Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29:147–163, 2006

Copyright  Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/10576100500497012

The Threat of Agroterrorism to Australia:

A Preliminary Assessment

CARL UNGERER
DALLAS ROGERS
School of Political Science and International Studies
University of Queensland
St. Lucia, Queensland, Australia

This article provides a preliminary assessment of the agroterrorism threat to Aus-

tralia. Based on primary research conducted among Australia’s biotechnology and
agriculture sectors, it examines current threat scenarios and existing vulnerabilities
within Australia. It argues that the threat of agroterrorism to Australia is real, and,
for prudential reasons, should be taken more seriously by government authorities.
The article concludes with a series of broad policy options to mitigate the threat of
agroterrorism to Australia.

It is very important to concentrate on hitting the American economy with

every available tool . . . the economy is the base of its military power. . . .
The United States has a great economy, but it is fragile.
—Osama bin Laden1

As in most Western countries, Australian intelligence agencies and policymakers have

become increasingly concerned by the potential threat of terrorist attacks employing
nonconventional weapons and methods. Much of the focus on this “new” terrorism has
highlighted the potential use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), comprising of
Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) weapons against civilian tar-
gets.2 The Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Alexander Downer, has
described the threat from WMD terrorism as the “ultimate horror.”3 Despite the political
focus on WMD terrorism, however, less attention has been given to the threat of terror-
ist attacks against plant and animal populations in Australia. To date, the agricultural
sector has not been considered an integral part of the public debate over critical infra-
structure protection. Agricultural terrorism, or “agroterrorism,” is defined as “the delib-
erate introduction of a disease agent, either against livestock or into the food chain, for
purposes of undermining socio-economic stability and/or generating fear.”4

Received 6 April 2005; accepted 3 May 2005.

The authors thank the journal’s anonymous referee for helpful comments in an earlier draft
of this article.
Address correspondence to Dr. Carl Ungerer, School of Political Science and International
Studies, University of Queensland, St. Lucia, QLD 4072, Australia. Email: c.ungerer@uq.edu.au

147
148 C. Ungerer and D. Rogers

Although horrific in nature, a bioterrorist attack against humans may be less devas-
tating in terms of the economic losses that a nation would suffer as opposed to a delib-
erate agroterrorist attack.5 Policymakers and threat assessment agencies have tended to
group agroterrorism alongside human bioterrorism because of the belief that the technical
constraints for these two types of attacks are similar, and that both are low probability–
high consequence events.6 Moreover, the domestic agency responsible for threat assess-
ments, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), continues to rank both
the threat of bioterrorism and agroterrorism in Australia as low.7 However, grouping
these two types of attacks together not only underplays the lower capability require-
ments of an agroterrorist attack, but also reduces the number and scale of response
mechanisms put into place to deal with this type of incident.
This article argues that the threat of agroterrorism to Australia is real and should be
taken seriously.8 Structural weaknesses within the agribusiness sector together with the
lower capability requirements for such an attack highlight the current vulnerabilities that
exist in the Australian agricultural sector. Furthermore, the importance of the agricul-
tural sector to Australia’s overall economic well-being underscores the need for greater
prudence in re-assessing this threat.9 As this study shows, the threat of agroterrorism to
Australia has either been underassessed or overlooked. Although the threat may be lower
than the more conventional means of terrorist attacks such as bombings or highjackings,
the threat is not zero. As such, government authorities should be more aware of poten-
tial threat scenarios and better prepared for an act of agroterrorism within Australia.

Agricultural Terrorism: An Old Problem

Although the term “agroterrorism” may be relatively new, the offensive use of biological
agents to contaminate or destroy agricultural industries is not. Many countries experi-
mented with these types of weapons throughout the Cold War.10 In addition to the ex-
tensive biological warfare programs in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the
former Soviet Union, countries such as Iran, Iraq, and South Africa operated concerted
bioweapons programs targeting animals and agriculture. These programs saw experi-
mentation with pathogens such as Foot-and-Mouth-Disease (FMD), rinderpest, wheat
stem rust, African swine fever, vesicular stomatitis, as well as a range of other diseases
for the purposes of destroying enemy targets. Prior to the negotiation of the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1972, military establishments in these countries con-
sidered biological attacks against an enemy’s agricultural interests as a legitimate means
of warfare as it would cause significant harm to the economy of a target state.11
With an increasing propensity to utilize new and novel techniques in asymmetric
warfare, various non-state actors have also opted to experiment with these types of bio-
logical weapons. In 1952 in Kenya, members of the Mau Mau anti-colonialist group
poisoned 33 steers with a biological agent. During the 1980s, Huk terrorists in the Phil-
ippines contaminated pineapples destined for export and the Rajneeshee cult in the United
States used salmonella to poison local restaurants in Oregon. More recently, Israeli au-
thorities discovered a Palestinian operation that was contaminating eggs with salmonella
with the intent of harming Israeli citizens.12
These acts and other threats of agroterrorism over the past 50 years illustrate that
the terrorist use of biological agents to promote political agendas, seek revenge, intimi-
date a target population, or extort or economically punish particular governments or
populations is well established. The WMD Terrorism Database at the Monterey Institute
for International Studies outlines 21 incidents that can be classified as agricultural at-
 The Threat of Agroterrorism to Australia 149

tacks using biological weapons over the past 50 years.13 Although none of these docu-
mented cases of agroterrorism was of a scale that threatened national economies, they
illustrate a clear precedence for the terrorist use of biological agents to target agricul-
tural commodities.

