Republic of the Philippines The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida, and was 13 years old

ter of appellant Ida, and was 13 years old at the time of the
SUPREME COURT incident. Ida worked as a waitress in Bayanihan Beer House in Mabini, Cebu City. On February 19,
Manila 1995, Ida and ABC started to rent a room in a house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. On April 1,
1995, about 4:30 p.m., ABC testified that she was in the house with Ida and Tampus9 who were both
FIRST DIVISION drinking beer at that time. They forced her to drink beer10 and after consuming three and one-half (3 ½)
glasses of beer, she became intoxicated and very sleepy.11While ABC was lying on the floor of their
room, she overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be allowed to "remedyo"12 or have
G.R. No. 181084 June 16, 2009 sexual intercourse with her.13 Appellant Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he
finished having sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida then went to work, leaving Tampus alone with ABC.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, ABC fell asleep and when she woke up, she noticed that the garter of her panties was loose and rolled
vs. down to her knees. She suffered pain in her head, thighs, buttocks, groin and vagina, and noticed that
BARTOLOME TAMPUS1 and IDA MONTESCLAROS, Defendants. her panties and short pants were stained with blood which was coming from her vagina.14 When her
IDA MONTESCLAROS, Appellant. mother arrived home from work the following morning, she kept on crying but appellant Ida ignored
her.15
DECISION
ABC testified that on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she was left alone in the room since her mother
PUNO, C.J.: was at work at the beer house.16 Tampus went inside their room and threatened to kill her if she would
report the previous sexual assault to anyone.17 He then forcibly removed her panties. ABC shouted but
Tampus covered her mouth and again threatened to kill her if she shouted.18 He undressed himself,
On appeal is the decision2 of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, dated September 29, 2006 in CA- spread ABC’s legs, put saliva on his right hand and he applied this to her vagina; he then inserted his
G.R. CR-HC No. 00215. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, the decision3 of the Regional penis into ABC’s vagina and made a push and pull movement.19After consummating the sexual act, he
Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros (Ida) left the house. When ABC told appellant Ida about the incident, the latter again ignored her.20
guilty as an accomplice in the commission of rape.
On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her mother, ABC sought the help of her aunt, Nellie
The present appeal stems from two criminal cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 013324-L charging Bartolome Montesclaros (Nellie). She told Nellie about the rape and that her mother sold her.21 ABC, together with
Tampus (Tampus) and Ida as conspirators in the rape of ABC4 on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m.; and (2) Nellie and Norma Andales, a traffic enforcer, reported the incident of rape to the police. On May 9, 1995,
Criminal Case No. 013325-L charging Tampus of raping ABC on April 4, 1995 at 1:00 a.m. Nestor A. Sator , M.D. (Dr. Sator), head of the Medico-Legal Branch of the Philippine National Crime
Laboratory Services, Regional Unit 7, conducted a physical examination of ABC and issued a Medico-
The Information5 in each case reads as follows: Legal Report.22 Dr. Sator testified that the result of his examination of ABC revealed a deep healed
laceration at the seven (7) o’clock position and a shallow healed laceration at the one (1) o’clock
position on ABC’s hymen.
CRIM. CASE NO. 013324-L6

That on the 1st day of April 1995, at about 4:30 o’clock [sic] in the afternoon, in Looc, Lapulapu City,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Bartolome Tampus, taking
advantage that [ABC] was in deep slumber due to drunkenness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic] the latter, who was at that time thirteen (13) years old,
against her will, in conspiracy with the accused Ida Montesclaros who gave permission to Bartolome
Tampus to rape [ABC].
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIM. CASE NO. 013325-L7
That on the 3rd day of April, 1995,8 at about 1:00 o’clock [sic] dawn, in Looc, Lapulapu City, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a wooden club
(poras), by means of threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with [sic] [ABC], who was at that time thirteen (13) years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On September 22, 1995, ABC filed two Complaints. She accused Tampus of taking advantage of her by
having carnal knowledge of her, against her will, while she was intoxicated and sleeping on April 1, 1995
at 4:30 p.m. She declared in her Complaint that this was done in conspiracy with accused Ida who gave
permission to Tampus to rape her. And again, she stated that on April 3, 1995, she was threatened with
a wooden club by Tampus, who then succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, against her will.
Tampus denied raping ABC on April 1, 1995. He claimed that at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995, he left the
house to go to the public market of Lapu-lapu City. When he arrived home at 6:00 p.m., ABC and Ida
were not there as they usually go to the beer house at 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m.23 He denied forcing ABC
to drink beer. He also denied asking Ida to allow him to have sexual intercourse with ABC.24 Appellant
Ida also testified that she and ABC left for the beer house at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995 and they came
back at 6:00 a.m. the following day.25 She said that she always brought her daughter to the beer house
with her and there was never an instance when she left her daughter alone in the house.26 She denied
forcing ABC to drink beer at 4:30 p.m. of April 1, 1995, and she denied giving permission to Tampus to
have sexual intercourse with ABC.27
Tampus also denied raping ABC on April 4, 1995. He testified that he arrived at the Barangay Tanod
Headquarters between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. of April 3, 199528 and that his actual duty time shift was
from midnight to 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995. Guillermo Berdin (Berdin), a defense witness, testified that
on April 3, 1995, Tampus reported for duty at the police outpost at 8:00 p.m. and left at 5:00 a.m. of April
4, 1995, as reflected in the attendance logbook. However, on cross-examination, Berdin could not tell
whether the signature appearing on the logbook really belonged to Tampus. It was noted by the trial
court that the handwriting used by Tampus in the logbook entry on April 2, 1995 is different from his
handwriting appearing on April 3, 1995.29 It was also revealed that the house of Tampus is just 500
meters away or just a three-minute walk from the barangay tanod outpost and that the barangay tanod
on duty could leave the outpost unnoticed or without permission.30
Agustos B. Costas, M.D.31 (Dr. Costas), the Head of the Department of Psychiatry of the Vicente Sotto
Memorial Medical Center, issued a Medical Certification,32 which showed that appellant Ida was treated
as an outpatient at the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center Psychiatry Department from November
11, 1994 to January 12, 1995 and was provisionally diagnosed with Schizophrenia, paranoid type.
The trial court convicted Tampus of two counts of rape, as principal in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and
Criminal Case No. 013325-L. Appellant Ida was found guilty as an accomplice in Criminal Case No.
013324-L. The trial court appreciated in Ida’s favor the mitigating circumstance of illness which would
diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to
Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.33 The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision states, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds accused Bartolome Tampus
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of two counts of rape, as principals [sic], in Criminal Case
No. 013324-L and Criminal Case No. 013325-L and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua in each of the aforementioned cases.
The Court also finds accused Ida Montesclaros GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as an
accomplice in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years, and eight (8) months of Reclusion Temporal.
Both accused are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the offended party, [ABC], the sum
of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 013324-L.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 34
Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, accused Tampus died on November 16,
200035 and his appeal was dismissed by the Third Division of this Court.36 Thus, the appeal before the
Court of Appeals dealt only with that of appellant Ida. The appellate court gave credence to the
testimony of ABC and affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. It appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found that Ida failed to prove that she was completely
deprived of intelligence on April 1, 1995. On the basis of the medical report and the testimony of the
attending physician, Ida’s schizophrenia was determined by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
to have diminished the exercise of her will-power though it did not deprive her of the consciousness of
her acts. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida Montesclaros is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in
the commission of rape and hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Further, she is ORDERED to pay moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (Php
50,000.00) and exemplary damages in the amount of twenty-five thousand pesos (Php 25,000.00).37
We find the findings of the lower courts to be well-taken.
The finding of guilt of Ida as an accomplice in the rape of ABC is dependent on proving the guilt of the
principal accused. Upon examination of the records of the case, we agree with the ruling of the trial and
appellate courts that the testimony of ABC is clear and straightforward, and is sufficient to conclude that
Tampus is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the rape of ABC, in Criminal Case No.
013324-L, as well as to convict appellant Ida as an accomplice in the same criminal case.
The findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally, appellate courts will not
overturn said findings unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the
case.38 The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the
Court of Appeals.39
The trial court has carefully scrutinized the testimony of complainant ABC and has given full faith and
credence to her testimony. Both the trial and appellate courts found that the rape of ABC by Tampus on
April 1, 1995 has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, it is highly inconceivable for a
young girl to impute the crime of rape, implicate her own mother in such a vile act, allow an examination
of her private parts and subject herself to public trial if she has not been a victim of rape and was
impelled to seek justice for the defilement of her person. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given
full credit.40
Tampus was positively identified by ABC as the person who had carnal knowledge of her against her
will on April 1, 1995. The denial of Tampus cannot prevail over the positive and direct identification by
the victim, ABC. Although ABC was asleep and unconscious at the time the sexual debasement was
committed by Tampus, circumstantial evidence established beyond doubt that it is Tampus who raped
ABC. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.41 In cases like the one at
bar, the Court takes into consideration the events that transpired before and after the victim lost
consciousness in order to establish the commission of the act of coitus.42
The trial court correctly determined, thus:
The prosecution has clearly established by its evidence that accused Bartolome Tampus had carnal
knowledge of [ABC] on April 1, 1995 under the circumstance set forth in Article 335 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended; that is, when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.
xxxx
The Court cannot accept accused Bartolome Tampus’ defense of denial and alibi. His denial pales in
effect against the positive evidence given by [ABC] that he ravished her [on] two occasions.
xxxx
It is true that in the first incident on April 1, 1995, [ABC] did not see Tampus lie down with her. What she (b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and,
saw was the aftermath of her deflowering upon waking up. Nevertheless, the Court has taken note of
the following circumstances: (1) The drinking session where the complainant was forced to drink beer (c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
by both accused; (2) The conversation between the two accused when accused Tampus requested person charged as accomplice.48
accused Ida Montesclaros, and was granted by the latter, permission to have sexual intercourse with
the complainant; (3) Accused Tampus and the complainant were the only persons left in the house
when Ida Montesclaros went to work after acceding to the request of Tampus; (4) The bloodstained The testimony of ABC establishes that Ida cooperated in the execution of the rape by Tampus when
pants, the pain and blood in complainant’s vagina and the pain in her head, groin and buttocks; (5) The prior to the act of rape by Tampus, she forced ABC to drink beer and she agreed to Tampus’ request for
threat made by accused Tampus on the complainant in the dawn of April 4, 1995 that he would kill her if him to have sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida’s acts show that she had knowledge of and even gave her
she would tell about the previous incident on April 1, 1995; and (6) The second incident of rape that permission to the plan of Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.1avvphi1
immediately ensued. These circumstances form a chain that points to accused Bartolome Tampus as
the person who had carnal knowledge of [ABC] when she was asleep in an inebriated condition. 43 During the cross-examination by the defense counsel, Atty. Paulito Cabrera, of witness ABC, she
testified that:
After establishing the guilt of Tampus as principal, the trial court then determined the guilt of Ida.
Although Ida was charged as a conspirator, the trial court found her liable as an accomplice. The trial Q Before this date, April 1, 1995, did you already usually drink beer?
court ruled that her act of forcing or intimidating ABC to drink beer and then acceding to the request of
co-accused Tampus to be allowed to have sexual intercourse with ABC did not prove their A No, sir.
conspiracy.44 Hence, it held that, "[u]ndoubtedly, Ida Montesclaros participated in the commission of the
crime by previous acts but her participation, not being indispensable, was not that of a principal. She is
liable as an accomplice."45 Q So, you are telling the Honorable Court that it was only on April 1, 1995 that you first drank
beer?
In her appeal, appellant Ida argued that it is against human nature for a mother to allow her daughter to
be raped. She maintained that there was no instance when she left ABC alone in the house. The Court A Yes, sir.
of Appeals dismissed appellant Ida’s appeal as it also gave credence to the testimony of ABC.
Q What did you say, you were forced to drink beer?
In her appeal brief filed before this Court, Ida raises the following assignment of errors:
A Yes, sir.
I
Q Who forced you to drink beer in that afternoon of April 1, 1995?
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BARTOLOME TAMPUS OF
THE CRIMES OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT A Bartolome Tampus and "Nanay", my mother.49
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
xxxx
II
Q By the way, your mother proposed to you to drink beer?
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING IDA MONTESCLAROS AS ACCOMPLICE TO
THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT
A Yes, sir.
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.46

Q Before you concede to her proposition, did you not complain that you had not been used to
We affirm the trial and appellate courts in ruling that Ida is liable as an accomplice in the rape of her
drinking beer and then, why suddenly, she would let you drink beer at that time?
daughter, ABC.

A No, sir.
Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperate in
the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.47 The following requisites must be proved
in order that a person can be considered an accomplice: Q Did you not tell her that, "I am not used to drinking beer, so, I would not drink beer"?

(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct A Because the beer was mixed with Coke.
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
Q So, you mean that you also agreed to drink beer at that time?
A I just agreed to the proposal of my mother.
Q But you never voiced any complaint or any refusal to her at that time?
A No, sir because I was afraid that she might maltreat me.
Q At that time when she proposed to you to drink beer, was she already threatening to maltreat
you if you would not drink that beer?
A Not yet.
Q And how were you able to conclude that she might maltreat you if you would not drink that
beer that she proposed for you to drink?
A Because "Nanay" stared at me sharply and she had a wooden stick prepared.
Q Are you sure that she was doing that while she was offering the glass of beer to you?
A Yes, sir. 50
xxxx
Q While you were drinking beer, your mother and Bartolome went out of the house and you
overheard Bartolome asking or proposing to your mother that he would have sexual
intercourse with you which you term in the Visayan dialect "remedyo", Bartolome would want
to have a "remedyo" with you. When [sic], particular moment did you allegedly hear this
statement, while you were drinking beer or after you had finished drinking beer?
A When I was already lying on the floor of the room we were renting.51
xxxx
Q And, of course, as you have stated now, it was you, you were quite sure that it was you who
was being referred by Bartolome Tampus when he said to your mother in the Visayan dialect
that "gusto siya moremedyo nimo", he wants to have sexual intercourse with you?
A Yes, sir, but I don’t know the meaning of "remedyo".
Q At that time, you did not know the meaning of "remedyo"?
A Not yet, sir.52
xxxx
Q Was that the very first time that you ever heard of the word "remedyo"?
A Yes, sir53
xxxx
Q And when your mother came back from work at about 7:00 o’clock [sic] in the morning of
April 2, 1995, did you not also bother to tell her of what you suspected that something serious
or bad had happened to you in the previous day?
A Because she already knew, sir.
Q How did you know that she already knew?
A Because I heard her telling Omeng,54 "After you have sexual intercourse with her, leave her
immediately!"55
xxxx
Q Considering that you never knew what is the meaning of the word, "remedyo", when your
mother arrived in the morning of April 2, 1995, did you not confront your mother, did you not tell
her that, "Is this what you mean by "remedyo", as what you had agreed with Bartolome
Tampus that he would do something to my genitals?
A No sir, because when she arrived, she kept on laughing.56
All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in the rape of ABC. The
testimony of ABC shows that there was community of design between Ida and Tampus to commit the
rape of ABC. Ida had knowledge of and assented to Tampus’ intention to have sexual intercourse with
her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer, and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with
Tampus, with the knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus’ plan to have sexual
intercourse with her daughter.
It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be
indispensable to the commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by
indispensable cooperation. The evidence shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not
indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First, because it was both Ida and Tampus who
forced ABC to drink beer, and second because Tampus already had the intention to have sexual
intercourse with ABC and he could have consummated the act even without Ida’s consent.
The acts of Ida are closely related to the eventual commission of rape by Tampus. They both forced
ABC to drink beer; when ABC was already drunk, Tampus asked Ida if he could have sexual intercourse
with ABC and Ida gave her consent; and lastly, Ida left ABC alone with Tampus so that he proceed with
his plan to rape ABC.
Circumstances affecting the liability of the Appellant as an Accomplice
We agree with both the trial and appellate courts in their appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of
illness as would diminish the exercise of willpower of Ida without depriving her of the consciousness of
her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.
Dr. Costas testified that Ida was provisionally treated for schizophrenia a few months before the
incident, from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995. Based on his expert opinion, Ida was not totally
deprived of intelligence at the time of the incident; but, she may have poor judgment. On Direct
Examination of Dr. Costas by City Prosecutor Celso V. Espinosa, he testified as follows:
Q Doctor, taking into consideration your diagnosis, as you said, is provisional, would you say
that the patient [sic] totally deprived of intelligence or reason?
A Not totally.
Q She will be conscious of her acts?
A She may be, that is possible, for certain cause.
Q And there will be loss of intelligence?
A There could be.
Q Now, Doctor, she is charged her [sic] as one of the principals in the commission of the crime
of rape for having given her daughter to be sexually abused by her co-accused, allegedly
convinced by her co-accused on the first day of April, 1995. Now, if she was then under
treatment, Doctor, from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995, would you say, Doctor, that
having taken this diagnosis for [sic] schizophrenic patient, at the time, after January 12, 1995,
she must have acted with discernment?
A It is possible because you are this kind of mental illness even with the treatment, and even
without any medication, it may be what we called spontaneous, really it will get back.
Q At that time it will loss the intelligence? [sic]
A I think because it might be back, the treatment should be yearly.
Q Doctor, in your opinion, since our office is very much concern [sic] on this, if a person is
totally deprived of intelligence, he has still discernment, she is unconscious of her act, she or
he may be exempted from any criminal liability, please tell, Doctor, in your personal opinion for
the purpose of this proceedings she may be acting with discernment and with certain degree of
intelligence?
A It is possible but I think of a mother feeding her own daughter to somebody, I think there is a
motive, she wants to gain financial or material things from the daughter if no material gain,
then perhaps it was borne out of her illness. This is my opinion.57
xxxx
Q Doctor, is this schizophrenic person can distinguish the right or wrong? [sic]
A If they are in the [sic] state of illness, judgment is impaired to discern between right or wrong.
Q In the case of this particular accused, what would you say at the state of her ailment?
A When she was brought to the hospital, Your Honor, I think, although the mother alleged that
the sickness could be more than one year duration, it is in acute stage because she was
allegedly destroying everything in the house according to the mother, so she was in acute
stage.58
On cross-examination by Atty. Paulito Cabrera, Dr. Costas testified thus:
Q Would you say, Doctor, that that particular ailment of Ida Montesclaros affected her sense of
judgment?
A I think, so.
Q And that being scizophronic [sic] somehow, it has, while in that stage, the patient lost contact
with reality?
A Yes, that is possible.
Q In your opinion, Doctor, granting, for the sake of argument, the alleged accusation against
her is true, being an expert on scizophrania, could you tell the Honorable Court as a mother,
who would allegedly do such an offense to her daughter, is it still in her sound mind or proper
mental sane [sic]?
A I think, as I said, one thing to be considered is the motivation if she want [sic] to gain some
material things, if not, it is because of her judgment.
Q If she would not gain anything from allowing her daughter allegedly to be rubbished by
another person, then there must be something wrong?
A There must be something wrong and it came up from scizpphrania.
A It is the judgment, in the case of the schizophrenic.59
We have previously held that Schizophrenia may be considered mitigating under Art. 13(9) if it
diminishes the exercise of the willpower of the accused.60 In this case, the testimony of Dr. Costas
shows that even though Ida was diagnosed with schizophrenia, she was not totally deprived of
intelligence but her judgment was affected. Thus, on the basis of the Medical Certification that Ida
suffered from and was treated for schizophrenia a few months prior to the incident, and on the
testimony of Dr. Costas, Ida’s schizophrenia could be considered to have diminished the exercise of her
willpower although it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts.
We note that in the case at bar, the undisputed fact that Ida is the mother of ABC—who was 13 years
old at the time of the incident—could have been considered as a special qualifying circumstance which
would have increased the imposable penalty to death, under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,
viz.:
ARTICLE 266-B. Penalties. —
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxxx
Both the circumstances of the minority and the relationship of the offender to the victim, either as the
victim’s parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, must be alleged in the information
and proved during the trial in order for them to serve as qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code.61
In the case at bar, although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship with the
accused as the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the Information, and even though this was
proven during trial and not refuted by the accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying
circumstance that would serve to increase the penalty of the offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which should be given retroactive effect following the rule that statutes governing court
proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage,62 every Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances attending the
commission of the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the penalty.63Since in the case at
bar, the Information in Criminal Case No. 013324-L did not state that Ida is the mother of ABC, this
circumstance could not be appreciated as a special qualifying circumstance. Ida may only be convicted
as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In any event,
Republic Act No. 9346, entitled an "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines," which was signed into law on June 24, 2006 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.
Civil indemnity imposed against the appellant
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision ordered Tampus and Ida "jointly and severally, to
indemnify the offended party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 013324-L."64 The
Court of Appeals, however, did not award any civil indemnity to ABC, and only awarded moral and
exemplary damages. We deem it necessary and proper to award ABC civil indemnity of P50,000.00.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape. This is distinct from moral
damages awarded upon such finding without need of further proof, because it is assumed that a rape
victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award.65
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the victim in simple rape cases is entitled to an award of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as moral damages. 66 However,
Tampus’ civil indemnity ex delicto has been extinguished by reason of his death before the final
judgment, in accordance with Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.67 Thus, the amount of civil
indemnity which remains for accomplice Ida to pay is put at issue.
It becomes relevant to determine the particular amount for which each accused is liable when they have
different degrees of responsibility in the commission of the crime and, consequently, differing degrees of
liability. When a crime is committed by many, each one has a distinct part in the commission of the
crime and though all the persons who took part in the commission of the crime are liable, the liability is
not equally shared among them. Hence, an accused may be liable either as principal, accomplice or
accessory.
The particular liability that each accused is responsible for depends on the nature and degree of his
participation in the commission of the crime. The penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for a
particular crime is imposed upon the principal in a consummated felony.68 The accomplice is only given
the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by the law for the crime committed69 and an
accessory is given the penalty lower by two degrees.70However, a felon is not only criminally liable, he is
likewise civilly liable. 71 Apart from the penalty of imprisonment imposed on him, he is also ordered to
indemnify the victim and to make whole the damage caused by his act or omission through the payment
of civil indemnity and damages.
Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the accused. Although, unlike criminal liability—in
which the Revised Penal Code specifically states the corresponding penalty imposed on the principal,
accomplice and accessory—the share of each accused in the civil liability is not specified in the Revised
Penal Code. The courts have the discretion to determine the apportionment of the civil indemnity which
the principal, accomplice and accessory are respectively liable for, without guidelines with respect to the
basis of the allotment.
Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[i]f there are two or more persons civilly liable for a
felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond." Notwithstanding the
determination of the respective liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories within their
respective class, they shall also be subsidiarily liable for the amount of civil liability adjudged in the other
classes. Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[t]he principals, accomplices, and
accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves
for their quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable."72
As courts are given a free hand in determining the apportionment of civil liability, previous decisions
dealing with this matter have been grossly inconsistent.
In People v. Galapin,73 People v. Continente,74 United States v. Lasada,75 People v. Mobe,76 People v.
Irinea,77People v. Rillorta,78 People v. Cagalingan,79 People v. Villanueva,80 People v. Magno,81 People v.
del Rosario,82People v. Yrat,83 People v. Saul,84 and People v. Tamayo,85 the principal and accomplice
were ordered to pay jointly and severally the entire amount of the civil indemnity awarded to the victim.
In People v. Sotto,86 the accomplice was ordered to pay half of the amount of civil indemnity imposed by
the trial court, while the principal was liable for the other half. In People v. Toring,87 the principal,
accomplice and the accessory were made jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the civil
indemnity.
In the cases mentioned above, the principal and accomplice were made to pay equal shares of the civil
indemnity. This makes the accomplice who had less participation in the commission of the crime equally
liable with the principal for the civil indemnity. The degree of their participation in the crime was not
taken into account in the apportionment of the amount of the civil indemnity. This is contrary to the
principle behind the treble division of persons criminally responsible for felonies, i.e., that the liability
must be commensurate with the degree of participation of the accused in the crime committed. In such
a situation, the accomplice who just cooperated in the execution of the offense but whose participation
is not indispensable to the commission of the crime is made to pay the same amount of civil indemnity
as the principal by direct participation who took a direct part in the execution of the criminal act. It is an
injustice when the penalty and liability imposed are not commensurate to the actual responsibility of the
offender; for criminal responsibility is individual and not collective, and each of the participants should
be liable only for the acts actually committed by him.88 The proportion of this individual liability must be
graduated not only according to the nature of the crime committed and the circumstances attending it,
but also the degree and nature of participation of the individual offender.
In Garces v. People,89 People v. Flores,90 People v. Barbosa,91 People v. Ragundiaz,92 People v.
Bato,93 and People v. Garalde,94 the accomplice was held to be solidarily liable with the principal for only
one-half (1/2) of the amount adjudged as civil indemnity. In Garces, the accomplice was held solidarily
liable for half of the civil indemnity ex delicto but was made to pay the moral damages of P50,000.00
separately from the principal. In Flores, Ragundiaz, Bato, and Garalde, the accomplice was held
solidarily liable for half of the combined amounts of the civil indemnity ex delicto and moral damages. In
Ragundiaz, the accomplice was also made solidarily liable with the principal for half of the actual
damages, and in Garalde the accomplice was also held solidarily liable with the principal for half of the
exemplary damages, aside from the civil and moral damages.
In these cases, the accomplice was made jointly and severally liable with the principal for only half of
the amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages, only for purposes of the enforcement of the
payment of civil indemnity to the offended party. When the liability in solidum has been enforced, as
when payment has been made, the person by whom payment has been made shall have a right of
action against the other persons liable for the amount of their respective shares.95 As against each
other, whoever made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share that corresponds to
each, with interest for the payment already made.96 In these cases, therefore, payment is made by
either the principal or the accomplice, the one who made the payment to the victim could demand
payment of the part of the debt corresponding to his co-debtor. If for example the principal paid the
victim the entire amount of the civil indemnity, he could go against the accomplice for one-fourth (1/4) of
the total amount of civil indemnity and damages. The principal was primarily liable for only one-half (1/2)
of the total amount of civil indemnity and he was solidarily liable with the accomplice for the other half.
Since the principal paid for the half which the accomplice is solidarily liable with, he could claim one-half
(1/2) of that amount from the accomplice. Thus, the principal would have become ultimately liable for
three-fourths (3/4) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and damages, while the accomplice would
have become liable for one-fourth (1/4) of such amount.
In People v. Cortes,97 People v. Budol,98 People v. Nulla,99 and People v. Madali,100 the principal was
ordered to pay twice the share of the accomplice in the civil indemnity. In Nulla, the Court determined
the respective amounts for which the principal, accomplice and accessory were liable for. The principal
was ordered to pay P20,000.00, the accomplice was ordered to pay P10,000.00, and the accessory
was ordered to pay P2,000.00. Unlike the cases cited above where the principal and accomplice were
held solidarily liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity or half of it, in Nulla, the court particularly
determined the amount for which each shall respond. This is consistent with Article 109 and Article 110
of the Revised Penal Code, which require that the courts should determine the amount for which the
principals, accomplices and accessories must respond to and upon specifying this amount, the
principals are solidarily liable within their class for their quota, the accomplices are solidarily liable
among themselves for their quota and the accessories are solidarily liable for their quota. If any one of
the classes is unable to pay for its respective quota, it becomes subsidiarily liable for the quota of the
other classes, which shall be enforced first against the property of the principals; next, against that of
the accomplices; and lastly, against that of the accessories.101
There are also cases where the principal was ordered to pay more than double the amount that the
accomplice is liable for. In Lumiguis v. People,102 the civil liability of P6,000.00 was apportioned as
follows: the sole principal was primarily liable for P3,000.00, the four accomplices were primarily liable
in solidum among themselves for the other half of the indemnity, or P3,000.00. Thus, each accomplice
was answerable for one-fourth (1/4) of P3,000.00 or one-eighth (1/8) of the entire amount of civil
indemnity, which is P750.00.
Similarly in People v. Bantagan,103 the principal was required to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P500.00. In case of his insolvency, his three accomplices should be jointly and severally
liable. The three accomplices were jointly and severally liable for the other P500 and in case of their
insolvency the principal was secondarily liable for such amount.
In People v. Castillo,104 the accomplice was ordered to pay one-fourth (1/4) of the amount of the civil
indemnity, while the principal was liable for the remaining three-fourths (3/4).
In People v. Cariaga,105 the total amount of indemnity and damages due to the heirs of the victim
amounted to P601,000.00. The sole accomplice was ordered to pay P101,000.00 which is roughly one-
sixth (1/6) of the entire civil indemnity, while the two principals were ordered to pay the rest of the
indemnity and damages amounting to P500,000.00.
The cases cited above demonstrate the ad hoc method by which the ratio of shares of the civil
indemnity and damages among the principal, accomplice and accessory is determined. Though the
responsibility to decide the respective shares of persons liable for a felony is left to the courts, this does
not mean that this amount can be decided arbitrarily or upon conjecture. The power of the courts to
grant indemnity and damages demands factual, legal and equitable justification, and cannot be left to
speculation and caprice.
The entire amount of the civil indemnity, together with the moral and actual damages, should be
apportioned among the persons who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the
degree of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation in the criminal act. Salvador
Viada, an authority in criminal law, is of the opinion that there are no fixed rules which are applicable in
all cases in order to determine the apportionment of civil liability among two or more persons civilly
liable for a felony, either because there are different degrees of culpability of offenders, or because of
the inequality of their financial capabilities.106 On this note, he states in his commentaries on the 1870
Penal Code of Spain that the law should leave the determination of the amount of respective liabilities to
the discretion of the courts.107 The courts have the competence to determine the exact participation of
the principal, accomplice, and accessory in the commission of the crime relative to the other classes
because they are able to directly consider the evidence presented and the unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses.
We must stress, however, that the courts’ discretion should not be untrammelled and must be guided by
the principle behind differing liabilities for persons with varying roles in the commission of the crime. The
person with greater participation in the commission of the crime should have a greater share in the civil
liability than those who played a minor role in the crime or those who had no participation in the crime
but merely profited from its effects. Each principal should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of
indemnity and damages than every accomplice, and each accomplice should also be liable for a greater
amount as against every accessory. Care should also be taken in considering the number of principals
versus that of accomplices and accessories. If for instance, there are four principals and only one
accomplice and the total of the civil indemnity and damages is P6,000.00, the court cannot assign two-
thirds (2/3) of the indemnity and damages to the principals and one-third (1/3) to the accomplice. Even
though the principals, as a class, have a greater share in the liability as against the accomplice-- since
one-third (1/3) of P6,000.00 is P2,000.00, while two-thirds (2/3) of P6,000.00 is P4,000.00-- when the
civil liability of every person is computed, the share of the accomplice ends up to be greater than that of
each principal. This is so because the two-thirds (2/3) share of the principals—or P4,000.00—is still
divided among all the four principals, and thus every principal is liable for only P1,000.00.
In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is solidarily liable with the principal for the
entire amount of the civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an erroneous apportionment of the civil
indemnity. First, because it does not take into account the difference in the nature and degree of
participation between the principal, Tampus, versus the accomplice, Ida. Ida’s previous acts of
cooperation include her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus to have sexual
intercourse with her daughter. But even without these acts, Tampus could have still raped ABC. It was
Tampus, the principal by direct participation, who should have the greater liability, not only in terms of
criminal liability, but also with respect to civil liability. Second, Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code
states that the apportionment should provide for a quota amount for every class for which members of
such class are solidarily liable within their respective class, and they are only subsidiarily liable for the
share of the other classes. The Revised Penal Code does not provide for solidary liability among the
different classes, as was held by the trial court in the case at bar.lavvphi1
"vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrongdoings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or
a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.110 Exemplary damages may be awarded only
when one or more aggravating circumstances are alleged in the information and proved during the
trial.111
In the case at bar, no qualifying or aggravating circumstance was appreciated against Ida. Although, the
minority of the victim coupled with the fact that the offender is the parent of the victim could have served
to qualify the crime of rape, the presence of these concurring circumstances cannot justify the award of
exemplary damages since the relationship of the offender, Ida, to the victim, ABC, was not alleged in the
Information.112 The minority of the rape victim and her relationship with the offender must both be
alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order to be appreciated as an
aggravating/qualifying circumstance.113 While the information in the instant case alleged that ABC was a
minor during the incident, there was no allegation that Ida was her parent. Since the relationship
between ABC and appellant was not duly established, the award of exemplary damages is not
warranted.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, dated September 29, 2006,
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00215, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
accomplice in the crime of rape and sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida Montesclaros is ORDERED
to pay civil indemnity in the amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven
centavos (P16,666.67), and moral damages in the amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six
pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67). The award of exemplary damages is DELETED.

