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Foreign Policy Brief: The Iran Nuclear Deal

The relationship between the U.S. and Iran has often been described as strained and laden

with distrust on both sides of the aisle. Iran’s effort to increase its nuclear capabilities is

significant, seeing as it is a state with a great deal of influence in the Middle East. In regards to

strategic interests, it is essential that the U.S. maintains good relations with Iran in order to bring

about stability and to secure a much-needed alliance in the region. In a changing world where

nuclear weapons are capable of widespread and unimaginable destruction, the U.S. has had to

take a stance on quelling Iran’s nuclear program, seeing as such power being available in one of

the most unstable regions in the world could prove catastrophic.

In July of 2015, the Iran Nuclear Deal, more officially known as the Joint Comprehensive

Plan of Action (JCPOA) was created under former President Obama’s leadership. It has aimed to

improve relations with Iran and prevent nuclear proliferation by instituting oversight over Iran’s

nuclear program and decreasing the amount of centrifuges and enriched uranium the nation can

have (The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration 2016). Today, there are three

different courses of action that can be taken in terms of our policy regarding this agreement, and

they are: do not honor the deal and force Iran not to acquire nuclear weapons through physical

means or increased sanctions, renegotiate the deal to make it even more restrictive, or honor the

deal and help integrate Iran into the global community to rebuild trust, which is the policy option

I recommend.

Before evaluating each policy strategy, it is crucial to remember the history of American

involvement in Iran in past decades. As a theocracy, the Iranian government by definition

conflicts with American democratic values. President Bush famously referred to Iran as being a

part of the so-called “axis of evil,” and the Iranian Revolution of 1979, in which the CIA and
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British MI6 conspired to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeqh because he

threatened to constrain British Petroleum’s access to oil by attempting to nationalize the

company, soured both nations’ views of one another. Mosaddeqh was quite popular, and when

he was replaced with Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, mass protest erupted (Mansbach & Taylor

2017: 251). This tension would eventually result in the attack on the American embassy in

Tehran in the same year, followed by the notorious Iran hostage crisis, during which a number of

American diplomats were held in retaliation for Mosaddeqh’s deposition. As a result, the U.S.

and Iran have both harbored some hostility toward one another since then. Iran’s ambitions in the

past few years to gain a nuclear weapon have caused concern because of our seesawing

relationship, and the possibility of those weapons falling into the wrong hands in a region riddled

with constant power vacuums and the frequent rise of insurgent groups could not only harm our

allies, but also have a direct impact on the American people.

The JCPOA outlines several goals for decreasing Iran’s nuclear capabilities and since

October 2015, “Iran has shipped 25,000 pounds of enriched uranium out of the country,

dismantled and removed two-thirds of its centrifuges, [and] provided unprecedented access to its

nuclear facilities and supply chain” (The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration

2016). Iran is now obligated to allow their nuclear energy facilities to operate under the

supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and although some sanctions

have been lifted, others are still in place because Iran continues to be accused of providing

financial aid to Hezbollah, a terrorist organization. Furthermore, the U.S. State Department has

categorized Iran as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” since 1984, and thus, these particular

sanctions will not be lifted until Iran can show that “There has been a fundamental change in the

leadership and policies of the government of the country concerned, the government is not
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supporting acts of international terrorism, and the government has provided assurances that it

will not support acts of international terrorism in the future” (U.S. Department of State 2015).

Therefore, economic pressure on Iran continues, despite the nuclear agreement. That said, Iran

would currently be capable of producing eight to ten nuclear weapons, but it is expected to

decrease its uranium by 98% in the coming years. (The U.S. National Archives and Records

Administration 2016).

Critics of the JCPOA insist that Iran cannot be trusted to follow up on its promises in the

agreement. Some of these critics reflect the first policy option aforementioned: using military

force on Iran. Considering Iran’s status as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the skepticism of the

deal’s opponents is understandable. Republican Senator John McCain, for example, has claimed

that “The Iran Deal unshackled the theocratic regime’s pursuit of advanced military capabilities,

including missiles that can target Israel, Europe, and someday the U.S. homeland. And it poured

billions of dollars on the world’s number one state sponsor of terrorism to fuel further

destabilization of the Middle East and undermine U.S. national security interests.” (McCain

2016). McCain also once made comments about bombing Iran in 2007 during a speech he gave

in South Carolina while running in the 2008 presidential election, but he later said that the

comments were a joke. However, he did say in a speech to Christians United for Israel, an NGO,

that “every option must remain on the table [...] There is only one thing worse than a military

solution, and that, my friends, is a nuclear armed Iran” (New York Times 2008), insinuating that

using military force against Iran would be preferable to allowing it to having nuclear weapons.

Doing away with the JCPOA and using military force or hard power against Iran at this

point could prove to be disastrous, and it would reflect poorly on the U.S. for failing to promote

diplomacy. Who knows how many lives could be lost in the process? Backing out of the
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agreement would end any chance we may have had to improve our relationship with Iran, and

even if we did destroy all of their centrifuges and nuclear facilities, who is to say they wouldn’t

simply rebuild them in the future? Any overt military action would leave the U.S. embroiled in

another war in the Middle East, something which the American public overwhelmingly

disapproves of. We already have sanctions in place to continue exercising economic constraints

on Iran and both the IAEA and the U.S. Congress have been reviewing Iran’s activities to ensure

it is complying with the requirements that have been put into place.

