DAGASDAS v GRAND PLACEMENT
Nonetheless, this new contract, which was used as basis for
FACTS
Grand Placement, a licensed recruitment agency, employed Dagasdas as a
network technician on behalf of Industrial Management Technology
Methods (ITM), whereby he is to be deployed to in Saudi Arabia under a 1-
year contract. Dagasdas contended that while the contract specified that
he was employed as a network technician, he was actually engaged as a
civil engineer and said former position was only for the purpose of securing
a visa.
When he arrived in Saudi Arabia, he signed a new employment contract
with ITM which stipulated that the latter contracted him as a
Superintendent and he was placed under a 3-month probationary period.
He reported to the worksite but was given tasks suited for a Mechanical
Engineer which were foreign to the job applied for. He was then
temporarily given the position of Civil Construction Engineer.
ITM gave him a termination notice indicating that he was dismissed
pursuant to clause 17.4.3 of his contract, which provided that ITM reserved
the right to terminate any employee within the three-month probationary
period without need of any notice to the employee. Thus, he returned to
the Philippines and filed a case for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: WON Dagasdas was validly dismissed from work
RULING
No, Dagasdas was not validly dismissed. Security of tenure remains even if
employees, particularly OFWs, work in a different jurisdiction. Thus, even if
a Filipino is employed abroad, he or she is entitled to security of tenure. In
this case, prior to his deployment and while still in the PH, Dagasdas was
made to sign a POEA-approved contract with GPGS, on behalf of ITM; and,
upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, ITM made him sign a new employment
contract.
dismissing Dagasdas, is void for being in violation of his right to security of
tenure. To allow employers to reserve a right to terminate employees
without cause is violative of the guarantee of security of tenure.
Article 297 of the Labor Code provides for the just causes for dismissing an
employee but ITM terminated Dagasdas for violating a clause in the new
contract. The clause is contrary to law because to allow employers to
reserve a right to terminate employees without cause is violative of the
guarantee of security of tenure. Moreover, even if Dagasdas was a
probationary employee, his termination must still be with a valid clause.
Furthermore, the new contract was not shown to have been processed
through the POEA. It also breached Dagasdas' original contract as it was
entered into even before the expiration of the original contract approved
by the POEA.
BDO v NERBES
FACTS
Respondents Nestor Nerbes and Armenia Suravilla were employees of
petitioner BDO Unibank, Inc. (previously EPCI Bank) and members of
Equitable PCI Bank Employees Union (EPCIBEU). For having won and
proclaimed in the election of officers of EPCIBEU as President and
Executive Vice President, Nerbes and Suravilla notified the bank of their
decision to exercise their privilege under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) which allows them to be on full-time leave during their
term of office. Subsequently, the losing candidates appealed to the Bureau
of Labor Relations (BLR) the resolution of the DOLE proclaiming
respondents as winners.
Because of this appeal, the bank disapproved respondents’ union leaves.
However, respondents failed to return to work despite orders for them to
do so. After conducting administrative hearings, the bank dismissed
respondents on the ground of serious misconduct and willful disobedience.
Hence, they filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor
practice (ULP), illegal dismissal and money claims. The LA ruled in favor of
respondents and ordered the bank to allow them to go on paid union
leaves. On appeal by the bank to the NLRC, the NLRC reversed the ruling of
the LA. On certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the
LA was reinstated.
ISSUE: WON Nerbes and Suravilla's refusal to report to work, despite the
bank's order for them to do so, constitutes disobedience of such a willful
character as to justify their dismissal from service.
RULING
No, Nerbes and Suravilla's refusal to report to work despite the bank's
order for them to do so does not constitute disobedience of such a willful
character as to justify their dismissal from service.
In Micro Sales Operation Network, et al. v. NLRC, it was held that valid
dismissal on the ground of willful disobedience requires the concurrence of
twin requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful
or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and
perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable,
lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which
he had been engaged to discharge.
In this case, Nerbes and Suravilla's failure to report for work despite the
disapproval of their application for leave was clearly intentional. However,
though their refusal to do so may have been intentional, such was not
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude or with deliberate
disregard of their duties as such. At the time Nerbes and Suravilla notified
the bank of their intent to avail of their union leaves, they were already
proclaimed as winners and in fact took their respective oaths of office.