Australia’s Vulnerability to Agroterrorism

The Australian agricultural sector is one of the most viable in the world. Australia re-
mains free of many exotic diseases that can cripple livestock industries and decimate
crops. Agriculture contributes around 4 percent of Australia’s Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) annually and a large share of Australia’s exports.14 Attacks against this sector in
Australia would cause significant economic harm to the country that in turn would have
numerous flow-on effects within the Australian community. By addressing the impor-
tance of the Australian agricultural sector, and by illustrating the nature of contemporary
Australian agribusiness practices, this section of the article outlines the extent of Australia’s
vulnerability to an agroterrorist attack.
Although most people understand that agriculture is a major industry in Australia,
many would not be aware of the extent to which Australia depends on products, rev-
enue, and employment in this sector. In 2002, there were over 135,000 establishments
or businesses undertaking some form of agricultural activity in Australia.15 Within this
group, a majority were engaged in beef/cattle farming (34,110), grain growing (15,911),
mixed grain/sheep/beef farming (15,610), sheep farming (13,911), or dairy farming (11,135).16
The number of people directly employed by businesses within the agricultural sector
stands at approximately 376,000.17 While this figure represents around 4 percent of the
total labor force in Australia, the total number of people employed in related industries
such as transport and food processing plants would increase this figure to nearly 8.5
percent. Moreover, around 1 in 12 people depend on revenue earned from Australia’s
agricultural exports.18 It is clear that a terrorist incident resulting in the loss of employ-
ment for even a fraction of this population would have serious economic consequences
for the Australian economy as a whole. A large-scale and purposeful agroterrorist attack
could threaten the livelihood of many Australian families, as well as threaten the eco-
nomic viability of some rural communities.
Australia’s gross value of agriculture commodities stands at around $39.5 billion of
which $11.4 billion comes from livestock slaughterings, $6.7 billion from livestock prod-
ucts, and $6.4 billion from wheat for grain alone.19 Wheat is Australia’s largest crop,
being produced in all States but concentrated in an area immediately inland from the
Great Dividing Range along the east coast. Cattle, sheep, and pigs are the main livestock
raised in Australia with the number of heads now standing at 27.8 million, 106.2 mil-
lion, and 3.0 million, respectively.20 Cattle farming is conducted in all States and Terri-
tories, whereas dairy farming is mainly restricted to the cooler, wetter areas of southern
and coastal Australia. Figure 1 demonstrates the location of cattle for all farming pur-
poses.
As noted earlier, dairy farming is performed in high rainfall coastal areas where due
to favorable conditions it is possible to produce dairy products all year round. In this
industry, the use of feedlots and the supplementary use of grains as feed are becoming
more common throughout Australia.22
Sheep and lamb farming is concentrated in Victoria and southern New South Wales
as well as coastal border districts in southern South Australia. Distribution is shown in
Figure 2.
150 C. Ungerer and D. Rogers

Figure 1. Cattle for all purposes.21

Pig and poultry farming are both highly intensive industries, with the majority of
both being undertaken in large sheds to produce controlled and stable environments that
are conducive to intensive animal husbandry techniques. Again, both pig and poultry
farming is heavily concentrated in the southern States of New South Wales and Victoria.24
The geographic concentration of livestock production and farming in coastal and
southern parts of Australia, which are climatically the coolest and wettest areas of the
country, provides a favorable environment for the release of a Foreign Animal Disease
(FAD). In parts of Victoria, for example, the concentration of breeding animals at some
farms is extremely high, which would further contribute to the ability of an agroterrorist
to instigate an effective outbreak of infectious disease because of the high level of animal-
to-animal contact that takes place. Also, the fact that all three major livestock animals

Figure 2. Sheep and lamb distribution.23

 The Threat of Agroterrorism to Australia 151

susceptible to these types of diseases are concentrated in the southern regions of Australia
means that a terrorist attack would most likely be executed in these areas, where a
disease such as FMD could affect all three species—cattle, sheep, and pigs—simulta-
neously.
Agribusiness in Australia has changed significantly over the last 20 years. It is now
much more intensive, with many large corporations consolidating farms to cut costs and
increase both profit margins and competitiveness in international markets. The competi-
tion in consumer markets, both domestically and internationally, continues to drive prices
down, forcing farmers to become more efficient in their farming practices. Like other
Western countries, agricultural holdings in Australia generally follow an “80/20” rule,
whereby 80 percent of the commodities are owned by the top 20 percent of compa-
nies.25 As a result, animal rearing has become a more concentrated, intensive, and highly
technical business.26 Unfortunately, this places animals at greater risk of outbreaks of
infectious diseases whether by an agroterrorist attack or by the accidental introduction
of a disease.27 Moreover, to increase the quantity and quality of meat produced for the
market, cattle are now subjected to higher stress levels, which in turn reduce their ability
to overcome infection through immune response, leading to longer periods of infection
and higher numbers of pathogens being shed in bodily secretions.28
Although modern farming techniques such as contract calf-raising (where cattle are
transported back and forth from farms designed to accelerate their growth) are not yet
commonplace in Australia, growing pressure on agribusiness is resulting in its gradual
introduction. Any technique that involves transporting livestock to different locations
increases the probability that small clusters of disease will rapidly become major out-
breaks at key focal points. In areas that practice contract calf-raising, young cattle could
be reared on a particular farm, transported to larger feedlots for fattening, and then
transported to slaughterhouses for processing, all within relatively short periods of time.29
Added to this is the huge distance that livestock can travel from their rearing yards to
auction yards and then on to new owners’ yards. In Australia, it is possible for livestock
to travel long distances in a matter of three days, which is enough time to disguise an
infected animal through the incubation period of the disease.30
Most modern farms in Australia employ close feeding and watering conditions that
provide a further mechanism for infectious agents to spread. Physical contact, increased
exposure to fecal matter (which can be highly concentrated with pathogens), as well as
the contamination of water and feeding troughs all ensure that FADs will spread quickly
once introduced into a target population.31 As has been the case in various animal dis-
ease outbreaks in Europe, the movement of people and farming equipment is also a
cause of widening disease outbreaks.32
Farm security is an area of agribusiness that has received limited attention in Aus-
tralia. Intensive livestock industries such as poultry and porcine exhibit relatively effi-
cient security mechanisms, whereas the openness of cattle farms and feedlots suggests
that unauthorized access to these animals would be extremely difficult to control or
police. Security of auction yards is another vulnerability that could be exploited by an
agroterrorist. Direct infection of a large number of animals could be possible either by
inoculating the animals individually, or by placing animals that have been reared to
spread the disease within the same enclosures as other auctioned animals.33
Through quarantine and containment procedures, the Australian government has
been broadly successful preventing the accidental introduction of exotic foreign dis-
eases. This has meant that Australia has remained “endemic-free” from most agricultural
pathogens. However, a lack of previous exposure to these organisms, and therefore a
152 C. Ungerer and D. Rogers

lack of immunity, only increases the vulnerability of agricultural commodities to delib-

erate attack.

