POLI REV 1 CASE DIGEST (August 14, 2019)

Javellana v. Executive Sec

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 Lansang v. Garcia
(42 SCRA 448) (December 11, 1971) (Concepcion,C.J.) (Section 1, Article VIII, Expanded Jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court)

G.R. No. L-33964

PETITIONER: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO

LANSANG RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA

RESPONDENT: BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine

Constabulary

G.R. No. L-33965

PETITIONER: ROGELIO V. ARIENDA

RESPONDENT: SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, and CHIEF, PHIL. CONSTABULARY

G.R. No. L-33973

PETITIONER: LUZVIMINDA DAVID

RESPONDENT: GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine Constabulary,

COL. N. C. CAMELLO, in his capacity as Chief of Staff, Philippine Constabulary and HON.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE in his capacity as Secretary, Department of National defense

G.R. No. L-33982

PETITIONER: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NEMESIO E.

PRUDENTE FELICIDAD G. PRUDENTE

RESPONDENT: GENERAL MANUEL YAN, GEN. EDU GARCIA

G.R. No. L-34004

PETITIONER: IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF

OF GERARDO TOMAS, ALSO KNOWN AS "GERRY TOMAS" AND FOR RETURN OF
DOCUMENTS ILLEGALLY SEIZED. DOMINGO E. DE LARA, in his capacity as Chairman,
Committee on Legal Assistance, Philippine Bar Association

RESPONDENT: BRIG. GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE

CONSTABULARY, respondent.

G.R. No. L-34013

PETITIONER: REYNALDO RIMANDO

RESPONDENT: BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief of the Philippine Constabulary

G.R. No. L-34039

PETITIONER: IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF

OF SGT. FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO AND HIS WIFE, MRS. BARCELISA C. DE CASTRO.

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CARLOS C. RABAGO, in his capacity as President of the Conference Delegates
Association of the Philippines (CONDA)

RESPONDENT: BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary

G.R. No. L-34265

PETITIONER: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTOLIN

ORETA, JR. ANTOLIN ORETA, JR.

RESPONDENT: GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA and COL. PROSPERO OLIVAS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-34339

PETITIONER: GARY B. OLIVAR, assisted by his father, GEORGE OLIVAR

RESPONDENT: GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine Constabulary,

et al.,

SUMMARY: Pres. Marcos issued a proclamation suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus. Certain
individuals assailed its validity/constitutionality. The SC by virtue of its power to review finds that
the suspension is Constitutional and upholds its validity.

DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to annul the same if no legal ground could be
established.
FACTS:
On the evening of August 21, 1971, two grenades were thrown while the Liberal Party of the
Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila killing 8 persons and injuring
many.

On August 23 then President Marcos issued Proclamation No.889 (dated August 21,1971), the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Herein petitioners were apprehended by members of the
Philippine Constabulary having invoked the said proclamation. In effect the proclamation implies
that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension of the writ
belongs to the President and it expressly states that such declaration is deemed final and
conclusive upon the courts and all other persons

Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed, in the above-entitled cases, by the petitioners, who,
having been arrested without a warrant therefor and then detained, upon the authority of said
proclamation, assail its validity, as well as that of their detention

August 30: the president issued proclamation 889-A, amending the previous proclamation.

September 18: proclamation 889-B issued; lifting the suspension on selected provinces/cities.

September 25: proclamation 889-C issued; lifting the suspension on selected provinces/cities.

October 4: proclamation 889-D issued; same as 889-C on selected areas. 18 provinces, 2 sub-
provinces and 18 cities are still under the suspension of writ of habeas corpus

ISSUE/S: Whether the Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual
bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ; Whether or not
the suspension is constitutional

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RULING:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as amended,
and that, accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional;
xxx

RATIO:

The grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The precept in the
Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. "the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended ...." It is only by way of exception that it permits the
suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" — or, under Art VII of
the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" — "when the public safety requires it, in any of which
events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such
suspension shall exist."

Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus under specified conditions. It goes hand in hand with the system of checks and
balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but
only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this
respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.

