Ring Road which will connect the major Afghan
573 cities apart from Afghanistan with China and Central Asia. Chinese Railways is
574 the only corporation which has uninterruptedly worked on the project by
575 providing engineers. Similarly, an increasing number of engineers and Chinese
576 workers are settling in Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan.
577 3.5. Uzbekistan.
578 In the case of the Uzbek minority in Afghanistan, they do not embrace
579 secession prospects or willingness to create a reunified country with Uzbekistan
580 in spite of the fact that this country is the most widely populated in Central Asia
581 and has strong nationalistic feelings. It is located on the border with the Afghan
582 province of Kunduz.12 The Uzbek general Abdul Rashid Dostum collaborated
583 with the American forces supporting the armed initiative against the Taliban and
584 Al Qaeda. Dostum has been accused of killing hundreds of Taliban in late
585 November 2001. Dostum lived in exile in Turkey until President Karzai made the
586 decision to let him return before the general elections in order to gain the Uzbek
587 Afghans’ last minute support.
11
“En cas de nouveaux troubles au Xinjiang. Le gouverneur promet une “main de fer”” Algérie
News 28 July 2009, p. 15.
12
Uzbekistan has a population of 26 mill. inhabitants, i.e. half the overall population in Central
Asia. It is energetically self-sufficient and has a strong nationalistic and Muslim identity.
17
588 During the spring of 2009 Uzbekistan reached an agreement with Korean Air to
589 allow their planes to operate near Navoi and transport NATO’s supplies to
590 Afghanistan13, which may affect the Afghan perceptions considered within the
591 security domain. Opening supply routes, as Takijistan had previously done, to
592 avoid attacks on the Pakistani route has improved the country’s image in the
593 eyes of the Afghans and of those willing to stabilize the country. Uzbekistan’s
594 image had deteriorated when the Americans were given notice to leave Karshi-
595 Khanabad airbase (known as K-2), where they had been deployed since 2002,
596 in the wake of Washington’s criticism of the incidents in Andijan. During the
597 incidents on May 12 and 13 2002, over 1000 people are estimated to have been
598 killed. Uzbekistan has become more vulnerable to Salafi jihadist terrorism,
599 partly due to its desire to resume the collaboration with the USA. Lately,
600 Khanabad and Andijan have been struck by important attacks by terrorist
601 groups. Consequently, the border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan14 was
602 closed in Sokh and Shakhimardan since the Uzbek government deemed that
603 the terrorists came from the neighbouring country. On May 26 a suicide terrorist
604 killed a policeman and injured another one in Andijan at the time an attack was
605 launched against police facilities in Khanabad15. In October 2009, the sanctions
606 levied on Uzbekistan by the European Union were lifted, which may encourage
607 terrorists of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) to intensify their
608 offensive, including Afghan terrain. The potential attacks will aim at neutralizing
609 the Northern Distribution Network resulting from the agreement reached by the
610 USA and Russia and from the pragmatic approach on the part of Uzbekistan
611 since the network extends across Uzbekistan to Termez16, on the border with
612 Afghanistan.
613
614 The security of the Northern province of Kunduz, which borders Uzbekistan to
615 the West and Tajikistan to the East, relies on Germany, which has facilities in
616 the country. It is the only Western country allowed to keep a base in
617 Uzbekistan, Termez, on the border with Afghanistan, though attacks against the
13
TYNAN, D.: “Uzbekistan: Karimov Gives Washington the Air Base It Needs for Afghan
Operations” Eurasia Insight 11 May 2009, at <www.eurasianet.org>.
14
“Andijan Attackers’ Identity Still Unclear” Institute for War and Peace Reporting 27 May 2009,
at www TYNAN, D.: “Uzbekistan: Karimov Gives Washington the Air Base It Needs for Afghan
Operations” Eurasia Insight 11 May 2009, at <www.eurasianet.org>..iwpr.net.
15
Uzbekistan: Suicide Bombing in Andijan Ups the Ante for Karimov” Eurasia Insight 27 May
2009, at www.eurasianet.org.
16
See TYNAN, D.: “Uzbekistan: European Union Looks Likely to Lift Arms Embargo” Eurasia
Insight 22 October 2009 and “Uzbekistan: Opposition Figure’s Release Signal of Warming
Uzbek-US Ties?” Eurasia Insight 20 November 2009, at <www.eurasianet.org>.
18
618 base or the German Army have lately been quite common —some of them
619 suicide bombers—. In the late nineties the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
620 (IMU) was created, which is a belligerent terrorist group founded by Tahir
621 Yuldasheve. Soon after its inception it was attracted to Al Qaida’s sphere of
622 influence. The IMU was especially active in the period 1999-2000 in Uzbekistan
623 and Kyrgyzstan. During the military operation against the Taliban regime in
624 2001, it was severely repressed though in 2004 resumed their operations
625 carrying out attacks in Tashkent and Bujara17. The IMU is supposed to have
626 been involved in the Andijan massacre on May 13 2005. It was precisely the
627 international offensive against the Afghan regime which led Salafi jihadists from
628 Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to seek shelter in tribal areas in Pakistan
629 from where they initiated their terrorist actions in Afghanistan. It is highly
630 remarkable that on October 11 2009 fifteen members of the IMU were captured
631 by American forces in Kunduz, and on October 18 2008 Pakistani security
632 forces arrested dozens of Uzbek in the North West Province during an
633 operation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Similarly, in July 2007 the Afghan
634 security services had also arrested a number of members of the IMU across the
635 country18.
636 During the second half of 2009, the IMU exhibited some worrisome activities in
637 a number of scenarios. In the spring 2009, the Pakistani Army launched an
638 offensive against local Taliban and a vast number of members of the IMU
639 withdrew to different locations in Central Asia19. On October 19, on the border
640 with Kyrgyzstan police officers arrested four members of the IMU in Vorukh, a
641 Tajik enclave surrounded by the Kyrgyz province of Batken, one day after Tajik
642 police officers had killed four alleged members of the IMU in Isfara, in the
643 Fergana Valley near the borders with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan20. Everything
644 occurred after the alleged decease of the group’s founder, Tahi Yuldashev, in
17
Regarding Afghanistan, it is worth noting that the internal opposition to the
Uzbek regime has long acted from Afghanistan. In 2007, over 60000 Uzbeks
were reported to have settled in Afghanistan fleeing from repression.
18
Following the last arrests, the Afghan Department of Defense estimated that
there were about 4000 “foreign mercenaries” in the country. That is the name
given to Uzbek terrorists who target North Afghanistan. See TYNAN, D.:
“Central Asia: the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan undergoing dangerous
transformation” Eurasia Insight 20 October 2009, at <www.eurasianet.org>.
19
“Uzbekistán: If a Taliban Outpost Falls in Pakistan, Is the Ripple Felt in the Fergana Valley?”
Eurasia Insight 26 May 2009, at www.eurasianet.org.
20
The four people killed were being chased accused of having allegedly killed in September a
top official from the Tajik Department of Defense in Isfara. See TYNAN, D.: “Central Asia: the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan op cit.
19
645 August as a result of a US missile attack. He was substituted by Tartar Abdur

646 Rahman.
647 3.6. Turkmenistan.
648 In contrast with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, Turkmenistan’s president,

649 Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, is less reluctant than his predecessor,
650 Saparmurat Niyazov —deceased in December 2006— to allow for NATO’s
651 logistics transport to Afghanistan. However, he has adopted a cautious
652 approach in order to remain neutral and not undermine the country’s
653 relationships with Russia. Turkmenistan is one of the largest gas producers —
654 the fifth largest reserve in the world— and there are plans to build a gas pipeline
655 to Pakistan and India through Afghanistan. Although the Turkmen state is highly
656 interested in the stabilization of Afghanistan, it has not made strides to actively
657 improve the situation. Nonetheless, NATO’s lift aircraft have been allowed to
658 refuel at Ashjabat airport21. President Berdymukhamedov’s pedecessor’s
659 pragmatism made that Turkmenistan were the only Central Asian country which
660 kept relationships with Kabul in the nineties. Since the Taliban regime was
661 overthrown, Turkmenistan has not facilitated the attacks against Afghanistan
662 trying to keep a balance in the region. Turkmenistan is not willing to overtly
663 oppose radicalized sectors or contribute to strengthen the US presence in the
664 eyes of Russia, Iran and China — a potential customer—.
665 On the other hand, the vulnerabilities of the country —an extension of 500000
666 km2 with a population of less than 6 mill.— have contributed to act with greater
667 caution. However, Turkmenistan has long considered jihadism a threat. When
668 the Taliban expanded their reach to North Afghanistan in the second half of the
669 nineties this Central Asian country was already confronting radical Islamism
670 coming from neighbouring Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan has recently had to
671 counter Uzbekistan’s attempts to exert its influence on bordering areas such as
672 Tashauz Chardzhou, which are mainly inhabited by Uzbeks, as well as the flow
673 of arms and drugs from Afghanistan, especially after the Taliban had reopened
674 the road connecting Kandahar and Ashgabat —Turkmenistan’s capital city.
675 Afghanistan has shown interest in being provided Turkmen gas through the
676 eventual gas pipeline which, through Afghanistan, will reach Pakistan and
677 possibly India. In December 2002, the Afghan president organized a summit
678 with the presidents of Pakistan and Turkmenistan in Kabul to sign an initial
21
It is unknown if Turkmenistan allows the movement of military supplies across its territories.
An agreement between the NATO and the Russian Federation concerning the transit of non-
military cargos to Afghanistan pointed Serhetabat as the most suitable Southern location for the
Northern Distribution Network (NDN). See TYNAN, D.: “Afghanistan: Central Asian States op cit
20
679 commitment to build the pipeline22. During NATO’s summit in Bucarest last year,
680 president Berdymukhamedov made a remark about the initiative. From the
681 Afghan point of view, the problem lies on the fact that, to date, Turkmen energy
682 policies do not account for the South project. In December 2009 it is scheduled
683 to open a gas pipeline —with a capacity of 40 bln cubic meters a year and a
684 length of 7000 km— which reaches China across Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
685 A new gas pipeline towards the East side of the Caspian Sea is planned,
686 however, little is said about the pipeline towards Pakistan and India across
687 Afghanistan23.
688 The increasingly unstable province of Bagdhis borders Turkmenistan. This

689 country could be a relevant contributor to Afghan stability since both parties
690 would benefit from a stable condition, mainly due to the gas exports from
691 Turkmenistan to Pakistan and to the vigorous Indian market via Afghanistan.
692 However, in the last report on terrorism by the US Department of State it is
693 stated that the porosity of the Turkmen and Tajik borders foment the creation or
694 evolvement of radicalized Islamic movements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir or the
695 Islamic Liberation Party. The gunfights that took place on September 13 2008 in
696 Ashgabat were reported by state officials as a collision between drug traffickers.
697 However, it is considered to have been a sign that the Salafi jihadism is
698 affecting this discreet Central Asian country. According to estimates, ten to
699 twenty policemen were killed. Drug trafficking had become so common and
700 overt in Turkmenistan that president Berdymukhamedov attended the SCO
701 Summit in Bishkek on August 16 2007 despite not being a member of that
702 subregional security organization.
703 3.7. Kyrgyzstan.
704 In spite of the fact that Afghanistan is not bordered by Kyrgyzstan, its
705 interactions with the other Central Asian countries, including Afghanistan, are
706 persistent. Since 2002 it has also notably supported the coalition forces by
707 letting the US use Manas airbase (near Bishkek) —the deal expires in 2010—
708 which makes it necessary to account for it in our analysis since it exerts an
709 influence on part of the Afghan population24. The new term in office by president
710 Kurmanbek Bakiyev as a result of the elections held on July 24 2009 assured
22
The project envisaged a pipeline with a length of 1600 km and capacity to deliver over 30 bln.
of cubic meters a year; however, the security conditions have stopped it.
23
BONET, Pilar: “Turkmenistán. Petróleo, gas y mucho culto al líder” El País 1 November 2009,
pp. 20-21.
24
TYNAN, D.: “Kyrgyzstan: US Forces Appear To Have Deal To Stay At Manas Air Base”
Eurasia Insight 1 June 2009, at www.eurasianet.org.
21
711 the leasing of Manas airbase until 201025 though in February 2009 the
712 Parliament had decreed to end up the leasing. In fact, on June 23 2009 the US
713 had reached an agreement with Kyrgyzstan to move military supplies26 to
714 Afghanistan through that country.
715 Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the two Central Asian countries which are more
716 dependent on the Russian Federation. Kyrgyzstan joined the Custom Union in
717 1996 while Tajikistan did it in 1999; both states signed the Collective Security
718 Treaty in 1992. Russia reinforced Kant base, located 20 km far from Manas
719 airbase. However, Russia does not oppose to the US military presence since
720 the IMU and the Taliban27 are common enemies.
721 According to the Report on Terrorism by the US Department of State, released

722 on April 30 2009, the jihadist activity is expanding in the Kyrgyz and Tajik areas
723 of the Fergana Valley. It is estimated that Hizb ut-Tahrir’s militants have
724 increased from 5000 in 2006 to 15000 in 2008. It has especially affected the
725 Southern region, which is populated by Uzbek, though it is spreading
726 northwards28. The Fergana Valley is an area where the borders of Uzbekistan,
727 Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan all meet. Despite being the most densely populated
728 area in Central Asia, the jihadists, including Hizb ut-Tahrir, decided to settle
729 down in the Afghan area and proselytize. The violent incidents in Khanabad and
730 Andijan (Uzbekistan) on May 26 2009 forced the closure of the borders with
731 Kyrgyzstan since this country was held responsible for having hosted the
732 radicals, which was repeatedly denied Kyrgyz officials29.
733 Afghan drug trafficking has a notorious negative impact on Kyrgyzstan. At the
734 SCO Summit in Bishkek on August 16 2007 it was decided to include in the
735 intergovernmental organization’s objectives to create a “drug-free area” —to
736 fight against secessionism, terrorism and extremism—. However, since the
737 celebration of the SCO Summit in Astana in July 2005, Kyrgyzstan had
738 notoriously strengthened the coordination with the allies in the organization.
25
“Election présidentielle au Kirghizstan. Le président Bakiev réélu” El Moudjahid (Argelia) 24-
25 July 2009, p. 9
26
TYNAN, D.: “Afghanistan: Central Asian States Now Allowing Military Cargo Bound for US,
NATO Forces” Eurasia Insight 13 October 2009, en <www.eurasianet.org>.
27
Russia doubled its strength at Kant base since it was deemed necessary to keep a credible
military presence in order to counter radicalism.
28
KUCERA, Joshua: “Central Asia and Caucasus: Terrorist Threat on Rise in Fergana Valley-
US State Department” Eurasia Insight 8 May 2009, at www.eurasianet.org.
29
See “Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan Exchange “Hostage” Border Guards” News Brief 3 junio
2009, at www.eurasianet.org, and “Uzbekistan Border Lackdown. After Andijan Violence”
Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2 June 2009, at www.iwpr.net.
22
739 4. CONCLUSIONS
740 The Afghan perception of neighbouring countries is determined by a number of

741 factors: the role played by the Russian Federation since it is considered to be
742 the heir of the former Soviet Union and a major power in Central Asia; the
743 relationships with the Islamic Republic of Iran; the complex condition of
744 Pakistan which is linked to Afghanistan due to the Pashtun ethnic groups and
745 the interest on the part of Pakistan to get Afghanistan involved in its conflict with
746 India; and finally the short border with the People's Republic of China.
747 When other Central Asian countries are at stake, the perceptions vary
748 considering the opportunities Turkmenistan may offer in terms of energy, and
749 the complexities derived from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan in
750 terms of illegal trafficking and radicalization with the associated destabilizing
751 effects, and on the positive side, the foreign support received across those
752 countries. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a difficult actor to define in terms of
753 perceptions: Iran holds a hostile posture towards the USA —the major actor
754 involved in stabilizing Afghanistan— which turns this country into a difficult
755 neighbor since it may try to implement strategic plans on Afghan terrain. The
756 tensions between Iran and Pakistan, and between Pakistan and India are also a
757 matter of concern since all these countries may try to develop their strategies in
758 Afghanistan.
759 In sum, there are not separatist movements in Afghanistan as it is the case of
760 other neighboring countries; however, Afghanistan has suffered for over thirty
761 years from the instability provoked by alien actors in its own terrain. The
762 ideologically imbued Islamic radicalization embodied in actors such as Al Queda
763 or the Taliban together with direct or indirect strategies implemented in Afghan
764 terrain by actors such as Iran or Pakistan will likely feed complex conflicts in the
765 future. This perception or approach to Afghanistan is unfeasible for locals as
766 they suffer from violence and lack a civil society or policies which can serve as
767 benchmarks of a modern state.
768
23
769
24
770 ANNEX B: THE AFGHAN MELTING POT OF ETHNIC GROUPS AS A

771 VARIABLE EXPLAINING THE REASONS FOR THE CONFLICT30
772
773 1. INTRODUCTION.
774 Afghanistan well serves as a paramount example of multiethnic society. Most

775 people have heard about its most symbolic groups such as the Pashtuns or or
776 Tajiks. Probably, they have also heard some kind of news about the Hazaras.
777 And, finally, it is the experts who are aware of the fact that there coexist other
778 minority groups such as the Uzbeks or the Nuristans. In fact, the list of ethnic
779 groups can be further expanded if the internal divide between the Pashtuns —
780 Durrani and Ghilzai— is taken into account. However, this sort of knowledge is
781 overly superficial and does not suffice to have a accurate view of the scenario.
782 Furthermore, it is as well to note the relationships —generally conflicting ones—
783 between the various minority groups (at present there does not exist a majority
784 ethnic group in Afghanistan). As a matter of fact, this condition turns out to be a
785 conclusive variable when approaching and understanding the Afghan society’s
786 propensity for civil war. It also helps to realize the challenges an international
787 coalition must face when trying to create order among that cluster of ethnic
788 groups with the best of intentions.
789 This does not imply there is certainly an easy way out. On the contrary, the
790 scenario resulting from this research is likely to be even more discouraging than
791 the widely acknowledged one to date. Nonetheless, that is exactly the path to
792 follow. When a doctor tries to cure a patient, he needs all the information
793 available about his medical record, allergies or drugs his body will not tolerate.
794 Certainly, this will hinder the prescription of a “default” treatment. However, it is
795 imperative to proceed that way in order to apply an appropriate treatment for the
796 patient's condition. It can be the case that the perfect therapy will not be found
797 despite following the previous steps; it may simply not exist. Now, if we take the
798 easy way out and ignore that procedure, the task is doomed to failure. A similar
799 process must be implemented in Afghanistan.
800 Actually, Afghanistan’s recent history must be taken into account, i.e., the
801 period encompassed from the time Afghanistan first attempted to form a state
802 until present time. This leads us back to the mid 18th c. In the best case
803 scenario, according to some experts in the field it did not exist an Afghan state
804 until the late 19th c. Anyhow, it seems apparent that the problem cannot be duly
805 diagnosed without considering those background events. We must be more
30
Josep Baqués . Universitat de Barcelona.
25
806 incisive in our assessments as a vast number of the current quarrells and
807 distrust date back to past conflicts or to the policies supporting the Afghan state
808 in its inception. Thus, the aim of the present assessment is to cast light on the
809 background forces which so adversely affect the interethnic coexistence within
810 Afghanistan proper.
811
812 2. AFGHANISTAN OR PASHTUNISTAN?
813 Firstly, we must be aware of the fact that the Pashtuns played the central role in
814 the inception of the Afghan state. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this is still
815 present in the collective imaginery as far as the Pashtuns or other ethnic groups
816 are concerned. In fact, the Pashtuns are an ancient community. They boast of
817 being the “true Afghans”; at least, they have been in the area for some
818 thousands of years. Heredotus already referred to the Patki people in his
819 writings. Similar references can be found in the Vedas. Today, the text writings
820 are considered to refer to the Pashtuns. However, verifying the data is not what
821 really matters, the core issue relies on the fact that the Pashtuns ascribe to
822 themselves an antiquity of 6000 years (Harrison, 2008: 3). It has been proven
823 that about six millennia ago a migration of Indo-Aryan people occupied the north
824 of the Indian subcontinent and advanced to current Pakistan and Afghanistan
825 inland (Ewans, 2002: 5). The Pashtuns feel proud of it and of the fact that they
826 think of themselves as the rightful descendants of Qais, a relevant figure of
827 Islam. So, more recently, the Pashtuns have placed the emphasis on their
828 bonds to Islam. They adhere severely to the Sunni branch, i.e., they display a
829 very critical attitude towards practitioners of other Islamic branches.
830 However, the Pashtuns' relevance faded into the background throughout
831 history. In the 18th c., it could be stated that the Pashtuns were dominated and
832 could not have access to the political power. On the contrary, they were
833 subjected to the dominance of more powerful neighbouring peoples such as the
834 Persians (mainly Shia) and the Mongolians, which does not imply the Pashtuns
835 were glad to do so. That was a character-building experience and made the
836 Pashtuns a people “almost genetically expert in the guerrilla warfare” (Dupree,
837 1997: 425), melancholic and eager to have a future appropriate to such
838 illustrious past. In this respect, their scarce though well-known poets do not
839 miss the opportunity to place emphasis on the need to politically preserve the
840 “Pashtun unity”, e.g., Abdul Rahman Baba and Khushal Kahn Kattak, both from
841 the 17th c. (Raich, 2002: 67-68).
842 So, the Pashtuns’ resistance increased in so far as the traditional dominating
843 peoples became weaker. Certainly, with the advent of the 18th c and the
844 weakening of Persians and Mongolians alike, there arose opportunities for
845 important political changes to take place (however, it is still early to consider
846 Afghanistan a state). In this respect, some of the events this analysis focuses
26
847 on started to come into the world. For instance, we should know that the first
848 Pashtun group to confront the Persians were the Ghilzai —the Durranis have
849 taken the credit for it, which is far from being true. The first major uprising was
850 led by Ghilzai Mir Wais Hotaki in 1709, who recovered Kandahar —defeating
851 and killing the Persian governor— and prevented Shi'ism from spreading among
852 the Pashtuns. Incidentally, that was their main aim, which adds up another
853 relevant datum to our analysis. Subsequently, his son Mahmud fought and
854 defeated the Safavid Army in the battle of Gulnbad counting on half the strength
855 of his adversary. He besieged the Safavid capital (Isfahan) which eventually
856 surrendered to the Ghilzai after a six month siege that left over 100000 people
857 dead, most of them fatalities due to hunger. It was in 1722. Later, the Persians
858 regained the control. Nonetheless the Ghilzais’ wit had set a permanent stamp
859 in the area before the Durranis dared challenge the Safavid Persians (Tanner,
860 2009: 114 – 115).
861 In addition to that, when the Ghilzais defeated the Persians by armed means,
862 many Durranis opted for a more compliant strategy. In fact, some of them
863 served in the Persian Army. As an indefeasible result, many Durrani Pashtuns
864 (then known as Abdali) were entrusted to persecute Ghilzai Pashtuns. At
865 present, may Ghilzais still consider the Durranis opportunistic, courting and
866 having a tendency to make arrangements with foreigners in order to obtain
867 benefits from the power at the expense of the most committed Pashtuns,
868 themselves. It is worth keeping this idea in mind. The Ghilzais value and
869 develop the spirit of self-sacrifice resembling Mir Wais Hotaki’s warriors, who
870 fought for an actual Pashtun cause. But it also involved overtly opposing Sunni
871 to Shi'ism without making any concessions whatsoever. Thus, when I
872 sometimes reflect on the paths of both idiosyncrasies I cannot help thinking
873 about Durrani Hamid Karzai and Ghilzai Mullah Omar… and, being fully aware,
874 of what they both think of each other.
875 However, after the attrition against the Persians by the Ghilzai, a Durrani took
876 credit for the action, Ahmad Shah Abdali, who had served in the Safavid army
877 as many other Durranis. It was in 1747 when Shah Abdali was proclaimed
878 monarch in a Loia Jirga, a tribal assembly. As a consequence he –and his tribe-
879 substituted the name Abdali for Durrani31. Most striking is the fact that the brave
880 Ghilzai community has been subjugated by the Durranis. The Ghilzais were
881 extraneous to the court and kept themselves apart from the ruling elites, which
882 maintained and aggravated the internal divide between the Pashtun during the
883 foreign domination.
884 Anyhow, the referred scenario can be seen from a different perspective now. In
885 spite of the distrustful attitudes within the Pashtun community, it is worth noting
886 that the newly born Afghan state, created by Ahmad Shah Durrani, was mainly
31
He was cheerfully recognized as “Durr-i-Durran”, which means pearl of pearls.
27
887 composed of Pashtuns. In other words, only the Pashtuns, whether Ghilzai or
888 Durrani, recognized themselves as Afghans soon after the creation of the
889 Afghan state. When the Afghan state was created there was no difference
890 between Afghanistan and Pashtunistan and could be referred with both terms32.
891 That is the reason why a number of analysts rightfully claim that the embryo of
892 the Afghan State was not but a “tribal Pashtun confederation” (Harrison, 2008:
893 4), which meant that being Afghan equalled being Pashtun at first (Rashid,
894 2009: 10). That is the reality and another datum we should keep in mind for our
895 assessment. Nowadays, Pashtuns still recognize themselves as the true
896 Afghans, which lead them to deny the commitment of other communities in the
897 initial project.
898 The borders of the first Pashtun state is a different matter. It enclosed all the
899 Pashtun area of influence including part of today’s Pakistan’s passage, for
900 instance, Peshawar area. That fact further reinforced the sense of identity and
901 equivalence of the Afghans and the Pashtuns. Nonetheless, Ahmad Shah
902 Durrani recognized that in order to keep the bonds between the different
903 Pashtun faction groups it would be necessary to identify new enemies and
904 plunders (Ewans, 2002, 33). Thus, he launched a number of conquering
905 campaigns reaching the north, which had been customarily inhabited by ethnic
906 groups which have little or nothing in common with the Durranis or the Ghilzais.
907 So, the Pashtuns led by the Durranis successively confronted the Hazaras, the
908 Tajiks and the Uzbeks in the second half of the 18th c. The Nuristans were
909 assimilated at the end of the 19th c, which made the picture more complex. In
910 fact, the Pashtuns succumbed to their own success. Their ambition rapidly
911 turned an essentially Pashtun state into a multiethnic state. “Rapidly” is
912 meaningful, since it prevented a state or nation-state from being moderately
913 consolidated. Anyhow, the dilemma is: “pashtunize” the territory or take the new
914 realitey? This question has been vital and its effects are still visible nowadays.
915 Before going into that matter, we shall first make a review of the most
916 outstanding features of the different communities in order to better understand
917 what is at stake.
918
919 3. AFGHAN MACEDONIA.
920 The Pashtuns form an ethnic group who speak a language of the same name
921 and practise Sunni Islam. As we have already mentioned in this paper they
32
As a matter of fact, the first Afghan capital city was Kandahar, Pashtun territory par
excellence. It was not an interim decision, since Kabul could only become capital city after the
decease of the first monarch. It took place in 1774, when Timur Shah, son of the founder,
became the emir.
28
922 considered themselves custodians of that religious branch, particularly the