Agroterrorism Capability Requirements Are Low

The capability requirements for act of agroterrorism are much lower than for human
bioterrorism attacks. Information on infectious diseases that could be used as agroterrorist
weapons is available on the Internet. Individuals with little or no training in microbiol-
ogy or veterinary medicine can readily access information on the epidemiology, patho-
genicity, and even disease diagnosis on many biological pathogens. Various websites
provide detailed data regarding outbreaks of foreign animal and crop diseases, from
which potential agroterrorists can acquire the location of epidemic and endemic areas.34
Added to this is the availability of online diagnostic images that illustrate the clinical
symptoms associated with these particular diseases. As a result, a would-be agroterrorist
has much of the information that they need to acquire and control agricultural bioweapons.35
International organizations such as the World Organisation for Animal Health (for-
merly known as the Office International des Epizooties (OIE)) provide detailed lists of
FADs that could cause significant socioeconomic or public health consequences, as well
as the potential effect on international trade. Table 1 shows “List A” pathogens as desig-
nated by OIE, their potential hosts, as well as Australia’s current status with respect to
each of these diseases. The OIE categorizes diseases based on the severity of their intro-
duction to a “disease-free” area.
The diseases listed in Table 1 would provide terrorists with weapons that would
cause significant harm to primary-producing economies, especially to a country such as
Australia. In recent years, the damage to agricultural industries in the United Kingdom
and Southeast Asia from diseases such as FMD, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE), and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) is an indication of the extent to
which national economies can be affected by an outbreak of a FAD. These diseases are
of concern to the Australian government for a variety of reasons: FMD because of the
significant damage it would cause to the livestock industry and potential to become
endemic; BSE because of its link to human disease; and HPAI because of its zoonotic
nature. Both FMD and HPAI can be found in close proximity to Australian shores,
shortening the amount of travel time an agroterrorist would require in order to import
these diseases into Australia.37
Although it is difficult to find a comprehensive list of crop pathogens, some that are
mentioned as diseases that would cause major economic disruption to Australia are wheat
rust, soybean rust, citrus greening, rice blast, and potato wart.38 Wheat rust is of particu-
lar concern, given the importance of the wheat industry to the overall national economy.
The susceptibility of Australia’s wheat crops has been recently highlighted by small
outbreaks of the disease in northwestern New South Wales.39
A terrorist intent on obtaining agricultural pathogens could do so in a number of
ways. First, as mentioned previously, a terrorist could isolate an organism from the
environment by tracking disease outbreaks. Many diseases of concern to Australia such
as FMD, versicular stomatitis, and rinderpest are endemic in less developed countries
geographically close to Australia. These diseases are widespread and many cases go
unreported. Often, government control in these areas is ineffective, and most Southeast
Asian countries lack the institutional and regulatory structures to control or eradicate
these diseases. It is highly likely that the terrorist acquisition of infectious material from
countries in Southeast Asia would go unnoticed by local authorities. FMD in the Philip-
 The Threat of Agroterrorism to Australia 153

Table 1
“List A” pathogens, host range, status in Australia36

Disease Host range Status

Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) Cloven-footed domestic and Free

wild animals—cattle, sheep,
pigs, etc.
Vesicular stomatitis Cattle, pigs, horses, humans Free
Swine vesicular disease Pigs Free
Rinderpest Cloven-footed domestic and Free
wild animals—cattle, sheep,
pigs, etc.
Peste des petits ruminants Goats, sheep Free
Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia Cattle Free
Lumpy skin disease Cattle Free
Rift Valley fever (RVF) Most animals—but mainly Free
cattle, sheep, goats, humans
Bluetongue Sheep, cattle, goats Virus present
Sheep pox and goat pox Sheep and goats, respectively Free
African horse sickness Horses, mules Free
African swine fever Pigs Free
Classical swine fever Pigs Free
Highly pathogenic avian influenza Most avian species Free
(HPAI)
Newcastle disease Poultry Virus present

pines and HPAI throughout other parts of the Southeast Asian region are two pathogens
that an agroterrorist could isolate with relative ease, and transport to Australia within a
short period of time.
Second, terrorists could obtain the organism from a laboratory or biological collec-
tion agency where security is less stringent. Most Southeast Asian countries maintain
hospital and university laboratories where stocks of biological pathogens are available.
Security at many of these establishments remains less than adequate. A third and less
likely possibility is that an organism suitable for an agroterrorist attack could be ob-
tained from a state-sponsor who shares a similar worldview as the terrorist group.40
Previous studies on WMD terrorism have tended to dismiss or downplay the possibility
of states collaborating with terrorist groups because of the clear repercussions for any
country seen to be assisting a terrorist organization in the acquisition or use of WMD.41
However, in the current climate, with numerous “rogue” states flouting non-proliferation
norms, it would be imprudent to dismiss the possibility completely. Moreover, supply-
ing biological agents to kill animals as opposed to humans is less likely to elicit a
military response from the targeted state.
154 C. Ungerer and D. Rogers

Port security remains a problem for preventing agroterrorism, as a recent case in