Thus, taking into consideration the difference in participation of the principal and accomplice, the SO ORDERED.
principal, Tampus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and
moral damages and appellant Ida should be ordered to pay one-third (1/3) of the amount. Civil
indemnity for simple rape was correctly set at P50,000.00 and moral damages at P50,000.00. The total
amount of damages to be divided between Tampus and Ida is P100,000.00, where Tampus is liable for
P66,666.67 (which is two-thirds [2/3] of P100,000.00) and Ida is liable for P33,333.33 (which is one-third
[1/3] of P100,000.00). This is broken down into civil indemnity of P16,666.67 and moral damages of
P16,666.67. However, since the principal, Tampus, died while the case was pending in the Court of
Appeals, his liability for civil indemnity ex delicto is extinguished by reason of his death before the final
judgment.108 His share in the civil indemnity and damages cannot be passed over to the accomplice,
Ida, because Tampus’ share of the civil liability has been extinguished. And even if Tampus were alive
upon the promulgation of this decision, Ida would only have been subsidiarily liable for his share of the
civil indemnity of P66,666.67. However, since Tampus’ civil liability ex delicto is extinguished, Ida’s
subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is also eliminated, following the principle that the
accessory follows the principal. Tampus’ obligation to pay P66,666.67 — his quota of the civil indemnity
— is the principal obligation, for which Ida is only subsidiarily liable. Upon the extinguishment of the
principal obligation, there is no longer any accessory obligation which could attach to it; thus, the
subsidiary liability of Ida is also extinguished.

On the matter of exemplary damages, we find that exemplary damages were incorrectly awarded by the
Court of Appeals.
Republic of the Philippines
In criminal cases, exemplary damages are imposed on the offender as part of the civil liability when the SUPREME COURT
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.109 Also known as "punitive" or Manila
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 108172-73 May 25, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CONRADO LUCAS Y BRIONES, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a sworn statement 1 taken on 16 February 1991, Chanda Lucas y Austria, then seventeen years old,
charged her natural father, accused Jose Conrado Lucas, of attempted rape committed against her on
12 February 1991. She revealed therein that she was first raped by him when she was only nine years
old, or, as disclosed in a handwritten note at the left-hand margin of her sworn statement, "noong
Nov. 26, 1982 . . . at naulit ng maraming beses."
On 19 February 1991, Chanda, assisted by her mother, Ofelia Austria-Lucas, filed two separate sworn
criminal complaints for rape 2 and for attempted rape 3 against her father with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The complaints, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-91-18465 and Q-91-18466, were
subsequently assigned to Branch 104 of the said court.
The accusatory portion of the complaint for rape in Criminal Case
No. Q-91-18465 reads:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1982 and sometime thereafter in Quezon
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd designs and by means of violence and intimidation did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned
CHANDA LUCAS Y AUSTRIA, who was then nine (9) years old, now 17 yrs. of age,
against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to
her under the provisions of the New Civil Code.
while that for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 reads:
That on or about the 12th day of February 1991, in Quezon City, Philippines and
within the jurisdictionof this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with lewd design and by means of force
and intimidation, commence the commission of the crime of rape directly by overt acts
by then and there taking advantage of complainant's tender age and innocence,
by then and there putting his hand inside the panty of the undersigned and mashing
her vagina while his other hand was pressing her nipples and at the same time
kissing her on the lips, face and neck, thereafter accused placed himself on top of her
but said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
said offense of rape by reason of the fact that the brother and sister of the
undersigned was awakened and shouted upon the accused, a cause other than
thespontaneous desistance of the said accused, that the aforesaid act of the said
accused was done against the will of the undersigned, to her damage and prejudice
in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the New Civil
Code.
The cases were jointly tried after the accused had pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment. 4 The
prosecution presented as witnesses the complainant herself; her sister, Cynthia; and Dr. Emmanuel
Aranas. The defense presented only the accused.
Complainant Chanda Lucas, who was born on 2 June 1973, 5 testified that their0 house at 23-X Daropa
Road, Baesa, Quezon City, has only one bedroom. On 26 November 1983, she was sleeping in the
bedroom with her brother and sisters. Their mother did not sleep in their house at that time. At about
2:00 to 3:00 a.m., she awoke and realized that her father was removing her panty and shorts. He
cautioned her to keep quiet. Then, her father, who was already naked, went on top of her and placed his
sexual organ inside her vagina. She was hurt but did not resist because her father threatened to kill her.
Only her older sister Cynthia witnessed the incident. Chanda reported the incident to her mother and
her aunt but the former did nothing. When her aunt said that her father should be jailed, her mother did
not agree. 6
The 26 November 1983 incident was only the first of many atrocities. Since then, her father had been
repeatedly molesting her, especially when her mother was not around. The last assault on her
womanhood occurred on 12 February 1991 when she was already seventeen years old. Before he had
sex with her at 3:00 a.m. on 12 February 1991, he first moved her brothers and sisters, who were
sleeping in the same room with her, to another place. She did not resist because he had a balisong with
him and told her that he can take her life anytime. After the sexual assault, he stood up holding
his balisong 7 and again said that she has only one life and that he can take it anytime.
On the morning of 16 February 1992, in the company of her mother and uncle, she reported the incident
to the police in their area. The police investigator questioned her and her sworn statement (Exhibit "D")
was taken. In the afternoon of that day, she submitted to a medical examination at Camp Crame and a
medical certificate was issued. 8
Cynthia Lucas Viado, the elder sister of Chanda, testified that she witnessed the incident of 26
November 1983. She was then thirteen years old while Chanda was only nine years old. She saw his
father on top of Chanda, then she closed her eyes and covered her face with a blanket. She reported
the incident and the fact that she saw blood on the underwear of Chanda to her aunt Neneng and her
mother; the former was very angry upon learning of the incident but the latter did not believe her; at that
time, her mother loved her father
dearly. 9 On cross- examination, Cynthia declared that her father intended to sexually abuse her on 26
November 1983 but because she resisted, her father instead raped Chanda. She was not able to help
Chanda because she was afraid of her father. Their brother and another sister were not aware of the
incident and they did not wake them up because they were ashamed of their neighbors. 10
Dr. Emmanuel Aranas testified that he examined the complainant on 16 February 1991 at the Crime
Laboratory Services at Camp Crame pursuant to a letter-request 11 from Capt. Jaime Q. Peralta of the
Central Police district, Quezon City. His examination of her genitalia disclosed healed lacerations, but
he could not determine when the lacerations were inflicted or sustained. He concluded that the
complainant has had several sexual experiences and was no longer a virgin. 12 He issued a written
report of his findings. 13 On cross-examination, he declared that he found no sperm on the organ of the
complainant and that there were no signs of recent trauma or physical injuries on her. 14
On the witness stand, the accused testified that he and Chanda's mother, Ofelia Austria, are not
married; however, since 1969, they had been living together as husband and wife until 1972, when he
was detained for alleged gunrunning and when Ofelia and the children moved to Cotabato. They were
reunited in 1977. He denied having raped his second daughter, Chanda, and alleged that the brothers
and sisters of Ofelia, particularly Leonardo Austria, were all angry at him and instigated the filing of the
fabricated charges against him. He further declared that Ofelia was angry at him because he intervened
in guiding the life of Chanda. He could not recall anymore where he was on 26 November 1983.
However, on 12 February 1991, he and Ofelia quarreled about Chanda's frequent late arrivals from
school and, because of the quarrel, he "physically harmed" both of them. 15
On 28 October 1992, the trial court promulgated its decision 16 in the two cases finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of rape. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
In Crim. Case No. Q-91-18465, the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged in the information,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA plus all the
accessory penalties provided by law.
In Crim. Case No. Q-91-18466, the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged in the information,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the
accessory penalties provided by law.
Accused is ordered to pay the victim the sum of P30,000.00 as actual and moral
damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 17
On 4 November 1992, the accused filed a notice of appeal. 18 In his brief submitted to this Court, he
alleges that the trial court erred:
I Moreover, at the tender age of nine, she was totally helpless and defenseless. And regarding the
. . . IN GIVING UNMERITED VERACITY TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNPERSUASIVE
AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN
DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.
II
. . . IN CONVICTING HIM OF THE CRIME OF RAPE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-91-
18466 INASMUCH AS THE SAME IS MORE SERIOUS THAN THE OFFENSE
CHARGED.
III
. . . IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO Q-91-18465 DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 19
As to the first assigned error, the accused asserts that the conduct of his daughters, Chanda and
Cynthia, after the alleged first sexual abuse casts doubt on their credibility. It is hard to believe that if
Chanda were indeed raped by him when she was only nine years old and repeatedly thereafter, she
would report the abuses only when she was seventeen years old. Several remedies were available to
her and she had relatives who could extend their help. 20
He also contends that the testimony of Cynthia is not convincing; it was contrary to human experience
and conduct for her to simply close her eyes and cover her face with a blanket upon witnessing the rape
of her younger sister by their own father instead of helping Chanda. If she was afraid of her father at
that time, she could have convinced Chanda to temporarily leave their house and seek shelter with her
relatives. It was also unnatural for her to abandon Chanda when, as she claims, she fully knew the
bestial tendencies of her father. 21 As to his wife, Ofelia, he attributes to her an ulterior motive when she
consented to the filing of the charges against him. Except for the souring of their relationship which
ended in their separation, he finds no possible explanation why Ofelia believed Chanda's report on the
12 February 1991 incident when she, Ofelia, refused to heed Chanda and Cynthia's report concerning
the 26 November 1983 incident.
Anent the second assigned error, he contends that he could not be validly convicted of rape in Criminal
Case No. Q-91-18466 under a complaint for attempted rape only. He cites the rule that when the
offense proved is more serious than that charged, the accused can only be convicted of the offense
charged.
The appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prays that the judgment of conviction in
Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 be affirmed in toto. However, it submits that the accused can be
convicted only of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466. The appellee argues that the trial
court correctly gave credence to the testimony of Chanda as it is "positive, straightforward and clearly
revelatory only of the truth of the facts she experienced, without any dubious motive shown why she
would bear false witness against appellant." 22 The reaction which the accused expected of Chanda
after the first rape and which she did not so manifest does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that she
fabricated her story. As Chanda's father, he exercised absolute authority and moral influence over her.
imputed motive of Chanda's mother, the same is too trivial to prompt her to falsely charged him with a
grave crime.
The first and third assigned errors raise a question of fact which hinges on the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. The second involves a question of law.
In rape cases, this Court has been guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation for
rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 23
Conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie heavily on the sound judgment of the trial
court. Accordingly, in the appreciation of the evidence, the appellate court accords due deference to the
trial court's views on who should be given credence since the latter is in a better position to decide the
question of the credibility of witnesses, having seen and heard these witnesses and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The trial court's findings concerning the credibility
of witnesses carry great weight and respect and will be sustained by the appellate court unless the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which would have affected the result of the case. 24
After a careful examination of the records and the evidence, we are unable to find any cogent reason to
disturb the finding of the trial court that the accused raped his daughter, Chanda, on 26 November 1983
and 12 February 1991.
As regards the first charge, there is, however, a variance between the evidence presented and the
allegations of the complaint. The complaint in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 charges the accused with
the crime of rape committed on 26 November 1982. Both Chanda and Cynthia, however, testified that
the incident took place on 26 November 1983. 25 The accused offered no objection to such evidence.
Consequently, the variance was not fatal to the prosecution.
In United States vs. Arcos, 26 this Court ruled:
Where time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential
element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of
the commission of the crime, even if it appear that the crime was
not committed at the precise time or placed alleged, or if the proof
fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the
complaint, providing itappears that the specific crime charged was
in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or
information within the period of the statute of limitations, and at a
place within the jurisdiction of the court. (U.S. vs. Smith, and
cases cited, 2 Phil. Rep., 20).
The unobjected testimony of another date of the commission of the crime charged in Criminal Case No.
Q-91-18465 could even be the basis for an amendment of the complaint to make it conform to the
evidence. 27
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court also provides:
Sec. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in
substance and form,without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads;
and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the
discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of
the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Chanda was less than twelve years old when she was raped by the accused on 26 November 1983.
Since she was born on 2 June 1973, she was then exactly ten years, five months, and twenty-four days
old.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve (12) years of age, even though
neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding
paragraphs shall be present.
xxx xxx xxx
The third paragraph is known as statutory rape or the unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman
below 12 years of age. 28 Otherwise stated, carnal knowledge alone is sufficient for conviction
as the presence of any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 335 is
not required. 29
As found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, the accused had carnal knowledge of his
daughter Chanda — then below twelve years old — on 26 November 1983. We are not persuaded by
the arguments of the accused that if indeed she were raped on that date and several times thereafter,
she should not have kept her silence until she was seventeen years old since she had all the available
remedies for redress as well as relatives who could help her. The equanimity or the wisdom of more
mature persons cannot be expected from a young and immature girl like Chanda. We have said before
that the workings of a human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable and that
people react differently to various situations. 30
In addition to her tender age and immaturity, Chanda was, to say the least, a victim of unfavorable
circumstances not of her own making. These prevented her from exposing earlier the evil deeds of her
father. All that she could proudly claim was a beautiful name — Chanda. She had no decent home. Her
father and her mother were not married and were untrammeled by the bonds of lawful wedlock. When
she was born, her father was under detention for gunrunning and it was only when she was four years
old (1977) when he rejoined his "family." Since then, all the members of the family slept in one room.
Chanda had no choice of another home, for it does not appear that another was available to the family
or that she was prepared to leave it because she had the means to face life alone or that a kind soul
had offered her shelter. She was a victim of poverty and a virtual captive in the only "home" her natural
parents could provide, for she was entirely dependent upon them.
Verily, she was completely under the moral ascendancy and control of her father and the fear alone of a
harsher life outside such a "home" and of what her father would do if she would expose his evil deeds,
made her suffer in silence for a long time the excruciating pains his assaults inflicted upon her. Then
too, although she told her mother about the abuse committed by her father on 26 November
1983, 31 her mother only got angry but did not do anything. Chanda must have felt despair at such
indifference.
Her delay in reporting the sexual assaults to the authorities is thus understandable and does not affect
her credibility. We do not believe that she would fabricate a story of defloration against her own father,
make public her painful and humiliating experiences which are better kept in secret or forgotten, allow
her private parts to be examined, and eventually bring to shame her own family and jeopardize her
chances of marriage unless she was not telling the truth and was motivated by nothing but the desire to
obtain justice for the grievous wrongs committed against her. 32
There was a consummated rape on 12 February 1991. According to Chanda's testimony, at 3:00 a.m.
that day, the accused, who had a balisong with him, laid down beside her, threatened her that she had
only one life which he can take away any time; removed her shorts and panty and then moved on top of
her and inserted "his organ to her organ." Thereafter, he stood up holding his balisong and reiterated his
earlier threat. 33
Considering, however, that the complaint for this incident subject of Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466
charges the accused with the crime of attempted rape, then, as correctly pointed out by the accused in
his second assigned error and concurred in by the Office of the Solicitor General, he cannot be
convicted of consummated rape.
Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides that "[w]hen there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of
the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is
proved." The offense charged in Criminal Case
No. Q-91-18466 (attempted rape) is necessarily included in the offense that was proved (consummated
rape). Accordingly, the accused should be convicted of attempted rape only. The penalty for attempted
rape is prision mayor, which is two degrees lower than that provided by law for rape. 34 The accused is
entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and for attempted rape he may be
sentenced to a penalty whose minimum should be within the range of prision correccional and whose
maximum should be within the range range of prision mayor, taking into account the modifying
circumstances. The alternative circumstance of relationship provided for in Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code should be appreciated against the accused considering that the offended party, Chanda, is
his descendant. In crimes against chastity, such as rape, relationship is aggravating. 35
Prior to R.A. No. 7659, 36 the presence of modifying circumstances would not affect the penalty
of reclusion perpetua prescribed for the crime of rape because such a penalty was then indivisible and
under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall
be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed. However, pursuant to Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659, which
amended Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, reclusion perpetuahas now a defined duration, i.e.,
from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years. There is, however, no corresponding
amendment to Article 76 of the same Code for the purpose of converting reclusion perpetua into a
divisible penalty with three specific
period — minimum, medium, and maximum — and including it in the table provided therein showing the
duration and the time included in each of the periods.
It may thus be said that although the law has now fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua, it did not
make explicit its intention to convert it into a divisible penalty. In any event, Article 65 of the Code which
provides:
Art. 65. Rules in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three periods. — In
cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the
courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into three
equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of
each of the three portions.
may be applied. Accordingly, the time included in the penalty of reclusion perpetua (twenty [20]
years and one [1] days to forty [40] years) can be divided into three equal portions, with each
composing a period. The periods of reclusion perpetua would then be as follows:
minimum — 20 years and 1
day to 26 years and 8 months
medium —
26 years, 8
months and
1 day to 33
years and 4
months
maximum — 34 years, 4
months and 1 day to 40 years
Taking into account the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship in Criminal Case No.
Q-91-18465, the accused may finally be sentenced to thirty-four (34) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of reclusion perpetua.
Considering again such aggravating circumstance, the accused may be sentenced in Criminal Case No.
Q-91-18466 to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor maximum as maximum.
There should also be awards for damages in each of the two cases.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of 28 October 1992 of Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City in Criminal Case
No. Q-91-18465 and Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modifications
indicated above. As modified:
(1) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, accused JOSE CONRADO
LUCAS y BRIONES is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Thirty-four (34) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the offended party the sum
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
 (2) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466, said accused is hereby found
GUILTY beyondreasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED
RAPE only and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from Four (4) years, TWO (2) months
and One (1) day of prision correccional maximum as minimum to
Ten (10) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor maximum
as maximum and to pay the offended party the sum of P30,000.00
as civil indemnity.

