ISIDRO BAMBALAN vs GERMAN MARAMBA

G.R. No. L-27710 January 30, 1928

Facts:

Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner, with Torrens title, of the land here in question and that the plaintiff is the
sole and universal heir of the said deceased Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura, as regards the said land.

The plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed said document, yet he did so by intimidation made upon his
mother Paula Prado by the defendant Genoveva Muerong, who threatened the former with imprisonment. While the
evidence on this particular point does not decisively support the plaintiff's allegation, this document, however, is vitiated
to the extent of being void as regards the said plaintiff, for the reason that the latter, at the time he signed it, was a
minor, which is clearly shown by the record and it does not appear that it was his real intention to sell the land in
question.

Issue: Whether the sale of the land to Maramaba and Muerong is valid being the seller as minor.

Ruling: No, the sale is void as to the plaintiff.

Even supposing that the document in question embodies all of the requisites prescribed by law for its efficacy, yet it
does not bind the land and would only be a valid contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the
register of deeds to make the proper registration, inasmuch as it is the registration that gives validity to the transfer
(section 50 of Act No. 496). Therefore, the defendants did not acquire any right to the property sold as much less, the
vendor Isidro Bambalan y Prado, the herein plaintiff, was a minor.

As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein
the minor was held to be estopped from contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be age, is not applicable
herein. In the case now before us the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age; his minority was well known to the
purchaser, the defendant, who was the one who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula used in the acknowledgment of
the document.

SIA SUAN and GAW CHIAO vs RAMON ALCANTARA

G.R. No. L-1720 March 4, 1950

Facts:
On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons Damaso Alcantara and Ramon
Alcantara conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land. Ramon Alcantara was then 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old.
On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from Francisco Alfonso, attorney of Ramon
Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was a minor and accordingly disavowing the contract. After
being contacted by Gaw Chiao, however, Ramon Alcantara executed an affidavit in the office of Jose Gomez, attorney
of Gaw Chiao, wherein Ramon Alcantara ratified the deed of sale. On said occasion Ramon Alcantara received from
Gaw Chiao the sum of P500. In the meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots to Nicolas Azores from whom Antonio
Azores inherited the same.

On August 8, 1940, an action was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the Court of First Instance of Laguna for the
annulment of the deed of sale, on the ground that the deed of sale is not binding against Ramon Alcantara in view of
his minority on the date of its execution.

Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Sale is null and void.

Ruling: NO, Ramon Alcantara in his minority may not be allowed to execute the deed of sale but his act of ratification,
the contract was given a binding effect.
Under the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado vs Espiritu (37 Phil 215) to bind a minor who represents himself
to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with a cash, as long as the contract is supported
by a valid consideration. Preexisting indebtedness is a valid consideration which produces its full force and effect, in
the absence of any other vice that may legally invalidate the sale.

The circumstance that, about one month after the date of the conveyance, Ramon informed Sia and her husband of
his minority, is of no moment, because Ramon’s previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from
disavowing the contract.

In the Matter of the Claim for Attorney’s Fees. CLARO M. RECTO vs ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN and
FRED M. HARDEN
G.R. No. L-6897. November 29, 1956

Facts:

Esperanza Harden (American) engaged the services of Atty. Claro M. Recto. They executed a contract of professional
services. The engagement was for the protection of Mrs. Harden’s interest over the conjugal properties while pending
petition for divorce obtained and filed abroad. The husband is also an American.

It was agreed that the compensation of Atty. Recto will consists of 20% of the share in the conjugal partnership upon
liquidation.

Atty. Recto complied with the agreement. He filed several actions and secured judgments in favor of Mrs. Harden.
However, without the knowledge, advise, and consent of Atty. Recto as counsel for Mrs. Harden, the Spouses Harden
had purportedly agreed to settle.

Atty. Recto now wants to collect fees for the services he rendered. However, as a defense, the Harden spouses argue
that the contract's object was unlawful, divorce being not allowed in the Philippines, so it is invalid, thus, Atty. Recto
cannot enforce it against them.

Issue: Whether Recto could enforce the agreement.

Ruling: YES. The contract of services between Mrs. Harden and Atty. Recto is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.

Its purpose was NOT to secure a divorce, or to facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to
protect the interest of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership during the pendency of a divorce suit she intended to
file in the US. What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are admittedly citizens of the US, their status and the
dissolution thereof are governed – pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines
at the time of the execution of the contract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines – the laws
of the US, which sanctions divorce.

Moreover, divorce can be granted to Spouses Harden, they being nationals of country whose laws allow divorce
following the nationality principle in determining the status and dissolution of the marriage.