New Zealand demonstrates. The biosecurity measures within New Zealand are generally
considered to be world-class, and thought to be a highly effective deterrent against im-
porting foreign biological material.42 However, in one case, farmers who had a long
running battle with government authorities over the problem of rabbits on their farms
sought to isolate rabbit calicivirus from a foreign source, and infect the rabbit popula-
tion within New Zealand. They were able to transport enough infectious material into
the country to achieve their goals, illustrating the fallibility of existing biosecurity re-
gimes.43 Indeed, the Australian Quarantine Inspection Service (AQIS) shares many of
the same procedures and policies as New Zealand with respect to concealed importation
of biological material.
Unlike the inherent problems associated with weaponization of biological agents for
a human bioterror attack, bioweapons targeting agricultural commodities require little or
no manipulation. Many of the diseases mentioned earlier are highly contagious and can
cause significant damage even from a single release point as was evident in the FMD
outbreak in the United Kingdom.44 The low infective dose required for the disease to
spread ensures that relatively little infectious material, perhaps as little as a few milli-
liters, would be needed to be transported to a target country in order to cause a significant
outbreak. The non-zoonotic nature of most agricultural diseases also enables a terrorist
to handle and transport FADs without any personal protective equipment that would be
required if they were smuggling human pathogens. Attaching small “snap lock” bags to
one’s body, would allow an agroterrorist to import an agricultural pathogen into Austra-
lia with little or no difficulty.
In the context of this discussion it is prudent to ask: Exactly how would a terrorist
group introduce a biological agent into the Australian agriculture sector for the purposes
of a deliberate attack? This question has been underanalyzed in the literature on terrorist
threats to Australia. The following provides a fictitious scenario that traces the simple
steps needed to be taken by a terrorist group in order to conduct a successful act of
agroterrorism using FMD.
To begin with, an individual or group would travel to an area where FMD is en-
demic, such as Thailand, Vietnam, or the Philippines and source the infectious material
from selected animals. The organism could be gathered by swiping the lesions of an
infected animal or by collecting the animal’s saliva using a wet handkerchief. These
small amounts of biological material could then be concealed in plastic bags and brought
to Australia. Under the right conditions, the pathogen would remain active for much
longer than the time it takes to travel to Australia. As body searches are not routinely
employed by the Australian Quarantine Inspection Service, the individuals would pass
directly through Customs. Prior to, or perhaps concurrently, others persons would be
involved in the purchase of livestock or a small farming operation in Australia. Because
it is relatively easy to procure livestock animals in Australia, no record of such a small
operation would be required. The infected material would be then used to inoculate the
animals, allowing amplification of the agent over several days. Following significant
amplification within a number of animals, transportation to a high-density livestock farming
area would enable the terrorists to strategically place infected animals onto a number of
farms, resulting in a significant multifocal point outbreak.45
Although fictitious, the scientific credibility of this scenario is high. The ease at
which agricultural pathogens can be found in the environment, the low infective dose
needed, the vulnerabilities within agribusiness, and the effectiveness of diseases such as
FMD, make agroterrorism a real threat in Australia. The technical ease at which an
 The Threat of Agroterrorism to Australia 155

agroterrorist attack could be perpetrated leads many foreign analysts to believe that if an
attack was to occur, it would most likely begin in several locations simultaneously,
overwhelming the response capacity of the authorities.46

Agroterrorism as a Means to Achieve Political Goals

As with any threat assessment, the capabilities along with the intentions of terrorist
groups need to be considered. The potential for serious economic damage by an agroterrorist
attack makes it attractive to a small but significant number of individuals and groups.
Politically motivated groups operating in Australia including “anti-GM crusaders” and
radical animal rights activists are both potential actors that could exploit acts of agro-
terrorism to further their interests.47 But perhaps the most worrying of all is that reli-
giously motivated terrorist groups such as the Al Qaeda network may be thinking about
using biological agents to attack the economy of nations such as the United States and
Australia. In his testimony to Congress in 2004, the former head of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, George Tenet, stated that over two dozen terrorist groups were actively
seeking CBRN weapons.48 Given that Australia has already been highlighted as a pri-
mary target for groups such as Al Qaeda and the affiliated Southeast Asian group Jemaah
Islamiyah, the question of whether these groups will consider using agroterrorism as a
means of attack remains salient.
Although agroterrorism may not be as spectacular as other mass casualty attacks,
terrorism analysts such as Dorothy Preslan believe that there are a number of reasons
why certain terrorist groups may be attracted to agroterrorism using biological agents.49
Some of these reasons include: the relative ease in which these organisms can be ac-
quired and used; the potential effect of outbreaks on a nation’s economy as seen with
accidental outbreaks; the quest to be innovative in their methods to attack an enemy; the
burden of proof that would be associated with proving that the outbreak was the result
of a deliberate attack; and the fact that an agroterrorist attack may not incite an immedi-
ate military response by the target nation.
It is clear that agroterrorism offers individuals and groups a way to make a political
statement. But whether or not groups that decide to utilize this tactic are motivated by
politics, religion, or some other imperative, Australian agriculture remains a relatively
“soft” target for terrorism because of the low level of awareness of its potential dangers
among the agricultural sector. In this way, Australia is similar to other Western coun-
tries that have large agricultural industries and are a target of international terrorist at-
tention. As one American analyst has stated, “it’s far easier to attack our food system,
our crops and animals, than to attack people—with far greater economic consequences
. . . agroterrorism has more vulnerable credentials than skyjacking, and it’s technically
easier.”50

Consequences of an Agroterrorist Attack Are High

The outbreak of any infectious disease whether accidentally or intentionally introduced
into a population has significant consequences for homeland security. The potential im-
pact of an act of agroterrorism is dependent on a number of factors including the intent
and determination of the terrorist, the awareness of the country involved as to the nature
of the threat, and the response mechanisms that have been put into place for such an
event. Peter Chalk has outlined three broad intentions that a would-be agroterrorist might
have:
156 C. Ungerer and D. Rogers

1. To kill a large number of the human population and decimate an agricultural

industry to undermine a nation’s economic base, which could be achieved by
introducing a zoonotic pathogen;
2. To cause economic destabilization, which could achieved through the dissemi-
nation of a non-zoonotic pathogen; and
3. To directly cause human casualties through the introduction of a human patho-
gen further down the food chain.51