Following the terms of the parties' CBA, which has the strength of law as
between them, Nerbes and Suravilla, as duly-elected union officers, were
entitled to take their union leaves. Hence, the Court finds that the penalty
of dismissal in this case is harsh and severe.
The petition is denied. The decision of the CA finding Nerbes and Suravilla
as illegally dismissed is affirmed. The LA is directed to recompute the
proper amount of backwages and separation pay due to respondent
Nerbes. (Note: During the pendency of this petition, BDO Unibank and
Suravilla had a compromise agreement).
READ RITE v FRANCISCO (G.R. 195457)
FACTS
ISSUE: WON
RULING
NPC DRIVER v NPC
FACTS
On June 8, 2001, Republic Act 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA Law), was approved and signed
into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It took effect on 26 June
2001. Under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law, a new National Power Board
(NPB) of Directors was formed. An energy restructuring committee
(Restructuring Committee) was also created to manage the privatization
and the restructuring of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the
National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO), and the Power Sector
Assets and Liabilities Corporation (PSALC).
On November 18 , 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA Law and Rule
33 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), the NPB passed NPB
Resolution No. 2002-124, which provided for “Guidelines on the Separation
Program of the NPC and the Selection and Placement of Personnel.” Under
this Resolution, the services of all NPC personnel shall be legally
terminated on January 31, 2003, and shall be entitled to separation
benefits provided therein. On the same day, the NPB approved NPB
Resolution 2002-125, constituting a Transition Team to manage and
implement the NPC’s Separation Program.
Contending that the assailed NPB Resolutions were void, petitioners filed,
in their individual and representative capacities, the present Petition for
Injunction to restrain respondents from implementing NPB Resolution Nos.
2002-124 and 2002-125.
ISSUE: WON the NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125 were
properly enacted
RULING
The Court’s Decision, held that the Resolutions were invalid, because they
lacked the necessary number of votes for their adoption. Under Section 48,
the power to exercise judgment and discretion in running the affairs of the
NPC was vested by the legislature upon the persons composing the
National Power Board of Directors. When applied to public functionaries,
discretion refers to a power or right conferred upon them by law, consisting
of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of
their own judgment and conscience, and uncontrolled by the judgment or
conscience of others.
Presumably, in naming the respective department heads as members of
the board of directors, the legislature chose these secretaries of the
various executive departments on the basis of their personal qualifications
and acumen that had made them eligible to occupy their present positions
as department heads. Thus, the department secretaries cannot delegate
their duties as members of the NPB, much less their power to vote and
approve board resolutions. Their personal judgments are what they must
exercise in the fulfillment of their responsibilities. There was no question
that the enactment of the assailed Resolutions involved the exercise of
discretion, not merely a ministerial act that could be validly performed by a
delegate.
Respondents’ reliance on American Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents
was misplaced. The Court explicitly stated in that case that, in exercising
their own judgment and discretion, administrative officers were not
prevented from using the help of subordinates as a matter of practical
administrative procedure. Officers could seek such aid, as long as the
legally authorized official was the one who would make the final decision
through the use of personal judgment.
In the present case, it is not difficult to comprehend that in approving NPB
Resolutions 2002-124 and 2002-125, it is the representatives of the
secretaries of the different executive departments and not the secretaries
themselves who exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution.
This action violates the duty imposed upon the specifically enumerated
department heads to employ their own sound discretion in exercising the
corporate powers of the NPC.
JOLO’S KIDDIE CARTS v CABELLA
FACTS
ISSUE: WON
RULING
ZAMBRANO v PHILIPPINE CARPET
FACTS
On January 3, 2011, petitioners, who were employees of private
respondent Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation, were notified of
the termination of their employment effective February 3, 2011 on the
ground of cessation of operation due to serious business losses. They were
of the belief that their dismissal was without just cause and in violation of
due process because the closure of Phil Carpet was a mere pretense to
transfer its operations to its wholly owned and controlled corporation,
Pacific Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (Pacific Carpet). They asserted
that their dismissal constituted unfair labor practice as it involved the mass
dismissal of all union officers and members of the Philippine Carpet
Manufacturing Employees Association (PHILCEA).