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179477 February 6, 2008
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JIMMY TABIO, appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Appellant Jimmy Tabio was charged with three (3) counts of rape in a single Information,1 the
accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That between June 13, 2002 and June 28, 2002 in [Aurora2] the said accused, did then and
there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully, have carnal knowledge of mentally retarded AAA3 by
means of force and intimidation three times all committed while the victim was alone inside
their house and during nighttime which was taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of
the crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora,
Branch 96.4Trial on the merits ensued. The victim, AAA testified that one night in June 2002, while she
was alone in her home, appellant entered her house. He pressed a knife on AAA’s breast, removed her
clothing, fondled her breast, undressed himself, and mounted her as she was seated on a bed. He
inserted his penis in her vagina and ejaculated. AAA was able to recognize the appellant as her house
was lighted with a gas lamp. AAA further testified that the appellant on two succeeding occasions again
entered her home and repeated the same acts on her. 5
Other witnesses for the prosecution presented testimony concerning AAA’s mental condition. A
doctor6 who had trained with the National Center for Mental Health testified that he had examined AAA
and concluded that while she was 23 years old at the time of the rape, she nonetheless had the mental
age of a six-year old child.7 AAA’s mother and grand aunt also testified on her mental retardation and
the occurrences after she had reported the rape to them. 8
Appellant testified in his own behalf, denying that he had raped AAA and offering as alibi that he was up
in the mountain at the time of the rape.9 Appellant’s wife10 and his brother-in-law, Jaime Bautista,11 tried
to corroborate his alibi through their own testimony.
On 25 November 2003, the RTC handed down a decision finding appellant guilty and imposing the
penalty of death on three (3) counts of qualified rape, defined in Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) and
penalized under Article 266-B, paragraph 6 (10) of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC also ordered
appellant to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. 12 The records of the
case were thereafter forwarded to this Court on automatic review. On 7 June 2005, the Court issued a
Resolution13 transferring the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.14
The Court of Appeals15 affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. The appellate court
found appellant guilty of all three (3) counts for simple rape only and not qualified rape. It also reduced
the civil indemnity to P50,000.00 and added an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.16
The case is again before us for our final disposition. Appellant had assigned three (3) errors in his
appeal initially passed upon by the Court of Appeals, to wit: whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty
of qualified rape with the penalty of death in view of the prosecution’s failure to allege a qualifying
circumstance in the information; whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of all three (3) counts of
rape despite the alleged failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and
whether the RTC erred in awarding P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The Court of Appeals properly resolved the first error in appellant’s favor. The information should have
warranted a judgment of guilt only for simple, not qualified rape. We quote with approval the appellate
court when it said:
Under Article 266-B(10)17 of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of the mental
disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the commission of the rape is
the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty. Rule 110[16 of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying and aggravating circumstances
to be alleged with specificity in the information.[16
In the case at bench, however, the information merely states that the appellant had carnal
knowledge with a mentally retarded complainant. It does not state that appellant knew of the
mental disability of the complainant at the time of the commission of the crime. It bears
stressing that the rules now require that the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the
imposition of the death penalty should be specifically stated in the information. Article 266-B
(10) of the Revised Penal Code could not, thus, be applied and the supreme penalty of death
could not be validly imposed.20
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear and unequivocal that both qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be alleged with specificity in the information.
The Court also observes that there is duplicity21 of the offenses charged in the information, which is a
ground for a motion to quash.22 Three (3) separate acts of rape were charged in one information only.
But the failure of appellant to interpose an objection on this ground constitutes waiver.23
We turn to the second issue. While the Court affirms that appellant is guilty of simple rape, we
nonetheless find that only the first rape was conclusively proven. The second and third rapes of which
appellant was charged and found guilty, were not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Our courts have been traditionally guided by three settled principles in the prosecution of the crime of
rape: (1) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove;
(2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
utmost caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.24 In a prosecution for rape, the
complainant’s candor is the single most important issue. If a complainant’s testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the sole basis thereof. 25
We have thoroughly examined AAA’s testimony and found nothing that would cast doubt on the PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness
credibility of her account of the first rape. We quote the pertinent portion of her testimony:
Q When Jimmy placed himself on top of you was he dressed or nude?
PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness
A He was naked, Sir.
xxx
Q You said that he placed himself on top of you. What did Jimmy do while he was on top of
Q Did you have any occasion to see Jimmy inside your house in June 2002? you?

A Yes, Sir. A He pressed a knife on me.

Q What time was that? Q On what part of your body did he press the knife?

A Night time, Sir. A Here, Sir. (Witness indicated the upper part of her left breast)

xxx Q What else did Jimmy do aside from pressing the knife near your breast?

Q You said that Jimmy went inside your house. What did he do there? A Jimmy was in our house, Sir.

A He fondled my breast, Sir. Q Do you know what penis is?

Q Did you have your clothes on when Jimmy Tabio went to your house? A Yes, Sir.

A Yes, sir. Q Do you know what Jimmy did with hs penis?

xxx A Yes, Sir.

Q Don’t be ashamed. You said that you have your clothes on. When Jimmy saw you what Q What did he do with his penis?
did he do with your clothes, if any?
A He placed his penis to my vagina.
A He removed my dress, Sir.
Q What did you feel when Jimmy did that?
xxx
A I felt pain, Sir.
Q So you are now without clothes because you said Jimmy removed your clothes.
What did he do after removing your clothes? Q After Jimmy inserted his penis in your vagina, what else did he do?

A He placed himself on top of me. A Nothing more, Sir.

COURT: to the witness Q Did he move while he was on top of you?

Q Was he standing when Jimmy mounted on you? A Yes, Sir.

A I was sitting, Sir. Q Can you demonstrate his movement while he was on top of you?
 A (Witness indicated the movement by moving her body.) Appellant’s denials and alibi, which are merely self-serving evidence, cannot prevail over the positive,
consistent and straightforward testimony of AAA. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy
xxx to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing
evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was
PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness committed.28 We have meticulously reviewed the records and found no justification to deviate from the
findings of fact of the trial court that—
Q What else did you notice while the penis of Jimmy was in your vagina?
Accused’s alibi that he was in the mountain gathering woods during the period when [AAA]
A There was some kind of milk, Sir. was raped deserves no consideration. When the accused took the witness stand, he gave an
evasive, confused and vague account of his whereabouts at the time the crime was committed
COURT: to the witness as well as with respect to the distance of his whereabouts from the locus criminis. Accused’s
wife and his brother-in-law tried to corroborate his (accused’s) testimony that he was in the
mountain during the commission of rape but to no avail.
Q Where?
xxx
A In my vagina, Sir.
In the instant case, the distance of the place where the accused allegedly was is less than half
PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness a kilometer (200 meters) which could be negotiated in less than an hour. x x x29

Q Why did you notice that? What did you do? However, as to the alleged second and third rape, we find that the prosecution failed to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the offense e.g., carnal knowledge and force or intimidation.
A I watched my vagina, Sir. The only evidence presented to prove the two other charges were AAA’s monosyllabic affirmative
answers to two leading questions if appellant repeated during the second and third times he was in her
house what he had done during the first time. We quote that only portion of AAA’s testimony relating to
Q That is why you saw that thing which looks like milk?
the second and third alleged rapes, to wit:

A Yes, Sir.
PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness

Q Now, it was night time when Jimmy went into your house, is it not?
Q You said that Jimmy went to your house three times. What did he do during the second
time?
A Yes, Sir.
A He entered our house, Sir.
Q How were you able to see Jimmy while it was night time?
Q Yes, he entered your house. Did he repeat what he did during the first time.
A I have a light, Sir.
A Yes, Sir.
Q What kind of light was that?
Q How about the third time? What did he do?
A Gas l[a]mp, Sir. 26 (Emphasis supplied.)
A He has a knife, Sir.
AAA never wavered in her assertion that appellant raped her. AAA’s testimony is distinctively clear, frank
and definite without any pretension or hint of a concocted story despite her low intelligence as can be
Q Yes. Did he repeat what he did during the first time?
gleaned from her answers in the direct examination. The fact of her mental retardation does not impair
the credibility of her unequivocal testimony. AAA’s mental deficiency lends greater credence to her
testimony for someone as feeble-minded and guileless as her could not speak so tenaciously and A Yes, Sir.30 (Emphasis supplied)
explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the
appellant.27
AAA’s testimony on these two later rapes was overly generalized and lacked many specific details on
how they were committed. Her bare statement that appellant repeated what he had done to her the first
time is inadequate to establish beyond reasonable doubt the alleged second and third rapes. Whether
or not he raped her is the fact in issue which the court must determine31 based on the evidence offered.
The prosecution must demonstrate in sufficient detail the manner by which the crime was perpetrated.
Certainly, the testimony of AAA to the effect that the appellant repeated what he did in the first rape
would not be enough to warrant the conclusion that the second and third rape had indeed been
committed. Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each of them should
be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The quantum of evidence in criminal cases requires more than
that.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01301 is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is found GUILTY of only ONE count of simple rape and ACQUITTED
of the TWO other counts of qualified rape. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty reclusion
perpetua, and ordered to pay to the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

In the case of People v. Garcia,32 wherein the appellant was charged with 183 counts of rape, we held
that:

x x x Be that as it may, however, on the bases of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, appellant
can be convicted only of the two rapes committed in November, [sic] 1990 and on July 21, 1994 as
testified to by complainant, and for the eight counts of rape committed in May and June and on July 16,
1994 as admitted in appellants aforementioned letter of August 24, 1994. We cannot agree with the
trial court that appellant is guilty of 183 counts of rape because, as correctly asserted by the
defense, each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each of them
should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On that score alone, the indefinite testimonial
evidence that complainant was raped every week is decidedly inadequate and grossly
insufficient to establish the guilt of appellant therefor with the required quantum of evidence. So
much of such indefinite imputations of rape, which are uncorroborated by any other evidence,
fall within this category.33 (Emphasis supplied)

We must uphold the primacy of the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused when the
evidence at hand falls short of the quantum required to support conviction.

As to the civil liability of appellant, we affirm the reduction by the appellate court of the civil indemnity
to P50,000.00 only, as well as the additional award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, but on rather
different premises, considering our conclusion that he is only guilty of one, not three counts of rape.

The civil indemnity awarded to the victims of qualified rape shall not be less than seventy-five thousand
pesos (P75,000.00),34 and P50,000.00 for simple rape.35 This civil indemnity is awarded for each and
every count of rape, such that one found guilty of two counts of simple rape would be liable to
pay P50,000.00 for each count, or P100,000.00 in all.

We note that the appellate court implicitly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for all three counts of
simple rape. Such award would have been improper for a conviction for three counts of simple
rape.36 Still, because appellant is guilty of one count of simple rape, P50,000.00 still emerges as the
appropriate amount of civil indemnity.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
In addition, the victim or heirs, as the case may be, can also recover moral damages pursuant to Article
Manila
2219 of the Civil Code. In rape cases, moral damages are awarded without need of proof other than the
fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an
award.37 In this respect, we agree with the appellate court in the award of P50,000.00 as moral EN BANC
damages. The appellate court’s award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages by way of public example
is also proper.38 G.R. No. L-30146 February 24, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSEPH CASEY alias "Burl" and RICARDO FELIX alias "CARDING TUWAD", defendants-
appellants.
GUERRERO, J.:
Automatic review of the judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court in Criminal Case No. CCC-VI -6 Rizal (1
7857), imposing upon Joseph Casey alias "Burl" and Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" the capital
punishment for the death of Alfredo Valdez. The dispositive portion thereof, states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Joseph Casey alias "Buri" and Ricardo
Felix alias "Carding Tuwad", GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the commission of
the crime of Murder, under Article No. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in
an Information, and hereby sentences them to suffer the PENALTY OF DEATH, with
accessory penalties as prescribed by law; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased,
Alfredo Valdez, in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000) PESOS, jointly and
severally; and to pay the costs.
On May 22, 1968, Assistant Fiscal Herminio I. Benito filed an Information for Murder against accused-
appellant Joseph Casey alias "Burl", alleging:
That on or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the municipality of San Juan,
province of Rizal, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then armed with a knife, together with one Ricardo Felix alias
"Carding Tuwad" who is then armed with a firearm and who was (sic) still at large,
and the two of them conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and
aiding one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery and taking
advantage of superior strength, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot and stab with the said firearm and knife one Alfredo Valdez,
thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law. 1
On June 24, 1968, upon arraignment, said accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the said
complaint. Then, sometime in September, 1968, accused ' appellant Ricardo Felix alias "Carding
Tuwad" was arrested. Accordingly, an Amended Information was filed by the same fiscal to include
Ricardo Felix as an accused, stating as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the municipality of San Juan,
province of Rizal, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused Joseph Casey alias "Burl" being then armed with a knife, together
with the accused Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" who was then armed with a
firearm, and the two of them conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery
and taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot and stab with the said firearm and knife one
Alfredo Valdez, thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds which directly caused
his death.
Contrary to law. 2
On October 15, 1968, accused Ricardo Felix entered the plea of not guilty upon being arraigned and
trial was accordingly had.
Mercedes Palomo, 28, resident of 242 Mahinhin Street, San Juan, Rizal, testified that on March 31,
1968, at around three o'clock in the afternoon, while in the house of her aunt, she heard a shot coming
from the pool room located near her aunt's place. She then looked towards the direction of the pool
room and saw three men coming out, one of them being pursued by the two others. She recognized the
man being pursued as Alfredo Valdez alias "G.I." She, however, did not know the names of the pursuers
but described one of them as a short man, with curly black hair and black complexion while the other as
having a fair complexion. When asked as to whether she can Identify them, she answered in the
affirmative and pointed to Joseph Casey and Ricardo Felix. 3
Continuing her testimony, she said that she saw the one with curly hair overtake and stab the victim
several times, while in the meantime, Ricardo Felix stood nearby holding a gun which he later fired once
at the victim. 4
Jose Rivera, 57 years old, a policeman, was presented by the prosecution to testify on the investigation
he conducted before Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio on April 1, 1968 involving the accused Joseph Casey.
He submitted in evidence the extrajudicial statement of the said accused, contained in a two page
sworn statement wherein said accused narrated having a rendezvous with the accused Ricardo Felix
and with another person named Rudy at Cubao Rotonda, Quezon City at about nine o'clock in the
morning of March 31, 1968 and thereafter proceeding to Barrio Halo-Halo, San Juan, Rizal at about
three o'clock in the afternoon, where the incident happened. 5
Patrolman Honorio Carritero, 46 years old, also a policeman, testified that in the afternoon of March 31,
1968. he was awakened by noise that somebody was stabbed and shot. Upon going out to investigate,
he saw the victim lying down near the toilet with stab wounds but still alive, hovering between life and
death. He then called for a jeep and brought him to a hospital. 6
Finally, Dr. Mariano B. Cueva, 32 years of age, a physician, was presented to testify on the Necropsy
Report No. 58-425 of Alfredo Valdez, herein quoted as follows:
Marked paleness of lips, nailbeds, and integument.
Abrasion, 1.5 x 0.7 cm., right scapular region of back, 12.0 cm. from posterior median
line.
Stab wounds: (1) 1.1 cm. long, spindle shape, located at left hypochondriac region of
abdomen, 11.0 cm. from anterior median line, level of 8th intercostal space; long axis
is oriented horizontally, medial extremity sharp, lateral extremity contused, edges
clean-cut and slightly gaping, with bevelled lower border; attract is directed backward
upward medially, entering abdominal cavity and perforating along its track the greater
momentum, body of stomach, body of pancreas, and partly severing the abdominal
aorta at the level of 12th thoracic vertebra; approximate depth, 10.0 cms.
 (2) 1.1 cm. long, spindle shape, located at umbilical region of abdomen, 2.3. cm. to
the left of anterior median line, 6.0 cm. above the level of navel; long axis oriented
horizontally, medial extremity sharp, lateral extremity contused, edges clean- cut and
gaping, with bevelled lower border; track is directed backward upward and medially,
entering abdominal cavity and perforating along its track the greater momentum,
pylorus of stomach and body of pancreas; approximate depth, 10.0 cms.
(3) 1.0 cm. long, spindle shape, located at left infra scapular region of the back, 8.5
cm. from posterior median line, level of 9th rib; long axis is oriented slightly downward
and laterally, lateral extremity sharp, medial extremity contused, edges clean-cut and
gaping with bevelled upper border; track is directed downward slightly forward and
medially taking a deep intra-muscular route at left posterior lumbar region to a depth
of 9.0 cm.
(4) 1.2 cm. long, slightly curvilinear in shape, located at right posterior lumbar region,
8.0 cm. from posterior lumbar region, 8.0 cm. from posterior median line, 12.0 cm.
above iliac crest convexity of wound is directed upward, medial extremity sharp,
lateral extremity contused, edges clean-cut and gaping, with bevelled upper border;
track is directed downward slightly forward and laterally, taking a subcutaneous route
at right lateral lumbar region to a depth of 6.5 cm.
Hemoperitoneum — 840 cc.
Hematomas, retroperitoneal, severe, bilateral.
Heart and its big vessels, almost empty of blood.
Brain and other visceral organs, markedly pale.
7
Stomach, filled with dark fluid and clotted blood about 800 cc.
Case of Death: Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to stab wounds of
abdomen.
On the other hand, the evidence for the defense consisted of the testimonies of the two accused.
Joseph Casey, when called to testify on his behalf, admitted having stabbed the victim, Alfredo Valdez
but alleged that he did so in self-defense. His version of the incident was that on March 31, 1968, he
went to the house of Ricardo Felix but was told that he was not in. So he proceeded to the pool room,
located around two or three meters away from the residence of Ricardo Felix. At the start, he simply
witnessed those playing pool and when they were through, he himself played. While playing, he
accidentally bumped the victim with the pool cue (tako). He accordingly asked for apoloy but the victim
simply ignored him and left the place immediately. 8
When he was through playing, he went out and saw the victim waiting for him outside, accompanied by
six or seven persons holding pieces of wood. As the place had no other exit, he proceeded on his way
together with one person named "Rody." While passing by, the victim suddenly drew a "balisong" and
lunged it on him. But he was able to parry the thrust. He then took hold of the victim's right hand and
grappled with him. In the process, he successfully wrested the knife from him. He then used the weapon
against him, hitting him about two or three times. While he was contending with the victim, the latter's
companions joined in and hit him with pieces of wood, inflicting "gasgas" or abrasions on his back. 9
The other accused, Ricardo Felix, testified that he did not see Joseph Casey on March 31, 1968.
Likewise, he said that he knew the victim, Alfredo Valdez; that he last saw him alive in a store on the
same day that he was killed when he was about to leave for Manila; and that he learned that he was
dead when he returned home. 10
On the basis of the aforesaid evidence, the court a quo rendered the aforementioned judgment of
conviction. It found that two aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, namely:
employing or taking advantage of superior strength and evident premeditation, one of which qualified
the killing to murder. Hence, this automatic review.
The able counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant raised the following assignments of errors in a
well-prepared brief:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Court a quo erred in illegally trying appellant Casey on the amended information
without arraignment, and in finding him guilty after such illegal trial.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Court a quo erred in holding that the appellants acted with evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength, and in qualifying the crane committed as aggravated
murder.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Court a quo erred in holding that the appellants had forged a conspiracy to kill
the victim, Alfredo Valdez.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Court a quo erred in holding that both appellants were liable for the death of
Alfredo Valdez; if any crime had been committed at all, the only person responsible
therefore was appellant Casey, and, at that, only for homicide, instead of murder.
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Court a quo erred in discounting appellant Casey's defense that he acted in
legitimate self-defense.
SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
 The Court a quo erred in discounting the defense of alibi interposed by appellant
Felix.
SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Court a quo erred in not acquitting both appellants. 11
We do not find merit in the first assignment of error. The lack of arraignment under the amended
information is objected to by accused-appellant Joseph Casey allegedly on the ground that there is a
violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the charge against him. There can be a violation of
such right, however, only when the amendment pertains to matters of substance. In the case at bar, the
alterations introduced in the information refer to the inclusion of accused appellant Ricardo Felix to the
same charge of murder. They do not change the nature of the crime against accused-appellant Casey.
Conspiracy, evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength are similarly
alleged in both informations. No extenuating circumstance is likewise alleged in both. Thus the
amendment of the information as far as accused-appellant Casey is concerned is one of form and not of
substance as it is not prejudicial to his rights.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an information has been said to
be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to
the information in the one form as in the other. 12A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that
an amendment to an information introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which
does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a charge
which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or
deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form
and not of substance — not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by Section 13, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Court. 13
We, however, find the second assignment of error of accused- appellants meritorious. The lower court
erred in its findings and conclusions, herein quoted below, that the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime:
In the morning of March 31, 1968, from the evidence on the record, the two (2)
accused, Joseph Casey and Ricardo Felix, had rendezvous in Cubao, Quezon City,
and planned to kill the victim, Alfredo Valdez. (Evident premeditation and conspiracy)
There was superior strength that was used because the victim, Alfredo Valdez, was
alone, being pursued by the two accused, who were both armed. The two accused
did not waste time in planning the killing of the victim on March 31, 1968. They clung
to their determination of killing the victim. From 9:00 o'clock in the morning, they had
the firm conviction and strong determination of killing the victim up to the time of the
execution of their evil motive. (People vs. Caushi, G. R. No. L16495) 14
Indeed, accused-appellant Joseph Casey gave an extrajudicial sworn statement that he met accused-
appellant Ricardo Felix and another person named Rudy in Cubao, Quezon City on that fateful day.
However, there is no showing that this meeting was purposely arranged to plan the killing of the victim.
In fact, the following questions and answers in the said sworn statement show that there was no
preconceived design to kill the victim:
7. T— Sino ang sinasabi mong binaril at sinaksak mo?
S — Hindi ko po kilala dahil noon ko po lamang nakita ang
nasabing tao.
8. T— Maari mo bang isalaysay ang buong pangyayari?
S — Kami po ay nagkita nila Carding Tuwad at isang
nagngangalang Rody sa Cubao, Quezon City, ng mga alas 9:00 ng
umaga, Marzo 31, 1968, at kami ay nag-inuman. Matapos kaming
mag-inuman, ng mga mag-aalas 3:00 ng hapon ng araw ding iyon,
nagyaya po si Carding doon sa kanila sa Barrio Halo-Halo, San
Juan, Rizal, at sa paglalakad namin doon sa daang Mahinhin, San
Juan, Rizal, nakita ni Carding ang isang lalaki, at ang ginawa ay
nilapitan niya. Ng makita ng lalaki si Carding, tumakbo po, at ang
ginawa ni Carding ay kanyang hinabol. 15
The subsequent portions of the said sworn statement further militate against the existence of evident
premeditation. Thus, when accused-appellant Casey was asked why Ricardo Felix shot the victim, he
answered: "Noon pong nakasakay na kami sa jeep, tinanong ko siya kung bakit nangyari ang away na
yaon at ang sabi ni Carding ay. DATI KO NANG NAKAENKWENTRO YAONG TAO" (Question No.
28). And when asked why he stabbed the victim, he replied: Dahilan kasama ko po si Carding kaya ko
po nasaksak ang tao. Hindi ko kusang kagustuhan na saksakin ang tao kung hindi dahil sa nakasama
ko si Carding.
(Question No. 29)
There is evident premeditation when the killing had been carefully planned by the offender or when he
had previously prepared the means which he had considered adequate to carry it out, when he had
prepared beforehand the means suitable for carrying it into execution, when he has had sufficient time
to consider and accept the final consequences, and when there had been a concerted plan. 16 It has
also been held that to appreciate the circumstances of evident premeditation, it is necessary to
establish the following; (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) the act
manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and execution to snow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and
to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warning. 17
From the answers of accused-appellant Casey in said sworn statement, it can be gleaned that the killing
was not a preconceived plan. It was not preceded by any reflection or deep thought. It was just a
spontaneous decision reached when the victim started to run away upon being approached by accused-
appellant Ricardo Felix. Evident premeditation cannot, thus, be considered in this case. The Solicitor
General himself agrees with the defense that this circumstance has not been duly proved (People's
Brief, p. 8). Hence, the crime committed is simple homicide (Article 249, Revised Penal Code).
There are indeed two accused-appellants in this case charged with the murder of not one victim but
superiority in number does not necessarily mean superiority in strength. It is necessary to show that the
aggressors "cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from their superiority in strength." 18 In
the case of U.S. vs.. Devela, et al., 19there were two accused who were armed with a bolo and a dagger.
But the circumstance of abuse of superiority was not taken into consideration because the mere fact,
according to this Court, of there being a superiority of number is not sufficient to bring the case within
this provision. There must be proof of the relative physical strength of the aggressors and the assaulted
party; 20 or proof that the accused simultaneously assaulted the deceased. 21As likewise held in People
vs. Trumata and Baligasa, 22 the mere fact that the two accused may have inflicted fatal wounds on the
deceased with their respective bolos does not justify a finding that advantage was taken of superior
strength in the absence of proof showing that they cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage
from their superiority of strength.
Thus, in the face of the evidence on record showing that although the victim was pursued by both of the
accused-appellants 23 and that he was unarmed 24 while the accused-appellants were both armed, one
with a gun and the other with a long pointed weapon, 25 since it is also duly proved that it was only
accused-appellant Casey who assaulted and inflicted stab wounds on him as the other accused-
appellant merely stood nearby toying with his gun, abuse of superiority cannot be said to have attended
the commission of the crime.
The third essential issue to be resolved is whether or not there is conspiracy between the two accused
in the commission of the crime. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 26 This agreement need not be in writing
or be expressly manifested. 27 It is sufficient that there is a mutual implied understanding between the
malefactors as shown by their concerted action towards the fulfillment of the same objective. In People
v. Cadag, 28 it was held: "Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period
prior to the occurrence; from the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of
the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution." To the same effect is
the ruling in other cases decided by this Court. 29
Pursuant to this uniform and consistent jurisprudence on the existence of conspiracy by the mere proof
of community of design and purpose on the part of the accused, We hold that conspiracy exists in this
case, True enough that there is no direct showing that the accused had conspired together, but their
acts and the attendant circumstances disclose that common motive that would make accused Ricardo
Felix as a co-principal with the actual slayer, Joseph Casey. Without doubt, he performed overt acts in
furtherance of the conspiracy. In People vs. Peralta, 30 it was held that such overt act may consist in
actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, in lending moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or in exerting moral ascendancy over the rest
of the conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy. In the case at bar, Ricardo Felix's
overt acts consist in instigating the pursuit of the deceased, in firing a shot at him and in giving Joseph
Casey encouragement by his armed presence while the latter inflicted the fatal wounds on the
deceased.
From the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant Joseph Casey, it can also be inferred that
Ricardo Felix was the moving factor of the evil act perpetrated by the former against the victim. While it
was Joseph Casey who inflicted the mortal wounds that caused the death of the victim, he did so out of
his perverted sense of friendship or companionship with Ricardo Felix.
Hence, it would be incongruous to acquit Ricardo Felix and put all the blame of the killing on Joseph
Casey when it was the latter who merely joined the former in his criminal resolution. The fact that he did
nothing but toyed with his gun when Joseph Casey successively stabbed the victim means that he
concurred with the wife of Casey to do away with the victim. For this reason, he should also be held
accountable, notwithstanding the fact that his shot did not hit the victim and that the cause of death of
the victim is the stab wounds inflicted by Casey. In People vs. Peralta, 31 it was held that the moment it
is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony proved,
collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall
not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators
present at the scene of the crime.
The above discussion also disposes of the fourth assignment of error of accused-appellants. So We
proceed with the fifth assignment of error.
We find that the respondent court correctly disregarded Joseph Casey's claim of self-defense. Besides
being unworthy of credence, said claim is uncorroborated and contrary to the testimony of the
eyewitness, Mercedes Palomo.
The fact that the victim sustained four stab wounds while the accused complained merely of abrasions
on his back indicates the falsity of the claim. The accused failed to present a medical certificate for the
bruises he allegedly sustained. He likewise failed to present anybody to attest to the truth of his
allegations. There is no clear and convincing evidence that the elements of self-defense are present.
On the other hand, the prosecution had not only one but several eyewitnesses to the crime as shown by
the different affidavits attached to the records of the case. Although only one of the eyewitnesses was
presented in court, her lone testimony on what actually transpired, negating the claim of self-defense, is
more credible than the version of Joseph Casey. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from
the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself. Human perception can be warped by
the impact the events and testimony colored by the unconscious workings of the mind. No better test
has yet been found to measure the value of a witness' testimony than its conformity to the knowledge
and common experience of mankind. 32
We likewise find that respondent court correctly denied the defense of alibi of Ricardo Felix. Alibi, in
order to be given full faith and credit must be clearly established and must not leave any room for doubt
as to its plausibility and verity. 33 In the case at bar, said accused-appellant failed to show clearly and
convincingly that he was at some other place about the time of the alleged crime. He merely said that
he was at home and that he went to Manila. 34 As pointed out by the Solicitor General, he did not even
specify the exact place at Manila where he had gone and the purpose for going there. Then, while said
defense was corroborated by Joseph Casey, the latter's testimony lacks that character of
trustworthiness since it is very apparent that he was merely attempting to assume full and exclusive
responsibility for the crime. Finally, said defense is unavailing when there is positive Identification.
Prosecution witness, Mercedes Palomo, gave distinct attributes of Ricardo Felix in her sworn statement
that leave no iota of doubt that he was one of the perpetrators of the crime.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court under automatic review is MODIFIED in that the accused-
appellants Joseph Casey and Ricardo Felix are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide without any attending circumstances and should be sentenced to reclusion temporal in its
medium period. But applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of the accused is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The accused are likewise sentenced to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Alfredo Valdez in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00)
jointly and severally, and to pay the costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4017 August 30, 1951
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
JOSE C. ZULUETA, respondent-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Special Counsel Pedro Quinto for petitioners
and appellants.
Manuel C. Briones and Mariano A. Albert for respondent and appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
Review of decision of the Court of Appeals that annulled the order of Hon. Juan R. Liwag, Judge
admitting the amended information filed in Criminal Case No. 11232 of Manila.
There is no question about these facts:
1. On October 15, 1949 an information was filed in said criminal case charging Jose C. Zulueta with the
crime of malversation of public property. Copy of the information is appended hereto (App. A.). The
substance of the accusation is that the accused, as Acting Chairman of the Surplus Property
Commission, wilfully or thru abandonment permitted Beatriz Poblete to take and convert 3,000 kegs of
nails of the aforesaid Commission. It is alleged that he secured the approval of sale to her of said nails
at very low prices by "astutely" prevailing upon Commissioner Angel Llanes to approve it on the pretext
of urgency to expedite the liquidation of surplus properties. As an alternative charge the information
states that at least through abandonment the accused permitted Beatriz Poblete to carry the hardware
away.
2. Arraigned on November 24, 1949, the accused pleaded "not guilty."
3. On January 14, 1950, the prosecution submitted an amended information (App. B), which practically
reproducing the original accusation, contained the additional assertion — among others — that in
permitting the misappropriation the accused Jose C. Zulueta acted in conspiracy with Commissioner
Llanes, who had subsequently been booked for malversation of the identical public property (nails) in
Criminal Case no. 11727 of the same court.
4. The accused objected to the admission of the amended information contending that it introduced
allegations about acts and omission constituting another offense, and that the amendments were
substantial and prejudicial to his right.
5. The court admitted amended information by its order dated February 28, 1950.
6. Having failed a in a motion to reconsider, the accused started proceedings on certiorari in the Court
of Appeals to annul the last mentioned order of admission.
7. The appellate court upheld his contentions. Hence, the People presented this petition for review,
which was given due course.
The issue require application of the principles that after the defendant has pleaded, the information may
be amended as to all matters of form, in the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the defendant. (Sec. 13, Rule 106). At that stage, no substantial amendment
may be permitted.
The question for decision is: Was the amendment purely a matter of form? Or did it touch upon matters
of substance?
The amended pleading, with its deletions, transportation and rephrasing, practically added a full page to
the original seven-page information. Seeing the prosecution's insistence in its admission, to the extent
of appealing to this Court even at the risk of delaying the proceedings, one would naturally suppose that
its moves are dictated by the necessities — neither formal nor unsubstantial — of the case for the
People.
Indeed, contrasting the two informations one will perceive that whereas in the first the accused is
charged with misappropriation, of public property because: (1) he deceived Angel Llanes into approving
the bargain sale of nails to Beatriz Poblete or (2) at least, by his abandonment he permitted that woman
to obtain information a third ground responsibility is inserted, namely, that he connived and conspired
with Angel Llanes to consummate the give-away transaction.
Again it will be observed that the third ground of action in effect contradicts the original theory of the
information: if the accused conspired with Llanes, he did not deceive the latter, and did not by
mere negligence permit the sale.
Now therefore, an amended information stating forth a different manner of committing the felony, — a
totally new proposition-does it merely introduce a formal amendment?
We do not think so. Even in civil cases — wherein the rules are more liberal as to amendments — its
not generally permissible to alter plaintiff's theory of the case, alteration being substantial.1
In this connection it must be recalled that under the rules of criminal procedure there is further limitation
to formal amendments, namely, that the amendment "can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
defendant." Surely the preparation made by herein accused to face to meet the new situation. For
undoubtedly the allegations of conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the
accused Zulueta all the facts, knowledge, admission and even omissions2 of his co-conspirator Angel
Llanes in furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendments thereby widens the battlefront to allow the
use by the prosecution of newly discovered weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp.
Thus it would seem inequitable to sanction the tactical movement at this stage of the controversy,
bearing in mind that the accused is only guaranteed two-days' preparation for trial. Needless to
emphasize, as in criminal cases the liberty, even the life, of the accused is the at stake, it is always wise
and proper that he be fully apprised of the charges, to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to
injustice. The prosecution has too many facilities to covet the added advantage of meeting unprepared
adversaries.
Some passages from "Regala contra El Juez de Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Bataan"3 are quoted
by petitioners. Therein the accused pleaded not guilty to an formation for murder, and later the fiscal
amended the indictment by including two other persons charged with the same offense and alleging
conspiracy between the three. Five justices held that the amendment was not substantial. But that
situation differs from the one at bar. The amendment there did not modify the basic theory of the
prosecution that the accused had killed the deceased by a voluntary act and deed. Here there is an
innovation, or the introduction of another alternative imputation, which, to Make matters worse, is
inconsistent with the original allegations. In view of the above, we believe it unnecessary to discuss the
defendant's proposition that the original information did not actually describe the crime, of malversation
(but only of theft), which the amended information sets forth. Neither is it unnecessary to pass on the
other minor amendments objected to.

