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NINTH WEEK Antonio, namely Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
Concept of paternity, filiation and legitimacy
1. ARBOLARIO vs. CA [G.R. No. 129163. April 22,
2003]
DOCTRINE: Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it,
is a relationship that must be judicially
established.
FACTS:
The original owners of the controverted lot, Sps.
Baloyo and Lirazan, had 5 children. Everyone
mentioned is dead. The first child, Agueda
Colinco, was survived by her two children,
namely, Antonio Colinco and Irene Colinco
(respondent); Antonio Colinco predeceased his
three daughters, respondents Ruth, Orpha, and
Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco. The second
child, Catalina Baloyo, was married to Juan
Arbolario and their union was blessed with the
birth of only one child, Purificacion Arbolario,
who, in 1985, died a spinster and without issue.
Juan Arbolario, consorted with another woman
by the name of Francisca Malvas and from this
cohabitation petitioners Voltaire Arbolario,
Lucena Arbolario Taala, Fe Arbolario,
Exaltacion Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario
(referred to hereinafter as ‘Arbolarios’) were
born. All the foregoing petitioners were born
well before the year 1951.
In 1946, the third child, Eduardo Baloyo, sold his
entire interest in the lot to his sister, Agueda (first
child), by virtue of a notarized document. In
1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was
executed by and between Agueda, Catalina,
Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and
Julian, who extrajudicially declared themselves
to be the only heirs of the late Sps. Baloyo. The
fourth child, Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her
interest in the said lot in favor of her two nieces,
Irene Colinco to one-half (1/2) and Purificacion
Arbolario to the other half. Purificacion
Arbolario was then allowed to take possession
of a portion of the disputed parcel until her
death sometime in 1984 or 1985.
Respondents Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco,
Orpha Colinco, and Goldelina Colinco,
believing themselves to be the only surviving
heirs of Sps Baloyo executed a ‘Declaration of
Heirship and Partition Agreement’, dated May
8, 1987 where they adjudicated upon
themselves their proportionate or ideal shares:
Irene Colinco, to one-half (1/2); while the
surviving daughters of her (Irene’s) late brother
Colinco, to share in equal, ideal proportions to
the remaining half (1/2).
On October 2, 1987, the Colincos filed a case
against Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay and
Carlito Salhay, seeking to recover possession of
a portion of the aforesaid lot occupied by
respondent spouses (‘Salhays’ hereinafter)
since 1970. The Salhays alleged in their defense
that they have been the lawful lessees of the
late Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978;
and that said spouses allegedly purchased the
disputed portion of Lot from the deceased
lessor sometime in September 1978.
On May 9, 1988 before the case was tried the
Arbolarios and spouses Carlito Salhay and
Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay (all respondents in the
case) filed another case ‘[f]or Cancellation of
Title with Damages’. The Arbolarios, joined by
the Salhays, contend that the ‘Declaration of
Heirship and Partition Agreement’ executed by
the Colincos was defective and thus voidable
as they (Arbolarios) were excluded therein. The
Arbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate
to the inheritance of their alleged half-sister,
Purificacion Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they
should be included in the distribution of the
aforesaid lot.
RTC: Arbolarios were the brothers and the sisters
of the deceased Purificacion Arbolario, while
the Colincos were her cousins and nieces. The
Colincos could not inherit from her, because
she had half-brothers and half-sisters (CC,
Article 1009). Their 1987 Declaration of Heirship
and Partition Agreement was made in bad
faith, because they knew all along the
existence of, and their relationship with, the
Arbolarios. The Salhays, on the other hand, had
no document to prove their acquisition and
possession of a portion of the disputed lot.
CA: Arbolarios are illegitimate. Illegitimate
children are barred by Article 992 of the Civil
Code from inheriting intestate from the
legitimate children and relatives of their father
or mother. As the illegitimate siblings of the late
Purificacion Arbolario, petitioners cannot
conveniently undermine the legal limitations by
insisting that they were treated as half-brothers
and half-sisters by the deceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arbolarios are illegitimate
children
HELD:

YES, they are illegitimate.
The petitioners were born before
1951. Therefore, in the absence of any fact that
would show that conjugal union of Juan
Arbolario and Catalina Baloyo had been
judicially annulled before 1951, or before Juan
Arbolario cohabited with Francisca Malvas, it
would only be reasonable to conclude that the
foregoing union which resulted in the birth of the
[Arbolarios] was extra-marital. And
consequently, Voltaire Arbolario, et al., are
illegitimate children of Juan Arbolario.
As held by the appellate court, without proof
that Catalina died in 1903, her marriage to Juan
is presumed to have continued. Even where
there is actual severance of the filial
companionship between spouses, their
marriage subsists, and either spouse’s
cohabitation with any third party cannot be
presumed to be between “husband and wife.
In other words, it does not follow that just
because his first wife has died, a man is already
conclusively married to the woman who bore
his children. A marriage certificate or other
generally accepted proof is necessary to
establish the marriage as an undisputable fact.
Since they failed to prove the fact (or even the
presumption) of marriage between their
parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca Malvas;
hence, they cannot invoke a presumption of
legitimacy in their favor. Paternity or filiation, or
the lack of it, is a relationship that must be
judicially established.
2. ANGELES V. MAGLAYA, G.R. NO. 153798,
SEPTEMBER 2, 2005, 469 SCRA 363
DOCTRINE: The legitimate filiation of a child is a
matter fixed by law itself, it cannot be made
dependent on the declaration of the attending
physician or midwife, or that of the mother of
the new-born child.
FACTS:
On January 21, 1998, in the city of Manila,
Francisco Angeles died intestate leaving
behind four (4) parcels of land among other
valuable properties. Respondent Corazon
claims that as the sole legitimate child of the
deceased and Genoveva Mercado, she has all
the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications required of an administrator.
Petitioner Belen claims that as Francisco’s
second wife and surviving spouse, she should
be made the administrator of the estate of the
deceased. Belen adds that the respondent
cannot be the daughter of Francisco because
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although she was recorded as Francisco’s
legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth
certificate was not signed by him. Belen further
added that the respondent, who claims to be
the legitimate child of Francisco and a certain
Genovena Mercado did not present the
marriage contract of her supposed parents or
any other document supporting their union for
that matter. Belen also said that she and
Francisco adopted a child.
Respondents in turn alleged that per
certification of the appropriate offices from
January to December 1938, records of
marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor
Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Franciso-
Genoveva wedding took place were
destroyed. She also dismissed the adoption as
of little consequence, owing to her having
interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition
to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the
RTC at Caloocan. Respondent testified having
been in open and continuous possession of the
status of the legitimate child. Four other
witnesses testified on her behalf, and she also
offered in evidence her birth certificate which
contained an entry stating that she was born at
Mary Johnson Hospital, Tondo Manila to
Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado
and whereon the handwritten “Yes” appears
below the question “Legitimate?”. Pictures
taken during respondent’s wedding as bride to
Atty Guillermo Maglaya; a copy of her marriage
contract, and her scholastic and government
records were also offered as evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is a legitimate
child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and
Genoveva Mercado
RULING:
NO. CA erred in giving respondent presumptive
legitimacy.
A legitimate child is a product of, end,
therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage
(FC Art 146). However, the presumption of
legitimacy under Art 164 may be availed only
upon convincing proof of the factual basis
therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were
legally married and that his/her conception or
birth occurred during the subsistence of that
marriage. Respondent failed to present
evidence of Francisco’s marriage to
Genoveva, thus she cannot be presumed
legitimate.

Further, the Birth Certificate presented was not
signed by Francisco against whom legitimate
filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It
was only signed by the attending physician
making it only proof of the fact of the birth of a
child. The legitimate filiation of a child is a
matter fixed by law itself, it cannot be made
dependent on the declaration of the attending
physician or midwife, or that of the mother of
the newborn child. None of the evidence
respondent presented is enough to prove
filiation or recognition.
Further, RTC Caloocan in the case respondent
filed to nullify the adoption of Francisco and
Belen of their child, said that respondent is NOT
a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva;
following the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment, herein respondent is precluded from
claiming that she is the legitimate daughter of
Francisco and Genoveva Mercado.
In fine, the issue of herein respondent’s
legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latter’s
marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially
determined in a final judgment by a court of
competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res
judicata and may not again be resurrected or
litigated between herein petitioner and
respondent or their privies in a subsequent
action, regardless of the form of the latter.
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of
appointment of administrator of the estate of
the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred
over the next of kin of the deceased.
LEGITIMATE CHILDREN
1. Tan v. Trocio, 191 SCRA 764
FACTS:
In a verified complaint, filed on 9 November
1979, complainant Felicidad Bariñan Tan seeks
the disbarment of respondent Atty. Galileo J.
Trocio for immorality and conduct unbecoming
of a lawyer.
Complainant, owner and directress of Harlyn
Vocational School in Baroy, Lanao del Norte,
declares that sometime in April, 1971, at about
8:30 PM, after classes were dismissed,
respondent, who is the legal counsel of the
school, overpowered her inside the office and,
against her will, succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her. As a result, she begot a son
on 5 February 1972 whom she named and
registered as Jewel Tan. She avers that
respondent used to support Jewel but
subsequently lost interest in doing so thereby
neglecting to defray the needed expenses for
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Jewel’s well-being. Complainant also alleges
that the respondent threatened her with the
deportation of her alien husband if she
complained to the authorities since she was
violating the Anti-Dummy Law in operating the
vocational school. This threat, aside from the
fact that Complainant is a married woman with
eight children and a school directress at the
time of the sexual assault, made her desist from
filing a charge against the Respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jewel is the illegitimate son of
Atty. Trocio.
RULING:
Jewel Tan was born during the wedlock of
Complainant and her husband and the
presumption should be in favor of legitimacy
unless physical access between the couple was
impossible. From the evidence on hand, the
presumption has not been overcome by
adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel
was registered in his birth certificate as the
legitimate child of the Felicidad and her
husband, Tan Le Pok.
2. Angeles vs Maglaya, 469 SCRA 363
FACTS:
Petitioner Belen Angeles is the wife of the
deceased while the respondent Aleli Maglaya
is the child of the deceased Francisco Angeles
in his first wife. Francisco died intestate and the
respondent seeks administration of the estate of
the deceased but opposed by the surviving
wife (2nd wife) alleging that the respondent is
an illegitimate child of the deceased. Petitioner
also averred that respondent could not be the
daughter of Francisco for, although she was
recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter,
the corresponding birth certificate was not
signed by him. Respondent alleged, inter alia,
that per certification of the appropriate offices,
records of marriages of the Civil Registrar where
the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding
took place were destroyed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is illegitimate
precluding her to become the administrator of
the deceased Francisco Angeles’s Estate?
HELD:
No, respondent is not illegitimate.
The Birth Certificate presented was not signed
by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is

asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was signed
by the attending physician, one Rebecca De
Guzman, who certified to having attended the
birth of a child. Such certificate, albeit
considered a public record of a private
document is, under Section 23, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which
gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth of a
child. [25]Jurisprudence teaches that a birth
certificate, to be considered as validating proof
of paternity and as an instrument of recognition,
must be signed by the father and mother jointly,
or by the mother alone if the father
refuses. [26] Dr. Arturo Tolentino, commenting
on the probative value of the entries in a
certificate of birth, wrote:
xxx if the alleged father did not intervene in the
making of the birth certificate, the putting of his
name by the mother or doctor or registrar is
void; the signature of the alleged father is
necessary
The conclusion reached by the Court of
Appeals that the Birth Certificate of respondent,
unsigned as it were by Francisco and
Genoveva, establishes ' and 'indubitably at that
- not only respondent's filiation to Francisco but
even her being a legitimate daughter of
Francisco and Genoveva, taxes credulity to the
limit. In a very real sense, the appellate court
regarded such certificate as defining proof of
filiation, and not just filiation but of legitimate
filiation, by inferring from it that Francisco and
Genoveva are legally married. In the apt words
of petitioner, the appellate court, out of a Birth
Certificate signed by a physician who merely
certified having attended 'the birth of a child
who was born alive at 3:50 P.M. ' , created ' a
marriage that of ' Francisco and Genoveva',
and filiation (that said child) is the daughter of
'Francisco
It cannot be over-emphasized that the
legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by
law itself. It cannot, as the decision under
review seems to suggest, be made dependent
on the declaration of the attending physician or
midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn
child. For then, an unwed mother, with or
without the participation of a doctor or midwife,
could veritably invest legitimate status to her
offspring through the simple expedient of writing
the putative father's name in the appropriate
space in the birth certificate. A long time past,
this Court cautioned against according a similar
unsigned birth certificate prima
facie evidentiary value of filiation:
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3. SSS v. AGUAS G.R. No. 165546 February 27,
2006.
FACTS:
Pablo Aguas, a member and pensioner of the
SSS died. Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H.
Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death
benefits on indicating in her claim that Pablo
was survived by his minor child, Jeylnn. Her
claim for monthly pension was settled. SSS
received a sworn from Leticia Aguas-
Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting
Rosanna’s claim for death benefits. She alleged
that Rosanna abandoned the family abode
approximately more than 6 years before, and
lived with another man on whom she has been
dependent for support. She further averred that
Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna. The
SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified
as primary beneficiary.
ISSUE:
W/N Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to
the SSS death benefits accruing from the death
of Pablo.
HELD:
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the
Family Code, children conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of
her birth certificate which bears the signature of
Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the
certification from the Civil Registry showing that
she was born on October 29, 1991. The records
also show that Rosanna and Pablo were
married on December 4, 1977 and the marriage
subsisted until the latter’s death on December
8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was
born during Rosanna and Pablo’s
marriage. Impugning the legitimacy of a child
is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs. In this case, there is
no showing that Pablo challenged the
legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. The
presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is
buttressed by her birth certificate bearing
Pablo’s signature, which was verified from his
specimen signature on file with petitioner. A
birth certificate signed by the father is a
competent evidence of paternity.
For Rosanna, to qualify as a primary
beneficiary, she must establish 2 qualifying
factors: (1) that she is the legitimate spouse, and

(2) that she is dependent upon the member for
support.
A wife who is already separated de facto from
her husband cannot be said to be "dependent
for support" upon the husband, absent any
showing to the contrary. If it is proved that the
were till living together at the time of his death,
it is presumed that she was dependent on the
husband for support, unless it is shown that she
is capable of providing for herself.
Only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits
as it was established that she is his legitimate
child. Records show that Janet was merely
"adopted" by the spouses, but there are no
legal papers to prove it. Rosanna was the
legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not
qualified as a primary beneficiary since she
failed to present any proof to show that at the
time of his death, she was still dependent on him
for support even if they were already living
separately. NOTE: Legitimacy cannot be
extended to other siblings.
4. Rivera v. Heirs of Villanueva G.R. No. 141501,
July 21, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers, the
half-sister-in-law, and the children of a half-
brother of the deceased Pacita Gonzales.
Respondents are heirs of Villanueva and are
represented by Melchor. The remaining
respondents, Angelina Villanueva and husband
Victoriano de Luna, are allegedly the daughter
and the son-in-law, respectively, of the late
Villanueva. From 1927 until her death in 1980,
Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without
the benefit of marriage because the latter was
married to one Amanda Musngi who died on
April 20, 1963. In the course of
their cohabitation, they acquired several
properties including the properties contested in
this case. Gonzales died on July 3, 1980 without
leaving a will. On August 8, 1980, Villanueva
and respondent Angelina executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with sale, that is,
an extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales’ estate
comprising a number of the
aforementioned properties. In this document,
Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000,
conveyed his interests in the estate to Angelina.
Petitioners filed a case for partition of
Gonzales’ estate and annulment of titles and
damages, with the RTC. In dismissing the
complaint, the RTC made two findings: (1)
Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and
(2) respondent Angelina was her illegitimate
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child by Villanueva and therefore her
sole heir, to the exclusion of petitioners. The CA
ruled that respondent Angelina was
the illegitimate daughter of the decedent,
based solely on her birth certificate.
ISSUE:
WON Angelina is an illegitimate child of the
deceased Villanueva.
RULING:
No. The mere registration of a child in his or her
birth certificate as the child of the supposed
parents is not a valid adoption, does
not confer upon the child the status of an
adopted child and the legal rights of such child,
and even amounts to simulation of the child’s
birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate,
which is a public document.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of
birth is merely a prima face evidence of the
facts contained therein. It is not conclusive
evidence of the truthfulness of the statements
made there by the interested parties. Following
the logic
of Benitez case, respondent Angelina and her
co-defendants in SD-857 should have adduced
evidence of her adoption, in view of the
contents of her birth certificate. The records,
however, are bereft of any such evidence.
Under the circumstances, the Court ruled that it
was not sufficiently established that
respondent Angelina was Gonzales’ biological
daughter, nor even her adopted daughter.
Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales. Since
she could not have validly participated in
Gonzales’ estate, the extrajudicial partition
which she executed with Villanueva on August
8, 1980 was invalid.
5. Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay (MR) G.R. No.
183053. October 10, 2012
FACTS:
Cristina Suntay died intestate. Her husband
Federico died while the case was pending.
Cristina and Federico’s son, Emilio I,
predeceased the spouses.
Emilio I left them with 5 grandchildren: 3
legitimate including Isabel (respondent), and 2
illegitimate including Emilio III (petitioner).
The legitimate grandchildren were separated
from their grandparents 30 years from the time
Emilio I annulled (psychological incapacity) his
marriage to his wife Isabel (they like using the
same names).