In its defense, Phil Carpet countered that it permanently closed and totally
ceased its operations because there had been a steady decline in the
demand for its products due to global recession, stiffer competition, and
the effects of a changing market. Thus, in order to stem the bleeding, the
company implemented several cost-cutting measures, including voluntary
redundancy and early retirement programs. Phil Carpet likewise faithfully
complied with the requisites for closure or cessation of business under the
Labor Code. The petitioners and the Department of Labor and Employment
were served written notices one (1) month before the intended closure of
the company. The petitioners’ •were also paid their separation pay and
they voluntarily executed their respective Release and Quitclaim before the
DOLE officials.
In the September 29, 2014 Decision, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the
complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. The NLRC affirmed
the findings of the LA, which was subsequently affirmed by the CA.
ISSUES: WON the petitioners were dismissed from employment for a lawful
cause; WON the petitioners’ termination from employment constitutes
unfair labor practice
RULING
1. Yes. The petitioners were terminated from employment for an
authorized cause. In this case, the LA's findings that Phil Carpet suffered
from serious business losses which resulted in its closure were affirmed in
toto by the NLRC, and subsequently by the CA. It is a rule that absent any
showing that the findings of fact of the labor tribunals and the appellate
court are not supported by evidence on record or the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts, the Court shall not examine anew the evidence
submitted by the parties.
Further, even if the petitioners refuse to consider these losses as serious
enough to warrant Phil Carpet's total and permanent closure, it was a
business judgment on the part of the company's owners and stockholders
to cease operations, a judgment which the Court has no business
interfering with. The only limitation provided by law is that the closure
must be "bonafide in character and not impelled by a motive to defeat or
circumvent the tenurial rights of employees. Thus, when an employer
complies with the foregoing conditions, the Court cannot prohibit closure
"just because the business is not suffering from any loss or because of the
desire to provide the workers continued employment."
2. No. The dismissal of the petitioners did not amount to unfair labor
practice. Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers' right
to organize. There should be no dispute that all the prohibited acts
constituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers' right to
self-organization. Thus, an employer may only be held liable for unfair labor
practice if it can be shown that his acts affect in whatever manner the right
of his employees to self-organize.
The general principle is that one who makes an allegation has the burden
of proving it. The petitioners miserably failed to discharge the duty
imposed upon them. They did not identify the acts of Phil Carpet, which,
they claimed, constituted unfair labor practice. They did not even point out
the specific provisions, which Phil Carpet violated.
FACTS
Petitioners were terminated on the ground of cessation of operation due to
serious business losses. They allege that their dismissal was without just
cause and in violation of due process because the closure of Phil Carpet
was a mere pretense to transfer its operations to Pacific Carpet. They
claimed that the job orders of some regular clients of Phil Carpet were
transferred to Pacific Carpet and that several machines were moved from
Phil Carpet to Pacific Carpet. Petitioners also alleged that their dismissal
was constituted with unfair labor practice as it involved mass dismissal of
its union officers and members.
Respondent countered that it permanently closed and totally ceased its
operations because there had been a steady decline in the demand for its
products due to global recession, stiffer competition and the effects of a
changing market. Respondent also faithfully complied with the requisites
for closure and cessation of business under the Labor Code.
LA dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.
NLRC affirmed LA’s ruling. CA ruled that the total cessation of Phil Carpet’s
manufacturing operations was not made in bad faith because the same
was clearly due to economic necessity.
ISSUES: WON the petitioners were dismissed from employment for a lawful
cause; WON the petitioners’ termination from employment constitutes
unfair labor practice
RULING
1. YES. Petitioners were terminated for an authorized cause.
Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, three requirements are necessary for
a valid cessation of business operations: (a) service of a written notice to
the employees and to the DOLE at least one month before the intended
date thereof; (b) the cessation of business must be bona fide in character;
and (c) payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to one
month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher.
In this case, the LA's findings that Phil Carpet suffered from serious
business losses which resulted in its closure were affirmed in toto by the
NLRC, and subsequently by the CA. It is a rule that absent any showing that
the findings of fact of the labor tribunals and the appellate court are not
supported by evidence on record or the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts, the Court shall not examine anew the evidence
submitted by the parties.
2. NO. The dismissal did not amount to unfair labor practice.
Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove
the same.
The petitioners miserably failed to discharge the duty imposed upon them.