Although all three scenarios have the potential to cause damage to any population, this
section will address the first and second scenarios, as the third could be interpreted as an
act of human bioterrorism.
There are a number of zoonotic pathogens that could cause significant economic
disruption to Australia as well as considerable human mortality. One such disease is Rift
Valley Fever (RVF). RVF is an arthropod-borne disease primarily of sheep, cattle, and
goats. It has a 100 percent mortality rate for young animals, as well as the ability to
cause severe illness and sometimes death in adult animals. Along with livestock, it can
be transmitted to a number of domestic animals that can act as reservoirs, such as cats
and dogs. RVF can also be transmitted to humans by certain species of mosquitoes
(many of which are found in Australia) where it can cause severe illness and sometimes
death.52 Although introduction of a pathogen like RVF would be of concern to authori-
ties, it is difficult to see that it would cause the same level of panic and hysteria as a
true bioterrorist attack or a purely agricultural attack using a more dangerous pathogen.
A pathogen that would cause more significant economic destabilization to a primary
producer nation such as Australia is FMD. Following the outbreak of FMD in the United
Kingdom in 2001, many governments around the world stepped up preparations for a
possible FMD incident, conducting various simulations and response-preparedness exer-
cises.53 The Australian government was no exception, with the Productivity Commission
undertaking a study into the impact of an FMD outbreak within Australia. Various au-
thorities have also taken part in exercises to test the ability of government agencies to
respond to such an event.54 Of particular concern in the case of the U.K. FMD outbreak
was the multidimensional impact of the disease that saw economic disruption occur
across a number of related industries including supermarkets, restaurants, and tourist
facilities.55
The Australian Productivity Commission study considered 3 scenarios—a small single-
point outbreak, a medium-sized outbreak impacting 2 States taking 6 months to control
and eradicate, and a large multipoint outbreak taking up to 12 months to control and
eradicate. The Commission found that the economic losses to the export and domestic
markets sustained in a single-point outbreak would be close to $5.7 billion, whereas a
multipoint outbreak could cost up to $12.8 billion. It was also found that a multipoint
outbreak would result in a $2 billion reduction to Australia’s GDP in the first year, and
$8–$13 billion over 10 years. The report showed that employment levels were reduced
within livestock-related industries, food-processing industries, as well as industries sup-
plying inputs to livestock production by 30%, 30% and 2%, respectively. The total cost
to tourism was estimated to be over $300 million.56
Direct economic losses that would be sustained from such an event include the
costs of containing and destroying disease-ridden agricultural commodities, the resulting
loss in production, the costs of purchasing drugs, vaccines, pesticides, as well as the
costs associated with diagnostic and veterinarian services. The loss of international trade
through sanctions and tighter quarantine measures, the loss of contracts and a reduction
 The Threat of Agroterrorism to Australia 157

in domestic consumption would also occur as a result of the introduction of any infec-
tious disease into the Australian agricultural sector.57 The indirect economic costs and
multiplier effects include losses to the feed industry due to decreased domestic require-
ments, losses to the transportation industry due to decreased movement of animals and
animal products, losses to the retail industry due to falls in domestic consumption as
well as increased supply costs, and potential losses to the tourism industry due to the
stigma associated with an outbreak of an infectious disease.58
The report also outlined the social consequences that a FMD outbreak would have
on the Australian community. It found that financial stress and hardship, especially in
rural communities, would be one of the main adverse social impacts. These two factors
could then in turn result in increased rates of depression and other psychological prob-
lems, substance abuse, other more serious health problems such as heart attack and
stroke, increased relationship breakdown and abuse, and the loss of cohesiveness in
particular communities resulting in the collapse of entire towns.59 The resolution of these
social consequences could take much longer than the simple eradication of the disease.
The overall consequences of a successful agroterrorist attack on Australia would
depend on a number of other factors. First, the severity of a particular disease, the host
range, and the size of the infected geographical area would determine the extent of the
economic impact to the nation. Second, the ability of the government authorities to
successfully contain and deal with the outbreak would influence the social and political
impact of an agroterrorist attack. Finally, the involvement of the media in broadcasting
images associated with an attack could affect public morale and hence their response to
such an event.
Although highlighting the aforementioned costs is appropriate for accidental out-
breaks, the nature of a terrorist attack itself could result in a number of other conse-
quences. A bioterrorist attack, whether directed at humans or agriculture, would result in
a greater degree of fear and anxiety among the general public.60 There would be sus-
tained political pressure on governments to respond to such an attack, in which case
failure to do so could create a climate of no confidence in government authorities that
may lead to a breakdown of law and order. As has been evident recently, the failure or
inaccuracy of intelligence agencies to predict and prevent terrorist attacks can result in
significant political backlash.61

Australia’s Limited Response to the Threat of Agroterrorism

Whereas the U.S. government has undertaken specific initiatives to address the threat
posed by agroterrorism,62 the Australian government has opted for a more compartmen-
talized approach to counterterrorism. Within the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Forestry, as well as organizations such as AusVet, response preparedness has fo-
cused on the accidental introduction of diseases such as FMD. Indeed, apart from Aus-
tralian intelligence agencies such as ASIO who have looked at the threat of agroterrorism
to Australia and assessed it to be low, almost all other government authorities place little
emphasis on the possibility of such an event.63
In response to the introduction of a FAD, Australian authorities have in place a
number of basic measures to contain an accidental outbreak. For example, Biosecurity
Australia, AusVet, and the Australian Cattle Council have communications systems in
place to deal with such an incident.64 However, in order for these plans to cope effec-
tively with disease outbreaks, they require a number of prior actions to occur. These
include an efficient disease reporting system to highlight any abnormal trends in disease
158 C. Ungerer and D. Rogers

activity, appropriately trained veterinarians to diagnose and respond quickly to outbreaks

