G.R. No.

193507 January 30, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

REY MONTICALVO y MAGNO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00457 dated 3
December 2009 affirming in toto the Decision2 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Catarman, Northern Samar, in Criminal Case No. C-3460 dated 18 October 2005 finding herein appellant
Rey Monticalvo y Magno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape of a demented person
committed against AAA,3 thereby imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering
him to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

Appellant Rey Monticalvo y Magno was charged with raping AAA in an Information4 dated 30 April
2003, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 9th day of December 2002 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening in Bgy. XXX,
Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named appellant, actuated by lust and with lewd design, with force and intimidation, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with AAA, 12 years old and is
suffering from mental disorder or is demented or has mental disability, without the consent and against
the will of said victim.5 [Emphasis supplied].

On arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY6 to the crime
charged.

At the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense failed to make any stipulation of facts.7 The
pre-trial conference was then terminated and trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) AAA, the private offended party; (2) BBB, mother
of AAA; (3) Analiza Pait (Analiza), neighbor and friend of AAA; (4) Dr. Jesus Emmanuel Nochete (Dr.
Nochete), Medical Officer IV, Northern Samar Provincial Hospital; and (5) Dr. Vincent Anthony M.
Belicena (Dr. Belicena), Medical Specialist II, Northern SamarProvincial Hospital. Their testimonies
established the following facts:

AAA is a mental retardate and was 12 years and 11 months old at the time of the rape incident.8 She
and appellant, who was then 17 years old,9 are neighbors − their respective houses are adjoining each
other.10

In the afternoon of 9 December 2002, AAA and her friend, Analiza, were in front of the sari-sari store of
AAA’s mother, BBB, while appellant was inside the fence of their house adjacent to the said sari-sari
store. Shortly, thereafter, appellant invited AAA to go with him to the kiln at the back of their house.
AAA acceded and went ahead.11

Upon seeing appellant and AAA going to the kiln, Analiza, pretending to look for her one peso coin,
followed them until she reached a papaya tree located three and a half meters away from the place.
Analiza hid under the papaya tree and from there she saw appellant undress AAA by removing the
latter’s shorts and panty. Appellant, however, glanced and saw Analiza. Frightened, Analiza ran away
and went back to the sari-sari store of BBB without telling BBB what she saw.12

Appellant proceeded to satisfy his bestial desire. After undressing AAA, appellant made her lie down. He
then placed himself on top of AAA and made push and pull movements. Afterwards, appellant stopped,
allowed AAA to sit down for a while and then sent her home.13

When AAA arrived at their house around 7:30 p.m., she was asked by her mother, BBB, where she came
from and why she came home late. AAA replied that she was at the back of their house as appellant
brought her there and had sexual intercourse with her.14

The following day, BBB brought AAA to the police station and then to the Northern Samar Provincial
Hospital where AAA was examined by Dr. Nochete.15 The medical examination yielded the following:

The findings are:

= Confluent abrasion 1 x 1 inches, 2 inches below the umbilicus.

Genitalia Exam:

= Admits 1 finger with ease.

= (-) vulvar swelling, (-) erythema.

= (+) complete healed hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock, 7 o’clock & 10 o’clock position.

Gram Stain Result: Negative for spermatozoa.16

Dr. Nochete explained that AAA could have possibly sustained those complete healed hymenal
lacerations more than a month prior to the date of the examination. He also clarified that even though
AAA has no fresh hymenal laceration it does not necessarily mean that no sexual intercourse was
committed on her on 9 December 2002. It is possible that AAA did not sustain any fresh hymenal
laceration because the vaginal canal has become loose. He did not also find any trace of spermatozoa on
AAA’s vagina, its presence being dependent on whether the appellant did ejaculate or not.17

AAA was also examined by Dr. Belicena, a Psychiatrist at the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital, who
found that AAA is suffering from moderate to severe mental retardation, meaning, AAA is suffering from
the specific form of below average intelligence that has a low reproduction functioning resulting in
impaired functioning. This finding was obtained through mental examination and actual interview of
AAA. Dr. Belicena, however, recommended a full battery of psychological testing to determine AAA’s
exact mental age.18 Dr. Belicena’s finding was reduced into writing as evidenced by a Medical
Certificate19 dated 18 May 2004.

For its part, the defense offered the testimonies of (1) Pio Campos (Pio), neighbor and friend of
appellant; (2) Cesar Monticalvo (Cesar), appellant’s father; (3) Alexander Sanico (Alexander), Local Civil
Registrar of Bobon, Northern Samar; and (4) appellant, who invoked the defense of denial and alibi to
exonerate himself from the crime charged.