They did not identify the acts of Phil Carpet which, they claimed,
constituted unfair labor practice. They did not even point out the specific
provisions which Phil Carpet violated. Thus, they would have the Court
pronounce that Phil Carpet committed unfair labor practice on the ground
that they were dismissed from employment simply because they were
union officers and members. The constitutional commitment to the policy
of social justice, however, cannot be understood to mean that every labor
dispute shall automatically be decided in favor of labor.
In this case, as far as the pieces of evidence offered by the petitioners are
concerned, there is no showing that the closure of the company was an
attempt at union-busting. Hence, the charge that Phil Carpet is guilty of
unfair labor practice must fail for lack of merit.
CLAUDIA’S KITCHEN v TANGUIN
C F SHARP v CASTILLO
MADRILEJOS v NYF-FIL Pontesor, et al.'s services which are necessary and desirable to the business
of petitioner.
PEOPLE v ABELLANOSA
On the other hand, while petitioner admitted that it repeatedly hired
DE LEON v MAUNLAD TRANS Pontesor, et al. in different capacities throughout the aforesaid years, it
nevertheless maintained that they were merely hired on a per-project
ESPERE v NFD
basis, as evidenced by numerous Contractual Employee Appointments
NORTH SEA MARINE v ENRIQUEZ (CEAs) signed by them. In this regard, petitioner pointed out that each of
the CEAs that Pontesor, et al. signed defined the nature and term of the
CICM MISSIONARIES v PEREZ project to which they are assigned, and that each contract was renewable
in the event the project remained unfinished upon the expiration of the
EXPEDITION v AFRICA
specified term. In accordance with the express provisions of said CEAs,
TPG CORP v PENAS Pontesor, et al.'s project employment were automatically terminated: (a)
upon the expiration of the specific term specified in the CEA; (b) when the
SPECTRUM v GRAVE project is completed ahead of such expiration; or (c) in cases when their
employment was extended due to the non-completion of the specific
INNODATA v INTING project for which they were hired, upon the completion of the said project.
As such, the termination of Pontesor, et al.'s employment with petitioner
DE LA SALLE-ARANETA v BERNARDO
was validly made due to the completion of the specific projects for which
UST v SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA they were hired.

FACTS ISSUE: WON Respondent Pontesor is a regular employee thus rendering

the dismissal invalid
A complaint for regularization and illegal dismissal was filed by respondents
Samahang Manggagawa ng UST and Pontesor, et al. (respondents) against RULING
petitioner before the NLRC. Respondents alleged that on various periods
YES. Pontesor should be considered regularized casual employees who
spanning the years 1990-1999, petitioner repeatedly hired Pontesor, et al.
enjoy security of tenure. The law provides for two (2) types of regular
to perform various maintenance duties within its campus. Respondents
employees, namely: (a) those who are engaged to perform activities which
insisted that in view of Pontesor, et al.' s performance of such maintenance
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
tasks throughout the years, they should be deemed regular employees of
employer; and (b) those who have rendered at least one year of service,
petitioner. Respondents further argued that for as long as petitioner
whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they
continues to operate and exist as an educational institution, with rooms,
are employed. The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular
buildings, and facilities to maintain, the latter could not dispense with
employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity
performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the
employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be
determined by considering the nature of work performed and its relation
to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also, if the
employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the
performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems
repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of
the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence,
the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such
activity and while such activity exists
In the case at bar, a review of Pontesor, et al.'s respective CEAs reveal that
petitioner repeatedly rehired them for various positions in the nature of
maintenance workers for various periods spanning the years 1990-1999.
Although nature of work are not necessary and desirable to petitioner's
usual business as an educational institution; nonetheless, it is clear that
their respective cumulative periods of employment as per their respective
CEAs each exceed one (1) year. Thus, Pontesor, et al. falls under the second
category of regular employees under Article 295 of the Labor Code.
Accordingly, they should be deemed as regular employees but only with
respect to the activities for which they were hired and for as long as such
activities exist.