923 Ghilzais. However, the communities they came across in their march towards
924 the south side of the Amu Daria River had little in common with them, whether
925 ethnic group, language or religion, or all these features together.
926 To be sure, the Hazaras are considered to be descendants of Mongolian

927 warriors, which can be noticed in their personal constitution (countenance and
928 average height). However, they are rather —as it could be expected—
929 descendants of native women and Mongolian warriors. But the Pashtuns and
930 the Hazaras have been unrelentingly at odds just from the beginning. Although
931 there are several reasons for such a confrontation, one of the most outstanding
932 ones is the fact that most Hazaras practise Shia Islam. So, if the Ghilzais
933 challenged the Persians years before to prevent the penetration of that branch
934 of Islam, they would undoubtedly confront the Hazaras since they were weaker
935 than the Safavid Army. In spite of their origin, or maybe due to that fact, the
936 Hazaras have always been a wretched community, poorly-regarded by their
937 neighbours and aware of their alienated condition. In other respects, it is
938 frequently alleged that the Hazaras speak a language of the same name
939 though, as a matter of fact, it is a dialect from Dari or Persian. Certainly, this is
940 another alienating aspect which seclude them from the Ghilzais, who have had
941 few opportunies and are not inclined to learn Dari.
942 The largest community, in numerical terms, Ahmad Shah Durrani’s troops came
943 across was the Tajik, who were predominantly Sunni —which should alleviate
944 the difficulties—, though there is also a Ismaelite minority group (an unorthodox
945 branch of Shia Islam). They inhabit the most Eastern province in today’s
946 Afghanistan, which makes it plausible that they had little contact with the
947 Pashtuns or, be it the case, the contacts would have been discontinuous.
948 However, the Tajiks speak Dari. It must be taken into account that they are not
949 simply Dari speakers, they are aware of the fact that Persian (or its dialects) is a
950 cultured language, in contrast to Pashtun, which has been considered vulgar
951 and rude33. On the other hand, they are preeminently merchants and
952 craftpeople, which make their codes of honor being different from the
953 pashtunwali, adapted to a semi-nomadic people of warriors. In fact, the Tajiks
954 are more urban-like than the Pashtuns (especially when compared to the
955 Ghilzais).
33
A particular and quaint event we should not neglect has occurred in Afghanistan: when it is
difficult to identify the ethnic ascendancy of a community, its members are classified as Tajik if
the language spoken is Dari. This practice has not only affected individuals but also
communities such as the Aimak. This people could be well regarded as a mix raced community
between Tajik and Hazara; particularly their physical constitution. Frequently, they are referred
to as a Tajik subgroup due to a number of factors such as language or to a combination of
language and religion (Sunni). Since this practice has become officialized when referring to
registers, the category “Tajik” has turned out to be residual or a ragbag.
29
956 So far, there has been provided a paradoxical datum which deserves our
957 attention: the language of the conqueror is considered to be inferior to the
958 conquered ones’ (it is not a biased assessment on the part of the Tajiks). This
959 makes the analysis be more complex though it is highly relevant from a political
960 point of view. Rather than a problem it may become a key element to find a
961 solution as long as it is managed properly. It has been corroborated that the
962 ruling Durrani elite did not object to and, in fact, learnt Dari without abandoning
963 the Pashtun language. Once again, the Ghilzais were reluctant to proceed that
964 way. Now, it may be due to structural motives: they had been far from ruling
965 positions for a long time and during this period the Dari language was found to
966 be less useful (or useless). Anyhow, the Pashtun dominance may be tempered
967 and understood by the other ethnic groups in so far the Pashtun show flexibility
968 in this regard, which would have an integrating effect for the Hazaras, the Tajiks
969 and other ethnic groups such as the Aimak (considered Tajik for linguistic
970 reasons).
971 However, the Afghan ethnic complexity grows further. In fact, with their
972 advancement to the North and Northeast the Pashtuns made contacts with the
973 Uzbeks. From the ethnical point of view, this contributes to create an ever
974 increasing complex scenario. Nonetheless, religion is not a hindrance since the
975 Uzbeks practise Sunni Islam. A different matter is that they are well known for
976 not having a strong faith or being hypocritical concerning religious issues. But I
977 suspect that image is somewhat related to the role played by one of their
978 leaders who supported the invaders almost until the last moment. For a long
979 term analysis we should bear in mind that the Uzbeks are a Turkmen people
980 who communicate in a language of the same language and do not use Pashtun
981 or Dari.
982 It must be added that none of these groups had been consulted on their
983 willingness to participate in the Pashtun political project, which is not particularly
984 odd if considered the epoch we are referring to. Most important is the fact that
985 the Pashtun did not even consider them true Afghans, as it has been
986 aforementioned. Anyhow, the Uzbeks did not display attitudes in compliance
987 with the presumably Afghan character.
988 Well, these three communities (Hazara, Tajik –in the broad sense– and Uzbek)
989 have been most politically active from the inception of the Afghan state until
990 present time. Although there exist other minorities, considering the above three
991 ones serves well the purpose of portraying the difficulties the first Pashtun rulers
992 must have faced in the area of political management. Nevertheless, the fact is
993 that the members of those communities, whether Hazara, Tajik or Uzbek,
994 became Afghan de jure. After all, what’s the problem? There is no evidence that
995 a State, even a nation, turns out into something different due to the simple fact
996 that it is composed of people with diverse languages or religions. It’s rather the
997 contrary. A number of states, nations or state-nations are considered as such
998 being made up of people with a different language, religion or ethnic
30
999 provenance in the conviction of their citizens (or most of them). Then, where
1000 does the real problem –if any– lie? Why has everything been so complicated
1001 and still is in Afghanistan?
1002
1003 4. INTERETHNIC RELATIONSHIPS IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER THE

1004 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE.
1005 The previous question can be probably be answered by resorting to the policies
1006 implemented by the ruling Durranis throughout history, not only during the
1007 golden epoch of the first conquests by Ahmad Shah Durrani. If a thorough
1008 analysis of minor details about Afghanistan's history were to be made —which
1009 goes beyond the reach of the present paper— we would come to the conclusion
1010 that the conquests had never been consolidated. The State Apparatus was so
1011 mediocre that could not meet the basic needs involved in such a concept. Kabul
1012 was unable to control the territories which had been recently incorporated.
1013 Some things never change in Afghanistan. In fact, when in 1809 a British
1014 legation reached Afghanistan, the scenario found was described as anarchic, in
1015 spite of the fact that they visited Kabul and the surrounding areas. They could
1016 observe that the country was run without a judicial system or a police corps, and
1017 could not figure out “how a nation can endure under such disorder” (Weber,
1018 2001: 60). Civil wars, in order to accede to the throne, together with mutual
1019 distrust within the Pashtun community seemed to be rule. Hence, when a skillful
1020 and dynamic monarch tried to create order out of chaos in Afghanistan in the
1021 late 19th c, he found himself compelled to start from scratch. The monarch was
1022 Abd-al-Rahman, who ruled the country from 1880 to 1901and was known as the
1023 "Iron Emir".
1024 In fact, his reign was beneficial for the Afghans since it embodied the second
1025 conscientious attempt —partially successful— to move the border to the south
1026 side of the river Amu Daria and control that area and its inhabitants. It is worth
1027 noting that the British supported Abd-al-Rahman on that endevour since they
1028 were willing to put an end to the prevailing anarchy34. However, a question still
34
The case of Abd-al-Rahman is interesting. Before acceding to the throne he was exiled on
Tashkent (Russian Empire) under the protection of the Tsar. So, he was considered to be on
Moscow's side. However, the British hastened to recognize his rights and offered him help
(economic, military and political) in order to support their own interests. This compliant strategy
was a success. Abd-al-Rahman progressively drifted away from his protectors and, in general
terms it can be stated that he forged a strong relationship with the United Kingdom. It goes
without saying that the attrition provoked by the casualties and the cost of the first two wars
between the UK and Afghanistan became a key element to implement less aggressive policies
in Afghanistan (s. gr. Fitzgerald and Gould, 2009: 48).
31
1029 remains unanswered, i.e., What model of State-Nation is it supported upon? In

1030 fact, how?
1031 Abd-al-Rahman was an excellent Emir for the Durrani Pashtuns. He was not so
1032 good for the Ghilzai and even worse for the rest of Afghans. His project was
1033 essentially Durrani Pashtun. But, at the beginning he applied the same strategy
1034 as the great Ahmad Shah Durrani, i.e., mobilizing the Ghilzais for the sake of
1035 his own benefit with his sights set on reconquering Kandahar or Herat.
1036 However, as early as 1886 he found himself compelled to manage the first
1037 revolt by the Ghilzai since this community was systematically being excluded
1038 from the sphere of power. Hence, as always before, he extended his objective
1039 to include other territories. Although this emir was the responsible for the final
1040 subjugation of the Nuristan minority35, the fact is the Hazaras were used as
1041 propitiatory victim. In fact, he declared the jihad against them, which mobilized
1042 the Ghilzais. Hence, by 1888 Hazarajat was virtually dominated by Kabul.
1043 Nonetheless, that was not the end. The policies implemented by Abd-al-
1044 Rahman were more elaborated and complex. After subjugating the Hazaras,
1045 many of these moved to Kabul to “serve as servants” to the Durrani Pashtuns,
1046 who were in power. But the Hazaras had previously seen their Shia mosques
1047 destroyed in their own homeland. They had also to bear the fact that the
1048 Koochis (nomadic herding peoples of Pashtun origin) were granted protection
1049 and were encouraged from Kabul to penetrate the Hazaras’ homeland despite
1050 the objections of the locals and the damage for their agricultural and livestock
1051 interests (Griffins, 2001: 335 – 336). In fact, Abd-al-Rahman’s policies included
1052 a real repopulation with people from the Southern Pashtun tribes which
1053 particularly affected the Hazaras and some other minorities such as the Tajiks
1054 and the Uzbeks, which will eventually fit into the new state.
1055 This domestic-like exodus involved families from the Ghilzai Pashtun
1056 community. Tens of thousands were ordered to leave their homeland in order to
1057 settle north of the Hindu Kush mountain range and work the lands which, until
1058 then, were exploited by other ethnic minorities (Ewans, 2002: 102). By
1059 proceeding that way, Abd-al-Rahman managed to weaken the Ghilzais, who
1060 were uncomfortable allies. At the same time they were satisfied by the granting
1061 of lands they did not previously own. Finally, his master move ended up with the
1062 embedding of real Pashtun Trojan horses in customarily opposing territories.
1063 But, as I previously suggested it may be a master move from Abd-al-Rahman
35
The Nuristans rival with the Pashtuns to be considered the Afghans par excellence, i.e., the
oldest settlers in the area. The competition takes place within a conceptual framework since, in
demographical terms, their relevance is rather limited. In that sense, it is suggested that the
Nuristans may be the true “indigenous population” in Afghanistan (Ewans, 2002: 10-11). Until
they were assimilated by the Pashtuns, they were polytheistic and were referred to as “kafir”
(infidel), and the area they inhabited was known as “Kafiristan”.
32
1064 point of view, which does not entail that it may not bring about a number of
1065 drawbacks.
1066 In fact, the effects of such decisions are still felt today in political terms. Some
1067 analysts deem that the recent Taliban penetration throughout a priori hostile
1068 territories was favoured by the presence of Pashtun clusters that have settled
1069 down, from Abd-al-Rahman’s times, in areas traditionally inhabited by other
1070 communities (Marsden, 2002: 40). On the other hand, this concatenation of
1071 actions intended to favour the Pashtuns to the detriment of the rest of Afghans
1072 has necessarily affected the collective imaginery as negatively as possible.
1073 Nowadays, over a century later, the attitudes displayed by the Pashtuns when
1074 trying to create a state-nation in Afghan territories are still remembered.
1075 However, these are not the only upsetting experiences affecting the political
1076 project led by Kabul in order to create an essentially Pashtun state-nation. A
1077 further event contributed to hamper Abd-al-Rahman’s project: the establishment
1078 of the famous Durand Line in 1893. At that time, the Pashtuns were the majority
1079 community in Afghanistan, including the passage that links the Khyber pass and
1080 Kandahar. Let’s avoid misunderstandings: given the particular context, the
1081 creation of an essentially Pashtun state-nation was a highly risky decision, even
1082 more if future is taken into account. Things can always get worse though. And
1083 that is what exactly happened when British diplomats negotiated with the Emir
1084 the dividing line between Afghanistan and the British Empire.
1085 Since then the Pashtun community has been divided and over 20 per cent of
1086 them were excluded from the official list and, consequently, were not taken into
1087 account for the distribution of power within the newly created Afghan state-
1088 nation. In other words, the Pashtuns became another ethnic minority that
1089 coexists within the (new) Afghan borders. As the new dividing line36 affected
1090 almost solely the Pashtun community, their demographic relevance decreased
1091 while the other ethnic groups' increased. Therefore, Abd-al-Rahman’s
1092 expectations did not come true, to his deepest chagrin37. Table 1 shows the
36
The use of the term “dividing line” instead of “border” is intended. Although it eventually turned
out to become the acknowledged border, Abd-al-Rahman argued that the agreement was in
terms of responsibilities in the security area rather than a transfer of sovereignty to the British.
This fact casts light when trying to comprehend the status quo and explains why a vast a
number of Pashtuns support the previous thesis to show disrespect for the border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
37
In fact the impact of these events has been twofold: on the one hand the number of Pashtuns
in Afghanistan decreased ipso facto; on the other hand, the Pashtusns flee to Pakistan when
they deem it appropriate due to domestic conflicts. Hence, the hemorrhage of Pashtuns out of
Afghanistan has been the norm throughout time though its acuteness has been intrinsically
related to the political situation in Afghanistan.
33
1093 approximate percentages related to the ethnic distribution in Afghanistan though

1094 there are not appropriate register.
1095 Table 1
Afghan ethnic % overall population

minorities
Pashtun 38-42%
Tajik 25-27%
Hazara 10-12%
Uzbek 9-10%
Other 9-18%
1096 Source: Own elaboration
1097
1098 5. INTERETHNIC VICISSITUDES IN THE 20TH C.: PRE-SOVIET PHASE.
1099 In the wake of the successful though risky management by Abd-al-Rahman, a