In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check — not to supplant —
the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he had gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.

According to the Supreme Court, the existence of a rebellion is obvious, so much so that counsel
for several petitioners herein have admitted it.

Considering that the President was in possession of the above data (uprising, bombing,
assasination incidents, etc.), the Court is not prepared to hold that the Executive had acted
arbitrarily or gravely abused his discretion when he then concluded that public safety and national
security required the suspension of the privilege of the writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike
simultaneously with violent demonstrations staged by the two hundred forty-five (245) KM
chapters, all over the Philippines, with the assistance and cooperation of the dozens of CPP front
organizations, and the bombing or water mains and conduits, as well as electric power plants and
installations — a possibility which, no matter how remote, he was bound to forestall, and a danger
he was under obligation to anticipate and arrest.

The President had consulted his advisers and sought their views. He had reason to feel that the
situation was critical — as, indeed, it was — and demanded immediate action. This he took
believing in good faith that public safety required it. And, in the light of the circumstances adverted
to above, he had substantial grounds to entertain such belief.

In view of the foregoing, it does not appear that the President has acted arbitrary in issuing
Proclamation No. 889, as amended, nor that the same is unconstitutional.

DOMINADOR R. AYTONA v. ANDRES V. CASTILLO, ET AL.

January 19, 1962 | Bengzon, CJ, J. | Expanded Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

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 PETITIONER: DOMINADOR R. AYTONA

RESPONDENTS: ANDRES V. CASTILLO, ET AL.

SUMMARY: Aytona (by Garcia) and Castillo (by Macapagal) were both appointed as Governor of Central
Bank. However, by virtue of the AO no. 2 (issued by Macapagal) revoked all ad interim appointments of
then Pres. Garcia. This AO is now being questioned because once an appointee has qualified, it cannot
anymore be reconsidered. Thus, this petition of quo warranto proceeding filed by Aytona against Castillo.

DOCTRINE: The Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an appointment has been
issued, it cannot be reconsidered, specially where the appointee has qualified. But none of them refer to
mass ad interim appointments, where the authorities admit of exceptional circumstances justifying
revocation and if any circumstances justify revocation, those described herein should fit the exception
(actions which detract from that degree of good faith, morality and propriety which form the basic foundation
of claims to equitable relief). Thus, This Court resolves that it must decline to disregard the Presidential
Administrative Order No. 2, cancelling such "midnight" or "last-minute" appointments.

FACTS: On December 29, 1961, Late Pres. Carlos Garcia appointed Dominador Aytina as ad
interim Governor of the Central bank. Then, on December 30, 1961, at noon, President-elect
Diosdado Macapagal assumed office, to which on December 31, 1961, he issued Administrative
Order No. 2 (AO no.2) recalling withdrawing and cancelling all ad interim appointment made by
Pres. Garcia. On January 1, 1962, Pres. Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim
Governor of the Central Bank, and the latter qualified immediately. On January 2, 1962, both
appointed exercised the powers of their office. However, the next day and thereafter, Aytona was
definitely prevented from holding office in the Central Bank.

Aytona, then, instituted a quo warranto proceeding challenging Castillo’s right to exercise the powers
of Governor of the Central Bank, fo he claimed that he was validly appointed, had qualified for the
post, and the subsequent appointment and qualification of Castillo was void.

But Castillo argued that the appointment of Ayton, as well as the other 350 midnight appointment
by Garcia, had been revoked by the AO no, 2 of Macapagal due to the following reasons:

(1) the outgoing President should have refrained from filling vacancies to give the new President
opportunity to consider names in the light of his new policies, which were approved by the electorate
in the last elections;

(2) these scandalously hurried appointments in mass do not fall within the intent and spirit of the
constitutional provision authorizing the issuance of ad interim appointments;

(3) the appointments were irregular, immoral and unjust, because they were issued only upon the
condition that the appointee would immediately qualify obviously to prevent a recall or revocation by
the incoming President, with the result that those deserving of promotion or appointment who
preferred to be named by the new President declined and were by-passed; and

(4) the abnormal conditions surrounding the appointment and qualifications evinced a desire on the
part of the outgoing President merely subvert the policies of the incoming administration.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not the new President had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad
interim appointments made by past President, even after the appointees had already qualified, and
that the quo warranto proceeding shall be dismissed because of such power. – YES

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RULING: Wherefore, the Court exercising its judgment and discretion in the matter, hereby
dismiss the action (quo warranto proceeding).