E. GANZON v ANDO
HERMA v OLIVEROS
VALENCIA v CLASSIQUE
PNB v DALMACIO
MAULA v XIMEX
SCANMAN v DE LEON
JEBSENS v RAPIZ
STATUS v DOCTOLERO
ROMANA v MAGSAYSAY
TURKS SHAWARMA v PAJARON
*BRAM v MARSWIN
*BRAVOS v URIOS
FACTS
Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher in 1988 by Urios College. In
addition to his duties as a part-time teacher, Bravo was designated as the
school's comptroller from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2002. Urios College
organized a committee to formulate a new "ranking system for non-
academic employees for school year 2001-2002” where Bravo
recommended that "the position of Comptroller should be classified as a
middle management position.
A committee to review the ranking system implemented during school year
2001-2002 was formed and found out that the ranking system for school
year 2001-2002 caused salary distortions. There were also discrepancies in
the salary adjustments of Bravo and of two (2) other employees. The
committee discovered that "the Comptroller's Office solely prepared and
implemented the salary adjustment schedule" without prior approval from
the Human Resources Department. The committee recommended that
Bravo be administratively charged for serious misconduct or willful breach
of trust.
On March 16, 2005, Bravo received a show cause memo requiring him to
explain in writing why his services should not be terminated for his alleged
acts of serious misconduct. A committee was organized to investigate the
matter. Hearings were conducted thereafter. Bravo was found guilty of
serious misconduct for which he was ordered to return the sum of ₱
179,319.16, representing overpayment of his monthly salary. On July 25,
2005, Urios College notified Bravo of its decision to terminate his services
for serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. Upon receipt of
the termination letter, Bravo immediately filed before Executive Labor
Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for the payment of
separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees.
The Executive Labor dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal,
the National Labor Relations Commission found that Bravo's dismissal from
service was illegal. The Court of Appeals reversed the National Labor
Relations Commission's Resolution and reinstated the decision of Executive
Labor Arbiter Pelaez.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner's employment was terminated for a just cause;
WON the petitioner was deprived of procedural due process
RULING
(1) YES. Under Article 297 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate
the services of an employee for “fraud or willful breach by the employee of
the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative”
Due to the nature of his occupation, petitioner's employment may be
terminated for willful breach of trust under Article 297(c), not Article
297(a), of the Labor Code. A dismissal based on willful breach of trust or
loss of trust and confidence under Article 297 of the Labor Code entails the
concurrence of two (2) conditions. First, the employee whose services are
to be terminated must occupy a position of trust and confidence. And that
there must be the presence of some basis for the loss of trust and
confidence. This means that "the employer must establish the existence of
an act justifying the loss of trust and confidence." Otherwise, employees
will be left at the mercy of their employers. Different rules apply in
determining whether loss of trust and confidence may validly be used as a
justification in termination cases. Managerial employees are treated
differently than fiduciary rank-and-file employees.
With respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as
ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged
events in question, and that mere uncorroborated assertions and
accusations by the employer will not be sufficient. But, as regards a
managerial employee, mere existence of a basis for believing that such
employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his
dismissal. Hence, in the case of managerial employees, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required, it being sufficient that there is some basis
for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable
ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the
purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders
him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.
The Supreme Court holds that petitioner was validly dismissed based on
loss of trust and confidence. Petitioner was not an ordinary rank-and-file
employee. His position of responsibility on delicate financial matters
entailed a substantial amount of trust from respondent. It was reasonable
for the employer to trust that he had basis for his computations especially
with respect to his own compensation. Petitioner's act in assigning to
himself a higher salary rate without proper authorization is a clear breach
of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Petitioner's position made him
accountable in ensuring that the Comptroller's Office observed the
company's established procedures. It was reasonable that he should be
held liable by respondent on the basis of command responsibility.
(2) NO. Any meaningful opportunity for the employee to present evidence
and address the charges against him or her satisfies the requirement of
ample opportunity to be heard.
In this case, respondent complied with all the requirements of procedural
due process in terminating petitioner's employment. Respondent furnished
petitioner a show cause memo stating the specific grounds for dismissal.
The show cause memo also required petitioner to answer the charges by
submitting a written explanation. Respondent even informed petitioner
that he may avail the services of counsel. Respondent then conducted a
thorough investigation. Three (3) hearings were conducted on separate
occasions. The findings of the investigation committee were then sent to
petitioner. Lastly, petitioner was given a notice of termination containing
respondent’s final decision. There was a just cause for terminating
petitioner from employment, there is no basis to award him separation pay
and back wages.

*ALASKA MILK