of foreign diseases, effective record keeping and monitoring of agricultural commodi-
ties, and the willingness of farmers to report the suspected presence of unusual diseases.
In Australia, Animal Health Australia (AHA) through the National Animal Health
Information System (NAHIS) coordinates the acquisition and analysis of epidemiologi-
cal data for animal diseases. Through contributors such as animal health authorities,
diagnostic laboratories, disease surveillance programs, disease control and accreditation
programs, universities and research programs, they monitor reported cases of animal
diseases, investigations of suspected cases, along with simply queries from farmers and
veterinarians.65 In order to achieve effective disease surveillance, all Australian veteri-
narians are required to be able to recognize and diagnose animal diseases. Although it is
evident that many Australian veterinarians would be able to diagnose FMD due to the
heavy media attention that it has received since the outbreak in the United Kingdom, it
is questionable as to whether many would be able to effectively diagnose other FADs.
Training for the diagnosis of FADs is not emphasized in veterinarian programs within
Australian universities, and most graduate veterinarians return to the cities following
relatively short periods of work in rural practices.66 This highlights one of the key weak-
nesses among Australia’s first line of responders, who would play a crucial role in an
effective response to an FAD outbreak.
Livestock traceability within Australia in recent years has improved. The FMD and
BSE outbreaks overseas have caused livestock industries to rethink the way that they
trace the movement of animals across the country. In 2003, the Primary Industries Min-
isterial Council instigated a National Livestock Identification Scheme (NLIS) to improve
the traceability of livestock commodities. When the system is running effectively, a full
life record of every agricultural commodity will be available from the database.67 As this
system is not yet fully implemented, animals will continue to pass through auction yards
with no verifiable history or disease profile. Indeed, for many years the onus has rested
on buyers to ascertain the history of particular animals. The possibility for an agroterrorist
to introduce infected animals into these yards without the appropriate NLIS tag for the
time being still exists.
In order for veterinarians to respond early to an outbreak of an FAD, they rely on
the willingness and vigilance of farmers to report the presence of unusual diseases. In
addition to awareness campaigns that Animal Health Australia has implemented such as
the Look. Check. Ask a Vet program and the Emergency Disease Watch Hotline, the
Australian government has attempted to lessen the cost burden to farmers in such an
event by ensuring that compensation is paid to affected parties. This compensation, how-
ever, only covers the costs of the eradication and clean-up of the diseased animals, not
the loss of production. To some owners, this may not be as attractive as it is to others.
Indeed, the stigma associated with outbreaks of infectious disease may last well beyond
the eradication of the disease from those farms. Some authorities question whether farmers
would report highly politicized diseases such as BSE, which would have serious ramifi-
cations for their business.68 Indeed, many farmers who operate on thin profit margins
may feel that it is in the best interests of their business and their reputation in the
marketplace to simply kill the affected livestock and bury them. This may provide a
more attractive alternative to the situation where the authorities and the media would be
alerted to the problem and the large-scale culling of animals would be required. With
the possibility that this attitude may still exist within the agricultural community, the
effectiveness of early detection of an outbreak due to a FAD in Australia would be
significantly reduced.
 The Threat of Agroterrorism to Australia 159

Other measures that the Australian government and industry have instigated to re-
duce the impact of outbreaks of foreign diseases include increased border surveillance
and control,69 capacity building in neighboring countries to increase their ability to detect
and control outbreaks of infectious disease,70 and exercises to simulate disease outbreak
scenarios and test the response of relevant parties.71 Again, although these measures
build Australia’s capacity to respond to accidental introduction of foreign diseases, they
have done little to reduce the risk of deliberate and covert agroterrorism.
As illustrated in the aforementioned scenario, border surveillance can be overcome
by individuals with the intent of importing pathogens into the country, especially the
small amounts that would be required to instigate an attack. Although capacity building
reduces the pool of environmentally available agricultural pathogens, it does not eradi-
cate these diseases from all affected countries, nor can it address other possible avenues
for terrorists to obtain these pathogens. And although simulating accidental outbreaks
can assist authorities in preparing for and dealing with such an event, a real outbreak
brings with it many other factors that cannot be accounted for in such an exercise. Nor
can an exercise address the public response to a terrorist attack against Australian infra-
structure.

Re-Assessing the Threat of Agroterrorism: Low but Rising

Agroterrorism continues to receive limited attention in Australia, both in the political
and the public realms. Unlike in the United States where specific studies have been
undertaken to address this threat, Australian authorities have continued to focus on the
accidental introduction of foreign diseases as the most likely form of a biological inci-
dent. Although there is significant “cross-over” between the response to an outbreak due
to accidental introduction and a deliberate agroterrorist attack, the magnitude of such
events could differ quite dramatically.
As outlined earlier, agricultural industries are a major contributor to Australia’s economy
and GDP. The livestock industries in particular constitute a significant proportion of the
nation’s external trade. The continuation of international trading arrangements for agri-
cultural commodities relies on Australia’s ability to remain disease-free with respect to
diseases such as FMD. To an individual or terrorist organization with the intent of de-
bilitating the economy, Australian agriculture represents a unique and vulnerable target.
A successful attack would have follow-on consequences in a number of other industries
as well as social and psychological costs that would last well beyond the eradication of
the disease.
Contributing to the attractiveness of an agroterrorist attack is the changing nature of
Australian agribusiness itself. Consolidation of holdings, intensive animal rearing prac-
tices, the openness of farms, and the distances in which livestock travel in relatively
short periods of time make outbreaks of infectious disease, whether by intent or by
accident, more likely. The increase in technical information about biological pathogens
available on the Internet and the increased technical ability of some terrorist organiza-
tions increases the possibility that terrorists will be less risk adverse in using tactics that
are unfamiliar to them, including the use of biological agents against plant and animal
populations. The lower capability requirements associated with an agroterrorist attack
also makes it more attractive than a human bioterror attack.
Although Australian authorities have implemented some mechanisms to provide early
detection and response to outbreaks of foreign diseases, several vulnerabilities continue
to exist. As a recent national inquiry into Australia’s intelligence agencies has shown,
160 C. Ungerer and D. Rogers

information sharing between the six national intelligence agencies and local first-re-
sponders such as doctors and veterinarians continues to be compartmentalized and less
than fully effective.72 Biosecurity in Australia is improving, but border security controls
and the security of individual farms remain less than adequate. The fact that a deter-
mined terrorist group could damage Australian agricultural industries and the Australian
economy, along with instilling fear and instability within the Australian population, em-
phasizes the need for the Australian authorities to increase domestic preparedness for
such an attack.
Given the current situation, what can the Australian government do to mitigate the
threat of agroterrorism? Three broad policy options appear relevant.

