A.M. No. P-01-1472.

June 26, 2003]

ADRIANO V. ALBIOR, complainant, vs. DONATO A. AUGUIS, Clerk of Court II,

4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Talibon-Getafe,
Bohol, respondent.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

Respondent Donato Auguis, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Branch 4, Talibon-Getafe[1], Talibon, Bohol, is charged by Adriano Albior, of usurpation
of judicial function and negligence in the performance of official duties. According to
complainant, respondent usurped judicial functions when he issued the order for the
detention of one Edilberto Albior, the son of complainant. Further, complainant alleged
that respondent committed negligence when he failed to inform Acting Presiding Judge
Avelino N. Puracan of that court regarding the filing of cases that necessitated
issuance of the detention order.
The antecedent facts of this administrative matter are as follows:
On January 25, 1999, two complaints for rape[2] were filed against Edilberto Albior
before the MCTC, Branch 4 in Talibon-Getafe, Talibon, Bohol. As clerk of court of the
said court, respondent Auguis received and filed the complaints which were docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 9144 and 9145. The following day, respondent issued a
detention order[3] to the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) in San
Jose, Talibon, Bohol, for the commitment of the accused Edilberto Albior. On January
27, 1999, the BJMP duly issued a receipt of detainee[4]for the person of the accused.
According to complainant, said order was issued without a prior preliminary
investigation and without a warrant of arrest. Neither was there any record in the Police
Blotter of the accuseds apprehension, or of his surrender. Nor was there proof that he
signed a waiver for his detention. Whats more, the respondent failed to inform Acting
Municipal Judge Avelino Puracan regarding the filing of the complaints for rape before
his sala.[5]
On February 23, 1999, counsel for the accused then filed an urgent motion to
release the accused.[6] Two days later, respondent issued a subpoena, directing the
accused to submit counter-affidavits for the preliminary investigation of the charges of
rape. But no further action was taken by the court. Accused through counsel filed a
second motion[7] on March 1, 1999. Again, the motion was not acted upon.
Having no other recourse to regain his liberty, the accused filed a petition
for habeas corpus on March 15, 1999, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
Branch 52. During the habeas corpus proceedings,[8] the respondent testified that this
was not the first time he issued a detention order without a warrant of arrest. He
testified that he has done this action many times already[9] in the past, upon the
request of the Chief of Police of the Philippine National Police in Talibon. He reasoned
out that it was in the best interest of the detainees to be transferred from the PNP jail
to the BJMP because the former did not have meal provisions for detainees.
After due hearing, the RTC Judge Zeta V. Villamayor issued an order [10] on
March 25, 1999, finding that the accused was being illegally restrained of his liberty
and ordering his immediate release from confinement. On the same day, the MCTC
conducted a preliminary examination of the prosecutions witnesses and issued an
Omnibus Order[11] confirming the arrest of the accused.
On April 12, 1999, counsel for the accused filed a motion for reinvestigation[12] with
the Department of Justice, assailing the validity of the Omnibus Order. He maintained
that no warrant of arrest was ever issued against his client and as such, no
confirmation of such arrest may be undertaken.
On June 2, 1999, the father of the accused, herein complainant Adriano Albior,
filed a letter-complaint[13] with the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. Complainant
charged respondent of usurpation of judicial functions and negligence in the
performance of duties, in connection with the detention of his son, Edilberto Albior.
In a resolution dated June 3, 1999,[14] the Deputy Ombudsman referred the letter-
complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action. On
May 8, 2000, the Ombudsman issued a resolution[15] dismissing the criminal complaint
for usurpation of judicial function as defined under Article 241 of the Revised Penal
Code.[16] However, he recommended the filing of an information with the proper court
for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.[17]
Acting on the letter-complaint, the OCA required respondent to file a comment to
the complaint. Respondent filed his counter-affidavit.[18] Respondent claims that he
issued the detention order only after the PNP Chief and PNP Trial Officer of Talibon
repeatedly requested him to do so. The respondent asserts that it was out of honest
conviction that he was only helping the accused and his relatives. He was merely
sparing them the trouble of having to bring meals to the accused, as the municipal jail
where the latter was detained did not serve food to its prisoners.
Respondent also appended the affidavit[19] of Police Senior Inspector Lecarion P.
Torrefiel, the PNP Chief of Police of Talibon. In it the Police Chief stated that he
personally requested the respondent to immediately issue a detention order in order
to transfer the accused to the BJMP jail, where he is ensured of three square meals a
day. The Chief explained that the municipality did not have a budget for meals of
detainees at the PNP jail, hence, it is alleged that respondents action was intended
purely for humanitarian reasons. Nothing is said, however, why the local government
unit allows this inhumane practice. The Chief of Police himself appears blissfully
ignorant of the human rights aspects of the matter for which his command could be
held accountable.
On January 29, 2001, the OCA issued its report.[20] It found respondents defense
unconvincing and held him administratively liable for issuing the said detention order
prior to a preliminary investigation conducted by a judge and before a warrant of arrest
was issued against the accused. It recommended that the case be re-docketed as an
administrative matter and that a fine in the amount of P3,000.00 be imposed upon
respondent with a warning that the commission of the same or similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
 We then required the parties to manifest if they were willing to submit the case for
decision on the basis of the pleadings filed.[21] The respondent subsequently
manifested his conformity.[22]
The main issue for our resolution is whether the respondent should be held
administratively liable for the issuance of a detention order resulting in the actual
detention of the accused under the abovementioned circumstances.
The OCA report stresses that respondent clerk of court is not empowered to issue
the questioned detention order. The duties of a clerk of court in the absence of the
judge are defined under Section 5, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 5. Duties of the clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. - In the
absence of the judge, the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving
applications, petitions, inventories, reports, and the issuance of all orders and
notices that follow as a matter of course under these rules, and may also, when
directed so to do by the judge, receive the accounts of executors, administrators,
guardians, trustees, and receivers, and all evidence relating to them, or to the
settlement of the estates of deceased persons, or to guardianships, trusteeships, or
receiverships, and forthwith transmit such reports, accounts, and evidence to the
judge, together with his findings in relation to the same, if the judge shall direct him
to make findings and include the same in his report.