One other point remains to be threshed out. The petitioners insist that certiorari is improper, because
the accused has an adequate remedy by appeal. Of course these special civil actions may not generally
be entertained if the party has an adequate remedy by appeal. However there have been exceptions.
(Cf. Moran 3rd Ed. Vol. II, p. 148). For instance, in Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad 47 Phil. 385 this Court took
cognizance of a petition for certiorari and prohibition notwithstanding the accused could have appealed
in due time. The Court's action was premised on the public welfare and the advancement of public
policy, in view of the many merchants interested in the Chinese Bookkeeping Law.

In Dimayuga vs. Fajardo (43 Phil., 304) this Court admitted a petition to enjoin the prosecution of certain
chiropractors. Although these could have appealed if convicted, the petition was given due course for
the orderly administration of justice to avoid possible oppression by the strong arm of the law.

And Arevalo vs. Nepomuceno (63 Phil. 627), was a petition for certiorari to challenge the trial judge's
action permitting an amended information. This Court passed on the petition, despite the availability of
appeal at the proper time.

Now, inasmuch as the surplus properly cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to
proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof, and inasmuch as the Court of Appeals delving into
the legal question has reached a conclusion which we do not reckon to be erroneous, it would not be in
furtherance of justice presently to dismiss the whole proceedings on the technical ground that the
accused has a remedy by appeal at the proper time.