The second policy alternative some critics of the JCPOA champion is referred to as

simply “repeal and replace.” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel is a firm supporter of

this strategy and stated in an interview for the Washington Examiner that he would like President

Trump to end the nuclear agreement. "Here's my position, but it's my position vis-a-vis the deal

with Iran. If I had to compress it into two words, repeal or replace [...] Clearly, one thing that has

to be changed is to not let Iran have the best of all worlds, which is the worst of all worlds for

Israel and the Arab countries, the United States, the world." (Washington Examiner 2017) Prime

Minister Netanyahu has been condemned in the past for being a more nationalistic and war-

hawkish leader than his predecessors, and his attitudes toward Iran have arguably demonstrated

this. He believes Iran is still a threat even with the deal in place, and similarly to Senator

McCain, does not trust Iran to continue keeping its promises. Renegotiating the agreement now

with a new one could prove to be very difficult, and there is no guarantee that Iran would be

willing to sign another agreement once the U.S. has backed out of the first one.

Additionally, a number of European countries asserted in November of 2016 that they

will continue to support the implementation of the JCPOA even if President Trump decides to

repeal it (Council of the EU 2016). Thus, getting the remainder of the international community to
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come together and support a new plan would be far from easy, if not impossible. Nonetheless,

John Bolton, a contributor to the non-partisan think tank, American Enterprise Institution,

argues, “There should be little doubt that Iran, whose path to deliverable nuclear weapons was

paved by Obama’s 2015 nuclear agreement, would readily use or threaten to use those weapons,

or provide them to terrorists, to achieve regional hegemony. Iran’s continuing menace as a

terrorist state is inextricably linked to its nuclear program, and that is one reason why Obama’s

nuclear deal is so inadvisable” (Bolton 2017).

The third and final policy option for dealing with Iran’s nuclear program is to honor the

deal we have agreed upon along with our allies worldwide and continue to try and bring Iran to

the table so that it may be integrated into the international community for more diplomatic peace

talks. Although we still do not completely agree with many of Iran’s actions in the Middle East,

this does not mean we have not made any progress. International Crisis Group, an NGO that

reports on and investigates conflicts around the globe, has stated “The one-year-old Iran nuclear

deal has succeeded in its goal of blocking nuclear proliferation and opening the door to Iranian

economic recovery. But it remains in jeopardy unless both Washington and Tehran defend and

extend the spirit as well as the letter of the accord” (International Crisis Group 2017).

Ultimately, the JCPOA is the most effective piece of legislation we have in place to

restrain Iran’s nuclear developments, and unless an actual, more efficient alternative is brought

to the negotiating table and it can be proven that said alternative can conceivably be passed and

implemented, the JCPOA must stay in place to ensure Iran’s programs continue to be subject to

oversight. Doing anything other than honoring this deal will merely give Iran a reason to become

even more distrustful of the West and will provide incentive to keep Iran from joining future
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negotiations. Iran will continue to run its programs in secret and any hope to form an eventual

alliance or at least to mend some American-Iranian ties will be squandered.

Risking the interference of partisanship now would be counterintuitive. “Over the past

year, internal polarisation in Tehran and Washington about the accord’s merits often

overshadowed what really matters: that it is working and delivering concrete results. It has put

Iran’s nuclear program under the most stringent inspection mechanism ever implemented, while

lengthening the breakout time to produce weapons-grade uranium from a few weeks to more

than a year. Since January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has verified

six times that Iran has fulfilled its JCPOA obligations” (International Crisis Group 2017).

Furthermore, during the few occasions when there has not been total compliance with regard to

the rules, the IAEA has managed to remedy the problem because of the intense oversight. It is

effortless to just state that the JCPOA should be repealed or that it could be replaced with

something better, but writing the actual policies and getting them passed is far more laborious. It

is difficult to get the UN Security Council to agree unanimously on anything, and putting Iran

into that mix makes the battle all the more complex. The JCPOA has been a victory in showing

that the pen remains stronger than the sword, and now we must stand by and protect the

agreement we have signed. Abiding by our decisions shows strength, but undermining those

same decisions gives the U.S. a reputation of being warmongering and aggressive for not being

able to find diplomatic solutions to problems.

Looking toward the future, it is unclear what President Trump intends to do about the

JCPOA. The new administration has yet to define a specific policy strategy in regards to dealing

with Iran. President Trump expressed some dislike of the nuclear deal on the campaign trail in

2016, but words do not necessarily always translate into actions. It could be hypothesized that
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diplomacy may not be President Trump’s first priority in terms of policy options, considering his

budget proposal would cut funding for the State Department substantially and many of the job

positions in the State Department have yet to even be filled. Jared Kushner, President Trump’s

son-in-law, has been put in charge of negotiating with several international actors recently,

including China and Israel, and it is possible he will also be asked to negotiate with Iran at some

point. Kushner’s lack of experience working in government or politics may prove to be

problematic in restoring relations with Iran should Kushner not have a clear grasp of the

historical and contemporary factors surrounding the issue, or perhaps an outsider view will be

advantageous.