Appellant denied having raped AAA. He claimed that on 9 December 2002, at around 1:00 p.m., he,
together with Pio and a certain Dinnes Samson, was having a drinking spree in the house of one Adolfo
Congayao (Adolfo). They finished drinking at around 6:00 p.m. As he was too drunk, Pio assisted him in
going home. He went to sleep and woke up only at 12:00 midnight as he needed to urinate. He went
back to sleep and woke up at 6:00 a.m. of the following day, i.e., 10 December 2002. He was surprised
that AAA charged him with rape. He was then arrested at around 3:00 p.m. of 10 December 2002.20

Appellant disclosed, however, that the house of Adolfo, where they had their drinking spree, is more or
less six (6) meters away from the house of AAA. In fact, he could still see the house of AAA even when he
was in the house of Adolfo. He similarly admitted that he knew very well that AAA is suffering from
mental abnormalities. He also divulged that he asked Pio to testify on his behalf.21

Appellant’s testimony was corroborated on all material points by Pio and his father, Cesar, who also
admitted that he personally knew AAA as she is their neighbor. Cesar also knew that AAA is suffering
from mental disorder.22 Both Pio and Cesar confirmed that on 9 December 2002, they brought
appellant to his bedroom and let him sleep there because he was too drunk. Thereafter, Pio and Cesar
engaged in a drinking spree inside the latter’s house, particularly at the kitchen that is more than two (2)
meters away from appellant’s bedroom, which lasted until 11:00 p.m. Pio and Cesar likewise stated that
there was no moment that appellant went out of his bedroom since the time they brought him there.23

Alexander, another defense witness, presented appellant’s Certificate of Live Birth24 to prove that the
latter was only 17 years old during the commission of the crime, i.e., 9 December 2002.25

The trial court, convinced about the merits of the prosecution’s case rendered a Decision on 18 October
2005, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape of a demented person
and sentenced him to an imprisonment term of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to indemnify AAA
in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

On appeal, the following errors were assigned:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE OF A
DEMENTED PERSON DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE APPELLANT’S AGE, BEING A MINOR, ATTHE TIME OF THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO IMPOSE THE PROPER PENALTY.26

The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision on 3 December 2009 affirming in toto the trial
court’s Decision dated 18 October 2005.

Hence, this appeal.

Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the
testimonies of AAA, BBB, Analiza and Dr. Nochete were replete with inconsistencies and improbabilities.
Firstly, while the Information stated that appellant raped AAA on or about the 9th day of December
2002 at around 7:00 p.m., Analiza testified that it was in the afternoon of the same day when she saw
and heard appellant calling AAA to go to the kiln at the back of their house, and while she saw appellant
undress AAA, she did not actually see the sexual intercourse because the appellant saw her watching
them, so she ran away. Secondly, BBB’s testimony that on 9 December 2002, AAA confided to her that
she was raped by appellant early that night was inconsistent with the testimony of Analiza that it was in
the afternoon of the same day when she saw appellant and AAA going to the kiln, where the former
undressed the latter. Thirdly, Dr. Nochete’s testimony clearly stated that the hymenal lacerations on
AAA’s vagina could have possibly been sustained by her a month ago, which does not support AAA’s
claim of rape on 9 December 2002. Even granting that appellant, indeed, raped AAA on 9 December
2002, it is highly implausible that the hymenal lacerations on her vagina were already completely healed
when she was examined by Dr. Nochete on 10 December 2002, which was only after less than 24-hours
from the date the alleged rape was committed.

Appellant also questions the credibility of AAA as a witness given her condition as a mental retardate.
Appellant opines that AAA, could not perceive and is not capable of making known her perception to
others. As such, she can be easily coached on what to say or do.

Appellant finally avers that granting arguendo that he is guilty of the crime charged, he was only 17
years old at the time of its commission as evidenced by his Certificate of Live Birth. This fact was even
attested to by the Local Civil Registrar of Bobon, Northern Samar. Given his minority at the time of the
commission of the crime charged, the court should have considered the same as privileged mitigating
circumstance in imposing the penalty against him.
This Court affirms appellant’s conviction.