Wherefore the judgment under review will be affirmed. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-31665 August 6, 1975
LEONARDO ALMEDA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as presiding judge of the Circuit Criminal Court,
Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal, and HON. GREGORIO PINEDA, City Fiscal of Pasay
City, respondents.
Honorio Makalintal, Jr. for petitioner.
Pasay City Fiscal Gregorio Pineda for respondent.
CASTRO, J.:
The petitioner Leonardo Almeda (alias Nardong Paa) was charged, together with five others, with the
crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle (criminal case 285-Pasay) in the Circuit Criminal Court of
Pasig, Rizal, presided by the respondent Judge Onofre Villauz. The amount of the bond recommended
for the provisional release of Almeda was P15,000, and this was approved by the respondent judge with
a direction that it be posted entirely in cash.
At the hearing of February 18, 1970, Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post a surety bond in
lieu of the cash bond required of him. This request was denied, and so was an oral motion for
reconsideration, on the ground that the amended information imputed habitual delinquency and
recidivism on the part of Almeda.
At the same hearing, the respondent city fiscal, thru his assistant, reiterated his oral motion made at a
previous hearing for amendment of the information so as to include allegations of recidivism and
habitual delinquency in the particular case of Almeda. The latter vigorously objected, arguing that (a)
such an amendment was premature since no copies of prior conviction could yet be presented in court,
(b) the motion to amend should have been made in writing in order to enable him to object formally, and
(c) the proposed amendment would place him in double jeopardy considering that he had already
pleaded not guilty to the information. The trial court nevertheless granted the respondent fiscal's motion
in open court. An oral motion for reconsideration was denied.
Immediately thereafter, the assistant fiscal took hold of the original information and, then and there,
entered his amendment by annotating the same on the back of the document. The petitioner forthwith
moved for the dismissal of the charge on the ground of double jeopardy, but this motion and a motion
for reconsideration were denied in open court.
Hence, the present special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
Two issues are posed to us for resolution: First, whether the respondent judge has the authority to
require a strictly cash bond and disallow the petitioner's attempt to post a surety bond for his provisional
liberty, and second, whether the amendment to the information, after a plea of not guilty thereto, was
properly allowed in both substance and procedure.
1. As defined by section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, bail is "the security required and given for
the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." The purpose of requiring
bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the
trial.1
In this jurisdiction, the accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior to conviction except when he is
charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. This right is guaranteed by the
Constitution,2 and may not be denied even where the accused has previously escaped detention,3 or by
reason of his prior absconding.4 In order to safeguard the right of an accused to bail, the Constitution
further provides that "excessive bail shall not be required." This is logical cause the imposition of an
unreasonable bail may negate the very right itself. We have thus held that "where conditions imposed
upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional
right to bail, we would not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy."5
Coming to the issue at hand, the amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered in terms of surety
or property bonds, may be excessive if demanded in the form of cash. A surety or property bond does
not require an actual financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the property owner, and in the case
of the bondsman the bond may be obtained by the accused upon the payment of a relatively small
premium. Only the reputation or credit standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price at which
the property can be sold, is placed in the hands of the court to guarantee the production of the body of
the accused at the various proceedings leading to his conviction or acquittal. Upon the other hand, the
posting of a cash bond would entail a transfer of assets into the possession of the court, and its
procurement could work untold hardship on the part of the accused as to have the effect of altogether
denying him his constitutional right to bail.
Aside from the foregoing, the condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his
posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter. The
sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court, and there
should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of the
government. The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only
because our rules expressly provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by depositing cash
with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail presupposes
the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be delivered.6 And even where cash
bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. This
is clearly deducible from the language of section 14 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 14. Deposit of money as bail. — At any time after the amount of bail is fixed by
order, the defendant, instead of giving bail, may deposit with the nearest collector of
internal revenue, or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the sum mentioned in the
order, and upon delivering to the court a proper certificate of the deposit, must be
discharged from custody. Money thus deposited, shall be applied to the payment of
the fine and costs for which judgment may be given; and the surplus, if any, shall be
returned to the defendant.
Thus, the trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist that the accused obtain his
provisional liberty only thru a cash bond.
But while we repudiate the particular measure adopted by the respondent judge, we cannot fault the
motive that caused him to demur to the petitioner's offer of a surety bond. Based on the petitioner's past
record,7 the range of his career in crime weighs heavily against letting him off easily on a middling
amount of bail. The likelihood of his jumping bail or committing other harm to the citizenry while on
provisional liberty is a consideration that simply cannot be ignored.
Fortunately, the court is not without devices with which to meet the situation. First, it could increase the
amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level. Second, as part of the power of the court over the
person of the accused and for the purpose of discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a
notorious defendant while on provisional liberty, the latter could be required, as one of the conditions of
his bail bond, to report in person periodically to the court and make an accounting of his movements.
And third, the accused might be warned, though this warning is not essential to the requirements of due
process, that under the 1973 Constitution8 "Trial may proceed notwithstanding his absence provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified."
With respect to the amount of the bail bond, the trial court is well advised to consider, inter alia, the
following factors, where applicable: (1) the ability of the accused to give bail: (2) the nature of the
offense; (3) the penalty for the offense charged; (4) the character and reputation of the accused (5) the
health of the accused; (6) the character and strength of the evidence; (7) the probability of the
accused's appearance or non-appearance at the trial; (8) forfeiture of previous bonds; (9) whether the
accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) whether the accused is under bond for
appearance at trial in other cases. 9
It is not amiss, at this point, to remind all courts to exercise extreme care and caution in the screening of
bondsmen and sureties in regard to their reputation, solvency and promptitude. Aside from the other
precautions hitherto considered useful courts should see to it that all surety bonds are accompanied by
corresponding clearances from the Office of the Insurance Commissioner. Bondsmen who cannot make
good their undertaking render inutile all efforts at making the bail system work in this jurisdiction.
2. Anent the second issue posed by the petitioner, the amendment of the information to include
allegations of habitual delinquency and recidivism, after a previous plea thereto by the accused, is valid
and in no way violates his right to be fully apprised before trial of the charges against him.
Under section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has discretion to allow amendments to
the information on all matters of form after the defendant has pleaded and during the trial when the
same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant. What are prohibited at this stage of
the proceedings are amendments in substance. And the substantial matter in a complaint or information
is the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.
All other matters are merely of form. 10
Under our law, a person is considered a habitual delinquent "if within a period of ten years from the date
of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto,
estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener." 11 The law imposes
an additional penalty based on the criminal propensity of the accused apart from that provided by law
for the last crime of which he is found guilty. Habitual delinquency is not however, a crime in itself, it is
only a factor in determining a total penalty. 12 Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code which treats of
habitual delinquency does not establish a new crime, but only regulates the "effect of the attendance of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency." as its caption indicates. In fact,
the provision on habitual delinquency is found in a section of the Code prescribing rules for the
application of penalties, not in a section defining offense. 13 A recidivist, upon the other hand, is one
who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. Recidivism is likewise not a
criminal offense; it is but one of the aggravating circumstances enumerated by the said Code. 14
The additional allegations of habitual delinquency and recidivism do not have the effect of charging
another offense different or distinct from the charge of qualified theft (of a motor vehicle) contained in
the information. Neither do they tend to correct any defect in the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
subject-matter of the case. The said new allegations relate only to the range of the penalty that the court
might impose in the event of conviction. They do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case nor
possibly prejudice the form of defense the accused has or will assume. Consequently, in authorizing the
amendments, the respondent judge acted with due consideration of the petitioner's rights and did not
abuse his discretion.
Anent the petitioner's claim that the amendment of the information by the State places him in double
jeopardy, it should be remembered that there is double jeopardy only when all the following requisites
obtain in the original prosecution; (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent. 15
It is clear that the petitioner Almeda has not yet been convicted nor acquitted of the charge of qualified
theft of a motor vehicle contained in the original information. Neither has the case against him been
dismissed or otherwise terminated. The mere amendment of the information to include allegations of
habitual delinquency and recidivism does not have the effect of a dismissal of the criminal action for
qualified theft alleged in the original information. 16
It cannot likewise be said that the accused is being placed in jeopardy a second time for the past crimes
of which he had been convicted. The constitutional objection, on the ground of double jeopardy, to the
statute providing an additional penalty to be meted out to habitual delinquents, has long been
rejected. 17
The procedure taken by the respondent fiscal and allowed by the respondent judge in the amendment
of the information does not, however, merit our approbation. Under section 2 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court, "all motions shall be made in writing except motions for continuance made in the presence of the
adverse party, or those made in the course of a hearing or trial." A motion to amend the information,
after the accused has pleaded thereto, is certainly one that should be placed in writing and properly set
for hearing. We are loath to give our imprimatur to the kind of shortcut devised by the respondents,
especially as it relates to an alteration in the information. Considering, however, that the petitioner was
not deprived of his day in court and was in fact given advance warning of the proposed amendment,
although orally, we refrain from disturbing the said amendment.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of the respondent judge of February 18, 1970 denying the motion of the
petitioner Almeda that he be allowed to post a surety bond instead of a cash bond is hereby set aside,
without prejudice, however, to increasing the amount of the bail bond and/or the imposition of such
conditions as the respondent judge might consider desirable and proper for the purpose of insuring the
attendance of the petitioner at the trial, provided they are consistent with the views herein expressed.
No costs.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 160451 February 9, 2007
EDUARDO G. RICARZE, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK (PCIBANK), Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 68492, and its Resolution2 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was employed as a collector-messenger by City Service Corporation, a
domestic corporation engaged in messengerial services. He was assigned to the main office of Caltex
Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati City. His primary task was to collect checks payable to Caltex and
deliver them to the cashier. He also delivered invoices to Caltex’s customers.3
On November 6, 1997, Caltex, through its Banking and Insurance Department Manager Ramon
Romano, filed a criminal complaint against petitioner before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
City for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. Romano alleged that, on October 16,
1997, while his department was conducting a daily electronic report from Philippine Commercial &
Industrial Bank (PCIB) Dela Rosa, Makati Branch, one of its depositary banks, it was discovered that
unknown to the department, a company check, Check No. 74001 dated October 13, 1997 in the amount
of ₱5,790,570.25 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, had been cleared through PCIB on October 15, 1997.
An investigation also revealed that two other checks (Check Nos. 73999 and 74000) were also missing
and that in Check No. 74001, his signature and that of another signatory, Victor S. Goquinco, were
forgeries. Another check, Check No. 72922 dated September 15, 1997 in the amount of ₱1,790,757.25
likewise payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, was also cleared through the same bank on September 24,
1997; this check was likewise not issued by Caltex, and the signatures appearing thereon had also
been forged. Upon verification, it was uncovered that Check Nos. 74001 and 72922 were deposited at
the Banco de Oro’s SM Makati Branch under Savings Account No. S/A 2004-0047245-7, in the name of
a regular customer of Caltex, Dante R. Gutierrez.
Gutierrez, however, disowned the savings account as well as his signatures on the dorsal portions
thereof. He also denied having withdrawn any amount from said savings account. Further investigation
revealed that said savings account had actually been opened by petitioner; the forged checks were
deposited and endorsed by him under Gutierrez’s name. A bank teller from the Banco de Oro, Winnie P.
Donable Dela Cruz, positively identified petitioner as the person who opened the savings account using
Gutierrez’s name.4
In the meantime, the PCIB credited the amount of ₱581,229.00 to Caltex on March 29, 1998. However,
the City Prosecutor of Makati City was not informed of this development. After the requisite preliminary
investigation, the City Prosecutor filed two (2) Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents on June 29, 1998 against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 63. The Informations are worded as follows:
Criminal Case No. 98-1611
That on or about the 24th day of September 1997 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a private individual, with
intent to defraud and intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of Caltex Philippines, Inc.
through its duly authorized officers/representatives, and by means of falsification of commercial
document, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Caltex Phils., Inc., in the
following manner, to wit: said accused, having obtained possession of PCIBank check no. 72922 dated
September 15, 1997 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, in the amount of Php1,790,757.50 with intent to
defraud or cause damage to complainant Caltex Phils., Inc., willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affixed
or caused to be affixed signatures purporting to be those of Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco,
Caltex authorized officers/signatories, and of payee Dante R. Gutierrez, causing it to appear that
Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco have participated in the issuance of PCIBank check no. 72922
and that Dante R. Gutierrez had endorsed it, when in truth and in fact, as said accused well knew, such
was not the case, since said check previously stolen from Payables Section of CALTEX, was neither
duly signed by Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco nor endorsed by Dante R. Gutierrez, after the
check, a commercial document, was falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused purporting
himself to be the payee, Dante R. Gutierrez, deposited the check with Banco De Oro under Account No.
2004-0047245-7, thereby appropriating the proceeds of the falsified but cleared check, to the damage
and prejudice of complainant herein represented by Ramon Romano, in the amount of
Php1,790,757.50.
Criminal Case No. 98-1612
That on or about the 15th day of October 1997 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a private individual, with
intent to defraud and intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of Caltex Philippines, Inc.
through its duly authorized officers/representatives, and by means of falsification of commercial
document, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Caltex Phils., Inc., in the
following manner, to wit: said accused, having obtained possession of PCIBank check no. 74001 dated
October 13, 1997 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, in the amount of Php5,790,570.25 with intent to
defraud or cause damage to complainant Caltex Phils., Inc., willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affixed
or caused to be affixed signatures purporting to be those of Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco,
Caltex authorized officers/signatories, and of payee Dante R. Gutierrez, causing it to appear that
Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco have participated in the issuance of PCIBank check no. 74001
and that Dante R. Gutierrez had endorsed it, when in truth and in fact, as said accused well knew, such
was not the case, since said check previously stolen from Payables Section of CALTEX, was neither
duly signed by Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco nor endorsed by Dante R. Gutierrez, after the
check, a commercial document, was falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused purporting
himself to be the payee, Dante R. Gutierrez, deposited the check with Banco De Oro under Account No.
2004-0047245-7, thereby appropriating the proceeds of the falsified but cleared check, to the damage
and prejudice of complainant herein represented by Ramon Romano, in the amount of
Php5,790,570.25.5
Petitioner was arraigned on August 18, 1998, and pleaded not guilty to both charges.6 Pre-trial ensued
and the cases were jointly tried. The prosecution presented its witnesses, after which the Siguion
Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law Offices (SRMO) as private prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of
Evidence.7 Petitioner opposed the pleading, contending that the private complainant was represented
by the ACCRA Law Offices and the Balgos and Perez Law Office during trial, and it was only after the
prosecution had rested its case that SRMO entered its appearance as private prosecutor representing
the PCIB. Since the ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices had not withdrawn their appearance,
SRMO had no personality to appear as private prosecutor. Under the Informations, the private
complainant is Caltex and not PCIB; hence, the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO should be
stricken from the records.
Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the private complainant
to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced. He pointed out, however, that the Informations can
no longer be amended because he had already been arraigned under the original Informations.8 He
insisted that the amendments of the Informations to substitute PCIB as the offended party for Caltex
would place him in double jeopardy.
PCIB, through SRMO, opposed the motion. It contended that the PCIB had re-credited the amount to
Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogated to the rights and interests
of Caltex as private complainant. Consequently, the PCIB is entitled to receive any civil indemnity which
the trial court would adjudge against the accused. Moreover, the re-credited amount was brought out on
cross-examination by Ramon Romano who testified for the Prosecution. PCIB pointed out that petitioner
had marked in evidence the letter of the ACCRA Law Office to PCIBank dated October 10, 1997 and the
credit memo sent by PCIB to Caltex.9
Petitioner filed a Motion to Expunge the Opposition of SRMO.10 In his Rejoinder, he averred that the
substitution of PCIB as private complainant cannot be made by mere oral motion; the Information must
be amended to allege that the private complainant was PCIB and not Caltex after the preliminary
investigation of the appropriate complaint of PCIB before the Makati City Prosecutor.
In response, the PCIB, through SRMO, averred that as provided in Section 2, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the erroneous designation of the name of the offended party is a mere
formal defect which can be cured by inserting the name of the offended party in the Information. To
support its claim, PCIB cited the ruling of this Court in Sayson v. People.11
On July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of the private prosecutor for the
substitution of PCIB as private complainant for Caltex. It however denied petitioner’s motion to have the
formal offer of evidence of SRMO expunged from the record.12 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which the RTC denied on November 14, 2001.13
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Urgent Application for
Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals (CA,) praying for the annulment of the RTC’s
Orders of July 18, 2001 and November 14, 2001. The petitioner averred that:
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRIEVEOUSLY (SIC) ERRED IN RENDERING ITS ORDER ISSUED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
BY ALLOWING THE SUBSTITUTION OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, AFTER THE ACUSED WAS
ALREADY ARRAIGNED AND PROSECUTION HAS ALREADY TERMINATED PRESENTING ITS
EVIDENCE THEREBY PATENTLY VIOLATING THE STRICT CONDITION IMPOSED UPON BY RULE
110 SEC. 14 RULES ON CRIMINAL ROCEDURE.
II
AND AS A COROLLARY GROUND RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RENDERING AN ORDER RECOGNIZING THE
APPEARANCE OF A NEW PROSECUTOR WITHOUT WRITTEN OR EVEN ORAL WITHDRAWAL OF
THE COUNSEL ON RECORD.14
According to petitioner, damage or injury to the offended party is an essential element of estafa. The
amendment of the Informations substituting the PCIBank for Caltex as the offended party would
prejudice his rights since he is deprived of a defense available before the amendment, and which would
be unavailable if the Informations are amended. Petitioner further insisted that the ruling in the Sayson
case did not apply to this case.
On November 5, 2002, the appellate court rendered judgment dismissing the petition. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition to annul the orders dated July 18, 2001 and
November 14, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 98-1611
and 98-1612 is hereby DENIED and consequently DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.15
The appellate court declared that when PCIB restored the amount of the checks to Caltex, it was
subrogated to the latter’s right against petitioner. It further declared that in offenses against property, the
designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal
act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified. The appellate court cited the
rulings of this Court in People v. Ho16 and People v. Reyes.17
On October 17, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.18
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition which is anchored on the following grounds:
I. THE PEOPLE V. YU CHAI HO 53 PHILIPPINES 874 IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR CONSIDERING THE PACTS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT.
II. LIKEWISE, THE CASE OF PEOPLE VS. REYES CA, 50 (2) OG 665, NOVEMBER 11, 1953
HAS NO MATERIAL BEARING TO THE PRESENT CASE.
III. THE SUBSTITUTION OF PCIBANK WILL SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OF
THE PETITIONER HENCE, IT IS PROHIBITED BY SEC. 14 OF RULE 110.
IV. THERE IS NO VALID SUBROGATION BETWEEN CALTEX AND PCIBANK. ASSUMING
THERE IS, THE CIVIL CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED TO PROSECUTE.
V. THE TWIN INFORMATIONS UPON WHICH PETITIONER WAS INDICTED, ARRAIGNED,
PRE-TRIAL HELD AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TERMINATED THE PRESENTATION OF
 ITS EVIDENCE IN CHIEF ARE DEFECTIVE AND VOID, HENCE THE DISMISSAL IS IN
ORDER.
VI. PETITIONER TIMELY OBJECTED TO THE APPEARANCE OF PRIVATE PROSECUTOR
FOR PCIBANK.
VII. THE FINDINGS OF MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT SUPORTED BY THE RECORD NOR
EVIDENCE AND BASED ON MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS.
VIII. PETITIONER’S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DID NOT
VIOLATE THE OMNIBUS MOTION RULE UNDER SEC. 8, RULE 15 OF THE 1997 RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.19
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner argues that the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complainant at this late stage of the
trial is prejudicial to his defense. He argues that the substitution is tantamount to a substantial
amendment of the Informations which is prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 5, Rule 11020 of the Revised Rules of Rules, all criminal actions covered by a complaint
or information shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor.
Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the accused result in damage or injury to another, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly instituted, and the
offended party has not waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted the
civil action prior to the criminal action, the prosecution of the action (including the civil) remains under
the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is a public function.
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the
criminal action personally or by counsel, who will act as private prosecutor for the protection of his
interests and in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action
for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and
further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied
institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite
proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is
to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to
isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.21
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or indemnification
of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or
felonious act of the accused.22 Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil
liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. – The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and
103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
On the other hand, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
Thus, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may
be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment,
a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.23
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.24 The following have
been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the
penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge
another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which
do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the
form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any
substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate
vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with
additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds
nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.25
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any
evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the
other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein
does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.26
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial
amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor did it result
in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the
same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any
surprise by virtue of the substitution.
Petitioner next argues that in no way was PCIB subrogated to the rights of Caltex, considering that he
has no knowledge of the subrogation much less gave his consent to it. Alternatively, he posits that if
subrogation was proper, then the charges against him should be dismissed, the two Informations being
"defective and void due to false allegations."
Petitioner was charged of the crime of estafa complex with falsification document. In estafa one of the
essential elements "to prejudice of another" as mandated by article 315 of the Revise Penal Code.
The element of "to the prejudice of another" being as essential element of the felony should be clearly
indicated and charged in the information with TRUTH AND LEGAL PRECISION.
This is not so in the case of petitioner, the twin information filed against him alleged the felony
committed " to the damage and prejudice of Caltex." This allegation is UNTRUE and FALSE for there is
no question that as early as March 24, 1998 or THREE (3) LONG MONTHS before the twin information
were filed on June 29, 1998, the prejudice party is already PCIBank since the latter Re-Credit the value
of the checks to Caltex as early as March 24, 1998. In effect, assuming there is valid subrogation as the
subject decision concluded, the subrogation took place an occurred on March 24, 1998 THREE (3)
MONTHS before the twin information were filed.
The phrase "to the prejudice to another" as element of the felony is limited to the person DEFRAUDED
in the very act of embezzlement. It should not be expanded to other persons which the loss may
ultimately fall as a result of a contract which contract herein petitioner is total stranger.
In this case, there is no question that the very act of commission of the offense of September 24, 1997
and October 15, 1997 respectively, Caltex was the one defrauded by the act of the felony.
In the light of these facts, petitioner submits that the twin information are DEFECTIVE AND VOID due to
the FALSE ALLEGATIONS that the offense was committed to the prejudice of Caltex when it truth and
in fact the one prejudiced here was PCIBank.
The twin information being DEFECTIVE AND VOID, the same should be dismissed without prejudice to
the filing of another information which should state the offense was committed to the prejudice of
PCIBank if it still legally possible without prejudicing substantial and statutory rights of the petitioner.27
Petitioner’s argument on subrogation is misplaced. The Court agrees with respondent PCIB’s comment
that petitioner failed to make a distinction between legal and conventional subrogation. Subrogation is
the transfer of all the rights of the creditor to a third person, who substitutes him in all his rights.28 It may
either be legal or conventional. Legal subrogation is that which takes place without agreement but by
operation of law because of certain acts.29 Instances of legal subrogation are those provided in Article
130230 of the Civil Code. Conventional subrogation, on the other hand, is that which takes place by
agreement of the parties.31 Thus, petitioner’s acquiescence is not necessary for subrogation to take
place because the instant case is one of legal subrogation that occurs by operation of law, and without
need of the debtor’s knowledge.
Contrary to petitioner’s asseverations, the case of People v. Yu Chai Ho32 relied upon by the appellate
court is in point. The Court declared –
We do not however, think that the fiscal erred in alleging that the commission of the crime resulted to
the prejudice of Wm. H. Anderson & Co. It is true that originally the International Banking Corporation
was the prejudiced party, but Wm. H. Anderson & Co. compensated it for its loss and thus became
subrogated to all its rights against the defendant (article 1839, Civil Code). Wm. H. Anderson & Co.,
therefore, stood exactly in the shoes of the International Banking Corporation in relation to the
defendant's acts, and the commission of the crime resulted to the prejudice of the firm previously to the
filing of the information in the case. The loss suffered by the firm was the ultimate result of the
defendant's unlawful acts, and we see no valid reason why this fact should not be stated in the
information; it stands to reason that, in the crime of estafa, the damage resulting therefrom need not
necessarily occur simultaneously with the acts constituting the other essential elements of the crime.
Thus, being subrogated to the right of Caltex, PCIB, through counsel, has the right to intervene in the
proceedings, and under substantive laws is entitled to restitution of its properties or funds, reparation, or
indemnification.
Petitioner’s gripe that the charges against him should be dismissed because the allegations in both
Informations failed to name PCIB as true offended party does not hold water.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of
the offense; and the place wherein the offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint
or information.
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same Rule provides:
Section. 12. Name of the offended party. –The complaint or information must state the name and
surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any
appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known. If there is no better way of
identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property
must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be
inserted in the complaint or information and the record.
(c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or any name or
designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified, without need of averring that
it is a juridical person or that it is organized in accordance with law. (12a)
In Sayson v. People,33 the Court held that in case of offenses against property, the designation of the
name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the
complaint or information can be properly identified:
The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state the name and surname of
the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed or any appellation or
nickname by which such person has been or is known and if there is no better way of Identifying him, he
must be described under a fictitious name (Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule 110,
Section 12 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] In case of offenses against property, the
designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal
act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified. Thus, Rule 110, Section 11 of the
Rules of Court provides that:

Section 11. Name of the offended party-

(a) In cases of offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the
property, subject matter of the offense, must be described with such particularity as to properly
Identify the particular offense charged.

(b) If in the course of the trial, the true name of the person against whom or against whose
property the offense was committed is disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause the true
name to be inserted in the complaint or information or record.

In U.S. v. Kepner [1 Phil. 519 (1902)], this Court laid down the rule that when an offense shall have
been described in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to Identify the act, an erroneous allegation
as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial as the same is a mere formal defect which did not
tend to prejudice any substantial right of the defendant. Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which
had a factual backdrop similar to the instant case, where the defendant was charged with estafa for the
misappropriation of the proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed without authority, the erroneous
allegation in the complaint to the effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of the owner of the
cheque, when in reality the bank which cashed it was the one which suffered a loss, was held to be
immaterial on the ground that the subject matter of the estafa, the warrant, was described in the
complaint with such particularity as to properly Identify the particular offense charged. In the instant suit
for estafa which is a crime against property under the Revised Penal Code, since the check, which was
the subject-matter of the offense, was described with such particularity as to properly identify the
offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of convicting the accused, that it was established
during the trial that the offended party was actually Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of
America as alleged in the information.

Lastly, on petitioner’s claim that he timely objected to the appearance of SRMO34 as private prosecutor
for PCIB, the Court agrees with the observation of the CA that contrary to his claim, petitioner did not
question the said entry of appearance even as the RTC acknowledged the same on October 8,
1999.35 Thus, petitioner cannot feign ignorance or surprise of the incident, which are "all water under the
bridge for [his] failure to make a timely objection thereto."36
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, for further
FIRST DIVISION
proceedings.
G.R. No. 169889 September 29, 2009
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES SIMON YAP AND MILAGROS GUEVARRA, Petitioners,
vs.
FIRST e-BANK CORPORATION (previously known as PDCP DEVELOPMENT BANK, INC.), Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
On August 30, 1990, Sammy Yap obtained a ₱2 million loan from PDCP Development Bank,
Inc.1 (PDCP). As security, Sammy’s parents, petitioners Simon Yap and Milagros Guevarra, executed a
third-party mortgage on their land2 and warehouse standing on it. The mortgage agreement provided
that PDCP may extrajudicially foreclose the property in case Sammy failed to pay the loan.
On November 7, 1990, Sammy issued a promissory note and six postdated checks3 in favor of PDCP
as additional securities for the loan.
When Sammy defaulted on the payment of his loan, PDCP presented the six checks to the drawee
bank but the said checks were dishonored.4 This prompted PDCP to file a complaint against Sammy for
six counts of violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) on February 8, 1993.
On May 3, 1993, PDCP filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage on the property of
petitioners which served as principal security for Sammy’s loan.
On December 16, 1993, on motion of Sammy and without objection from the public prosecutor and
PDCP, the BP 22 cases were provisionally dismissed.
On October 26, 1994, pursuant to the petition of PDCP for extrajudicial foreclosure, the extrajudicial
sale was set on December 28, 1994. Copies of the notice of extrajudicial sale were sent by registered
mail to Sammy, petitioners, the Registrar of Deeds of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of San Carlos City and the office of the barangay secretary of Taloy District, San Carlos
City, Pangasinan.
The notice was also published in the Sunday Punch, a newspaper of general circulation in Pangasinan
on November 27, December 4 and 11, 1994.
On December 20, 1994, petitioners filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan a complaint for injunction (with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order/preliminary injunction), damages and accounting of payments against PDCP. The complaint
sought to stop the foreclosure sale on the ground that PDCP waived its right to foreclose the mortgage
on their property when it filed the BP 22 cases against Sammy.
On April 2, 1997, the RTC5 ruled in favor of petitioners. It held that PDCP had three options when
Sammy defaulted in the payment of his loan: enforcement of the promissory note in a collection case,
enforcement of the checks under the Negotiable Instruments Law and/or BP 22, or foreclosure of
mortgage. The remedies were alternative and the choice of one excluded the others. Thus, PDCP was
deemed to have waived its right to foreclose on the property of petitioners when it elected to sue
Sammy for violation of BP 22.6
PDCP appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 8, 2005, the CA7 reversed the RTC. It
opined that PDCP was not barred from exercising its right to foreclose on the property of petitioners
despite suing Sammy for violation of BP 22. The purpose of BP 22 was to punish the act of issuing a
worthless check, not to force a debtor to pay his debt.8
Hence, this appeal9 where petitioners argue that, when Sammy was sued for six counts of violation of
BP 22, PDCP should have been deemed to have simultaneously filed for collection of the amount
represented by the checks. The civil aspect of the case was naturally an action for collection of
Sammy’s obligation to PDCP. PDCP clearly elected a remedy. PDCP should not be allowed to pursue
another, like foreclosure of mortgage.
The argument is not convincing.
First, petitioners anchor their position on Supreme Court Circular 57-97, which provides for the rules
and guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases under BP 22. Pertinent portions of Circular
57-97 provide:
1. The criminal action for violation of [BP] 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall
be allowed or recognized.
2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in
full the filing fees based upon the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as
the actual damages claimed, in accordance with the filing fees in Section 7 (a) and Section 8
(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, and last amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94
effective August 1, 1994. Where the offended party seeks to enforce against the accused civil
liability by way of liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, he shall pay
the corresponding filing fees therefore based on the amounts thereof as alleged either in his
complaint or in the information. If not so alleged but any of these damages are awarded by the
court, the amount of such fees shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court
trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with the pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 governing the
proceedings in the actions as thus consolidated. (emphasis supplied)
Circular 57-97 has been institutionalized as Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:10
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of [BP] 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing
fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fee based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (emphasis supplied)
Sad to say, Circular 57-97 (and, it goes without saying, Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court)
was not yet in force11 when PDCP sued Sammy for violation of BP 22 and when it filed a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure on the mortgaged property of petitioners on February 8, 1993 and May 3, 1993,
respectively. In Lo Bun Tiong v. Balboa,12 Circular 57-97 was not applied because the collection suit and
the criminal complaints for violation of BP 22 were filed prior to the adoption of Circular 57-97. The
same principle applies here.
Thus, prior to the effectivity of Circular 57-97, the alternative remedies of foreclosure of mortgage and
collection suit were not barred even if a suit for BP 22 had been filed earlier, unless a judgment of
conviction had already been rendered in the BP 22 case finding the accused debtor criminally liable and
ordering him to pay the amount of the check(s).13
In this case, no judgment of conviction (which could have declared the criminal and civil liability of
Sammy) was rendered because Sammy moved for the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, PDCP
could have still foreclosed on the mortgage or filed a collection suit.
Nonetheless, records show that, during the pendency of the BP 22 case, Sammy had already paid
PDCP the total amount of ₱1,783,582.14 Thus, to prevent unjust enrichment on the part of the creditor,
any foreclosure by PDCP should only be for the unpaid balance.
Second, it is undisputed that the BP 22 cases were provisionally dismissed at Sammy’s instance. In
other words, PDCP was prevented from recovering the whole amount by Sammy himself. To bar PDCP
from foreclosing on petitioners’ property for the balance of the indebtedness would be to penalize PDCP
for the act of Sammy. That would not only be illogical and absurd but would also violate elementary
rules of justice and fair play. In sum, PDCP has not yet effectively availed of and fully exhausted its
remedy.
While it can be argued that PDCP may revive the BP 22 cases anytime as their dismissal was only
provisional, suffice it to state that the law gives the right of choice to PDCP, not to Sammy or to
petitioners.1avvph!1
Third, petitioners should be mindful that, by being third party mortgagors, they agreed that their property
would stand as collateral to the loan of Sammy until the last centavo is paid to PDCP. That is a risk they
willingly assumed. To release the mortgage just because they find it inconvenient would be the height of
injustice against PDCP.
All told, PDCP should not be left without recourse for the unsettled loan of Sammy. Otherwise, an
iniquitous situation will arise where Sammy and petitioners are unjustly enriched at the expense of
PDCP. That we cannot sanction.
So as not to create any misunderstanding, however, the point should be underscored that the creditor’s
obvious purpose when it forecloses on mortgaged property is to obtain payment for a loan which the
debtor is unable or unjustifiably refuses to pay. The rationale is the same if the creditor opts to sue the
debtor for collection. Thus, it is but logical that a creditor who obtains a personal judgment against the
debtor on a loan waives his right to foreclose on the mortgage securing the loan. Otherwise, the creditor
becomes guilty of splitting a single cause of action15 for the debtor’s inability (or unjustified refusal) to
pay his debt.16 Nemo debet bis vexare pro una et eadem causa. No man shall be twice vexed for one
and the same cause.
In the light of Circular 57-97 and Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, the same rule applies
when the creditor sues the debtor for BP 22 and thereafter forecloses on the mortgaged property. It is
true that BP 22 is a criminal remedy while foreclosure of mortgage is a civil remedy. It is also true that
BP 22 was not enacted to force, much more penalize a person for his inability (or refusal to pay) his
debt.17 What BP 22 prohibits and penalizes is the issuance of bum checks because of its pernicious
effects on public interest. Congress, in the exercise of police power, enacted BP 22 in order to maintain
public confidence in commercial transactions.18
At the other end of the spectrum, however, is the fact that a creditor’s principal purpose in suing the
debtor for BP 22 is to be able to collect his debt. (Circular 57-97 and Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court have been drawn up to address this reality.) It is not so much that the debtor should be
imprisoned for issuing a bad check; this is so specially because a conviction for BP 22 does not
necessarily result in imprisonment.19
Thus, we state the rule at present. If the debtor fails (or unjustly refuses) to pay his debt when it falls
due and the debt is secured by a mortgage and by a check, the creditor has three options against the
debtor and the exercise of one will bar the exercise of the others. He may pursue either of the three but
not all or a combination of them.
First, the creditor may file a collection suit against the debtor. This will open up all the properties of the
debtor to attachment and execution, even the mortgaged property itself. Second, the creditor may opt to
foreclose on the mortgaged property. In case the debt is not fully satisfied, he may sue the debtor for
deficiency judgment (not a collection case for the whole indebtedness), in which case, all the properties
of the debtor, other than the mortgaged property, are again opened up for the satisfaction of the
deficiency.20 Lastly, the creditor may opt to sue the debtor for violation of BP 22 if the checks securing
the obligation bounce. Circular 57-97 and Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court both provide that
the criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil
action, i.e., a collection suit. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized.
Petitioners would have been correct had it not been for the reasons stated earlier. WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby DENIED.
 From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is established.

Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who manages ESC Transport, the taxicab business of his
father, hired appellant as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive a Daewoo Racer with plate number
PWH-266. It was agreed that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after which he
would return it to ESC Transport’s garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount of ₱780.00 per
day.5

On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return
it on the same day as he was supposed to.
THIRD DIVISION

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, on December 25, 1996, did you report for work?
G. R. No. 148233 June 8, 2004

A: Yes, sir.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
LUISITO D. BUSTINERA, appellant. Q: Now, since you reported for work, what are your duties and responsibilities as taxi driver of
the taxi company?
DECISION
A: That we have to bring back the taxi at night with the boundary.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Q: How much is your boundary?
1
From the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City finding appellant Luisito D.
Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft2 for the unlawful taking of a Daewoo Racer A: ₱780.00, sir.
GTE Taxi and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, he comes to this Court on
appeal. Q: On December 25, 1996, did you bring out any taxi?

In an information3 dated June 17, 1997, appellant was indicted as follows: A: Yes, sir.

The undersigned accuses LUISITO D. BUSTINERA of the crime of Qualified Theft, committed Q: Now, when ever (sic) you bring out a taxi, what procedure [do] you follow with that
as follows: company?

That on or about the 25th day of December up to the 9th day of January, 1997, in A: That we have to bring back the taxi to the company and before we leave we also sign
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused being then employed as one [of] the taxi something, sir.
Drivers of Elias S. Cipriano, an Operator of several taxi cabs with business address at
corner 44 Commonwealth Avenue, iliman (sic), this City, and as such has free access
Q: What is that something you mentioned?
to the taxi he being driven, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to gain, with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him by his employer and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away a A: On the record book and on the daily trip ticket, sir.
Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi with Plate No. PWH-266 worth ₱303,000.00, Philippine
Currency, belonging to Elias S. Cipriano, to the damage and prejudice of the said Q: You said that you have to return your taxi at the end of the day, what is then the procedure
offended party in the amount of ₱303,000.00. reflect (sic) by your company when you return a taxi?