1. Australian authorities must be better able to identify and control the movement
of dangerous pathogens between Southeast Asia and Australia. A system similar
to the Co-operative Threat Reduction program between the United States and
Russia (which provides for the security of nuclear materials) should be put in
place between Australia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Such a program would provide accounting controls over stocks of dangerous
pathogens in veterinary hospitals, research laboratories, and universities. This
system would also need to incorporate an early warning alert system for disease
outbreaks and better border security screening measures.
2. Australia must address the issue of information sharing between national intelli-
gence agencies, state government agencies, and first-responders. Veterinary stu-
dents at Australian universities should be made more aware of dangerous patho-
gens that could be used in an agroterrorist attack. Intelligence briefings should
be provided to farmers, auction yards, and other frontline groups by the national
threat assessment agencies on a more regular basis. Overall, working-level co-
operation between intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, and agri-
businesses needs to improve.
3. Australia must work closely with other intelligence agencies in Southeast Asia
and globally to profile individual terrorists or groups with an interest in acquir-
ing and using biological weapons. Australia needs to have a better understand-
ing of the capabilities and intentions of groups who would seek to target agri-
cultural industries for political gain.

Implementing these reforms would not be expensive. Australia has already increased
funding for counterterrorism operations by over $400 million since 2001; however, very
little additional funding has been directed toward agricultural emergency preparedness
and response mechanisms. The current focus in Australia on military counterterrorism
capabilities, such as the chemical and biological Incident Response Unit at the Holsworthy
Army base in Sydney, are ill-suited to the task of identifying and responding to the
threat of deliberate disease outbreaks in the agricultural sector. For prudential reasons,
the Australian government will need to redress this imbalance.

Notes
1. Quoted in Muhammad Q. Islam and Wasim N. Shahin, “Applying Economic Methodol-
ogy to the War on Terrorism,” Forum for Social Economics (2002), pp. 7–26 as reported on
AOL News (http://www.aol.com).
2. Richard Falkenrath, Richard Newman, and Brad Thayer, America’s Achilles’ Heel: Nuclear,
 The Threat of Agroterrorism to Australia 161

Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, BCSIA Studies in International Security
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998).
3. Alexander Downer, Security in an Unstable World, Speech delivered to the National Press
Club 26 June 2003. See (http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2003/030626_unstableworld.html).
4. Peter Chalk, The Bio-Terrorist Threat to Agricultural Livestock and Produce. Testi-
mony presented before the Government Affairs Committee of the United States Senate on 19
November 2003.
5. Corrie Brown, “Agro-Terrorism: A cause for alarm,” The Monitor: Nonproliferation,
Demilitarisation, and Arms Control, 5(1–2) (1999), p. 6.
6. Highlighted in a number of papers including Mark Wheelis, “Biological Attack on Agri-
culture: Low-Tech, High Impact Bioterrorism,” BioScience. 52(7) (2002), p. 569 and Rocco Casagrande,
“Biological Terrorism Targeted at Agriculture: The Threat to U.S. National Security,” The Non-
proliferation Review, Fall–Winter (2000), p. 92.
7. Lecture given by ASIO Director-General, Dennis Richardson, University of Queensland,
11 October 2004.
8. The focus of the article will be on the deliberate use and consequences of foreign ani-
mal diseases (FADs) in an agroterrorist attack. It is acknowledged that to undertake an agroterrorist
attack on livestock will have far fewer constraints than one involving an attack on crops. How-
ever, crop-based agroterrorism will be discussed in more general terms throughout the article.
9. The structure and methodology of this paper is based on a recent study of the agroterrorist
threat in the United States. See Peter Chalk, Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly: The Potential
Threat of Deliberate Biological Attacks Against the U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry (Santa
Monica CA: RAND Corporation, 2004). Available at (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/
RAND_MG135.pdf).
10. Anne Kohnen, Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism: Specific Recommendations
for the United States Department of Agriculture, BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-29 (John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2000).
11. Ibid.
12. Jason Pate and Gavin Cameron, “Covert Biological Weapons Attacks against Agricul-
tural Targets: Assessing the Impact against U.S. Agriculture,” in Arnold M. Howitt and Robyn L.
Pangi, eds., Countering Terrorism: Dimensions for Preparedness (BCSIA, Cambridge: MIT Press,
2003), pp. 95–218.
13. The Monterey Institute WMD Terrorism Database, Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Available at (http://www.cns.miis.edu).
14. Statistics available from the World Bank Group at (http://www.worldbank.org/data.
15. Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Agriculture: Characteristics of Australian Farms,” Year
Book Australia 2003 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004). Available at (http://www.abs.gov.au/
ausstats).
16. Ibid.
17. Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Agriculture: Employment in agriculture,” Year Book
Australia 2003 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004). Available at (http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats).
18. Based on Labour Force figures found at the Australian Bureau of Statistics (http://www.abs.gov.au/
ausstats).
19. Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Agriculture: Gross Value of Agricultural Commodities
Produced,” Year Book Australia 2003 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004). Available at (http://
www.abs.gov.au/ausstats).
20. Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Agriculture: Livestock,” Year Book Australia 2003 (Australian
Bureau of Statistics 2004). Available at (http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats).
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. From the author’s interviews with employees of AusVet and the Australian Cattle Council.
162 C. Ungerer and D. Rogers