1100 relative calm period followed in Afghanistan. In the early 20th c. the separation
1101 from the United Kingdom eventually took place (ending of the protectorate in
1102 1919 —Treaty of Rawalpindi) and the rapprochement to the Soviet Union
1103 began. All these events were to a great extent influenced by a new urban and
1104 learned Durrani Pashtun elite led by Mahmoud Beg Tarzi. They endovoured to
1105 develop and spread the Dari language (considered the cultural language par
1106 excellence) though expecting that the other ethnic groups to become
1107 acquainted with the Pashtun language as well. In fact, Tarzi was really
1108 concerned about the possibility that the Dari language could become a
1109 dominant language because it could have dangerously increased the influence
1110 of Persia on Afghanistan. So Tarzi became the strong man in Afghanistan after
1111 first counseling Habibullah (Abd-al-Rahman’s son and heir to the throne) and
1112 then Amanollah (Abd-al-Rahman’s grandson). He was highly influenced by the
1113 Turkish Kemalist movement and did not approve of religious quarrels; so, there
1114 were hopes that Tarzi could pave the way for religious tolerance, which was
1115 badly needed in Afghanistan. In spite of Tarzi’s best intentions, the domestic
1116 opposition to his plans was not mild, even on the part of the Tajiks (the Pashtun
1117 Ghilzai also objected to Tarzi’s reforms).
34
1118 A plausible explanation for this opposition may be grounded on the fact that
1119 during the 20’s (20th c.) the Tajiks, who had a strong faith or were not prone to
1120 renounce it, found themselves compelled to hastily flee from their homeland
1121 north to Amu Daria river -invaded by the Soviets- to inland areas due to the
1122 Marxist-Leninist policies applied (Marsden, 2002: 46). Hence, I understand the
1123 Tajiks made up a community increasingly concerned about religious matters.
1124 This casts light on the fact that where the Tajiks have been a relevant or
1125 dominant community, for example, they have taken harder positions concerning
1126 morality than the most conservative Pashtuns. I highlight this piece of
1127 information again as it may well serve to understand current situations.
1128 The issue is that those confrontations, as so many times before, became a real
1129 civil war. In 1928-1929 the hostilities concluded with Amanollah’s defeat.
1130 Furthermore, they laid the foundation for the Tajik Baccheh Saqow’s ascension
1131 to power, who was named Emir Habibollah II. The effects of this historical event
1132 are still felt today. For example, he was of humble origin and, even today, many
1133 Pashtuns call him the “bandit”. Another relevant fact we should consider is that
1134 their advantageous position was only kept for less than a year. So, the brave
1135 Tajiks were executed at the time the old Durrani dynasty hastened to lead the
1136 state, which had been made their own from its very inception. So, the Tajiks
1137 realized that the Pashtuns would not let other people interfere since they were
1138 still considered aliens to the Pashtuns’ project after all. The Durrani Pashtuns
1139 learnt the lesson that the Afghan society (not only the Ghilzais tribes from the
1140 outlaying districts) is quite reluctant to accept reforms.
1141 After those upheavals, Afghanistan enjoyed one of the most peaceful periods
1142 ruled by Zahir Sha (1933 – 1973). It goes without saying that this emir along
1143 with Ahmad Shah Durrani and Abd-al-Rahman form the triad of great Afghan
1144 monarches. However, their policies resembled those ones implemented by their
1145 illustrious predecessors. In spite of everything the ideals entailed the
1146 Pasthunization of Afghanistan, but a vast number of problems began to emerge
1147 all around. In 1946 the Hazaras successfully challenged a fiscal reform and
1148 Kabul had to pull out for fear that a secessionist outburst would take place in the
1149 Hazarajat. At this time, the Uzbek minority had problems with Kabul since their
1150 territories were expropriated and repopulated with Pasthun families. To make
1151 matters worse the Uzbeks suffered a fierce linguistic repression while the Tajiks
1152 and the Hazaras did not as these communities were fluent in Dari. The Uzbeks
1153 weren't. Resentment reached a peak and the Uzbeks created a nationalist-like
1154 organization. It may have been the first organization of this sort in Afghanistan.
1155 It began in 1954, at a time when political parties were not even legal, and was
1156 called Sazman-e Demokratik-e Khorasan (Democratic Organization for the
1157 Khorasan). One of its most outstanding features was the combination of the
1158 defense of rights with a nationalist vindication rooted on Islamic grounds.
1159 On the contrary the Tajik minority was in a better position and their relationships
1160 with the Pashtuns increasingly improved. In fact, the Tajiks were well
35
1161 represented at the armed forces and at the civil administration, even in Kabul.
1162 As the Dari language had out of inertia become more relevant than the Pashtun,
1163 the Tajiks felt at ease consequently.
1164
1165 6. THE SOVIET INVASION: A WASTED OPPORTUNITY.
1166 That was the social and ethnic scenario just before the Soviet invasion took
1167 place in 1979. Then, the Afghan society got divided. At first, a part of the urban
1168 elite was willing to readily accept the invaders. In fact, as already mentioned
1169 along this essay, the Soviet influence has been noticeable for decades. Some
1170 people associated the invasion with better roads, airports and economic burst
1171 though a vast majority was reluctant to accept the rules imposed by foreigners,
1172 particularly when these are overtly materialistic and atheistic. So, it did not take
1173 long for the first political organizations –which emerged out of the Constitution
1174 promulgated in 1964– to lead the civil opposition to Kabul puppet government.
1175 The most relevant movement was undoubtedly Jamiat-e-Islami, which was led
1176 by Tajik Burhanuddin Rabbani and originally supported by Pashtun Gulbuddin
1177 Hekmatyar. Jamiat allegedly aimed at an interethnic integration and
1178 promulgated that the Islamic law undertake the protection of minorities.
1179 Theoretically, there were avenues open for the other Afghan minorities to unite,
1180 which suggested that the Afghans would eventually fight on the same side. So,
1181 given the circumstances it may well have been thought that the presence of the
1182 Soviet troops on the ground would spur the unity of Afghans. That’s to say, it
1183 may have acted as “external federator” as this phenomenon is know in the area
1184 of politics and international relationships.
1185 Nevertheless, the confluence of Tajiks and Pashtuns, which was a sign of the
1186 good relationships between both communities during the reign of Zahir Shah,
1187 did not last long. In fact, when the Soviet invasion took place Rabbani and
1188 Hekmatyar had already taken different ways. The latter one created his own
1189 organization, Hezb-e-Islami, which was Pashtun in character. Rabbani
1190 endevoured to maintain the initial interethnic character of Jamiat, though rather
1191 unsuccessfully. It goes without saying that some minorities cooperated but they
1192 were looking at their own interests apart from being full of distrust rooted in the
1193 previous stages of the Afghan history (it was the case of the Hazaras). Other
1194 emblematic leaders were loyal to the Soviets until the end of the confrontation.
1195 It was the case of Rashid Dostum who, during the invasion, fought the
1196 mujahideens.
1197 We must take into account that during the resistance against the Soviets a
1198 number of actors played a major role in determining the resulting critical
1199 situation: the regional neighbouring powers. I cannot elaborate on this theme,
1200 which, furthermore, is fairly well known. I would like to note that those regional
36
1201 powers created alliances with different Afghan faction groups for the sake of
1202 their own interest preventing, eventually, the unity of the Afghan ethnic groups
1203 and aggravating the already existing problems within the Pashtun community.
1204 Overall, from a political point of view the support received turned out to be
1205 detrimental (this assessment does not include the military domain).
1206 So, the scenario looked like this: (1) Saudi Arabia supported Pashtun Abdul
1207 Sayyaf who was highly influenced by Wahhabism and was skillful in confronting
1208 the Shia Hazaras; (2) Pakistan supported Hekmatyar, a Pashtun descendant of
1209 a family compelled to migrate to the north who practically hated everybody —
1210 including illustrious Durrani—. This may be the reason why he always seemed
1211 to be a possibilist; (3) Iran supported Hazara Ali Mazari, who temporarily was
1212 named Ayatollah in Afghanistan; (4) Pakistan and Saudi Arabia supported
1213 Deobanti Yunis Khalis, whose faction group became the embryo of the
1214 Talibans, i.e., Ali Mazari's slayer. In addition to that, all the powers pretended to
1215 ignore the situation and contributed with some funds to Jamiat-e-Islami,
1216 Rabbani and Massud’s party38. However, that could not be the most favorable
1217 way out in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal as it is already known that overtly
1218 opposing the Pashtuns in order to gain the power in Kabul has been detrimental
1219 to the Tajiks. Given the circumstances it is rather complicated to find a solution.
1220 By now, we fully acknowledge that those regional powers took advantage of the
1221 existing hatred and desire for revenge within the Afghan society because the
1222 history of the country generated an opportunity for them to do so. For the sake
1223 of their national interest, they opened old wounds; they did not invent or create
1224 anything though. Nonetheless, it is striking that in spite of the fact that all those
1225 communities reached an agreement on different stages of the struggle against
1226 the Soviets, the differing interests and the external influences made it possible
1227 for the Afghan tragedy come true. After obtaining the victory over the Soviets
1228 (withdrawn in 1989) and the defection of the Najibullah’s government (1992) the
1229 civil war broke out at a moment when they allegedly should have been jointly
1230 celebrating that victory. That was precisely the consequence and the reward of
1231 "being successful" after a ten year fight against the Soviet presence. However,
1232 that was also the "logical" aftermath following two centuries of domestic
1233 confrontations.
1234 In fact, the civil war39 —keep it in mind— made up an excuse for the emergence
1235 of the Talibans. Mullah Omar and his followers’ success was only possible due
38
We should also note the influence exerted by Turkey on the Junbesh, Dostum's militia-like
party, when its founder betrayed Najibullah and fought on the anti-Soviet jihad's side, in the late
stages of the process. However, it is worth taking it into account since the external influences
lasted beyond 1992 and, to a great extent, can be held responsible for the vicissitudes of the
following civil war.
39
History books suggest that the last Afghan civil war —"penultimate" shall we say— lasted
from the collapse of pro-Soviet Najibullah’s government (1992) until 1996, when the Talibans
37
1236 to the continuous struggles between the leaders of the “social” spoils of war.
1237 Beyond any theological debate, they succeeded in appearing before the local
1238 population as the only actors capable of restoring order. That was the key for
1239 their initial success and for the aura they are surrounded by nowadays. There is
1240 almost total consensus among experts on that issue (Gohari, 1999: 27; Griffin,
1241 2001: 65; Marsden, 2002: 78; Rashid, 2009: 160). Therefore, I shall not
1242 elaborate on the topic since I agree with them too.
1243 Nevertheless, for the sake of the aims of the present assessment I shall focus
1244 on the ethnic confrontations that took place in the recent Afghan history. To a
1245 great extent they were an unusually cruel follow-up of the traditional divide.
1246 At first, the government led by Rabbani (Tajik) was supported by Ali Mazari and
1247 his Hazaras (an interesting fact) and by Dostum (Uzbek) though the latter one
1248 increasing became more nationalistic, due in part to the pressure exerted by
1249 Turkey. Rabbani was also supported by Durrani Pashtuns (indispensable to
1250 govern) such as pro-Arabic Abdul Sayyaf and a very young pro-Western
1251 moderate leader, Hamid Karzai40. Kunduz Pashtun Hekmatyar was on the
1252 opposite site and, supported by Pakistan, bombarded Kabul and the
1253 surrounding areas. At the same time, Khalis’s followers (including Omar), who
1254 were upset with both the Tajik government and Hekmatyar, kept expectant in
1255 the Kandahar area.
1256
1257 7. INTERETHNIC CONFRONTATIONS DURING THE AFGHAN CIVIL WAR
1258 Rather sooner than later did the problems arise within the ruling coalition. The
1259 multiethnic government had only been established for a few months when
1260 Sayyaf and Ali Mazari clashed. It is the same old story: a Wahhabist Pashtun
1261 against the Shiites. The big question: what would the Tajiks' reaction be? It was
1262 unequivocal: support Sayyaf. History repeats itself: the Hazaras used as
1263 propitiatory victims. This time, the decision provoked the “Afshar slaughter”,
1264 including 1000 civilian fatalities. Sayyaf’s Wahhabists and Massud’s Tajiks
reached Kabul. However, the new government encountered armed resistance by other groups,
which were endowed with legitimacy by the international community since they were deemed
the righteous successors to the political regime established in 1992. These groups were, in fact,
the forces of the so-called North Alliance led by Massud. Thus, it could be argued that the civil
war lasted from 1992 to 2001, when the coalition forces’ military action put an end to it.
40
Karzai himself suffered the effects or the degraded interethnic relationships when Fahim
(Tajik), chief of the police in Kabul, ordered to detain and question him. Rabbani ordered to
release him and apologized. However, Karzai decided to exile into Pakistan. Given the
circumstances, it may be stated that it was a semi-voluntary decision. He returned to
Afghanistan in 2001.
38
1265 acted with acute cruelty since elderlies, women, children and even their dogs
1266 were beheaded and then were thrown into wells. Massud got “a reputation in
1267 the Shia horror chronicle" (Griffin, 2001: 57). Massud was concerned about the
1268 possibility of drifting apart from the Pashtun. He probably remembered the only
1269 Tajik leader who acceded to the power in Kabul, Habibollah II. He was
1270 overthrown by the Pashtuns in 1929, after less than a year in power (Marsden,
1271 2002: 68). Massud likely feared to confront one of the few Pashtun communities
1272 which, at that moment, was still providing support to Rabbani's government as
1273 well as "Afghan" legitimacy. So, it was in January 1993 when he decided to
1274 confront the Hazaras.
1275 In March of the same year, when the Hazaras withdrew from the ruling coalition
1276 Rabbani tried to close the gap with Hekmatyar, who was still bombarding Kabul
1277 with his field artillery. Then, Hekmatyar was appointed Prime Minister. But in
1278 January 1994, things drastically changed again. Pashtun Hetmatyar was at
1279 odds again with Tajik Rabbani, but this time he was supported by Dostum (after
1280 going over to the other side, as he used to do). Rabbani’s support was scarce
1281 and the rise of the Taliban movement, which is preeminently Pashtun and the
1282 Ghilzais play a major role, gave his government the coup de grace. So, the first
1283 part of the civil war ended when Kabul was seized by the Talibans (1996) and
1284 the Tajiks fled to the north. The history of 1929 repeated itself. The Pashtun, in
1285 the form of Talibans, held the power again. In fact, between 1994 and 1995, a
1286 defection process took place within Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami followers and
1287 Yunis Khalis’ dissidents, so many of their members joined the Talibans.
1288 However, the Talibans took to confront non-Pashtun communities sitting on the
1289 fence throughout the Afghan civil war. First and foremost, they fought the
1290 Hazaras and slew their traditional leader, Ali Mazari (1995). In fact, it was
1291 another of the many confrontations between Sunni and Shiites which are
1292 common in the region and particularly in Afghanistan. The Ghilzai Pashtun,
1293 heirs to Qais —one of prophet Muhammad’s partners— consider themselves
1294 custodians of the orthodox tradition and, from their point of view, of Afghanistan
1295 itself. Thus, they could not let the kafirs from Hazarajat condition their
1296 administration. They wondered: what can you expect from people who are bad
1297 Muslims and bad Afghans? In addition to that, they thought: What can you
1298 expect from people who are neither true Muslims nor true Afghans? So, they
1299 preferred to have the Hazaras as enemies. As simple as that.
1300 However, they confronted the Uzbeks as well, though their relationships were
1301 far from similar to the ones maintained with the Hazaras. As a matter of fact, the
1302 Uzbeks are Sunni. The Talibans have always seen the Uzbeks as unreliable
1303 people and irreligious or even hypocritical from a religious point of view. So, the
1304 Taliban leader Rashid Dostum was not inclined to establish alliances. Thus, the
1305 Taliban were doing what they have traditionally done. In my opinion, they were
1306 probably trying to imitate Ahmad Shah Durrani or Abd-al-Rahman, i.e., unite the
1307 Pasthun in order to subject the other minority groups. The differing aspect is
39
1308 that under Mullah Omar’s leadership they pursued the achievement of another
1309 aim: do justice within the Pashtun community and give back the Ghilzai the
1310 prominence they had lost. The aim involved creating a large Pashtun coalition.
1311 The regrouping of the Pashtun groups was supported from the outside. The
1312 Pakistani madrasah played an important role since they have always been an
1313 important strategic reserve to feedback the expectations of tribes which count
1314 on insights and human resources. In this sense, when Mullah Omar had
1315 acceded to power in 1989, there were over 500000 Taliban in neighboring
1316 Pakistan (Roy, 2003: 49). This is the result of disrespecting the Durand line.
1317 However, we have already seen this is something recursive in Afghanistan.
1318 Furthermore, it has been analyzed how the establishment of such a dividing line
1319 affected the Pashtun unity and how it doomed Abd-a-Rahman’s project to
1320 failure. So, the Taliban seek to go back and regain the demographic hegemony
1321 lost, which has always been longed for. All the parts fit perfectly as well as the
1322 thread of the story.
1323 The final stage of the civil war, before the intervention of the coalition forces,
1324 was particularly dramatic. The maximalist posture adopted by the Taliban made
1325 the non-Pashtun communities confront them and, at the same time, prevented
1326 Durrani moderate sectors from getting involved in their project. The two
1327 campaigns intended to seize Mazar-e-Sharif (1997 and 1998) triggered fights
1328 which are common in civil wars where atrocities are committed by both sides. At
1329 the end, both come off worst. For example, Malik's Uzbek troops massacred the
1330 Taliban and, simultaneously, a vast number of Pashtun families who had
1331 emigrated to the north during the compelling repopulation policies implemented
1332 by Abd-al-Rahman. The communal graves discovered by the Taliban revealed
1333 over 20000 Pashtun corpes (Griffin, 2001: 267). Most of them were innocent
1334 civilians who did not even know who Mullah Omar was. When the Taliban finally
1335 entered Mazar-e-Sharif in the summer 1998, they sought revenge by hunting
1336 Hazaras, particularly Uzbeks (as it had been the norm).
1337 The number of victims is unknown, though most of them were women and
1338 children. The inhabitants of a village were flayed alive. The Taliban also put into
1339 practice procedures they had rejected until then such as the massive raping of
1340 women. When the mullah held responsible for the atrocities was questioned
1341 whether Islam respects the most basic human rights, his answer was
1342 affirmative. But he added, "Hazaras are not human, they’re asses” (Raich,
1343 2002: 124). This incident may have gone unnoticed but because a Western
1344 humanitarian aid worker, who was also fluent in Dari, was told the story by an
1345 elderly man. It can be supposed that a number of similar incidents still remained
1346 unknown to the public opinion.
1347 The Tajiks apparently were the ones who did best out of the whirl in the period
1348 1997 - 1999. Pashtuns and Tajiks are quite able to command respect and
1349 respect each other as long as the latter ones do not attempt to play a leading
40
1350 role in the political field. Even so, 1999 was a bad year. It should be borne in
1351 mind that Massud was still leading the last stronghold against the Taliban in the
1352 Panjshir Valley. In the summer 1999, the Taliban compelled over 100000
1353 people to leave those territories in a matter of a few weeks. Some estimates
1354 raise that figure to 200000. The Taliban’s intention was to cause irreversible
1355 damage to Jamiat-e-Islam: “the Tajiks from Shomali were simply massively
1356 expelled so that Massud could not rely on his homeland’s wealth” (Griffin, 2001:
1357 346). During the following weeks the Taliban carried out scorched earth policies
1358 in an area which used to be one of the most fertile in Afghanistan.
1359 All in all, these are the consequences derived from the confrontations: between
1360 Pashtuns and other ethnic groups; within the Pashtun community itself;
1361 between Tajiks and Hazaras. Those confrontations are closely related to the
1362 Afghan ethnic divide, to the difficulties to establish a state-nation capable of
1363 embracing the entire ethnic groups and to the idea of making power one’s own.
1364
1365 8. CONCLUSIONS.
1366 The more detailed the analysis of the Afghan society is, the more evident and
1367 deeper the ethnic divide appears to be. The divide is deep because it is rooted
1368 in the very inception of the establishment of the Afghan state-nation, or
1369 whatever it looks like it. Because it is not easy to hold the idea that what is
1370 called Afghanistan meets the requirements to be so-called. Because the
1371 confrontations are particularly fierce. The depth of the divide depends as much
1372 on the time as on their intensity.
1373 The difficulties are aggravated due to the fact that Afghanistan lacks a
1374 democratic background. The population does not display basic liberal attitudes
1375 related to the principle of tolerance, which implies that when discrepancies arise
1376 they resort to the arms as a way to solve them. Changing that situation is a big
1377 challenge since it takes generations for the changes to develop and get rooted.
1378 Improvisation should be avoided at any cost. Secondly, it would be necessary to
1379 neutralize or mitigate the confrontations aforementioned, which is a mammoth
1380 endevour. Notwithstanding, taking into account the dividing factors may help to
1381 prevent making mistakes when different ethnic groups' interests are at stake.
1382 To this regard, the international coalition should, at least, prevent his activities
1383 from increasing latent distrust among the communities involved. Although the
1384 aim of this work is not to provide an inventory of solutions, I emphasize, as
1385 already stated in a previous article, the advisability of building (even better,
1386 rebuilding) a “common narration” which can serve as social concrete (s.
1387 Baqués, 2008: 55-56). Something like this might, at least, ease the
1388 discrepancies.
41
1389 Finally, efforts should be made to progress in the creation of a true Afghan
1390 state. In fact, lack of a state or its inability to act as such (depending on the
1391 historical moment we may refer) are to a large extent responsible for the current
1392 reigning chaos. As a matter of fact, lack or disrespect for authority have both
1393 triggered a feedback effect on the confrontations which is still noticed at
1394 present.
1395 So, the present assessment is concluding. It was intended to show a portrait of
1396 the interethnic conflicts and their roots. The task has not been unambitious,
1397 easy or pleasant. However, that was the aim stated in the introduction as it was
1398 commissioned by the leadership of the research project the present essay
1399 belongs to. And I deem the approach necessary. It appears clear that a different
1400 conceptual apparatus is required in order to create a “good solution” (assuming
1401 it is possible). It should be linked to what is called “constitutional engineering” in
1402 the field of political science. Anyhow, that sort of engineering cannot leave aside
1403 the results of the present assessment without running the risk of aggravating
1404 the problems it may try to solve.
1405 To this regard, any socio-political project should integrate all this elements,
1406 which no doubt is challenging. Any proposal intended to improve the situation in
1407 Afghanistan should initiate activities basing on data or insights similar to the
1408 ones provided in the present essay. That is to say, it should aim at neutralizing
1409 latent intra and interethnic conflicts by presenting a framework which can
1410 prevent maximalism (particularly Pashtun maximalism) from being supported by
1411 the civil population.
1412
42
1413 ANNEX C: INTERCULTURAL AWARENESS IN TRANSITION PROCESSES41
1414 1. INTRODUCTION
1415 To advocate that a certain degree of cultural sensitivity be exercised by those

1416 involved in peace-building processes is to acknowledge the importance of civil
1417 society as a vital player in the road towards peace and to confirm the need for
1418 knowledge of the cultural parameters, values and principles that govern social
1419 relations.
1420 Peace missions and operations have revealed the need for interaction between
1421 the military and civil officers forming such missions and the local population in
1422 the territory where they are deployed. Cultural sensitivity facilitates
1423 communication between the civil and military officers and the local population.
1424 Indeed, those operating under the auspices of a peace mission should be
1425 aware of the key cultural factors that can simplify communication with locals. At
1426 internal level, cultural sensitivity can expedite communication between the
1427 various contingents that make up the military component of a mission. It can
1428 also aid coordination between civil and military elements.
1429 In this essay I will first of all analyse how the design and implementation of
1430 peace operations may be influenced by the application of the cultural approach.
1431 Peace is the goal but there may be many ways of attaining it. Cultural sensitivity
1432 can lead us to choose one path over another in this quest for peace.
1433 In the course of this paper, we shall see that the cultural approach may be
1434 essential in solving at least two of the dilemmas that arise in relation to this type
1435 of operations: the human rights dilemma and the local ownership dilemma. In
1436 this regard, I will address an issue that is a constant in discussions of cultural
1437 diversity: i.e., how to define the limits in acknowledging this diversity. These
1438 limits are marked by the existence of universally accepted international
1439 regulations which have the purpose of affording protection to people. In
1440 approaching this issue, I will refer to the possibility of solving the potential
1441 conflict between peace and justice, considered in many cases to be a false
1442 conflict as it may be said that lasting peace may not be achieved if justice has
1443 been grossly neglected42. However, as we shall see in these lines, there are
41
Written by Alicia Cebada Romero. Director of the Crisis Management Programme (CITpax);
Professor of Public International Law (Carlos III University of Madrid)
42
“Thus, the choice presented to negotiators is whether to have peace or justice. Sometimes
this dichotomy is presented along more sophisticated lines: peace now and justice some other
time. The choice is, however, frequently fallacious and the dichotomy may be tragically
deceptive. Surely, no one can argue that peace is unnecessary and not preferable to a state of
violence. But the attainment of peace is not necessarily to the exclusion of justice, because
43
1444 grey areas43. The idea of justice and the definition of the ways in which “justice”
1445 may be “enforced” are imbued with cultural patterns, values and principles.
1446 Moreover, in situations of conflict, there may be a radical change in what justice
1447 is understood to mean44. Naturally, this also complicates the definition of
1448 ‘peace’, because in many circumstances, peace should be understood as a
1449 form of justice. This essay will endeavour to demonstrate that in order to define
1450 both peace and justice, it is necessary to focus our attention on international law
1451 and particularly, on some of its regulations.
1452 To my mind, the application of a cultural approach requires action in two planes:
1453 To define the fundamental principles of a universal nature that would be

1454 above any particular cultural model. These fundamental principles should
1455 be promoted, including initiatives to support and drive the transformation
1456 of cultural models in which they are not recognised.
1457 To acknowledge cultural diversity and acquire a deep knowledge and

1458 analysis of the prevalent cultural conditions in a particular scenario,
1459 which will lead to better relations among the local population and
1460 facilitate the design of an efficient strategy towards attaining or
1461 consolidating peace.
1462
1463 2. TWO DILEMMAS IN THE TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE
1464 Intercultural awareness may be of key importance in addressing two dilemmas

1465 that arise in transitional contexts:
1466 The human rights dilemma: How is it possible to include in the transition
1467 process those that have been involved in committing gross human rights
frequently, justice is necessary to attain peace”. M. Cherif Bassiouni. “Accountability for

violations of International humanitarian law and other serious violations of human rights”. In:
Bassiouni (Ed.) Post-Conflict Justice, Transnational Publishers: New York, 2002, p. 8.
43
To quote Bassiouni: “While accountability should never be bartered in a realpolitik fashion in
order to arrive at political expediency at the expense of both the dictates of international law and
the interests of the victims, that does not necessarily mean that every individual violator must be
prosecuted in order to assure accountability” Ibidem, p. 41.
44
In his book on transitional Justice, Teitel claims that this is the main dilemma in this kind of
contexts: “The threshold dilemma of transitional justice is the problem of the rule of law in
periods of radical change. By their very definitions, these are often times of massive paradigm
shifts in understandings of justice”. Ruti G. Teitel. “Transitional Justice”. Oxford University
Press, 2000, p. 11.
44
1468 violations? There is no doubt that limits have to be established here,

1469 some of which have already been marked out by the international legal
1470 system.
1471 The local ownership dilemma: How is it possible to involve civil society
1472 and at the same time take all the necessary steps to transform it?
1473 2.1. The human rights dilemma
1474 To what extent is it possible to include in the transition process those that have
1475 been involved in committing gross human rights violations? There is no doubt
1476 that limits have to be established here, some of which have already been
1477 marked out by the international legal system.
1478 The Guidelines on civil/military cooperation in Afghanistan state that “all

1479 humanitarian actors, military actors and other security actors should at all times
1480 be respectful of international law and Afghan laws, culture and customs”. This is
1481 the key to overcoming what is known as the “human rights dilemma”. The local
1482 customs, laws and culture have to be respected, but the same is true of
1483 international law. The fact is that international law plays a fundamental role in
1484 guaranteeing that quality peace is attained. Therefore, in this context, it is
1485 necessary to analyse the connection existing between the limits on
1486 acknowledging local culture and the observance of international law.
1487 The human rights dilemma may also be linked to the definition of the point of
1488 balance between peace and justice. Can the term "peace" be used to refer to a
1489 situation reached without justice having been enforced? Can an agreement in
1490 which the human rights of certain sectors of the population have been
1491 undermined be considered to be valid and the basis for stable, lasting peace?
1492 2.1.a. PEACE / JUSTICE
1493 The question might be phrased as follows: Is it possible to achieve sustainable,

1494 lasting peace without enforcing justice? This is one of the major questions on
1495 the agenda when designing transitional justice models. In seeking to strike the
1496 balance between these two fundamental values, it is of paramount importance
1497 to bear in mind certain international regulations, about which a universal
1498 consensus has crystallised.
1499 Nowadays it may be said that international law prohibits impunity in cases of
1500 war crimes and/or crimes against humanity. The terms of any peace agreement
1501 that dispensed immunity in such cases would be null. To quote Bassiouni: “The
45
1502 realpolitik of reaching political settlements without regard to a post-conflict

1503 justice component is no longer acceptable”45.
1504 One well-known case is the Lomé Peace Accord (1999) that marked the end of
1505 the war in Sierra Leone46. This Agreement had been negotiated under the
1506 condition (imposed by both parties) that total immunity be guaranteed47.
1507 However, the United Nations Representative managed to include at the last
1508 minute - to the Parties’ surprise - a disclaimer clause, clarifying that: “The
1509 United Nations holds the understanding that the amnesty and pardon in Article
1510 IX of the agreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes
1511 against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international
1512 humanitarian laws”48.
45 BASSIOUNI, M. Cherif. “Accountability for violations of International humanitarian law and

other serious violations of human rights”. In: BASSIOUNI (Ed.) Post-Conflict Justice,
Transnational Publishers: New York, 2002, p. 3. See also: ROHT-ARRIAZA, Naomi.
“State responsibility to investigate and prosecute human rights violations in international law”,
78 Cal. L. Rev. (1990), p. 449; BASSIOUNI, M. Cherif. “Combating Impunity for International
Crimes, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev, 2000, p. 209.
46 HAYNER, Priscilla. Negotiating peace in Sierra Leone: Confronting the justice challenge”,
December 2007, Report for the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the International Center
for Transitional Justice.
47 Amnesty is included in article IX of the Agreement in the following terms:
1. “In order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone, the Government of Sierra Leone shall
take appropriate legal steps to grant Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon.
2. After the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall also
grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in
respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the
signing of the present Agreement.
3. To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, the
Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken
against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA (Sierra Leone Army) or CDF
(Civil Defence Force) in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives
as members of those organizations, since March 1991, up to the time of the signing of
the present Agreement. In addition, legislative and other measures necessary to
guarantee immunity to former combatants, exiles and other persons, currently outside
the country for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be adopted ensuring the full
exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view to their reintegration within a
framework of full legality”.
48
The first guidelines directed to the United Nations Representatives regarding certain aspects
of negotiation in conflict settlement were drawn up by the Office of the Secretary-General of the
UN in the middle of 1999. It appears that these guidelines only reached the UN Special
Representative in Lomé, Francis Okelo, a few days before the signing of the Lomé Peace
Accord (Sierra Leone), obliging him to introduce a note beside his signature, referring to article
IX of the Accord.
46
1513 At the time when the agreement was being negotiated in Sierra Leone, there
1514 was a clamour for peace from the local population, which had come to the
1515 conclusion that any price could be paid if it were to buy the end of the war and
1516 the atrocities that had been committed over the course of the conflict, which had
1517 been started in 1991. However, the Peace Accord that was negotiated in these
1518 terms turned out to be very hard to implement. Indeed, after various violations
1519 by the rebels, the conflict was on the brink of being reactivated in May 2000.
1520 The rapid intervention of the British and the United Nations, who reinforced their
1521 presence in the area, helped to avoid these violent events resulting in the
1522 resurgence of armed conflict. The Government fully realised that the
1523 perpetrators of gross human rights violations had to be prosecuted, but they
1524 were also aware that it was very difficult to do this in the national courts.
1525 Therefore, talks with the United Nations commenced; the result of which was an
1526 agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone, according to which a
1527 mixed Court was set up, the Special Court for Sierra Leone49. In his report on
1528 the Court, the Secretary-General of the United Nations considered that the
1529 impunity granted by the Lomé Peace Accord was contrary to international law
1530 and that therefore, it was not an obstacle to the Court’s operation. In short, the
1531 Secretary-General stated that no legal effects could be attributed to the
1532 amnesty granted in the Lomé Peace Accord “to the extent of its illegality under
1533 international law”50. He also stated that “While recognizing that amnesty is an
1534 accepted legal concept and a gesture of peace and reconciliation at the end of
1535 a civil war or an internal armed conflict, the United Nations has consistently
1536 maintained the position that amnesty cannot be granted in respect of
1537 international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity or other
1538 serious violations of international humanitarian law51”. Therefore, amnesty is not
1539 completely ruled out but remains subject to the condition that it should never
1540 shelter those that are guilty of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.
1541 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has also established the illegality of
1542 the impunity granted in Amnesty Laws, which Cançado Trindade calls "auto-
49
Regarding events in Sierra Leone, see also: KRITZ, Neil J. “Progress and Humility: the
ongoing search for post-conflict justice”. In: BASSIOUNI (Ed.) Post-Conflict… op. cit., p. 66-70.
This author underlines that in contexts like in Sierra Leone, an international or mixed court is not
sufficient in order to enforce justice and its work has to be complemented by that of other
mechanisms like the truth and reconciliation commissions.
50
Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
S/2000/915, 4th October 2000, paragraph 24.
51
Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
S/2000/915, 4th October 2000, paragraph 22.
47
1543 amnesties"52 granted in the context of national reconciliation processes53.