The illegitimate grandchildren were under the
care of the grandparents since birth. Federico
even adopted Emilio III as his son when Cristina
died.
This case is a motion for reconsideration, filed by
Isabel, of SC’s decision appointing Emilio III and
Isabel as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate.
Isabel assails that she should be the sole
administrator as she is the next of kin, not Emilio
III; and that Emilio III is not fit to administer the
estate.
Isabel alleged that since 2001, when RTC
appointed him, he has mismanaged and did
not properly account the estate.
ISSUE:
WON Emilio III should be excluded as co-
administrator.
HELD: YES. MR granted.
In administering the estate of an intestate
decedent, the legitimate next of kin is preferred.
The letters of administration, generally, is
granted to the surviving spouse. If there is no
surviving spouse, the next of kin is preferred.
(RoC Rule 78, Sec. 6)
It had been decided that Isabel is a legitimate
child of Emilio I. In effect, she is the legitimate
grandchild of Cristina. Her next of kin.
In contrast, Emilio III cannot be considered as
the preferred next of kin of Cristina since he is an
illegitimate grandchild, and since a legitimate
next of kin is present.
Also, he is excluded as co-administrator
because he is unfit and incompetent to
administer the estate.
Who are considered legitimate children?
LEGITIMATE PROPER
Conceived during marriage
Suntay v Suntay, GR 132524, Dec. 29, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner Federico is the oppositors to
respondent Isabel’s Petition for Letters of
Administration over the estate of Cristina A.
Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The
decedent is the wife of Federico and the
grandmother of Isabel. Isabel’s father Emilio,
had predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously
been declared by the CFI as “null and void.”
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Federico anchors his opposition on this fact,
alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel
has no right to succeed by right of
representation as she is an illegitimate child. The
trial court had denied Federico’s Motion to
Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari.
Federico contends that, inter alia, that the
dispositive portion of the decision declaring the
marriage of Isabel’s parents “null and void” be
upheld.
ISSUES:
1. In case of conflict between the body of the
decision and the dispositive portion thereof,
which should prevail? Related thereto, was the
marriage of Isabel’s parents a case of a void or
voidable marriage?
2. Whether or not Isabel is a legitimate child?
RULING:
Petition dismissed
Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of
doubt in the interpretation and application of
laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail. This is also
applicable and binding upon courts in relation
to its judgment.
While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision
states that the marriage be “declared null and
void,” the body had shown that the legal basis
was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was
in effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the
causes for which a marriage may be annulled.
As such the conflict between the body and the
dispositive portion of the decision may be
reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court.
The fundamental distinction between void and
voidable marriages is that void marriage is
deemed never to have taken place at all. The
effects of void marriages, with respect to
property relations of the spouses are provided
for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children
born of such marriages who are called natural
children by legal fiction have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural
children under Article 89 irrespective of whether
or not the parties to the void marriage are in
good faith or in bad faith.
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is
considered valid and produces all its civil
effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a
competent court in an action for annulment.
Juridically, the annulment of a marriage

dissolves the special contract as if it had never
been entered into but the law makes express
provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage
from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable
marriages is governed by the second
paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages
before the decree of annulment shall be
considered legitimate; and children conceived
thereafter shall have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children,
and are also called natural children by legal
fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would
be covered by the second paragraph of Article
89 of the Civil Code which provides that
“children conceived of voidable marriages
before the decree of annulment shall be
considered legitimate.”
Proof of Filiation Of legitimate children
1. [G.R. No. 118904. April 20, 1998.]
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF AP
PEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and
LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.
ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE;
BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE; MEANS ALLOWED
UNDER THE LAW TO SHOW PEDIGREE. — Although
a baptismal certificate is indeed not a
conclusive proof of filiation it is one of "the other
means allowed under the Rules of Court and
special laws" to show pedigree, as
this Court ruled
in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals.
FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING
PEDIGREE; FAMILY PICTURES, NOT DIRECT
PROOF OF FILIATION BUT SHOWS
ACCEPTANCE OFFILIATION ANTE LITEM
MOTAM. — To prove his filiation, he presented in
evidence two family pictures. The first family
picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5)
carrying his second daughter and his wife
(Exhibit A-4) together with the late
Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying petitioner's
first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad(Exhibit A-1).
Exhibit B is another picture showing
Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit B-1) carrying
petitioner's first child (Exhibit B-2). These pictures
were taken before the case was instituted.
Although they do not directly prove petitioner's
filiation to Inocentes, they show that petitioner
was accepted by the private respondents as
Inocentes' legitimate son ante litem motam.
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ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE;
CONSISTENT USE OF FATHER'S SURNAME
WITHOUT OBJECTION FROM ADVERSE PARTY IS
PRESUMPTIVE PROOF OF FILIATION. —
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used
Inocentes' surname (Trinidad) without objection
from private respondents — a presumptive
proof of his status as Inocentes' legitimate child.
FACTS:
Patricio Trinidad died leaving four (4)
parcels of land to his three children,
Inocentes Trinidad and the private respondents
Felix Trinidad and Lourdes Trinidad. Petitioner
Arturio Trinidad, claiming to be the legitimate
son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, filed with
the Court of First Instance an action for partition
and damages demanding from private
respondents the partition of the aforesaid land
into three (3) equal shares and to give him the
one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father.
Private respondents denied the claim of the
petitioner contending that Inocentes was single
when he died. Petitioner, in order to prove his
filiation, he presented a Certificate of Baptism,
a Certificate of Loss issued by the Civil
Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan attesting that the
records of births, deaths and marriages were
either lost, burned or destroyed during the
Japanese occupation of the said municipality,
family pictures of the petitioner at childbirth
with private respondents and other family
members, a witness who was personally present
during the nuptial of petitioner's parents, and
another witness who testified that petitioners
parents deported themselves as husband and
wife after the marriage. The trial court rendered
a decision in favor of the petitioner. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court on the ground that
petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence
to prove that his parents were validly married,
and that he was recognized as the legitimate
son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. The
appellate court likewise held that acquisitive
prescription has set in. Hence, this petition.
The merits of this petition were patent. The
partition of the late Patricio's real properties
requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a
co-owner or co-heir of the decedent's estate.
His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend
on whether he was born during the
existence of a valid and subsisting marriage
between his mother and his putative father. The
Supreme Court held that such burden was
successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus,
the reversal of the Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals was
inevitable. Moreover, the Court found that the
totality of petitioner's positive evidence clearly
preponderates over private respondents' self-
serving negations. The Court also ruled that
private respondents have not acquired
ownership of the property in question by
acquisitive prescription since there was no
evidence that the co-ownership of petitioner's
father over the land was repudiated by the
private respondents.
ISSUE:
1. 1. Did petitioner present sufficient
evidence of his parents' marriage and of his
filiation?
2. Was petitioner's status as a legitimate child
subject to collateral attack in the action for
partition?.
RULING:
At the outset, we stress that an
appellate court's assessment of the evidence
presented by the parties will not, as a rule, be
disturbed because the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts. But in the face of the
contradictory conclusions of the appellate and
the trial courts, such rule does not apply here.
So, we had to meticulously pore over the
records and the evidence adduced in this
case.
Petitioner's first burden is to prove that Inocentes
and his mother (Felicidad) were validly married,
and that he was born during the
subsistence of their marriage. This, according to
Respondent Court, he failed to accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias ruled that
when the question of whether a marriage has
been contracted arises in litigation, said
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence.
To prove the fact of marriage, the following
would constitute competent evidence: the
testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the
couple's public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock,
the birth and the baptismal
certificates of children born during such union,
and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents.
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a
certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Aklan that all records of births,
deaths and marriages were either lost, burned
or destroyed during the Japanese
occupation of said municipality. This fact,
8
however, is not fatal to petitioner's case.
Although the marriage contract is considered
the primary evidence of the marital union,
petitioner's failure to present it is not proof that
no marriage took place, as other
forms of relevant evidence may take its place.
Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not
permitted. Rather than rely on this axiom,
petitioner chose to present evidence of his
filiation and of his parents' marriage. Hence,
there is no more need to rule on the
application of this doctrine to petitioner's
cause.
2. [G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001.]
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE
A. DE JESUS, minors, represented by their
mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs.
THEESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON
, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON,
FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and
MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS
MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP.,
FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY
CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES,
INC., respondents.
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE;
PROOF OF FILIATION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN,
HOW ESTABLISHED. — The filiation of illegitimate
children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1)
the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated
act of acknowledgment of the child, and no
further court action is required. In fact, any
authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a
claim for recognition is predicated on other
evidence merely tending to prove paternity,
i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statute of limitations is essential in
order to establish the child's acknowledgment.

2. PROOF OF FILIATION;
PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, WHEN
CONCLUSIVE. — A scrutiny of the records would
show that petitioners were born during the
marriage of their parents. The certificates of live
birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as
being their father. There is perhaps no
presumption of the law more firmly established
and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses
during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due
to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the
fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse
is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the
expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170,
and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family
Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988),
the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child
would no longer be legally feasible and the
status conferred by the presumption becomes
fixed and unassailable.
3. LEGITIMACY CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY
ATTACKED; CASE AT BAR. — The
presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for
the child born in wedlock, and only the father,
or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can
contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is
only when the legitimacy of a child has been
successfully impugned that the paternity of the
husband can be rejected. . . . The rule that the
written acknowledgment made by the
deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners'
alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent
cannot be validly invoked to be of any
relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e.,
whether petitioners are indeed the
acknowledged illegitimate offspring’s of the
decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated
without an action having been first instituted to
impugn their legitimacy as being the
children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock.
Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law
cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can
only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a
9
child so born in such wedlock shall be
considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as having been an
adulteress.
FACTS:
Upon the death of Juan G. Dizon,
petitioners, born during the
marriage of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus, were recognized in a notarized
document by the decedent Juan G. Dizon as
his own illegitimate children by Carolina
Aves de Jesus. Based on this notarized
acknowledgment, the petitioners filed a
complaint, inventory and
accounting of the Dizon estate. Private
respondents filed a motion to dismiss, alleging
that the case, while denominated as an action
for partition, would call for the altering of the
status of petitioners from being the legitimate
children of Sps. Danilo de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate
children of Carolina Aves de Jesus and
deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court ultimately
dismissed the complaint for
lack of cause of action and for being improper,
decreeing that the declaration of heirship
could only be made in a special proceeding.
On appeal, petitioners assailed the said
order of the trial court maintaining that their
recognition as being illegitimate children in an
authentic writing is in itself sufficient to establish
their status as such and does not require a
separate action for judicial approval.
The Supreme Court held that in an attempt to
establish their illegitimate filiation to the
late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would
impugn their legitimate status as being
children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus. This cannot be done because
the law itself established their legitimacy which
can only be contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose.
ISSUE:
WON Jacqueline and Jinkie are illegitimate
children of the late Juan Dizon
HELD:
No. A scrutiny of the records would show that
petitioners were born during the marriage of
their parents. The certificates of live would also
identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law
more firmly established and founded on

sounder morality and more convincing reason
than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. Succinctly, in an
attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to
the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect,
would impugn their legitimate status as being
children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves
de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done
because the law itself establishes the legitimacy
of children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents. The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional
instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child
born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
legitimacy of a child has been successfully
impugned that the paternity of the husband
can be rejected. The rule that the written
acknowledgement made by the deceased
Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged
illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be
validly invoked to be of any relevance in this
instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are
indeed the acknowledge illegitimate off springs
of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated
without an action having been first instituted to
impugn their legitimacy as being the children of
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus
born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly
settled that the paramount declaration of
legitimacy by law cannot be attacked
collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or
contested in a direct suit specifically brought for
that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such
wedlock shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as having been an adulteress
3. [G.R. No. 171713. December 17, 2007.]
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner, vs.
Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by
Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky
C. Diaz, respondent.
FACTS:
Minor Diaz filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court for compulsory recognition
with prayer for support against Rogelio Ong, she
was represented by her mother Jinky. Before the
case, Jinky married a certain
Hasegawa Katsuo, a Japanese. That same
year, Jinky met Rogelio, the fell in love.
The next year, Rogelio and Jinky cohabited.
After four years, Joanna was born, Rogelio
10
recognized Joanna as his, however, that same
year, Rogelio abandoned them and stopped
giving support to Joanna, he alleged that he is
not the father of Joanna, hence this petition.
RTC rendered a decision and declared the
minor to be the illegitimate child of Ong with
Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to support the child
until she reaches the age of majority.
Ong opposed the CA’s order to directing the
Estate and Joanne Rodgin Diaz for DNA analysis
for determining the paternity of the minor
Joanne. During the pendency of the case,
Rogelion Died. The Estate filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Court of Appeals. They
contended that a dead person cannot be
subject to testing. CA justified that "DNA
paternity testing, as current jurisprudence
affirms, would be the most reliable and
effective method of settling the present
paternity dispute.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done
even if the person is whose DNA is the subject is
dead.
RULING:
Yes. The court held that the death of Rogelio
does not ipso facto negate the application of
DNA analysis so long as there exist suitable
biological samples of his DNA. The New Rules on
DNA Evidence permits the manner of DNA
testing by using biological samples--organic
material originating from the person's body, for
example, blood, saliva, other body fluids,
tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic materials-
that is susceptible to DNA testing.
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be
unlikely to adequately found or would be hard
to get, DNA testing, which examines genetic
codes found from body cells of the illegitimate
child and any physical remains of the long
dead parent could be resorted to.
4. [G.R. No. 177861. July 13, 2010.]
IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND
CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF
BIRTH, EMMA K. LEE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K.
LEE-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA
LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K.
LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE,
and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE,
as Attorney-in-Fact, respondents.
FACTS:

Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok
Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s
as immigrants from China. They had 11 children,
namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-
Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Rosa Lee-
Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee,
Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and
Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh
children).
In 1948, Lee brought from China a young
woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to
serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh
children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh
household, moved into another property of Lee
nearby, and had a relation with him.
Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh
children learned that Tiu's children with Lee
(collectively, the Lee's other children) claimed
that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh.
Respondent Lee-Keh children filed two
separate petitions, one of them before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City 2 in
Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from
the certificate of live birth of the petitioner
Emma Lee, one of Lee's other children, the
name Keh and replace the same with the name
Tiu to indicate her true mother's name.
In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the
RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu,
Emma Lee's presumed mother, to testify in the
case. The RTC granted the motion but Tiu
moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it
was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental
privilege, she being Emma Lee's
stepmother. 3 On August 5, 2005 the RTC
quashed the subpoena.
The CA set aside the order of the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON the court may compel Tiu to testify in the
correction of entry case?
RULING:
YES.
As the CA correctly ruled, the grounds cited —
unreasonable and oppressive — are proper for
subpoena ad duces tecum or for the
production of documents and things in the
possession of the witness, a command that has
a tendency to infringe on the right against
invasion of privacy.
11
Notably, the Court previously decided in the
related case of Lee v. Court of Appeals 6 that
the Lee-Keh children have the right to file the
action for correction of entries in the certificates
of birth of Lee's other children, Emma Lee
included. The Court recognized that the
ultimate object of the suit was to establish the
fact that Lee's other children were not children
of Keh.
Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-
Keh children's action, obviously, they would
want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the mother
of Lee's other children, including petitioner
Emma Lee. Keh had died and so could not give
testimony that Lee's other children were not
hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a
legitimate reason for seeking Tiu's testimony
and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of
their right to compel the attendance of such a
material witness.
ISSUE 2:
WON compelling Tiu to testify would violate her
parental right not to be compelled to testify
against her stepdaughter?
RULING:
NO.
The privilege cannot apply to them because
the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and
descendants, a family tie connected by a
common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no
common ancestry by her stepmother. Article
965 thus provides:
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or
ascending. The former unites the head of the
family with those who descend from him. The
latter binds a person with those from whom he
descends.
5. [G.R. No. 189998. August 29, 2012.]
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT,
INC., petitioner, vs. ELLEN JOHANNE HARPER,
JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER HARPER, and
RIGOBERTO GILLERA, respondents.
FACTS:
In the first week of November 1999, Christian
Harper (Harper) came to Manila on a business
trip. He checked in at the Makati Shangri-La
Hotel and was billeted at Room 1428. He was
due to check out on November 6, 1999. In the
early morning of that date, however, he was
murdered inside his hotel room by still
unidentified malefactors.