RATIO: This Court resolves that it must decline to disregard the Presidential Administrative Order
No. 2, cancelling such "midnight" or "last-minute" appointments.

Of course, the Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an appointment has been
issued, it cannot be reconsidered, specially where the appointee has qualified. But none of them
refer to mass ad interim appointments (350), issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief Executive,
in a setting similar to that outlined herein. On the other hand, the authorities admit of exceptional
circumstances justifying revocation and if any circumstances justify revocation, those described
herein should fit the exception.

Incidentally, it should be stated that the underlying reason for denying the power to revoke after the
appointee has qualified is the latter's equitable rights. Yet it is doubtful if such equity might be
successfully set up in the present situation, considering the rush conditional appointments, hurried
maneuvers and other happenings detracting from that degree of good faith, morality and propriety
which form the basic foundation of claims to equitable relief.

Furthermore, it is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the election of President
Macapagal, Pres. Garcia was no more than a "care-taker" administration. Pres. Garcia was duty
bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do
acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. In this case,
the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few
hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter
as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill
all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new
administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.

Normally, when the President makes appointments the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, he has benefit of their advice. Where the Commission on Appointments that will
consider the appointees is different from that existing at the time of the appointment and where the
names are to be submitted by successor, who may not wholly approve of the selections, the
President should be doubly careful in extending such appointments. Now, it is hard to believe that
in signing 350 appointments in one night, President Garcia exercised such "double care" which was
required and expected of him; and therefore, there seems to be force to the contention that these
appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision granting to the Executive
authority to issue ad interim appointments.

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In re Saturnino Bermudez

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 Collector of Internal Revenue v. Antonio Campos Rueda
October 29, 1971 | Fernando, J. | Definition of a State

PETITIONER: THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE

RESPONDENTS: ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA

SUMMARY: The estate of the deceased Maria Cerdeira (Spanish national by reason of her marriage to a
Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco up to the time of her death) is being assessed by
the CIR with state and inheritance taxes of ₱369,383.96 on her intangible personal properties in the
Philippines. Antonio Campos Rueda, administrator of the estate, filed an amended return stating that
intangible personal properties worth ₱396,308.90 should be exempted from taxes.

CIR denied the request saying that there was not reciprocity with Tangier which is NOT A FOREIGN
COUNTRY.
Thus, exemption under Section 122 of the NIRC does not apply.

On appeal, CTA reversed the CIR’s action holding that Tangier is a foreign country and that it need not
acquire international personality for it to be considered a “foreign country”.

The SC upheld the CTA decision ruling that Tangier is foreign country since it met the following requisites:
(a) politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of
nationhood; (b) legally supreme within its territory; (c) acting through a government functioning under a
regime of law.

DOCTRINE: A state need not acquire international personality for it to be recognized as a foreign country.
As long as it has people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its
government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international
personality.

FACTS:

1. Antonio Campos Rueda is the administrator of the estate of the deceased Maria Cerdeira.
2. Cerdeira is a Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a
resident of Tangier, Morocco up to her death.

3. At the time of her demise she left, among others, intangible personal properties in the
Philippines.

4. The CIR then issued an assessment for state and inheritance taxes of ₱369,383.96. Rueda
filed an amended return stating that intangible personal properties worth ₱396,308.90 should
be exempted from taxes.

CIR: The CIR denied the request on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section
122 (now Section 104) of the National Internal Revenue Code. There was no reciprocity [with
Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country.

Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code provides as follows:

"That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the
decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his
death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person
property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign
country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption
from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property
owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country."