1544 Regarding the Almonacid Arellano case, the Inter-American Court declared:
1545 “Said prohibition to commit crimes against humanity is a ius cogens rule, and
1546 the punishment of such crimes is obligatory pursuant to the general principles of
1547 international law”54.
1548 In reaching this conclusion, the Court refers as the grounds of law to the
1549 Assembly General Resolutions 2583 (XXIV) of 196955 and 3074 (XXVIII) of
1550 197356. It also refers to Resolutions 827 and 955 issued by the United Nations
1551 Security Council57, and to the Statutes of the Courts for the former Yugoslavia
1552 (Article 29) and Rwanda (Article 28). Finally, the Court mentions that the
1553 Secretary-General of the United Nations had pointed out that in view of the
1554 rules and principles of the United Nations, the peace agreements that are
1555 approved by the latter may never promise amnesties for crimes against
1556 humanity58.
1557 In his Report on Mediation59, the Secretary-General of the United Nations once
1558 again addressed this issue, stating that the United Nations should not support
1559 any peace agreement that claims to guarantee impunity for those that are
1560 responsible for gross human rights violations. He further recommends that
52
Reasoned vote in the case of Almonacid Arellano and others v. Chile. Available at: Revista
Ius et Praxis, 12 (2): 349 - 362, 2006 : http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?pid=S0718-
00122006000200012&script=sci_arttext&tlng=en
53
Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, Sentence of 14th March 2001. Available at:
http://www.unifr.ch/ddp1/derechopenal/jurisprudencia/j_20080616_18.pdf
Case of Almonacid Arellana and others v. Chile. Sentence of 26th September 2006. Available
at: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_154_esp.pdf
54
Cit. Supra, paragraph 99.
55
Resolution: The question of the punishment of war criminals and persons that have committed
crimes against humanity, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution
2583 (XXIV) of 15th December 1969.
56
Principles of international cooperation in the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of
persons guilty of war crimes or crimes against humanity, adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in its resolution 3074 (XXVIII) of 3rd December 1973.
57
Security Council Resolution S/RES/827 to establish the International Criminal Court for the
former Yugoslavia on 25th March 1993; and Security Council Resolution S/RES/955 to
establish the International Criminal Court for Rwanda on 8th November 1994.
58
Report of the Secretary-General on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-
conflict societies, S/2004/616, of 3rd August 2004, paragraph 10.
59
“Enhancing mediation and its supporting activities”, cit. supra, S/2009/189.
48
1561 United Nations Representatives in peace negotiations should always make it

1562 clear that no stipulation regarding impunity will prevent the intervention of the
1563 International Criminal Court, in the case of situations in which it may exercise its
1564 jurisdiction.
1565 This is a relevant issue that is still the object of attention. The defence of
1566 Radovan Karadzic before the Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia alleged
1567 that Richard Holbrooke, the UN’s special envoy in Yugoslavia in the nineties,
1568 had promised Karadzic immunity in exchange for his abandoning public life in
1569 order to expedite the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Holbrooke has
1570 repeatedly denied the existence of such an arrangement and in any case, the
1571 Criminal Court has stated - in line with the limits on impunity to which I have
1572 already referred - that even if such an arrangement had existed, it would not
1573 recognise immunity for Karadzic60. Indeed, in its Decision regarding the
1574 immunity of Karadzic, the Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia lays down
1575 that any arrangement granting amnesty in the case of genocide, war crimes or
1576 crimes against humanity would be non-valid under international law61.
1577 There are more recent examples that demonstrate that States are aware of and
1578 accept the existence of this international rule. For instance, in the Democratic
1579 Republic of the Congo, the Government has granted an amnesty to the rebel
1580 groups and militias from the north and south of Kivu; however, this amnesty
1581 does not include war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide62. On the
1582 other hand, the Report that was recently published by the Truth and
1583 Reconciliation Commission in Liberia on the Liberian civil conflict strongly
1584 recommends that those responsible for gross human rights violations during the
1585 conflict (1979-2003) be brought to justice63.
60
Boletín de Justicia Transicional, n. 12, ECP, May-June 2009, p. 18. This newsletter may be
consulted at: http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/derecho/justicia/boletin012.pdf
61
Trial Chamber Decision on the Accused's Second Motion for Inspection and Disclosure:
Immunity Issue, ICTY-2008-IT-95-5/18-PT (17 December 2008)
<http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tdec/en/081217.pdf, paragraph 25.
62
Boletín de Justicia Transicional, n. 12, ECP, May-June 2009.
63
The report was presented in June 2009: The truth and reconciliation commission of Liberia:
summary of preliminary findings, determinations and recommendations. It may be consulted at:
https://www.trcofliberia.org/reports/final/final-report/trc-final-report-volume-1-summary:
“Prosecution mechanism is desirable to fight impunity and promote justice and genuine
reconciliation” It concludes by saying: “Prosecution in a court of competent jurisdiction and other
forms of public sanctions are desirable and appropriate mechanisms to promote the ends of
justice, peace and security, foster genuine national reconciliation and combat impunity”. It also
sets out a first recommendation regarding the creation of a mechanism for delineating
responsibilities: “1. Accountability: A Prosecution Mechanism. The Commissioners of the TRC
determine that a criminal court with the competence and jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal
responsibility for individuals, armed groups and other entities that the TRC determines
49
1586 Therefore, regardless of the fact that certain societies may for various reasons
1587 show more proclivity towards a pardon or be more predisposed to reconciliation,
1588 after having suffered the consequences of lengthy conflict, the international
1589 legal system does not permit impunity in such cases64. The debate that arose
1590 between Hart and Fuller in relation to the persecution of Nazi collaborators after
1591 World War II in Germany would not be possible in the same terms nowadays. In
1592 a radically positivist posture, Hart considered that the rule of law required the
1593 application of the laws that were in force during the Nazi regime, in spite of their
1594 immorality. On the other hand, Fuller defended the need to apply a substantive
1595 concept of justice that implied that in very serious circumstances, “moral law”
1596 should prevail over legal law. If the debate were to take place in the same terms
1597 today, Fuller would not have to refer to morality and it would suffice for him to
1598 mention international law. The concept of the rule of law should be delimited in
1599 the context of the existence of international legal regulations and under no
1600 circumstances may those that are imperative be dispensed with65.
1601 Therefore, the above paragraphs demonstrate that the international legal
1602 system is an inescapable point of reference in order that the right balance may
1603 be struck between peace and justice. In accordance with this legal system, it
1604 may be said that under no circumstances may war crimes or crimes against
1605 humanity66 be justified or pardoned without those that are guilty of such crimes
wereresponsible for ‘egregious’ domestic crimes, ‘gross’ violations of human rights and ‘serious’
humanitarian law violations is appropriate . Such institution shall be specifically endowed with
the authority and jurisdiction to adjudicate domestic, IHRL and IHL violations”.
64
However, these issues continue to ignite discussion. At the moment, there is a debate
ongoing in Cambodia. The international Co-Prosecutor of the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia, Robert Petit, has announced his resignation, which will take effect from
September onwards. The differences between Petit and the Cambodian Prosecutor Chea
Leang have been publicly revealed. Whereas the former wishes the trials to continue and
believes that more authorities should be brought before the Court, Chea Leang disagrees
because of the danger of further trials destabilising the situation in the country. Debate is
currently underway on the possibility of setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
which in Petit's opinion should never be conceived as an alternative to the action of the judges,
but rather as a complementary mechanism.
65
On this discussion between Hart and Fuller, see: TEITEL. Transitional justice… op. cit., p. 13.
66
The Secretary-General of the United Nations states in his Report on implementing the
responsibility to protect: “Moreover, if principles relating to the responsibility to protect are to
take full effect and be sustainable, they must be integrated into each culture and society without
hesitation or condition, as a reflection of not only global but also local values and standards.
This should not be an impossible task since no community, society, or culture publicly and
officially condones genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity as
acceptable behaviour. On this principle, Member States are united” A/63/677, of 12th January
2009, p. 20. Available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,REFERENCE,UNGA,,,4989924d2,0.html
50
1606 having been brought to justice. This type of crimes should be condemned,
1607 repudiated and punished in any cultural scenario and in any legal context.
1608 2.1.b. PEACE / HUMAN RIGHTS
1609 A peace agreement that fails to respect the international standards for the
1610 protection of human rights will probably only establish an illusion of peace.
1611 We shall refer here to the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Dayton
1612 Agreement. In the Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia-Herzegovina67 case, the Grand
1613 Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights will have to decide if articles
1614 4 and 5 of the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is based on the
1615 Dayton Agreement, violate the European Convention on Human Rights. The
1616 applicants are a Bosnian citizen of Roma ethnicity and a Jewish Bosnian
1617 citizen, who are not allowed to stand as candidates for the presidential or
1618 parliamentary elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, precisely because of their
1619 Roma and Jewish origins, respectively. Articles 4 and 5 of the Constitution of
1620 Bosnia-Herzegovina state that only those persons belonging to one of the
1621 “constituent peoples” (i.e. Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs) may exercise the right to
1622 passive suffrage in these elections. The Constitution excludes “the others”,
1623 members of other national minorities or ethnic groups, including the Jews and
1624 the members of the Roma minority, which do not define themselves as
1625 members of one of the constituent peoples.
1626 Both the Human Rights Committee and the Committee of the Convention for the
1627 Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination have issued concluding
1628 observations/ comments recommending to the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina
1629 that it should alter its Constitution68.
1630 The Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy Through Law
1631 (the Venice Commission) also issued an Opinion on the constitutional situation
1632 in Bosnia-Herzegovina in which it recorded the following considerations: “In the
1633 present case, the distribution of posts in the State organs between the
1634 constituent peoples was a central element of the Dayton Agreement making
1635 peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina possible. In such a context, it is difficult to
1636 deny legitimacy to norms that may be problematic from the point of view of non-
1637 discrimination but necessary to achieve peace and stability and to avoid further
67
27996/06 and 34836/06, Dervo SEJDIĆ and Jakob FINCI v. Bosnia and Herzegovina.
68
Human Rights Committee, document no. CCPR/C/BIH/CO/1, § 8, of 22nd November 2006.
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, document no. CERD/C/BIH/CO/6, § 11,
of 21st March 2006.
51
1638 loss of human lives”69 . Furthermore, as we have already mentioned, the

1639 Bosnian Constitution is based on the Dayton Agreement that made peace
1640 possible. The distribution of posts in state bodies among the “constituent
1641 peoples” was one of the essential elements in this Agreement. Although it
1642 seems evident that the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina violates the
1643 international parameters for the protection of human rights, the Venice
1644 Commission appears to insinuate that this was a price that it may have been
1645 convenient to pay at the time in order to achieve peace.
1646 In any case, the arrangement reached in Dayton and reflected in the
1647 Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina can probably not subsist in its current
1648 terms. Although the Venice Commission acknowledged in the aforementioned
1649 Opinion a certain degree of legitimacy to the constitutional rule being
1650 challenged or at least considered it to be opportune in the context of negotiating
1651 the peace accord, ultimately it advocated the need to alter it, considering that
1652 the current circumstances allowed to embark on a process of reform that would
1653 guarantee political representation for all ethnic groups. It was more emphatic in
1654 the amicus curiae briefs that it presented in the Sedjic and Finci cases, in which
1655 it states that the exclusion of “the other” that is articulated in the Constitution of
1656 Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Electoral Act is incompatible with article 14 in
1657 conjunction with article 3 of Protocol 1 in the Convention and article 1 of
1658 Protocol 1270.
1659 It appears to be obvious that a peace accord that fails to guarantee the rights of
1660 all will not be lasting and is bound to be altered. The Sedjic and Finci cases also
1661 demonstrate the importance of the existence of international bodies that
1662 guarantee human rights, from whose scrutiny peace accords do not escape.
1663 The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrates, in my opinion, the importance
1664 of taking into consideration the two planes in which action should be taken
1665 when applying the cultural approach, referred to in the Introduction. The
1666 universal fundamental principles must be applied, even when this requires that
1667 a profound transformation be wrought in the local society.
1668 Aside from the dilemmas, human rights are an essential component in
1669 integrated missions. The Memorandum of Understanding of 5th November 1999
1670 between the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
1671 (the High Commissioner) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
1672 (DPKO) describes the need to link the building and maintenance of peace to
1673 human rights. To this end, both parties to the memorandum undertake to
69
Opinion on the constitutional situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the powers of the High
Representative (document no. CDL-AD(2005)004).
70
CDL-AD(2008)027; Opinion no. 483/2008, of 22nd October 2008. Venice Commission.
Amicus Curiae Brief in the cases of Sedjic and Finci v. Bosnia-Herzegovina.
52
1674 reinforce their cooperation and exchange information, experience, etc. It is

1675 acknowledged that the Office of the High Commissioner should become
1676 involved from the outset in planning the Mission, because if the objectives in the
1677 area of human rights are included in the strategy from the very beginning, the
1678 possibilities of peace being maintained even after the Mission has withdrawn
1679 will be higher (sustainable peace). Although the human rights component of a
1680 mission remains under the authority of the Secretary-General, collaboration is
1681 enhanced with the Office of the High Commissioner, which also provides
1682 decisive support to those in charge of the human rights component. The latter
1683 report to the Secretary-General, but also to the Office of the High
1684 Commissioner71. In short, the human rights component is an essential part of an
1685 integrated Mission.
1686 2.2. Local ownership dilemma
1687 Transitional scenarios are characterised by their great complexity. Political,

1688 security, humanitarian and economic challenges are faced, together with the
1689 need to consolidate or foster democracy and the rule of law and to guarantee
1690 human rights. In these scenarios, there are two levels of complexity: that which
1691 is derived from the multidimensionality of the action that is required and that
1692 which is derived from the diversity of actors that are needed in order to deal with
1693 all of the challenges. Both of these complexities must be addressed.
1694 Coordination and decentralisation are fundamental in organising the steps to be

1695 taken in this kind of situations. Transition processes involve international,
1696 universal or regional organisations, as well as international and local civil
1697 society organisations. Needless to say, local authorities must also be included.
1698 Intercultural awareness can facilitate coordination and communication among
1699 all of these actors. In some cases, transforming the local society will be a
1700 condition in order that peace may be consolidated and this transformation will
1701 not materialise without knowledge of the cultural parameters that guide social
1702 relations.
1703 How is it possible to involve civil society and at the same time, take all of the
1704 necessary steps to transform it, sometimes radically?
1705 The Brahimi Report underlined the need for United Nations peace missions to
1706 show sensitivity towards local and regional cultures, as well as towards the
1707 economic and political situation of a particular country. Once again, the limit on
71
For further details on collaboration between the High Commissioner and the human rights
components of the Missions, see: Bertrand G. Ramcharan. “The United Nations. High
Commissioner for Human Rights. The challenges of international protection”. Martinus Nijhoff,
2002.
53
1708 cultural sensitivity will be marked by the need to combine peace with justice and
1709 respect for human rights.
1710 One fundamental element in empowering the local population is to provide

1711 recognition for and to strengthen the justice administration. It is a well-known
1712 fact that there are different concepts of justice that are imbued with cultural
1713 values and consequently, that there are different ideas about what it means to
1714 enforce justice.
1715 In this regard, the question is if certain forms of traditional justice meet the
1716 standards that are required as regards the delineation of responsibility and
1717 punishment for those that are guilty of atrocities. We may quote here the case
1718 of the “gacaca” local justice system that was developed in Rwanda to punish
1719 the thousands of perpetrators of gross human rights violations72. Only those
1720 accused of designing and leading the genocide, those whose crimes were
1721 particularly notorious or brutal or those who committed sexual torture crimes are
1722 excluded from the possibility of being tried in this traditional local system of
1723 justice. All others: murderers and accomplices, those accused of injuries or
1724 crimes against property may be prosecuted in the gacaca courts73. These courts
1725 offer substantially lighter sentences in exchange for total cooperation and
1726 confession of the truth by the accused. Although doubts may arise as regards
1727 whether the gacaca system is “sufficient” in considering that justice has been
1728 done74, the fact is that it has allowed to speed up prosecutions75, while opening
1729 a door to participation by local communities and enabling the perpetrators to be
1730 reintegrated in these communities.
72
The Organic Act that establishes these courts may be consulted at: http://www.inkiko-
gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/Organic%20Law%2027062006.pdf. No. 28/2006 of 27/06/2006
Organic Law modifying and complementing Organic Law no. 16/2004 of 19/06/2004
establishing the organisation, competence and functioning of Gacaca Courts charged with
prosecuting and trying the perpetrators of the crime of genocide and other crimes against
humanity, committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994.
73
Neil J. Kritz. “Progress and Humility: the ongoing search for post-conflict justice”. In:
Bassiouni (Ed.) Post-Conflict… op. cit., p. 77.
74
It is criticised not only from the side of the victims, but also from that of the accused. The
former complain that the trials are fundamentally based on the accounts of witnesses and that
the latter are not afforded sufficient protection; while the accused denounce the fact that they
are not assisted by a lawyer, which means that their entitlement to defence is undermined. A
report on Trials in Gacaca Courts may be found at: http://www.inkiko-
gacaca.gov.rw/En/EnIntroduction.htm
75
The numbers of those accused of crimes related to the 1994 genocide exceed 100,000
persons, many of whom were confined in prisons awaiting trial.
54
1731 On the other hand, there are also doubts about if certain "alternative" forms of
1732 justice comply with international standards in the area of the protection of
1733 human rights. This is the case, for instance, in Indonesia, where as well as
1734 ordinary justice, there is also recognition for Islamic justice (sharia) and
1735 traditional justice (adat). Sharia is only applied to Muslims in areas of family,
1736 criminal and property law. It has its own specific courts and an authority
1737 (Wilayatul Hisbah) that is in charge of supervising the intervention of the courts
1738 under Islamic law. The traditional adat justice system is used for settling
1739 community conflicts and mediating between neighbours.
1740 Discriminatory practices for reasons of gender have been documented (an
1741 Islamic judge is more reticent about granting a divorce to a woman than to a
1742 man), as well as the application of corporal punishments. Both sharia and adat
1743 may prescribe punishments such as whipping, caning and rotan (rattan) caning.
1744 Corporal punishment is also meted out in indigenous justice in Latin America.
1745 The case-law of the Colombian Constitutional Court has declared the
1746 constitutionality of the fuete (whipping) and the cepo (stocks) methods when
1747 applied in the context of indigenous jurisdiction76.
1748 The Colombian Constitutional Court has even had occasion to issue a
1749 statement on the constitutionality of certain punishments used in the course of
1750 application of indigenous jurisdiction. Thus, it has analysed the constitutionality
1751 of measures such as banishment from indigenous territory, in the light of the
1752 constitutional prohibition on exile, coming to the conclusion that banishment is
1753 not equivalent to exile because the person may remain within Colombian
1754 territory. Hence it considers such banishment to be constitutional, as long as the
1755 punishment is not extended to include the convict's family. As I have already
1756 mentioned, the Constitutional Court has also established the "constitutionality"
1757 of punishments like the fuete or the cepo, arguing that in accordance with the
1758 indigenous cosmovision they may not be considered to be torture or inhumane
1759 or degrading treatment, as on the contrary, they allow the individual to be
1760 reintegrated into the community77.
1761 However, the Constitutional Court declares in its Sentence T-254 of 1994 that
1762 “the imperative laws prevail over uses and customs as long as they protect a
76
Sentences T-254 of 1994; T-349 of 1996 and T-523 of 1997.
77
Colombian constitutional case-law in relation to this matter is analysed in: Edgar Solano. “La
jurisdicción especial indígena ante la Corte constitucional colombiana” (Special indigenous
jurisdiction before the Colombian Constitutional Court). In: Ordóñez Cifuentes (Coord.). “La
construcción del Estado nacional: democracia, justicia, paz y Estado de Derecho” (The
construction of the national State: democracy, justice, peace and the rule of law”) XII Jornadas
Lascasianas, UNAM, 2004. PDF version available at:
http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/libro.htm?l=1333
55
1763 constitutional value that is superior to the principle of ethnic and cultural
1764 diversity”78. Therefore, it acknowledges that there are principles that should
1765 prevail over the latter. In fact, the Colombian Constitutional Court is categorical
1766 in claiming that no violations of human rights protected by ius cogens rules
1767 should be allowed, where the latter are defined as those that may not be
1768 repealed under any circumstance (the right to life, the prohibition on torture and
1769 cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment and the prohibition on slavery, which
1770 it considers to be “intangible rights”). The problem arises the moment that
1771 someone considers corporal punishment to be torture or at least inhumane or
1772 degrading treatment79. However, it is important to remember that for the
1773 indigenous people, long prison sentences are much worse than corporal
1774 punishment. Reclusion may lead to the death of the spirit. Moreover, corporal
1775 punishment is of course not worse than the death penalty, which is applied in
1776 the U.S., where, paradoxically, there is considerable criticism of the
1777 acknowledgement granted to these indigenous practices. However, it is
1778 possible to be against the two things: both the death penalty and corporal
1779 punishment.
1780 In any case, it is an important debate there is a clear issue as regards limits:
1781 how far it is possible to go in acknowledging different cultural parameters and,
1782 consequently, in promoting the fundamental principles. In my opinion there are
1783 clear limits: thus, for example, in the case of corporal punishment, cultural
1784 sensitivity should not under any circumstances be used to justify its application
1785 to minors80. The question of limits may be formulated in a positive manner,
1786 according to which they are defined as the pursuit and identification of the
1787 common elements (fundamental principles) that should be present in any
1788 cultural and legal setting.
1789 From our point of view, social transformation is the most difficult goal to be
1790 attained. Nonetheless in some contexts it is absolutely necessary in order for
1791 peace to be consolidated; for instance, in the ethnic melting pot of the Balkans.
1792 The countries in the Western Balkans are either partners in the process of
1793 association and stabilisation with the European Union or candidates for
1794 membership (Croatia and Macedonia). They have a real chance of joining the
1795 European Union and since the beginning of the association and stabilisation
1796 process (Zagreb, 2000), a great deal of money has been invested towards
78
Edgar Solano. “La jurisdicción… op. cit., p. 4.
79
See, for example: V. J. Cabedo Mallol. “La jurisdicción especial indígena de Colombia y los
derechos humanos” (The special indigeneous jurisdiction in Colombia and human rights).
Available at: http://www.alertanet.org/F2b-VCabedo.htm . Also highly critical: Brian Williams.
“Victims of crime and community justice”, 2005, 176 p. see in particular p. 71 onwards.
80
See: “Against corporal punishment, moving toward constructive child discipline”. UNESCO
Report. Available at: http://www.nospank.net/unesco.pdf
56
1797 promoting the necessary transformations: economic development, human

1798 rights, the rule of law, institutional stability, the existence of a functioning market
1799 economy, democracy. These are the conditions or guidelines that have been
1800 set out as the criteria for entry since the Copenhagen Summit. Neither is the
1801 accession process exempt from political considerations (consider the case of
1802 the conflict between Macedonia and Greece over the issue of the former’s
1803 name, which may sabotage its aspirations to join the EU; or the difficulty in
1804 attaining the requirement that will be demanded in each of the future
1805 enlargements: the European Union’s capacity for absorption). Many of these
1806 countries have benefited from notable political and institutional transformation
1807 and despite encountering major problems (some of the Balkan countries are still
1808 struggling to be able to attain the Millennium Goals by 2015), the fact is that
1809 these changes have not been accompanied by a social transformation. They
1810 are still societies that interpret and define themselves by exclusion on the basic
1811 of ethnicity, adorned by a nationalism based on membership of an ethnic group.
1812 It was not possible to organise the co-existence of Macedonians and Albanians
1813 in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The theory is one
1814 thing; the Albanian minority is guaranteed representation in Parliament, for
1815 example, but in practice, interethnic relations are practically non-existent. The
1816 two communities live back to back. In the Macedonian context, despite the fact
1817 that it was recently on the brink of an internal conflict, it may not be possible to
1818 speak of a quest for peace, but rather of a desire for sustainable peace or, if
1819 one prefers, for conflict prevention. In this regard, the initiatives to promote a
1820 social transformation and to foster and promote relations and even integration
1821 between the ethnic groups would appear to be essential. In such contexts, it is
1822 often the governments that are more interested in maintaining the status quo
1823 and therefore the action of the international community is even more
1824 indispensable, if this is possible. The international community needs to be able
1825 to rely on local organisations with a capacity to influence that is sufficient in
1826 order to provide support for the necessary changes.
1827 In this sphere, the alliance between the international organisations and local
1828 civil society is essential. This must be taken into account when planning peace
1829 operations. It is necessary to identify the local actors and delegate on them part
1830 of the actions that are required in order to bring about social transformation.
1831 There is no need to insist on the importance that cultural sensitivity may have in
1832 this type of contexts.
1833
1834 3. FINAL REFLECTIONS
1835 In applying the paradigm of cultural sensitivity or a cultural approach, the great
1836 challenge is to identify a common cultural substrate, a minimum common
1837 denominator that is linked to respect for persons and their basic rights. This
57
1838 common substrate may be found in the international legal system, some of
1839 whose rules may be considered to be the elements that form an international
1840 material constitution.
1841 It seems clear that when making concessions in the area of justice in order to
1842 benefit peace, there is certainly a clear limit: impunity should not be
1843 acknowledged in cases of gross, massive and systematic human rights
1844 violations. No cultural paradigm can change this rule, which would be one of the
1845 components in this cultural substrate to which I referred previously.
1846 A situation that is reached by guaranteeing this type of impunity may not be
1847 called “peace”. Perhaps peace may be attained, but it will not be sustainable if it
1848 is achieved without a guarantee being provided for the human rights of all.
1849 It seems obvious that a peace agreement that fails to guarantee the rights of all
1850 parties shall not be lasting as is bound to be altered. The Sedjic and Finci cases
1851 also demonstrate the importance of the existence of international bodies that
1852 act as the guarantors of human rights.
1853 Throughout this paper, reference has also been made to situations that
1854 demonstrate that although in applying the cultural approach it is possible to
1855 acknowledge different ways of “enforcing justice”, it should be a requirement
1856 that human rights be respected, at least those that are unrepealable. In this
1857 regard, the reference made by the Colombian Constitutional Court to the
1858 existence of an “intercultural consensus” regarding the need to preserve the
1859 intangible human rights is highly illustrative81 .
1860 At least those human rights that are protected by the imperative rules of general
1861 international law should be considered to be filters when acknowledging any
1862 local practice or custom and should therefore be considered to be fundamental
1863 principles in any cultural setting. At least those rights should be considered to
1864 be genuine universal voices that could come together to form a cultural
1865 Esperanto, which is necessary in order to facilitate communication between
1866 different cultural universes.
1867 More efficient planning of peace operations or of any transitional model will be
1868 achievable after this Esperanto has been identified and after recognition has
1869 been provided to the cultural context in which the international community has
1870 to intervene in order to promote and consolidate peace.
1871
81
The Peruvian Constitution of 1993 establishes that human rights are a limit for the
acknowledgement of indigenous jurisdiction (article 149 – Available at:
http://www.cajpe.org.pe/rij/bases/legisla/peru/consper.HTM). In the Colombian Constitution, the
Constitution itself and the laws are the established limit.
58
1872 ANNEX D: THE POLITICAL-LEGAL DIMENSION OF INTERCULTURAL