Thus, the heirs of Christian Harper sued the hotel
for damages. Col. Rodrigo de Guzman, the
hotels Security Manager, testified that the
management practice prior to the murder of
Harper had been to deploy only one security or
roving guard for every three or four floors of the
building; that such ratio had not been enough
considering the L-shape configuration of the
hotel that rendered the hallways not visible from
one or the other end; and that he had
recommended to management to post a
guard for each floor, but his recommendation
had been disapproved because the hotel "was
not doing well" at that particular time.
And to prove heirship of the plaintiffs-appellees,
they presented several documents which were
all kept in Norway. The documents had been
authenticated by the Royal Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and also bore the official seal
of the Ministry and signature of one, Tanja Sorlie.
The documents were also accompanied by an
Authentication by the Consul, Embassy of the
Republic of the Philippines in Stockholm,
Sweden to the effect that, Tanja Sorlie was duly
authorized to legalize official documents for the
Ministry.
The RTC ruled in favor of Christian Harpers heirs
and found the hotel negligent. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the heirs substantially
complied with the rules on the authentication
and proof of documents set by Section 24 and
Section 25 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court?
II. Whether or not Makati Shangri-La Hotel is
liable to pay damages?
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: The requirements for authentication
of documents establishing respondents legal
relationship with the victim as his heirs were
complied with.
REMEDIAL LAW:
Although Exhibit Q, Exhibit Q-1, Exhibit R and
Exhibit R-1 were not attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record or by his
deputy in the manner required in Section 25 of
Rule 132, and said documents did not comply
with the requirement under Section 24 of Rule
132 to the effect that if the record was not kept
in the Philippines a certificate of the person
having custody must accompany the copy of
the document that was duly attested stating
12
that such person had custody of the
documents, the deviation was not enough
reason to reject the utility of the documents for
the purposes they were intended to serve. The
official participation in the authentication
process of Tanja Sorlie of the Royal Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Norway and the attachment
of the official seal of that office on each
authentication indicated that Exhibit Q, Exhibit
R, Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1 were documents of
a public nature in Norway, not merely private
documents.
That rules of procedure may be mandatory in
form and application does not forbid a showing
of substantial compliance under justifiable
circumstances, because substantial
compliance does not equate to a disregard of
basic rules. For sure, substantial compliance
and strict adherence are not always
incompatible and do not always clash in
discord.
SECOND ISSUE: Petitioner was liable due to its
own negligence.
CIVIL LAW:
The CA resolved petitioners arguments thus
wise: "negligence is defined as the omission to
do something which a reasonable man, guided
by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do. It is a
relative or comparative, not an absolute, term
and its application depends upon the situation
of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably
require. In determining whether or not there is
negligence on the part of the parties in a given
situation, jurisprudence has laid down the
following test: Did defendant, in doing the
alleged negligent act, use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation?
If not, the person is guilty of negligence. The law,
in effect, adopts the standard supposed to be
supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet pater familias of the Roman law.
Liability on the part of the defendant is based
upon the fact that he was in a better situation
than the injured person to foresee and prevent
the happening of the injurious occurrence.
Moreover, in applying the premises liability rule
in the instant case as it is applied in some
jurisdiction in the United States, it is enough that
guests are injured while inside the hotel premises
to make the hotelkeeper liable."

Proximate cause is defined as that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces, the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. More
comprehensively, proximate cause is that
cause acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom. To reiterate,
defendant-appellant is engaged in a business
imbued with public interest, ergo, it is bound to
provide adequate security to its guests.
6. [G.R. No. 180284. September 11, 2013.]
NARCISO SALAS, petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE
MATUSALEM, respondent.
FACTS:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem
(respondent) filed a complaint for
Support/Damages against Narciso Salas
(petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cabanatuan City (Civil Case No. 2124-AF).
Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father
of her son Christian Paulo Salas who was born
on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56
years old at the time, enticed her as she was
then only 24 years old, making her believe that
he is a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment
where respondent stayed and shouldered all
expenses in the delivery of their child, including
the cost of caesarian operation and hospital
confinement. However, when respondent
refused the offer of petitioner's family to take the
child from her, petitioner abandoned
respondent and her child and left them to the
mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent
further alleged that she attempted suicide due
to depression but still petitioner refused to
support her and their child.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente
lite and monthly support in the amount of
P20,000.00, as well as actual, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
13
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its
decision 8 in favor of respondent.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's
ruling that respondent satisfactorily established
the illegitimate filiation of her son Christian
Paulo, and consequently no error was
committed by the trial court in granting
respondent's prayer for support.
ISSUE:
WON respondent's evidence sufficiently proved
that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate
child of petitioner?
RULING:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the
Philippines states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. (Underscoring
supplied.)
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live
Birth (Exhibit "A-1") of Christian Paulo Salas in
which the name of petitioner appears as his
father but which is not signed by him.
Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up
the entries and signed the said document
though she claims it was petitioner who
supplied the information she wrote therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is
no showing that the putative father had a hand
in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the
father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, doctor,
registrar, or other person is incompetent

evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth
certificate be taken as a recognition in a public
instrument and it has no probative value to
establish filiation to the alleged father.
As to the Baptismal Certificate (Exhibit "B") of
Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner
as the father, we have ruled that while
baptismal certificates may be considered
public documents, they can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the
sacraments on the dates so specified. They are
not necessarily competent evidence of the
veracity of entries therein with respect to the
child's paternity.
The rest of respondent's documentary evidence
consists of handwritten notes and letters,
hospital bill and photographs taken of
petitioner and respondent inside their rented
apartment unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child
together with the alleged father are
inconclusive evidence to prove
paternity. Exhibits "E" and "F" showing petitioner
and respondent inside the rented apartment
unit thus have scant evidentiary value. The
Statement of Account (Exhibit "C") from the
Good Samaritan General Hospital where
respondent herself was indicated as the payee
is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner
is the father of her child notwithstanding
petitioner's admission in his answer that he
shouldered the expenses in the delivery of
respondent's child as an act of charity.
As to the handwritten notes (Exhibits "D" to "D-
13") of petitioner and respondent showing their
exchange of affectionate words and romantic
trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish
Christian Paulo's filiation to petitioner as they
were not signed by petitioner and contained no
statement of admission by petitioner that he is
the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes
were authentic, they do not qualify under
Article 172 (2) vis-Ã -vis Article 175 of the Code
which admits as competent evidence of
illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a
private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to
establish his claimed filiation by "any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his
name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other
14
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. Reviewing the records, we
find the totality of respondent's evidence
insufficient to establish that petitioner is the
father of Christian Paulo.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high
standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for recognition
and support may create an unwholesome
situation or may be an irritant to the family or the
lives of the parties so that it must be issued only
if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.
7. G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, Petitioner v. EDNA G.
SIASAT, Respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo and Cadelaria (Aguilar) died
without will and without debts in 1983 and 1994,
respectively, leaving two parcels of land.
Rodolfo filed a petition alleging that he is the
only son of the spouses Alfredo and Candelaria;
that he suspected the two titles of the land was
stolen by someone from the Siasat clan, which
Edna opposed, claiming that the titles were in
her possession, were not stolen, and entrusted
to her by her aunt Candelaria.
In her defense, Edna claimed that Rodolfo is not
the son of the deceased spouses but a stranger
raised by them merely out of generosity and
kind heart; that Alfredo predeceased
Candelaria, thus the latter inherited his conjugal
share; upon her death, her brothers and sisters
inherited the estate of Candelaria, and the titles
were entrusted to her by Candelaria, her aunt.
At trial Rodolfo presented documentary exhibits
such as his school records, where Alfredo was
indicated as his father; his ITR which listed
Candelaria as her mother; deceased Alfredo’s
Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1, a public
instrument subscribed and made under oath by
him during his employment, which bears his
signature and thumb marks and indicates that
petitioner, who was his son and dependent;
and other pertinent documents to show his
filiation to the spouses.
Edna also presented an Affidavit executed by
Candelaria announcing that she and Alfredo
had no issue, and she is the sole heir to Alfredo’s
estate.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Edna
since Rodolfo failed to present any evidence
that he is the biological son of Alfredo and

Edna, further complicated by the lack of a
certificate of live birth and the affidavit of
Candelaria that she had no issue.
In his appeal to the CA, Rodolfo argued that his
failure to present a Certificate of Live Birth was
by reason of the destruction of all records at the
Local Civil Registry; that under Article 172 of the
Family Code, an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten document
signed by the parent constitute proof of filiation,
which he sufficiently proved by his
documentary exhibits.
The CA ruled otherwise, averring that the
documents presented by Rodolfo do not
establish pedigree.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documents presented by
petitioner Rodolfo constitute an admission of
filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten document signed by the parent as
stated in Article 172 of the Family Code
HELD:
The Court grants the Petition.
Article 172 of the Family Code states that the
filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate
children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment
of the child, and no further court action is
required.
Petitioner presented his father’s SSS Form E-1 to
prove filiation. It is already evidence of filiation
under the first paragraph thereof, the same
being an express recognition in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child
shall be the “paramount consideration” in
resolving questions affecting him.
8. G.R. No. 197099 September 28, 2015
15
EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO vs. KAREN
SANTOS
Civil Law; Family Code; Filiation. The
presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code
actually fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and that civil status cannot be
attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the
child can be impugned only in a direct action
brought for that purpose, by the proper parties,
and within the period limited by law.
FACTS:
Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, the
defendants, executed a document declaring
themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino
and Caridad Geronimo. Consequently, they
took possession and were able to transfer the
tax declaration of the subject property to their
names.
Karen Santos, on the other hand, claims to be
the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad
Geronimo. She filed a complaint for the
annulment of document and recovery of the
possession against the defendants, brothers of
his father. She alleged that with the death of her
parents, the property belonging to her parents
was passed on to her by the law of intestacy.
The defendant denied the allegation that the
plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their
brother stating that the deceased Rufino and
Caridad were childless and took in as their ward
Karen, the child of Caridad’s sister. To
strengthen their defense, they claimed that the
birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated
document. The birth certificate had alterations
as confirmed by an NSO representative.
They alleged that it is impossible for Rufino and
Caridad to register the plaintiff in Sta. Maria,
Ilocos Sur because they never lived or sojourned
in that place. Also, Caridad, an elementary
teacher in Bulacan, never filed a maternity
leave during the period of her service, as
supported by a certification from the Schools
Division Superintendent.
The RTC ruled that the respondent is a
legitimate child of the putative parents. The trial
court found that respondent’s filiation was duly
established by the certificate of live birth which
was presented in evidence. It dismissed the
petitioners’ claim that the certificate was
tampered. It further stated that even
granting arguendo that the birth certificate is
questionable, the filiation of respondent has
already been sufficiently proven by evidence of
her open and continuous possession of the

status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of
the Family Code.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that
under Article 170, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from
either of these two dates: the date the child was
born to the mother during the marriage, or the
date when the birth of such child was recorded
in the civil registry. The appellate court found no
evidence or admission that Caridad indeed
gave birth to respondent on a specific date.
It further resolved that the birth certificate
presented in this case does not qualify as the
valid registration of birth in the civil register
because it was not signed by the physician or
midwife in attendance at the child’s birth or the
parents of the newborn child, contrary to what
the law required. However, the CA ultimately
ruled that the respondent was able to prove her
filiation via open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child as supported by
secondary evidence presented.
The evidence consists of the following: (1) the
plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to
bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they
supported her and sent her to school paying for
her tuition and other school expenses; (3) she
was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of
Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death of
Rufino, Caridad applied for and was appointed
legal guardian of the person and property of
the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and
(5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino
on the basis of the fact that they are both the
legal heirs of the deceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
allowing the introduction of secondary
evidence and rendered judgment
notwithstanding the existence of primary
evidence of birth certificate.
HELD:
NEGATIVE. Secondary evidence may be
admitted only in a direct action under Article
172 because the said provision of law is meant
to be instituted as a separate action, and proof
of filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue
as in the instant case which is an action for
annulment of document and recovery of
possession. However, this rule is applicable only
to actions where the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child is at issue.
16
In the case at bar, filiation is not an issue. What
petitioner alleges is that the respondent is not a
child of the deceased spouses at all. Thus, both
the RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly
admitted secondary evidence similar to the
proof admissible under Art. 172 of the Family
Code.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that the
lower court’s declaration that the respondent is
a legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased
spouses is based on misapprehension of facts.
The irregularities consisting of the superimposed
entries on the date of birth and the name of the
informant made the document questionable,
as supported by the corroborating testimony of
the NSO representative. In addition, even the
respondent herself did not offer any evidence
to explain such irregularities. These irregularities
and the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are
sufficient to overthrow the presumption of
regularity attached to the respondent’s birth.
With the declaration that the birth certificate is
a nullity or falsity ruled then the respondent is not
the child of Rufino, and therefore not entitled to
inherit from the estate.
OPEN AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF
LEGITIMATE STATUS.
1. Mariategui vs. CA G.R. No. L-57062 January
24, 1992
FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages
during his lifetime. On his first wife, Eusebia
Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he
begot four children, Baldomera, Maria del
Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. With his second
wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter
named Cresenciana. And his third wife, Felipa
Velasco, he begot three children, namely
Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.
At the time of Lupo’s death he left certain
properties with which he acquired when he was
still unmarried. Lupo died without a will. Upon his
death, descendants from his first and second
marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition on Lot No. 163. However, the children
on Lupo’s third marriage filed with the lower
court an amended complaint claiming that
they were deprive on the partition of Lot No. 163
which were owned by their common father. The
petitioners, children on first and second
marriage, filed a counterclaim to dismiss the
said complaint. Trial court denied the motion to

dismiss and also the complaint by the
respondents, children on third marriage.
Respondents elevated the case on CA on the
ground that the trial court committed an error
for not finding the third marriage to be lawfully
married and also in holding respondents are not
legitimate children of their said parents. CA
rendered a decision declaring all the children
and descendants of Lupo, including the
respondents, are entitled to equal shares of
estate of their father. However, petitioners filed
a motion for reconsideration of said decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents were able to prove
their succession rights over the said estate.
RULING:
With respect to the legal basis of private
respondents' demand for partition of the estate
of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly
held that the private respondents are legitimate
children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were
alleged to have been lawfully married in or
about 1930. This fact is based on the
declaration communicated by Lupo
Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when
his father was still living, he was able to mention
to him that he and his mother were able to get
married before a Justice of the Peace of
Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves
as husband and wife, and were known in the
community to be such.
Although no marriage certificate was
introduced to this effect, no evidence was
likewise offered to controvert these facts.
Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the
marriage exists does not invalidate the
marriage, provided all requisites for its validity
are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be
presumed to have taken place between Lupo
and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deporting themselves as husband and
wife, have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock,
there being no divorce, absolute or from bed
and board is legitimate; and that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life.
2. Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 675
Civil Law; Paternity and Filiation; Rules on
compulsory recognition applicable not only to
17
natural children but also to spurious children.—
The rules on compulsory recognition are
embodied in Article 283 of the Civil Code, which
has been held to be applicable not only to
natural children but also to spurious children.
Compliance with certain jurisprudential
requirements necessary to establish “the open
and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child.—To establish “the open and
continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child,” it is necessary to comply with
certain jurisprudential requirements.
“Continuous” does not mean that the
concession of status shall continue forever but
only that it shall not be of an intermittent
character while it continues, The possession of
such status means that the father has treated
the child as his own, directly and not through
others, spontaneously and without
concealment though without publicity (since
the relation is illegitimate). There must be a
showing of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his
own, by continuous and clear manifestation of
paternal affection and care.
Court agrees with the trial court that Teopista
has not been in continuous possession of the
status of a recognized illegitimate child of
Casimiro Mendoza.—With these guidelines in
mind, we agree with the trial court that Teopista
has not been in continuous possession of the
status of a recognized illegitimate child of
Casimiro Mendoza, Under both Article 283 of
the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family
Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Fact that
Teopista failed to show that she was in open
and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child of Casimiro, she has
nevertheless established that status by another
method.—But although Teopista has failed to
show that she was in open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child
of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless
establish that status by another method.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An
illegitimate child is allowed to establish his
claimed filiation by any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws according
to the Civil Code or by evidence or proof in his
favor that the defendant is her father according
to the Family Code.—What both the trial court
and the respondent court did not take into
account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to
establish his claimed filiation by “any other