The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
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CTA: The CTA reversed the action taken by petitioner CIR. The CTA held that requisites of
statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an international
personality, NEED NOT BE MET for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122
of the National Internal Revenue Code.

The CTA stated that the foreign country mentioned in Section 122 "refers to a government of that
foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not
impose transfer or death upon intangible person properties of our citizens not residing therein, or
whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier
should have been recognized by our Government order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption
benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax Code.”

Hence, this appeal to the SC by the petitioner, CIR.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acquisition of international personality is a condition sine qua non to Tangier
being considered a "foreign country" in order for the exemption to apply (Simply put – Whether or
not Tangier is considered a “foreign country” for the exemption to apply)

RULING:

The SC upheld the decision of the CTA.

Acquisition of international personality is not required. Tangier is a foreign country. Thus, since
Tangier laws provide for a similar exemption, the reciprocity requirement is met. The intangible
personal properties should be exempted from taxes

RATIO:

The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code. It reads thus: "That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal
property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the
time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible
person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign
country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from
transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by
citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country."

It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line
with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of
outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through
a government functioning under a regime of law. A foreign country is thus a sovereign person with
the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the
legal competence to exact obedience to its commands. The stress is on its being a nation, its people
occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its
sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality.

Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, the CIR has not
successfully made out a case. The Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality,
like Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall under this exempt
category.

US v. DORR

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FACTS:

Fred L. Dorr and a number of other persons (Dorr, et al.) were convicted of violating Section 8 of
Act No. 292 which punishes the utterance of "seditious words or speeches" and the writing,
publication, or circulation of "scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands" or other libels against the same entities which (1) "tend
to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office", (2) "tend to instigate others to cabal
or meet together for unlawful purposes", (3) "suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots", or
(4) "tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community,
the safety, and order of the Government". The same provision also punishes the deliberate
concealment of the aforementioned acts.

The following are part of the article:

“…the Civil Commission has, in its distribution of offices, constituted a protectorate over a set of
men who should be in jail or deported…xxx…this kind of foolish work that the Commission is doing
all over the Island, reinstating insurgents and rogues and turning down the men who have during
struggle, at the risk of their lives, aided the Americans.”

“The commission has exalted to the highest position in the Islands Filipinos who are alleged to be
notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no personal character”.

“it is a notorious fact that many branches of the Government organized by the Civil Commission are
rotten and corrupt…xxx”.

Article 292, section 8 has provided modes for committing an offense against it. However, albeit the
article has a virulent attack against the policy of the Civil Commission, the complaint in question
cannot be regarded as having a tendency to produce anything like what may be called disaffection
or a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient
to the laws.

There is a question as how the term “the Insular Government of the Phil. Islands”, is used in Section
8, Art. 292. Is it defined as “the existing law and institutions of the Islands” or “the aggregate of the
individuals by whom the government of the Islands is administered”?

ISSUE: Whether the Article published by the respondents is in violation of the Art. 292 for it directly
attacks the U.S. government and the Insular Government of the Phil. Island?

RULING:

In modern political science, the term government is defined as “the institution or aggregate of
institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules…xxx…the
government is the aggregation of authorities which rule a society (administration)”.[1]

On the other hand, the Sedition Act of 1798, the term ‘government’ is used in an abstract sense
(e.q. President, Congress), meaning the existing political system, its laws and institutions. The Court
opines that it is in this sense that the term is used in the enactment (Art. 292) under consideration.

Hence, in Art. 292, the meaning of “Insular of the Government of the Phil. Islands” is the government
as a system, however, the article in questions attacks the ‘government’ as the aggregate of public
officials who run it.
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The Court ruled that the article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system of the
U.S., by which the authority of the U.S. is enforced in these Islands per se. In this case, it is the
character of men who are entrusted with the administration of the government which the writer wants
to bring disrepute due to their motives, public integrity, and private morals and wisdoms of their
policy. The publication does not constitute any seditious tendency being apparent to be in violation
of Art. 292.

Respondents were acquitted.