1873 AWARENESS. A PROPOSAL FOR APPLICATION IN STABILITY AND
1874 RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS82
1875
1876 1. INTRODUCTION
1877 The fight against international terrorism, the need to intervene in States affected
1878 by humanitarian crises or to reconstruct them after major conflicts, has led in
1879 recent years to intense intervention in countries where the cultural, social,
1880 political and religious culture is different to the concepts of same that exist in the
1881 Western countries and more specifically, in NATO countries. The experience
1882 gained in these years and in these missions proves that the fact of troops
1883 receiving limited or non-existent training on the cultural issues prevailing in the
1884 scenarios where they were to carry out their intervention has led, or may lead,
1885 to the failure of some important operations. Traditionally, cultural aspects were
1886 not included in NATO’s operational, planning and training procedures. There is
1887 no doctrine making this kind of training mandatory or dealing with religious and
1888 cultural issues in the context of such operations. The specific policies regarding
1889 cultural, legal or religious issues are left for each State to determine, so different
1890 commands may interpret what is meant by “respect for local culture” in different
1891 ways.
1892 Cultural awareness implies, on the one hand, the ability to understand our own
1893 cultural values, beliefs and perceptions, and, on the other, the ability to
1894 comprehend and interpret the values, beliefs and perceptions of those that
1895 interact in our operational surroundings, be they friends or adversaries. This
1896 means that cultural issues have a two-pronged effect on military State
1897 intervention or peacekeeping operations. (a) On the one hand, the soldiers that
1898 make up multinational formations come from a great variety of cultural
1899 environments and should be capable of dealing with their differences in such a
1900 manner that they can work efficiently together. (b) On the other hand, they have
1901 to adapt the way that they operate to the circumstances prevailing in each
1902 scenario in order to maintain good relations with the local population and attain
1903 success, especially in post-conflict reconstruction.
1904 However, there is an issue that is part of what intercultural awareness means
1905 and which is linked to the above and to the missions in which the armed forces
1906 take part and on which armies need to receive training, at least when
82
Written by Mª Conception Pérez Villalobos. Professor of Constitutional Law. University of
Granada (Spain)
59
1907 intervening in two kinds of operations: those in which the mission includes the
1908 reconstruction of the States and those in which it is necessary to take into
1909 account the structures already in existence that can be used and which can
1910 serve as the basis for creating new mechanisms for stabilising the States.
1911 These missions may only be carried out successfully by being knowledgeable
1912 about the structures of power that exist in each culture.
1913 Culture is universal in human experience but each local or regional cultural
1914 manifestation is unique; i.e. each culture has developed in a unique, particular
1915 way. It is true that culture is stable, but it is also dynamic, with an ongoing and
1916 constant tendency towards change. That is what it is said that culture is stable
1917 and changeable at the same time. The phenomenon of culture has an intrinsic
1918 relativism, because all peoples judge ways of life that are different to their
1919 own in a negative light. It is taken for granted that one’s own way of life is
1920 preferable to all others. Those that have dedicated more study to the
1921 phenomenon of culture, such as anthropologists and political scientists, are in
1922 agreement in highlighting the relativism of culture. Thus it is not possible to think
1923 of a recipe that is valid on a universal basis, because the conflicts and tensions
1924 that can arise are absolutely unpredictable. This is not merely because the
1925 problems may be very numerous and impossible to imagine, but also because
1926 the situation in each country is different. The strength and the depth of the
1927 autochthonous cultures vary greatly and there are also huge variations in how
1928 they may have evolved historically and in how the cultures existing in a single
1929 country may have come closer together and exercised reciprocal influences on
1930 each other.
1931 The first manifestation of culture is always the way in which each people
1932 organises their co-existence as a social group and this is always done, in all
1933 societies and at all historical times, by means of rules. These rules have legal
1934 content the moment that compliance with them is felt to be mandatory and
1935 binding on the whole community. This sentiment in turn depends on the cultural
1936 element. Therefore, only if I understand the rule to be legitimate will I be able to
1937 comply with it, because I will feel linked to it; this is a cultural sentiment and I
1938 may be bound to it with instruments as wide-ranging as tradition, custom, force,
1939 obedience to a leader or a democratic election. In any case, failure to comply
1940 with it is associated to a sanction for having infringed a social code. This
1941 element is constant and permanent in all societies; it is present in all societies
1942 without exception, in spite of the cultural relativism to which we referred above.
1943 Therefore, it is also possible to identify cultural and legal elements that are
1944 common in the political organisation of States and which if destroyed, bring
1945 about the destabilisation of the entire structure of the state and society and if
1946 maintained or properly implemented, bring about a more rapid process of
1947 stabilisation of the State in question.
1948 There are some cultural elements that are common to all societies, States and
1949 human groups, but there are others that present significant differences.
60
1950 However, awareness of Law is universal and is present in all cultures. By

1951 ‘universal awareness of Law’, we refer to the body of precepts that govern the
1952 peaceful co-existence of people living in society, in accordance with a superior
1953 ideal or criterion of justice83. Beyond this universal concept, the word ‘law’ may
1954 be understood in two different ways: as a rule (the set of rules that enable the
1955 peaceful co-existence of mankind in society) or as a science (a systematic
1956 body of knowledge about the rules to which the other meaning refers). These
1957 meanings are also common to all legal systems. They may be identified in all
1958 societies that are structured as Rule of Law systems and also in societies that
1959 are destructured, in crisis or organised in present-day feudal or tribal systems.
1960 Despite the fact that it is not possible to establish a universal legal system,
1961 precisely because of the cultural differences, it is possible to reduce to scientific
1962 terms how each of the cultural systems is organised and to establish how
1963 concepts like "law" and "right", "authority" and "power" are understood by
1964 different cultures. There is no universal content as regards these concepts that
1965 might be extended to all cultures and therefore we cannot resort to formulae
1966 that are unique and equal for all. All cultures regulate social relations by laws,
1967 but in some, the law is the expression of popular will and in others, it is the
1968 manifestation of the power of God. All cultures group these laws in legal
1969 corpuses that are the basis for their Law, but in some, Law is a systematic order
1970 containing rules that determine how laws are implemented (Rule of Law
1971 systems) and in orders, conflicts are settled according to the divine law that has
1972 been revealed previously. The concepts of authority and power are also present
1973 in the background, because compliance with laws is imposed in societies by
1974 those that have to power to do so and in others, by the authority of those that
1975 issue them84. The degree to which they are complied with will depend on this
1976 factor.
83
There is a concept that is common to all societies, regarding justice as an ideal to which
society aspires. The Greeks were the first to define Justice as a “universal law”, in the first
place. Secondly, as the main social virtue, in the sense that it is only when mankind comes
together in human groups, to form societies, that they may practise the virtue of Justice; in other
words, it is only when I co-exist with another person that I can be fair, that I have someone to
whom to be fair. Therefore, for Western civilisation, Justice is closely linked to equality and in
systems of Law, it is associated to the Roman idea of summ quique tribuere (to give each his
own): Justice is understood as equality among equals and inequality among unequals. In Islam,
it is the word that is most often repeated, precisely because Islam aspires to universal Justice.
However, the content is not always the same as that which was bestowed on the concept by the
Greeks and the Romans.
84
The Romans used to distinguish between two concepts to refer to authority and power, which
were identified with auctoritas and potestas; on the one hand, with knowledge that was socially
acknowledged and on the other, with power that was socially acknowledged. See: DOMINGO,
R.: Auctoritas, Ariel, Barcelona, 1999.
61
1977 All of these elements that have an impact on the “legal-political culture” of a
1978 State or organised social group are influenced by factors of different kinds:
1979 anthropological, psycho-social, economic, historical, religious, etc., which must
1980 be taken into account in order to attain a complete understanding of each legal-
1981 political culture. Therefore, the content of this document should be transversally
1982 linked to all of the dimensions studied in objective 4.3 of MNE-6.
1983 The analysis carried out in this study has been structured as follows:
1984 First of all, we will identify the elements that make up a legal culture, paying
1985 close attention to those that legitimise the law and the exercise of power.
1986 Although some of these may be attributed universal value, others are heavily
1987 dependent on each particular culture and require specific study. Therefore, for
1988 practical purposes, we will basically concentrate on Western political systems
1989 and Islamic systems, in view of the different ways in which the law and the Rule
1990 of Law are conceived in each one. Once we have completed this part, we will
1991 have the conceptual framework that is necessary in order to approach the
1992 second part.
1993 These concepts then have to be applied in the general scenario of a stability
1994 operation, in which the ultimate objective is to set up or restore a framework for
1995 coexistence that is stable and safe. This objective is closely linked to success in
1996 establishing a legal-political system that is compatible with the culture of the
1997 social group under consideration: this is the only way that its governability may
1998 be guaranteed.
1999 There are three sequential stages in a standard operation of these

2000 characteristics: preparation prior to the intervention and, during the actual
2001 intervention, a stage of stability followed by a stage of reconstruction. The
2002 purpose of our study is to determine which elements of the legal culture of a
2003 society on which the intervention is carried out are the most relevant in each of
2004 these stages, in order to assist decision-making in the area of governability.
2005 As regards the first stage, we have to insist that the success of an operation of
2006 this kind will largely depend on prior preparation of the direct intervention on the
2007 social group under consideration; i.e. the knowledge that is available about their
2008 culture and, given that the law is the expression of culture85, about the elements
2009 on which their political and legal organisation are based. As regards the scope
2010 of this study, it presents a general overview of the main cultures, the families of
2011 legal cultures and their political structures of power. These elements are
2012 essential and should be taken into account at the stage of preparing and
85
See HÄBERLE, P.: Teoría de la Constitución como ciencia de la Cultura, Tecnos, Madrid,
2000
62
2013 planning an operation, even months or years in advance, whether the aim is to
2014 stabilise a regime that already exists or to replace it with another.
2015 In the second stage, the concepts that are studied are mostly aimed at military
2016 actors, because they are normally the protagonists in this period that is
2017 characterised by the priority need to establish a level of security that allows to
2018 pass on to the third stage; for these soldiers, it is fundamental to know how to
2019 connect with the society that they are entering. It is important that the local
2020 population should not feel that their culture is under threat from the external
2021 intervention or that certain rules that are foreign to their culture are being
2022 imposed.
2023 Stability and post-conflict reconstruction and intervention in contra-insurgence

2024 operations generally constitute decisive stages in dealing with crises and
2025 modern conflicts. That is why planning a strategy that will ensure the stability
2026 and governability of the State is probably the most complicated part. At that
2027 moment, implementing cultural awareness is of transcendental importance, far
2028 above the role that it may have in a conventional war. To study, analyse and
2029 process the cultural elements and propose a state reconstruction model in
2030 accordance with the culture of the host society, is the essential tool “in winning
2031 over the hearts and minds”86, the trust and cooperation of the local population,
2032 who should perceive the reconstruction of the State as a legitimate action. In
2033 other words, “whoever has control over culture has control over power”87,
2034 because the way in which a society is organised is none other than the prime
2035 manifestation of its culture; how politics are organised is always a reflection on
2036 how culture is organised and if a post-conflict reconstruction that is culturally
2037 adequate is achieved, it will be socially perceived to be legitimate and will have
2038 the support and collaboration of the population, which is an indispensable
2039 condition in order for it to be fast, efficient and lasting in time.
2040
Whoever has control over culture has control over power

2041
2042 Reconstruction, which is the third stage of the operation, requires that it is
2043 necessary to clearly identify which elements have to be created or restored and
2044 how this should be done in order that they may be “culturally compatible”. The
2045 study is now intended for both military and civilian actors because at this stage,
86
See R. DIDZIULIS, J.: “Winning the battle for hearts and minds: operationalizing cultural
awareness during stability operations”
87
See VALADES, D.: El control del poder, Mexico, 1998
63
2046 it is essential that both components should intervene in reconstructing the State.
2047 The role of the armed forces will be aimed in particular at maintaining security
2048 and supporting civilian reconstruction and, depending on the situation of the
2049 State, they may collaborate with civilian bodies or even assume responsibility
2050 for these functions. In any case, the way in which they proceed should be
2051 adapted to civilian and not military intervention parameters and military
2052 elements should act according to civilian and not military models. Therefore, the
2053 military component will have to have clear knowledge of the legal model that is
2054 to be set up in order that it may efficiently contribute towards the general
2055 reconstruction effort.
2056 Finally, we will present the conclusions, which will underline the importance of
2057 including in the multi-level training of all participating actors, including the
2058 military, the knowledge and aptitudes that are necessary in order to identify the
2059 elements that define the legal culture of the social group in which a stability
2060 operation is to be carried out, in order to design a legal-political system that is
2061 compatible with this culture, in order to adapt the strategic planning of the
2062 operation to the model that is to be set up and to carry out the operation in such
2063 a manner that the host society perceives the objectives and actions of the
2064 external actors to be legitimate. This is the model that is derived from the
2065 comprehensive approach to multinational operations under civilian leadership88,
2066 the conclusion of which will be the transfer of power to the civilian authorities
2067 that take over state control; but which will in advance have consolidated the
2068 state structures to an extent that prevents the State from disintegrating and
2069 enables their natural integration in the international system, after the civilian-
2070 military multinational coalition leaves. This will be the only reliable indicator of
2071 the success of the completed operation.
2072
2073 2. ELEMENTS THAT IDENTIFY A STATE'S LEGAL-POLITICAL CULTURE
2074 2.1. A universal legal culture?
2075 We have mentioned the impossibility of making law uniform throughout the
2076 world, despite the efforts to equal the rules in force on a universal scale. This
2077 has limited or prevented the imitation or copying of legislative formulae that may
2078 have achieved magnificent results in one country, but fail in another. National
2079 experiences are unrepeatable and they cannot be transferred to other
88
See PAREJA, I., and COLOM, G.: “El enfoque integral (Comprehensive Approach) en la
gestión de crisis internacionales” (The comprehensive approach in managing international
crises), ARI, no. 115/2008. Real Instituto Elcano.
64
2080 surroundings, no matter how successful they may have been in a particular
2081 State or at a particular time, basically because of the cultural differences in
2082 existence. All of these differences and difficulties that are inherently cultural in
2083 origin are compounded by the influence of a typically legal component: the legal
2084 system to which they belong. As well as the continental European system that is
2085 based on Roman law and on encoding, we have the Anglo-Saxon
2086 consuetudinary law - generally referred to using the expression "common law",
2087 the African consuetudinary system, Islamic law, Indian law, the legal systems of
2088 the Far Eastern countries, etc.… Therefore, if we look at the issue from a
2089 universal perspective, we know that there are multiple legal approaches,
2090 involving different concepts, criteria, techniques and circumstances, of such
2091 dimensions and range of influence that unification on a worldwide scale is
2092 rendered extremely difficult. We can go even further: actual experiences in the
2093 area of regional integration demonstrate that there are differences that may not
2094 be overlooked even between countries that belong to the same legal system
2095 and which are linked by ties of historical and geographical proximity.
2096 In this context and in the light of these difficulties, the constitutional approach is
2097 the one that can best help to pinpoint the legal elements that are common to all
2098 systems, not just because it is a legal standard that can be found in all of them,
2099 but because Constitutions are the clear legal reflection of a people's culture. To
2100 quote the German constitutionalist P. Häberle: “Constitution is culture. This
2101 means that it does not consist merely of legal material: the Constitution is not
2102 just the legal order for the jurists, by which they interpret old and new rules. The
2103 Constitution is also essentially a guide for those that are not jurists: for citizens.
2104 The Constitution is not merely a legal text or a regulatory work; it is also the
2105 expression of a cultural situation, an instrument by means of which people
2106 represent themselves, a mirror of their cultural heritage and the foundation on
2107 which their hopes are based. ‘Living’ Constitutions, as the work of all of the
2108 constitutional interpreters in an open society, are the means and the material
2109 that best express and mediate culture, the framework for cultural (re)production
2110 and reception and the receptacle in which to save accumulated cultural
2111 ‘information’, experiences, learning and wisdom. Its cultural validity is of similar
2112 depth”89.
2113 There is space for all cultures in the constitutional approach, because the
2114 Constitution is a reflection of culture and that is why they incorporate what is
2115 important to peoples90. The laws of a people always describe the way in which
2116 the people in question wish to live, the principles on which they wish to build
89
See HÄBERLE, P.: Teoría de la Constitución como ciencia de la Cultura, Cit.
90
For example, article 16 of the Constitution of Ukraine of 1996 refers to Chernobyl, or article 20
of the Constitution of Gabon of 1991, to its national feast-day or to the national anthem, as the
cultural elements are manifested as elements of a people’s identity.
65
2117 their social relations, who they wish to control them or to whom they entrust the
2118 power of regulating their co-existence; this is, in essence, the culture of a
2119 people. Constitutional techniques allow us to learn about these resources and
2120 therefore, to acquire a deeper knowledge of a people's culture. It is not in vain
2121 that the concept of ‘Constitution’ has been widely used by cultural anthropology
2122 and ethnology in a non-legal sense91.
2123 The different legal cultures that have arisen down through history also contain
2124 differences that reflect the way of life of each society, meaning that the
2125 grounding for their legal systems and laws is also different. Any legal culture is
2126 grounded in a legal philosophy that is enriched by traditions and by an
2127 evolutionary development that is increasingly deeper and more rooted, so that
2128 its existence ends up seeming evident, as if it had always been like that. This
2129 statement coincides with the idea expressed by Häberle in the sense that the
2130 context of constitutional texts may only be explained by referring to their cultural
2131 context. For example, in any Western society, based on liberal constitutionalism
2132 and on the same cultural values, the legal concepts of liberty and equality are a
2133 profound and evident part of the mindset of its citizens, so much so that they
2134 are not even questioned. This same phenomenon is observed among the
2135 citizens of Islamic States for whom it is evident that some constitutional
2136 concepts, such as liberty or equality, for example, are dressed with
2137 connotations that belong to the history and tradition of Islamic law itself.
2138
The Constitution is the most efficient instrument in stabilising societies

and laying the foundations for a Rule of Law as it subjects cultural
elements to legal rules
2139
2140 We can use the following sequence to depict in schematic form the elements
2141 that identify the political systems and the legal systems that we are going to
2142 describe in the next section of this document:
91
MALINOWSKI, B.: Eine Wissenschaftliche Theorie der Kultur, 1975.
66
CULTURAL LEGITIMACY LEGITIMACY OF POWER LEGITIMACY OF LAW
Cultural Systems Political systems Legal Systems
Western Western Rule of Law systems

- Europe democratic Islamic Law
- America - Europe
Asia - America
Africa Islamic
2143
2144 We have used the term "cultural legitimacy" to refer to how a society identifies
2145 its customs and how they are used to build government structures. Every
2146 culture supports its social structure and its power relationships on the forms that
2147 it has inherited by tradition or by means of a rational intellectual process, which
2148 also incorporates a cultural element. For example, traditional African societies
2149 base their political organisation on inherited traditions, whereas Western
2150 societies have based their “constitutional culture” on processes of rationality.
2151 The two cultural systems have reasons on which to base power - which will be
2152 legitimate if it is acknowledged as such by individuals. What Constitutions do is
2153 to bring together the elements that each culture identifies as being fundamental
2154 and to legitimise them92.
2155 We have used the term “legitimacy of power” to the exercise of the power that is
2156 perceived to be legitimate by a society. Political legitimacy refers to the exercise
2157 of power. Political power that is perceived to be legitimate will be obeyed on a
2158 majority basis, whereas that which is perceived to be illegitimate will be
2159 disobeyed, unless obedience is obtained by means of State violence. “Political
2160 legitimacy” could therefore be defined from two perspectives: from that of those
2161 that obey and from that of those that have the control.
92
For instance, the consideration that trees are inhabited by the spirits that founded the cultures
of some African people has warranted constitutional protection. Or the Preamble of the African
Charter on Human and People’s Rights, adopted on 27th June 1981, which states: “Taking into
consideration the virtue of their historical tradition and the values of African civilisation which
should inspire and characterise their reflection on the concept of human and peoples’ rights”.
This declaration led to many of these fundamental rights being subsequently incorporated into
the Constitutions of the African States, because they have been conceptualised in accordance
with their own historical tradition and values. Thus, fundamental rights historically proclaimed in
recent times have been accepted by these people because they have been understood to be
culturally legitimate.
67
2162 From the perspective of those that obey, a legitimate government is one
2163 that comes to power (legitimacy of origin) and exercises that power
2164 (legitimacy of exercise) while complying with the requirements that
2165 those who obey believe should be complied with in order to exercise
2166 control.
2167 From the perspective of those that exercise control, a legitimate

2168 government is one that comes to power and exercises that power while
2169 showing those that obey that it complies with the requirements in order to
2170 exercise control.
2171 Therefore, legitimacy is a commitment between both sides. Of course, the

2172 theory of legitimacy does not judge in advance the virtue or goodness or
2173 badness of a particular political regime, but rather simply examines the
2174 mechanisms of control and obedience. Needless to say, in general, when power
2175 loses its legitimacy it ceases from being power, unless coercion is exercised.
2176
When power loses legitimacy it is no longer power, unless coercion is

exercised
2177
2178 We have used the term “legitimacy of law” to refer to the law that is issued by
2179 the body that is legitimately acknowledged as being competent to issue same.
2180 In democratic constitutional states the body that issues the law is a
2181 representative body because the law is the expression of popular will. These
2182 legal systems are also Rule of Law systems because both the citizens and the
2183 public powers submit to the law. Other legal systems also have laws to regulate
2184 their co-existence but are based on instances of legitimation. In this document
2185 we will present only the Islamic legal system in contrast to Rule of Law systems.
2186 2.2. Legitimacy of Power. Political systems
2187 2.2.a. CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON

2188 POWER AND LEGITIMACY
2189 The various political regimes are no more than the effective political solutions
2190 that a community adopts for its self-government. The political institutions that
2191 make them up should answer the following questions:
2192 a) Who has the power to make decisions? How are they elected?
2193 b) How and why does the community accept the authority of those that
2194 have power?
68
2195 c) Does the power to make decisions lie with one person or with several?
2196 How is this power organised?
2197 d) Why do those that exercise control do so? What are their goals and
2198 limitations?
2199 e) What are public liberties?
2200
2201 In order to answer these questions, we must first of all define the concepts of
2202 Power, legitimacy and sovereignty. Power and legitimacy are linked to and
2203 identified with the concept of sovereignty. This is a term that allows for several
2204 interpretations as power may be understood to mean the manifestation of a
2205 State's sovereignty and power as the authority with which a certain conduct is
2206 imposed. In turn, authority as it is understood here, materialises as the
2207 legitimacy of those that impose this conduct, i.e. only those that have
2208 sovereignty have the legitimacy to impose a form of conduct on citizens93.
2209 Despite the many definitions that may be assigned to “political power” and
2210 “legitimacy”, we may briefly sum up that Power is the ability to influence
2211 individual or group conduct and that legitimacy is the justification for having
2212 been invested with power. Monopoly of force is not sufficient in order to
2213 characterise power as being political, insofar as it is also for power to have
2214 been legitimised and acknowledged as being valid under some title. It is
2215 an order that subjects represent mentally as rules to be complied with. This
2216 representation rests on charisma, tradition or legality. On the other hand,
2217 Authority is the legitimation that is granted by the group in order to exercise
2218 power, which means that it is easy to deduct that Authority is not always
2219 synonymous with Power.
2220 We cannot say that Power is legitimate or otherwise without knowing in

2221 advance the predominant conception on which Power is based. In order to
2222 ascertain if Power, the way in which governors are elected and its structure and
2223 purposes, fit the 'predominant system' of beliefs held by a particular social
2224 group, we will have to carry out prior empirical analyses on the widespread
2225 state of opinion. In Western countries there are formal or institutionalised
2226 means, as well as informal means of finding out this state. For example, the
2227 typical institutionalised formal channel in democracies is what is called universal
2228 suffrage. If we wish to know the nature and characteristics of each political
2229 regime, we will have to analyse and take into account the way in which it
2230 answers the questions listed above. Only then will be know if it is a democratic
2231 system - liberal, Marxist, authoritarian, Islamic or any combination thereof.
93
See HÄBERLE, P. and KOTZUR, M.: De la soberanía al Derecho Constitucional Común,
Autonomous University of Mexico, 2003
69
2232 Simply by knowing these answers, we will be able to classify it in one of the
2233 prefabricated political categories. It is necessary to analyse the specific way that
2234 the governors of a country are elected, how they are organised and what
2235 purpose they serve, in order to be able to classify them.
2236 Political power appears in the history of non-tribal societies in the form of
2237 individualised Power and of institutionalised or State Power. The former is
2238 characterised by an entitlement based on the person that has acquired it by
2239 multiple procedures: conquest, economic dominion, personal superiority, etc.
2240 This form of Power presents serious problems: that of succession or continuity
2241 and that of abuse or arbitrariness in exercising same. Both of these problems
2242 may only be addressed by legally institutionalising Power, i.e., submitting it to
2243 rules. Institutionalised Power is power that exists “under the legal form of the
2244 State”. It is not linked to a person, but rather to a status. The law establishes the
2245 competences of Power, its functions, structures, the eligibility of its holders and
2246 the limitations to their faculties. The Law lays the foundations of the legitimacy -
2247 we might say the legal legitimacy - of the state’s Power.
2248 2.2.b. LEGITIMACY IN WESTERN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS
2249 The political legitimacy of Western States lies in the democratic element on
2250 which they base popular sovereignty. They are also constitutional Rule of Law
2251 systems. However, the West has witnessed the emergence of different kinds of
2252 systems over the course of democratic history, which depend precisely on the
2253 element of legitimacy.
2254 Some political scientists have divided political systems on the basis of two
2255 variables: the social values that are translated into legal rules, thus influencing
2256 the decision-making process and how this legitimised power or authority is
2257 exercised94. In this model, the values may be represented as ideologies or
2258 ethical precepts, or as specific social goals. Authority may be exercised on a
2259 hierarchical or pyramidal basis. Thus, four kinds of systems have been derived
2260 from crossing the two variables:
2261
2262
2263
94
APTER, D.: The Politics of Modernization, Chicago, 1965
70
Authority
Hierarchical Pyramidal
Mobilisation systems Theocratic systems

Ethical precepts
Totalitarianisms Dictatorships
Rules
Bureaucratic systems Conciliation systems
Social goals
Dictatorships Democracies
2264
2265 Mobilisation systems have a universalistic political ideology that allows issues of
2266 interest to be agreed upon as issues of value. The form of government that
2267 corresponds to this political system is totalitarianism including a charismatic or
2268 prophetic leader that mobilises with a proselytising ideology.
2269 Conciliation systems are those political systems in which the decision-making
2270 process takes place on the basis of seeking a conciliating solution to all, where
2271 the negotiation mechanisms on which the system depends take on special
2272 importance for legitimising power. Thus there are attempts to influence
2273 decision-making using diverse techniques in order to reach a situation in which
2274 the rest of the interlocutors are satisfied with the decision.
2275 Bureaucratic systems are those political systems in which the decision-making
2276 process is carried out while ensuring that legitimacy arises by virtue of rules that
2277 have already been established and institutionalised through tradition as a
2278 rational process.
2279 Theocratic systems are those political systems in which the decision-making
2280 process takes place according to rules that have already been established and
2281 institutionalised on the basis of beliefs of a religious or merely ideological
2282 nature.
2283 Government models also move between democracy and authoritarian systems
2284 depending on the legitimacy that is granted, not to the legal rule and the values
2285 on which it is supported, but to legitimacy itself in exercising power.
2286 Now if we use a crossed model of political power and political legitimacy to
2287 focus on the dynamic in which societies and States are situated between
2288 democracy and authoritarianism, we will see that the ideal type to which all
2289 governments and regimes aspire is in exercising maximum political power while
2290 enjoying the maximum political legitimacy.
71
Political
Legitimacy
+
1 4
Political -
Power +
2 3
2291
-
2292
2293 In terms of the above table, the ideal position is in field 1, in which the
2294 authorities (government or regime) enjoy a positive combination of legitimacy
2295 and political power. The antithesis, i.e. a situation that would lead to violent
2296 changes or to the disintegration of the existing government or regime existing in
2297 a situation of negative legitimacy and negative ability to exercise political power,
2298 is represented in field 3. Field 2 is that which is represented by a government or
2299 regime of an authoritarian nature in possession of positive political power but
2300 partially or entirely lacking in political legitimacy. Field 4 represents regimes or
2301 governments that are highly legitimate, but which are partially or entirely lacking
2302 in political power.
2303 The oppositions to the various governments or regimes may be situated on the
2304 same table in accordance with the degree of political legitimacy that they enjoy
2305 at a particular time and in accordance with the degree of political power, or in
2306 the case of the oppositions, with their chances of gaining access to political
2307 power. The model is conceived as being dynamic, in the sense that we can
2308 move from authoritarian regimes towards democratic systems.
2309 However, it is possible to implement new political systems in a State without