At the outset, paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353,27 provides for two (2) circumstances when carnal knowledge of a woman with mental disability is
considered rape. Subparagraph (b) thereof refers to rape of a person "deprived of reason" while
subparagraph (d) refers to rape of a "demented person."28 The term "deprived of reason" has been
construed to encompass those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation.29 The term
"demented," on the other hand, means having dementia, which Webster defines as mental
deterioration; also madness, insanity.30 Dementia has also been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as a
"form of mental disorder in which cognitive and intellectual functions of the mind are prominently
affected; x x x total recovery not possible since cerebral disease is involved."31 Thus, a mental retardate
can be classified as a person "deprived of reason," not one who is "demented" and carnal knowledge of
a mental retardate is considered rape under subparagraph (b), not subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.32

In this case, both the trial court and the appellate court incorrectly used the word demented to
characterize AAA’s mental condition and mistakenly categorized the rape committed by appellant under
subparagraph (d), Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, instead of under
subparagraph (b) thereof. Nonetheless, the mistake would not exonerate appellant. Otherwise stated,
his conviction or criminal liability for rape stands though not under subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, but under subparagraph (b) thereof.

Neither can it be said that appellant’s right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated. This Court is not unaware that the Information was worded, as
follows: "AAA is suffering from mental disorder or is demented or has mental disability." This fact,
however, will not render the Information defective and will not bar this Court from convicting appellant
under subparagraph (b) of Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

In Olivarez v. Court of Appeals,33 this Court pronounced that:

x x x In People v. Rosare,34 the information did not allege that the victim was a mental retardate which
is an essential element of the crime of statutory rape. This Court however sustained the trial court’s
judgment of conviction holding that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor which formed the
basis of the information, a copy of which is attached thereto, stated that the offended party is suffering
from mental retardation. It ruled that there was substantial compliance with the mandate that an
accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him. Thus:
Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of statutory rape because the fact that the victim was a
mental retardate was never alleged in the information and, absent this element, the acts charged
negate the commission of the offense for which he was convicted by the lower court.

Pursuant to Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, we have decided to motu proprio take cognizance
of the resolution issued by the investigating prosecutor in I.S. No. 92-0197 dated June 2, 1992, which
formed the basis of and a copy of which was attached to the information for rape filed against herein
appellant. Therein, it is clearly stated that the offended party is suffering from mental retardation. We
hold, therefore, that this should be deemed a substantial compliance with the constitutional mandate
that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him x x x (citation omitted).35
[Emphasis supplied].

In this case, both the Complaint36 and the Resolution37 of the Municipal Trial Court of Northern Samar,
which formed the basis of the Information and copies of which were attached in the records, stated that
AAA is suffering from mental abnormalities – she looked like a retardate and her focus is not normal.
Even, the Resolution38 of the Acting Provincial Prosecutor concurred with the aforesaid findings. From
the aforesaid, it can be gleaned that AAA’s mental disorder or mental disability is that of being a
mentally retarded and not demented. Thus, there was substantial compliance with the mandate to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation.39 More so, as discussed hereunder, the prosecution
was able to prove that AAA is, indeed, a mental retardate. Even the appellant affirmed the said mental
condition of the victim.

To repeat, the term "deprived of reason" has been construed to encompass those suffering from mental
abnormality, deficiency or retardation.40 Hence, carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under
subparagraph (b) not subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.41

The gravamen of the crime of rape under Art. 266-A(1) is sexual intercourse with a woman against her
will or without her consent.42 Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically
states that:

ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is committed.

1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.[Emphasis supplied].

From the foregoing, for the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman through any of the four enumerated circumstances. Without doubt,
carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under the aforesaid provisions of law.
Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to
a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the
victim, and the mental retardation of the latter.43

In People v. Dalandas,44 citing People v. Dumanon,45 this Court held that mental retardation can be
proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses and even
the observation by the trial court.46

In the present case, the prosecution was able to establish that AAA is, indeed, a mental retardate
through, (1) the testimony of her mother; (2) the trial court’s observation; and (3) the mental
examination and actual interview of AAA conducted by Dr. Belicena, a Psychiatrist at the Northern
Samar Provincial Hospital, who found AAA to be suffering from moderate to severe mental retardation,
meaning, AAA is suffering from the "specific form of below average intelligence which has a low
reproduction functioning which result to impairment functioning."47 It is also worthy to note that the
defense did not dispute, even admitted the fact that AAA is suffering from mental retardation. The
findings of the lower courts about AAA’s mental condition must be upheld.