means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws,” according to the Civil Code, or
“by evidence or proof in his favor that the
defendant is her father,” according to the
Family Code, Such evidence may consist of his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies
of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Acts or declarations about pedigree may be
received in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule.—Such acts or declarations may
be received in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule because “it is the best the nature
of the case admits and because greater evils
are apprehended from the rejection of such
proof than from its admission.
Requisites to be complied with before the act
or declaration regarding pedigree may be
admitted in evidence. —Commenting on this
provision, Francisco enumerates the following
requisites that Have to be complied with before
the act or declaration regarding pedigree may
be admitted in evidence: 1. The declarant is;
dead or unable to testify. 2. The pedigree must
be in issue. 3. The declarant must be a relative
of the person whose pedigree is in issue. 4. The
declaration must be made before the
controversy arose. 5. The relationship between
the declarant and the person whose pedigree
is in question must be shown by evidence other
than such declaration.
All the above requisite are present in the case
at bar.—All the above requisites are present in
the case at bar. The persons who made the
declarations about the pedigree of Teopista,
namely, the mother of Casimiro. Brigida
Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both
dead at the time of Isaac’s testimony. The
declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista
and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the
very issues involved in the complaint for
compulsory recognition. The declarations were
made before the complaint was filed by
Teopista or before the controversy arose
between her and Casimiro. Finally, the
relationship between the declarants and
Casimiro has been established by evidence
other than such declaration, consisting of the
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio
Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as
one of his heirs.
18
Court gives effect to the policy of the Civil Code
and the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity of illegitimate
children.—We hold that by virtue of the above
discussed declarations, and in view of the other
circumstances of this case, Teopista Toring
Tuñacao has proved that she is the illegitimate
daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled
to be recognized as such. In so holding, we give
effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the
Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity of illegitimate
children, without prejudice to the right of the
alleged parent to resist the claimed status with
his own defenses, including evidence now
obtainable through the facilities of modern
medicine and technology.
FACTS:
Private respondent (Teopista) claimed that she
was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro
Mendoza (petitioner), but the latter denied the
claim. The RTC ruled in favor of Mendoza and
dismissed the complaint for compulsory
recognition of Teopista. CA reversed the
judgment of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent is the
illegitimate daughter of Mendoza?
HELD:
Teopista is the illegitimate daughter of
Mendoza. An illegitimate child is allowed to
establish his claimed filiation by “any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and
Special laws”, according to the Civil Code, or
“by evidence or proof in his favor that the
defendant is her father,” according to the
Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies
of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Under Sec.
39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the act or
declaration of a person deceased or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may
be received in evidence where it occurred
before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration.
DNA RESULTS

Herrera v. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005,
460 SCRA 197
FACTS:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old
Rosendo Alba (respondent), represented by his
mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a
petition for compulsory recognition, support
and damages against petitioner. On 7 August
1998, petitioner filed his answer with
counterclaim where he denied that he is the
biological father of respondent. Petitioner also
denied physical contact with respondent’s
mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking
of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support the motion,
respondent presented the testimony of
Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. When she testified, Dr.
Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle
University where she taught Cell Biology. She
was also head of the University of the Philippines
Natural Sciences Research Institute (UP-NSRI), a
DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former
professor at the University of the Philippines in
Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the
Molecular Biology Program and taught
Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos
described the process for DNA paternity testing
and asserted that the test had an accuracy
rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and
contended that it has not gained acceptability.
Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity
testing violates his right against self-
incrimination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA Paternity testing violates
Herrera’s right against self-incrimination.
RULING:
No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court
ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not yet
recognized in the Philippines and at the time
when he questioned the order of the trial court,
the prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case;
however, in 2002 there is already no question as
to the acceptability of DNA test results as
admissible object evidence in Philippine courts.
This was the decisive ruling in the case of People
vs Vallejo (2002).
It is also considered that the Vallejo Guidelines
be considered by the courts. The Vallejo
Guidelines determines weight and probative
value of DNA test results.
19
The Vallejo Guidelines:
1. how the samples were collected;
2. how they were handled;
3. the possibility of contamination of the
samples;
4. the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples;
5. whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the
tests; and
6. the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.
Herrera v. Alba summarizes the laws, rules, and
jurisprudence on establishing filiation,
discoursing in relevant part as follows:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence Establishing
Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code
provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on
pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130
provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. —
The act or declaration of a person deceased,
or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree
of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where
it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown

by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where
these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree. — The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any
one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be
also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles
or other family books or charts, engraving on
rings, family portraits and the like, may be
received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what
incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence
to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA,a case
petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of
paternity still has to be resolved by
such conventional evidence as the relevant
incriminating verbal and written acts by the
putative father. Under Article 278 of the New
Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent
shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of
filiation must be made by the putative father
himself and the writing must be the writing of the
putative father. A notarial agreement to
support a child whose filiation is admitted by the
putative father was considered acceptable
evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a
good father to the child and pictures of the
putative father cuddling the child on various
occasions, together with the certificate of live
birth, proved filiation. However, a student
permanent record, a written consent to a
father's operation, or a marriage contract
where the putative father gave consent,
cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing
alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family
pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
Action to impugn legitimacy
1. EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH
M. REYES, MA. GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN
GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. REYES,
petitioners, vs. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO
(deceased) and LEONIDA F. MAURICIO,
respondents. November 24, 2010 G.R. No.
175080
FACTS:
20
Eugenio owns a parcel of land in Turo, Bocaue,
Bulacan (4,527 square meters, more or less, and
covered by a TCT --- property was adjudicated
to Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial
settlement among the heirs following the death
of his parents).
Librada F. Mauricio (Librada, DECEASED) and
her daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida)
filed a complaint before the DARAB of Malolos,
Bulacan alleging that they’re the legal heirs of
Godofredo Mauricio who was the lawful and
registered tenant of Eugenio through his
predecessors-in-interest to the subject land(
that from 1936 until his death in May 1994,
Godofredo had been working on the subject
land and introduced improvements consisting
of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a
residential house and other permanent
improvements; that through fraud, deceit,
strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio
caused the preparation of a document
denominated as Kasunduan dated 28
September 1994 to eject respondents from the
subject property, and had the same notarized
by Notary Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig,
Metro Manila; that Librada never appeared
before the Notary Public; that Librada was
illiterate and the contents of
the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to
her; that Eugenio took undue advantage of the
weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence
and other handicaps of Librada in the
execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void
for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been
employing all illegal means to eject
respondents from the subject property).
Leonida and Librada prayed for the
declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for
an order for Eugenio to maintain and place
them in peaceful possession and cultivation of
the subject property.
According to Eugenio: Godofredo’s
occupation of the subject premises was based
on the former’s mere tolerance and
accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a
tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person
to sign such an agreement. He maintained that
Librada, accompanied by a relative, voluntarily
affixed her signature to the Kasunduan and
that she was fully aware of the contents of the
document. Moreover, Librada
receivedP50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same
day of the execution of
the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the
jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal
relief sought by respondents is the annulment of

the contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on
the regular courts.
Provincial Adjudicator – Godofredo was the
tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being the
surviving spouse, should have peaceful
possession of the land.
DARAB - Mauricios are former tenants of
Spouses Reyes.
CA - affirmed the decision and resolution of the
DARAB.
ON APPEAL, Leonida’s legal standing as a party
was also assailed by Eugenio. Eugenio
submitted that the complaint was rendered
moot with the death of Librada, Godofredo’s
sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that
Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and
Librada, thus, not a legal heir.
ISSUE:
WON Eugenio can question the filiation of
Leonida in a case regarding land dispute.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals
when it ruled that Eugenio cannot collaterally
attack the status of Leonida in the instant
petition.
It is settled law that filiation cannot be
collaterally attacked. Well-known civilista Dr.
Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book “Civil Code of
the Philippines, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence,” noted that the aforecited
doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. He explained thus:
The legitimacy of the child cannot be
contested by way of defense or as a collateral
issue in another action for a different
purpose. The necessity of an independent
action directly impugning the legitimacy is
more clearly expressed in the Mexican code
(article 335) which provides: “The contest of the
legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs
must be made by proper complaint before the
competent court; any contest made in any
other way is void.” This principle applies under
our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the
code confirm this view, because they refer to
“the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This
action can be brought only by the husband or
his heirs and within the periods fixed in the
present articles.
21
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar
of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the
Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not
through collateral attack.
The same rule is applied to adoption such that
it cannot also be made subject to a collateral
attack. In Reyes v. Sotero, this Court reiterated
that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in
a proceeding for the settlement of a
decedent’s estate. Furthermore, in Austria v.
Reyes, the Court declared that the legality of
the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed
only in a separate action brought for that
purpose and cannot be subject to collateral
attack.
2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-
MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON
MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), Respondent. [G.R.
No. 189476, February 2, 2011, CARPIO
MORALES, J.:]
TOPIC: PERSONS – ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTER
DOCTRINE: When a petition for cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations
including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage,
a strict compliance with the requirements of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. In
this case Respondent Julian denies his
legitimacy in his petition to change his last
name “Magpayo” to “Coseteng”.
FACTS: Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng
Magpayo (respondent) was born in Makati on
September 9, 1972. He is the son of Fulvio M.
Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-
Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate
of live birth shows, contracted marriage on
March 26, 1972. Julian claimed that his parents
were never legally married. Julian filed a
Petition to change his name to Julian Edward
Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng.
In support of his petition he submitted the
following:
a. a certification from the National
Statistics Office stating that his
mother Anna Dominique "does
not appear in [its] National Indices
of Marriage."
b. his academic records from
elementary up to

college3 showing that he carried
the surname "Coseteng," and
c. the birth certificate of his child
where "Coseteng" appears as his
surname
In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent
ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon
City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L.
COSETENG." On order of Branch 77 of the
Quezon City RTC, respondent amended his
petition by alleging therein compliance with the
3-year residency requirement under Section
2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
RTC granted the petition and directed the Civil
Registrar of Makati City to:
1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24
for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES"
[in herein respondent’s Certificate of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for
the Last Name of the [respondent] to
"COSETENG";
3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for
Middle Name of the [respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo,
Jr." in the space for FATHER of the [respondent]
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied by
the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009,
ISSUE/S:
1) WON Rule 103 is the applicable remedy
where a change in name involves change in
civil status of a person.
2) WON Respondent complied with the
jurisdictional requirements provided under Rule
108.
HELD:
1) NO. The valid ground for change of name
under Rule 103 are: a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (b) when the change results
as a legal consequence such as legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d)
when one has continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name, and
was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a
22
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest. In relation to the
case at hand, respondent’s reason for
changing his name cannot be considered as
one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds.
Furthermore, respondent seeks to change his
legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. It affects his
legal status. When a petition for cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations
including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage,
a strict compliance with the requirements of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. Rule
103 would not suffice to grant respondent’s
supplication.
2) NO. Rule 108 directs that a petition which
concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the
civil registry in which the entry is sought to be
cancelled or corrected and "all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby" should be made parties to
the proceeding. It also provides that there are
two sets of notices to different "potential
oppositors." The first notice is that given to the
"persons named in the petition" and the second
(which is through publication) is that given to
other persons who are not named in the petition
but nonetheless may be considered interested
or affected parties, such as creditors. These two
sets of notices are mandated. In the present
case, there is wrong venue and failure to
implead the proper parties. There is improper
venue since the petition of respondent was not
filed in Makati where his birth certificate was
registered but in Quezon City. There is failure to
implead the proper parties since neither his
father nor mother were made parties thereto.
No notice was sent to his parents in order to
implead them.
Grounds to impugn legitimacy
Physical impossibility of access
1. Andal vs. Macaraig GR No. 2474, May 30,
1951
FACTS:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother
Maria Duenas, filed a complaint for the
recovery of the ownership and possession of a
parcel of land owned by Emiliano Andal and
Maria Duenas. Eduvigis Macaraig, herein
defendant, donated the land by virtue of
donation propter nuptias in favor of
Emiliano. The latter was suffering from
tuberculosis in January 1941. His brother, Felix,

then lived with them to work his house and
farm. Emiliano became so weak that he can
hardly move and get up from his
bed. Sometime in September 1942, the wife
eloped with Felix and lived at the house of
Maria’s father until 1943. Emiliano died in
January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend
the funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth
to a boy who was, herein petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the
deceased. YES
RULING:
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17,
1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the
former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the
latter because he was born within 300 days
following the dissolution of the marriage. The
fact that the husband was seriously sick is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of
legitimacy. This presumption can only be
rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access
to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300
days next preceding the birth of the
child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife
includes absence during the initial period of
conception, impotence which is patent, and
incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be
shown that cohabitation took place through
corrupt violation of prison regulations. Maria’s
illicit intercourse with a man other than the
husband during the initial period does not
preclude cohabitation between husband and
wife.
Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a
legitimate son of the deceased making him the
owner of the parcel land.
2. G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE,
Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma.
Theresa Almonte were married on December
29, 1989. They lived in Fairview, Quezon City and
a year later on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa
gave birth to Jose Gerardo.
On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition
to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on
the ground of bigamy, alleging that her
marriage with Mario Gopiao on December 10,
198- was never annulled. Although Ma. Theresa
23
did not deny marrying Mario, she averred that
the marriage was a sham and that she have
never lived with Mario at all.
The trial court said otherwise, and ruled that Ma.
Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and
subsisting, thus declaring her marriage to
Gerardo as void ab initio. It deemed Jose
Gerardo to be an illegitimate child and the
custody was awarded to Ma. Theresa while
Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Also, it
allowed the child to use the surname of his
father.
Ma. Theresa appealed and pleaded for the
reverse of the court’s decisions. The Court of
Appeals ruled that Jose Gerardo was not the
son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario
during her first marriage considering the fact
that the second marriage was void from the
beginning. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo –
under the law – is the child of the legal and
subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and
Mario Gopiao.
Gerardo Concepcion moved for the
reconsideration of the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the child is the legitimate child of Ma.
Theresa and Gopiao or the illegimate child of
Ma. Theresa and Gerardo.
RULING:
The child, Jose Gerardo, is the legitimate child
of Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised as per Art. 164 of the Family Code
which states, “A child who is conceived or born
during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.”
It is fully supported by Art. 167 of the Family
Code which states, “The child shall be
considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress.”.
The law requires that every reasonable
presumption be made in favor of the
legitimacy. It is grounded on the policy to
protect the innocent offspring from the odium
of illegitimacy.
Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa
was void from the very beginning, he never
became her husband and thus never acquired
any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The minor cannot be deprived of his/her
legitimate status on the bare declaration of the
mother and/or even much less, the supposed
father. In fine, the law and only the law

determines who are the legitimate or
illegitimate children for one’s legitimacy or
illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. It
should be what the law says and not what a
parent says it is. Additionally, public policy
demands that there be no compromise on the
status and filiation of a child. Otherwise, the
child will be at the mercy of those who may be
so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have
the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario
and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the
provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. Also,
there being no such parent-child relationship
between the child and Gerardo, Gerardo has
no legally demandable right to visit the child.
The State as parens patriae affords special
protection to children from abuse, exploitation
and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. It is mandated to provide
protection to those of tender years. Through its
laws, the State safeguards them from everyone,
even their own parents, to the end that their
eventual development as responsible citizens
and members of society shall not be impeded,
distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This
is especially significant where, as in this case,
the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at
their very identity and lineage. The child, by
reason of his mental and physical immaturity,
needs special safeguard and care, including
appropriate legal protection before as well as
after birth. In case of assault on his rights by
those who take advantage of his innocence
and vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense
with the single-minded purpose of upholding
only his best interests.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Gerardo is hereby
DENIED. The resolution of the Court of Appeals
in favor of respondents is AFFIRMED.
Biological or other scientific grounds
1. G.R. No. 171713 December 17, 2007
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG vs Minor JOANNE
RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and
Guardian, JINKY C. DIAZ
DOCTRINE:
DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate
child and any physical residue of the long dead
parent could be resorted. The death of a
petitioner does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there
exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
24
Biological sample means any organic material
originating from a person’s body, even if found
in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA
testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other
body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
FACTS:
Jinky Diaz was already married to a Japanese
national when she got acquainted and fell in
love with Rogelio Ong. Despite of this, the two
cohabited for more than four years and bore a
child. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the
baptismal expenses and provided for all of
minor Joanne’s needs, recognizing the child as
his own. On September 1998, Rogelio
abandoned them and stopped giving support,
alleging that the child is not his. Due to
continued refusal to support the child, minor
Joanne Diaz represented by her mother and
guardian, Jinky Diaz filed a complaint for
compulsory recognition with prayer for support
against Rogelio before the RTC.
RTC declared that the minor respondent is the
illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky Diaz.
Although the law presumes that Joanne is a
legitimate child of the Jinky and his Japanese
national husband. It was turned down by the
RTC because the legitimacy of a child may be
impugned by the ground provided in Art. 166,
FC that husband and wife were living
separately in such way that sexual intercourse is
not possible. Also, defendant admitted to
shouldered the hospital bills representing the
expenses in connection with the birth of plaintiff
is an evidence of admission that he is the real
father of Joanne.
Rogelio appealed to the CA but died during its
pendency. CA granted the appeal and
remanded the case to RTC for the issuance of
an order directing the parties to make
arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose
of determining the paternity of Joanne.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in remanding the case
for DNA analysis despite the fact that it is no
longer feasible due to Rogelio's death.
RULING:
NO, the death of the petitioner does not ipso
facto negate the application of DNA testing for
as long as there exist appropriate biological
samples of his DNA. Biological sample means
any organic material originating from a person’s