CONTRARY TO LAW. A: To remit the boundary and to sign the record book and daily trip ticket.

Upon arraignment4 on March 27, 2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not Q: So, when you return the taxi, you sign the record book?
guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
 A: Yes, sir.
Q: You mentioned that on December 25, 1996, you brought out a taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of taxi?
A: Daewoo taxi, sir.
Q: Now did you return the taxi on December 25, 1996?
A: I was not able to bring back the taxi because I was short of my boundary, sir.6
The following day, December 26, 1996, Cipriano went to appellant’s house to ascertain why the taxi was
not returned.7 Arriving at appellant’s house, he did not find the taxi there, appellant’s wife telling him that
her husband had not yet arrived.8 Leaving nothing to chance, Cipriano went to the Commonwealth
Avenue police station and reported that his taxi was missing.9
On January 9, 1997, appellant’s wife went to the garage of ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi
had been abandoned in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon City.10 Cipriano lost no time in repairing to
Regalado Street where he recovered the taxi.11
Upon the other hand, while appellant does not deny that he did not return the taxi on December 25,
1996 as he was short of the boundary fee, he claims that he did not abandon the taxi but actually
returned it on January 5, 1997;12and that on December 27, 1996, he gave the amount of ₱2,000.0013 to
his wife whom he instructed to remit the same to Cipriano as payment of the boundary fee14 and to tell
the latter that he could not return the taxi as he still had a balance thereof.15
Appellant, however, admits that his wife informed him that when she went to the garage to remit the
boundary fee on the very same day (December 27, 1996),16 Cipriano was already demanding the return
of the taxi.17
Appellant maintains though that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and signed the record
book,18 which was company procedure, to show that he indeed returned it and gave his employer
₱2,500.0019 as partial payment for the boundary fee covering the period from December 25, 1996 to
January 5, 1997.
Continuing, appellant claims that as he still had a balance in the boundary fee, he left his driver’s
license with Cipriano;20 that as he could not drive, which was the only work he had ever known, without
his driver’s license, and with the obligation to pay the balance of the boundary fee still lingering, his wife
started working on February 18, 1997 as a stay-in maid for Cipriano, with a monthly salary of
₱1,300.00,21 until March 26, 1997 when Cipriano told her that she had worked off the balance of his
obligation;22 and that with his obligation extinguished, his driver’s license was returned to him.23
Brushing aside appellant’s claim that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and that he had in fact
paid the total amount of ₱4,500.00, the trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified
theft by Decision of May 17, 2001, the dispositive portion of which is quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as charged, and he is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, accused is ordered credited with four-fifths (4/5) of the preventive
imprisonment undergone by him there being no showing that he agreed in writing to abide by
the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
Hence, the present appeal anchored on the following assigned errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING WITHOUT CONCRETE BASIS
THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS INTENT TO GAIN WHEN HE FAILED TO RETURN
THE TAXI TO ITS GARAGE.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED THEFT. 25
It is settled that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review, and it
becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment even if
they have not been specifically assigned.26
Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended for
the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain
vehicles,27 by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND
PENALIZING CARNAPPING."
When statutes are in pari materia28 or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same
class of persons or things, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter,29 or have the same
purpose or object,30 the rule dictates that they should be construed together – interpretare et
concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi modus.31 Every statute must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence,32 as this Court explained
in City of Naga v. Agna,33 viz:
. . . When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates that they
should be construed together. This is because enactments of the same legislature on the same
subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform system; that later statutes are
supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the
 legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislation on the same subject and to
have enacted its new act with reference thereto. Having thus in mind the previous statutes
relating to the same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to
have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in those
prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and they all should be construed
together. In construing them the old statutes relating to the same subject matter should
be compared with the new provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both
should be so construed that effect may be given to every provision of each. However,
when the new provision and the old relating to the same subject cannot be reconciled
the former shall prevail as it is the latter expression of the legislative will . . .34(Emphasis
and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that
there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be
done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things.35
Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a
domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is
either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken
from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6)
the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.36
On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines "carnapping" as "the
taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The elements of
carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without
the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force
upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain.37
Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle,38 the concept of unlawful taking in
theft, robbery and carnapping being the same.39
In the 2000 case of People v. Tan40 where the accused took a Mitsubishi Gallant and in the later case
of People v. Lobitania41 which involved the taking of a Yamaha motorized tricycle, this Court held that
the unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the anti-carnapping law and not by the
provisions on qualified theft or robbery.
There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the
crime of robbery and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses
the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things. But a careful comparison of this special law with the crimes of robbery and theft readily
reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking, intent to gain, and
that personal property belonging to another is taken without the latter's consent. However, the
anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor
vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with
intent to gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the
use of force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor
vehicle would fall within the purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the
case before the enactment of said statute.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted.)
It is to be noted, however, that while the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor
vehicles, it excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys, street-sweepers,
sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which
run only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively
for agricultural purposes. By implication, the theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be covered
by Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and the provisions on robbery, respectively.43
From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the
anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle
does not fall within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.
The designation in the information of the offense committed by appellant as one for qualified theft
notwithstanding, appellant may still be convicted of the crime of carnapping. For while it is necessary
that the statutory designation be stated in the information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in
designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is
controlling but the facts alleged in the information which determines the real nature of the crime.44
In the case at bar, the information alleges that appellant, with intent to gain, took the taxi owned by
Cipriano without the latter’s consent.45 Thus, the indictment alleges every element of the crime of
carnapping,46 and the prosecution proved the same.
Appellant’s appeal is thus bereft of merit.
That appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and did not return it on the same day as he
was supposed to is admitted.47
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner,
or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed
complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to
dispose of the same.48
While the nature of appellant’s possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he was hired as a taxi driver
and was entrusted possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its owner, which is contrary to
company practice and against the owner’s consent transformed the character of the possession into an
unlawful one.49 Appellant himself admits that he was aware that his possession of the taxi was no longer
with Cipriano’s consent as the latter was already demanding its return.
Q: Also you said that during your direct testimony that when you gave your wife the ₱2,500.00,
you also told her to go to the company to ask the company for permission for you to use the
taxi since you were then still short of the boundary. Alright, after telling that to your wife and
after seeing your wife between December 27, 1996 and January 5, 1997, did you ask your wife
what was the answer of the company to that request of yours?
 A: He did not allow me, sir, and he even [got] angry with me.
Q: So, when did you learn that the company was not agreeable to your making use of the
taxicab without first returning it to the company?
A: Before the new year, sir.
Q: When you said new year, you were referring to January 1, 1997?
A: Either December 29 or December 30, 1996, sir.
Q: So, are you telling us that even if you knew already that the company was not agreeable to
your making use of the taxicab continually (sic) without returning the same to the company,
you still went ahead and make (sic) use of it and returned it only on January 5, 1997.
A: Yes, sir.50 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Appellant assails the trial court’s conclusion that there was intent to gain with the mere taking of the taxi
without the owner’s consent. He maintains that his reason for failing to return the taxi was his inability to
remit the boundary fee, his earnings that day not having permitted it; and that there was no intent to
gain since the taking of the taxi was not permanent in character, he having returned it.
Appellant’s position does not persuade.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor
vehicle.51 Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.52 The term "gain"
is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be
derived or expected from the act which is performed.53 Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken
without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.54
In Villacorta v. Insurance Commission55 which was reiterated in Association of Baptists for World
Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen’s Insurance Co, Inc.,56 Justice Claudio Teehankee (later Chief Justice),
interpreting the theft clause of an insurance policy, explained that, when one takes the motor vehicle of
another without the latter’s consent even if the motor vehicle is later returned, there is theft, there
being intent to gain as the use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain:
Assuming, despite the totally inadequate evidence, that the taking was "temporary" and for
a "joy ride", the Court sustains as the better view57 that which holds that when a person, either
with the object of going to a certain place, or learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride,
takes possession of a vehicle belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he is
guilty of theft because by taking possession of the personal property belonging to another
and using it, his intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom utility, satisfaction,
enjoyment and pleasure. Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites in his work Groizard who holds
that the use of a thing constitutes gain and Cuello Calon who calls it "hurt de
uso."58 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)
Besides, the trial court did not believe appellant’s claim that he in fact returned the taxi on January 5,
1997.
The Court can not (sic) believe accused’s assertion that he returned the subject vehicle on January 5,
1997 to the garage and that he had in fact paid the amount of ₱4,500.00 in partial payment of his
unremitted "boundary" for ten (10) days. He could not even be certain of the exact amount he allegedly
paid the taxicab owner. On direct-examination, he claimed that he paid Edwin Cipriano on December
27, 1996 the amount of ₱2,000.00 and it was his wife who handed said amount to Cipriano, yet on
cross-examination, he claimed that he gave ₱2,500.00 to his wife on that date for payment to the
taxicab owner.59
The rule is well-entrenched that findings of fact of the trial court are accorded the highest degree of
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that the trial court had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and significance which, if
considered, would alter the result of the case.60 The reason for the rule being that trial courts have the
distinct advantage of having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying or their conduct and behavior during the trial.61
Other than his bare and self-serving allegations, appellant has not shown any scintilla of evidence that
he indeed returned the taxi on January 5, 1997.
Q: You said that you returned the taxi on January 5, 1997, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, did you sign any record when you returned the taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you have any copy of that record?
A: They were the one (sic) in-charge of the record book and I even voluntarily left my driver’s
license with them, sir.
Q: You said that you did not return the taxi because you were short of (sic) boundary, did you
turn over any money to your employer when you returned the taxi?
A: I gave them [an] additional ₱2,500.00, sir.
Q: At the time when you returned the taxi, how much was your short indebtedness (sic) or
short boundary (sic)?
A: I was short for ten (10) days, and I was able to pay ₱4,500.00.
Q: Do you have any receipt to show receipt of payment for this ₱4,500.00?
 A: They were the ones having the record of my payment, and our agreement was that I and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same – the penalty
have to pay the balance in installment.62 (Emphasis supplied) imposed being a range.70

While appellant maintains that he signed on January 5, 1997 the record book indicating that he returned
the taxi on the said date and paid Cipriano the amount of ₱4,500.00 as partial payment for the boundary
fee, appellant did not produce the documentary evidence alluded to, to substantiate his claim. That such
alleged record book is in the possession of Cipriano did not prevent him from producing it as appellant
has the right to have compulsory process issued to secure the production of evidence on his behalf.63
The trial court having convicted appellant of qualified theft instead of carnapping, it erred in the
imposition of the penalty. While the information alleges that the crime was attended with grave abuse of
confidence, the same cannot be appreciated as the suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to
special laws, as provided in Article 10 of said Code, cannot be invoked when there is a legal
impossibility of application, either by express provision or by necessary implication.64
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, in Crim Case No.
Q-97-71956, finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another judgment entered in its place, finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539, as amended and sentencing
him to an indeterminate penalty of Fourteen (14) Years and Eight (8) Months, as minimum, to
Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Moreover, when the penalties under the special law are different from and are without reference or
relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules, for the
application of penalties under the said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions are based on or
applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code.65

Thus, in People v. Panida66 which involved the crime of carnapping and the penalty imposed was the
indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as
maximum, this Court did not apply the provisions of the Revised Penal Code suppletorily as the anti-
carnapping law provides for its own penalties which are distinct and without reference to the said Code.

The charge being simple carnapping, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than
14 years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months. There can be no
suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties under the Revised Penal
Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based on, or applicable only to, the rules
for felonies under the Code. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and 8 months to
17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period
of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to
that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the
qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The
rules on penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539
and special laws of the same formulation. For this reason, we hold that the proper penalty to
be imposed on each of accused-appellants is an indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8
months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as maximum.67(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)

Appellant being then culpable for carnapping under the first clause of Section 14 of Republic Act No.
6539, as amended, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months, not
more than 17 years and 4 months,68 for, as discussed above, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
cannot be applied suppletorily and, therefore, the alleged aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of
confidence cannot be appreciated.

Applying Section 1 of Act No. 4103,69 as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, if the offense is punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2128 May 12, 1948
MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF CITY OF
MANILA,respondents.
Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.
Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Nañawa and D. Guinto Lazaro for
respondents.
FERIA, J.:
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the crime of
robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948,
and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the
petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court was heard, the petitioners were still detained or under
arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an information with the proper courts
justice.
This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a sufficient number of Justices
to form a quorum in Manila, And it had to be transferred to the Supreme Court acting in division here in
Baguio for deliberation and decision. We have not until now an official information as to the action taken
by the office of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by the Dumlao against the petitioners. But whatever
night have been the action taken by said office, if there was any, we have to decide this case in order to
lay down a ruling on the question involved herein for the information and guidance in the future of the
officers concerned.
The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide whether or not the
petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of manila
a judicial authority within the meaning of the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the next proceeding
article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal
ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six
hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted article, the precept of our
Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of Court regarding arrest
and habeas corpus, we are of the opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in said article,
mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary
detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense, that is, "the
Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.)
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article 202 of the old Penal Code
formerly in force of these Islands, which penalized a public officer other than a judicial officer who,
without warrant, "shall arrest a person upon a charge of crime and shall fail to deliver such person to the
judicial authority within twenty four hours after his arrest." There was no doubt that a judicial authority
therein referred to was the judge of a court of justice empowered by law, after a proper investigation, to
order the temporary commitment or detention of the person arrested; and not the city fiscals or any
other officers, who are not authorized by law to do so. Because article 204, which complements said
section 202, of the same Code provided that "the penalty of suspension in its minimum and medium
degrees shall be imposed upon the following persons: 1. Any judicial officer who, within the period
prescribed by the provisions of the law of criminal procedure in force, shall fail to release any prisoner
under arrest or to commit such prisoner formally by written order containing a statement of the grounds
upon which the same is based."
Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has not been incorporated in
the Revised Penal Code the import of said words judicial authority or officer can not be construed as
having been modified by the mere omission of said provision in the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons...against unreasonable seizure shall not be violated, and no warrant [of arrest, detention
or confinement] shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after the
examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witness he may produce." Under this
constitutional precept no person may be deprived of his liberty, except by warrant of arrest or
commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the complainant and his
witness. And the judicial authority to whom the person arrested by a public officers must be surrendered
can not be any other but court or judge who alone is authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or
provisional detention of the person arrested pending the trial of the case against the latter. Without such
warrant of commitment, the detention of the person arrested for than six hours would be illegal and in
violation of our Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of court, which, referring to the duty of
an officer after arrest without warrant, provides that "a person making arrest for legal ground shall,
without unnecessary delay, and within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the person
arrested to the proper court or judge for such action for they may deem proper to take;" and by section
11 of Rule 108, which reads that "after the arrest by the defendant and his delivery to the Court, he shall
be informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He shall also informed of the substance of
the testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses
or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be
reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.
And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
According to the provision of said section, "a writ of habeas corpus shall extend any person to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if it
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgement or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed. "Which a contrario sensu means that, otherwise, the writ shall be allowed and the
person detained shall be released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not be construed to
include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or
of commitment or temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person
arrested without warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashim vs. Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz. 13th Supp., p.13;
Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on January 30, 1947, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214). The investigation
which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation proper provided for in section
11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person charged with offenses cognizable by the Court of First
Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is a mere investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of
filing the corresponding information against the defendant with the proper municipal court or Court of
First Instance of Manila if the result of the investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from
the court a warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is provided by a law as a substitute, in a certain sense,
of the preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or malicious prosecution, since
defendant charged with offenses triable by the courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a proper
preliminary investigation.
The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary investigation in case of
temporary absence of both the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from the
municipality, town or place, are the municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a
warrant of arrest of the caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with section 6, Rule 108, and
section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary investigation which a city fiscal may conduct under section 2,
Rule 108, is the investigation referred to in the proceeding paragraph.
Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense cognizable by the
courts of Manila is not filed with municipal court or the Court of First Instance of Manila, because as
above stated, the latter do not make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint must
be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or through one of his assistants, makes
the investigation, not for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused, but of filing with the proper
court the necessary information against the accused if the result of the investigation so warrants, and
obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the accused.
When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted bylaw, the officer or person making the
arrest should, as abovestated, without unnecessary delay take or surrender the person arrested, within
the period of time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having jurisdiction to try
or make a preliminary investigation of the offense (section 17, Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try
and decide the case if the court has original jurisdiction over the offense charged, or make the
preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace court having no original jurisdiction, and then
transfer the case to the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the provisions of section 13,
Rule 108.
In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or the Court of First
Instance, the officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take the person
arrested to the city fiscal, and the latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and file, if proper,
the corresponding information within the time prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so
that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for the temporary detention of the accused. And the
city fiscal or his assistants shall make the investigation forthwith, unless it is materially impossible for
them to do so, because the testimony of the person or officer making the arrest without warrant is in
such cases ready and available, and shall, immediately after the investigation, either release the person
arrested or file the corresponding information. If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the
defendant having committed the offense charged, or is not ready to file the information on the strength
of the testimony or evidence presented, he should release and not detain the person arrested for a
longer period than that prescribed in the Penal Code, without prejudice to making or continuing the
investigation and filing afterwards the proper information against him with the court, in order to obtain or
secure a warrant of his arrest. Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer
detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of
communication as well as the hour of arrested and other circumstances, such as the time of surrender
and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary
information, must be taken into consideration.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
would be to authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period longer than that
permitted by law without any process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may
not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting the person
arrested and release him, after the latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks without any
process issued by a court or judge.
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the
offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the
complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the
justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has no
authority, and he has not, to order the arrest even if he finds, after due investigation, that there is a
probability that a crime has been committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer
has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended
party or other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty
of the offense charged.
In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers
who intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good
faith, in the absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the
mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the
latter might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being actually detained when the said
policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are being
illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by
virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice. So ordered.
Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial
Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to
Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife,
Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang
Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita
Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant
informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name,
passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely,
"WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages.
Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars,
and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita
Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed
inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the
bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making
the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job
Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor
emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on
one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30,
October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6,
October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e.,
August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed
the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3)
NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30,
October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the
presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the
cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been
contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He
discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The
package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried
marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof,
after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7,
1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his
passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief
Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited
by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the
Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory
examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the
forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED
AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED
FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL
PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE
APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's
Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of
his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2
and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence
(Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by
law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its
origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As
such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State
Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367
US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]),
declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant,
abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948])
wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter
(Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with the
advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable
searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon,
66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687
[1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably
procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government
agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and
without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can
accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure
has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of
one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is
his residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is
his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to
refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf.
Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886];
Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as
shown in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history
clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and
was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such
authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of
unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right
of seizure by process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who
searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge
and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of
narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure
clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals (citing People v.
Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965);
State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen — the owner
of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case
containing the evidence***complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's own
initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the
bag's contents, and made it available to the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence
obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes
governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent
reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure
of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances, the
argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents
conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly
indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection
of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr.
Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau
of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the
same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the
parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents.
Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate
of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes
into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that
which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been
committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband
articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is
prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California
374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was taken
into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was initially
made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of
the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection
against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query
which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of
constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of
Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the
relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill
of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any
power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is
to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the
present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not
whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p.
8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2,
Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of
the judge in the issuance thereof (SeeSoliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13
[October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no
manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed
against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the
State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant
that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of
the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure
equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's
constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him
despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation were
not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and found
nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights
or that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified that
accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly
performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and
credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is
that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as testified by Atty.
Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did you
investigate the accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his
constitutional right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original
Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on cross-
examination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that appellant
gave uncounselled confession while being investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed
judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while
under custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second
assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he was
not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German
national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute
conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the
shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987,
TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving
and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete
stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels
and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the
undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not
simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the
cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand,
would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a
complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do
the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo,
171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he
was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of
Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a
Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's
residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p.
21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg.
130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]);
Castañares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask
Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German
national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of
shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the
owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses,
or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is
therefore estopped to claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 143944 July 11, 2002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, finding accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 64252 as amended,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.1âwphi1.nêt
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an Information which reads, thus:
"That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control eight (8) packs of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known as Shabu, weighing
approximately 400 grams, without the corresponding license or prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659."3
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship, M/V Super
Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to
dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Mark Diesmo, received a complaint from
passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at
cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel security force
accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at the economy section.4 The
suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the
complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no
jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2) security agents back to the economy section to get
his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When
requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic
packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be "shabu," the security
personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside
the suitcase and its contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.5 At about 6:00
a.m., Lt. Robert Patrimonio, YN Aurelio Estoque, CD2 Phoudinie Lantao and RM3 Merchardo De
Guzman of the Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized items--
the Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag6 and eight (8) small plastic packs of white crystalline
substance.7 When asked about the contraband articles, the accused explained that he was just
requested by a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latter's brother in Iligan
City.8 The accused and the seized items were later turned over by the coast guard to the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). Chief Inspector Graciano Mijares and his men brought the
accused to the PAOCTF Headquarters,9 while the packs of white crystalline substance were sent to the
NBI Regional Office in Cagayan de Oro City for laboratory examination. NBI Forensic Chemist Nicanor
Cruz later confirmed the substance to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as
"shabu," weighing 399.3266 grams.10
The accused testified and proffered his own version. On March 11, 1999, at about 10:00 p.m., he was in
Quiapo, Manila where he met Alican "Alex" Macapudi, a neighbor who has a store in Marawi City. He
was requested by Macapudi to bring a Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses and watches to Iligan
City, and to give it to Macapudi's brother at the Iligan port. He boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5 on the
same night, carrying a big luggage full of clothes, a small luggage or "maleta" containing the sunglasses
and brushes he bought from Manila, and the Samsonite suitcase of Macapudi.11 He stayed at cabin no.
106. At about 4:00 a.m of March 13, 1999, as the vessel was about to dock at the Iligan port, he took his
baggage and positioned himself at the economy section to be able to disembark ahead of the other
passengers. There, he met a friend, Ansari Ambor. While they were conversing, five (5) members of the
vessel security force and a woman whom he recognized as his co-passenger at cabin no. 106 came
and told him that he was suspected of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily went with the group back to cabin
no. 106 where he was frisked. Subsequently, he was asked to get his baggage, so he went back to the
economy section and took the big luggage and Macapudi's Samsonite suitcase. He left the small
"maleta" containing sunglasses and brushes for fear that they would be confiscated by the security
personnel. When requested, he voluntarily opened the big luggage, but refused to do the same to the
Samsonite suitcase which he claimed was not his and had a secret combination lock. The security
personnel forcibly opened the suitcase and found packs of white crystalline substance inside which they
suspected to be "shabu." They took pictures of him with the merchandise, and asked him to sign a turn
over receipt which was later given to the Philippine Coast Guard, then to the PAOCTF.12
On December 27, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the offense of violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A. No.
6425 as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Having been under preventive imprisonment since March 13, 1999 until the present, the period
of such preventive detention shall be credited in full in favor of the accused in the service of his
sentence.
 The 399.3266 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is hereby ordered delivered
to the National Bureau of Investigation for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED."13
Hence, this appeal where the accused raises the following assignment of errors:
"I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG CONFISCATED IS
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED/APPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT OWNED THE
CONFISCATED EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST
HIM."14
On the first assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase containing
the methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" was forcibly opened and searched without his consent,
and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any
evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence
against him. He also contends that People v. Marti15 is not applicable in this case because a vessel
security personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution.16 Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.17 Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It should be
stressed, however, that protection is against transgression committed by the government or its agent.
As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti,18 "[i]n the absence of governmental interference,
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State."19 The constitutional
proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.20
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security
personnel. It was only after they found "shabu" inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast
Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore
carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by
the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like
the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in
the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast,
police officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law.
Historically and until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.
On the second assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that he is not the owner of the
Samsonite suitcase and he had no knowledge that the same contained "shabu." He submits that
without knowledge or intent to possess the dangerous drug, he cannot be convicted of the crime
charged.21
We are not persuaded.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a
regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.22 The first two elements were sufficiently proven in this case, and
were in fact undisputed. We are left with the third.
As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. Tan Misa,23 this Court has ruled that to warrant
conviction, the possession of dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the accused, or that animus
possidendi existed together with the possession or control of such articles.24 It has been ruled, however,
that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such
possession.25 Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of
knowledge or animus possidendi.26
In this respect, the accused-appellant has utterly failed. His testimony, uncorroborated, self-serving and
incredulous, was not given credence by the trial court. We find no reason to disagree. Well-settled is the
rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the
trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.27 Moreover,
evidence must be credible in itself to deserve credence and weight in law. In this case, the accused-
appellant admits that when he was asked to get his baggage, he knew it would be inspected.28 Why he
got the Samsonite suitcase allegedly not owned by him and which had a combination lock known only
to the owner remains unclear. He also claims that he did not present his small "maleta" for inspection for
fear that its contents consisting of expensive sunglasses and brushes would be confiscated,29 but he
brought the Samsonite suitcase which is not his and also contained expensive sunglasses, and even
watches.30
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him.31 To overcome this
presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the
accused points to a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented no
evidence to support his claim. As aptly observed by the trial judge:
"First, who is Alex Macap[u]di aka Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does he really exist or simply a figment
of the imagination? He says that Alex Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow businessman who
has a stall selling sunglasses in Marawi City. But no witnesses were presented to prove that
there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted
the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and
acquaintances who could testify and support the claim of the accused."32
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the keystone of the
defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone
allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no
knowledge or intent to possess the same.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No.
06-7542, convicting accused-appellant Basher Bongcarawan of violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED.