2310 their being perceived as being in principle fully legitimate: this is what is known
2311 as pre-legitimacy, which, when used correctly, can be useful in achieving
2312 ultimate adhesion to the new regime. During a period of time, power is
2313 supported more by force than by consent. In such cases, instead of the
2314 “principle of legitimacy” holding the power, it needs to be upheld by the latter.
2315 This occurs in the stage of the first governments in a new system: many citizens
2316 may resist complying with the governor’s orders, this adhesion will take place
72
2317 later on - if this criterion takes root - or the system will give way to another one
2318 with more prestige. Therefore, a pre-legitimate government is a government in
2319 which power is conferred and exercised in accordance with rules and principles
2320 that the people do not accept yet, but which respect the same cultural
2321 approaches. Pre-legitimacy is a path towards legitimacy. However, it is different
2322 to illegitimacy and usually occurs in States that suffer coups d'état in which a
2323 significant part of the population perceives the new political power while maybe
2324 not entirely acceptable, at least with a high degree of acceptance; if the coup is
2325 able to take root quickly, then it will achieve legitimacy.
2326
Pre-legitimacy may be a path towards legitimacy and be used in

regime-changing operations
2327
2328 2.2.c. LEGITIMACY IN ISLAMIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS
2329 One of the key problems affecting the study of Power in today’s Arab and
2330 Islamic societies is the problem of their legitimation. It is not a problem that is
2331 exclusively associated to this cultural area, but rather one that affects all of the
2332 new regimes that have appeared in the international context. However, in the
2333 Arab and Islamic world it presents a specific typology linked to the variations
2334 that are available as regards legitimation of the governor, depending on the
2335 interpretation that is made of Islamic law and on the form of government that is
2336 adopted (sultanates and monarchies)95.
2337 From the 19th century onwards, the Islamic world embarked on a process of
2338 modernisation that has gone through different stages. Since the 19th century,
2339 Western influence has acted on Islamic societies, leading to the splitting-up of
2340 executive power into sultanates and kingdoms that were practically
2341 independent, the precursors of modern States. This influence affected the
2342 institutional framework of the local governments, either through simple imitation
2343 or by seeking to strike a balance between the Islamic ideal and the Western
2344 system.
2345 At the end of World War I, practically the entire Arab world was under colonial
2346 domination, except for Saudi Arabia and Yemen. This meant that this entire
95
There is an immense body of work that may be quoted on the Muslim world and Islamic law.
We have limited ourselves to highlighting some of the most relevant in a very general manner.
Moreover, our intention is only to provide the key factors that make it a set of clearly
differentiated cultural and legal systems.
73
2347 region was submitted to Western public law. The formal independences or
2348 protected regimes that arose from that period onwards were marked by the
2349 imprint of European jurisdiction, but their political systems were to be a
2350 translation of those of the colonists.
2351 The great contradiction, as Abdallah Laroui (1974) pointed out, lay in the
2352 “fundamental inadequacy of the liberal system to a society that did not give birth
2353 to it”. Hence the failure of all of these imposed regimes, which were to end
2354 before the new notion of legitimacy could take hold. It was based, in the ”liberal”
2355 stage of Arab history, on the mould of the European institutions: the Egyptian,
2356 Iraqi or Transjordanian monarchies from the decade of the twenties were
2357 hereditary - contrary to the Islamic conception -, they had legislative assemblies
2358 and they established that Islam was the State religion. The exercise of
2359 imported democracy was only to provoke frequent tensions between the
2360 monarchs and the legislative branch, which were settled, as in the case of
2361 Egypt, by means of frequent dissolutions of an Assembly that was not controlled
2362 by the king or, as in the other two cases, by prior control over the electoral
2363 processes that would allow for the authoritarian exercise of power in line with
2364 the tradition in this area. In turn, the Lebanese or Syrian ”republics”, which were
2365 created in the image and likeness of the French Third Republic, were lacking in
2366 real independence and were not able to develop normal relations between the
2367 executive and the legislative branches.
2368 What is clearly evident, regardless of the casuistry that may be derived from the
2369 various processes, is that when the intention has been to establish from the top
2370 down a new legitimacy in accordance with the principles that were consolidated
2371 in the West, the people showed their rejection by defending from a
2372 fundamentalist - Salafist - perspective that the old Islamic legitimacy be
2373 updated, that there be a return to tradition, in which ”Power” and ”religion” were
2374 not separated. This conceptual unity is a fundamental and genuine element in
2375 the Islamic political-legal system, from which all of the others are derived
2376 (sovereignty, legitimacy, functions of power, sources and interpretation of the
2377 law, etc).
2378
Democratic systems should not be forcefully imposed on systems

whose legal principles are incompatible, because they will be
perceived as being illegitimate
2379
2380 In general, in scarcely evolved Islamic societies, the legitimation of the governor
2381 is found in the Sharia, but, as I say, it is necessary to take into account the
2382 various schools for interpreting Islam down through history. A government may
74
2383 be said to be legitimate, to the extent to which it complies with the Sharia.
2384 However, there is also another standard for judging legitimacy, which is the
2385 general acceptance of the type of government by those that it rules. To take the
2386 governors from a tribe that is recognised by the others - for example, from a
2387 tribe like the Quraysh, which is the tribe that is descended from the Prophet -, is
2388 a guarantee of stability for the community. A third element worthy of being
2389 highlighted is that of obedience, which for a Muslim is a precept with which
2390 compliance is mandatory, of submission to the Power that has been
2391 acknowledged as being legitimate, as a reflection of God’s will. In some
2392 societies, the population is obliged to swear an oath of submission to those that
2393 hold the power, even if it was taken by force, and this oath obliges them to
2394 obedience.
2395 Nowadays, the most developed Muslim countries, which underwent significant
2396 processes of Western influence during the 19th century and of political
2397 development during the 20th, are leading an important return to the "liberal
2398 revolution", aimed at the democratisation of the institutions and the revival of
2399 parliaments and assemblies, which means that the legitimacy of power is
2400 associated to the representative element, which also has its basis in Islamic
2401 law.
2402 This process has been accompanied by the displacement of the sources of
2403 legitimacy, from purely following Islamic law, to the Sharia, to the configuration
2404 of a system that is more or less stable, with rational legal bases that provide for
2405 participation (real or fictitious) by citizens.
2406 ”The solution to the problem of legitimacy is to achieve a significant degree of

2407 institutionalised participation through parliaments, parties, or equivalent(...); the
2408 political realities of a population that is politically mobilised and in expansion,
2409 more differentiated, more organised and more sophisticated, will require
2410 representative institutions that will generate a higher level of political legitimacy”
2411 (M. C. Hudson, 1977). This is indicated by the reality and evolution of the Arab
2412 world today, although in some regimes there is serious resistance, supported by
2413 their populations, to making more or less peaceful transitions that involve
2414 altering the current division of power.
2415
2416 3. THE LEGITIMACY OF LAW: LEGAL SYSTEMS
2417 3.1. Rule of Law systems
2418 The cultural similarities of the Western world have traditionally been centred on
2419 elements of Law, i.e. the values in each society that are derived from the
75
2420 Roman concept of lex and iuris, which are the same in all of the territories that
2421 were Romanised and to which Roman citizenship and therefore the application
2422 of Roman law, was extended. To this, we also have to add the religious values
2423 that are derived in turn from Christianity and from the extension of the rights of
2424 mankind, on the basis of the principle of equality, which is intrinsic to Christian
2425 philosophy. The Roman idea of slavery is countered by the idea of equality and
2426 the Roman idea of the connection between State and religion (the emperor was
2427 the symbol of the State and the symbol of the Roman gods) is questioned by
2428 the separation of the two (give to Caesar what is to Caesar and to God what is
2429 to God).
2430 However, these ideas were not undertaken in this way when Christianity was no
2431 longer persecuted and it became the official religion of the Empire, similar to
2432 what had happened with the Roman emperors. The same occurred with the
2433 concept of law and its content; now, the values that should inspire the creation
2434 of the law have a moral content of a religious nature, so that after Roman Law
2435 had been received by the medieval States (Corpus Iuris Civilis), confusion
2436 between the political law and the religious law ensued. This confusion is the
2437 basis for the birth of modern States. The political philosophy that endeavours to
2438 reflect on the origin of law, from William of Ockham (who marks the threshold of
2439 modernity) and the political philosophy that ends at the Enlightenment situate
2440 the States in forms of organisation of a constitutional nature.
2441 It is precisely at that historical moment that the Western states were configured
2442 as Rule of Law systems that, on the basis of enlightened approaches, subject
2443 all state interventions to the limits of the Law. Initially, this was mistaken for the
2444 principle of legality and the need for the law (equal, impartial and drawn up by a
2445 legitimate body), to be generally applied; the public powers will also adjust their
2446 actions to comply with legal rules. This the moment that all of the previous legal
2447 structures that were medieval, unequal and arbitrary in their application of the
2448 law were superseded.
2449 Obviously, in the context of this report this approach must necessarily be highly
2450 Reductionist. Despite the foregoing, we will describe in a schematic manner the
2451 fundamental elements of the Rule of Law because they will serve to establish
2452 the basic differences from other legal systems. These elements are the empire
2453 of the Law, the division of powers and acknowledgement and protection for
2454 fundamental rights.
2455 3.1.a. EMPIRE OF THE LAW
2456 The law is the expression of the general will and it is drawn up by a
2457 democratically elected body that is independent of the other state bodies and
2458 which is invested with national sovereignty. Both the citizens and the public
2459 powers, without exception, submit to the law. The law is a purely human
2460 creation. It is the main source from which Law is created, along with other
76
2461 secondary sources that remain in any case subject to it. Rule of Law systems
2462 are also usually constitutional States, because they are structured on the basis
2463 of a Constitution. The latter is configured as the basic legal rule to which all of
2464 the other rules in turn are submitted.
2465 This does not mean that non-democratic States cannot be configured as Rule of
2466 Law systems, although some authors prefer the term “State of law”; in any case,
2467 it means that citizens and public powers are submitted to certain legal rules that
2468 are decided in advance, which are implemented by procedures that are also
2469 established by the law on an equal basis in all cases. The fact of the public
2470 powers submitting to the legal rule that establishes the faculties that they may
2471 exercise reduces the arbitrariness in the exercise of power. Even when the
2472 State is not governed by democratic rules and procedures, it is good to
2473 implement Rule of Law systems that submit these actions to legal rules.
2474
The Rule of Law eliminates arbitrariness in the exercise of power

2475
2476 3.1.b. DIVISION OF POWERS
2477 State functions are divided among three different powers:
2478 Legislative, which is identified with representative Assemblies elected

2479 according to the principle of universal suffrage.
2480 Executive, which is identified with the bodies in charge of political

2481 management and of the application of government programmes.
2482 Judiciary, which is identified with the independent implementation of the

2483 law in settling conflicts, entrusted to independent judges or to popular
2484 juries, which are exclusively subject to the empire of the law.
2485
2486 None of these elements appears in pure form in the complex state structures in
2487 the Western world and therefore each state function is not always exercised by
2488 a single body, but rather there is collaboration between powers and
2489 interdependency. These are also a variety of rules depending on the body that
2490 issues them, but in general, they may be reduced to the same principles. This is
2491 completed with the possibility of controlling the actual content and the legitimacy
2492 and validity of the laws, a function that corresponds to the constitutional courts.
77
2493 3.1.c. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND PROTECTION FOR FUNDAMENTAL

2494 RIGHTS
2495 Democratic constitutional systems are ultimately characterised by the fact that
2496 they expressly acknowledge rights to citizens. This acknowledgement is
2497 incorporated either in the actual constitutional text or in documents that are
2498 attached to same, but which form part of the constitutional documents. In any
2499 case, the fact that they are constitutionally acknowledged guarantees them
2500 legal protection. These rights were incorporated into the Universal Declaration
2501 of Human Rights in 1948 with the intention of their being extended to all human
2502 beings, merely on account of their humanity, without such acknowledgement
2503 being dependent on citizen status, and therefore, of their being accepted as
2504 being fundamental in all States, so as to materialise the aspiration of the
2505 universality of the rights acknowledged in the Declaration.
2506 However, not all of the States represented in the United Nations were to accept
2507 this Declaration or to grant the same content to the rights incorporated in same.
2508 It may be said that in the 19th century, this was the most important issue for the
2509 West, because there were several “alternative” declarations describing a
2510 concept of human rights that pertains to other cultures, fundamentally Islamic
2511 culture, and which did not always coincide with the content that democratic
2512 systems invested in them. However, it is important that the Islamic world
2513 entered the debate on human rights, on how to enshrine them in law and on the
2514 guarantees to be provided to them.
2515 The rest of the cultural systems do not pose problems in connecting with the
2516 Universal Declaration, because their claims are usually regarding the
2517 acknowledgement of people’s rights and not guarantees in the legal system. On
2518 the other hand, Islam does present important legal difficulties, which generate
2519 conflicts with the international system for protecting rights, which means that the
2520 Muslim States do not usually sign International Treaties referring to fundamental
2521 rights, or do so with reservations.
2522 Western States are democratic, with constitutional courts and the Rule of Law;
2523 they have formed complete, coherent legal systems that are subject to rules as
2524 regards creation, implementation and systematic interpretation, i.e. the
2525 functioning of which is in turn subject to legal rules, which are what determines
2526 the validity of the system.
2527 Legal systems may incorporate these same elements but with different
2528 contents: for example, the law will not always be understood to mean the
2529 expression of the general will (although obviously all societies function with
2530 laws); the separation of powers may not exist in other legal systems (although
2531 obviously somebody makes the law and somebody implements it, albeit under
2532 the auspices of different kinds of bodies), and finally, the fundamental rights are
78
2533 not always understood in the same way or granted the same content or level of
2534 protection.
2535
The legal issues that differentiate societies from a cultural

perspective are: the concept of law, how powers are separated and
controlled, and fundamental rights
2536
2537 3.2. Islamic Law
2538 It has been said that Islamic law is one of the most important sources in
2539 obtaining knowledge about Islamic society and culture96.
2540 The link that exists between Law-Society-State, is already a constant in

2541 historical studies of any Law, on which there is no need to insist: the evolution,
2542 formation and progressive enrichment of the Law in a State is directly related to
2543 the degree of complexity that a Society attains. Naturally, this principle is also
2544 valid for Muslim Law, as, from this point of view, it may be said to be the direct
2545 result of the various stages, phases and evolutionary processes undergone by
2546 Islamic society, from the new changes hailed with the arrival of Mohammed, to
2547 the transformations that have occurred in the various national Law systems of
2548 present-day Muslim countries in order to adapt them to their modern political
2549 forms.
2550 Having said that, on the basis of this close link between the formation of Law
2551 and society, which is applicable not only to the Islamic element, we should insist
2552 on the Muslim specificity, on the characteristics that make Islam a legal world
2553 with a personality and hallmark that differ from the legal transformations that
2554 have occurred in other civilisations and therefore, which are worthy of very
2555 particular study.
2556 3.2.a. BRIEF HISTORICAL REFERENCE
2557 When Mohammed decided to end his private phase and become publicly known
2558 in order to disseminate divine revelation, he presented himself in the
2559 surroundings of Mecca as a religious reformer, vehemently rebelling when his
2560 fellow citizens accused him of being another fortune-teller among the many that
96
See SCHACHT, J. (1995). Law and Justice. In P.M. Holt, K. S. Lambton and B. Lewis (eds.),
The Cambridge History of Islam (chapter 4). http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/med/schacht.html
[16th May 2007]
79
2561 existed at the time. It was by chance that he decided on the legal world,
2562 because by virtue of his personal authority, he was invited in the year 622 to the
2563 city of Medina to arbitrate a tribal dispute. This petition, which was made to him
2564 as a Prophet, was to result in Mohammed's status as the legislator in a new
2565 society, built on the basis of religious principles, which would replace the Arab
2566 tribal society. The new Islamic Law was to replace the law of the clan. The
2567 notion of the tribe was replaced by that of the community (Ummah), created on
2568 the basis of the religious ideal. From being a religious leader, as he was
2569 considered in Mecca, in Medina he became a political and military leader,
2570 organising the community of believers.
2571 From this point of view, the law that was consolidated on a religious substrate
2572 was a real innovation in this social group. In principle, Muhammad had not
2573 come to change the law of the clan, which was consuetudinary; his mission, as
2574 a Prophet, was not to create a new legal order, but to teach people how to act,
2575 what to do and what to avoid doing, so that when the Day of Final Judgement
2576 arrived, they would be able to enter Paradise. That is why Islam in general and
2577 Islamic law in particular, is a system of obligations, both ritual, moral and legal,
2578 all of which are on the same plane of equality and subject to same religious
2579 imperative. The pivotal thought in Islamic law is that, if the moral and religious
2580 rules that were revealed and published by Muhammad were to be extended to
2581 all fields, aspects and relations of human behaviour, there would be no need for
2582 a legal system. However, in the end Muhammad had to bow before the
2583 evidence and resign himself to applying the new moral and religious principles
2584 to the framework of legal institutions that he had inherited. Thus commenced
2585 the process of creating the Sharia of Islamic law, with divine revelations,
2586 subsequently described in the Qur’an.
2587 3.2.b. LEGAL SOURCES
2588 While Mohammed lived, his words and revelations as described in the Qur’an
2589 were the main source of Law. The problem arose when the Prophet died. Islam
2590 was an unfinished building. It was concluded by the following generations, who
2591 had to find administrative, political, social and religious rules for many issues
2592 that had not been touched upon or sufficiently developed. This need became
2593 even more pressing when the Muslims rapidly became the rules of vast
2594 countries of different cultures. They attempted to conclude the building in the
2595 same way as they had started out, trying to find the living rule for believers in
2596 behaviour and in what Muhammad and his companions had said, i.e., in the
2597 Sunnah. Sunnah or tradition is the compilation of sayings or practices by the
2598 Prophet, according to the witness of the first Muslims that accompanied him,
2599 orally imparted to his disciplines in the form of hadith, which became the second
2600 legal source for Islam, after the Qur’an.
80
2601 In any case, both the Qur’an and the Sunnah also proved to be insufficient in
2602 responding to all of the legal problems and therefore they resorted to other
2603 sources of Law, which were based on the sayings or practices of the Muslim
2604 ulema, by the faqis or legal experts in the Qur’an and the Sunnah. This third
2605 source of Law took several forms:
2606 The ijma, or consensus between the Islamic community that are experts
2607 in the laws of a region or city, in order to find a solution to a problem that
2608 has not been addressed in the Qur’an or in the Sunnah.
2609 The qijas, the reasoning or interpretation carried out by the ulema, which
2610 may be done in three ways:
2611 o By analogy, qijas.
2612 o By deduction, ijtihad.
2613 o By personal reasoning or opinion, ra’ j
2614
2615 The following table sums up the sources of Islamic law:
The Qur’an (sacred book)
BASIC SOURCES
The Sunnah (collection of hadiths and traditions)
General sources:
− Consensus
− Analogy
− Deduction
SOURCES EMANATING
− Personal opinion
FROM JURISTS
Complementary sources:
− Customs
− Legal presumption
− Opinion of companions
− Others
2616
2617 3.2.c. SCHOOLS OF LAW
2618 The liberty in interpreting and creating Law means that, even when based on
2619 the same legal principles, there are records towards the 9th century of the
81
2620 existence of four different forms of interpretation, of four Sunni legal schools -
2621 the Maliki, the Hanifi, the Safi and the Hanbali - and one Shi’ite school, called
2622 Jafari. These schools even had their own legal Treaties, a different way of
2623 solving identical problems, a different way of applying the sources and even a
2624 different way of structuring the legal institutions. This was to influence the legal
2625 life of every State and even of every smaller territory, forming a complex reality
2626 of local historical-cultural customs.
2627 The following table depicts a synthesis of the main characteristics of these
2628 Islamic legal schools:
2629
SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS
− Creator: Abu Hanifa (d. 767/150)

− Origin: Iraqi
− Extensive use of ra’j
HANIFI
− Importance of qijas to the detriment of tradition
− Expansion in: Iraq, Iran, Turkey
− Renaissance with the Ottomans
− Half of Muslims are Hanifi
− Creator: Malik b. Anas (d. 795/179)

− Origin: Medina
MALIKI
− Rejection of ra’j
− Expansion in Al-Andalus, Maghreb, Saudi Arabia and
partially in Egypt
− Creator: al-Safí (d.820/204)

− Origin: Baghdad
− Lays the foundations of Muslim legal science
SAFI
− Indicates the limits in the use of each source
− Establishes the concept of Sunnah as a source of Law
− Expansion in Bahrain, Yemen, Indonesia, East Africa,
Egypt and Central Asia
− Creator: Ibn Hanbal (d. 855/241)

− Origin: Iraq
HANBALI − Staunch defence of tradition
− Acceptance of uncertain hadiths
− Expansion in Near East, Oman, Arabian Gulf and Saudi
Arabia (Wahhabi)
2630
82
2631 3.2.d. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ISLAMIC LEGAL SYSTEM
2632 At this point we should point out an important characteristic of Islamic legal
2633 systems that sets them apart from Western Rule of Law systems and which is,
2634 in turn, the product of an important cultural difference: the principle of the
2635 separation of powers. The division of powers in Rule of Law systems occurs as
2636 a consequence of the disappearance of the state structures in medieval
2637 European States. To understand that the State’s functions - Executive,
2638 Legislative and Judiciary − are awarded to different centres of power, means
2639 that, in turn, they may be controlled, thus creating a system of obstacles and
2640 counterweights that avoid the arbitrariness of power, submit the exercise of
2641 same to legal rules and guarantee independence and equality.
2642 However, this has nothing to do with Islamic law, where the governor, who is
2643 usually invested with what we might identify as executive power, delegates
2644 judicial functions on the cadi or judge (although, like in the case of the medieval
2645 caliphs, for example, he continues to hold on a nominal basis the power to
2646 judge). This same governor is also in charge of maintaining the law, but the
2647 capacity to create Law rests with the faqis. Thus although these functions -
2648 legislative, executive and judiciary - exist, they are not materialised in the same
2649 way as they are understood in our legal culture.
2650 This leads us to underline how in the less advanced Islamic societies, there is a
2651 separation between the legal sphere and the political power. According to the
2652 doctrinal construction of any of the four Islamic schools, the governor should not
2653 interfere in the sphere of the faqi, limiting his power of creation and adjudication
2654 to only the purely administrative and political sphere.
2655 However, throughout history, it has been essential to legislate on matters that
2656 remained outside the scope of the Sharia and therefore it was not the
2657 specialists in Law that were in charge of legislating and enforcing the rule, but
2658 rather the administrative political power, which in turn, in this matter, was
2659 dependent on the secular councils. This legal corpus is what is known as
2660 Qanun, which might be equiparated to “state rules” of all kinds (criminal,
2661 administrative, tax-related,…) and which should also be subsumed into
2662 genuinely Islamic legislation, although in many of today's societies, it is already
2663 the standard that is taking over, sometimes even being superposed on genuine
2664 Islamic law. This occurs especially in countries where Western legal colonialism
2665 is patent, with the resulting protests from the ulema, cadis, faqis and other
2666 Islamic jurists.
2667 The Qanun is precisely one of the key elements that can help in understanding
2668 the legal distortions that appear in some Muslim systems. One clear example is
2669 the situation of the Muslims in the Central Asian countries, where even before
2670 the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, the Islamic legislation was being gradually
2671 replaced with lay legislation, through the implementation of the principle of
83
2672 Qanun or the principle of legislative statism. On the other hand, it is curious that
2673 since achieving independence from the USSR in 1991, these countries have
2674 been favourable to the adoption of Islamic law and to the restoration of Islamic
2675 culture, so that the legal aspect takes priority over the political. The reason for
2676 this might lie in the fact that Moscow ignored millions of Muslims residing in the
2677 Southern republics for several decades, just as it failed to identify the religious
2678 and cultural problem in Afghanistan from 1979 onwards, extrapolating the
2679 Marxist political values and ignoring that the “atheist” Soviet army was in fact
2680 formed by a third Muslims and it was not very reasonable to send them to the
2681 Afghan front.
2682 The Qanun is also the element that can serve as a link to the constitutional
2683 system, so that at the level of constitutional rules, it may be identified with the
2684 rules of ordinary legislation from assemblies or parliaments.
2685 From here, it is possible to deduct at least four clear characteristics of Islamic
2686 systems that set them apart from Western systems:
2687 The cadi emerges as the key element in the legal system. In Muslim law,
2688 he is the pivot around which the entire legal structure revolves and
2689 functions, acquiring a level of importance that greatly exceeds the
2690 attributes of other similar posts in other societies.
2691 The consultative nature of Islamic law. This occurs especially in less
2692 advanced societies and not so much in those that already have Western-
2693 type legislative Assemblies; in the latter, it may function as a
2694 democratising element if a consultative body - Consultative Council - is
2695 created on the basis of the Western representation model. In any case,
2696 the consultative character of law refers to the need that the governor has
2697 to consult the council of elders on unrevealed issues needing canonical
2698 interpretation.
2699 Tolerance towards the practice of other law systems. This allows to
2700 create a dual practice in the implementation of the Law in the various
2701 societies. This element started to be introduced in Western societies in
2702 which constitutional systems co-exist along with autochthonous or
2703 foreign cultures, which provide their own legal systems, thus becoming
2704 one of these societies' responses to increasing interculturalism.
2705 Personal character in implementing the Law. This quality contrasts with
2706 the territorial character of the law, linked to the legal sovereignty of
2707 Western States. Because Muslim Law is an ethical product of religion,
2708 more than the result of a mere social organisation, its field of application
2709 affects all Muslims; i.e. a legal solution issued in Cairo may also be valid
2710 in a case that is raised in Morocco.
84
2711 The characteristics described above may be depicted in synthesised form in the
2712 following table showing the specifics of Islamic law:
2713
PRINCIPLES OF LAW Religious personality of Islamic law
− Influence from legal culture of

conquered countries and from the
HOW LAW IS FORMED AND
Islamic element
DRAWN UP
− Importance of the faqi in drafting the
Law
− Autonomy of Law from the State
− System of delegation: the cadi and his

interpretation as a key element in the
system
− Consultative nature, the importance of
HOW LAW IS APPLIED the consilium system, of masur
− Dual system depending on the
societies
− Predominantly urban in nature
− Predomination of personality over
territoriality
2714
2715 3.2.e. ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM
2716 As stated already, the Constitution is understood to mean the Highest Legal
2717 Rule in a State, to which all of the other rules that form the state system are
2718 submitted and according to whose parameters the validity and efficacy of the
2719 whole system must be referred. For this reason, any State whose legislation
2720 and legal system are derived from a particular Constitution or constitutional
2721 model may be considered to be a constitutional State.
2722 It is not possible, without taking into account the general and specific cultural
2723 element of each particular country, to gain knowledge of the constitutionalism of
2724 the Islamic systems; it is not possible to analyse only political, sociological or
2725 anthropological parameters. The specific cultural basis of each State, even of
2726 each local community, is fundamental.
2727 This situation means that many authors deny the possibility of configuring
2728 Western-type constitutional systems in countries that openly declare
85
2729 themselves to be of the Muslim confession, due to the special characteristics of