body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is
susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood,
saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and
bones.
In People vs Umanito, citing Tecson vs
COMELEC, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted. Thus, the
death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of
DNA testing. Petition DENIED. CA's decision is
affirmed.
2. G.R. No. 190710, June 06, 2011 ] JESSE U.
LUCAS, PETITIONER, VS. JESUS S. LUCAS,
RESPONDENT.
DOCTRINE:
To warrant the issuance of the DNA testing
order, there must be a show cause hearing
wherein the applicant must first present
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or
“good cause” for the holding of the test.
FACTS:
Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish
Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72,
Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that,
sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy migrated
to Manila and stayed with Belen. Elsie would
oftentimes accompany Belen to work which
eventually led to her acquaintance with
respondent Jesus Lucas at Belen's workplace.
This resulted in an intimate relationship between
Elsie and Jesus until the former gave birth to
Jesse. It is alleged that the respondent
extended financial support to Elsie and Jesse for
a period of two years until the end of the
relationship when Elsie refused the same and
raised Jesse on her own.
There was no mention of Jesse's father in his
Certificate of Live Birth but Elsie told Jesse that it
was the respondent. Then, Jesse filed a Petition
to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with motion for
the Submission of the Parties to DNA Testing).
Attached to the petition were the following:
among others, petitioner’s certificate of live
birth, petitioner’s college diploma, showing that
he graduated from Saint Louis University in
Baguio City with a degree in Psychology a and
his Certificate of Graduation from the same
school petitioner’s baptismal certificate.
25
The Regional Trial Court found the same to be
sufficient in form and granted the motion. This
was opposed by the respondent averring that
such motion may be granted only upon
showing of a prima facie case. Ultimately, RTC
ruled against such opposition.
Respondent went to the Court of Appeals via
Petition for review on Certiorari which was
granted in his favor. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a prima facie case of filiation is
required so that the parties may be ordered to
submit to DNA testing.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.
The Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for
conditions that are aimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing.
Section 4 states: SEC. 4. Application for DNA
Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at
any time, either motu proprio or on application
of any person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such
order shall issue after due hearing and notice to
the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to
the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to
DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential
to produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which
the court may consider as potentially affecting
the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing,
without need of a prior court order, at the
behest of any party, including law enforcement
agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA this
testing order will be issued as a matter of right if,
during the hearing, the said conditions are
established.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the
DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first present
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or
“good cause” for the holding of the test.
The same condition precedent should be
applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative
father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during
the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
However, the Supreme Court still granted the
petition holding that, notwithstanding these, it
should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA
testing order remains discretionary upon the
court. The court may, for example, consider
whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA
testing. If there is already preponderance of
evidence to establish paternity and the DNA
test result would only be corroborative, the
court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA
testing.
In subsequent marriages
[G.R. No. 118852. January 20, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. EDGARDO QUITORIANO y BRIONES,
accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Edgardo Quitariano was charged with rape. He
was found guilty and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. The complainant got pregnant and
gave birth ten (10) months after the alleged
rape. The accused contended that it was
impossible for the child to be conceived on the
alleged date of the rape or on December 1992.
ISSUE:
What is the normal gestation period?
RULING:
40 WEEKS OR 280 DAYS FOR FIRST PREGNANCY.
The fact that private complainant gave birth
more than ten months after the alleged rape
does not discredit her testimony. Dr. Honesto
Marquez, a physician from the Marinduque
Provincial Hospital, explained that the normal
gestation period is 40 weeks or 280 days, but it
can also extend beyond 40 weeks if the woman
is having her first pregnancy. It is undisputed
that the child delivered by private complainant
on October 31, 1993 was her first. Hence, it is not
26
impossible that the child was conceived in
December, 1992, the date of the alleged rape.
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
Who are considered illegitimate
[G.R. No. 183965. September 18, 2009.]
JOANIE SURPOSA UY, petitioner, vs. JOSE NGO
CHUA, respondent.
FACTS:
Joanie Surposa filed a petition for the issuance
of a decree of illegitimate filiation against Jose
Ngo Chua. Surposa alleged that Chua and her
mother had an illicit affair and that they had
two (2) children: the petitioner and her brother,
Allan. Chua denied the allegations.
Chua filed a Demurrer to Evidence and alleged
that a previous decision of the RTC in a similar
petition filed by Surposa bars the instant case. In
said case, the RTC granted the Compromise
Agreement wherein Surposa admitted that he
was not related to Chua and the latter paid
Surposa and her brother P2,000,000 each.
ISSUE:
Was the compromise valid?
RULING: NO.
A compromise is a contract whereby the
parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced. 18 In Estate of the late Jesus S.
Yujuico v. Republic, 19 the Court pronounced
that a judicial compromise has the effect of res
judicata. A judgment based on a compromise
agreement is a judgment on the merits.
It must be emphasized, though, that like any
other contract, a compromise agreement must
comply with the requisites in Article 1318 of the
Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the
contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the
subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of
the obligation that is established. And, like any
other contract, the terms and conditions of a
compromise agreement must not be contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public policy and
public order. Any compromise agreement that
is contrary to law or public policy is null and void,
and vests no rights in and holds no obligation for
any party. It produces no legal effect at all.
In connection with the foregoing, the Court
calls attention to Article 2035 of the Civil Code,
which states:

ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following
questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal
separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)
The Compromise Agreement between
petitioner and respondent, executed on 18
February 2000 and approved by RTC-Branch 9
in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended
to settle the question of petitioner's status and
filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child
of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and
her brother Allan acknowledging that they are
not the children of respondent, respondent
would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00
each. Although unmentioned, it was a
necessary consequence of said Compromise
Agreement that petitioner also waived away
her rights to future support and future legitime
as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently,
the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February
2000 between petitioner and respondent is
covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of
the Civil Code.
Rights of illegitimate children
1. [G.R. No. 165016. June 17, 2008.]
DOLORES MONTEFALCON & LAURENCE
MONTEFALCON, petitioners, vs. RONNIE S.
VASQUEZ, respondent.
FACTS:
Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint 4 for
acknowledgment and support against
respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez. According to
petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of
P19,000 as support for Laurence since Laurence
was born in 1993. Vasquez allegedly also
refused to give him regular school allowance
despite repeated demands. Petitioner Dolores
added that she and Vasquez are not legally
married, and that Vasquez has his own family.
The trial court declared Vasquez in default for
failure to file an answer despite the substituted
service of summons. RTC ruled in favor of
Dolores.
27
Vasquez resurfaced and filed a notice of
appeal. He argued that the trial court erred in
trying and deciding the case as it "never"
acquired jurisdiction over his person, as well as
in awarding P5,000-per-month support, which
was allegedly "excessive and exorbitant.”
ISSUE:
May Vasquez be compelled to support
Laurence?
RULING: YES.
Laurence's record of birth is an authentic,
relevant and admissible piece of evidence to
prove paternity and filiation. Vasquez did not
deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores. He
signed as father in Laurence's certificate of live
birth, a public document. He supplied the data
entered in it. Thus, it is a competent evidence of
filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. In
fact, if the child had been recognized by any of
the modes in the first paragraph of Article 172,
there is no further need to file any action for
acknowledgment because any of said modes
is by itself a consummated act.
As filiation is beyond question, support follows as
matter of obligation.
Under Article 195 (4) 31 of the Family Code, a
parent is obliged to support his illegitimate child.
The amount is variable. There is no final
judgment thereof as it shall be in proportion to
the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient. 32 It may be
reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support. 33
Support comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the
family. 34 Under the premises, the award of
P5,000 monthly support to Laurence is
reasonable, and not excessive nor exorbitant.
2. Maramag vs De Guzman, GR 181132, June 5,
2009
Same; Same; Same; No legal proscription exists
in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit
relationships by the insured.—The revocation of
Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her
disqualification as such in another are of no
moment considering that the designation of the
illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s
insurance policies remains valid. Because no
legal proscription exists in naming as

beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships
by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance
proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view
of the prohibition on donations under Article 739
of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves
for reasons based on the insurance contracts,
must be awarded to the said illegitimate
children, the designated beneficiaries, to the
exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where
the insured has not designated any beneficiary,
or when the designated beneficiary is
disqualified by law to receive the proceeds,
that the insurance policy proceeds shall
redound to the benefit of the estate of the
insured.
FACTS:
Petitioners were the legitimate wife (Vicenta)
and children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto), while
respondents were Loreto’s illegitimate family.
Loreto designated respondents as beneficiaries
in his life insurance policies from Insular Life
Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular) and Great
Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife).
Hence, Loreto’s concubine, Eva de Guzman
Maramag, was designated as such.
Petitioner Vicenta and respondent Eva claimed
for Loreto’s insurance.
Petitioners instituted in the RTC a petition for
revocation and/or reduction of insurance
proceeds for being void and/or inofficious, with
prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners allege that Eva was a concubine of
Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the latter,
thus, she is disqualified to receive any proceeds
from his insurance policies Insular and Grepalife;
the illegitimate children of Loreto—Odessa, Karl
Brian, and Trisha Angelie—were entitled only to
one-half of the legitime of the legitimate
children, thus, the proceeds released to Odessa
and those to be released to Karl Brian and Trisha
Angelie were inofficious and should be
reduced; and petitioners could not be deprived
of their legitimes, which should be satisfied first.
Petitioners invoked the law on donations or the
rules on testamentary succession in order to
defeat the right of herein defendants to collect
the insurance indemnity.
Pursuant to the motion to dismiss incorporated
in Insular and Grepalife’s respective answers,
the TC dismissed the complaint with respect to
the illegitimate children, who are the
designated primary beneficiaries in the life
insurance policies, for lack of cause action.
28
However, trial court ruled that the action may
proceed against the concubine Eva, Insular
Life, and Grepalife.
Insular and Grepalife filed their respective
motions for reconsideration, arguing, in the
main, that the petition failed to state a cause of
action against them.
TC granted the MRs, and dismissed the case
against them.
CA dismissed petitioners ‘appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that the decision of the trial
court dismissing the complaint for failure to state
a cause of action involved a pure question of
law. Further, it found that due to petitioners’
failure to timely file a motion for reconsideration,
the dismissal against Insular and Grepalife had
already attained finality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the illegitimate family of Loreto
can claim his insurance proceeds.
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
The civil code provides that any person who is
forbidden from receiving any donation under
Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a
life insurance policy of the person who cannot
make any donation to him. If a concubine is
made the beneficiary, it is believed that the
insurance contract will still remain valid, but the
indemnity must go to the legal heirs and not to
the concubine, for evidently, what is prohibited
under Art. 2012 is the naming of the improper
beneficiary.
However, Art. 2011 of the Civil Code provides
that the contract of insurance is governed by
the (sic) special laws. Matters not expressly
provided for in such special laws shall be
regulated by this Code. The principal law on
insurance is the Insurance Code, as amended.
Only in case of deficiency in the Insurance
Code that the Civil Code may be resorted to.
Section 53 of the Insurance Code provides that
the insurance proceeds shall be applied
exclusively to the proper interest of the person
in whose name or for whose benefit it is made
unless otherwise specified in the policy.
Hence, the general rule is only persons entitled
to claim the insurance proceeds are either the
insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the
insured is already deceased, upon the
maturation of the policy.

Exception lies in a situation where the insurance
contract was intended to benefit third persons
who are not parties to the same in the form of
favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a
case, third parties may directly sue and claim
from the insurer
It is only in cases where the insured has not
designated any beneficiary, or when the
designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to
receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy
proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the
estate of the insured
It is evident from the face of the complaint that
petitioners are not entitled to a favorable
judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil
Code which expressly provides that insurance
contracts shall be governed by special laws,
i.e., the Insurance Code.
Section 53 of the Insurance Code states that
“the insurance proceeds shall be applied
exclusively to the proper interest of the person
in whose name or for whose benefit it is made
unless otherwise specified in the policy.” From
the petition filed before the trial court that, it is
clear that although petitioners are the
legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named
as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued
by Insular and Grepalife. Thus, they are not
entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly,
respondents Insular and Grepalife have no
legal obligation to turn over the insurance
proceeds to petitioners.
3. JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ
and minorCHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ AQUINO,
represented by JENIE SANJUAN
DELACRUZ, Petitioners, Versus. RONALD PAUL S.
GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of
Antipolo City, Respondent GR No. 177728, July
31, 2009
FACTS:
For several months in 2005, Jenie San Juan De
La Cruz and Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas
Aquino lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
They resided in the house of Christian’s parents
in Rizal.
On September 4, 2005. Christian died.
After 2 months, Jenie, who continued to live
with Christian’s parents, gave birth to her minor
child.
Jenie applied for registration of child’s birth,
using the surname Aquino, with the Office of
29
City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of
which she submitted:
• Childs certificate of live birth;
• Affidavit to use the surname of the
father which she had executed and
signed, and;
• Affidavit of Acknowledgment
executed by Christians father
Domingo Butch Aquino.
• Both affidavits attested that during
the lifetime of Christian, he had
continuously acknowledged his yet
unborn child and that his paternity
had never been questioned.
• Attached to AUSF a document
entitled “AUTOBIOGRAPHY” which
Christian, during his lifetime, wrote in
his own handwriting.
City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, denied
Jenies application for registration and held that
“The child cannot use the surname of his father
because he was born out of wedlock and the
father unfortunately died prior to his birth and
has no more capacity to acknowledge his
paternity to the child.”
Jenie and the child filed a complaint for
injunction before the RTC of Antipolo alleging
that the denial of registration of the child’s
name is a violation of his righto use the surname
of his deceased father under Art. 176of the
Family Code, as amended by R.A. No. 9255.
“Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or
when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the
father.”
RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause
of action as the Autobiography was unsigned,
citing par. 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O no. 1, series of 2004
which defines private handwritten document
through which a father may acknowledge an
illegitimate child as follows:
“2.2 Private handwritten instrument
an instrument executed in the handwriting of
the father and duly signed by him where he
expressly recognizes paternity to the child.”
ISSUE:

Whether or not the unsigned private handwritt
en instrument or “Autobiography” can be
considered as recognition of paternity that
entitles the said minor to use his father’s
surname? YES
RULING:
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended
by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use
the surname of his/her father if the latter had
expressly recognized him/her as his offspring
through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or through an admission made in a
public or private handwritten instrument.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as
amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state
that the private handwritten instrument
acknowledging the child’s paternity must be
signed by the putative father. This provision
must, however, be read in conjunction with
related provisions of the Family Code which
require that recognition by the father must bear
his signature, thus: Art. 175. Illegitimate children
may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children’s x x x Art. 172. The filiation of
legitimate children is established by any of the
following:(1) The record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment; or(2) An
admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a
child through a written instrument must affix his
signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176
of the Family Code.
In the present case, however, special
circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques
Autobiography, though unsigned by
him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the
law.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the
earlier quoted statements in Dominiques
Autobiography have been made and written
by him. Taken together with the other relevant
facts extant herein that Dominique, during his
lifetime, and Jenie were living together as
common-law spouses for several months in 2005
at his parents house in Pulang-lupa,
Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant
when Dominique died on September 4, 2005;
and about two months after his death, Jenie
gave birth to the child they sufficiently establish
that the child of Jenie is Dominiques.
30
In view of the pronouncements herein made,
the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules
respecting the requirement of affixing the
signature of the acknowledging parent in any
private handwritten instrument wherein an
admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:1) Where the private
handwritten instrument is the lone piece of
evidence submitted to prove filiation, there
should be strict compliance with the
requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and2) Where the
private handwritten instrument is accompanied
by other relevant and competent evidence, it
suffices that the claim of filiation therein be
shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.
4. Uy v Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18,
2009
FACTS:
Petitioner filed for the issuance of a decree of
illegitimate filiation against respondent. She
alleged in her complaint that respondent, who
was then married, had an illicit relationship with
Irene Surposa and that the respondent and
Irene had two children namely, petitioner
(Joanie) and her brother, Allan. Respondent
attended at the birth of the latter instructed that
petitioner’s birth certificate be filled out with the
following names: “ALFREDO F. SURPOSA” as
father and “IRENE DUCAY” as mother. Alfredo F.
Surposa was the name of Irene’s father, and
Ducay was the maiden surname of Irene’s
mother.
However, respondent Chua financially
supported petitioner and Allan and even
provided employment for her. He and Allan
were introduced to each other and became
known in the Chinese community as
respondent’s illegitimate children. During
petitioner’s wedding, respondent sent his
brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his
representative and Respondent’s relatives even
attended the baptism of petitioner’s daughter.
Later, Respondent denied that he had an illicit
relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was
his daughter. Hearings then ensued and
petitioner presented documentary evidence to
prove her claim of illegitimate filiation. Petitioner
had already filed a similar Petition for the
issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation
against respondent. And latter filed a Demurrer
to Evidence on the ground that the Decision
dated 21 February 2000 barred by res judicata.