Kawananaka v. Polybank

April 8, 1907 Mr. Justice Holmes State Immunity

Facts:

This is an appeal from a decree affirming a decree of foreclosure and sale under a mortgage
executed by the appellants to the appellee, Sister Albertina. The defendants (appellants) pleaded
to the jurisdiction that after the execution of the mortgage, a part of the mortgaged land had been
conveyed by them to one Damon, and by Damon to the territory of Hawaii, and was now part of a
public street. The bill originally made the territory a party, but the territory demurred and the
plaintiffs dismissed their bill as to it before the above plea was argued. Then the plea was
overruled, and after answer and hearing the decree of foreclosure was made, the appellants
having saved their rights. The decree excepted from the sale the land conveyed to the territory,
and directed a judgment for the sum remaining due in case the proceeds of the sale were
insufficient to pay the debt.

The appellants contend that the owners of the equity of redemption in all parts of the mortgage
land must be joined, and that no deficiency judgment should be entered until all the mortgaged
premises have been sold. In aid of their contention they argue that the territory of Hawaii is liable
to suit like a municipal corporation, irrespective of the permission given by its statutes, which does
not extend to this case. They liken the territory to the District of Columbia and point out that it has
been a party to suits that have been before this court.

Issue: WON state can be sued? NO

HELD:

A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends.

As the ground is thus logical and practical, the doctrine is not confined to powers that are
sovereign in the full sense of juridical theory, but naturally is extended to those that, in actual
administration, originate and change at their will the law of contract and property,from which
persons within the jurisdiction derive their rights. A suit presupposes that the defendants are
subject to the law invoked. Of course it cannot be maintained unless they are so. But that is not
the case with a territory of the United States, because the territory itself is the fountain from which
rights ordinarily flow. It is true that Congress might intervene, just as, in the case of a state, the
Constitution does, and the power that can alter the Constitution might. But the rights that exist are
not created by Congress or the Constitution, except to the extent of certain limitations of power.
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The District of Columbia is different, because there the body of private rights is created and
controlled by Congress, and not by a legislature of the District. But for the territory of Hawaii it is
enough to refer to the organic act.

Garcia v. Chief of Staff

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 The Holy See v. Rosario

THE HOLY SEE, petitioner,

THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.

FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy
See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land
was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who
exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales
Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were
unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales
Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent
corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent,
subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales
Enterprises, Inc

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were
unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales
Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent
corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent,
subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money

ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.

HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As
expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are
adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our
admission in the society of nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy
shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action
relating to private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy
of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus
exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in
this Court.
Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the
ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure
gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made
for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature. The
lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for
the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of
the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character
as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said
property.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were dismissed accordingly.

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 US v. Ruiz

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 USA v. Guinto
Case Title: USA vs. Eliodoro B. Guinto
G.R. no and Date: G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990
Ponente: Justice Cruz

Facts

These are consolidated cases which involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of
America was not impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are
in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.

USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in
connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base,
which was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that
Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a
rebidding.

USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)

Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation
Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after investigation that Genove had
poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. The
club manager suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which
unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal.

USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)

Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O’ Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted
by petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. An information
was filed against Bautista and at the trial, petitioners testified against him. As a result of the charge,
Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming
that it was because of the latter’s acts that he lost his job.

USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)

A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US military officers)
for injuries allegedly sustained by the former when defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and
unleashed dogs on them. The petitioners deny this and claim that respondents were arrested for
theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries.

Issue

Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty.

Ruling/s

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles
of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such
affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under
the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such
principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and
consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot
assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the
state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against
such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit
must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When the
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government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.

It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a blanket
immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners
claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents
of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.

There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its
non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity (commercial
acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity
(governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied.

In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US
government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The Court would have
directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity
of the record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions
were not available. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature
of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary capacity, as they were
operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity. Not even the US government
can claim such immunity because by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the
discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
But, the court still dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the ground that there was nothing
arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite properly
in terminating Genove’s employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.

In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official
functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against the
complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly
impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.