2730 Islamic law. It is true that there is an ideological discrepancy in understanding
2731 the fundamental rights and the legal rule, so that Muslim and Western jurists are
2732 "not always talking about the same things even when they are using the same
2733 terms” (constitution, law, legal system, human rights, etc.). Faced with this
2734 situation, we must admit that either Islamic countries are incapable of applying
2735 even the most minimum legal logic (understood to mean a scientific process
2736 applied to Law), or the schemes of legal logic in Muslim systems have their own
2737 rules.
Muslim and Western jurists are not always talking about the same
things even when they are using the same terms
2738
2739 What is the meaning of the Constitutions that have been passed by Muslim
2740 countries? Is it their own cultural projection or is it an attempt at projecting the
2741 Western model on a different cultural reality? This second option is usually
2742 doomed to fail on its own. They are an historical reflection of Western cultural
2743 colonialism in the 19th and 20th centuries, but the fact is that countries that
2744 have co-existed with Western legal forms throughout their history have
2745 managed to implement “lay" constitutional systems that are close to Western
2746 approaches (Morocco, Turkey, Egypt…). Even within the E.U., an entirely
2747 Muslim country, Bosnia, has been constitutionalised. On the other hand, the first
2748 option is the one that may be considered to be more likely to succeed. It means
2749 a genuinely European constitutional proposal, in line with the proposals of Peter
2750 Häberle’s cultural constitutionalism based on understanding legal texts within
2751 the respective cultural contexts.
2752 Nonetheless, this second way of approaching the constitutional phenomenon is

2753 not exempt from difficulties. As regards Western Law, the corpus formed by the
2754 history and development of the local civilisation has led to the formation of a
2755 Common Constitutional Law, which may be easily reduced to a system that is
2756 capable of solving any problem that arises in any legal system. This
2757 phenomenon occurs in the same way in all European and American countries,
2758 regardless of cultural differentiations, attaining the same results in historical
2759 moments that are close. On the other hand, the same development in Islamic
2760 systems has produced down through history a constitutional mosaic that is
2761 amorphous, juxtaposed, overlapping and complicated, meaning that it is
2762 impossible to speak of unified Islamic Constitutional Law. Even then, it is
2763 possible to find some common elements that are repeated in all Islamic State
2764 Constitutions:
2765 Use of Arabic as the basic language.
86
2766 Mandatory referral, in order to determine the validity of rules, including

2767 the constitution, to Islamic law or Sharia, regardless of the different
2768 sources that exist in each country.
2769 Referral to the various Islamic schools, depending on each State, in

2770 order to determine the validity of lower rules.
2771 All legal action and business must always be in line with the general
2772 principles of Islamic law.
2773 The sovereignty of any Islamic State lies with God, who is the Only
2774 Sovereign Power in the State.
2775
Despite the differences that exist between the Muslim States, the
Constitution can subject state institutions to legal rules and be the
germ for an incipient Rule of Law in these cultures
2776
2777 4. THE APPLICATION OF LEGAL-POLITICAL CULTURE IN OPERATIONS
2778 4.1. General considerations on stability and reconstruction operations
2779 Many of the wars that are currently being fought are probably not military wars,
2780 but rather cultural wars. Many of them will not be won on a military battlefield,
2781 but by developing the countries, by economic and social development and by
2782 welfare. Many political systems in the course of history have managed to be
2783 legitimised socially because they have brought welfare and security to the
2784 population. The problem of working with this idea is that it is necessary to act in
2785 a very long term in order to stabilise the States. This strategy has been
2786 followed, for example, in the operations that were first undertaken in
2787 Afghanistan, although in recent months it has not proved to be very efficient.
2788 The new security strategies move away from this concept and back to the idea
2789 of a quick military victory, probably because they have been incapable of
2790 defeating non-state actors, due to the amount of sociocultural information that is
2791 needed and because they are very lengthy operations that the armed forces
2792 engaged in reconstruction functions cannot undertake. In this regard, the new
2793 American Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, on which all U.S. military
2794 operations should be based until the year 2028, establishes as the objective the
2795 military defeat of any adversary, which if necessary in order to ensure that they
87
2796 cease their fighting, should be destroyed, even physically97, but makes it clear
2797 that no crisis may be solved by using military power on an isolated basis.
2798 Leaving aside the generalities, even the physical elimination of these insurgent
2799 elements should be planned according to the consequences that such a move
2800 may have on the State's stability.
2801 In fact, although the armed forces should maintain their combat capacity in
2802 order to achieve the military defeat of the adversary, the concept emphasises
2803 the need for them to have other capacities, which should be closer to the tasks
2804 that are assigned to the civilian component and adapted to each of the stages
2805 of an operation, in order to attain the ultimate goal of stabilising and
2806 reconstructing a State.
2807 Any stability and reconstruction operation commences with the implementation
2808 of a strictly military stage in which the use of force is necessary once the social
2809 and political crisis that threatens to totally destabilise the state structure has
2810 taken place. This would be the combat stage, which, in a conventional war
2811 setting, would imply maintaining the already existing military supremacy and in
2812 an irregular or hybrid war setting, would call for the development of other
2813 capacities such as intelligence, special operations, civilian-military cooperation,
2814 etc.
2815 Secondly, security, in order to protect the population and control the territory.
2816 These tasks end when violence ceases and authority is transferred to the
2817 civilian power and they require capacities as regards military police, intelligence,
2818 mass control and cultural knowledge of the scenarios where the action is taking
2819 place.
2820 Finally, reconstruction, which spans the set of activities aimed at re-establishing
2821 the essential services after the combats are over and that take place when the
2822 civil authorities take control of the situation. These steps may also be carried
2823 out in the context of crisis management operations or in the case of an
2824 emergency, calamity or catastrophe and require the reinforcement of the armed
2825 forces’ stability and reconstruction capacities.
2826 Rapid stabilisation of the State requires not only adequate military planning, but
2827 prior precise knowledge of at least three aspects related to the legal-political
2828 dimension of intercultural awareness:
2829 Knowledge of the State’s legal culture
97
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, US
Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 2009, [www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/
2009/CCJO2009.pdf.]. There is an interesting comment on this in COLOM, G.: “El nuevo
concepto estadounidense para el empleo de la fuerza militar” (The new U.S. concept for using
military force), ARI no. 70/2009, Instituto Elcano.
88
2830 Elements of intelligence on governability
2831 State structures and rules that must be complied with
2832
2833 The first aspect is derived from the importance of being aware of the political,
2834 social and legal reality of the society in which the operation is to be carried out,
2835 of its actual situation, which is often removed from the theoretical framework in
2836 which it appears at international level, and of the domestic sphere. Domestic
2837 legality is not always perceived correctly by the international community, which
2838 tends to interpret the structures of other States according to their own cultural
2839 criteria. All of the actors intervening in an operation of these characteristics, and
2840 each at their own level, should have a general idea of the people with whom
2841 they are going to interact and of the environment in which they are going to
2842 function and, in order to achieve that, they need up-to-date, ongoing information
2843 on the political factors that may be subject to change. This information is
2844 fundamental in order to deal with the conflict properly and it may propitiate the
2845 use of minimum force, merely intended to annul the political conditions that
2846 gave rise to the crisis.
2847 Knowledge of the legal culture of the State is probably an aspect that is more
2848 aimed at those that have to work by relating to different cultures and for those
2849 that have to win over the trust of the local powers with which they have to make
2850 reliable alliances; in these cases, making the right analysis and being
2851 successful depends on the knowledge of how the powers work and on
2852 information on the political ideology. Thus, for example, in countries with an
2853 Islamic culture, at the time of the tacit decision, it is necessary to take into
2854 account the system of Islamic principles and rules in the host society, as legal
2855 rules are not interpreted in the same way, depending on the ideology that reigns
2856 in each State, even in equally Islamic States.
2857 Lastly, those that are in charge of making decision should also have a clear
2858 knowledge of what general and specific rules should not be violated in the first
2859 stage of the intervention, the stability stage, in order, on the one hand, not to
2860 make the military operation fail and on the other, to facilitate the reconstruction
2861 process, which will generally be supported by the existing structures. At the first
2862 level, these rules are the Constitution, the law and local custom. The latter is the
2863 one that is closest to the reality of the indigenous population, so knowing it is
2864 fundamental if we are to count on the native population later on. On the other
2865 hand, neither the Constitution - if it exists, as is the case in the majority of the
2866 States in the world - nor the law do not always have a real, effective content,
2867 which means that if it is not perceived to be legitimate in the international
2868 community, violating it may help to create stronger ties to the local population
2869 and for the foreign forces to be perceived not as an invading army, but as allies.
89
2870 The general and local institutions that in the second stage might be replaced by
2871 others would be on a lower level.
2872
Stability and reconstruction should leverage and be supported

insofar as possible by the state structures existing in the host
country
2873
2874 4.2. Preparing the Operation. Knowledge of legal culture
2875 The basic strategy that should inspire the design of the legal-political structure
2876 of a stability and reconstruction operation would be as follows:
2877 Legitimacy of the intervention.
2878 Implementation or maintenance of a Rule of Law system.
2879 Maintenance of social peace.
2880
2881 As regards the legitimacy of the intervention, we are referring to the ad intra
2882 legitimacy in the host State. The international legitimacy of the intervening
2883 troops does not always condition the host population, who may not understand
2884 the international reasons that lead to the intervention and end up seeing it as an
2885 invasion of their sovereignty and independence. That is why it is important for
2886 the population to perceive that the forces taking part in the operation carry out
2887 actions that they believe to be legitimate.
2888
Action should always be under the auspices of the legitimacy of the

intervention, as it is only when power is understood to be legitimate
that it will be supported on a personal and group level. Similarly, it
is only when rules are understood to be legitimate that they may be
complied with
2889
2890 The implementation or maintenance - if it already exists - of a Rule of Law

2891 system is essential in achieving peace and security in the State. In the case of
90
2892 non-democratic systems, social acceptance of the law will enable it to be

2893 complied with:
2894 What law? The existing law if it provides security and is culturally
2895 legitimate. If it is necessary to repeal this law, the new law that is issued
2896 must be supported by the population and therefore it is important to
2897 consider who will make the new law and the content it will have to have.
2898 Who makes it? The legitimate bodies that exist at the time of the
2899 intervention; if there has been a defeat, others that replace them and that
2900 are accepted by the society; if it is not possible to resort to them
2901 (normally because they are corrupt bodies that do not have the support
2902 of the population), the rule may be imposed by the occupying power,
2903 supported by international rules. In this case, the content of the law
2904 should be only that which is necessary in order to maintain security while
2905 the state institutions are being reconstructed.
2906
Those that hold power legitimately may impose compliance with

the law
2907
2908 As regards maintaining social peace, it is important to bear in mind that

2909 providing security to the local population is the most important task during
2910 stability and reconstruction operations. If order does not prevail, then none of
2911 the subsequent tasks will be a success. If the operation follows or seeks to end
2912 a military conflict, the early weeks offer a critical opportunity to design future
2913 conditions. During this period, the intervening forces need to guarantee that the
2914 law prevails and that delinquents, former soldiers and potential insurgents do
2915 not take advantage of a chaotic situation. In this regard, the support of two
2916 pillars is required:
2917 The police. It is necessary to have all of the possible state structures and
2918 for them to stay organised, removing any corrupt elements that will be
2919 rejected by the population. The police should be formed with the national
2920 forces and if this is not possible, be made dependent on state or
2921 international bodies that are accepted by the population. Military forces
2922 should not take on police functions.
2923 Justice. It is fundamental for the justice system to work. In the majority of
2924 conflicts, the population supports those that provide fast and firm
2925 solutions to problems and those that they believe to be invested with
2926 authority. This is why Justice should be formed by local judges that apply
2927 the local law.
91
2928
2929 4.3. Stability. Elements of intelligence on governability
2930 The elements of the State's governability will be determined by those provided
2931 by both anthropology and social psychology, as they are factors that are defined
2932 on the basis of significant fieldwork: we are referring, for example, to identifying
2933 reliable sources for information, the actual sources of power, the elements that
2934 have to be investigated in order to know what the real centre of power is, how to
2935 join it, etc. For our study, in particular, we are interested in three levels of the
2936 legal-political structure of the host society:
2937 Structure of power
2938 State structure
2939 Structure of local communities
2940
2941 4.3.a. STRUCTURE OF POWER
2942 Just as knowledge of a culture usually leads to an appreciation of the elements

2943 of power, we may inversely say that if we know how power is organised, we can
2944 know what the culture of a nation is like. Therefore, for an actor that is not legal,
2945 it is important to know the essential details about any political organisation,
2946 which for the latter may be summed up as the answers to questions like the
2947 following:
2948 Who has power?
2949 Who has control?
2950 Who makes the decisions?
2951 Who is the leader?
2952 How many leaders are there?
2953 On whom do they exercise control?
2954 How have they been legitimised?
2955 o By a law
92
2956 o By tradition
2957 o By custom
2958 o By inheritance
2959 o By force
2960 o By election:
2961 - by the entire group
2962 - by a dominant part
2963 - by the whole population
2964 - by each tribe
2965 o Are there conflicts about power in the group?
2966 o Are they frequent?
2967 o How are they dealt with?
2968
It is possible to understand a nation’s culture by knowing how

power is organised
2969
2970 These issues are related to social structure and to how a community of greater
2971 or lesser dimensions functions effectively, from the State itself to a nuclear tribal
2972 structure. Knowledge of these issues enables to discern the legitimacy or
2973 otherwise of the leader and it is important because it the leader is understood to
2974 be invested with legitimacy, we are always in the presence of structured
2975 regimes and stable regimes. In such cases, it may be the military intervention
2976 that is considered to be illegitimate and contrary to the international order and,
2977 in any case, leaving this fact aside, if defeat is considered to be necessary, it
2978 will be more difficult from the military perspective.
93
2979 4.3.b. STATE STRUCTURE
2980 There is a general principle that is useful as regards implementing new forms of
2981 state, i.e. that any state structure that is imposed by force is understood to be
2982 illegitimate. These structures lead to weak forms of state that have no control
2983 over local communities. These situations may be used in two ways: on the one
2984 hand, in States that are weak and that have no power over the local
2985 communities, military intervention is easier; on the other hand, the new state
2986 structures may be implemented from the local communities, adapting them to
2987 the local cultural criteria (for example, in Afghanistan, when a king was imposed
2988 in 1889, he was not acknowledged as being legitimate. However, after the
2989 Soviets withdrew, the regime rapidly surrendered to the groups that had arisen
2990 in networks created in local communities).
2991
Any state structure that is imposed by force is understood
to be illegitimate
2992
2993 4.3.c. STRUCTURES GENERATED IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES
2994 Control over culture leads to control over power. That is why in all interventions,
2995 there have been attempts at answering the question "Who holds the power?”.
2996 The response has traditionally been different in American and European
2997 doctrine. The United States has invested the figure of a leader with the holding
2998 of power, so that it has profusely developed the leadership theory. However, in
2999 Europe, the traditional understanding has been that the way in which politics
3000 were organised was a reflection of how culture was organised. The difference is
3001 that in the former case, the creation of a leader may not be perceived to be
3002 legitimate by the society that tends to reject the leader; in the latter, the leader is
3003 perceived as being legitimate because he has cultural ties with the society. This
3004 means that in many conflicts, the way that governability is designed should be
3005 by building up from the bottom and not down from the top. Sometimes it is not
3006 possible to impose a Constitution o a general law on the whole country because
3007 if the local communities are highly atomised, they will not acknowledge it as
3008 pertaining to them and will not feel compelled to comply with it. On the other
3009 hand, respecting local communities and grouping them around common
3010 elements (either small representative councils, forms of participation, etc.) can
3011 help for them to become equipped with their own general systems that are
3012 accepted throughout the territory.
94
3013 If the local authorities have collapsed or have been removed from power by
3014 force, the intervening forces may have to undertake the functions of government
3015 on a temporary basis while they simultaneously try to build new government
3016 institutions that can enable the indigenous authorities to recover power. The
3017 simultaneous construction of local and national government institutions requires
3018 that a delicate balance be struck. There is a potential hazard in doing this
3019 according to a bottom-up approach in these situations: on the one hand, it may
3020 reinforce new political actors that did not belong to the previous structure of
3021 power; on the other, it may be very destabilising to develop local authorities
3022 before national authorities because to do so establishes a de facto
3023 decentralisation that may exacerbate ethnic and sectarian conflicts in
3024 profoundly divided societies. That is why, in such cases, it is necessary to work
3025 towards grouping them around common elements. Otherwise, the community
3026 itself may find that fighting against a power that they consider to be illegitimate
3027 is in itself a “common element”.
3028 Therefore, intelligence processes have to include the gathering of data

3029 regarding the three elements that we have just described: leadership, forms of
3030 state and local communities, in order to be able to identify the legal cultural
3031 system.
Control over culture leads to control over power
3032
3033 4.4. Reconstruction. Rules and state structures to be complied with
3034 The strategy to be taken into account in the legal-political structure of a stability
3035 and reconstruction operation commences by knowing and respecting the
3036 existing rules and state structures, if this is possible and if it is not, by taking
3037 advantage of the institutions that can contribute towards reconstruction before
3038 they are replaced by others that are new or alien to the community.
3039 To continue with the proposed structure, if the country had a constitutional
3040 system, it should be respected and changes to it should only be suggested if
3041 there is social consensus in this regard; Constitutions that are imposed from
3042 above are not usually accepted by peoples; constitutional change should be
3043 brought in at a later stage. Constitutional systems normally have international
3044 backing, but implementing the rule does not correspond to the social reality of
3045 the country and that is why maintaining it may help in the early days of
3046 reconstruction; it might be said that the path should end with a new Constitution
3047 and not start out from one. However, the huge transforming force that is
3048 contained in Constitutions should be leveraged. Until then, it is possible to
95
3049 suspend the application of the Constitution if it is illegitimate and apply the
3050 constitutional laws that are useful to the administrative functioning of the State.
3051
Sometimes, the reconstruction process should not start with a new

Constitution, but the implementation of a constitutional regime is
advisable, because it generates a process of social transformation
that is peaceful and culturally accepted
3052
3053 The local laws and customs should be respected. In the majority of cases, they
3054 coincide, as they are consuetudinary legal systems, in which the formality of the
3055 law is not required in order to determine its validity, so that what the society
3056 understands to be worthy of mandatory compliance is what is sanctioned as
3057 law. It is very difficult for this kind of rules to be replaced, because they are in
3058 fact the clearest manifestation of the culture. Knowledge of and respect for
3059 these rules are fundamental in dealing with the local population.
3060 The following structure sums up the ideas expressed here:
3061
RULES THAT MUST BE COMPLIED WITH
Constitution (social acceptance and international recognition)

Constitutional laws
LEGAL
Islamic law
Usually coincide
Local custom
Cultural rules
Local law Relations with the
local population
3062
3063
3064 Despite the fact that the principle of separation of powers is not accepted by all
3065 cultures, nowadays all of the States in the world are organised politically in such
3066 a way that they have bodies that represent the State on an international basis,
3067 so that they are also organised around political institutions on a domestic basis
3068 (Heads of State, Presidents, Parliaments…). These institutions should be
96
3069 leveraged in reconstruction, although it is most likely that it will be necessary to

3070 replace the people that hold these magistratures if they prove to be corrupt.
3071 Only at a second stage, which will probably coincide with civilian intervention in
3072 the reconstruction stage, is it possible to try to create new institutions
3073 (parliaments (if there are none), an Office of the Head of State, courts, etc.) at
3074 the highest State level, providing constitutional solutions that are "culturally
3075 compatible" and specific to each State.
3076
3077 The following structure illustrates these considerations:
3078
INSTITUTIONS THAT SHOULD BE RESPECTED

3079
If they exist, maintain the figure

- Office of the Head If they do not exist, it is hard to impose from
above (stage 2)
of State Parliament If they have to be replaced, let it be by another
GENERAL that is culturally legitimate
- Courts
INSTITUTIONS
- Administration
- Police
Judges
In Stage 1, only the corrupt Civil servants
If replaced Police officers
In Stage 2, by other institutions

3080
3081
97
Local leader perceived to be legitimate
Judges
LOCAL Forms of
participation In Stage 2, other democratic institutions
may be incorporated, adapting them to
Representative the local culture
Institutions
3082
3083
3084 The majority of reconstruction operations take place in areas where local or
3085 national authorities are weak or are unable to fulfil their roles. The
3086 reconstruction of the State’s basic capacity to provide services and for self-
3087 administration is a high priority in these operations. Normally reconstruction
3088 requires the intervention of forces to (1) support and provide assistance to the
3089 national authorities in providing services such as education, electricity and
3090 healthcare and (2) help the municipal authorities to provide water, a sewage
3091 system, etc… These services that are essential for the community are the ones
3092 that require the most urgent intervention, but at the same time, they may be
3093 easily undertaken by other civilian operators and organisations that go to work
3094 in the area.
3095
Essential to the community

(water, electricity, healthcare, education:
COMMUNITY development)
In Stage 2, this is the most easily

replaced element
SERVICES May be undertaken by civilian elements
3096
3097
98
3098
3099 4.5. POSSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING CONSTITUTIONAL

3100 DEMOCRACIES IN OTHER CULTURAL SYSTEMS
3101 Efforts towards providing assistance in the political reconstruction of other

3102 countries, either in a post-conflict situation or in other circumstances,
3103 traditionally contain a strong element of democratisation. Generally speaking,
3104 democratisation refers to the transition towards the development of a liberal
3105 democratic system of government that (1) guarantees the civil liberties of the
3106 population free, clean elections and a free press, and (2) establishes controls
3107 and counterweights, accountability to the population, a strong civil society and
3108 respect for a broad spectrum of human rights. Also inherent to this process is
3109 concern for ensuring minority and women’s rights. This transformational agenda
3110 is necessary, but we believe that it should not be the ultimate goal of a military
3111 stability and reconstruction operation. Debate on whether or not the countries
3112 where interventions are staged should be democratised has been very intense
3113 in the last two decades.
3114
Democratisation should be the tendency, but it may not be imposed

by force. Reconstruction should include the foundations that will
enable peoples to arrive at it on their own cultural and political
journey
3115
3116 As demonstrated by the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, democratisation is

3117 as difficult as it is controversial. Premature elections in States where political
3118 divisions reflect sectarian divisions may further entrench the divisions existing in
3119 the population and delay reconciliation. Democracy is a system of government
3120 that is culturally difficult and technically complex and which is not reduced to
3121 mere universal suffrage. In Western societies, after elections, the electors that
3122 have lost accept the legitimacy of the winner and that of the whole group; on the
3123 other hand, in systems that lack a democratic tradition, to give equal treatment
3124 and political positioning to those that have been in a disadvantaged situation
3125 compared to those that were previously favoured, may be understood as an
3126 opportunity to take control over the former oppressor and may also cause
3127 frustration and rejection towards the new system.
3128 Reconstruction operations should incorporate democratic elements, which

3129 should be fundamentally representative in nature, by leveraging those that
3130 already exist, but they should not, in the short term, implement liberal
99
3131 democracies in countries whose cultural tradition is incompatible with the

3132 Western concepts of equality and liberty, even if we consider that there are
3133 important practical and ideological reasons to include democratisation in
3134 reconstruction projects. The democratic goals should be maintain the local
3135 traditions and allow the countries to find their own ways.
3136
3137
100
3138 ANNEX E: BASIC CONCEPTS ABOUT COMMUNICATION AND

3139 INTERGROUP RELATIONSHIPS 98
3140 1. PERCEPTION AMONG PEOPLE
3141 Interactions always start by acknowledging the presence of the other person.
3142 The way we perceive his features, intentions and likely reactions affects our
3143 actions and, without any doubt, has an influence upon our interaction. In order
3144 to guide our interactions with other people we need to know what norms to
3145 conform to, which makes us create a general impression of the other person.
3146 What are the foundations of such an impression? It is normally based on minor
3147 details, specific signs or indicators, on incomplete information, etc., which are
3148 ranked and made coherent according to previous experiences. Features,
3149 moods, intentions, etc,. are inferred from scarce data. Then, the previous
3150 question can be restated as follows: What are the inference processes and
3151 what data or indicators trigger them?
3152 One of the first inference processes is initiated in response to the other person’s
3153 gestures, glances and body language. When facing a strange person we only
3154 have nonverbal stimuli upon which we infer mood, emotions, character, etc.
3155 (however, face expressions do not always unequivocally convey a state of
3156 mind –different people can attribute various state of mind to the same face
3157 expression). The study of body language is called Kinesia. Body language is
3158 structured similarly to oral language: in the oral language there are phonemes
3159 that combine to form words, in the body language there are kinemes –basic
3160 body movements- that combine to form body language “paragraphs” called
3161 kinemorphemes. For example, there exist four basis kinemes attributed to
3162 eyebrow movements (frowned, lowered, raised and movement of a single
3163 eyebrow) which do not covey a specific meaning in isolation but they do when
3164 combined with other body movements.
3165 There seems to be a set of universal face expressions: happiness, surprise,