A Compromise Agreement was made between
the two parties prior where petitioner Joanie
declares, admits and acknowledges that there
is no blood relationship or filiation between
petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand
and the respondent, in exchange the latter
paid the Two Million Pesos each. The court ruled
in favor of the respondent hence this appeal
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of res judicata is
applicable to judgments predicated upon a
compromise agreement on cases enumerated
in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines;
RULING:
Res judicata is based upon two grounds
embodied in various maxims of the common
law, namely public policy and necessity, which
makes it in the interest of the State that there
should be an end to litigation and that the
hardship of the individual that he should be
vexed twice for the same cause.
The requisites must also concur: (1) there must
be a final judgment or order; (2) the court
rendering it must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there
must be, between the two cases, identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
The court rules held that res judicata does not
exist in this case.
The compromise agreement is a contract
whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to
one already commenced. In Estate of the late
Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, the Court
pronounced that a judicial compromise has the
effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a
compromise agreement is a judgment on the
merits. A contract must have requisites and no
according to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, one
of the requisites of such to be valid is that the
compromise must not pertain to the Civil Status
of a person and the issue of Future Support and
Future Legitime.
The agreement in this case is intended to settle
the question of petitioner’s status and filiation,
i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of
respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her
brother Allan acknowledging that they are not
the children of respondent, respondent would
pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each.
Although unmentioned, it was a necessary
31
consequence of said Compromise Agreement
that petitioner also waived away her rights to
future support and future legitime as an
illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the
Compromise Agreement dated 18 February
2000 between petitioner and respondent is
covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of
the Civil Code as espoused in the case of
Advincula v. Advincula.
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that
the status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Public policy demands that
there be no compromise on the status and
filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the
lack of the same, is a relationship that must be
judicially established, and it is for the Court to
declare its existence or absence. It cannot be
left to the will or agreement of the parties.
Being contrary to law and public policy, the
Compromise Agreement dated 18 February
2000 between petitioner and respondent is void
ab initio and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It produces no legal effect at all.
The void agreement cannot be rendered
operative even by the parties' alleged
performance (partial or full) of their respective
prestations.
5. DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner, versus
MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA
AVILAPARREÑO, Respondents G.R. No. 193161
Promulgated: August 22, 2011
FACTS:
Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino
Manungas (no children of their own).
They adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila) on
August 12, 1968.
Florentino Manungas died intestate on May 29,
1977, while Avila predeceased his adoptive
mother.
Avila was survived by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda.
de Manungas.
Engracia Manungas (administatrix) filed a
Motion for Partition of Estate on March 31, 1980
in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino
Manungas (she stated herself, Avila and Ramon
Manungas [natural son of Florentino] as forced
heirs). Avila’s widow executed a Waiver of
Rights and Participation on October 29, 1980.
Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the
intestate estate proceedings (distributing the
properties to Engracia Manungas and Ramon
Manungas).

October 25, 1995, the RTC of Panabo City,
appointed Parreño, the niece of Engracia
Manungas, as the Judicial Guardian of the
properties and person of her incompetent aunt.
Engracia Manungas, through Parreño, instituted
a Civil Case against the spouses Diosdado
Salinas Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for
illegal detainer and damages with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Panabo City
(they’re occupying the property because they
said Diosdado is an illegitimate son of
Florentino). Answer was filed beyond the
reglementary period, not considered by the
MTC = summary judgment was issued in favor of
Engracia. Spouses Salinas appealed in the RTC
of Davao City(affirmed decision of MTC).
August 7, 1998, Diosdado instituted a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration over
the Estate of Engracia Manungas (Estate of
Manungas) in his favor before the RTC, Branch
2 in Tagum City, Davao (Diosdado is
Florentino’s illegitimate son = Engracia’s heir).
Petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto
(Loreto) and Parreño alleging that Diosdado
was incompetent as an administrator of the
Estate of Manungas claiming that a) he was not
a Manungas, b) that he was not an heir of
Engracia Manungas, c) he was not a creditor of
Engracia Manungas or her estate and d) that
he was in fact a debtor of the estate (liable to
Engracia Manungas for PhP 177,000 because of
the MTC decision).
RTC appointed Parreno AGAIN as the
administrator of the Manunga Estate.
Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction. Parreño’s
appointment as special administrator of the
Estate of Manungas a) ceased upon Engracia
Manungas’ death (her appointment as special
administrator was without basis), b) Parreño was
not fit to become a special administrator
(already been fined by the court for failing to
render a timely accounting of Engracia
Manungas’ property as her judicial guardian),
c) Parreño is a mere niece, a collateral relative,
of Engracia Manungas, while he is the
illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas.
RTC reversed decision, appointed Diosdado as
administrator. CA reversed RTC, appointed
Parreno as Administrator.
ISSUE:
32
WON Diosdado should be an administrator of
the Manungas Estate (on the basis that he’s an
illegitimate child of Florentino).
HELD:
NO. The mere fact that Diosdado is an heir to
the estate of Florentino Manungas does not
mean that he is entitled or even qualified to
become the special administrator of the Estate
of Manungas.
RATIO: Jurisprudence teaches us that the
appointment of a special administrator lies
within the discretion of the court. In Heirs of
Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-
Gabriel,[24] it was stated that:
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as
to the prior or preferred right of certain persons
to the appointment of administrator under
Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory
provisions as to causes for removal of an
executor or administrator under section 653 of
Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not
apply to the selection or removal of special
administrator. x x x As the law does not say who
shall be appointed as special administrator and
the qualifications the appointee must have, the
judge or court has discretion in the selection of
the person to be appointed, discretion which
must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary
to reason, justice or equity.
While the trial court has the discretion to
appoint anyone as a special administrator of
the estate, such discretion must be exercised
with reason, guided by the directives of equity,
justice and legal principles. It may, therefore,
not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a
special administrator is to preserve the estate
until a regular administrator is appointed. As
stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules:
Section 2. Powers and duties of special
administrator. — Such special administrator shall
take possession and charge of the goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the
deceased and preserve the same for the
executors or administrator afterwards
appointed, and for that purpose may
commence and maintain suits as administrator.
He may sell only such perishable and other
property as the court orders sold. A special
administrator shall not be liable to pay any
debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the
court.
Given this duty on the part of the special
administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent
and reasonable to appoint someone interested

in preserving the estate for its eventual
distribution to the heirs. Such choice would
ensure that such person would not expose the
estate to losses that would effectively diminish
his or her share. While the court may use its
discretion and depart from such reasoning, still,
there is no logical reason to appoint a person
who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a
stranger to the deceased. To do so would be
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, the CA ruled that the trial court erred in
issuing the November 4, 2002 Order, acting with
grave abuse of discretion in appointing
Diosdado as the special administrator of
Engracia Manungas’ estate:
In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the
appointment of Florencia Avila Parreño as
Special Administrator on the ground that it
found merit in Diosdado’s contention that he is
the illegitimate child of the late Florentino
Manangus. The evidence on record shows that
Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia and
so he is not interested in preserving the latter’s
estate. On the other hand, Florencia, who is a
former Judicial guardian of Engracia when she
was still alive and who is also the niece of the
latter, is interested in protecting and preserving
the estate of her late aunt Engracia, as by doing
so she would reap the benefit of a wise
administration of the decedent’s
estate. Hence, the Order of the lower court
revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila
Parreño as special administrator constitutes not
only a reversible error, but also a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower court
exercised its power in a despotic, arbitrary or
capricious manner, as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
To reiterate, the subject of the intestate
proceedings is the estate of Engracia
Manungas. It must be remembered that the
estate of Florentino Manungas was already the
subject of intestate proceedings that have long
been terminated with the proceeds distributed
to the heirs with the issuance of a Decree of
Final Distribution.[27] With the termination of the
intestate estate proceedings of Florentino
Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of
Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of
Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to
receive any part of the Estate of Manungas. In
fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and
would have no interest in preserving its value.
33
There is no reason to appoint him as its special
administrator. The trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as
special administrator of the Estate of
Manungas. The CA correctly set aside the
November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC.
6. Charles Gotardo v. Divina Buling G.R.
No. 165166 August 15, 2012
FACTS:
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling
filed a complaint with the RTC of Maasin,
Southern Leyte, for compulsory recognition and
support pendente lite, claiming that the Charles
Gotardo is the father of her child Gliffze.
(answer) Petitioner denied the paternity.
Parties’ failed to amicably settle the dispute, the
RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings. Trial
on the merits ensued.
Evidence for Divina (casual employee) showed
that she met Charles (accounting supervisor) on
December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte
branch.
Charles courted Divina in the third week of
December 1992 and they became sweethearts
in the last week of January 1993. Charles gave
the respondent greeting cards on special
occasions, (Valentine’s Day and her birthday);
she reciprocated his love and took care of him
when he was ill.
In September 1993, Charles started intimate
sexual relations with the respondent in the
former’s rented room in the boarding house
managed by Rodulfo (Divina’s uncle). Rented
the room from March 1, 1993 to August 30, 1994.
The sexual encounters occurred twice a month
and became more frequent in June 1994;
eventually, on August 8, 1994, she got pregnant.
Charles was happy and made plans to marry
Divina. BUT, Charles backed out of the wedding
plan. (Divina filed for damages for breach of
promise to marry but was amicably settled).
Divina gave birth to Gliffze on March 9, 1995.
(When Charles did not show up and failed to
provide support to Gliffze, Divina sent him a
demand letter on July 24, 1995 for recognition
and support of their son)
Due to unanswered demand, Divina took her
demands in Court.
Charles denied being Gliffze’s father in Court.
RTC – approved monthly child support.

RTC (appeal) – reversed former decision
CA – ordered Charles to recognize Gliffze and
give monthly child support
ISSUE:
WON Gliffze is entitled to receive child support
and to be recognized as Charles’ son.
HELD: YES.
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or
illegitimate, through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned, or the
open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.32 We have held that such other
proof of one's filiation may be a “baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in
which [his] name has been entered, common
reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission
by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.”
We explained that a prima facie case exists if a
woman declares — supported by corroborative
proof — that she had sexual relations with the
putative father; at this point, the burden of
evidence shifts to the putative father. We
explained further that the two affirmative
defenses available to the putative father are:
(1) incapability of sexual relations with the
mother due to either physical absence or
impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual
relations with other men at the time of
conception.
In this case, the respondent established a prima
facie case that the petitioner is the putative
father of Gliffze through testimony that she had
been sexually involved only with one man, the
petitioner, at the time of her conception.
Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the
petitioner and the respondent had intimate
relationship.
On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny
that he had sexual encounters with the
respondent, only that it occurred on a much
later date than the respondent asserted, such
that it was physically impossible for the
respondent to have been three (3) months
pregnant already in September 1994 when he
was informed of the pregnancy.40 However,
the petitioner failed to substantiate his
34
allegations of infidelity and insinuations of
promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot
be given credence for lack of evidentiary
support. The petitioner’s denial cannot
overcome the respondent’s clear and
categorical assertions.
Since filiation is beyond question, support
follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is
obliged to support his child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate. Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of
support is variable and, for this reason, no final
judgment on the amount of support is made as
the amount shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient.47 It may be
reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support.
Proof of filiation
1. FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and MONINA JISON (G.R. No. 124853 February
24, 1998)
FACTS:
This is a case filed by one Monina Jison for
recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco
Jison who is married to Lilia Lopez Jison. MONINA
alleged that she is the daughter of FRANCISCO
who impregnated her mother Esperanza F.
Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny
of FRANCISCO's daughter. She claims that she
has openly and continuously possessed the
status of an illegitimate child of Francisco and
that Francisco had also openly and
continuously recognized her as such.
The trial court categorized Monina’s many
evidences as hearsay evidence, incredulous
evidence, or self-serving evidence and ruled
against Monina while the Court of Appeals
decided in favour of Monina and declared her
to be the illegitimate daughter of Francisco.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimonies
of Monina’s witnesses were sufficient to
establish MONINA's filiation.
ISSUE:
Did Monina successfully establish her filiation
under Article 172 par. 2 of the Family Code
(open and continuous possession of the status)?

RULING:
Yes. Under Article 175 of the Family Code,
illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be
established in the same way and on the same
evidence as that of legitimate children. The
Supreme Court sustained the findings of the CA
that Monina was able to prove her illegitimate
filiation.
For the success of an action to establish
illegitimate filiation under Article 172 par. 2, a
"high standard of proof" is required. To prove
open and continuous possession of the status of
an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of
the manifestation of the permanent intention of
the supposed father to consider the child as his,
by continuous and clear manifestations of
parental affection and care, which cannot be
attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of
such a nature that they reveal not only the
conviction of paternity, but also the apparent
desire to have and treat the child as such in all
relations in society and in life, not accidentally,
but continuously.
By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and
consistent, but does not require any particular
length of time.
In deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether
sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably
redounds to the victim's or mother's word, as
against the accused's or putative father's
protestations. In the instant case, MONINA's
mother could no longer testify as to the fact of
intercourse, as she had already passed away.
But the fact of Monina’s birth and her
parentage may be established by evidence
other than the testimony of her mother.
The testimonial evidence offered by MONINA,
woven by her narration of circumstances and
events that occurred through the years,
concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO,
coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses,
overwhelmingly established that the following:
1) FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she was
conceived at the time when her mother was in
the employ of the former;
2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child
through his overt acts and conduct like sending
her to school, paying for her tuition fees, school
uniforms, books, board and lodging at the
Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus, defraying for her
hospitalization expenses, providing her with
monthly allowance, paying for the funeral
expenses of her mother, acknowledging her
paternal greetings and calling appellant his
35
"Hija" or child, instructing his office personnel to
give appellant's monthly allowance,
recommending her to use his house in Bacolod
and paying for her long distance telephone
calls, having her spend her long distance
telephone calls, having her spend her vacation
in his apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes
residence, allowing her to use his surname in her
scholastic and other records.
3) Such recognition has been consistently
shown and manifested throughout the years
publicly, spontaneously, continuously and in an
uninterrupted manner.
The totality of the evidence on record
established Monina’s filiation.
Appeal filed by Francisco Jison was dismissed.
2. G.R. No. 141273 May 17, 2005
JOSE RIVERO, JESSIE RIVERO and AMALIA
RIVERO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
MARY JANE DY CHIAO*-DE GUZMAN, and
BENITO DY CHIAO, JR., represented by his uncle
HENRY S. DY CHIAO, respondents.
FACTS:
In behalf of her minor child, Benedick
Arevalo, her mother filed a complaint against
defendants for compulsory recognition as the
illegitimate child of their deceased father.
During trial, Mary Jane Dy-Chiao De Guzman,
one of the sisters entered a compromise
agreement with plaintiff whereby she is
acknowledging the petitioner as the illegitimate
son of her father and pay petitioner P6M as a
share in the estate of their deceased father.
RTC granted the compromised agreement.
Meanwhile, the Dy Chiao Brothers represented
by their uncle filed for the annulment of
judgment and Temporary Restraining Order for
the writ of execution of judgment and motion to
dismiss. CA directed Mary Jane on the other
hand to file a comment on the opposition of her
uncle. In her reply, she question the assailed
decision of RTC since the illegitimate filiation of
Benedick could not be the subject of a
compromise agreement. She further alleged
that the parties thereunder did not recognize
the validity of the compromise agreement, as in
fact she and the petitioners were exploring the
possibility of modifying their extrajudicial
settlement.
CA ruled in favor of the defendants, hence this
petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the compromise regarding
filiation is valid
RULING:
NO. The compromise agreement executed by
Mary Jane is null and void.
Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides
that no compromise upon the civil status of
persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and
filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship
that must be judicially established, and it is for
the court to determine its existence or
absence. It cannot be left to the will or
agreement of the parties.
Such recognition by Mary Jane, however, is
ineffectual, because under the law, the
recognition must be made personally by the
putative parent and not by any brother, sister or
relative.
3. G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE
DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO
RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA
and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely,
HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF
LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA
DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO
PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-
ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO,
BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and
CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO
DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO,
CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO
CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS,
FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and
MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-
MADARANG, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF
MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely,
GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN;
HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely,
TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ,
JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ
and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA,
SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO,
VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR.,
SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA
RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as
Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as
Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
FACTS:
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia’s
cohabitation produce no children but they
have two adopted children (not legally
adopted) namely Guillermina Rustia Rustia and
36
Nanie Rustia. During their cohabitation,
Gullermo fathered an illegitimate child,
Guillerma Rustia.
When Josefa died, Gillermo, executed a sole
adjudication of estate of Josefa and filed a
petition for acknowledgement of Guillermina
Rustia as her natural child. During the course of
petition, Guillermo died without a will.
Petitioners then filed for administration of the
estate of Josefa and Guillermo which was
opposed by the defendants. Guillerma Rustia
filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings,
claiming she was the only surviving descendant
in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the
objections of the oppositors (respondents
herein), the motion was granted.
RTC granted a decision declaring that
petitioners are the heirs of late Josefa and
Guillerma declared as the surviving heir of
Guillermo Rustia. On appeal to CA, it was
proved that there was a valid marriage
between Josefa and Guillermo and the
intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as
ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo
Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as
administratrix of his estate.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Guillerma, the illegitimate child has the
right to inherit from her father --NO
2. W/N Guillerma’s adoption is valid and
she has the right to inherit -- NO
RULING:
1. NO.
Intervenor (now co-respondent)
Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of
Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled
to successional rights only upon proof of an
admission or recognition of paternity. She,
however, claimed the status of an
acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo
Rustia only after the death of the latter on
February 28, 1974 at which time it was already
the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till
August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely
had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict
was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil
Code which granted certain successional rights
to illegitimate children but only on condition
that they were first recognized or
acknowledged by the parent.