Nevertheless, President Trump stressed in his inaugural address that he would not be

focusing so much on foreign policy and would instead shift toward a doctrine of “America First.”

If this is to be an indication of what his future decision-making will be, one could assume he will

be a more unilateral leader than former President Obama was. President Obama often stressed

working with our allies and other international actors and organizations to come to solutions

regarding foreign policy issues in a multilateral manner. He sought that agreements were made

with the cooperation of other nations in mind and that the U.S. did not act as the sole decider in

coming to conclusions about how to act. He emphasized reaching across the aisle and remarked

in his iconic 2008 presidential election victory speech, “And to all those watching tonight from

beyond our shores, from parliaments and palaces, to those who are huddled around radios in the

forgotten corners of the world, our stories are singular, but our destiny is shared, and a new dawn

of American leadership is at hand” (CNN 2008). This is a sharp contrast to President Trump,

who in his inauguration speech stated, “From this moment on, it’s going to be America First.
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Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs, will be made to benefit

American workers and American families. We must protect our borders from the ravages of

other countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs. Protection

will lead to great prosperity and strength” (White House 2017). This turn to a more isolationist

approach with regard to international affairs would almost certainly impact the JCPOA and its

viability moving forward. Legislation is only as strong as its enforcement is, and a hands-off

method could cripple the deal.

Policy-making and reaching conclusions is hardly ever a straightforward or clear process,

and every policy position is influenced by a number of factors. The Iran Nuclear Deal is no

exception to this. In the world of politics, circumstances change daily, and it is entirely possible

that the JCPOA will fail in the long term or that Iran will break its promises and covertly begin

advancing its nuclear capabilities again. Nonetheless, the results of the JCPOA until now have

proven that it has been effective in doing what it was meant to do, and until there is reason to

believe it is no longer working, we should continue to defend it and remain on the diplomatic

path we have been pursuing since the JCPOA’s creation. This policy position is what is in the

best interest for Iran, the U.S., and our allies who have supported this agreement. Repealing it

now would cause more problems than it would solve, and military intervention would incite

anger in the American public and harm our image in the eyes of the Iranian government and its

people. In an age of complicated political interdependence, we must defend any diplomatic

solutions that are made available to us. As former Secretary of State John Kerry once said, “We

look to Iran, as President [Hassan] Rouhani himself said, to make this a turning point” (CNBC

2016). Let us make this a turning point for the better and strive for a new era of peace, stability,

and comradery.
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Works Cited

Bolton, John R. (2017) “Iran and the Next Middle East War.” American Enterprise Institution.

Council of the EU. (2016) “Council conclusions on Iran” Retrieved April 23, 2017 from

http://dsms.consilium.europa.eu/952/Actions/Newsletter.aspx?messageid=8829&custome

rid=18886&password=enc_3343364144423034_enc

CNBC. (2016) “John Kerry: The world is safer thanks to Iran deal” January 21. Retrieved April

15, 2017 from http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/21/sec-of-state-kerry-iran-was-hurtling-

toward-a-full-fledged-nuclear-weapon-program.html

CNN Politics. (2008) “Transcript: ‘This is your victory’, says Obama.” Retrieved April 23, 2017

from http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/11/04/obama.transcript/

International Crisis Group. (2017) "Implementing the Iran Nuclear Deal: A Status Report."

Retrieved April 15, 2017 from https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-

and-arabian-peninsula/iran/173-implementing-iran-nuclear-deal-status-report>.

Mansbach, Richard W., and Kirsten L. Taylor. (2017) Contemporary American Foreign Policy:

Influences, Challenges, and Opportunities. Los Angeles: SAGE Reference/CQ Press.

McCain, John. (2016) “McCain on First Anniversary of Dangerous Iran Deal.” John McCain

U.S. Senator Arizona. Retrieved April 23, 2017 from

https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=B93775F1-E3FE-

4D5E-99E7-BD03070A36C2

New York Times. (2017) “On the Issues: Iran.” Contributors, Sanger, David E. , Shan Carter,

Jonathan Ellis, Farhana Hossain, & Alan Mclean. Retrieved April 23, 2017 from

http://www.nytimes.com/elections/2008/president/issues/iran.html
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The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (2016) "The Historic Deal that Will

Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon." Retrieved April 23, 2017 from

<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal>.

U.S. Department of State. (2015) “State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview.” Bureau of

Counterterrorism. Washington, D.C. Available at

<https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257520.htm>.

Washington Examiner. (2017) “Netanyahu tells Trump: ‘Repeal or Replace’ Iran Deal.”

Retrieved April 23, 2017 from http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/netanyahu-tells-

trump-repeal-or-replace-iran-deal/article/2620961

White House. (2017) “The Inaugural Address.” Retrieved April 23, 2017 from h

ttps://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural-address