3166 fear, ire, sadness, disgust. It has been proven that different cultures in a number
3167 of countries tend to use similar gestures to express the previous emotions and
3168 these can be identified as such when shown on pictures. In short, face
3169 expressions reveal emotions experienced by the individual.
3170 However, face-to-face deceptions are also possible. By controlling face

3171 expressions some emotions can be concealed or conveyed, different from the
98
Written by Dr. Humberto Trujillo. Senior Lecturer on Methodology for the Behavioural
Sciences. Department of Social Psychology at the University of Granada
101
3172 experienced ones. Nevertheless, people’s face expressions always give cues
3173 revealing the real emotional condition and the lack of spontaneity.
3174 Glances are also excellent sources of information. Looking straight into the eyes
3175 is normally associated to positive feelings towards us while getting away from
3176 our eyes is linked to guilty feelings, negative attitudes to us or a depressive
3177 condition. Friendship, as derived from a number of experiments, is manifestly
3178 related to a high level of eye contact. If someone stares at us fixedly, whatever
3179 we do, we will probably perceive an aggressive and hostile attitude.
3180 Furthermore, gazes can be used to establish a dominance-subjection hierarchy
3181 and to control a conversation.
3182 However, we can have wrong perceptions about others. People tend to
3183 generate general impressions of others even if complete information is not
3184 available to base them on. The majority of mistakes made during this process
3185 are derived from overgeneralizations that interfere on our ability to know the
3186 other person.
3187 One of the best-known types of overgeneralization is the primacy effect, which
3188 refers to the disproportionate salience of the first impression. First impressions
3189 act as a benchmark against which new data about the person are interpreted.
3190 Besides that, people can even discard new information on the basis that it is not
3191 in conformity with the first impression. On the contrary, the recency effect (last
3192 impressions are more influential) seems to have a more limited effect. Hence,
3193 this is the reason why people normally wish to make a good first impression.
3194 Supposedly, a positive first impression can override the effect of latter less
3195 positive impressions and viceversa.
3196 The so called halo effect is closely related to the primacy effect and refers to the
3197 extension of an initial assessment (positive or negative) based on a particular
3198 trait about the subject to other traits which are not concerned with the initial one.
3199 For example, a first positive impression about a person can be overgenaralized
3200 to other traits. It has been proven that, in that case, the person can be
3201 perceived to be more intelligent and taller than had our first impression been
3202 negative. The positive first impression can even corrupt the perception of
3203 physical features.
3204 The implicit personality theory can become another source of misperceptions.
3205 The first trait we recognize in other people influences our interpretation and
3206 perception of later ones because we expect them to be related to it forming a
3207 coherent general impression of the subject. There seems to exist some central
3208 traits which we use to infer peripheral ones. Another source of error can be the
3209 categorization processes based on stereotypes. A stereotype is a set of
3210 common beliefs about a group of people which have been learnt in our social
3211 environment. They are wide spread and accepted as true without further
102
3212 analysis. When a person is perceived people tend to assign stereotypical traits
3213 if the social group he belogs to is known.
3214
3215 2. BEHAVIOURAL MOTIVES: ENDOGENOUS VS. EXOGENOUS
3216 One of the main processes affecting interpersonal perception is the ascription of
3217 behavioural motives. There are two main types of behavioural causal ascription:
3218 endogenous and exogeneous. Endogenous ascription refers to the ascription
3219 done in terms of the state of mind or attitude of an individual. Conversely,
3220 exogenous ascription occurs when the motives for a specific behavioural
3221 pattern are sought outside the individual. At first, these processes may seem
3222 trivial, however they are central for the interaction among people. People
3223 constantly seek the cause of other people's behaviour, for example, did the
3224 murderer kill the victim premeditatedly (endogenous ascription) or did the
3225 circumstances compel him to act that way (exogenous ascription)? Our
3226 perceptions change and are dependent on the type of causal ascription. Then,
3227 what drives us to apply one or the other type of causal ascription? The findings
3228 derived from reseach suggest that in the case of endogenous ascription the
3229 following requirements must be met:
3230 a) A deliberate intention to behave that way must be perceived on the

3231 individual.
3232 b) His behaviour cannot be driven by environmental or external forces.
3233 How can we know that external forces are not intervening? The following
3234 requirements must be met:
3235 The behaviour is socially undesirable.
3236 The behaviour is improper according to the individual’s role.
3237 The behavior is not oriented towards a specific object or person.
3238 The behaviour differs from that of other people’s in similar

3239 circumstances.
3240
3241
103
3242 3. INTERGROUP CONFLICT
3243 Our analysis focuses now on the behaviour of individuals within a group:
3244 intergroup interaction. There will be dealt the main characteristics of intergroup
3245 relationships, the processess governing them and the procedures to solve
3246 intergroup conflicts. Some attention will also be devoted to stereotypes and
3247 prejudices related to intergroup relationships, which tend to inevitably arise.
3248 The relationships among people are manifestly influenced by their membership
3249 to a specific social group. It is worth noting that intergroup relationships can be
3250 either positive or negative, though the latter ones prevail in competitive
3251 societies.
3252 The most common negative intergroup relationships are:
3253 a) dominance-subjection: a dominant majority group uses its power and

3254 resources to subject another group;
3255 b) conflicting or competitive relationships: both groups persue incompatible

3256 goals or compete for the same one.
3257 Most research efforts have been on studying the latter sort of relationship: its
3258 origin, characteristcs and how to minimize its effects.
3259 On the one hand, some researchers can find indivialistic or psychological
3260 motives for this sort of conflict: hostility to a defenceless minority group (due to
3261 personal frustrations).
3262 On the other hand, it is suggested that acknowledging the differences between
3263 both groups is enough to generate a conflict even in the absence of objective
3264 grounds for incompatibility.
3265 However, the most widely-spread approach suggests that for intergroup coflict
3266 to occur it is required there be incompatible goals or activities on both groups.
3267 Indeed, when two groups persue the same goals or interests and their
3268 achievement by one group prejudices the latter one’s interests, a conflict
3269 relationship arises inevitably. According to this view, the collaborative or
3270 competitive nature underlying intergroup relationships will depend on whether
3271 the goals, interests and activities –economic, ideological, religious,
3272 occupational, etc. – are conflicting or harmonious.
3273 Intergroup coflicts generally produce a set of outcomes: greater cohesion and
3274 cooperation within each group; greater sense of membership to a group; greater
3275 loyalty –a member can be rejected if he shows disagreement on the negative
3276 attitudes to the other group–.
104
3277 Furthermore, in a negative intergroup relationship a number of reciprocal

3278 stereotypes and prejudicies arise, become fosilized and strengthen the conflict.
3279
3280 4. INTERGROUP PREJUDICES AND RELATIONSHIPS
3281 Conflicting and competitive intergroup relationships normally come with social
3282 prejudices. Social Psychology deals with social prejudices considered as
3283 negative attitudes from one group –typically a majority group- towards another
3284 one –typically a minority group-. On the whole, prejudices involve three
3285 components:
3286 a) a cognitive component (the stereotype): set of beliefs concerning the features
3287 of the members of a specific group;
3288 b) a judgemental or affective component: negative emotional assessment on a

3289 specific group which implies a degree of hostility towards its members (the
3290 prejudice per se), e.g. "I dislike Jews";
3291 c) a behavioural component: tendency to display hostile and discriminatory

3292 behaviour towards the members of the group (discrimination).
3293 Considering prejudices as a set of negative stereotypes, negative judgements

3294 and discriminatory behaviours, there arises the following question: How are
3295 prejudices generated and maintained?
3296 Some researchers suggest that some prejudices result from the frutrations and
3297 hostility displayed to a defenceless minority group which is held responsible for
3298 them.
3299 It has also been stated that a personality trait can generate prejudices:
3300 authoritarianism, which is characterized by marked prejudices against minority
3301 groups and dissidents. Moreover, it has been noted that individuals who wish to
3302 have power and a higher status probably need to despise others to feel
3303 themselves superior. In fact, it seems that people with a lower status tend to
3304 have more prejudices.
3305 However, prejudices are mainly a intergroup problem, which lets us state that
3306 their origin lies in the intergroup conflicts or in the exploitation of a minority
3307 group by a majority one. In these cases, prejudices' role will be that of founding
3308 and justifying the conflict and the exploitation. So, some prejudices give
3309 economical advantages to the dominant group, deny rights to the minorities,
3310 justify colonialism and the right to be above the other group.
105
3311 Finally, it is worth noting that past negative experiences with a specific group
3312 play a minor role in the origin of prejudices. As a conclusion, it can be stated tha
3313 prejudices are a social product that is internalized and shared by a community
3314 while, at the same time, values, norms, attitudes, etc., are assumed. Family,
3315 friends, mass media, school, etc. pervasively transmit those prejudices and
3316 individuals acquire them in an almost involuntary fashion. Pressures intended to
3317 get homogeneity help to internalize prejudices by punishing and discarding
3318 subjects that do not agree on the prevailing prejudices.
3319 There exists another general theory on social prejudices based on a set of
3320 personality traits: the so-called anti-democratic syndrome. The most relevant
3321 traits are:
3322 a) Conventionalism: ridig adherence to conventional, middle-class values

3323 (respect and loyalty to the leader are the most important virtues that must be
3324 internalized).
3325 b) Authoritarian submission: submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealized

3326 moral authorities of the ingroup.
3327 c) Authoritarian aggression: tendency to reject and punish people who violate
3328 conventional values.
3329 d) Anti-intraception: opposition to the subjective, the imaginative or poetic.
3330 e) Superstition and stereotypy: tendency to think in rigid categories and believe
3331 in fatalism.
3332 f) Power and toughness: exaggerated concern for themes related to dominance
3333 and subjection of followers; exaggerated assertion for strength and toughness
3334 (there are two types of people: weak and strong).
3335 g) Destructiveness and cynicism: generalized hostility towards people regarded

3336 despicable.
3337 h) Projectivity: disposition to cast our own impulses on other people.
3338 i) Sex: exaggerated concern for sexual themes.
3339 j) Ethnocentricy is a general trait that can be identified in addition to the

3340 aforementioned ones. It refers to the tendency to display negative attitudes
3341 towards most alien or threatening groups.
3342
106
3343 5. STEREOTYPES
3344 Stereotypes manifestly affect intergroup relationships. It can be said that there
3345 exists a stereotype when a group of individuals reach an agreement on the
3346 most salient traits for a category of people. Stereotypes fall under different
3347 categories, e.g., ethnic, national, regional, sexual, occupational, etc. The degree
3348 of veracity in stereotypes varies; some of them can even be completely false.
3349 The fact that stereotypes remain with the passage of time and following
3350 generations do not alter them is due to their functional character: stereotypes
3351 originate and are maintained through time because they can be used in an
3352 instrumental-like way.
3353 An example of instrumental use is the tendency to display hostilities, which are
3354 sociable unacceptable, towards the stereotyped group.
3355 Justifying attitudes and behaviours towards the stereotyped group is another
3356 function stereotypes perform in close relation to intergroup conflict. Stereotypes
3357 will explain and justify prejudices and discriminatory behaviors towards the
3358 members of the stereotyped group.
3359 Hostility will be paramount and will produce stereotyped images in accordance
3360 with the hostile behaviour. Hence, in conflict or intergroup exploitation
3361 conditions, stereotypes arise to justify discriminatory behaviors towards the
3362 stereotyped group and contribute to maintain the status quo and the social
3363 structure. So the socioeconomic discrimination can be perpetuated.
3364 This process unfolds very subtly through self-fullfilling prophecies: the condition
3365 of the members of the minority group itself will unequivocally prove they are and
3366 are to be inferiors. So, when an individual realises inmigrants have worse jobs
3367 or live in poor quarters, he joyfully arrives at the conclusion that this group is
3368 inferior and its members have what they deserve. So, this unequal treatment
3369 (discrimination) generates real inequality which later justifies unequal treatment,
3370 which forms an endless loop: gypsies are lazy, what’s the point in offering them
3371 a job?
3372
3373 6. CONTROL OF THE INTERGROUP CONFLICT
3374 Several procedures and approaches have been proposed to solve intergroup
3375 conflicts and make the accompanying negative prejudices and stereotypes
3376 decrease. It is worth noting that some proposals are mainly applicable to
3377 restricted conflicts of interest (e.g. an armed conflict over the possession of a
3378 territory) while others are more suitable for intergroup conflicts originated on the
3379 basis of prejudices or discrimination (e.g., race, cultural or religious conflicts).
107
3380 Some researchers suggest that most of social prejudices and intergroup
3381 conflicts are due to the “scapegoat” mechanism, which will be the target of the
3382 hostilities derived from the frustrations. In particular, they propose to reduce
3383 frustrations and psychological treatments to help people manage them. If the
3384 solution is intended for a community, the solutions differ from the previous ones.
3385 One of the most common procedures is the dissemination of favourable
3386 information about the rival group. It is taken for granted that propaganda
3387 campaigns can change hostile attitudes. However, facts indicate that this
3388 procedures is not always successful. First, in a vast number of intergroup
3389 conflicts the groups compete for the same objective (terrain, economics, etc.),
3390 so the actions should not be aimed at the attitudes displayed by the groups.
3391 Secondly, mass media are aware of the fact that perception selectivity is used
3392 to counter the effects of the propaganda campaigns: propagandistic information
3393 in the media -newspapers, radio, television, etc.- normally reaches people who
3394 somewhat agree with it since nobody likes listening ideas contrary to his own.
3395 Another well-studied solution is the contact between members of the groups in
3396 conflict. The employment of this procedure could be profitable and beneficial
3397 since individuals will be able to observe that their stereotypes and prejudices
3398 are wrong and can no longer justify aggressive hostilities. However, contact by
3399 itself can either reduce or increase conflictivity. A number of requirements must
3400 be met in order to have positive effects by applying this procedure.
3401 a) contacts must be between individuals with a similar status; otherwise,

3402 prejudices would be strengthened;
3403 b) contacts should not be accidental;
3404 c) during contacts, members from the minority group should not display
3405 stereotypical behaviours which can justify prejudices;
3406 d) the activities in common should be agreeable and rewarding; competitive

3407 ones should be avoided since the effects derived are negative;
3408 e) contacts should be supported by authorities and the social climate. It has
3409 even been suggested that adjusting law in order to modify discriminatory
3410 practices may be beneficial.
3411 In the event that all the requirements are met, negative attitudes may decrease
3412 and the conflicto can be ameliorated. According to some researchers, a further
3413 requirement is necessary: intergroup collaboration in pursuit of common goals.
3414 That is, goals or aims that can only be achieved if the members of the groups in
3415 conflict collaborate.
3416 A well-known strategy, frequently used in populist policies, involves introducing

3417 a common enemy though the positive effects may be limited to the span of time
108
3418 the threat is perceived. On the whole, the process implies creating a conflict to
3419 terminate a previous one, which seems to be a paradox.
3420 The strategy called graduated reciprocity may be effective when the conflict has
3421 become really tense: the conflict is split in smaller and more manageable parts,
3422 then a party unilaterally makes a concession without demanding but suggesting
3423 reciprocity. The other party may feel compelled to proceed in a similar way,
3424 which can initiate a process leading to the amelioration of the conflict. In order
3425 for the procedure to be effective, the concessions must be planned,
3426 communicated and disseminated to the allies and adversaries prior to the
3427 execution of the planning. Concessions must be gradual so that adversaries
3428 cannot exploit them to their advantage. All the solutions referred in this paper do
3429 not always yield positive results. If the procedures employed fail to ameliorate
3430 the conflict, it becomes destructive. An escalation of violence and hostilities
3431 break out regardless of the original causes of the conflict.
3432
3433 7. IMPORTANCE OF PERSUASION
3434 We sometimes should be objective and appreciate other people’s ideas (which
3435 can be better than ours). The point is joining to my interlocutor to come to a
3436 wider truth instead of convincing him that he is mistaken. During the oral
3437 interactions themes should be managed so as to avoid antagonism. We must
3438 use formulae which target the goal without blocking alternative solutions. These
3439 practices help develop a sort for “open mind” capable of analyzing, taking into
3440 account different approaches and respecting the privacy of the other. Hence,
3441 there are many occassions where it is suitable to avoid analyzing the
3442 personality of the other person to focus on his behaviour, acts and feelings
3443 shown. There are two outstanding rules when dealing with everyday thinking:
3444 (a) everybody is always right; (b) nobody is right. These clauses are not
3445 contradictory. Nobody thinks to be wrong from one’s inner self. A person’s
3446 experiences, knowledge or emotions determine to some extent his conclusions.
3447 This fact should be taken into account in human interactions. Given the fact that
3448 everybody is right from his point of view, truths cannot be considered to be
3449 absolute, but dependent upon a specific context. Therefore, if we succeed in
3450 rejecting dogmatism and attitudes leading to impose our ideas on others, it may
3451 be possible to reach a higher truth and have people willing to understand and
3452 accept it.
3453
109
3454 8. ERRORS IN ORAL COMMUNICATION
3455 Due to eagerness for approval, people tend to exaggerate their own attributes
3456 and to share his opinions and thoughts with others, which are considered to be
3457 superior to other opinions. That is the reason why their manners may be
3458 arrogant and disrespectful. Eagerness for approval has a negative effect which
3459 involves the development of “narrow minds” which are vulnerable to judgements
3460 and remarks. These minds are also oversensitive, which favours feeling insulted
3461 or offended, even by trivialities.
3462 That mistake is supported by measuring one’s attributes conceitedly. That

3463 explains why the thoughts expressed are supported by personal prestige and
3464 are regarded conclusive. The refutation of the arguments produces the so-
3465 called “damaged prestige” effect which may lead to violent or aggressive
3466 reactions if frustrated enough. The ideas or thoughts are not attacked but the
3467 vanity of the speaker. It is then when you can hear sentences such as “I will
3468 never believe an Arab / my boss / my doctor again”.
3469 Communicative effusiveness refers to the desire to talk about our problems in a
3470 subjective manner. It is quite common not to let the other interlocutors talk. It
3471 reveals inmature behaviours which can be mistaken with emotional disorders.
3472 When telling confidences, most people conceal reasons and resort to
3473 rationalizations which can be disseminated. Therefore, the harm is unavoidable
3474 if we are unaware that the message is distorted. In addition to that, by
3475 presenting personal problems and confidences in a “releasable” way, we run
3476 the risk of blurring reality. By proceeding that way, it will be virtually impossible
3477 to know oneself or assess accurately other people’s behaviour.
3478 Communicative effusiveness makes the subject express remarks and

3479 superficial appraisals of facts and people which, at the beginning, are just a
3480 waste of time. In the long term, the consequences may be even more serious if
3481 the speaker starts producing long wordy speeches.
3482 The communication crisis may arise because of negligence and verbal
3483 tolerance. Therefore, speeches should be prepared and rehearsed. Impulses
3484 should never control oral communication.
3485
3486
110
3487 BIBLIOGRAPHY
3488 For Annex B:
3489 BAQUÉS, Josep (2008). “El rompecabezas de Afganistán: hacia la

3490 construcción de un Estado” [The puzzle of Afghanistan: towards the creation of
3491 a state], Athena Intelligence Journal, Vol. 3, no. 4 (October-December), pp. 39-
3492 57.
3493 DUPREE, Louis (1997). Afghanistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
3494 EWANS, Martin (2002). Afghanistan. A Short History of Its People and Politics.
3495 New York&London: Harper Perennial.
3496 FITZGERALD, Paul y GOULD, Elizabeth (2009). Afghanistan´s Untold Story.

3497 San Francisco: City Ligths Books.
3498 GOHARI, M.J. (1999). Taliban. Ascent to Power. Oxford: Oxford Logos Society.
3499 GRIFFIN, Michael (2001). El movimiento talibán en Afganistán. Cosecha de

3500 tempestades.[Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan].
3501 Ed. Catarata. Madrid.
3502 HARRISON, Selig S. (2008). “`Pastunistán´: un desafío para Pakistán y

3503 Afganistán” [Pashtunistan: the Challenge to Pakistan and Afghanistan], in ARI,
3504 no. 38, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, pp. 1-8.
3505 MALINOWSKI, Jon C. (2004). “Cultural Geography”, in Palka, Eugene J (coor).

3506 Afghanistan. McGrawHill, Connecticut, pp. 39-47.
111
3507 MARSDEN, Meter (2002). Los talibanes. Guerra y religión en Afganistán. [The
3508 Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan]. Ed. Grijalbo,
3509 Barcelona.
3510 RAICH, Jordi (2002). Afganistán también existe. [Afghanistan exists]. RBA eds.
3511 Barcelona.
3512 RASHID, Ahmed (2009). Descens al caos. Biblioteca Universal Empuréis,

3513 Barcelona.
3514 ROY, Olivier (2003). El Islam mundializado. Los musulmanes en la era de la

3515 globalización. [Globalized Islam. Muslims in the era of globalization]. Ed.
3516 Bellaterra, Barcelona.
3517 TANNER, Stephen (2009). Afghanistan. A Military History from Alexander the
3518 Great to the war against the taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo Press.
3519 WEBER, Olivier (2001). El halcón afgano. Viaje al país de los talibanes. [The
3520 Afghan Falcon. A voyage to the Taliban’s homeland]. Ed. Oberon (Anaya),
3521 Madrid.
112

4.3 Cross Cultural Awareness Analytical Concept - Third Draft

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originalbeschreibung:

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

4.3 Cross Cultural Awareness Analytical Concept - Third Draft

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

16 Draft version number 3

17 Granada, 08 JAN 2010

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

23 Reproduction of this document and unlimited distribution of copies is authorised for

31 Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina (SP TRADOC)

32 Dirección de Investigación, Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales [Directorate for

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

56 Acquaintance with the local culture of the operational environment is paramount

61 In past conflicts, two or more belligerent parties engaged in the battlefield

64 In nowadays conflicts, threats are concealed among the population, which

79 Thereafter, we may possess sufficient elements to comprehend its internal

81 Since the contribution of the social science is considered to be cardinal, the

101 Finally, chapter 10 is focused on identifying and establishing the methodologies

106 A comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the local culture make

139 Table of Contents

140 1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 13

143 2. Baseline Assessment ................................................................................ 18

144 3. The concept of cross-cultural awareness terms and definitions ................ 20

151 4. Cultural themes ......................................................................................... 25

163 5. Significance of culture to the military: CCA applied to a military coalition . 32

164 6. Concept of culture from an anthropological point of view .......................... 33

167 6.3. Living cultures and the past ............................................................... 34

200 6.14.s. Rituality ....................................................................................... 45

203 7. Factors and psychosocial dimensions of culture ....................................... 47

214 8. The integration of cross-cultural awareness in functions and activities of the

230 9. Integration of cross-cultural awareness into operational and interagency

267 10.3. The learning process........................................................................ 151

280 11. Conclusions and recommendations. ....................................................... 167

281 Glossary of terms and definitions ................................................................... 168

282 Abbreviations.................................................................................................. 170

283 Bibliography.................................................................................................... 171

327 Therefore, in current operational environments it is the population (the human

334 Comprehending a given culture is a time-consuming endeavor. First, a definition

349 When approaching a culture, inquisitiveness should be a must: the same

358  military operations planning and analysis;

361  contributions to the comprehensive approach in a multinational or

365  identification and exploitation of opportunities as a result of the

367  identification, minimization and management of undesired and

369 Thus, cross-cultural awareness becomes one of the paramount enablers to

377 It is a paramount importance to know the different approaches to the target

384 1.1. Target audience for the concept

394 This paper aims at developing a theoretical concept of Cross-Cultural

403  Military personnel (all ranks), but particularly

404 o decision-makers at all levels;

405 o personnel posted to HQ in theaters of operations;

406 o personnel responsible for the writing and elaboration of syllabuses

409 o personnel responsible for the military training during the

411  Civilians (analysts, contractors, NGOs, government officials, private

425 1.2. Context and Scope of the concept

430 The MNE 6 Problem Statement is the following:

436 MNE 6 is an extension of the preceding MNE 5 campaign that focused on a

442 MNE 6 seeks to apply the Comprehensive Approach to actual operations.

3. To explain the MNE 5 Project and the document related.

464 In order to improve the shared situational understanding our cross-cultural

479 2. BASELINE ASSESSMENT

480 The document titled “Multinational Experiment 6. Baseline Assessment report.

489 1. We require the ability to understand the dynamics of the operational

4. Multinational Experiment 6. Baseline Assessment report.

492 2. Few personnel outside of the Special Operations Forces (SOF)

495 3. We have failed to develop an effective, culturally attuned narrative in our

497 4. Different organizational cultures, processes, and ways of doing business

358 military operations planning and analysis;

361 contributions to the comprehensive approach in a multinational or

365 identification and exploitation of opportunities as a result of the

367 identification, minimization and management of undesired and

403 Military personnel (all ranks), but particularly

411 Civilians (analysts, contractors, NGOs, government officials, private

516 It is crucial to close the collaboration and communication gaps between

520 Forces must train in foreign languages, cultural intelligence, negotiation,

522 An effective interagency framework for building partner capacity rooted in

526 Commanders need to appreciate the underlying interagency issues (such

574 the characteristic features of everyday existence shared by people in a

576 the set of values, conventions, or social practices associated with a

592 A system of values and beliefs shared by people that interact by

595 The whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and

618 What are our values, beliefs and perceptions?

621 Am I aware of the peculiarities and limits of my culture?

624 Why do we do things in that way?

625 Why do we react in that particular way?

734 Water: It is considered to be the main source of conflict: having or not

737 Land: Possessing land is another common source of conflict between