Under the new law, recognition may be
compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition is
compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction,
when the period of the offense coincides more
or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of
status of a child of the alleged father (or
mother) by the direct acts of the latter or of his
family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the
time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence
or proof that the defendant is his father. 6
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may
be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or in any
authentic writing.
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two
grounds: first, compulsory recognition through
the open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child and second,
voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she
possessed the status of an illegitimate child from
her birth until the death of her putative father
Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not
constitute acknowledgment but a mere
ground by which she could have compelled
acknowledgment through the
courts. Furthermore, any (judicial) action for
64
compulsory acknowledgment has a dual
limitation: the lifetime of the child and the
lifetime of the putative parent.65On the death of
either, the action for compulsory recognition
can no longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor
Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory
acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of
Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
2. Guillermina Rustia Rustia was never
adopted in accordance with law.
Although a petition for her adoption
was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never
came to fruition and was dismissed
upon the latter’s death. We affirm the
ruling of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals holding her a legal
stranger to the deceased spouses
and therefore not entitled to inherit
from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem,
which [created] between two persons a
37
relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an
adoption made through the court, or in
pursuance with the procedure laid down under
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this
jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is
wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the
relation, the statutory requirements must be
strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an
absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never
presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven]
by the person claiming its existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the
claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia,
namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and
the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia,
are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under
Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are
no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of
Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants,
consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.
4. G.R. No. 150206 March 13, 2009
Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA
GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN, PEREGRINO
GABATAN, REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA
GABATAN AND JESUS JABINIS, RIORITA
GABATAN TUMALA and FREIRA
GABATAN, Petitioners,
vs. Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO
PACANA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana filed a
complaint for recovery of real property against
the heir of Teofilo Gabatan. Subject parcel of
land was owned by Juan Gabatan. She alleged
that she is the real owner of the said land having
inherited the land from her mother
(Hermogena) which is the surviving heir of Juan
Gabatan. That upon the death of her mother,
the land was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo
Gabatan. Prior to the death of her Hermogena,
demand was made to return but heirs of
petitioner failed to heed to the demand.
During trial, respondent has two conflicting birth
certificate. One submitted by respondent and
the petitioner. The birth certificate presented by
petitioner, is that the name of her mother is
Hermogena Calarito in written form while that
of respondent is Hermogena Clarito Gabatan
which is typed form. Trial court ruled in favor of
respondent. CA affirms decision of RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the filiation by respondent is duly
proved
RULING:
NO. Under the Civil Code, the filiation of
legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is
proved by the record of birth appearing in the
Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a
final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated
in the preceding article, the filiation shall be
proved by the continuous possession of status of
a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth,
authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may be
proved by any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.
Supreme Court ruled that, to prove the
relationship of respondent’s mother to Juan
Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best
evidence of such familial tie was the record of
birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an
authentic document or a final judgment. In the
absence of these, respondent should have
presented proof that her mother enjoyed the
continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. Only in the absence of these
two classes of evidence is the respondent
allowed to present other proof admissible under
the Rules of Court of her mother’s relationship to
Juan Gabatan.
However, respondent’s mother’s
(Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which would
have been the best evidence of Hermogena’s
relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never
offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did
respondent present any authentic document or
final judgment categorically evidencing
Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.
5. DELA CRUZ v. GRACIA (G.R. No. 177728. July
31, 2009)
SHORT DIGEST:
FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's
birth because the document attached to the
Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father
(AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include
the signature of the deceased father,
38
and “because he was born out of wedlock and
the father unfortunately died prior to his birth
and has no more capacity to acknowledge his
paternity to the child.” Jenie and the child
promptly filed a complaint for
injunction/registration of name against Gracia.
The trial court held that even if Dominique, the
father, was the author of the unsigned
handwritten Autobiography, the same does not
contain any express recognition of paternity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten
instrument of the deceased father of minor
Christian can be considered as a recognition of
paternity. (Yes)
RULING:
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by
RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his/her father if the latter had
previously recognized him/her as his offspring
through an admission made in a pubic of
private handwritten instrument. Article 176, as
amended, does not explicitly state that there
must be a signature by the putative father in the
private handwritten instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement
of affixing the signature of the acknowledging
parent in any private handwritten instrument
wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate
or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten
instrument is the lone piece of
evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with
the requirement that the same must
be signed by the acknowledging
parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten
instrument is accompanied by other
relevant and competent evidence, it
suffices that the claim of filiation
therein be shown to have been made
and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.
DETAILED DIGEST:
FACTS:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old
petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and
then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas

Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After
almost two months, or on November 2, 2005,
Jenie, who continued to live with Dominiques
parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner
minor child Christian Dela Cruz Aquino at the
Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.
Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth,
using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the
Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in
support of which she submitted the
child’s Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use
the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had
executed and signed, and Affidavit of
Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques
father Domingo Butch Aquino. Both affidavits
attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of
Dominique, he had continuously
acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his
paternity had never been questioned. Jenie
attached to the AUSF a document entitled
AUTOBIOGRAPHY which Dominique, during his
lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting:
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA
CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR
HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME
GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH
EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD
COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN
OUR HOUSE NOW. THATS ALL.
The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald
Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenies
application for registration of the child’s name
Jenie and the child promptly filed a
complaint for injunction/registration of name
against respondent before
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. The
complaint alleged that the denial of registration
of the child’s name is a violation of his right to
use the surname of his deceased father
under Article 176 of the Family Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9255, which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or
when an admission in a public document
or private handwritten instrument is made by
39
the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to
prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of
one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
They maintained that the Autobiography
executed by Dominique constitutes an
admission of paternity in a private handwritten
instrument within the contemplation of the
above-quoted provision of law.
The trial court held that even if Dominique was
the author of the handwritten Autobiography,
the same does not contain any express
recognition of paternity.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN
STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR
CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS
A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A PRIVATE
HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT WITHIN THE
CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY
CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH
ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS FATHERS
SURNAME
HELD: Yes.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by
R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his/her father if the latter had
expressly recognized him/her as his offspring
through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or through an admission made in a
public or private handwritten
instrument. The recognition made in any of
these documents is, in itself, a consummated
act of acknowledgment of the childs paternity;
hence, no separate action for judicial approval
is necessary.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as
amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state
that the private handwritten instrument
acknowledging the childs paternity must be
signed by the putative father. This provision
must, however, be read in conjunction with
related provisions of the Family Code which
require that recognition by the father must bear
his signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a
child through a written instrument must affix his
signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176
of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2
of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated
such requirement; it did not unduly expand the
import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special
circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques
Autobiography, though unsigned by
him, substantially satisfies the requirement of
the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to
the child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in
the Autobiography, unquestionably
handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the
facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie
proffered. Third, Jenies testimony
is corroborated by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment of Dominiques father
Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother
Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights
could be affected by the registration of the
questioned recognition of the child. These
circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity
of the child give life to his statements in his
Autobiography that JENIE DELA CRUZ is
MY WIFE as WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER
and NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE
LIVE TOGETHER.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the
earlier quoted statements in Dominiques
Autobiography have been made and written
by him. Taken together with the other relevant
facts extant herein that Dominique, during his
lifetime, and Jenie were living together as
common-law spouses for several months in 2005
at his parents’ house in Pulang-lupa,
Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant
when Dominique died on September 4, 2005;
and about two months after his death, Jenie
gave birth to the child they sufficiently establish
that the child of Jenie is Dominiques.
In view of the pronouncements herein made,
the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules
respecting the requirement of affixing the
signature of the acknowledging parent in any
40
private handwritten instrument wherein an
admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten
instrument is the lone piece of evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should
be strict compliance with the
requirement that the same must be
signed by the acknowledging parent;
and
2) Where the private handwritten
instrument is accompanied by other
relevant and competent evidence, it
suffices that the claim of filiation therein
be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging
parent as it is merely corroborative of
such other evidence.
It is the policy of the Family Code
to liberalize the rule on the investigation of
the paternity and filiation of children, especially
of illegitimate children x x x Too, (t)he State
as parens patriae affords special protection to
children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development.
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown
father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to
petitioner minor child’s best interests to allow
him to bear the surname of the now deceased
Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.
6. JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCAS G.R. No.
190710, June 6, 2011, SECOND DIVISION
(Nachura, J.)
Doctrine:
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal,
the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient
justification under the particular factual
circumstances of the case must be made
before a court may order a compulsory blood
test.
FACTS:
Jesse U. Lucas (Jesse), filed a Petition to Establish
Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). Jesse narrated his mother’s
account of her history with Jesus S. Lucas (Jesus)
and attached several copies of his personal
documents.

Though Jesus was not summoned and was not
served a copy of the petition, he nevertheless
learned of it and obtained for himself a copy.
He then filed a Special Appearance and
Comment manifesting among others that the
petition was adversarial in nature and therefore
summons should be served on him as
respondent.
Unbeknownst to Jesus on the day before he
filed his Comment, Jesse filed a Very Urgent
Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC
found to be sufficient in form and hence set the
case for hearing.
After learning of the RTC’s order, Jesus filed a
Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA
testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere
allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration,
the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse
failed to establish compliance with the four
procedural aspects for a paternity action
enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for
Reconsideration of his own which the RTC
granted. A new hearing was scheduled where
the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied
upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is
premature considering that a full-blown trial has
not yet taken place.
Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The
CA ruled in favor of Jesus, it noted that Jesse
failed to show that the four significant aspects
of a traditional paternity action had been met
and held that DNA testing should not be
allowed when the petitioner has failed to
establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a prima facie showing is
necessary before a court can issue a DNA
testing order. (Yes)
HELD:
Petition GRANTED.
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are
four significant procedural aspects in a
traditional paternity case which parties have to
face has been widely misunderstood and
misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by
these so-called procedural aspects during trial,
41
when the parties have presented their
respective evidence. They are matters of
evidence that cannot be determined at this
initial stage of the proceedings, when only the
petition to establish filiation has been filed. The
CA’s observation that petitioner failed to
establish a prima facie case—the first
procedural aspect in a paternity case—is
therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built
by a party’s evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA evidence.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted
to guide the Bench and the Bar for the
introduction and use of DNA evidence in the
judicial system. It provides the “prescribed
parameters on the requisite elements for
reliability and validity (i.e., the proper
procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory
reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the
available objections to the admission of DNA
test results as evidence as well as the probative
value of DNA evidence.” It seeks “to ensure that
the evidence gathered, using various methods
of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and
properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or
abused and, more importantly, shall continue to
ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and
protects, rather than prejudice the public.”
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on
DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions
that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and
integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states: The
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has
a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due
hearing and notice to the parties upon a
showing of the following: (a) A biological
sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The
biological sample: (i) was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to
DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA
testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d)
The DNA testing has the scientific potential to
produce new information that is relevant to the
proper resolution of the case; and (e) The
existence of other factors, if any, which the
court may consider as potentially affecting the
accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This
Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without
need of a prior court order, at the behest of any
party, including law enforcement agencies,
before a suit or proceeding is commenced.

This does not mean, however, that a DNA
testing order will be issued as a matter of right if,
during the hearing, the said conditions are
established.
Court order for blood testing equivalent to
“search” under the Constitution.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of
the DNA testing order, there must be a show
cause hearing wherein the applicant must first
present sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case or a reasonable possibility of
paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the
test. In these states, a court order for blood
testing is considered a “search,” which, under
their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in
order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a
prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was
imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a
finding of probable cause.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently
explained; “Although a paternity action is civil,
not criminal, the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is
still applicable, and a proper showing of
sufficient justification under the particular
factual circumstances of the case must be
made before a court may order a compulsory
blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have
differed regarding the kind of procedures which
are required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing
must be made before a court can
constitutionally order compulsory blood testing
in paternity cases.
We agree, and find that, as a preliminary
matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party
must show that there is a reasonable possibility
of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in
which paternity is contested and a party to the
action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood
test, a show cause hearing must be held in
which the court can determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case which warrants issuance of a court
order for blood testing.”
The same condition precedent should be
applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative
father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during
the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
7. Gotardo v. Buling 165166 15 aug 2012
42
FACTS:
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling
filed a complaint for compulsory recognition
and support pendente lite, claiming that the
petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze.
The petitioner started courting the respondent
in the third week of December 1992 and they
became sweethearts in the last week of
January 1993. Sometime in September 1993, the
petitioner started intimate sexual relations with
the respondent in the former’s rented room in
the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the
respondent’s uncle, on Tomas Oppus St.,
Agbao, Maasin, Southern Leyte. When told of
the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and
made plans to marry the respondent. They in
fact applied for a marriage license. The
petitioner even inquired about the costs of a
wedding reception and the bridal gown.
Subsequently, however, the petitioner backed
out of the wedding plans.
The respondent responded by filing a complaint
with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte for damages against the
petitioner for breach of promise to marry. Later,
however, the petitioner and the respondent
amicably settled the case. The respondent
gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995.
When the petitioner did not show up and failed
to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent
sent him a letter on July 24, 1995 demanding
recognition of and support for their child. During
the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the
respondent’s motion granted a ₱2,000.00
monthly child support, retroactive from March
1995.
THE RTC RULING
In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed
the complaint for insufficiency of evidence
proving Gliffze’s filiation. It found the
respondent’s testimony inconsistent on the
question of when she had her first sexual
contact with the petitioner, i.e., "September
1993" in her direct testimony while "last week of
January 1993"
THE CA RULING
In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed
from the RTC's appreciation of the respondent’s
testimony, concluding that the latter merely
made an honest mistake in her understanding
of the questions of the petitioner’s counsel. It
noted that the petitioner and the respondent
had sexual relationship even before August
1994; that the respondent had only one

boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to
August 1994; and that the petitioner’s allegation
that the respondent had previous relationships
with other men remained unsubstantiated. The
CA consequently set aside the RTC decision
and ordered the petitioner to recognize his
minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order
granting a ₱ 2,000.00 monthly child support.28
THE ISSUE
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible
error when it set aside the RTC’s findings and
ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide
legal support to his minor son Gliffze.
RULING
We do not find any reversible error in the CA’s
ruling.
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or
illegitimate, through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned, or the
open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.32 We have held that such other
proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in
which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission
by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court."33
In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are
four significant procedural aspects of a
traditional paternity action that parties have to
face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and
the child.35 We explained that a prima
facie case exists if a woman declares —
supported by corroborative proof — that she
had sexual relations with the putative father; at
this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the
putative father.36 We explained further that the
two affirmative defenses available to the
putative father are: (1) incapability of sexual
relations with the mother due to either physical
absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother
had sexual relations with other men at the time
of conception.37
In this case, the respondent established a prima
facie case that the petitioner is the putative
father of Gliffze through testimony that she had
43
been sexually involved only with one man, the
petitioner, at the time of her
conception.38Rodulfo corroborated her
testimony that the petitioner and the
respondent had intimate relationship.39
On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny
that he had sexual encounters with the
respondent, only that it occurred on a much
later date than the respondent asserted, such
that it was physically impossible for the
respondent to have been three (3) months
pregnant already in September 1994 when he
was informed of the pregnancy.40 However, the
petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations
of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His
allegations, therefore, cannot be given
credence for lack of evidentiary support. The
petitioner’s denial cannot overcome the
respondent’s clear and categorical assertions.
The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of
the variance between the respondent’s direct
testimony regarding their first sexual contact as
"sometime in September 1993" and her cross-
testimony when she stated that their first sexual
contact was "last week of January 1993," as
follows:
We find that the contradictions are for the most
part more apparent than real, having resulted
from the failure of the respondent to
comprehend the question posed, but this
misunderstanding was later corrected and
satisfactorily explained. Indeed, when
confronted for her contradictory statements,
the respondent explained that that portion of
the transcript of stenographic notes was
incorrect and she had brought it to the
attention of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her former
counsel) but the latter took no action on the
matter.42
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the
credibility of a witness, his testimony must be
considered in its entirety instead of in truncated
parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony
is not to consider only its isolated parts and to
anchor a conclusion based on these parts. "In
ascertaining the facts established by a witness,
everything stated by him on direct, cross and
redirect examinations must be calibrated and
considered." Evidently, the totality of the
respondent's testimony positively and
convincingly shows that no real inconsistency
exists. The respondent has consistently asserted
that she started intimate sexual relations with
the petitioner sometime in September 1993