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143591 May 5, 2010
TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA, ARTURO E. MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE,
P. SIERVO H. DIZON, BENJAMIN DE LEON, DELFIN C. GONZALES, JR., and BEN YU LIM,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
MAGDALENO M. PEÑA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago City, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals, in its Decision1 dated 20 June 2000
in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666, is correct when it dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners
Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr., Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo H.
Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Eric L. Lee and Ben Yu Lim, Jr., and ruled that the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC), Bago City, did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the motion for
reinvestigation and recall of the warrants of arrest in Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña (Atty. Peña) instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s
compensation and expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees2 against Urban Bank and herein petitioners,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City. The case was raffled to Branch
62 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 754. Atty. Peña anchored his claim for compensation on the
Contract of Agency3 allegedly entered into with the petitioners, wherein the former undertook to perform
such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s
property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss4 arguing that
they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Attached to the motion were the following
documents: 1) a Letter5 dated 19 December 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of
Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property; 2) an unsigned
Letter6 dated 7 December 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; 3) a Letter7 dated 9
December 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan, Jr. and signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and 4) a
Memorandum8 dated 20 November 1994 from Enrique Montilla III. Said documents were presented in
an attempt to show that the respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by
the petitioners.
In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents, Atty. Peña filed his Complaint-
Affidavit9 with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City.10 He claimed that said documents were
falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were
neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI.11 Worse, petitioners introduced said documents
as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were falsified.
In a Resolution12 dated 24 September 1998, the City Prosecutor found probable cause for the
indictment of petitioners for four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents, penalized
by the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The City Prosecutor concluded that
the documents were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the
principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were falsified considering that the
signatories were mere dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No.
754 where they were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, and then
adopted in their answer and in their Pre-Trial Brief.13 Subsequently, the corresponding
Informations14 were filed with the MTCC, Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants15 for the arrest of
the petitioners.
On 1 October 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation.16 Petitioners insisted that they were denied due process because of the non-
observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court.
Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. Then
they argued that since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submitted by the
petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in
issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention with the Rules of Court. Petitioners further prayed
that the information be quashed for lack of probable cause. Moreover, one of the accused, i.e., Ben Lim,
Jr., is not even a director of Urban Bank, contrary to what complainant stated. Lastly, petitioners posited
that the criminal cases should have been suspended on the ground that the issue being threshed out in
the civil case is a prejudicial question.
In an Order17 dated 13 November 1998, the MTCC denied the omnibus motion primarily on the ground
that preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case – which fell within the jurisdiction of
the first-level court. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was
issued in accordance with the Rules of Court. Besides, the court added, petitioners could no longer
question the validity of the warrant since they already posted bail. The court also believed that the issue
involved in the civil case was not a prejudicial question, and, thus, denied the prayer for suspension of
the criminal proceedings. Lastly, the court was convinced that the Informations contained all the facts
necessary to constitute an offense.
Petitioners immediately instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the Court of Appeals, ascribing
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in issuing
and not recalling the warrants of arrest, reiterating the arguments in their omnibus motion.18 They,
likewise, questioned the court’s conclusion that by posting bail, petitioners already waived their right to
assail the validity of the warrants of arrest.
On 20 June 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.19 Thus, petitioners filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following issues:
A.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, is the finding of probable cause required for the filing of
an Information in court?
If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable cause, should not the investigating
prosecutor dismiss the complaint, or at the very least, require the respondent to submit his counter-
affidavit?
B.
Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not within the personal knowledge of the
complainant be sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause?
C.
Where there is offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and
not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, and the record of the preliminary investigation does
not show the existence of probable cause, should not the judge refuse to issue a warrant of arrest and
dismiss the criminal case, or at the very least, require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit in
order to aid the judge in determining the existence of probable cause?
D.
Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?
E.
Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of probable cause?20
On the other hand, respondent contends that the issues raised by the petitioners had already become
moot and academic when the latter posted bail and were already arraigned.
On 2 August 2000, this Court issued a TRO21 enjoining the judge of the MTCC from proceeding in any
manner with Criminal Case Nos. 6683 to 6686, effective during the entire period that the case is
pending before, or until further orders of, this Court.
We will first discuss the issue of mootness.
The issues raised by the petitioners have not been mooted by the fact that they had posted bail and
were already arraigned.
It appears from the records that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately
posted bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment, being then the officers of Urban Bank. On the
scheduled date for the arraignment, despite the petitioners’ refusal to enter a plea, the court a quo
entered a plea of "Not Guilty" for them.
The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the
legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during
trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto.22
As held in Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez:23
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one,
intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by
the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the
legalities or irregularities thereon. The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red.
The new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in
procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by
their essence retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate
retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of their
effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Before the appellate
court rendered its decision on January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already
in effect. It behoved the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the petitioner’s petition for
certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration.1avvphi1
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be
argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of
arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the
petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause.
When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent
with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no
other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x.
Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a
stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest.24 On the date of
their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality of
their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for
them, there was no valid waiver of their right to preclude them from raising the same with the Court of
Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert their
incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest. The ruling to which
we have returned in People v. Red25 stated:
x x x The present defendants were arrested towards the end of January, 1929, on the Island and
Province of Marinduque by order of the judge of the Court of First Instance of Lucena, Tayabas, at a
time when there were no court sessions being held in Marinduque. In view of these circumstances and
the number of the accused, it may properly be held that the furnishing of the bond was prompted by the
sheer necessity of not remaining in detention, and in no way implied their waiver of any right, such as
the summary examination of the case before their detention. That they had no intention of waiving this
right is clear from their motion of January 23, 1929, the same day on which they furnished a bond, and
the fact that they renewed this petition on February 23, 1929, praying for the stay of their arrest for lack
of the summary examination; the first motion being denied by the court on January 24, 1929 (G.R. No.
33708, page 8), and the second remaining undecided, but with an order to have it presented in Boac,
Marinduque.
Therefore, the defendants herein cannot be said to have waived the right granted to them by section 13,
General Order No. 58, as amended by Act No. 3042.
The rest of the issues raised by the petitioners may be grouped into two, which are: (1) the procedural
aspect, i.e., whether the prosecution and the court a quo properly observed the required procedure in
the instant case, and, (2) the substantive aspect, which is whether there was probable cause to pursue
the criminal cases to trial.
The procedural aspect:
Petitioners contend that they were denied due process as they were unable to submit their counter-
affidavits and were not accorded the right to a preliminary investigation. Considering that the complaint
of Atty. Peña was filed in September 1998, the rule then applicable was the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
The provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure relevant to the issue are Sections 1, 3(a) and
9(a) of Rule 112, to wit:
Section 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should
be held for trial.
Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having
been first conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such
number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The said
affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized
to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that
he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits.
Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure.
(a) Where filed with the fiscal.— If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state
prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The fiscal
shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting documents
submitted by the complainant. (underscoring supplied)
The crime to which petitioners were charged was defined and penalized under second paragraph of
Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than ₱5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next
preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of
commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage,
shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next
preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of
another or who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced
in the next preceding article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by
the penalty next lower in degree.
Prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods translates to imprisonment of 2 years, 4
months and 1 day.26 The next lower in degree to prision correccional is arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period which translates to 4 months and 1 day to 2 years
and 4 months27 of imprisonment. Since the crime committed is not covered by the Rules of Summary
Procedure,28 the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts but applying the
ordinary rules. In such instance, preliminary investigation as defined in Section 1, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable since such section covers only crimes cognizable by the
RTC. That which is stated in Section 9(a) is the applicable rule.
Under this Rule, while probable cause should first be determined before an information may be filed in
court, the prosecutor is not mandated to require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavits to
oppose the complaint. In the determination of probable cause, the prosecutor may solely rely on the
complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. If he does not find
probable cause, the prosecutor may dismiss outright the complaint or if he finds probable cause or
sufficient reason to proceed with the case, he shall issue a resolution and file the corresponding
information.
The complaint of respondent, verbatim, is as follows:
COMPLAINT – AFFIDAVIT
I, MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, Filipino, of legal age, with address at Brgy. Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental, after having been sworn in accordance with law hereby depose and state:
1. I am the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 754 pending with the Regional Trial Court of Bago City entitled
"Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña v. Urban Bank, et al" Impleaded therein as defendants of the board of the
bank, namely, Teodoro Borlongan, Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee,
Ben Lim Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel.(underlining ours)
2. I filed the said case to collect my fees as agent of Urban Bank, Inc.(hereinafter referred to as the
"bank") in ridding a certain parcel of land in Pasay City of squatters and intruders. A certified true copy
of the Complaint in the said case is hereto attached as Annex "A".
3. In the Motion to Dismiss dated 12 March 1996 (a certified true copy of which is attached as Annex
"B"), Answer dated 28 October 1996 (Annex "C"), and Pre-Trial Brief dated 28 January 1997 (Annex
"D") filed by the bank and the respondent members of the board, the said respondents used as
evidence the following documents:
a. Letter dated 19 December 1994 supposedly signed by a certain Herman Ponce and Julie Abad for Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña, who has been assigned by Isabela Sugar Company inc. to take charge of
Isabela Sugar Company (ISC) (a copy of which is attached as Annex "E"), which states: inspecting the tenants would like to request an authority similar to this from the Bank to new owners.
Can you please issue something like this today as he (unreadable) this.
December 19, 1994
Urban Bank b. Letter dated 9 December 1994 supposedly executed by the same Marilyn Ong, a copy of which is
Urban Avenue, Makati hereto attached as Annex "G", which states:
Metro Manila
December 9, 1994
Gentlemen:
Atty. Ted Borlongan
This has reference to your property located among Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City which you purchased URBAN BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
from Isabela Sugar Company under a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on December 1, 1994. MAKATI, METRO MANILA

In line with our warranties as the Seller of the said property and our undertaking to deliver to you the full Attention: Mr. Ted Borlongan
and actual possession and control of said property, free from tenants, occupants or squatters and from
any obstruction or impediment to the free use and occupancy of the property and to prevent the former Dear Mr. Borlongan
tenants or occupants from entering or returning to the premises. In view of the transfer of ownership of
the property to Urban Bank, it may be necessary for Urban Bank to appoint Atty. Peña likewise as its
authorized representative for purposes of holding/maintaining continued possession of the said property I would like to request for an authority from Urban Bank per attached immediately – as the tenants are
and to represent Urban Bank in any court action that may be instituted for the abovementioned questioning authority of the people who are helping us to take possession of the property.
purposes.
Marilyn Ong
It is understood that any attorney’s fees, cost of litigation and any other charges or expenses that may
be incurred relative to the exercise by Atty. Peña of his abovementioned duties shall be for the account c. Memorandum dated 20 November 1994, copy of which is attached as annex "H", which states:
of Isabela Sugar Company and any loss or damage that may be incurred to third parties shall be
answerable by Isabela Sugar Company. MEMORANDUM

Very truly yours, To: Atty. Magadaleno M. Peña

Director
Isabela Sugar Company
From: Enrique C. Montilla III
By: President

HERMAN PONCE Date: 20 November 1994

JULIE ABAD
You are hereby directed to recover and take possession of the property of the corporation situated at
b. Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 supposedly executed by a certain Marilyn Ong on behalf of Roxas Boulevard covered by TCT No. 5382 of the Registry of Deeds for Pasay City, immediately upon
ISC, a copy of which is hereto attached as annex "F", which states: the expiration of the contract of lease over the said property on 29 November 1994. For this purpose,
you are authorized to engage the services of security guards to protect the property against intruders.
December 7, 1994 You may also engage the services of a lawyer in case there is a need to go to court to protect the said
property of the corporation. In addition, you may take whatever steps or measures are necessary to
ensure our continued possession of the property.
To: ATTY. CORA BEJASA
ENRIQUE C. MONTILLA III
From: MARILYN G. ONG President

RE: ISABELA SUGAR CO., INC.

4. The respondent member of the board of the bank used and introduced the aforestated documents as
evidence in the civil case knowing that the same are falsified. They used thae said documents to justify
their refusal to pay my agent’s fees, to my damage and prejudice.
5. The 19 December 1994 letter (Annex ‘E") is a falsified document, in that the person who supposedly
executed the letter on behalf of ISC, a certain Herman Ponce and Julie Abad did not actually affix their
signatures on the document. The execution of the letter was merely simulated by making it appear that
Ponce and Abad executed the letter on behalf of ISC when they did not in fact do so.
6. No persons by the name of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad were ever stockholders, officers,
employees or representatives of ISC. In the letter, Herman Ponce was represented to be the President
of ISC and Julie Abad, the Corporate Secretary. However, as of 19 December 1994, the real President
of plaintiff was Enrique Montilla, III and Cristina Montilla was the Corporate Secretary. A copy of the
Minutes of the Regular Meeting of ISC for the year 1994, during which Montilla, et al. Were elected is
hereto attached as Annex "I". On the otherhand, a list of the stockholders of ISC on or about the time of
the transaction is attached as Annex "J".
7. The same holds true with respect to the Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 and athe letter dated
9 December 1994 allegedly written by a ceratin Marilyn Ong. Nobody by the said name was ever a
stockholder of ISC.
8. Lastly, with respect to the supposed Memorandum issued by Enrique Montilla, III his signature
thereon was merely forged by respondents. Enrique Montilla III, did not affix his signature on any such
document.
9. I am executing this affidavit for the purpose of charging Teodoro C. Borlongan, Corazon M. Bejasa
and Arturo E. Manuel, Delfin C. Gonzales Jr., Benjamin L. De Leon, P. Siervo H. Dizon and Eric Lee,
with the crime of use of falsified documents under Artilce 172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.
(underlining ours)
10. I am likewise executing this affidavit for whatever legal purpose it may serve.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
Sgd. MAGDALENO M. PEÑA
It is evident that in the affidavit-complaint, specifically in paragraph 1, respondent merely introduced and
identified "the board of the bank, namely, Teodoro Borlongan, Jr., Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De
Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel, Sr." However, in the
accusatory portion of the complaint which is paragraph number 9, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not included
among those charged with the crime of use of falsified documents under Article 172, paragraph 2, of the
Revised Penal Code. The omission indicates that respondent did not intend to criminally implicate Mr.
Ben Lim, Jr., even as he was acknowledged to be a member of the board. And there was no
explanation in the Resolution and Information by the City Prosecutor why Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was included.
Moreover, as can be gleaned from the body of the complaint and the specific averments therein, Mr.
Ben Lim, Jr. was never mentioned.
The City Prosecutor should have cautiously reviewed the complaint to determine whether there were
inconsistencies which ought to have been brought to the attention of the respondent or, on his own,
considered for due evaluation. It is a big mistake to bring a man to trial for a crime he did not commit.
Prosecutors are endowed with ample powers in order that they may properly fulfill their assigned role in
the administration of justice. It should be realized, however, that when a man is hailed to court on a
criminal charge, it brings in its wake problems not only for the accused but for his family as well.
Therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to weigh the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to
determine the existence of a prima facie case before filing the information in court. Anything less would
be a dereliction of duty.29
Atty. Peña, in his Second Manifestation30 dated 16 June 1999, averred that petitioners, including Mr.
Ben Lim, Jr., were already estopped from raising the fact that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not a member of the
board of directors of Urban Bank, as the latter participated and appeared through counsel in Civil Case
No. 754 without raising any opposition. However, this does not detract from the fact that the City
Prosecutor, as previously discussed, did not carefully scrutinize the complaint of Atty. Peña, which did
not charge Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. of any crime.
What tainted the procedure further was that the Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioners,
including, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. despite the filing of the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest
and/or For Reinvestigation raising among others the issue that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., was not even a
member of the board of directors. With the filing of the motion, the judge is put on alert that an innocent
person may have been included in the complaint. In the Order31 dated 13 November 1998, in denying
the motion to quash, Judge Primitivo Blanca ruled that:
Courts in resolving a motion to quash cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information
or which do not appear on the face of the information because said motion is hypothethical admission of
the facts alleged in the information x x x. (citations omitted.)
We cannot accept as mere oversight the mistake of respondent judge since it was at the expense of
liberty. This cannot be condoned.
In the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the mandate of the Constitution is for the judge to personally
determine the existence of probable cause:
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Corollary thereto, Section 9(b) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure.
(a) x x x.
(b) Where filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court. — If the complaint or information is filed directly
with the Municipal Trial Court, the procedure provided for in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall likewise be
observed. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the
complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant of arrest after personally examining in
writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that "[n]o x x x warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing x x x the persons x x x
to be seized."32 Interpreting the words "personal determination," we said in Soliven v. Makasiar33 that it
does not thereby mean that judges are obliged to conduct the personal examination of the complainant
and his witnesses themselves. To require thus would be to unduly laden them with preliminary
examinations and investigations of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before them. Rather, what is emphasized merely is the exclusive and personal responsibility
of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this end, he may: (a)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. What he is never allowed to do
is to follow blindly the prosecutor's bare certification as to the existence of probable cause. Much more
is required by the constitutional provision. Judges have to go over the report, the affidavits, the
transcript of stenographic notes if any, and other documents supporting the prosecutor's certification.
Although the extent of the judge's personal examination depends on the circumstances of each case, to
be sure, he cannot just rely on the bare certification alone but must go beyond it. This is because the
warrant of arrest issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the
records which sustain it.34 He should even call for the complainant and the witnesses to answer the
court's probing questions when the circumstances warrant.35
An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of
persons which ought not to be intruded by the State.36
Measured against the constitutional mandate and established rulings, there was here a clear abdication
of the judicial function and a clear indication that the judge blindly followed the certification of a city
prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest with respect to
all of the petitioners. The careless inclusion of Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., in the warrant of arrest gives flesh to the
bone of contention of petitioners that the instant case is a matter of persecution rather than
prosecution.37 On this ground, this Court may enjoin the criminal cases against petitioners. As a general
rule, criminal prosecutions cannot be enjoined. However, there are recognized exceptions which, as
summarized in Brocka v. Enrile,38 are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;39
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity
of actions;40
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;41
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;42
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;43
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;44
g. Where the court had no jurisdiction over the offense;45
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;46
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;47 and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied.48
The substantive aspect:
Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code or Introduction
of Falsified Document in a judicial proceeding. The elements of the offense are as follows:
1. That the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person.
2. That the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any subdivisions Nos. 1 or 2 of
Article 172.
3. That he introduced said document in evidence in any judicial proceeding.49
The falsity of the document and the defendants’ knowledge of its falsity are essential elements of the
offense. The Office of the City Prosecutor filed the Informations against the petitioners on the basis of
the Complaint-Affidavit of respondent Atty. Peña, attached to which were the documents contained in
the Motion to Dismiss filed by the petitioners in Civil Case No. 754. Also included as attachments to the
complaint were the Answers, Pre-Trial Brief, the alleged falsified documents, copy of the regular
meetings of ISCI during the election of the Board of Directors and the list of ISCI Stockholders.50 Based
on these documents and the complaint-affidavit of Atty. Peña, the City Prosecutor concluded that
probable cause for the prosecution of the charges existed. On the strength of the same documents, the
trial court issued the warrants of arrest.
This Court, however, cannot find these documents sufficient to support the existence of probable cause.
Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man
weighs the facts and circumstances without restoring to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of
which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than
evidence that would justify conviction.51
As enunciated in Baltazar v. People,52 the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with
the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the
arrest of the accused.
The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused
is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and
anxiety of a public trial.53
We do not see how it can be concluded that the documents mentioned by respondent in his complaint-
affidavit were falsified. In his complaint, Atty. Peña stated that Herman Ponce, Julie Abad and Marilyn
Ong, the alleged signatories of the questioned letters, did not actually affix their signatures therein; and
that they were not actually officers or stockholders of ISCI.54 He further claimed that Enrique Montilla’s
signature appearing in another memorandum addressed to respondent was forged.55 These averments
are mere assertions which are insufficient to warrant the filing of the complaint or worse the issuance of
warrants of arrest. These averments cannot be considered as proceeding from the personal knowledge
of herein respondent who failed to, basically, allege that he was present at the time of the execution of
the documents. Neither was there any mention in the complaint-affidavit that herein respondent was
familiar with the signatures of the mentioned signatories to be able to conclude that they were forged.
What Atty. Peña actually stated were but sweeping assertions that the signatories are mere dummies of
ISCI and that they are not in fact officers, stockholders or representatives of the corporation. Again,
there is no indication that the assertion was based on the personal knowledge of the affiant.
It is x x x imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the
pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima
facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.
Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the
same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence
depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a
finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons.
The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible
evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the
courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by visualizing
and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so.
On the foregoing discussion, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the findings of the
prosecutor as well as the court a quo as to the existence of probable cause. The criminal complaint
against the petitioners should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 June
2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order
dated 2 August 2000 is hereby made permanent. Accordingly, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Negros
Occidental, Bago City, is hereby DIRECTED to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685 and
6686.

The reason for the requirement that affidavits must be based on personal knowledge is to guard against SO ORDERED.
hearsay evidence. A witness, therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from others either
because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.56 Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or Associate Justice
statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral
statements.57

The requirement of personal knowledge should have been strictly applied considering that herein
petitioners were not given the opportunity to rebut the complainant’s allegation through counter-
affidavits.

Quite noticeable is the fact that in the letter dated 19 December 1994 of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad,
neither of the two made the representation that they were the president or secretary of ISCI. It was only
Atty. Peña who asserted that the two made such representation. He alleged that Marilyn Ong was never
a stockholder of ISCI but he did not present the stock and transfer book of ISCI. And, there was neither
allegation nor proof that Marilyn Ong was not connected to ISCI in any other way.lawphil Moreover,
even if Marilyn Ong was not a stockholder of ISCI, such would not prove that the documents she signed
were falsified.

The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of the public prosecutor’s
function without any showing of grave abuse of discretion or manifest error in his
findings.58 Considering, however, that the prosecution and the court a quo committed manifest errors in
their findings of probable cause, this Court therefore annuls their findings.