26. Brown, “Agro-Terrorism: A Cause for Alarm.”

27. Most outbreaks are the result of accidental introduction of a pathogen to a susceptible
population that have had little or no prior exposure to the pathogen.
28. Comments by Paul Effler, Hawaii State Epidemiologist, Transnational Security Threats
in Asia Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, 8–10 August 2000 as quoted by Peter Chalk, Hitting
America’s Soft Underbelly: The Potential Threat of Deliberate Biological Attacks Against the
U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry.
29. Brown, “Agro-Terrorism.”
30. From interviews with a senior veterinary epidemiologist.
31. Kohnen, Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism.
32. Arjan Stegeman, Armin R. W. Elbers, Jan Smak, and Mart C. M. de Jong, “Quantifica-
tion of the Transmission of Classical Swine Fever Virus between Herds during the 1997–1998
Epidemic in the Netherlands,” Preventative Veterinary Medicine, 42 (1999), p. 219.
33. Acknowledged by various industry professionals.
34. An example is the PROMED website. Here, it is possible to search for outbreaks of
particular infectious diseases as well as enlist for daily email updates with little personal informa-
tion required to access the site. See (http://www.promed.org).
35. With respect to FAD’s, the Foreign Animal Diseases “The Gray Book” available online
free of charge, provides some 500 pages of extremely detailed information on all aspects of
FADs, including a large number of detailed images of infected animals for all FADs. See United
States Animal Health Association, Foreign Animal Diseases “The Gray Book,” United States
Animal Health Association (Richmond, VA: Carter Printing Company, 1998). Available at (http:/
/www.vet.uga.edu/vpp/gray_book/pdf/1998_edition.htm).
36. The data for this figure was obtained from United States Animal Health Association
Foreign Animal Diseases “The Gray Book” as well as Table 1 of Animal Health in Australia
2003. See Animal Health Australia, Animal Health in Australia 2003 (Canberra, Australia, 2004).
37. The last recorded case of FMD in Australia was in 1872; the last outbreak of HPAI was
in 1997. Data sourced from Table 1 of Animal Health Australia, Animal Health in Australia 2003.
38. Kohnen, Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism.
39. Data from a recent report on the PROMED website.
40. Casagrande, “Biological Terrorism Targeted at Agriculture.”
41. Richard Falkenrath, et.al., America’s Achilles Heel.
42. According to the official government website, New Zealand prides itself on being a
“world-leader” in border protection. See (http://www.protectnz.org.nz).
43. Terrance M. Wilson, Linda Logan-Henfrey, Richard Weller, and Barry Kellman, “A
Review of Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agricul-
ture,” in C.Brown and C. A. Bolin, eds., Emerging Animal Diseases (American Society of Micro-
biology, Washington, DC, 2000), pp. 23–58.
44. Wheelis, “Biological Attack on Agriculture.”
45. Fictional scenario devised during a discussion with a veterinary epidemiologist.
46. Wheelis, “Biological Attack on Agriculture.”
47. In early March 2005, the Australian government named the animal rights group, People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), as a potential terrorist organisation. See “Minister
attacks animal rights group,” ABC Online, 2 March 2005. Available at (www.abc.net.au).
48. George J. Tenet, The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Con-
text, Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence 24 February 2004. Available at (http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/
congress/2004_hr/tenet_24feb2004.htm).
49. Adapted from reasons outlined by Dorothy B. Preslan, The Role of Disease Surveillance
in the Watch for Agro-Terrorism or Economic Sabotage (Federation of American Scientists, 2000).
Available at (http://www.fas.org); and Alejandro E. Segarro, Agroterrorism: Options in Congress,
Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 2002).
50. Stephen Handelman, “An Edible Threat: A Porous Border Means Taking Agricultural
Terrorism Seriously,” Time International, 162(4) (2003), p. 24.
 The Threat of Agroterrorism to Australia 163

51. Chalk, Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly.

52. United States Animal Health Association, Foreign Animal Diseases “The Gray Book.”
53. In the United States, the Department of Agriculture through the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) has undertaken various programs and simulation exercises. See (http:/
/www.aphis.usda.gov). Other countries such as Canada and Mexico have also developed mea-
sures to combat FAD outbreaks. For more information of Canada’s response, see (http://www.inspection.
gc.ca). In 2000, Canada, the U.S. and Mexico participated in a tripartite exercise that simulated a
cross-border outbreak of FMD, testing their emergency disease response plans.
54. See Productivity Commission, Impact of a Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak on Aus-
tralia, Research Report (Canberra: AusInfo, 2002); Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and For-
estry (DAFF), Exercise Minotaur: National Foot and Mouth Disease Simulation (2002). Avail-
able at (http://www.affa.gov.au/exerciseminotaur). This exercise was a desktop exercise focused
on testing the ability of the relevant authorities to respond to a significant animal disease emer-
gency. Around 1,000 people from government and industry were involved in the simulation.
55. See the report by D. Thompson et.al., Economic Costs of the Foot and Mouth Disease
Outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.
Available at (www.defra.gov.uk).
56. Productivity Commission, Impact of a Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak on Australia.
57. See Segarro, Agroterrorism; Chalk, Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly; and Beth Lautner,
U.S. Agriculture in Context: Sector’s Importance to the American Economy and Its Role in Global
Trade, Proceedings from the Blue Ribbon Panel on the Threat of Biological Terrorism Directed
Against Livestock, White House Conference Center, 8–9 December 2003. Available at (http://
www.rand.org).
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. See Segarro, Agroterrorism; and Chalk, Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly.
61. Chalk, Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly.
62. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has implemented a number of programs in recent
years to address the agroterrorism threat including improved education services for veterinarians,
biological risk management programs for business and a national response plan in association
with the Department of Homeland Security. See (www.usda.gov).
63. From interviews conducted with AusVet, DAFF and Dennis Richardson (ASIO).
64. Animal Health Australia runs an Emergency Animal Disease Preparedness program, in-
cluding an disease watch hotline. See (www.aahc.com.au).
65. Animal Health Australia, Animal Health in Australia 2003. Available at (www.aahc.com.au).
66. 60–70% of veterinary graduates find employment in combined rural and small animal
practices. However, these graduates have no experience diagnosing FADs, nor do they spend
enough time in these practices to ever develop enough rural experience. After 10 years, less than
20% of initial graduates remain in rural areas. This information was sourced from the School of
Veterinary Science at the University of Queensland.
67. Animal Health Australia, Animal Health in Australia 2003.
68. From interviews with industry professionals.
69. The Australian government has increased funding to departments such as the Australian
Quarantine and Inspection Service to ensure that the risk of accidental introduction of foreign
diseases is minimized.
70. Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Improving Regional Surveillance Ef-
forts: Animal Health: Australia’s Contribution, Australian Delegation Paper 6 for the BWC Ex-
perts Meeting, Geneva, July 2004.
71. Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Exercise Minotaur: National Foot
and Mouth Disease Simulation—which tested the ability to respond to a FMD outbreak.
72. Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies
(The Flood Report), July 2004. Available at (www.pmc.gov.au/publications/intelligence_inquiry).