In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what
actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging
their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred. The needed
inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of
the parties.

Principle/s used
§ Doctrine of State Immunity
§ Jure Gestionis – by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs Guinto)
§ Jure Imperii – by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No implied
consent. (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)

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Torio v. Fontanilla

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 LAUDENCIO TORIO, ET AL. v. ROSALINA FONTANILLA, ET AL.
Month, date, year | Teehankee, J. | Respondeat Superior
PETITIONER: Laudencio Torio, et al.
RESPONDENTS: Rosalina Fontanilla, et al.

SUMMARY: Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed a resolution whereby it resolved to

manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration. While in the midst of the zarzuela, the stage
collapsed, pinning Vicente Fontanilla who died thereafter. The heirs of Fontanilla filed a petition for
recovery of damages. CFI dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the decision and held all defendants
solidarily liable for damages. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA.

DOCTRINE: Under the doctrine of Respondeat Superior, an employer will be liable for an employee's
negligent actions or omissions that occur during the course and scope of the employee's employment.

FACTS:
1. On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed 2 resolutions:
one for management of the town fiesta celebration and the other for the creation of the
Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee. The Executive Committee, in turn, organized a
sub-committee on entertainment and stage with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The council
appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela"
and another for the cancionan. While the zarzuela was being held, the stage collapsed.
Vicente Fontanilla was pinned underneath and died in the afternoon of the following day.
Fontanilla’s heirs filed a complaint for damages with the CFI of Manila. The defendants were
the municipality, the municipal council and the municipal council members. In its Answer,
defendant municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it
performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its
governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any
of its agents.
2. The defendant councilors, in turn, maintained that they merely acted as agents of the
municipality in carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town
fiesta celebration and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking
was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in
implementing the municipal ordinance. CFI held that the municipal council exercised due
diligence in selecting the person to construct the stage and dismissed the complaint. CA
reversed the decision and held all defendants solidarily liable for damages.

ISSUE/s:
Whether or not the municipality is liable for the death of Fontanilla – YES

RULING: SC affirmed in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals.

RATIO:
1. The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality was an exercise of a private or
proprietary function of the municipality. The provision on Section 2282 of the Revised
Administrative Code simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but
it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. It follows that under the doctrine of
respondent-superior, the municipality is held liable for damages for the death of
Fontanilla. Since it is established that the municipality was acting a proprietary
function, it follows that it stands on the same footing as an ordinary private
corporation where officers are not held liable for the negligence of the corporation
merely because of their official relation to it. Thus, the municipal councilors are
absolved from any criminal liability for they did not directly participate in the defective
construction of the stage.

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 Merritt v. Gov't of the Philippines

PETITIONER: E. Merritt
RESPONDENTS: Gov’t of the Philippine Islands
SUMMARY: Plaintiff was involved in an accident concerning him and a General Hospital ambulance
resulting in him being incapacitated. He sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work.
The SC ruled that the State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs,
except when expressly made so by legislative enactment.

DOCTRINE: According to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a
decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is
limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or
commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim,
and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some
administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by
the law of civil responsibility.

FACTS:

Merritt was riding on a motorcycle towards the western part of Calle Padre Faura at a speed
of ten to twelve miles an hour. Upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from
the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching
said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it
would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor
Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the
street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by
which movement it struck Merritt, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or
from the post place there. As a result, Merritt was so severely injured. By authority of the
United States, Act 2457 was enacted, authorizing the Merritt to bring suit against the
Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing Attorney-General of said Islands to
appear in said court.

ISSUE/s:

Whether or not the government is liable for the injury of Merritt– NO

RULING: Judgment appealed must be reversed

RATIO:

● The government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or
agents whom it employs since that would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.
● By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit.
● It does not thereby concede its liability or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend
his liability to any cause not previously recognized.

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● It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
● The State is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor negligence can be presumed on the part
of the state in the organization of branches in the public service and in the appointment of
its agents.
● The responsibility of the State is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent,
duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with
some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim.

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Republic v. Purisima

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