The prosecution was also able to establish the fact of sexual congress between appellant and AAA.
Despite the latter’s mental condition, she narrated before the court in the best way she could her ordeal
in the hands of appellant. As stated by the appellate court, AAA conveyed her ideas by words and
demonstrations.48 AAA recounted how the appellant sexually abused her on 9 December 2002 by
inviting her to go to the kiln at the back of their house. Thereupon, appellant suddenly undressed her by
removing her shorts and panty. This fact was attested to by Analiza, one of the prosecution witnesses,
who actually witnessed appellant undressing AAA by removing the latter’s shorts and panty. AAA further
testified that after undressing her, appellant made her lie down, placed himself on top of her and made
push and pull movements. Thereafter, appellant stopped, made her sit down and sent her home.49 This
testimony of AAA was correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court as coherent and given in
a detailed manner.50
Emphasis must be given to the fact that the competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape
victims as witnesses have been upheld by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate their
ordeal capably and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainant’s accusations, it
even lends greater credence to her testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could
speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at
the hands of the accused. Moreover, it has been jurisprudentially settled that when a woman says she
has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her
testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the
accused.51

Worth stressing also is the fact that during AAA’s testimony, she positively identified the appellant as
the person who raped her.52 Thus, the straightforward narration of AAA of what transpired,
accompanied by her categorical identification of appellant as the malefactor, sealed the case for the
prosecution.53

The allegation of inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA, BBB, Analiza and Dr. Nochete as regards the
exact date and time the alleged rape incident happened, as well as the absence of fresh hymenal
lacerations on AAA’s vagina, pointed to by appellant cannot work in his favor.

Evidently, these inconsistencies refer only to trivial and inconsequential matters that do not alter the
essential fact of the commission of rape.54 A witness is not expected to remember with perfect
recollection every minute detail of her harrowing experience. A minor mistake as to the exact time of
the commission of the rape is immaterial and cannot discredit the testimony of a witness. This Court has
repeatedly held that the exact date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the
crime.55 Indeed, the precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its commission.56 What is
decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of the rape by the accused against the complainant has
been sufficiently proven. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters which are irrelevant to
the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal.57

In the same way, the absence of fresh hymenal lacerations and spermatozoa on AAA’s vagina do not
negate the fact of rape. A freshly broken hymen, as well as the presence or absence of spermatozoa, is
not also an essential element of rape.58 As clarified by Dr. Nochete, the absence of fresh hymenal
laceration on AAA’s vagina does not necessarily mean that she did not engage in sexual intercourse on 9
December 2002. Possibly, AAA did not sustain any fresh hymenal laceration as her vaginal canal had
become loose. And, he did not find any trace of spermatozoa because its presence depends on whether
or not the appellant ejaculated.
Indeed, a mental retardate is not, by reason of such handicap alone, be disqualified from testifying in
court.59 Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally retarded may be a credible
witness. The acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner
she can make them known to the court.60 If the testimony of a mental retardate is coherent, the same
is admissible in court.61

Neither can it be said that AAA was merely coached as a witness by her mother. It is highly unthinkable
that a mother would draw her daughter, a mental retardate at that, into a rape story with all its
attendant scandal and humiliation if the rape did not really happen. No mother in her right mind would
possibly wish to stamp her child with the stigma that follows the despicable crime of rape.62 Moreover,
appellant failed to show any ill-motive on the part of AAA and her mother to falsely testify against him.

In light of the straightforward and credible testimony of AAA, her positive identification of appellant as
her assailant and the lack of ill-motive on her part to falsely testify against appellant, the latter’s defense
of denial and alibi must necessarily fail.

Denial is an inherently weak defense and has always been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due
to the ease with which it can be concocted. Denial as a defense crumbles in the light of positive
identification of the accused, as in this case. The defense of denial assumes significance only when the
prosecution’s evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Verily, mere denial,
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative self-serving evidence which cannot be
given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of the complaining witness who testified on
affirmative matters.63

Like denial, alibi is not looked upon with favor by the trial court. It also cannot prevail over witnesses’
positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. In any event, for the defense of alibi
to prosper, it is not enough that the accused can prove his presence at another place at the time of its
commission, it is likewise essential that he show physical impossibility for him to be at the locus
delicti,64 which the appellant in this case failed to do.

As aptly observed by the trial court:

The houses of the offended party and the appellant are only divided by a fence and the place of the
incident is only at the back of the house of the appellant. The defense of alibi must fail. In addition to
the positive identification made by AAA and the place of the incident is adjacent to the houses of the
victim and the appellant, being neighbors, the fact that the appellant alleged that he was having
drinking spree at that time and that he was dead drunk at around 6:00 p.m. of that date, there is no
impossibility for the appellant to be physically present at the scene of the incident, because of its
proximity.

Corroborative testimony is not credible if tainted with bias particularly in cases where the witnesses are
closely associated to the appellant as to be interested in the appellant’s acquittal. In this case, the
appellant’s witnesses are his alleged drinking buddy and his father. Considering that they are bound by
friendship and affiliation, it is conceivable that they would be inclined to make excuses for him appellant
from culpability.65

All told, appellant’s guilt has been proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, thus, his
conviction stands.