Since filiation is beyond question, support
follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is
obliged to support his child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate. Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of
support is variable and, for this reason, no final
judgment on the amount of support is made as
the amount shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient It may be reduced
or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the
recipient and the resources or means of the
person obliged to support.
In this case, we sustain the award of ₱ 2,000.00
monthly child support, without prejudice to the
filing of the proper motion in the RTC for the
determination of any support in arrears,
considering the needs of the child, Gliffze,
during the pendency of this case.
8. PERLA V. BARING (G.R. NO. 172471;
NOVEMBER 12, 2012)
FACTS:
Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and
petitioner Antonio Perla (Antonio) were
allegedly neighbors. Eventually, they became
sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant,
Antonio allegedly assured her that he would
support her. However, Antonio started to evade
her.
Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla
(Randy), filed before the RTC a Complaint for
support against Antonio. Mirasol and Randy
thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support
Randy. During the trial, Mirasol presented
Randy’s Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal
Certificate indicating her and Antonio as
parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she
and Antonio supplied the information in the said
certificates. The RTC rendered a decision
ordering Antonio to support Randy, which was
affirmed by CA.
ISSUE:
Is Randy entitled for support from Antonio?
HELD:
Mirasol and Randy's Complaint for support is
based on Randy's alleged illegitimate filiation to
Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for
support, his filiation must be established with
44
sufficient certainty. The Court has ruled that a
high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for x xx support
may create an unwholesome situation or may
be an irritant to the family or the lives of the
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity
or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.
In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy failed to
establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio.
The Certificate of Live Birth and baptismal
certificate of Randy have no probative value to
establish Randy’s filiation to Antonio since the
latter had not signed the same. A certificate of
live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate. Also, while a baptismal certificate
may be considered a public document, it can
only serve as evidence of the administration of
the sacrament on the date specified but not
the veracity of the entries with respect to the
child's paternity. Thus, x xx baptismal certificates
are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of
filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly
as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when
affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court.
However, this rule admits of certain exceptions
such as when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures or when
the judgment of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts. As this case falls
under these exceptions, the Court is
constrained to re-examine the factual findings
of the lower courts.
9. Jesse U. Lucas V. Jesus S. Lucas, G.R. No.
190710, June 6, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to
Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he
is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted
with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He
also submitted documents which include (a)
petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b)
petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c)
petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he
graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio
City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his
Certificate of Graduation from the same school;
(e) Certificate of Recognition from the University
of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f)

clippings of several articles from different
newspapers about petitioner, as a musical
prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special
Appearance and Comment manifesting that
the petition was adversarial in nature and
therefore summons should be served on him.
Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to
Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to
be sufficient in form and hence set the case for
hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing
cannot be had on the basis of a mere
allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration,
the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse
failed to establish compliance with the four
procedural aspects for a paternity action
enumerated in the case of Herrera
v. Alba namely, a prima facie
case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for
Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new
hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that
ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for
filing the instant petition is premature
considering that a full-blown trial has not yet
taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC.
He then filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in
favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to
show that the four significant aspects of a
traditional paternity action had been met and
held that DNA testing should not be allowed
when the petitioner has failed to establish a
prima facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether a prima facie showing is necessary
before a court can issue a DNA testing order
HELD:
Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack
ofa prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for
DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet,
been presented by petitioner.
RATIO:
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that
there are four significant procedural aspects in
a traditional paternity case which parties have
45
to face has been widely misunderstood and
misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by
these so-called procedural aspects during trial,
when the parties have presented their
respective evidence. They are matters of
evidence that cannot be determined at this
initial stage of the proceedings, when only the
petition to establish filiation has been filed. The
CA’s observation that petitioner failed to
establish a prima facie case is therefore
misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a
party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in
the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely
provides for conditions that are aimed to
safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the
DNA testing. It states that the
appropriate court may, at any time, either
motu proprio or on application of any person,
who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall
issue after due hearing and notice to the parties
upon a showing of the following: (a) A
biological sample exists that is relevant to the
case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not
previously subjected to the type of DNA testing
now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected
to DNA testing, but the results may
require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The
DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential
to produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The
existence of other factors, if any, which
the court may consider as potentially affecting
the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This
Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without
need of a prior court order, at the behest of any
party, including law enforcement agencies,
before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This
does not mean, however, that a DNA testing
order will be issued as a matter of right if, during
the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the
DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first present
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or
“good cause” for the holding of the test. In
these states, a court order for blood testing is
considered a “search,” which, under their
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by
a finding of probable cause in order to be valid.
Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case,
or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of
probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions

have differed regarding the kind of procedures
which are required, but those jurisdictions have
almost universally found that a preliminary
showing must be made before a court can
constitutionally order compulsory blood testing
in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as
a preliminary matter, before the court may issue
an order for compulsory blood testing, the
moving party must show that there is a
reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is
contested and a party to the action refuses to
voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause
hearing must be held in which the court can
determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case which warrants
issuance of a court order for blood testing The
same condition precedent should be applied in
our jurisdiction to protect the putative father
from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the
hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.”
10. Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248 ,
February 18, 2014
FACTS:
Grace Grande and respondent Patricio
Antonio for a period lived together as husband
and wife, although Antonio was at that time
already married to someone else. Out of this
illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre
Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick
(on October 13, 1999). The children were not
expressly recognized by respondent as his own
in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil
Registry. The parties’ relationship, however,
eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the
United States with her two children in May 2007.
This prompted respondent Antonio to file a
Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition
with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental
Physical Custody, Correction/Change of
Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ
of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC),
appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary
Recognition of Paternity of the children.
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a
Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio.
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for
reconsideration. However, her motion was
denied by the trial court.
46
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the
CA attributing grave error on the part of the
RTC.
CA partially granted the appeal. It ratiocinated
that notwithstanding the father’s recognition of
his children, the mother cannot be deprived of
her sole parental custody over them absent the
most compelling of reasons. Since respondent
Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande
committed any act that adversely affected the
welfare of the children or rendered her
unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be
deprived of her sole parental custody over their
children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that
the legal consequence of the recognition
made by respondent Antonio that he is the
father of the minors, taken in conjunction with
the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-
child" clause, compels the use by the children
of the surname "ANTONIO."
Not satisfied with the CA's Decision, petitioner
Grande interposed a partial motion for
reconsideration. Her motion was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE:
The sole issue at hand is WON the father has the
right to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their
filiation.
RULING:
Yes.
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation... has
been expressly recognized by their father
through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father.
Provided, the father has the right to institute an
action before the regular courts to prove non-
filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis
supplied.)... the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or
her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255
is, in case his or her filiation is expressly
recognized by the father through the... record

of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. In
such a situation, the illegitimate child may use
the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition
for judicial approval of recognition of the
filiation of the two children. With the prayer for
the correction or change of the surname of the
minors from Grande to Antonio when a public
document acknowledged before a notary
public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court [15] is enough to establish the paternity of
his children. However, he wanted more: a
judicial conferment of parental authority,
parental custody, and an official declaration of
his children's surname as Antonio.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to
decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father (herein
respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner)
who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate... children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law
is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be
taken to mean what it says and it must be given
its literal meaning free from any
interpretation.[16] Respondent's position that
the court can order the minors to... use his
surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from
ambiguity. In addition, where there is no
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use
of the word "may" in the provision readily shows
that an acknowledged illegitimate child is
under no compulsion to use the surname of his...
illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive
and operates to confer discretion [17] upon the
illegitimate children.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the
IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear,
unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in
Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate
father’s surname discretionary controls, and
illegitimate children are given the choice on the
surnames by which they will be known.
Now, we take note of the letters submitted by
the children, now aged thirteen (13) and fifteen
(15) years old, to this Court declaring their
opposition to have their names changed to
"Antonio."26 However, since these letters were
not offered before and evaluated by the trial
court, they do not provide any evidentiary
weight to sway this Court to rule for or against
47
petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and
evaluation of the evidence of, the children's
choice of surname by the trial court is
necessary.
Compulsory recognition
1. People vs. Magtibay, G.R. No. 142985. Aug. 6,
2002
FACTS:
On September 15, 1997, at about 8:00 in the
evening in Barangay Sagana, Bongabong,
Oriental Mindoro, Rachelle went to the store of
Ka Emma Hernandez, about 40 meters from
their house to buy cigarette and ice. When she
got to the store, she saw accused-appellant
standing there. She noticed that the latter kept
staring at her. On her way home, when she was
some distance from the store, Raymundo
Magtibay approached her and pulled her right
hand. He covered her mouth and told her that
he will kill her if she tried to shout for help.
Raymundo made her lie on a grassy place and
removed her shorts and panties. He then
undressed, placed himself on top of Rachelle
and inserted his penis into her vagina. Because
of Raymundo threat on her life, Rachelle kept
silent about the incident. It was not until she
became pregnant that she was constrained to
tell her mother what happened. She eventually
gave birth to a baby boy.
ISSUE:
Can a person convicted of rape be ordered to
support the victim’s child?
RULING:
Yes. A person convicted of rape be ordered to
support the victim’s child.
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides
for three kinds of civil liability that may be
imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b)
acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the
law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in
every case to support the offspring. With the
passage of the Family Code, the classification
of acknowledged natural children and natural
children by legal fiction was eliminated and
they now fall under the specie of illegitimate
children. Since parental authority is vested by
Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother
and considering that an offender sentenced to
reclusion perpetua automatically loses parental
authority over his children, no further positive
act is required of the parent as the law itself
provides for the child’s status. Raymundo should
only be ordered to indemnify and support the

Rachelle’s child. However, the amount and
terms of support shall be determined by the trial
court after due notice and hearing in
accordance with Article 201 of the Family
Code. Therefore, a person convicted of rape
be ordered to support the victim’s child.
2. People v Abella, G.R. No. 177295, January 6,
2010
DOCTRINE:
The court also accord high respect to the ruling
of the trial court, as well as to the appellate
court's deference thereto, that the accused-
appellant was the biological father of the two-
year old daughter of AAA as a result of the rape
incident and in view of their "striking facial
similarities and features." The order to
acknowledge and support accused-
appellant's offspring is in accordance with
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
“That sometime on December 1999, in the
afternoon, at Barangay San Vicente,
Municipality of Pamplona, Province of
Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, while armed with "Balisong"
and under the influence of liquor, by means of
force and intimidation and with lewd design,
did then and there willfully and feloniously enter
the house of herein complainant and then and
there have sexual intercourse with AAA, a
woman of feeble mind, against her will to her
damage and prejudice. AAA later knew that
she was pregnant. She then subsequently
confided her situation to her mother that the
appellant raped her. Her mother then assisted
her in the institution the action.”
The RTC ruled in favor of AAA and dismissed the
averments that the appellees are only doing it
for ill motive and revenge since no mother will
ever put her daughter in shame just to pay
vindication for a family dispute. Further, the
positive identification of the victim of her
assailant is more powerful than the alibis and
denials of the accused.
On appeal, the CA affirmed. The CA
summarized the evidence of the parties as
follows:
Dr. Emelito Alegre, a radiologist and sonologist,
testified that he had conducted an ultrasound
examination on AAA on 10 July 2000. Through
the conduct of the necessary measurements
and ultrasound examination, he confirmed
48
AAA’s pregnancy. At the time of the
examination, AAA was already 30.7 weeks
pregnant.
During the last examination on 24 July 2000,
AAA looked depressed and claimed that her
baby was moving.
AAA testified that she knew the appellant
personally since he was a child because they
lived in the same neighborhood. xxx
Continuing with her narration, AAA stated that
several months after the incident, her stomach
became big. Thinking that she was just ill, she
drank some bitter solution upon her mother’s
instruction. As her stomach continued to grow,
AAA was forced to tell her mother about the
rape incident. Thereafter, AAA consulted a
doctor who confirmed that she was pregnant.
Consequently she gave birth to a baby girl.
BBB, AAA’s mother, on the other hand, testified
that the appellant is the cousin of her husband.
She claimed that she noticed her daughter
becoming pale and thinner. She also noticed
that AAA’s stomach was getting bigger and
thus decided to bring her to a doctor, who in
turn informed her that her daughter might be
pregnant. An ultrasound examination
confirmed that AAA was indeed pregnant. BBB
then asked her daughter who was responsible
for her pregnancy, AAA replied that it was the
appellant.
BBB further claimed that prior to the
confirmation of the pregnancy, the appellant
had given her some mahogany seeds which he
said AAA should take so that she will have her
menstruation. But since the mahogany seeds
made AAA weaker, BBB discontinued it and
decided to consult a doctor instead. Upon
learning that it was the appellant who had
raped her daughter, BBB immediately reported
the matter to the Municipal Hall of Pamplona.
Thereafter, the appellant was arrested.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in affirming the decision of
the RTC.
RULING:
No.
In the case before us, the prosecution has
established beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of
AAA, a demented person, through force, threat
or intimidation. AAA was psychiatrically
evaluated as an adult woman with the mental
 49

age of a 7 to 8-year old child and that she gave ISSUE:

birth to a child despite her mental inability to
give her consent to a sexual relationship. These
facts support the allegation of sexual abuse.
AAA also identified without uncertainty the
accused-appellant as her attacker and related
distinctly that he forcibly laid her down, held her
at knifepoint, and sexually abused her.
Well-settled is the doctrine that the lower court's
assessment of the credibility of a witness is
accorded great respect owing to its direct
opportunity to observe the latter's demeanor
during trial.
The court also accorded high respect to the
ruling of the trial court, as well as to the
appellate court's deference thereto, that the
accused-appellant was the biological father of
the two-year old daughter of AAA as a result of
the rape incident and in view of their "striking
facial similarities and features." The order to
acknowledge and support accused-
appellant's offspring is in accordance with
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code.
WON the 3 children can be considered
legitimate.
HELD:
The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any
way be considered legitimate since the time
they were born, there was an existing valid
marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only
natural children can be legitimated. Children
born outside of wedlock of parents, who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other, are natural.
Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only
children conceived and born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified
by any impediment to marry each other may
be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be
destroyed;

LEGITIMATED CHILDREN 2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in

terms of successional rights;
Who may be legitimated
3) There will be the problem of public scandal,
Abadilla vs Tabiliran, 249 SCRA 447 AM No. MTJ- unless social mores change;
92-716, October 25, 1995
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of
FACTS: legitimation to adulterous children as it will
destroy the sanctity of marriage;
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a
complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the 5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the
grounds of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, parents marry many years after the birth of the
and corruption unbecoming of a judge. With child.
respect to the charge on gross immorality, she
contended that the judge scandalously and
publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan
during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita
Banzuela. Tabiliran and Priscilla got married in
May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to
the charge on deceitful conduct, petitioner
claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate
children with Priscilla be registered as
“legitimate” by falsely executing separate
affidavits stating the delayed registration was
due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or
oversight when in fact, he knew these children
cannot be legally registered as legitimate. The
judge averred that 25 years had already
elapsed since the disappearance of her wife in
1966 when he married Priscilla hence the
cohabitation was neither bigamous nor
immoral. However, as early as 1970, based on
the record, Priscilla had begotten her 3 children
(1970, 1971 and 1975).