Indeed nowhere in the Rules is the clerk of court authorized to issue an order of
detention, as such function is purely judicial. In fact, we already had occasion to rule
that a clerk of court, unlike a judicial authority, has no power to order the commitment
of a person charged with a penal offense.[23]
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas aptly pointed out that where a judge is
not available, the arresting officer is duty-bound to release a detained person, if the
maximum hours for detention provided under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
had already expired. Failure to cause the release may result in an offense under the
Code, to wit:

ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. - The penalties provided in the next preceding articles shall be imposed
upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal
ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within
the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties,
or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.

Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to help the accused
and his relatives. But as an officer of the court, he should be aware that by issuing
such detention order, he trampled upon a fundamental human right of the accused.
Because of the unauthorized order issued by respondent, the accused Edilberto Albior
was deprived of liberty without due process of law for a total of 56 days, counted from
his unlawful detention on January 27, 1999 until the issuance of the appropriate order
of commitment by the municipal judge on March 25, 1999.
 Thus, the Court cannot condone nor take lightly the serious violation committed
by the respondent. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution mandates:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Underscoring ours)

Once again, it bears emphasizing that the behavior of everyone connected with
an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the clerk
of lowest rank, should be circumscribed with a high degree of responsibility. [24] Their
conduct at all times must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but
above all else must be in accordance with the Constitution and the law. A clerk of
court, such as herein respondent, is a ranking and essential officer in the judicial
system. His office is the hub of activities. He performs delicate administrative functions
essential to the prompt and proper administration of justice.[25]
Respondent needs no reminder that as an important officer in the dispensation of
justice, one of his primary duties is to uphold the fundamental law of the land. His
defense that he is not a lawyer or law graduate and so is excusably ignorant of the
legal implications of his detention order, deserves scant consideration. Ignorance of
the law excuses no one from compliance therewith, especially a clerk of court who
ought to know better than an ordinary layman.
This Court has assiduously condemned any omission or act which tends to
undermine the faith and trust of the people in the judiciary. [26] The Court cannot
countenance any act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration
of justice which would violate the norms of public accountability and diminish or tend
to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.[27]
The respondents issuance of the detention order not only deprived the accused of
liberty, it also considerably diminished the peoples faith in the judiciary. For the very
officer of the court on whom they depended to safeguard their human and
constitutional rights was also the one who violated these rights. Respondent should
be mindful of his ineluctable duty, as a ranking officer in the judicial system, to ensure
that basic rights are protected.
In conclusion, we agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent is liable as
charged administratively. But we disagree with its recommendation that respondent
be merely meted out the penalty of a fine. We cannot treat lightly the actions of the
respondent for he has admitted doing them repeatedly, in fact many times in the past.
The implication of his action as an official of the court is not only disturbing but
shocking, for it involves no less than a violation of the constitutional right to liberty. We
hold that respondents unauthorized issuance of the detention order and his failure to
inform the Presiding Judge about said order constitute not merely gross neglect of
duty but outright grave misconduct.
Misconduct is a violation of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly unlawful behaviour as well as gross negligence by the public officer. To
warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be serious, important,
weighty, momentous and not trifling. It must also have direct relation to, and connected
with the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of the office. [28] Because of the
order for the arrest of the accused and resultant confinement in police custody, the
respondent unduly usurped the judicial prerogative of the judge, and such usurpation
is equivalent to grave misconduct.[29]
In a previous case, we found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct for issuing
a Release Order without the knowledge and signature of the Presiding Judge
concerned.[30] In another, we ruled that the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct
warranting dismissal from the service when he issued a warrant of arrest without any
order coming from the court that caused the accused to be illegally confined for three
(3) days.[31] In both cases we held that though the respondents might have been
moved by compassion and might have acted in good faith, the respondents actuations
could not be condoned, for the committed acts constituted a serious infringement of,
and encroachment upon, judicial authority.
In our view, the present case cannot be treated with leniency, especially in light of
the fact that respondent herein admitted he issued detention orders countless times in
the past. In accordance with precedents and Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 19, series of 1999,[32] the appropriate penalty to be imposed on
respondent is dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, respondent DONATO AUGUIS, Clerk of Court II, MCTC, Branch
4 at Talibon-Getafe, Talibon, Bohol, is hereby found administratively liable for issuing
the assailed detention order without lawful authority, as well as failing to inform the
Presiding Judge of that court regarding such order, thus committing GRAVE
MISCONDUCT in the discharge of official functions. He is hereby DISMISSED from
the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits and privileges, except earned leave
credits if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in the government including
government owned and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.