As to penalty. Under Article 266-B66 in relation to Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. However, when rape is committed by an
assailant who has knowledge of the victim’s mental retardation, the penalty is increased to death. But
this circumstance must be alleged in the information being a qualifying circumstance which increases
the penalty to death and changes the nature of the offense from simple to qualified rape.67 In the case
at bench, while appellant categorically admitted that he knew AAA to be suffering from mental
abnormalities, the prosecution failed to allege this fact in the information. As such, even if it was proved,
it cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. Thus, appellant’s conviction is only for simple rape
for which he should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Nonetheless, a reasonable ground exists in this case that calls for the modification of the penaltyof
reclusion perpetua imposed by both lower courts upon the appellant.

This Court finds merit in appellant’s assertion that he was a minor during the commission of the crime
charged. During trial, upon order of the trial court, the Local Civil Registrar of Bobon, Northern Samar,
brought before it their office records, particularly appellant’s Certificate of Live

Birth containing the fact of birth of the latter. Appellant’s Certificate of Live Birth shows that he was
born on 23 February 1985. Indeed, at the time of the commission of the crime charged on 9 December
2002, appellant was only 17 years old, a minor. Thus, he is entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,68 which
specifically states that:
ART. 68. – Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. – When the offender is a
minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to
the last of article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

xxxx

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.69 [Emphasis supplied].

Applying the privileged mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty upon appellant is
reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua - the penalty prescribed by law
for simple rape. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.70

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the
minimum of which shall be within the range of prision mayor (the penalty next lower in degree to
reclusion temporal), that is 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, and maximum of which shall be within the
range of reclusion temporal in its medium period (there being no other modifying circumstances
attendant to the crime), that is 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.71 With that, the
indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, should be imposed upon the appellant. However, the case of appellant does
not, as it normally should, end at this point. On 20 May 2006, Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known
as the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," took effect. Section 68 thereof specifically provides for
its retroactive application, thus:72

SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. – Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age
of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and
are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be
entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted
accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable
law. [Emphasis supplied].

Clearly, Republic Act No. 9344 is applicable in this case even though the crime was committed four (4)
years prior to its enactment and effectivity. Parenthetically, with more reason should Republic Act No.
9344 apply to this case as the 2005 conviction by the lower courts was still under review when the law
took effect in 2006.73
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the
law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction
is pronounced.74 It reads, thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or more
at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court
shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles
in Conflict with the Law. [Emphasis supplied].

However, while Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be
applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time
of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence
until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:75

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the
child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution
of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. [Emphasis supplied].

At present, appellant is already 27 years of age, and the judgment of the trial court was promulgated
prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9344. Therefore, the application of Sections 38 and 40 of the
said law is already moot and academic.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of Republic Act No. 9344, the promotion of
the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit
of 21 years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be
entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No.
9344 in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of
the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when
he/she was still of tender age.76 The appellant, therefore, shall be entitled to appropriate disposition
under Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as
follows:77

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A child
in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD.

To conform to this Court’s ruling in People v.Sarcia,78 the case shall be remanded to the court of origin
to effect appellant’s confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.79

As to damages. The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the
appropriate disposition measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law.80 This Court affirms
both the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00 awarded by the lower courts in
favor of AAA. Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is
mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. Case law also requires automatic award of moral
damages to a rape victim without need of proof because from the nature of the crime, it can be
assumed that she has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. Such award is separate and
distinct from civil indemnity.81

In consonance with prevailing jurisprudence on simple rape wherein exemplary damages are awarded to
set a public example and to protect hapless individuals from sexual molestation, this Court likewise
affirms the lower courts award of exemplary damages but increased the same from P25,000.00 to
P30,000.00 to conform to recent jurisprudence.82

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00457
dated 3 December 2009 is hereby MODIFIED as follows: (I) appellant is found guilty of rape under
subparagraph (b) of Article 266-A( I) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and not under
subparagraph (d) thereof; (2) in view of the privileged mitigating circumstance appreciated in favor of
appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua is reduced to reclusion temporal and being a divisible
penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies and the indeterminate penalty of I 0 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is imposed upon the
appellant; and (3) the amount of exemplary damages awarded by the lower courts is increased from
P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. The award of civil indemnity and moral damages both in the amount of
P50,000.00 are maintained. This case, however, shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate
disposition in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

SO ORDERED.