Our pronouncement in Jimenez v. Jimenez59 as reiterated in Baltazar v. People is apropos:

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 161083 August 3, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Chief State Prosecutor JOVENCITO ZUÑO, State
Prosecutor GERONIMO SY and Prosecution Attorney IRWIN MARAYA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. BASILIO R. GABO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch II and WILSON CUA TING, EDWARD NGO YAO, WILLY SO TAN and
CAROL FERNAN ORTEGA,Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
July 24, 2003 Decision2 and October 3, 2003 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 71985.
The facts of the case, as culled from the petition, are as follows:
On May 14, 2001, around 12:15 a.m., a fire broke out inside the plant of Sanyoware Plastic Products
Manufacturing Corporation (Sanyoware) located at Km. 8, McArthur Highway, Lolomboy, Bocaue,
Bulacan. The Sanyoware plant had four single-storey buildings, enclosed in concrete walls with steel
tresses and galvanized iron sheet roofing.
Sanyoware 2, Warehouse 2, the building that was razed by fire, was located at the right innermost
portion of the plant facing north. Sanyoware occupied the right, western portion of the said building,
while New Unitedware Marketing Corporation (Unitedware) rented the other half, located at the left,
eastern portion. The building was divided at the center by a tall concrete firewall with a steel gate.
Investigations were conducted by the Philippine 3rd Regional Criminal Investigation and Detention
Group (CIDG) and the Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task Force (IATF) of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government. Pursuant to the August 1, 2001 letter4 of CIDG Regional Officer P/Supt. Christopher
A. Laxa to the Secretary of the Justice; the IATF’s October 25, 2001 Indorsement;5 and the October 8,
2001 letter6 of Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) Chief Sr. Supt. Victoriano C. Remedio to the Prosecutor
of the DOJ, the following were accused of destructive arson before the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor, namely: Samson Cua Ting, alias Ding Jian Zhi, External Vice-President; Wilson Cua Ting,
Plant Manager; Edward Ngo Yao (Yao), President of New Marketing Corporation; Willy So Tan, alias
Chen Yi Ming, Vice-President for Operations; Carol Fernan Ortega, Assistant to the External Vice-
President; and John Doe and Peter Doe.
In support of the accusation, petitioner submitted the Sworn Statements of Richard Madrideo, Jaime
Kalaw, Raymund Dy, Chit Chua, Jennifer Chua Reyes, Shanda Amistad, SPO1 Valeriano Dizon and
Inspector Allan N. Barredo.
In his sworn statement,7 Richard Madrideo, a supervisor at Sanyoware said that there were two
separate sets of fire in the Sanyoware Warehouse and that it was different from, but occurred
simultaneously, with the fire at the Unitedware Warehouse. Madrideo claimed that respondents Wilson
Ting and Yao instructed him that if anyone should ask about the fire, he should say that the fires did not
break out simultaneously and the cause thereof was defective wiring. In his additional sworn statement,
Madrideo claimed that, days after the fire, he was threatened by respondents and was being forced to
write a sworn statement against his will.
Jaime Kalaw, a former head of the Maintenance Department of Sanyoware, alleged in his sworn
statement8 that the cause of the fire could not have been faulty electrical wiring, because the warehouse
was relatively new and that, on the day of the fire, the plant was not in operation so there was no heavy
load of electricity and all the circuit breakers were shut down. Kalaw noted that a week before the fire
occurred, almost 300 unserviceable molds were transferred to the burned Sanyoware warehouse. A day
before the fire, expensive finish products were loaded in delivery trucks. In addition, Kalaw alleged that
he saw respondent Yao a day before the fire driving to the Unitedware warehouse. Once inside,
respondent Yao took a rectangular shaped object from his vehicle.
Raymond Dy, a warehouse supervisor at Sanyoware stated in his sworn statement9 that a week before
the fire occurred, he observed that saleable products from the burned warehouse were transferred to
the Sanyo City Warehouse, while unusable components from the Sanyo City warehouse were
transferred to the burned warehouse. Dy alleged that the transfer of the products was upon the orders
of Charles Lee, the plant manager of Sanyoware, who allegedly told the employees to finish the
transfers on May 12, 2001.
Chit Chua, an employee at the Accounting Department of Sanyoware, claimed in her sworn
statement10 that Sanyoware was indebted to a number of banks and corporations and that Sanyoware’s
outstanding obligations amounted to ₱95,000,000.00 to ₱96,000,000.00. Jennifer Chua Reyes, a
secretary at Sanyoware, alleged in her sworn statement11 that Sanyoware has an outstanding loan of
₱180,000,000.00 to various individuals.
Shanda Amistad, a former stay-in worker at Sanyoware, alleged in her affidavit12 that, around 8:00 a.m.
of May 13, 2001, she saw respondent Yao driving a Canter truck of Unitedware loaded with goods. Yao
went to Sanyoware three times that day. Amistad found it unusual, since Yao did not normally go to
Sanyoware on Sundays and there were available drivers at that time. Around 2:00 p.m. of the same
day, respondent Wilson Ting arrived.
SPO1 Valeriano Dizon (SPO1 Dizon), a fireman assigned at the Meycauayan Fire Station, Bulacan,
stated in his sworn statement13 that he conducted the examination of the fire that occurred on May 14,
2001. He alleged that he took the statement of the witnesses, but Sr. Supt. Enrique Linsangan of the
BFP Regional Office, Region III, took the witnesses’ statements from him before he could prepare the
Final Investigation Report (FIR). Thereafter, Sr. Supt. Linsangan summoned him, Inspector Allan
Barredo and BFP C/Ins. Absalon Zipagan, Municipal Fire Marshall of Bocaue, Bulacan, and showed
them the copy of the FIR and made them sign it. Inspector Barredo, in his affidavit,14corroborated SPO1
Dizon’s allegation as to how Sr. Supt. Lansangan summoned and ordered them to sign the FIR.
In their defense, respondents submitted a Counter-Affidavit15 to refute the allegations made against
them, the significant portions of which read:
7. Principally on the basis of the "Salaysay" of Richard Madrideo attached Annex "A" to the
Affidavit of Carol Ortega Fernan dated September 22, 2001, and on the basis of the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" of Ricky A. Hista and of the "Karagdagang Salaysay" of Bobby
Bacang and on the basis of our inquiry from others, we have good reason to believe that one
claiming to be a representative of CRM Adjustment Corporation had indeed offered money and
jobs to persons to give perjured statements to make it appear that there was arson and that we
committed it. (The Affidavit of Carol Ortega Fernan, together with the "Salaysay" of Richard
Madrideo as Annex "A" thereto, the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of Ricky A. Hista and the
"Karagdagang Salaysay" of Bobby Bacang were all submitted last September 22, 2001 to the
Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task Force, Office of the Secretary, Department of the Interior and
Local Government.
8. We would like to stress the fact that during the supposed investigation of this arson case by
complainant 3rd Regional Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, not one of us was
invited by complainant to answer the allegations of witnesses against us. As far as we know,
complainant did not even make an ocular inspection of the place where fire occurred.
9. Although the CIDG investigators were allegedly informed by Mrs. June Go, a clerk of
Sanyoware, that nobody could assist the team in the ocular inspection, said investigators did
not proceed to conduct an ocular inspection when they actually did not need any assistance
and when nobody was preventing them from conducting the inspection.
10. Although Senior Police Officer Regino Raquipiso claims that when he and SPO1 John
Tabago returned to the factory, the ocular inspection was not pushed through for alleged lack
of clearance from the company owners, there is no showing that said police officers insisted or
demanded to conduct then and there an ocular inspection.
11. Apparently, complainant solely relied on the statements of Jaime Kalaw, Raymond Dy and
Richard Madrideo in deciding to file the case at bar against us.
12. Richard Madrideo executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" before SPO4 Regino D. Raquipiso,
Jr. last June 29, 2001 wherein he claims, among others, that there was a simultaneous fire that
occurred in two places in Sanyoware warehouse and in a place in Unitedware. However, said
claim is a blatant lie and perjured statement.
13. In his "Salaysay" (Annex "A" to the Affidavit of Carol Ortega Fernan submitted last
September 22, 2001 to the Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task Force), Richard Madrideo admitted to
the fact that he received the sum of ₱1,000.00 from Atty. Lugtu and that he subsequently
received another sum of ₱15,000.00 from Atty. Lugtu. Richard Madrideo was also given a
cellphone and was promised a job. According to said "Salaysay," Atty. Lugtu instructed
Madrideo to state, among others, in his "Salaysay" that Madrideo saw a simultaneous fire that
occurred in two sides of the plant of Sanyoware.
14. In the "Karagdagang Salaysay" of Richard Madrideo, he repudiated his "Salaysay" by
claiming that he was threatened and coerced by Respondents into executing said "Salaysay."
Said claim is a blatant lie. In essence, the story contained in the "Karagdagang Salaysay"
regarding alleged threats and coercion is nothing but a fabricated lie for the truth of the matter
being that his "Salaysay" was executed by him freely and voluntarily last July 30, 2001 at the
conference room of Sanyoware. He was not threatened by anyone. He was neither paid nor
promised any consideration for executing said "Salaysay."
15. At any rate, I, Wilson Ting, and the security guards on duty can attest to the fact that fire
started at the warehouse of Unitedware and that it did not occur simultaneously in different
places.
16. In the Sworn Statement of Raymond Dy, he claims that Richard Madrideo had told him that
while the fire was on going at the Unitedware warehouse, Madrideo saw the fire on top of the
stock piles inside the Sanyoware warehouse aside from that fire at the Unitedware. However,
Jaime Kalaw, who was allegedly informed about the fire by Raymond Dy, did not mention in his
Sworn Statement about any simultaneous occurrence of the fire in different places. Jaime
Kalaw even further stated in his Sworn Statement that upon his inquiry from the employees, he
was allegedly told that the fire originated from Unitedware warehouse that spread to
Sanyoware warehouse.
17. The allegation of Jaime Kalaw in his Sworn Statement that all circuit breakers were "off"
position so that there was no flow of electric current that may cause fire on the warehouses
and the allegation of Raymond Dy that during his roving before the fire, all the lights were "off"
are not true for the truth being that management had required that some lights be put on every
night in all the warehouses so that they can be well guarded. Besides, I, Wilson Ting, and the
guards on duty can attest to the fact that there were lights in all the warehouses during the
subject incident.
18. Raymond Dy claims that the keys were usually kept by the guard on duty, but that on this
occasion, he learned from Shandra Amistad, a stay-in helper, that the keys were then kept by
Wilson Ting. Obviously, said claim is based on hearsay and thus, should not be given any
credence and besides, I, Wilson Ting, deny said claim for the truth of the matter being that the
keys of Sanyoware are kept inside its main office and are not kept by the guard on duty.
19. Raymond Dy also claims that the lights were 3 to 4 meters away from the stocks, so that it
could be impossible that stocks will be caught by fire if and when the lights or electrical system
leak down. However, said claim is not true for the fact of the matter is that in the Unitedware
warehouse and in Sanyoware warehouse, there were so much pile[s] of stocks that some
pile[s] almost reached the lights.
20. There is also no truth to the allegation of Raymond Dy that a week before the fire, saleable
finished products from Sanyoware and Unitedware were removed and transferred to Sanyo
City warehouse. There is also no truth to the allegation that non-useable components were
removed from Sanyo City and transferred a week before the fire to the warehouses that got
burned. Likewise, there is no truth that Charles Lee gave a deadline until Saturday (May 12) to
transfer non-useable components to the burned warehouses. Said allegations are all
fabricated lies designed to make it appear that there was arson.
21. Long before the subject incident, I, Wilson Ting, had ordered to have the stock piles that
were in between the steel gate dividing Unitedware and Sanyoware warehouses moved, not to
have a pathway, but for the purpose of closing the said steel gate. After said stock piles were
moved, the steel gate was padlocked.
22. There was nothing extraordinary or irregular for several delivery trucks filled with stocks to
stay at the parking area for the night and to leave very early in the morning to avoid traffic.
Considering the huge volume of deliveries being made regularly by Sanyoware and
Unitedware, delivery trucks with finished products were often times parked in the evening and
during Sundays and holidays at the compound of Sanyoware and they usually moved out very
early in the morning from Monday to Saturday. Thus, there was nothing extraordinary or
irregular for some delivery trucks with stocks at the parking area on the night of May 13, 2001,
considering especially that it was a Sunday.
23. Being the operations manager of Sanyoware, I have no fixed time and schedule of work.
Even on a Sunday or holiday, I, Wilson Ting[,] sometimes visit the plant. Thus, there was
nothing unusual that I, Wilson Ting, went to Sanyoware last May 13, 2001. Due to several
incidents of thefts that took place inside the compound of Sanyoware and because of reports
that the delivery trucks at the parking lot might contain some items that were not included in
the inventory for delivery, I, Wilson Ting, as operations manager, decided to be at Sanyoware
on that Sunday (May 13, 2001) principally to check the goods inside the delivery trucks. With
the help of security guards Bobby Bacang and Ricky Hista, I, Wilson Ting, checked the goods
in all the delivery trucks.
24. Being the President and practically the owner of Unitedware, a marketing area of
Sanyoware and the lessee of Sanyoware’s warehouse, I, (Edward Yao), visit Sanyoware and
Unitedware from time to time.
25. As my (Edward Yao’s) mother-in-law asked from me (Edward Yao) some chairs and
drawers, I (Edward Yao) drove my Pajero and went to Sanyoware. I (Edward Yao) called up
Wilson Ting and informed him that I’ll be getting some chairs and drawers from Sanyoware for
my mother-in-law. From the plant of Sanyoware, I (Edward Yao) got some chairs and drawers.
When said chairs and drawers could not fit in my (Edward Yao) [P]ajero, I (Edward Yao) left to
get a van. I (Edward Yao) came back later driving a van where the said chairs and drawers
were placed. I (Edward Yao) brought said chairs and drawers to my mother-in-law who
selected and got only some items and so, I (Edward Yao) returned to Sanyoware the remaining
items. Before I (Edward Yao) left again, Wilson Ting asked me to come back for some chat and
so, I (Edward Yao) returned in my [P]ajero. However, after chatting with Wilson Ting, I (Edward
Yao) left at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening of May 13, 2001. Thus, just before the incident
when the fire occurred, I (Edward Yao) was not in the compound of Sanyoware.
26. There is no truth, however, to the claim that I (Edward Yao) had entered the warehouse of
Unitedware and that I (Edward Yao) got a rectangular shape black object from my vehicle while
inside the warehouse for the truth of the matter being that I (Edward Yao) did not enter said
warehouse and I (Edward Yao) did not get any object from my vehicle. I (Edward Yao) got the
said chairs and drawers from the plant of Sanyoware.
27. There is no truth that the company is suffering losses even before the fire occurred. The
loan of Sanyoware with Metrobank is fully secured by a real estate mortgage wherein the value
of the real estate, together with the improvements thereon that was mortgaged is more or less
double the amount of the said loan and, thus, said real estate value is more than sufficient to
cover said loan of Sanyoware. On the other hand, the loan with Equitable Bank is also fully
secured by a real estate mortgage.
28. Before the subject incident, Sanyoware was making profits. There was no year that
Sanyoware incurred losses. Its business was going every year. Prior to the subject incident,
the record of Sanyoware with the banks was quite good.
29. Likewise, prior to the fire, Unitedware was steadily growing. Every year, its profit continued
to go up. Last year, Unitedware made a huge profit from its operation and it is expected that,
despite the fire that burned the warehouses, Unitedware will still make a good profit this year.
30. Complainant did not conduct any investigation, except to get the statements of its
witnesses: Madrideo, Kalaw and Dy. Likewise, the Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task Force did not
also conduct any investigation, except in essence to ask the witnesses of complainant to
identify under oath their sworn statements executed before the complainant and to ask
respondents to submit their sworn statements and later to identify the same under oath.
31. On the other hand, the elements of Bocaue Fire Station and OPFM Bulacan BFP Region 3
Intel and Inves Section conducted a thorough investigation of the origin of the fire. Statements
of security guards Bobby A. Bacang and Mark Anthony Gabay were taken. Statement of the
operations manager Wilson Ting was also taken. The subject place was inspected. Pictures
were taken. Specimens were obtained from the place where fire occurred and submitted to the
laboratory for examination. Said elements undertook other activities in line with proper
investigation.16
After preliminary investigation, then State Prosecutor Carlos C. Pormento issued a Resolution,17 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that an information for Destructive
Arson be filed against Wilson Ting, Edward Yao, Willy So Tan and Carol Ortega. That the case against
Samson Ting be dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to indict him under the charge.
As to the charge of Accessories against herein three (3) Fire Officers, let that case be remanded to TF-
IATF for further investigation.18
Pursuant to the foregoing Resolution, an Information19 for Arson was filed against Wilson Cua Ting,
Edward Ngo Yao, Willy So Tan, Carol F. Ortega, John Doe and Peter Doe, of the crime of arson, to wit:
That on or about May 14, 2001, in the Municipality of Bocaue, Province of Bulacan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating and
mutually helping one another, acting in common accord, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, destroy the warehouses known as Sanyoware Plastic Products Manufacturing Plant and
New Unitedware Marketing Corporation, including the stocks of raw materials and finish products,
machineries and various equipments by maliciously burning the same for the purpose of concealing or
destroying evidence of another violation of law, and to conceal bankruptcy to defraud creditors and to
collect from insurance.
CONTRARY TO LAW.20
The Information was raffled to Branch XI, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos Bulacan, 3rd Judicial
Region. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 300-47M 2002.
Prior to the arraignment of respondents and before warrants of arrest could be issued, respondents filed
a Motion to Conduct Hearing to Determine Probable Cause and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest Pending Determination of Probable Cause.21
On February 27, 2002, the RTC issued an Order22 dismissing the case, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Accordingly, for lack of probable cause, the instant case is DISMISSED as ordained under Sec. 6, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
SO ORDERED.23
The RTC applied the equipoise rule in dismissing the case, because of its observation that the sworn
statements submitted by petitioner and respondents contained contradictory positions.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,24 which was, however, denied by the RTC in an
Order25dated March 25, 2002.
On August 8, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
71985. On July 24, 2003, the CA issued a Decision denying the petition, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by the public
respondent, the assailed Orders dated February 27, 2002 and March 25, 2002 are hereby AFFIRMED
in toto and the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and is, accordingly, DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.26
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the CA in a
Resolution27 dated October 3, 2003.
Hence, this instant petition, with petitioner raising the following ground for this Court’s consideration, to
wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY AND GROSSLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADOPTING THE EQUIPOISE RULE IN THE CASE AT
BAR.28
Before anything else, this Court shall address a procedural issue raised by respondents that certiorari
does not lie considering that such special civil action is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, or
more importantly, a lapsed appeal.29
Respondents’ position is well taken.
It is well settled that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only
when, "there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," and
certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of
that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for a lost appeal.30
A perusal of the records will show that petitioner received the assailed CA Resolution on October 10,
2003. From that time on, petitioner had 15 days, or until October 25, 2003, to file an appeal by way of a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, instead of filing the appeal on the last
day of reglementary period, petitioner simply allowed it to lapse. Clearly, petitioner had an appeal, which
under the circumstances was the adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. On this point alone,
petitioner’s petition must be dismissed, as herein petition is without a doubt a substitute for a lost
appeal. In any case, even if this Court were to set aside the procedural infirmity of the petition, the same
still fails on the merits.
In a petition for certiorari, the court must confine itself to the issue of whether or not respondent court
lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion.31
It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry, which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and the preliminary investigation proper, which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable
cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation
proper – whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged – is the function of the investigating prosecutor.32
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. –
xxxx
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the
judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order of the accused had
already been arrested, pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case
of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the complaint or information.33
As enunciated in Baltazar v. People,34 the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with
the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the
arrest of the accused. Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information, or any
offense included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common
sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more
than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify conviction.35 The purpose of the
mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from
the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public
trial.36
Based on the foregoing, the RTC acted within its jurisdiction when it dismissed the case on lack of
probable cause as the same is sanctioned under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The
penultimate question to be resolved then is was such exercise of jurisdiction attended by grave abuse of
discretion?
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction, or in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.37
Petitioner’s main argument hinges on the propriety of the RTC’s use of the equipoise rule in dismissing
the case which was affirmed by the CA. Specifically, petitioner contends that the equipoise rule cannot
be used by the RTC merely after the filing of the information, thus:
Since there must be a proper determination of the presence or absence of evidence sufficient to support
a conviction, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt, the equipoise rule shall properly come into play when
the parties have already concluded the presentation of their respective evidence. It is only at this stage,
not at any prior time and certainly not merely after the filing of the information, can the trial court assess
and weigh the evidence of the parties and thereafter determine which party has the preponderance of
evidence. If both parties fail to adduce evidence in support of their respective cases, an adverse
decision would be rendered against the party which has the burden of proof.38
Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise, or there is doubt on
which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule
finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for
then the evidence does not suffice to produce a conviction.39
To this Court’s mind, the reliance of the RTC in the equipoise rule is misplaced as a review of previous
Court decisions would show that the position of petitioner is in fact correct. The equipoise rule has been
generally applied when the parties have already concluded the presentation of their respective evidence
as shown in a plethora of cases such as Abarquez v. People,40 Tin v. People41 and People v. Leano.42
While the use of the equipoise rule was not proper under the circumstances of the case at bar, the
same, however, does not equate to an abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, but at most, merely
an error of judgment. More importantly, this Court finds that the RTC had in fact complied with the
requirement under the rules of personally evaluating the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence and that the assailed Order was arrived at after due consideration of the merits thereto, thus:
By this statement of Madrideo, it would appear fire broke out in two (2) places, which, presupposes or
implies that some sort of incendiary or flammable substances were ignited to start the fire. The
investigation conducted by the Bocaue Fire Station, however, appears to have ruled out the use of
incendiary or inflammable substances. Annex "E" of the Complaint, Chemistry Report No. C-054-2001
of the Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office indicated that the specimen submitted by the Bocaue
Fire Station in connection with the fire in question was found negative of any flammable substance. This
finding was never debunked or repudiated, which makes the misgivings of the police investigators about
its veracity unfounded. Thus, pitted against the allegation of Madrideo, this physical evidence puts the
truth of the latter in grave doubt. Physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more
eloquently than a hundred witnesses (People vs. Sacabin, 57 SCRA 707). Physical evidence are mute
but eloquent manifestations of truth and they rate high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence (People
vs. Uycoque, 124 SCRA 769).
At this stage, it must be stressed that the Fire Investigation Report prepared by the Bocaue Fire Station
(Annex "D") and the Certification made by the Provincial Fire Marshall, Absalon Zipagan, point to the
faulty wiring as the cause or origin (sic) of the conflagration at bar. The Office the Regional Fire Marshall
also came out with the same findings. (Annexes "B" and "C") All the above reports and investigation
stand as the official report of the fire in question. Contrary to the Resolution, we find nothing in the
respective sworn statements of Supt. Absalon Zipagan, Sr. Supt. Enrique Linsangan and Insp. Allan
Barredo that deviated much less repudiated the aforesaid reports and findings. Far from impugning their
own investigation, the three (3) fire officials simply narrated the steps that were taken at the provincial
and regional levels in the investigation of the Sanyo fire. Needless to state, the investigation reports and
findings carry the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. A mere affidavit cannot
overcome this presumption. (Transport Corporation vs. CA, 241 SCRA 77) Government officials are
presumed to perform their functions with regularity and strong evidence is necessary to rebut this
presumption. (Tata vs. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 235)
The significance of the above reports and findings cannot be overlooked. Note that F/CINSP. Absalon
Zipagan, F/Insp. Allan Barredo and SPO1 Valeriano Dizon, Jr. were included as accessories in the
complaint by the DILG, Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task Force but the State Prosecutor did not rule on their
liability, which thus enhances all the more the probative value of the said reports and findings.
This Court, likewise, noted that although the Inter Agency Anti Arson Task Force was quick to rule out
faulty electrical wiring, it did note arrive at a definite theory how the fire started, leaving everything
hanging in mid-air.
This Court is also hard put to make out a case from the actuations of some of the accused before,
during and after the fire. For one, the presence of Wilson Ting and Edward Yao in the Sanyo premises
before the fire is not criminal per se. Both apparently have their own explanations, and following the
equipoise rule as elucidated above, no adverse implications can be inferred therefrom. So are with the
alleged utterances made by the accused during and after the fire, having been said in the midst of
tenseful happening these can be attributed to their desperation over the loss of some of their properties.
And, consistent with the equipoise rule, if ever said statements were uttered at all, they cannot serve as
evidence against the accused for the offense charged.431avvphi1
The conclusions of the RTC which led to the dismissal of the information against respondents cannot, in
any sense, be characterized as outrageously wrong or manifestly mistaken, or whimsically or
capriciously arrived at. The worst that may perhaps be said of it is that it is fairly debatable, and may
even be possibly erroneous. But they cannot be declared to have been made with grave abuse of
discretion.44
Based on Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the RTC judge, upon the filing of an Information,
has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish
probable cause; (2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and (3) in case of doubt
as to the existence of probable cause, order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five
days from notice, the issue to be resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the
information.45

The judge is required to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause.46 To this Court’s mind, the RTC had complied with its duty of personally evaluating the
supporting evidence of the prosecution before arriving at its decision of dismissing the case against
respondents.

While petitioner mainly argues against the use of the equipoise rule, it cannot escape this Court’s
attention that ultimately petitioner is asking this Court to resolve the propriety of the dismissal of the
case by the RTC, on the basis of the Information and the attached documents it had filed. This Court
however, will defer to the findings of fact of the RTC, which are accorded great weight and respect,
more so because the same were affirmed by the CA. In addition, it bears to stress that the instant case
is a petition for certiorari where questions of fact are not entertained.47

The sole office of writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including the commission of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and does not include correction of public
respondent’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings based thereon.48 An error of judgment that
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original special civil
action of certiorari.49

In any case, the dismissal of herein petition does not preclude petitioner from availing of any other
action it deems appropriate under the premises. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused
has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.50 Moreover,
while the absence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is a ground for the dismissal
of the case, the same does not result in the acquittal of the said accused.51

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The July 24, 2003 Decision and
October 3, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 71985, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice