Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
om any amount due to HCCC from the GSIS. Consequently, the trial court dismissed
SUPREME COURT the case upon the filing by the parties of a joint motion to dismiss.
Manila
Sometime in 1979, after an examination of the records of the GSIS, Ong discovered that Diaz and
THIRD DIVISION Francisco had executed and signed seven checks 4 , of various dates and amounts, drawn against
the IBAA and payable to HCCC for completed and delivered work under the contract. Ong,
G.R. No. 116320 November 29, 1999 however, claims that these checks were never delivered to HCCC. Upon inquiry with Diaz, Ong
learned that the GSIS gave Francisco custody of the checks since she promised that she would
deliver the same to HCCC. Instead, Francisco forged the signature of Ong, without his knowledge
ADALIA FRANCISCO, petitioner,
or consent, at the dorsal portion of the said checks to make it appear that HCCC had indorsed the
vs.
checks; Francisco then indorsed the checks for a second time by signing her name at the back of
COURT OF APPEALS, HERBY COMMERCIAL & CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION AND
the checks and deposited the checks in her IBAA savings account. IBAA credited Francisco's
JAIME C. ONG, respondents.
account with the amount of the checks and the latter withdrew the amount so credited.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
On June 7, 1979, Ong filed complaints with the office of the city fiscal of Quezon City, charging
Francisco with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. Francisco denied having forged
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming Ong's signature on the checks, claiming that Ong himself indorsed the seven checks in behalf of
the decision 2rendered by Branch 168 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35231 HCCC and delivered the same to Francisco in payment of the loans extended by Francisco to
in favor of private respondents. HCCC. According to Francisco, she agreed to grant HCCC the loans in the total amount of
P585,000.00 and covered by eighteen promissory notes in order to obviate the risk of the non-
The controversy before this Court finds its origins in a Land Development and Construction completion of the project. As a means of repayment, Ong allegedly issued a Certification
Contract which was entered into on June 23, 1977 by A. Francisco Realty & Development authorizing Francisco to collect HCCC's receivables from the GSIS. Assistant City Fiscal Ramon
Corporation (AFRDC), of which petitioner Adalia Francisco (Francisco) is the president, and M. Gerona gave credence to Francisco's claims and accordingly, dismissed the complaints, which
private respondent Herby Commercial & Construction Corporation (HCCC), represented by its dismissal was affirmed by the Minister of Justice in a resolution issued on June 5, 1981.
President and General Manager private respondent Jaime C. Ong (Ong), pursuant to a housing
project of AFRDC at San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, financed by the Government Service The present case was brought by private respondents on November 19, 1979 against Francisco
Insurance System (GSIS). Under the contract, HCCC agreed to undertake the construction of 35 and IBAA for the recovery of P370,475.00, representing the total value of the seven checks, and
housing units and the development of 35 hectares of land. The payment of HCCC for its services for damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs. After trial on the merits, the trial
was on a turn-key basis, that is, HCCC was to be paid on the basis of the completed houses and court rendered its decision in favor of private respondents, the dispositive portion of which
developed lands delivered to and accepted by AFRDC and the GSIS. To facilitate payment, provides —
AFRDC executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of HCCC to enable the latter to collect payments
directly from the GSIS. Furthermore, the GSIS and AFRDC put up an Executive Committee
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
Account with the Insular Bank of Asia & America (IBAA) in the amount of P4,000,000.00 from
plaintiffs and against the defendants INSULAR BANK OF ASIA & AMERICA and
which checks would be issued and co-signed by petitioner Francisco and the GSIS Vice-President
ATTY. ADALIA FRANCISCO, to jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the
Armando Diaz (Diaz).
amount of P370.475.00 plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from
the date of the filing of the complaint until the full amount is paid; moral damages
On February 10, 1978, HCCC filed a complaint 3 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to plaintiff Jaime Ong in the sum of P50,000.00; exemplary damages of
against Francisco, AFRDC and the GSIS for the collection of the unpaid balance under the Land P50,000.00; litigation expenses of P5,000.00; and attorney's fees of P50,000.00.
Development and Construction Contract in the amount of P515,493.89 for completed and
delivered housing units and land development. However, the parties eventually arrived at an With respect to the cross-claim of the defendant IBAA against its co-defendant
amicable settlement of their differences, which was embodied in a Memorandum Agreement
Atty. Adalia Francisco, the latter is ordered to reimburse the former for the sums
executed by HCCC and AFRDC on July 21, 1978. Under the agreement, the parties stipulated
that the Bank shall pay to the plaintiff on the forged checks including the interests
that HCCC had turned over 83 housing units which have been accepted and paid for by the GSIS. paid thereon.
The GSIS acknowledged that it still owed HCCC P520,177.50 representing incomplete
construction of housing units, incomplete land development and 5% retention, which amount will
be discharged when the defects and deficiencies are finally completed by HCCC. It was also Further, the defendants are ordered to pay the costs.
provided that HCCC was indebted to AFRDC in the amount of P180,234.91 which the former
agreed would be paid out of the proceeds from the 40 housing units still to be turned over by
Based upon the findings of handwriting experts from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), thru ONG to collect all receivables of HERBY from GSIS to pay
the trial court held that Francisco had indeed forged the signature of Ong to make it appear that he the loans extended to them. (Exhibit 3).
had indorsed the checks. Also, the court ruled that there were no loans extended, reasoning that it
was unbelievable that HCCC was experiencing financial difficulties so as to compel it to obtain the 3. That respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
loans from AFRDC in view of the fact that the GSIS had issued checks in favor of HCCC at about seven checks in question were not taken up in the liquidation
the same time that the alleged advances were made. The trial court stated that it was plausible and reconciliation of all outstanding account between AFRDC
that Francisco concealed the fact of issuance of the checks from private respondents in order to and HERBY as acknowledged by the parties in Memorandum
make it appear as if she were accommodating private respondents, when in truth she was lending Agreement (Exh. 5) is a pure conjecture, surmise and
HCCC its own money. speculation contrary to the unrebutted evidence presented by
petitioners. It is an inference made which is manifestly
With regards to the Memorandum Agreement entered into between AFRDC and HCCC in Civil mistaken.
Case No. Q-24628, the trial court held that the same did not make any mention of the forged
checks since private respondents were as of yet unaware of their existence, that fact having been 4. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
effectively concealed by Francisco, until private respondents acquired knowledge of Francisco's decision of the lower court and dismissing the appeal. 6
misdeeds in 1979.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not Francisco forged the signature of Ong on the seven
IBAA was held liable to private respondents for having honored the checks despite such obvious checks. In this connection, we uphold the lower courts' finding that the subject matter of the
irregularities as the lack of initials to validate the alterations made on the check, the absence of present case, specifically the seven checks, drawn by GSIS and AFRDC, dated between October
the signature of a co-signatory in the corporate checks of HCCC and the deposit of the checks on to November 1977, in the total amount of P370,475.00 and payable to HCCC, was not included in
a second indorsement in the savings account of Francisco. However, the trial court allowed IBAA the Memorandum Agreement executed by HCCC and AFRDC in Civil Case No. Q-24628. As
recourse against Francisco, who was ordered to reimburse the IBAA for any sums it shall have to observed by the trial court, aside from there being absolutely no mention of the checks in the said
pay to private respondents. 5 agreement, the amounts represented by said checks could not have been included in the
Memorandum Agreement executed in 1978 because private respondents only discovered
Both Francisco and IBAA appealed the trial court's decision, but the Court of Appeals dismissed Francisco's acts of forgery in 1979. The lower courts found that Francisco was able to easily
IBAA's appeal for its failure to file its brief within the 45-day extension granted by the appellate conceal from private respondents even the fact of the issuance of the checks since she was a co-
court. IBAA's motion for reconsideration and petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court signatory thereof. 7 We also note that Francisco had custody of the checks, as proven by the
were also similarly denied. On November 21, 1989, IBAA and HCCC entered into a Compromise check vouchers bearing her uncontested signature, 8 by which she, in effect, acknowledged
Agreement which was approved by the trial court, wherein HCCC acknowledged receipt of the having received the checks intended for HCCC. This contradicts Francisco's claims that the
amount of P370,475.00 in full satisfaction of its claims against IBAA, without prejudice to the right checks were issued to Ong who delivered them to Francisco already indorsed. 9
of the latter to pursue its claims against Francisco.
As regards the forgery, we concur with the lower courts', finding that Francisco forged the
On June 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, hence this petition for signature of Ong on the checks to make it appear as if Ong had indorsed said checks and that,
review on certiorarifiled by petitioner, assigning the following errors to the appealed decision — after indorsing the checks for a second time by signing her name at the back of the checks,
Francisco deposited said checks in her savings account with IBAA. The forgery was satisfactorily
1. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in concluding that established in the trial court upon the strength of the findings of the NBI handwriting
private respondents did not owe Petitioner the sum covered by expert. 10 Other than petitioner's self-serving denials, there is nothing in the records to rebut the
the Promissory Notes Exh. 2-2-A-2-P (FRANCISCO). Such NBI's findings. Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of trial courts which are factual in nature,
conclusion was based mainly on conjectures, surmises and especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, deserve to be respected and affirmed by the
speculation contrary to the unrebutted pleadings and evidence Supreme Court, provided it is supported by substantial evidence on record, 11 as it is in the case at
presented by petitioner. bench.
2. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that Petitioner claims that she was, in any event, authorized to sign Ong's name on the checks by
Petitioner falsified the signature of private respondent ONG on virtue of the Certification executed by Ong in her favor giving her the authority to collect all the
the checks in question without any authority therefor which is receivables of HCCC from the GSIS, including the questioned checks. 12 Petitioner's alternative
patently contradictory to the unrebutted pleading and evidence defense must similarly fail. The Negotiable Instruments Law provides that where any person is
that petitioner was expressly authorized by respondent HERBY under obligation to indorse in a representative capacity, he may indorse in such terms as to
negative personal liability. 13 An agent, when so signing, should indicate that he is merely signing
in behalf of the principal and must disclose the name of his principal; otherwise he shall be held
personally liable. 14 Even assuming that Francisco was authorized by HCCC to sign Ong's name, fair and reasonable. The grant of exemplary damages justifies the award of attorney's fees in the
still, Francisco did not indorse the instrument in accordance with law. Instead of signing Ong's amount of P50,000.00, and the award of P5,000.00 for litigation
name, Francisco should have signed her own name and expressly indicated that she was signing expenses. 21
as an agent of HCCC. Thus, the Certification cannot be used by Francisco to validate her act of
forgery. The appellate court's award of P50,000.00 in moral damages is warranted. Under Article 2217 of
the Civil Code, moral damages may be granted upon proof of physical suffering, mental anguish,
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation
indemnify the latter for the same. 15 Due to her forgery of Ong's signature which enabled her to and similar injury. 22 Ong testitified that he suffered sleepless nights, embarrassment, humiliation
deposit the checks in her own account, Francisco deprived HCCC of the money due it from the and anxiety upon discovering that the checks due his company were forged by petitioner and that
GSIS pursuant to the Land Development and Construction Contract. Thus, we affirm respondent petitioner had filed baseless criminal complaints against him before the fiscal's office of Quezon
court's award of compensatory damages in the amount of P370,475.00, but with a modification as City which disrupted HCCC's business operations. 23
to the interest rate which shall be six percent (6%) per annum, to be computed from the date of
the filing of the complaint since the amount of damages was alleged in the complaint; 16 however, WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the respondent court's decision promulgated on June 29, 1992,
the rate of interest shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time the judgment in this upholding the February 16, 1988 decision of the trial court in favor of private respondents, with the
case becomes final and executory until its satisfaction and the basis for the computation of this modification that the interest upon the actual damages awarded shall be at six percent (6%) per
twelve percent (12%) rate of interest shall be the amount of P370,475.00. This is in accordance annum, which interest rate shall be computed from the time of the filing of the complaint on
with the doctrine enunciated in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs.Court of Appeals, et al., 17 which November 19, 1979. However, the interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%)per annum from the
was reiterated in Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 18 Philippine time the judgment in this case becomes final and executory and until such amount is fully paid.
19
Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and in Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. vs. Court of The basis for computation of the six percent and twelve percent rates of interest shall be the
Appeals, 20 which provides that — amount of P370,475.00. No pronouncement as to costs.
1. When an obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan SO ORDERED.
or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the
rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be
twelve percent (12%) per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being
deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
We also sustain the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00. Under Article
2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Considering petitioner's fraudulent act, we hold that an award of P50,000.00 would be adequate,
Republic of the Philippines For deposit only with Bank of the Philippine Islands, to credit of account of San Carlos
SUPREME COURT Milling Co., Ltd.
Manila
By (Sgd.) NEWLAND BALDWIN
EN BANC For Agent
G.R. No. L-37467 December 11, 1933 The endorsement to which the name of Newland Baldwin was affixed was spurious.
SAN CARLOS MILLING CO., LTD., plaintiff-appellant, The Bank of the Philippine Islands thereupon credited the current account of plaintiff in the sum of
vs. P201,000 and passed the cashier's check in the ordinary course of business through the clearing
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, defendants- house, where it was paid by the China Banking Corporation.
appellees.
On the same day the cashier of the Bank of the Philippine Islands received a letter, purporting to
Gibbs and McDonough and Roman Ozaeta for appellant. be signed by Newland Baldwin, directing that P200,000 in bills of various denominations, named
Araneta, De Joya, Zaragosa and Araneta for appellee Bank of the Philippine Islands. in the letter, be packed for shipment and delivery the next day. The next day, Dolores witnessed
Marcelo Nubla and Guevara, Francisco and Recto for appellee China Banking Corporation. the counting and packing of the money, and shortly afterwards returned with the check for the sum
of P200,000, purporting to be signed by Newland Baldwin as agent.
HULL, J.:
Plaintiff had frequently withdrawn currency for shipment to its mill from the Bank of the Philippine
Plaintiff corporation, organized under the laws of the Territory of Hawaii, is authorized to engaged Islands but never in so large an amount, and according to the record, never under the sole
in business in the Philippine Islands, and maintains its main office in these Islands in the City of supervision of Dolores as the representative of plaintiff.
Manila.
Before delivering the money, the bank asked Dolores for P1 to cover the cost of packing the
The business in the Philippine Islands was in the hands of Alfred D. Cooper, its agent under money, and he left the bank and shortly afterwards returned with another check for P1, purporting
general power of attorney with authority of substitution. The principal employee in the Manila office to be signed by Newland Baldwin. Whereupon the money was turned over to Dolores, who took it
was one Joseph L. Wilson, to whom had been given a general power of attorney but without to plaintiff's office, where he turned the money over to Wilson and received as his share, P10,000.
power of substitution. In 1926 Cooper, desiring to go on vacation, gave a general power of
attorney to Newland Baldwin and at the same time revoked the power of Wilson relative to the Shortly thereafter the crime was discovered, and upon the defendant bank refusing to credit
dealings with the Bank of the Philippine Islands, one of the banks in Manila in which plaintiff plaintiff with the amount withdrawn by the two forged checks of P200,000 and P1, suit was
maintained a deposit. brought against the Bank of the Philippine Islands, and finally on the suggestion of the defendant
bank, an amended complaint was filed by plaintiff against both the Bank of the Philippine Islands
About a year thereafter Wilson, conspiring together with one Alfredo Dolores, a messenger-clerk in and the China Banking Corporation.
plaintiff's Manila office, sent a cable gram in code to the company in Honolulu requesting a
telegraphic transfer to the China Banking Corporation of Manila of $100,00. The money was At the trial the China Banking Corporation contended that they had drawn a check to the credit of
transferred by cable, and upon its receipt the China Banking Corporation, likewise a bank in which the plaintiff company, that the check had been endorsed for deposit, and that as the prior
plaintiff maintained a deposit, sent an exchange contract to plaintiff corporation offering the sum of endorsement had in law been guaranteed by the Bank of the Philippine Islands, when they
P201,000, which was then the current rate of exchange. On this contract was forged the name of presented the cashier's check to it for payment, the China Banking Corporation was absolved
Newland Baldwin and typed on the body of the contract was a note:lawphil.net even if the endorsement of Newland Baldwin on the check was a forgery.
Please send us certified check in our favor when transfer is received. The Bank of the Philippine Islands presented many special defenses, but in the main their
contentions were that they had been guilty of no negligence, that they had dealt with the
A manager's check on the China Banking Corporation for P201,000 payable to San Carlos Milling accredited representatives of the company in the due course of business, and that the loss was
Company or order was receipted for by Dolores. On the same date, September 28, 1927, the due to the dishonesty of plaintiff's employees and the negligence of plaintiff's general agent.
manger's check was deposited with the Bank of the Philippine Islands by the following
endorsement: In plaintiff's Manila office, besides the general agent, Wilson, and Dolores, most of the time there
was employed a woman stenographer and cashier. The agent did not keep in his personal
possession either the code-book or the blank checks of either the Bank of the Philippine Islands or It accepted the check and duly credited plaintiff's account with the amount on the face of the
the China Banking Corporation. Baldwin was authorized to draw checks on either of the check. Plaintiff was not harmed by the transaction as the only result was the removal of that sum
depositaries. Wilson could draw checks in the name of the plaintiff on the China Banking of money from a bank from which Wilson could have drawn it out in his own name to a bank where
Corporation. Wilson would not have authority to draw checks and where funds could only be drawn out by the
check of Baldwin.
After trial in which much testimony was taken, the trial court held that the deposit of P201,000 in
the Bank of the Philippine Islands being the result of a forged endorsement, the relation of Plaintiff in its letter of December 23, 1928, to the Bank of the Philippine Islands said in part:
depositor and banker did not exist, but the bank was only a gratuitous bailee; that the Bank of the
Philippine Islands acted in good faith in the ordinary course of its business, was not guilty of ". . . we now leave to demand that you pay over to us the entire amount of said manager's
negligence, and therefore under article 1902 of the Civil Code which should control the case, check of two hundred one thousand (P201,000) pesos, together with interest thereon at
plaintiff could not recover; and that as the cause of loss was the criminal actions of Wilson and the agreed rate of 3 ½ per cent per annum on daily balances of our credit in account
Dolores, employees of plaintiff, and as Newland Baldwin, the agent, had not exercised adequate current with your bank to this date. In the event of your refusal to pay, we shall claim
supervision over plaintiff's Manila office, therefore plaintiff was guilty of negligence, which ground interest at the legal rate of 6 per cent from and after the date of this demand inasmuch as
would likewise defeat recovery. we desire to withdraw and make use of the money." Such language might well be treated
as a ratification of the deposit.
From the decision of the trial court absolving the defendants, plaintiff brings this appeal and makes
nine assignments of error which we do not deem it necessary to discuss in detail. The contention of the bank that it was a gratuitous bailee is without merit. In the first place, it is
absolutely contrary to what the bank did. It did not take it up as a separate account but it
There is a mild assertion on the part of the defendant bank that the disputed signatures of transferred the credit to plaintiff's current account as a depositor of that bank. Furthermore, banks
Newland Baldwin were genuine and that he had been in the habit of signing checks in blank and are not gratuitous bailees of the funds deposited with them by their customers. Banks are run for
turning the checks so signed over to Wilson. gain, and they solicit deposits in order that they can use the money for that very purpose. In this
case the action was neither gratuitous nor was it a bailment.
The proof as to the falsity of the questioned signatures of Baldwin places the matter beyond
reasonable doubt, nor is it believed that Baldwin signed checks in blank and turned them over to On the other hand, we cannot agree with the theory of plaintiff that the Bank of the Philippine
Wilson. Islands was an intermeddling bank. In the many cases cited by plaintiff where the bank that
cashed the forged endorsement was held as an intermeddler, in none was the claimant a regular
As to the China Banking Corporation, it will be seen that it drew its check payable to the order of depositor of the bank, nor in any of the cases cited, was the endorsement for deposit only. It is
plaintiff and delivered it to plaintiff's agent who was authorized to receive it. A bank that cashes a therefore clear that the relation of plaintiff with the Bank of the Philippine Islands in regard to this
check must know to whom it pays. In connection with the cashier's check, this duty was therefore item of P201,000 was that of depositor and banker, creditor and debtor.
upon the Bank of the Philippine Islands, and the China Banking Corporation was not bound to
inspect and verify all endorsements of the check, even if some of them were also those of We now come to consider the legal effect of payment by the bank to Dolores of the sum of
depositors in that bank. It had a right to rely upon the endorsement of the Bank of the Philippine P201,000, on two checks on which the name of Baldwin was forged as drawer. As above stated,
Islands when it gave the latter bank credit for its own cashier's check. Even if we would treat the the fact that these signatures were forged is beyond question. It is an elementary principle both of
China Banking Corporation's cashier's check the same as the check of a depositor and attempt to banking and of the Negotiable Instruments Law that —
apply the doctrines of the Great Eastern Life Insurance Co. vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation and National Bank (43 Phil., 678), and hold the China Banking Corporation indebted A bank is bound to know the signatures of its customers; and if it pays a forged check, it
to plaintiff, we would at the same time have to hold that the Bank of the Philippine Islands was must be considered as making the payment out of its own funds, and cannot ordinarily
indebted to the China Banking Corporation in the same amount. As, however, the money was in charge the amount so paid to the account of the depositor whose name was forged. (7
fact paid to plaintiff corporation, we must hold that the China Banking Corporation is indebted C.J., 683.)
neither to plaintiff nor to the Bank of the Philippine Islands, and the judgment of the lower court far
as it absolves the China Banking Corporation from responsibility is affirmed.
There is no act of the plaintiff that led the Bank of the Philippine Islands astray. If it was in fact
lulled into a false sense of security, it was by the effrontery of Dolores, the messenger to whom it
Returning to the relation between plaintiff and the Bank of the Philippine Islands, we will now entrusted this large sum of money.
consider the effect of the deposit of P201,000. It must be noted that this was not a presenting of
the check for cash payment but for deposit only. It is a matter of general knowledge that most
endorsements for deposit only, are informal. Most are by means of a rubber stamp. The bank The bank paid out its money because it relied upon the genuineness of the purported signatures
would have been justified in accepting the check for deposit even with only a typed endorsement. of Baldwin. These, they never questioned at the time its employees should have used care. In
fact, even today the bank represents that it has a relief that they are genuine signatures.
The signatures to the check being forged, under section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
they are not a charge against plaintiff nor are the checks of any value to the defendant.
It must therefore be held that the proximate cause of loss was due to the negligence of the Bank
of the Philippine Islands in honoring and cashing the two forged checks.
The judgment absolving the Bank of the Philippine Islands must therefore be reversed, and a
judgment entered in favor of plaintiff-appellant and against the Bank of the Philippine Islands,
defendant-appellee, for the sum of P200,001, with legal interest thereon from December 23,1928,
until payment, together with costs in both instances. So ordered.
EN BANC 4. On April 8 and 10, 1933, the said checks were cleared at the clearing house and the
Philippine National Bank credited the National City Bank of New York for the amounts
G.R. No. L-43596 October 31, 1936 thereof, believing at the time that the signatures of the drawer were genuine, that the
payee is an existing entity and the endorsement at the back thereof regular and genuine.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. 5. The Philippine National Bank then found out that the purported signatures of J. L. Klar,
THE NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK, and MOTOR SERVICE COMPANY, as Manager and Treasurer of the Pangasinan Transportation Company, Inc., in said
INC., defendants. Exhibits A and A-1 were forged when so informed by the said Company, and it
MOTOR SERVICE COMPANY, INC., appellant. accordingly demanded from the defendants the reimbursement of the amounts for which
it credited the National City Bank of New York at the clearing house and for which the
latter credited the Motor Service Co., but the defendants refused, and continue to refuse,
L. D. Lockwood for appellant. to make such reimbursements.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
6. The Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc., objected to have the proceeds of said check
deducted from their deposit.
RECTO, J.:
7. Exhibits B, C, D, E, F, and G, which were introduced at the trial in the municipal court
This case was submitted for decision to the court below on the following stipulation of facts:
of Manila and forming part of the record of the present case, are admitted by the parties
as genuine and are made part of this stipulation as well as Exhibit H hereto attached and
1. That plaintiff is a banking corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of a made a part hereof.
special act of the Philippine Legislature, with office as principal place of business at the
Masonic Temple Bldg., Escolta, Manila, P. I.; that the defendant National City Bank of
Upon plaintiff's motion, the case was dismissed before trial as to the defendant National City Bank
New York is a foreign banking corporation with a branch office duly authorized and
of New York. a decision was thereafter rendered giving plaintiff judgment for the total amount of
licensed to carry and engage in banking business in the Philippine Islands, with branch P360.25, with interest and costs. From this decision the instant appeal was taken.
office and place of business in the National City Bank Bldg., City of Manila, P. I., and that
the defendant Motor Service Company, Inc., is a corporation organized and existing
under and by virtue of the general corporation law of the Philippine Islands, with office Before us is the preliminary question of whether the original appeal taken by the plaintiff from the
and principal place of business at 408 Rizal Avenue, City of Manila, P. I., engaged in the decision of the municipal court of Manila where this case originated, became perfected because of
purchase and sale of automobile spare parts and accessories. plaintiff's failure to attach to the record within 15 days from receipt of notice of said decision, the
certificate of appeal bond required by section 76 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not disputed
that both the appeal docket fee and the appeal cash bond were paid and deposited within the
2. That on April 7 and 9, 1933, an unknown person or persons negotiated with defendant
prescribed time. The issue is whether the mere failure to file the official receipt showing that such
Motor Service Company, Inc., the checks marked as Exhibits A and A-1, respectively,
deposit was made within the said period is a sufficient ground to dismiss plaintiff's appeal. This
which are made parts of the stipulation, in payment for automobile tires purchased from
question was settled by our decision in the case of Blanco vs. Bernabe and lawyers Cooperative
said defendant's stores, purporting to have been issued by the "Pangasinan
Publishing Co. (page 124, ante), and no further consideration. No error was committed in allowing
Transportation Co., Inc. by J. L. Klar, Manager and Treasurer", against the Philippine said appeal.
National Bank and in favor of the International Auto Repair Shop, for P144.50 and
P215.75; and said checks were indorsed by said unknown persons in the manner
indicated at the back thereof, the Motor Service Co., Inc., believing at the time that the We now pass on to consider and determine the main question presented by this appeal, namely,
signature of J. L. Klar, Manager and Treasurer of the Pangasinan Transportation Co., whether the appellee has the right to recover from the appellant, under the circumstances of this
Inc., on both checks were genuine. case, the value of the checks on which the signatures of the drawer were forged. The appellant
maintains that the question should be answered in the negative and in support of its contention
appellant advanced various reasons presently to be examined carefully.
I. It is contended, first of all, that the payment of the checks in question made by the drawee bank voluntarily to incur the obligation. The act by which the bank places itself under obligation to pay to
constitutes an "acceptance", and, consequently, the case should be governed by the provisions of the holder the sum called for by a check must be the expressed promise or undertaking of the
section 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which says: bank signifying its intent to assume the obligation, or some act from which the law will imperatively
imply such valid promise or undertaking. The most ordinary form which such an act assumes is
SEC. 62. Liability of acceptor. —The acceptor by accepting the instrument engages that the acceptance by the bank of the check, or, as it is perhaps more often called, the certifying of
he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance; and admits: the check. (1 Morse on Banks and Banking, pp. 898, 899; 5 R. C. L., p. 520.)
(a) The existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature, and his No doubt a bank may by an unequivocal promise in writing make itself liable in any event to pay
capacity and authority to draw the instrument; and the check upon demand, but this is not an "acceptance" of the check in the true sense of that term.
Although a check does not call for acceptance, and the holder can present it only for payment, the
certification of checks is a means in constant and extensive use in the business of banking, and its
(b) The existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse.
effects and consequences are regulated by the law merchant. Checks drawn upon banks or
bankers, thus marked and certified, enter largely into the commercial and financial transactions of
This contention is without merit. A check is a bill of exchange payable on demand and only the the country; they pass from hand to hand, in the payment of debts, the purchase of property, and
rules governing bills of exchange payable on demand are applicable to it, according to section 185 in the transfer of balances from one house and one bank to another. In the great commercial
of the Negotiable Instruments Law. In view of the fact that acceptance is a step unnecessary, in so centers, they make up no inconsiderable portion of the circulation, and thus perform a useful,
far as bills of exchange payable on demand are concerned (sec. 143), it follows that the provisions valuable, and an almost indispensable office. The purpose of procuring a check to be certified is to
relative to "acceptance" are without application to checks. Acceptance implies, in effect, impart strength and credit to the paper by obtaining an acknowledgment from the certifying bank
subsequent negotiation of the instrument, which is not true in case of the payment of a check that the drawer has funds therein sufficient to cover the check and securing the engagement of the
because from the moment a check is paid it is withdrawn from circulation. The warranty bank that the check will be paid upon presentation. A certified check has a distinctive character as
established by section 62, is in favor of holders of the instrument after its acceptance. When the a species of commercial paper, and performs important functions in banking and commercial
drawee bank cashes or pays a check, the cycle of negotiation is terminated, and it is illogical business. When a check is certified, it ceases to possess the character, or to perform the
thereafter to speak of subsequent holders who can invoke the warranty provided in section 62 functions, of a check, and represents so much money on deposit, payable to the holder on
against the drawee. Moreover, according to section 191, "acceptance" means "an acceptance demand. The check becomes a basis of credit — an easy mode of passing money from hand to
completed by delivery or notification" and this concept is entirely incompatible with payment, hand, and answers the purposes of money. (5 R. C. L., pp. 516, 517.)lâwphi1.nêt
because when payment is made the check is retained by the bank, and there is no such thing as
delivery or notification to the party receiving the payment. Checks are not to be accepted, but
All the authorities, both English and American, hold that a check may be accepted, though
presented at once for payment. (1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 476.) There can be no such thing as
acceptance is not usual. By the law merchant, the certificate of the bank that a check is good is
"acceptance" in the ordinary sense of the term. A check being payable immediately and on
equivalent to acceptance. It implies that the check is drawn upon sufficient funds in the hands of
demand, the bank can fulfill its duty to the depositor only by paying the amount demanded. The
the drawee, that they have been set apart for its satisfaction, and that they shall be so applied
holder has no right to demand from the bank anything but payment of the check, and the bank has whenever the check is presented for payment. It is an undertaking that the check is good then,
no right, as against the drawer, to do anything but pay it. (5 R. C. L., p. 516, par. 38.) A check is and shall continue good, and this agreement is as binding on the bank as its notes of circulation, a
not an instrument which in the ordinary course of business calls for acceptance. The holder can certificate of deposit payable to the order of the depositor, or any other obligation it can assume.
never claim acceptance as his legal right. He can present for payment, and only for payment. (1 The object of certifying a check, as regards both parties is to enable the holder to use it as money.
Morse on Banks and Banking, 6th ed., pp. 898, 899.)
The transferee takes it with the same readiness and sense of security that he would take the notes
of the bank. It is available also to him for all the purposes of money. Thus it continues to perform
There is, however, nothing in the law or in, business practice against the presentation of checks its important functions until in the course of business it goes back to the bank for redemption, and
for acceptance, before they are paid, in which case we have a "certification" equivalent to is extinguished by payment. It cannot be doubted that the certifying bank intended these
"acceptance" according to section 187, which provides that "where a check is certified by the bank consequences, and it is liable accordingly. To hold otherwise would render these important
on which it is drawn, the certification is equivalent to an acceptance", and it is then that the securities only a snare and a delusion. A bank incurs no greater risk in certifying a check than in
warranty under section 62 exists. This certification or acceptance consists in the signification by giving a certificate of deposit. In well-regulated banks the practice is at once to charge the check
the drawee of his assent to the order of the drawer, which must not express that the drawee will to the account of the drawer, to credit it in a certified check account, and, when the check is paid,
perform his promise by any other means than the payment of money. (Sec. 132.) When the holder to debit that account with the amount. Nothing can be simpler or safer than this process.
of a check procures it to be accepted or certified, the drawer and all indorsers are discharged from (Merchants' Bank vs. States Bank, 10 Wall., 604, at p. 647; 19 Law. ed., 1008, 1019.)
liability thereon (sec. 188), and then the check operates as an assignment of a part of the funds to
the credit of the drawer with the bank. (Sec. 189.) There is nothing in the nature of the check Ordinarily the acceptance or certification of a check is performed and evidenced by some word or
which intrinsically precludes its acceptance, in like manner and with like effect as a bill of mark, usually the words "good", "certified" or "accepted" written upon the check by the banker or
exchange or draft may be accepted. The bank may accept if it chooses; and it is frequently bank officer. (1 Morse, Banks and Banking, 915; 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 476.) The bank
induced by convenience, by the exigencies of business, or by the desire to oblige customers,
virtually says, that check is good; we have the money of the drawer here ready to pay it. We will by all of the recent cases in which the question is considered. (Cases cited, Annotation at 69 A. L.
pay it now if you will receive it. The holder says, No, I will not take the money; you may certify the R., 1076, 1077 [1930].)
check and retain the money for me until this check is presented. The law will not permit a check,
when due, to be thus presented, and the money to be left with the bank for the accommodation of Merely stamping a check "Paid" upon its payment on a forged or unauthorized indorsement is not
the holder without discharging the drawer. The money being due and the check presented, it is his an acceptance thereof so as to render the drawee bank liable to the true payee.
own fault if the holder declines to receive the pay, and for his own convenience has the money (Anderson vs. Tacoma National Bank [1928], 146 Wash., 520; 264 Pac., 8; Annotation at 69 A. L.
appropriated to that check subject to its future presentment at any time within the statute of R., 1077, [1930].)
limitations. (1 Morse on Banks and Banking, p. 920.)
In State Bank of Chicago vs. Mid-City Trust & Savings Bank (12 A. L. R., 989, 991, 992), the court
The theory of the appellant and of the decisions on which it relies to support its view is vitiated by said:
the fact that they take the word "acceptance" in its ordinary meaning and not in the technical
sense in which it is used in the Negotiable Instruments Law. Appellant says that when payment is
The defendant in error contends that the payment of the check shows acceptance by the bank,
made, such payment amounts to an acceptance, because he who pays accepts. This is true in
urging that there can be no more definite act by the bank upon which a check has been drawn,
common parlance but "acceptance" in legal contemplation. The word "acceptance" has a peculiar
showing acceptance than the payment of the check. Section 184 of the Negotiable Instruments
meaning in the Negotiable Instruments Law, and, as has been above stated, in the instant case
there was payment but no acceptatance, or what is equivalent to acceptance, certification. Act (sec. 202) provides that the provisions of the act applicable to bills of exchange apply to a
check, and section 131 (sec. 149), that the acceptance of a bill must be in writing signed by the
drawee. Payment is the final act which extinguishes a bill. Acceptance is a promise to pay in the
With few exceptions, the weight of authority is to the effect that "payment" neither includes nor future and continues the life of the bill. It was held in the First National Bank vs. Whitman (94 U.
implies "acceptance". S., 343; 24 L. ed., 229), that payment of a check upon a forged indorsement did not operate as an
acceptance in favor of the true owner. The contrary was held in Pickle vs. Muse
In National Bank vs. First National Bank ([19101, 141 Mo. App., 719; 125 S. W., 513), the court (Fickle vs. People's Nat. Bank, 88 Tenn., 380; 7 L.R.A., 93; 17 Am. St. Rep., 900; 12 S. W., 919),
asks, if a mere promise to pay a check is binding on a bank, why should not the absolute payment and Seventh National Bank vs. Cook (73 Pa., 483; 13 Am. Rep., 751) at a time when the
of the check have the same effect? In response, it is submitted that the two things, — that is Negotiable Instruments Act was not in force in those states. The opinion of the Supreme Court of
acceptance and payment, — are entirely different. If the drawee accepts the paper after seeing it, the United States seems more logical, and the provision of the Negotiable Instruments Act now
and then permits it to go into circulation as genuine, on all the principles of estoppel, he ought to require an acceptance to be in writing. Under this statute the payment of a check on a forged
be prevented from setting up forgery to defeat liability to one who has taken the paper on the faith indorsement, stamping it "paid," and charging it to the account of the drawer, do not constitute an
of the acceptance, or certification. On the other hand, mere payment of the paper at the acceptance of the check or create a liability of the bank to the true holder or the payee. (Elyria
termination of its course does not act as an estoppel. The attempt to state a general rule covering Sav. & Bkg. Co. vs. Walker Bin Co., 92 Ohio St., 406; L. R. A., 1916D, 433; 111 N. E., 147; Ann.
both acceptance and payment is responsible for a large part of the conflicting arguments which Cas. 1917D, 1055; Baltimore & O. R. Co. vs. First National Bank, 102 Va., 753; 47 S. E., 837;
have been advanced by the courts with respect to the rule. (Annotation at 12 A. L. R., 1090 State Bank of Chicago vs. Mid-City Trust & Savings Bank 12 A. L. R., pp. 989, 991, 992.)
1921].)
Before drawee's acceptance of check there is no privity of contract between drawee and payee.
In First National Bank vs. Brule National Bank ([1917], 12 A. L. R., 1079, 1085), the court said: Drawee's payment of check on unauthorized indorsement does not constitute "acceptance" of
check. (Sinclair Refining Co. vs. Moultrie Banking Co., 165 S. E., 860 [1932].)
We are of the opinion that "payment is not acceptance". Acceptance, as defined by
section 131, cannot be confounded with payment. . . . The great weight of authority is to the effect that the payment of a check upon a forged or
unauthorized indorsement and the stamping of it "paid" does not constitute an acceptance.
Acceptance, certification, or payment of a check, by the express language of the statute, (Dakota Radio Apparatus Co. vs. First Nat. Bank of Rapid City, 244 N. W., 351, 352 [1932].)
discharges the liability only of the persons named in the statute, to wit, the drawer and all
indorsers, and the contract of indorsement by the negotiator if the check is discharged by Payment of the check, cashing it on presentment is not acceptance. (South Boston Trust
acceptance, certification, or payment. But clearly the statute does not say that the Co. vs. Levin, 249 Mass., 45, 48, 49; 143 N. E., 816; Blocker, Shepard Co. vs. Granite Trust
contract of warranty of the negotiator, created by section 65, is discharged by these acts. Company, 187 Me., 53, 54 [1933].)
The rule supported by the majority of the cases (14 A. L. R. 764), that payment of a check on a In Rauch vs. Bankers National Bank of Chicago (143 Ill. App., 625, 636, 637 [1908]), the language
forged or unauthorized indorsement of the payee's name, and charging the same to the drawer's of the decision was as follows:
account, do not amount to an acceptance so as to make the bank liable to the payee, is supported
. . . The plaintiffs say that this acceptance was made by the very unauthorized payments tantamount to apro tanto assignment of that part of the funds. It is most easily understood how the
of which they complain. This suggestion does not seem forceful to us. It is the contention payment of the check, when not authorized to be done by the drawee bank, might under such
which was made before the Supreme Court of the United States in First National circumstances create liability on the part of the drawee to the drawer. Counsel cites the case of
Bank vs. Whitman (94 U. S., 343), and repudiated by that court. The language of the Pickle vs. Muse (88 Tenn, 380; 12 S. W., 919; 7 L. R. A., 93; 17 Am. St. Rep., 900), wherein
opinion in that case is so apt in the present case that we quote it: Judge Lurton held that the acceptance of a check was necessary in order to give the holder
thereof a right of action thereon against the bank, and further held in a case similar to this, so far
"It is further contended that such an acceptance of a check as creates a privity between as this question is concerned, that the acceptance of a check so as to give a right of action to the
the payee and the bank is established by the payment of the amount of this check in the payee is inferred from the retention of the check by the bank and its subsequent charge of the
manner described. This argument is based upon the erroneous assumption that the bank amount to the drawer, although it was presented by, and payment made, an unauthorized person.
has paid this check. If this were true, it would have discharged all of its duty, and there Judge Lurton cited the case of National Bank of the Republic vs. Millard (10 Wall., 152; 19 L. ed.,
would be an end to the claim against it. The bank supposed that it had paid the check, but 897), wherein the Supreme Court of the United States, not having such a case before it, threw out
this was an error. The money it paid was upon a pretended and not a real indorsement of the suggestion that, if it was shown that a bank had charged the check on its books against the
the name of the payee. . . . We cannot recognize the argument that payment of the drawer and made settlement with the drawee that the holder could recover on account of money
amount of the check or sight draft under such circumstances amounts to an acceptance had and received, invoking the rule of justice and fairness, it might be said there was an implied
creating a privity of contract with the real owner. promise to the holder to pay it on demand. (SeeNational Bank of the Republic vs. Millard, 10 Wall.
[77 U. S.], 152; 19 L. ed., 899.) The Tennessee court then argued that it would be inequitable and
unconscionable for the owner and payee of the check to be limited to an action against an
"It is difficult to construe a payment as an acceptance under any circumstances. . . . A
insolvent drawer and might thereby lose the debt. They recognized the legal principle that there is
banker or individual may be ready to make actual payment of a check or draft when
no privity between the drawer bank and the holder, or payee, of the check, and proceeded to hold
presented, while unwilling to make a promise to pay at a future time. Many, on the other
that no particular kind of writing was necessary to constitute an acceptance and that it became a
hand, are more ready to promise to pay than to meet the promise when required. The
question of fact, and the bank became liable when it stamped it "paid" and charged it to the
difference between the transactions is essential and inherent."
account of the drawer, and cites, in support of its opinion, Seventh National Bank vs. Cook (73
Pa., 483; 13 Am. Rep., 751); Saylor vs. Bushong (100 Pa., 23; 45 Am. Rep., 353); and
And in Wharf vs. Seattle National Bank (24 Pac. [2d]), 120, 123 [1933]): Dodge vs. Bank (20 Ohio St., 234; 5 Am. Rep., 648).
It is the rule that payment of a check on unauthorized or forged indorsement does not This decision was in 1890, prior to the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law by
operate as an acceptance of the check so as to authorize an action by the real owner to the State of Tennessee. However, in this case Judge Snodgrass points out that the
recover its amount from the drawee bank. (Michie on Banks and Banking, vol. 5, sec. Millard case, supra, was dicta. The Dodge case, from the Ohio court, held exactly as the
278, p. 521.) A full list of the authorities supporting the rule will be found in a footnote to Tennessee court, but subsequently in the case of Elyria Bank vs. Walker Bin Co. (92 Ohio
the foregoing citation. (See also, Federal Land Bank vs. Collins, 156 Miss., 893; 127 So., St., 406; 111 N. E., 147; L. R. A. 1916D, 433; Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1055), the court held to
570; 69 A. L. R., 1068.) the contrary, called attention to the fact that the Dodge case was no longer the law, and
proceeded to announce that, whatever might have been the law before the passage of
In a very recent case, Federal Land Bank vs. Collins (69 A. L. R., 1068, 1072-1074), this question the Negotiable Instrument Act in that state, it was no longer the law; that the rule
was discussed at considerable length. The court said: announced in the Dodge case had been "discarded." The court, in the latter case,
expressed its doubts that the courts of Tennessee and Pennsylvania would adhere to the
In the light of the first of these statutes, counsel for appellant is forced to stand upon the narrow rule announced in the Pickle case, quoted supra, in the face of the Negotiable Instrument
ledge that the payment of the check by the two banks will constitute an acceptance. The drawee Law. Subsequent to the Millard case, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case
bank simply marked it "paid" and did not write anything else except the date. The bank first paying of First National Bank of Washington vs. Whitman (94 U. S., 343, 347; 24 L. ed., 229),
the check, the Commercial National Bank and Trust Company, simply wrote its name as indorser where the bank, without any knowledge that the indorsement of the payee was
and passed the check on to the drawee bank; does this constitute an acceptance? The precise unauthorized, paid the check, and it was contended that by the payment the privity of
question has not been presented to this court for decision. Without reference to authorities in other contract existing between the drawer and drawee was imparted to the payee, said:
jurisdictions it would appear that the drawee bank had never written its name across the paper
and therefore, under the strict terms of the statute, could not be bound as an acceptor; in the "It is further contended that such an acceptance of the check as creates a privity between
second place, it does not appear to us to be illogical and unsound to say that the payment of a the payee and the bank is established by the payment of the amount of this check in the
check by the drawee, and the stamping of it "paid", is equivalent to the same thing as the manner described. This argument is based upon the erroneous assumption that the bank
acceptance of a check; however, there is a variety of opinions in the various jurisdictions on this has paid this check. If this were true, it would have discharged all of its duty, and there
question. Counsel correctly states that the theory upon which the numerous courts hold that the would be an end of the claim against it. The bank supposed that it had paid the check; but
payment of a check creates privity between the holder of the check and the drawee bank is this was an error. The money it paid was upon a pretended and not a real indorsement of
the name of the payee. The real indorsement of the payee was as necessary to a valid stated seems to have been the rule in the majority of the states even before the passage
payment as the real signature of the drawer; and in law the check remains unpaid. Its of the uniform Negotiable Instruments Act in the several states.
pretended payment did not diminish the funds of the drawer in the bank, or put money in
the pocket of the person entitled to the payment. The state of the account was the same The decision in the case of First National Bank vs. Bank of Cottage Grove (59 Or., 388), which
after the pretended payment as it was before. appellant cites in its brief (pp. 12, 13 ) has been expressly overruled by the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in South Boston Trust Co. vs. Levin (143 N. E., 816, 817), in the following
"We cannot recognize the argument that a payment of the amount of a check or sight language:
draft under such circumstances amounts to an acceptance, creating a privity of contract
with the real owner. It is difficult to construe a payment as an acceptance under any In First National Bank vs. Bank of Cottage Grove (59 Or., 388; 117 Pac., 293, 296, at
circumstances. The two things are essentially different. One is a promise to perform an page 396), it was said: "The payment of a bill or check by the drawee amounts to more
act, the other an actual performance. A banker or an individual may be ready to make than an acceptance. The rule, holding that such a payment has all the efficacy of an
actual payment of a check or draft when presented, while unwilling to make a promise to acceptance, is founded upon the principle that the greater includes the less." We are
pay at a future time. Many, on the other hand, are more ready to promise to pay than to unable to agree with this statement as there is no similarity between acceptance and
meet the promise when required. The difference between the transactions is essential payment; payment discharges the instrument, and no one else is expected to advance
and inherent." anything on the faith of it; acceptance, contemplates further circulation, induced by the
fact of acceptance. The rule that the acceptor made certain admissions which will inure to
Counsel for the appellant cite other cases holding that the stamping of the check "paid" the benefit of subsequent holders, has no applicability to payment of the instrument where
and the charging of the amount thereof to the drawer constituted an acceptance, but we subsequent holders can never exist.
are of opinion that none of these cases cited hold that it is in compliance with the
Negotiable Instruments Act; paying the check and stamping same is not the equivalent of II. The old doctrine that a bank was bound to know its correspondent's signature and that a
accepting the check in writing signed by the drawee. The cases holding that payment as drawee could not recover money paid upon a forgery of the drawer's name, because it was said,
indicated above constituted acceptance were rendered prior to the adoption of the the drawee was negligent not to know the forgery and it must bear the consequence of its
Negotiable Instruments Act in the particular state, and these decisions are divided into negligence, is fast fading into the misty past, where it belongs. It was founded in misconception of
two classes: the one holding that the check delivered by the drawer to the holder and the fundamental principles of law and common sense. (2 Morse, Banks and Banking, p. 1031.)
presented to the bank or drawee constitutes an assignment pro tanto; the other holding
that the payment of the check and the charging of same to the drawee although paid to
Some of the cases carried the rule to its furthest limit and held that under no circumstances
an unauthorized person creates privity of contract between the holder and the drawee
bank. (except, of course, where the purchaser of the bill has participated in the fraud upon the drawee)
would the drawee be allowed to recover bank money paid under a mistake of fact upon a bill of
exchange to which the name of the drawer had been forged. This doctrine has been freely
We have already seen that our own court has repudiated the assignment pro tanto theory, criticized by the eminent authorities, as a rule too favorable to the holder, not the most fair, nor
and since the adoption of the Negotiable Instrument Act by this state we are compelled to best calculated to effectuate justice between the drawee and the drawer. (5 R.C.L., p. 556.)
say that payment of a check is not equivalent to accepting a check in writing and signing
the name of the acceptor thereon. Payment of the check and the charging of same to the
The old rule which was originally announced by Lord Mansfield in the leading case of
drawer does not constitute an acceptance. Payment of the check is the end of the
Price vs. Neal (3 Burr., 1354), elicited the following comment from Justice Holmes, then Chief
voyage; acceptance of the check is to fuel the vessel and strengthen it for continued
Justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the case of Dedham National Bank vs. Everett
operation on the commercial sea. What we have said applies to the holder and not to the
National Bank (177 Mass., 392). "Probably the rule was adopted from an impression of
drawer of the check. On this question we conclude that the general rule is that an action
convenience rather than for any more academic reason; or perhaps we may say that Lord
cannot be maintained by a payee of the check against the bank on which is draw unless
Mansfield took the case out of the doctrine as to payments under a mistake of fact by the
the check has been certified or accepted by the bank in compliance with the statute, even
assumption that a holder who simply presents negotiable paper for payment makes no
though at the time the check is that an action cannot be maintained by a payee of the
representation as to the signature, and that the drawee pays at his peril."
drawer of the check out of which the check is legally payable; and that the payment of the
check by the bank on which it is drawn, even though paid on the unauthorized
indorsement of the name of the holder (without notice of the defect by the bank), does not Such was the reaction that followed Lord Mansfield's rule which Justice Story of the United States
constitute a certification thereof, neither is it an acceptance thereof; and without Supreme adopted in the case of Bank of United States vs. Georgia (10 Wheat., 333), that in B. B.
acceptance or certification, as provided by statute, there is no privity of contract between Ford & Co. vs. People's Bank of Orangeburg (74 S. C., 180), it was held that "an unrestricted
the drawee bank and the payee, or holder of the check. Neither is there an indorsement of a draft and presentation to the drawee is a representation that the signature of the
assignment pro tanto of the funds where the check is not drawn on a particular fund, or drawer is genuine", and in Lisbon First National Bank vs. Wyndmere Bank (15 N. D., 299), it was
does not show on its face that it is an assignment of a particular fund. The above rule as also held that "the drawee of a forged check who has paid the same without detecting the forgery,
may upon discovery of the forgery, recover the money paid from the party who received the as a sufficient voucher, the drawee had the right to believe he had taken. (Ellis vs. Ohio Life
money, even though the latter was a good faith holder, provided the latter has not been misled or Insurance & Trust Co., 4 Ohio St., 628; Rouvant vs. Bank, 63 Tex., 610; Bank vs. Ricker, 71 Ill.,
prejudiced by the drawee's failure to detect the forgery." 429; First National Bank of Danvers vs. First Nat. Bank of Salem, 24 N. E., 44, 45; B. B. Ford &
Co. vs.People's Bank of Orangeburg, supra.) The recovery is permitted in such case, because,
Daniel, in his treatise on Negotiable Instruments, has the following to say: although the drawee was constructively negligent in failing to detect the forgery, yet if the
purchaser had performed his duty, the forgery would in all probability have been detected and the
fraud defeated. (First National Bank of Lisbon vs. Bank of Wyndmere, 15 N. D., 209; 10 L. R. A.
In all the cases which hold the drawee absolutely estoppel by acceptance or payment from
[N. S.], 49.) In the absence of actual fault on the part of the drawee, his constructive fault in not
denying genuineness of the drawer's name, the loss is thrown upon him on the ground of knowing the signature of the drawer and detecting the forgery will not preclude his recovery from
negligence on his part in accepting or paying, until he has ascertained the bill to be genuine. But one who took the check under circumstances of suspicion without proper precaution, or whose
the holder has preceded him in negligence, by himself not ascertaining the true character of the conduct has been such as to mislead the drawee or induce him to pay the check without the usual
paper before he received it, or presented it for acceptance or payment. And although, as a general scrutiny or other precautions against mistake or fraud. (National Bank of
rule, the drawee is more likely to know the drawer's handwriting than a stranger is, if he is in fact America vs. Bangs, supra; First National Bank vs. Indiana National Bank, 30 N. E., 808-810;
deceived as to its genuineness, we do not perceive that he should suffer more deeply by mistake Woods and Malone vs. Colony Bank, supra; First National Bank of Danvers vs. First Nat. Bank of
than a stranger, who, without knowing the handwriting, has taken the paper without previously Salem, 151 Mass., 280.) Where a loss, which must be borne by one of two parties alike innocent
ascertaining its genuineness. And the mistake of the drawee should always be allowed to be
of forgery, can be traced to the neglect or fault of either, it is unreasonable that it would be borne
corrected, unless the holder, acting upon faith and confidence induced by his honoring the draft,
by him, even if innocent of any intentional fraud, through whose means it has succeeded.
would be placed in a worse position by according such privilege to him. This view has been
(Gloucester Bank vs. Salem Bank, 17 Mass., 33; First Nat. Bank of Danvers vs. First National
applied in a well considered case, and is intimidated in another; and is forcibly presented by Mr.
Bank of Salem, supra; B. B. Ford & Co. vs. People's Bank of Orangeburg, supra.) Again if the
Chitty, who says it is going a great way to charge the acceptor with knowledge of his
indorser is guilty of negligence in receiving and paying the check or draft, or has reason to believe
correspondent's handwriting, "unless some bona fide holder has purchased the paper on the faith
that the instrument is not genuine, but fails to inform the drawee of his suspicions the indorser
of such an act." Negligence in making payment under a mistake of fact is not now deemed a bar to
according to the reasoning of some courts will be held liable to the drawee upon his implied
recovery of it, and we do not see why any exception should be made to the principle, which would
warranty that the instrument is genuine. (B. B. Ford & Co. vs. People's Bank of
apply as well as to release an obligation not consummated by payment. ( Vol. 2, 6th edition, pp.
Orangeburg, supra; Newberry Sav. Bank vs. Bank of Columbia, 93 S. C., 294; 38 L. R. A. [N. S],
1537-1539.)
1200.) Most of the courts now agree that one who purchases a check or draft is bound to satisfy
himself that the paper is genuine; and that by indorsing it or presenting it for payment or putting it
III. But now the rule is perfectly well settled that in determining the relative rights of a drawee who, into circulation before presentation he impliedly asserts that he has performed his duty, the
under a mistake of fact, has paid, and a holder who has received such payment, upon a check to drawee, who has, without actual negligence on his part, paid the forged demand, may recover the
which the name of the drawer has been forged, it is only fair to consider the question of diligence money paid from such negligent purchaser. (Lisbon First National Bank vs. Wyndmere
or negligence of the parties in respect thereto. (Woods and Malone vs. Colony Bank [1902], 56 L. Bank, supra.) Of course, the drawee must, in order to recover back the holder, show that he
R. A., 929, 932.) The responsibility of the drawee who pays a forged check, for the genuineness of himself was free from fault. (See also 5 R. C. L., pp. 556-558.)
the drawer's signature, is absolute only in favor of one who has not, by his own fault or negligence,
contributed to the success of the fraud or to mislead the drawee. (National Bank of
So, if a collecting bank is alone culpable, and, on account of its negligence only, the loss has
America vs.Bangs, 106 Mass., 441; 8 Am. Rep., 349; Woods and Malone vs. Colony Bank, supra;
occurred, the drawee may recover the amount it paid on the forged draft or check. (Security
De Feriet vs. Bank of America, 23 La. Ann., 310; B. B. Ford & Co. vs. People's Bank of Commercial & Sav. Bank vs. Southern Trust & C. Bank [1925], 74 Cal. App., 734; 241 Pac., 945.)
Orangeburg, 74 S. C., 180; 10 L. R. A. [N. S.], 63.) If it appears that the one to whom payment
was made was not an innocent sufferer, but was guilty of negligence in not doing something,
which plain duty demanded, and which, if it had been done, would have avoided entailing loss on But we are aware of no case in which the principle that the drawee is bound to know the signature
any one, he is not entitled to retain the moneys paid through a mistake on the part of the drawee of the drawer of a bill or check which he undertakes to pay has been held to be decisive in favor of
bank. (First Nat. Bank of Danvers vs. First Nat. Bank of Salem, 151 Mass., 280; 24 N. E., 44; 21 A. a payee of a forged bill or check to which he has himself given credit by his indorsement.
S. R., 450; First Nat. Bank of Orleans vs. State Bank of Alma, 22 Neb., 769; 36 N. W., 289; 3 A. S. (Secalso, Mckleroy vs. Bank, 14 La. Ann., 458; Canal Bank vs. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill, 287;
R., 294; American Exp. Co. vs. State Nat. Bank, 27 Okla., 824; 113 Pac., 711; 33 L. R. A. [N. S.], Rouvant vs. Bank, supra, First Nat. Bank vs. Indiana National Bank; 30 N. E., 808-810.)
188; B. B. Ford & Co. vs. People's Bank of Orangeburg, 74 S. C., 180; 54 S. E., 204; 114 A. S. R.,
986; 7 Ann. Cas., 744; 10 L. R. A. [N. S.], 63; People's Bank vs. Franklin Bank, 88 Tenn. 299; 12 In First Nat. Bank vs. United States National Bank ([1921], 100 Or., 264; 14 A. L. R., 479; 197
S. W., 716; 17 A. S. R.) 884; 6 L. R. A., 724; Canadian Bank of Commerce vs. Bingham, 30 Pac., 547), the court declared: "A holder cannot profit by a mistake which his negligent disregard
Wash., 484; 71 Pac., 43; 60 L. R. A., 955.) In other words, to entitle the holder of a forged check to of duty has contributed to induce the drawee to commit. . . . The holder must refund, if by his
retain the money obtained he must be able to show that the whole responsibility of determining the negligence he has contributed to the consummation of the mistake on the part of the drawee by
validity of the signature was upon the drawee, and that the negligence of such drawee was not misleading him. . . . If the only fault attributable to the drawee is the constructive fault which the
lessened by any failure of any precaution which, from his implied assertion in presenting the check law raises from the bald fact that he has failed to detect the forgery, and if he is not chargeable
with actual fault in addition to such constructive fault, then he is not precluded from recovery from instrument, nor did it appear to be in trust for, or to the use of, any other person, nor was it
a holder whose conduct has been such as to mislead the drawee or induce him to pay the check conditional. Certainly the Pukwana Bank was justified in relying upon the warrant of genuineness,
or bill of exchange without the usual security against fraud. The holder must refund to a drawee which implied the full identification of Kost, and his signature by the defendant bank. This view of
who is not guilty of actual fault if the holder was negligent in not making due inquiry concerning the the statute is in accord with the decisions of many courts. (First National Bank vs. State Bank, 22
validity of the check before he took it, and if the drawee can be said to have been excused from Neb., 769; 3 Am. St. Rep., 294; 36 N. W., 289; First National Bank vs. First National Bank, 151
making inquiry before taking the check because of having had a right to, presume that the holder Mass., 280; 21 Am. St. Rep., 450; 24 N. E., 44; People's Bank vs. Franklin Bank, 88 Tenn., 299; 6
had made such inquiry." L. R. A., 727; 17 Am. St. Rep., 884; 12 S. W., 716.)"
The rule that one who first negotiates forged paper without taking some precaution to learn The appellant leans heavily on the case of Fidelity & Co. vs. Planenscheck (71 A. L. R., 331),
whether or not it is genuine should not be allowed to retain the proceeds of the draft or check from decided in 1929. We have carefully examined this decision and we do not feel justified in
the drawee, whose sole fault was that he did not discover the forgery before he paid the draft or accepting its conclusions. It is but a restatement of the long abandoned rule of Neal vs. Price, and
check, has been followed by the later cases. (Security Commercial & Savings Bank vs. Southern it predicated on the wrong premise that the payment includes acceptance, and that a bank drawee
Trust & C. Bank [1925], 74 Cal. App., 734; 241 Pac., 945; Hutcheson Hardware Co. vs. Planters paying a check drawn on it becomes ipso facto an acceptor within the meaning of section 62 of
State Bank [1921], 26 Ga. App., 321; 105 S. E., 854; [Annotation at 71 A. L. R., 337].) the Negotiable Instruments Act. Moreover in a more recent decision, that of Louisa National
Bank vs. Kentucky National Bank (39 S. W. [2nd] 497, 501) decided in 1931, the Court of Appeals
Where a bank, without inquiry or identification of the person presenting a forged check, purchases of Kentucky held the following:
it, indorses it, generally, and presents it to the drawee bank, which pays it, the latter may recover if
its only negligence was its mistake in having failed to detect the forgery, since its mistake, did not The appellee, on presentation for payment of $600 check, failed to discover it was a
mislead the purchaser or bring about a change in position. (Security Commercial & Savings forgery. It was bound to know the signature of its customer, Armstrong, and it was derelict
Bank vs. Southern Trust & C. Bank [1925], 74 Cal. App., 734; 241 Pac., 945.) in failing to give his signature to the check sufficient attention and examination to enable it
to discover instantly the forgery. The appellant, when the check was presented to it by
Also, a drawee could recover from another bank the portion of the proceeds of a forged check Banfield, failed to make an inquiry of or about him and did not cause or have him to be
cashed by the latter and deposited by the forger in the second bank and never withdrawn, upon identified. Its act in so paying to him the check is a degree of negligence on its part
the discovery of the forgery three months later, after the drawee had paid the check and returned equivalent to positive negligence. It indorsed the check, and, while such indorsement may
the voucher to the purported drawer, where the purchasing bank was negligent in taking the not be regarded within the meaning of the Negotiable Instrument Law as amounting to a
check, and was not injured by the drawee's negligence in discovering and reporting the forgery as warranty to appellant of that which it indorsed, it at least substantially served as a
to the amount left on deposit, since it was not a purchaser for value. (First State Bank & T. representation to it that it had exercised ordinary care and had complied with the rules
Co. vs. First Nat. Bank [1924], 314 Ill., 269; 145 N. E., 382.) and customs of prudent banking. Its indorsement was calculated, if it did not in fact do so,
to lull the drawee bank into indifference as to the drawer's signature to it when paying the
check and charging it to its customer's account and remitting its proceeds to appellant's
Similarly, it has been held that the drawee of a check could recover the amount paid on the check, correspondent.
after discovery of the forgery, from another bank, which put the check into circulation by cashing it
for the one who had forged the signature of both drawer and payee without making any inquiry as
to who he was although he was a stranger, after which the check reached, and was paid by, the If in such a transaction between the drawee and the holder of a check both are without
drawee, after going through the hands of several intermediate indorsees. (71 A. L. R., p. 340.) fault, no recovery may be had of the money so paid. (Deposit Bank of
Georgetown vs. Fayette National Bank, supra, and cases cited.) Or the rule may be more
accurately stated that, where the drawee pays the money, he cannot recover it back from
In First National Bank vs. Brule National Bank ([1917], 12 A. L. R., 1079, 1085), the following a holder in good faith, for value and without fault.
statement was made:
If, on the other hand, the holder acts in bad faith, or is guilty of culpable negligence, a
We are clearly of opinion, therefore that the warranty of genuineness, arising upon the act of the
recovery may be had by the drawee of such holder. The negligence of the Bank of Louisa
Brule National Bank in putting the check in circulation, was not discharged by payment of the
in failing to inquire of and about Banfield, and to cause or to have him identified before it
check by the drawee (First National Bank), nor was the Brule National Bank deceived or misled to
parted with its money on the forged check, may be regarded as the primary and
its prejudice by such payment. The Brule National Bank by its indorsement and delivery warranted
proximate cause of the loss. Its negligence in this respect reached in its effect the
its own identification of Kost and the genuineness of his signature. The indorsement of the check
appellee, and induced incaution on its part. In comparison of the degrees of the
by the Brule National Bank was such as to assign the title to the check to its assignee, the
negligence of the two, it is apparent that of the appellant excels in culpability. Both
Whitbeck National Bank, and the amount was credited to the indorser. The check bore no
appellant and appellee inadvertently made a mistake, doubtless due to a hurry incident to
indication that it was deposited for collection, and was not in any manner restricted so as to
business. The first and most grievous one was made by the appellant , amounting to its
constitute the indorsee the agent of the indorser, nor did it prohibit farther negotiation of the
disregard of the duty, it owed itself as well as the duty it owed to the appellee, and it
cannot on account thereof retain as against the appellee the money which it so received. similarity stated in the letter, then the same consideration applies to the Philippine
It cannot shift the loss to the appellee, for such disregard of its duty inevitably contributed National Bank, for the drawer is a customer of both the Motor Service Co., Inc., and the
to induce the appellee to omit its duty critically to examine the signature of Armstrong, Philippine National Bank. (B. of E., pp. 25, 28, 35.)
even if it did not know it instantly at the time it paid the check. (Farmers' Bank of
Augusta vs. Farmer's Bank of Maysville, supra, and cases cited.) We are of opinion that the facts of the present case do not make it one between two equally
innocent persons, the drawee bank and the holder, and that they are governed by the authorities
IV. The question now is to determine whether the appellant's negligence in purchasing the checks already cited and also the following:
in question is such as to give the appellee the right to recover upon said checks, and on the other
hand, whether the drawee bank was not itself negligent, except for its constructive fault in not The point in issue has sometimes been said to be that of negligence. The drawee who
knowing the signature of the drawer and detecting the forgery. has paid upon the forged signature is held to bear the loss, because he has been
negligent in failing to recognize that the handwriting is not that of his customer. But it
We quote with approval the following conclusions of the court a quo: follows obviously that if the payee, holder, or presenter of the forged paper has himself
been in default, if he has himself been guilty of a negligence prior to that of the banker, or
Check Exhibit A bears number 637023-D and is dated April 6, 1933, whereas check if by any act of his own he has at all contributed to induce the banker's negligence, then
Exhibit A-1 bears number 637020-D and is dated April 7, 1933. Therefore, the latter he may lose his right to cast the loss upon the banker. The courts have shown a steadily
check, which is prior in number to the former check, is however, issued on a later date. increasing disposition to extend the application of this rule over the new conditions of fact
This circumstance must have aroused at least the curiosity of the Motor Service Co., Inc. which from time to time arise, until it can now rarely happen that the holder, payee, or
presenter can escape the imputation of having been in some degree contributory towards
the mistake. Without any actual change in the abstract doctrines of the law, which are
The Motor Service Co., Inc., accepted the two checks from unknown persons. And not
clear, just, and simple enough, the gradual but sure tendency and effect of the decisions
only this; check Exhibit A is indorsed by a subagent of the agent of the payee,
have been to put as heavy a burden of responsibility upon the payee as upon the drawee,
International Auto Repair Shop. The Motor Service Co., Inc., made no inquiry whatsoever
contrary to the original custom. . . . (2 Morse on Banks and Banking, 5th ed., secs. 464
as to the extent of the authority of these unknown persons. Our Supreme Court said once and 466, pp. 82-85 and 86, 87.)
that "any person taking checks made payable to a corporation, which can act only by
agents, does so at his peril, and must abide by the consequences if the agent who
indorses the same is without authority" (Insular Drug Co. vs. National Bank, 58, Phil., In First National Bank vs. Brule National Bank (12 A. L. R., 1079, 1088, 1089), the following
684). statement appears in the concurring opinion:
xxx xxx xxx What, then, should be the rule? The drawee asks to recover for money had and received.
If his claim did not rest upon a transaction relating to a negotiable instrument plaintiff
could recover as for money paid under mistake, unless defendant could show some
Check Exhibit A-1, aside from having been indorsed by a supposed agent of the
equitable reason, such as changed condition since, and relying upon, payment by
international Auto Repair Shop is crossed generally. The existence of two parallel lines
plaintiff. In the Wyndmere Case, the North Dakota court holds that this rule giving right to
transversally drawn on the face of this check was a warning that the check could only be
recover money paid under mistake should extend to negotiable paper, and it rejects in its
collected through a banking institution (Jacobs, Law of Bills of Exchange, etc., pp., 179,
entirety the theory of estoppel and puts a case of this kind on exactly the same basis as
180; Bills of Exchange Act of England, secs. 76 and 79). Yet the Motor Service Co., Inc.,
the ordinary case of payment under mistake. But the great weight of authority, and that
accepted the check in payment for merchandise.
based on the better reasoning, holds that the exigencies of business demand a different
rule in relation to negotiable paper. What is that rule? Is it an absolute estoppel against
. . . In Exhibit H attached to the stipulation of facts as an integral part thereof, the Motor the drawee in favor of a holder, no matter how negligent such holder has been? It surely
Service Co., Inc., stated the following: is not. The correct rule recognizes the fact that, in case of payment without a prior
acceptance or certification, the holder takes the paper upon the of the prior indorsers and
"The Pangasinan Transportation Co. is a good customer of this firm and we received the credit of the drawer, and not upon the credit of the drawee, in making payment, has a
checks from them every month in payment of their account. The two checks in question right to rely upon the assumption that the payee used due diligence, especially where
seem to be exactly similar to the checks which we received from the Pangasinan such payee negotiated the bill or check to a holder, thus representing that it had so fully
Transportation Co. every month." satisfied itself as to the identity and signature of the maker that it was willing to warrant as
relates thereto to all subsequent holders. (Uniform Act, secs. 65 and 66.) Such correct
If the failure of the Motor Service Co., Inc., to detect the forgery of the drawer's signature rule denies the drawee the right to recover when the holder was without fault or when
in the two checks, may be considered as an omission in good faith because of the there has been some change of position calling for equitable relief. When a holder of a bill
of exchange uses all due care in the taking of bill or check and the drawee thereafter pays
same, the transaction is absolutely closed — modern business could not be done on any the appellant to believe in the genuineness of said instruments before appellant purchased them
other basis. While the correct rule promotes the fluidity of two recognized mediums of for value, it can not be said that the appellee is precluded from setting up the forgery and,
exchange, those mediums by which the great bulk of business is carried on, checks and therefore, the appellant is not entitled to retain the amount of the forged check paid to it by the
drafts, upon the other hand it encourages and demands prudent business methods upon appellee.
the part of those receiving such mediums of exchange. (Pennington County Bank vs. First
State Bank, 110 Minn., 263; 26 L. R. A. [N. S.], 849; 136 Am. St. Rep., 496; 125 N. W., VI. It has been held by many courts that a drawee of a check, who is deceived by a forgery of the
119; First National Bank vs. State Bank, 22 Neb., 769; 3 Am. St. Rep., 294; 36 N. W., drawer's signature may recover the payment back, unless his mistake has placed an innocent
289; Bank of Williamson, vs. McDowell County Bank, 66 W. Va., 545; 36 L. R. A. [N. S.], holder of the paper in a worse position than he would have been in if the discovery of the forgery
605; 66 S. E., 761; Germania Bank vs. Boutell, 60 Minn., 189; 27 L. R. A., 635; 51 Am. St. had been made on presentation. (5 R. C. L., p. 559; 2 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 1538.)
Rep., 519; 62 N. W., 327; American Express Co. vs. State National Bank, 27 Okla., 824; Forgeries often deceived the eye of the most cautious experts; and when a bank has been
33 L. R. A. [N. S.], 188; 113 Pac., 711; Farmers' National Bank vs. Farmers' & Traders deceived, it is a harsh rule which compels it to suffer although no one has suffered by its being
Bank, L. R. A., 1915A, 77, and note (159 Ky., 141; 166 S. W., 986].) deceived. (17 A. L. R. 891; 5 R. C. L., 559.)
That the defendant bank did not use reasonable business prudence is clear. It took this In the instant case should the drawee bank be allowed recovery, the appellant's position would not
check from a strangerwithout other identification than that given by another stranger; its become worse than if the drawee had refused the payment of these checks upon their
cashier witnessed the mark of such stranger thus vouching for the identity and signature presentation. The appellant has lost nothing by anything which the drawee has done. It had in its
of the maker; and it indorsed the check as "Paid," thus further throwing plaintiff off guard. hands some forged worthless papers. It did not purchase or acquire these papers because of any
Defendant could not but have known, when negotiating such check and putting it into the representation made to it by the drawee. It purchased them from unknown persons and under
channel through which it would finally be presented to plaintiff for payment, that plaintiff, if suspicious circumstances. It had no valid title to them, because the persons from whom it received
it paid such check, as defendant was asking it to do, would have to rely solely upon the them did not have such title. The appellant could not have compelled the drawee to pay them, and
apparent faith and credit that defendant had placed in the drawer. From the very the drawee could have refused payment had it been able to detect the forgery. By making a
circumstances of this case plaintiff had to act on the facts as presented to it by defendant, refund, the appellant would only returning what it had received without any title or right. And when
upon such facts only. appellant pays back the money it had received it will be entitled to have restored to it the forged
papers it parted with. There is no good reason why the accidental payment made by the appellant
But appellant argues that it so changed its position, after payment by plaintiff, that in should inure to the benefit of the appellant. If there were injury to the appellant said injury was
"equity and good conscience" plaintiff should not recover — it says it did not pay over any caused not by the failure of the appellee to detect the forgery but by the very negligence of the
money to the forger until after plaintiff had paid the check. There would be merit in such appellant in purchasing commercial papers from unknown persons without making inquiry as to
contention if defendant had indorsed the check for "collection," thus advising plaintiff that their genuineness.
it was relying on plaintiff and not on the drawer. It stands in court where it would have
been if it had done as it represented. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we conclude:
In Woods and Malone vs. Colony Bank (56 L. R. A., 929, 932), the court said: 1. That where a check is accepted or certified by the bank on which it is drawn, the bank
is estopped to deny the genuineness of the drawer's signature and his capacity to issue
. . . If the holder has been negligent in paying the forged paper, or has by his conduct, the instrument;
however innocent, misled or deceived the drawee to his damage, it would be unjust for
him to be allowed to shield himself from the results of his own carelessness by asserting 2. That if a drawee bank pays a forged check which was previously accepted or certified
that the drawee was bound in law to know his drawer's signature. by the said bank it cannot recover from a holder who did not participate in the forgery and
did not have actual notice thereof;
V. Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides that "when a signature is forged or made
without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, is wholly inoperative, and no 3. That the payment of a check does not include or imply its acceptance in the sense that
right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against this word is used in section 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Law;
any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the party against
whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of
authority. 4. That in the case of the payment of a forged check, even without former acceptance, the
drawee can not recover from a holder in due course not chargeable with any act of
negligence or disregard of duty;
It not appearing that the appellee bank did not warrant to the appellant the genuineness of the
checks in question, by its acceptance thereof, nor did it perform any act which would have induced
5. That to entitle the holder of a forged check to retain the money obtained thereon, there
must be a showing that the duty to ascertain the genuineness of the signature rested
entirely upon the drawee, and that the constructive negligence of such drawee in failing to
detect the forgery was not affected by any disregard of duty on the part of the holder, or
by failure of any precaution which, from his implied assertion in presenting the check as a
sufficient voucher, the drawee had the right to believe he had taken;
6. That in the absence of actual fault on the part of the drawee, his constructive fault in
not knowing the signature of the drawer and detecting the forgery will nor preclude his
recovery from one who took the check under circumstances of suspicion and without
proper precaution, or whose conduct has been such as to mislead the drawee or induce
him to pay the check without the usual scrutiny or other precautions against mistake or
fraud;
7. That on who purchases a check or draft is bound to satisfy himself that the paper is
genuine, and that by indorsing it or presenting it for payment or putting it into circulation
before presentation he impliedly asserts that he performed his duty;
8. That while the foregoing rule, chosen from a welter of decisions on the issue as the
correct one, will not hinder the circulation of two recognized mediums of exchange by
which the great bulk of business is carried on, namely, drafts and checks, on the other
hand, it will encourage and demand prudent business methods on the part of those
receiving such mediums of exchange;
9. That it being a matter of record in the present case, that the appellee bank in no more
chargeable with the knowledge of the drawer's signature than the appellant is, as the
drawer was as much the customer of the appellant as of the appellee, the presumption
that a drawee bank is bound to know more than any indorser the signature of its depositor
does not hold;
10. That according to the undisputed facts of the case the appellant in purchasing the
papers in question from unknown persons without making any inquiry as to the identity
and authority of the said persons negotiating and indorsing them, acted negligently and
contributed to the appellee's constructive negligence in failing to detect the forgery;
11. That under the circumstances of the case, if the appellee bank is allowed to recover,
there will be no change of position as to the injury or prejudice of the appellant.
Wherefore, the assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment appealed from must be, as it
is hereby, affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, and Laurel, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines In its brief, the PNB maintains that the lower court erred: (1) in not finding the PCIB guilty of
SUPREME COURT negligence; (2) in not finding that the indorsements at the back of the check are forged; (3) in not
Manila finding the PCIB liable to the PNB by virtue of the former's warranty on the back of the check; (4)
in not holding that "clearing" is not "acceptance", in contemplation of the Negotiable Instruments
EN BANC law; (5) in not finding that, since the check had not been accepted by the PNB, the latter is entitled
to reimbursement therefor; and (6) in denying the PNB's right to recover from the PCIB.
G.R. No. L-26001 October 29, 1968
The first assignment of error will be discussed later, together with the last,with which it is
interrelated.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL As regards the second assignment of error, the PNB argues that, since the signatures of the
BANK, respondents. drawer are forged, so must the signatures of the supposed indorsers be; but this conclusion does
not necessarily follow from said premise. Besides, there is absolutely no evidence, and the PNB
has not even tried to prove that the aforementioned indorsements are spurious. Again, the PNB
Tomas Besa, Jose B. Galang and Juan C. Jimenez for petitioner.
refunded the amount of the check to the GSIS, on account of the forgery in the signatures, not of
San Juan, Africa & Benedicto for respondents.
the indorsers or supposed indorsers, but of the officers of the GSIS as drawer of the instrument. In
other words, the question whether or not the indorsements have been falsified is immaterial to the
CONCEPCION, C.J.: PNB's liability as a drawee, or to its right to recover from the PCIB,1 for, as against the drawee, the
indorsement of an intermediate bank does not guarantee the signature of the drawer,2 since the
The Philippine National Bank — hereinafter referred to as the PNB — seeks the review forgery of the indorsement is notthe cause of the loss.3
by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, dismissing plaintiff's complaint against the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank — With respect to the warranty on the back of the check, to which the third assignment of error
hereinafter referred to as the PCIB — for the recovery of P57,415.00. refers, it should be noted that the PCIB thereby guaranteed "all prior indorsements," not the
authenticity of the signatures of the officers of the GSIS who signed on its behalf, because the
A partial stipulation of facts entered into by the parties and the decision of the Court of Appeals GSIS is not an indorser of the check, but its drawer.4 Said warranty is irrelevant, therefore, to the
show that, on about January 15, 1962, one Augusto Lim deposited in his current account with the PNB's alleged right to recover from the PCIB. It could have been availed of by a subsequent
PCIB branch at Padre Faura, Manila, GSIS Check No. 645915- B, in the sum of P57,415.00, indorsee5 or a holder in due course6 subsequent to the PCIB, but, the PNB is neither.7 Indeed,
drawn against the PNB; that, following an established banking practice in the Philippines, the upon payment by the PNB, as drawee, the check ceased to be a negotiable instrument, and
check was, on the same date, forwarded, for clearing, through the Central Bank, to the PNB, became a mere voucher or proof of payment.8
which did not return said check the next day, or at any other time, but retained it and paid its
amount to the PCIB, as well as debited it against the account of the GSIS in the PNB; that, Referring to the fourth and fifth assignments of error, we must bear in mind that, in general,
subsequently, or on January 31, 1962, upon demand from the GSIS, said sum of P57,415.00 was "acceptance", in the sense in which this term is used in the Negotiable Instruments Law 9 is not
re-credited to the latter's account, for the reason that the signatures of its officers on the check required for checks, for the same are payable on demand.10 Indeed, "acceptance" and "payment"
were forged; and that, thereupon, or on February 2, 1962, the PNB demanded from the PCIB the are, within the purview of said Law, essentially different things, for the former is "a promise to
refund of said sum, which the PCIB refused to do. Hence, the present action against the PCIB, perform an act," whereas the latter is the "actual performance" thereof.11 In the words of the
which was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Manila, whose decision was, in turn, Law,12 "the acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of his assent to the order of the
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. drawer," which, in the case of checks, is the payment, on demand, of a given sum of money. Upon
the other hand, actual payment of the amount of a check implies not only an assent to said order
It is not disputed that the signatures of the General Manager and the Auditor of the GSIS on the of the drawer and a recognition of the drawer's obligation to pay the aforementioned sum, but,
check, as drawer thereof, are forged; that the person named in the check as its payee was one also, a compliance with such obligation.
Mariano D. Pulido, who purportedly indorsed it to one Manuel Go; that the check purports to have
been indorsed by Manuel Go to Augusto Lim, who, in turn, deposited it with the PCIB, on January Let us now consider the first and the last assignments of error. The PNB maintains that the lower
15, 1962; that, thereupon, the PCIB stamped the following on the back of the check: "All prior court erred in not finding that the PCIB had been guilty of negligence in not discovering that the
indorsements and/or Lack of Endorsement Guaranteed, Philippine Commercial and Industrial check was forged. Assuming that there had been such negligence on the part of the PCIB, it is
Bank," Padre Faura Branch, Manila; that, on the same date, the PCIB sent the check to the PNB, undeniable, however, that the PNB has, also, been negligent, with the particularity that the PNB
for clearance, through the Central Bank; and that, over two (2) months before, or on November 13, had been guilty of a greater degree of negligence, because it had a previous and formal notice
1961, the GSIS had notified the PNB, which acknowledged receipt of the notice, that said check from the GSIS that the check had been lost, with the request that payment thereof be stopped.
had been lost, and, accordingly, requested that its payment be stopped.
Just as important, if not more important and decisive, is the fact that the PNB's negligence was the
main or proximate cause for the corresponding loss.
In this connection, it will be recalled that the PCIB did not cash the check upon its presentation by
Augusto Lim; that the latter had merely deposited it in his current account with the PCIB; that, on
the same day, the PCIB sent it, through the Central Bank, to the PNB, for clearing; that the PNB
did not return the check to the PCIB the next day or at any other time; that said failure to return the
check to the PCIB implied, under the current banking practice, that the PNB considered the check
good and would honor it; that, in fact, the PNB honored the check and paid its amount to the
PCIB; and that only then did the PCIB allow Augusto Lim to draw said amount from his
aforementioned current account.
Thus, by not returning the check to the PCIB, by thereby indicating that the PNB had found
nothing wrong with the check and would honor the same, and by actually paying its amount to the
PCIB, the PNB induced the latter, not only to believe that the check was genuine and good in
every respect, but, also, to pay its amount to Augusto Lim. In other words, the PNB was the
primary or proximate cause of the loss, and, hence, may not recover from the PCIB.13
It is a well-settled maxim of law and equity that when one of two (2) innocent persons must suffer
by the wrongful act of a third person, the loss must be borne by the one whose negligence was the
proximate cause of the loss or who put it into the power of the third person to perpetrate the
wrong.14
Then, again, it has, likewise, been held that, where the collecting (PCIB) and the drawee (PNB)
banks are equally at fault, the court will leave the parties where it finds them.15
The acceptor by accepting the instrument engages that he will pay it according to the
tenor of his acceptance; and admits:
(a) The existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature, and his capacity and
authority to draw the instrument; and
(b) The existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse.
The prevailing view is that the same rule applies in the case of a drawee who pays a bill without
having previously accepted it.16
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the Philippine
National Bank. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, Fernando and Capistrano,
JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
JOHNS, J.:
EN BANC
There is no dispute about any of the findings of fact made by the trial court, and the plaintiff relies
G.R. No. L-18657 August 23, 1922 upon them for a reversal. Among other things, the trial court says:
THE GREAT EASTERN LIFE INSURANCE CO., plaintiff-appellant, Who is responsible for the refund to the drawer of the amount of the check drawn and
vs. payable to order, when its value was collected by a third person by means of forgery of
HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL the signature of the payee? Is it the drawee or the last indorser, who ignored the forgery
BANK, defendants-appellees. at the time of making the payment, or the forger?
Camus and Delgado for appellant. To lower court found that Melicor's name was forged to the check. "So that the person to whose
Fisher and DeWitt and A. M. Opisso for Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. order the check was issued did not receive the money, which was collected by E. M. Maasim," and
Roman J. Lacson for Philippine National Bank. then says:
STATEMENT Now then, the National Bank should not be held responsible for the payment of made to
Maasim in good faith of the amount of the check, because the indorsement of Maasim is
The plaintiff is an insurance corporation, and the defendants are banking corporations, and each is unquestionable and his signature perfectly genuine, and the bank was not obliged to
duly licensed to do its respective business in the Philippines Islands. identify the signature of the former indorser. Neither could the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation be held responsible in making payment in good faith to the National
Bank, because the latter is a holder in due course of the check in question. In other
May 3, 1920, the plaintiff drew its check for P2,000 on the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
words, the two defendant banks can not be held civilly responsible for the consequences
Corporation with whom it had an account, payable to the order of Lazaro Melicor. E. M. Maasim
of the falsification or forgery of the signature of Lazaro Melicor, the National Bank having
fraudulently obtained possession of the check, forged Melicor's signature, as an endorser, and
had no notice of said forgery in making payment to Maasim, nor the Hongkong bank in
then personally endorsed and presented it to the Philippine National Bank where the amount of
making payment to National Bank. Neither bank incurred in any responsibility arising from
the check was placed to his credit. After having paid the check, and on the next day, the Philippine
that crime, nor was either of the said banks by subsequent acts, guilty of negligence or
national Bank endorsed the check to the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation which paid fault.
it and charged the amount of the check to the account of the plaintiff. In the ordinary course of
business, the Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation rendered a bank statement to the plaintiff
showing that the amount of the check was charged to its account, and no objection was then This was fundamental error.
made to the statement. About four months after the check was charged to the account of the
plaintiff, it developed that Lazaro Melicor, to whom the check was made payable, had never Plaintiff's check was drawn on Shanghai Bank payable to the order of Melicor. In other words, the
received it, and that his signature, as an endorser, was forged by Maasim, who presented and plaintiff authorized and directed the Shanghai Bank to pay Melicor, or his order, P2,000. It did not
deposited it to his private account in the Philippine National Bank. With this knowledge , the authorize or direct the bank to pay the check to any other person than Melicor, or his order, and
plaintiff promptly made a demand upon the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation that it the testimony is undisputed that Melicor never did part with his title or endorse the check, and
should be given credit for the amount of the forged check, which the bank refused to do, and the never received any of its proceeds. Neither is the plaintiff estopped or bound by the banks
plaintiff commenced this action to recover the P2,000 which was paid on the forged check. On the statement, which was made to it by the Shanghai Bank. This is not a case where the plaintiff's own
petition of the Shanghai Bank, the Philippine National Bank was made defendant. The Shanghai signature was forged to one of it checks. In such a case, the plaintiff would have known of the
Bank denies any liability, but prays that, if a judgment should be rendered against it, in turn, it forgery, and it would have been its duty to have promptly notified the bank of any forged signature,
should have like judgment against the Philippine National Bank which denies all liability to either and any failure on its part would have released bank from any liability. That is not this case. Here,
party. the forgery was that of Melicor, who was the payee of the check, and the legal presumption is that
the bank would not honor the check without the genuine endorsement of Melicor. In other words,
Upon the issues being joined, a trial was had and judgment was rendered against the plaintiff and when the plaintiff received it banks statement, it had a right to assume that Melicor had personally
in favor of the defendants, from which the plaintiff appeals, claiming that the court erred in endorsed the check, and that, otherwise, the bank would not have paid it.
dismissing the case, notwithstanding its finding of fact, and in not rendering a judgment in its favor,
as prayed for in its complaint. Section 23 of Act No. 2031, known as the Negotiable Instruments Law, says:
When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it
purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a
discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be
acquired through or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to
enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority.
The money was on deposit in the Shanghai Bank, and it had no legal right to pay it out to anyone
except the plaintiff or its order. Here, the plaintiff ordered the Shanghai Bank to pay the P2,000 to
Melicor, and the money was actually paid to Maasim and was never paid to Melicor, and he never
paid to Melicor, and he never personally endorsed the check, or authorized any one to endorse it
for him, and the alleged endorsement was a forgery. Hence, upon the undisputed facts, it must
follow that the Shanghai Bank has no defense to this action.
It is admitted that the Philippine National Bank cashed the check upon a forged signature, and
placed the money to the credit of Maasim, who was a forger. That the Philippine National Bank
then endorsed the check and forwarded it to the Shanghai Bank by whom it was paid. The
Philippine National Bank had no license or authority to pay the money to Maasim or anyone else
upon a forge signature. It was its legal duty to know that Melicor's endorsment was genuine before
cashing the check. Its remedy is against Maasim to whom it paid the money.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and one will be entered here in favor of the plaintiff
and against the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation for the P2,000, with interest
thereon from November 8, 1920 at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, and the costs of this action,
and a corresponding judgment will be entered in favor of the Hongkong Shanghai Banking
Corporation against the Philippine National Bank for the same amount, together with the amount
of its costs in this action. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN NOT FINDING
SUPREME COURT AND RULING THAT IT IS THE GROSS AND INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE
Manila AND FRAUDULENT ACTS OF THE OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE
RESPONDENT BANK IN FORGING THE SIGNATURE OF THE PAYEES AND
SECOND DIVISION THE WRONG AND/OR ILLEGAL PAYMENTS MADE TO PERSONS, OTHER
THAN TO THE INTENDED PAYEES SPECIFIED IN THE CHECKS, IS THE
DIRECT AND PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE TO PETITIONER
G.R. No. 92244 February 9, 1993
WHOSE SAVING (SIC) ACCOUNT WAS DEBITED.
With the foregoing provisions of the Civil Code being relied upon, it is being made clear that the
decision to hold the drawee bank liable is based on law and substantial justice and not on mere
equity. And although the case was brought before the court not on breach of contractual
obligations, the courts are not precluded from applying to the circumstances of the case the laws
pertinent thereto. Thus, the fact that petitioner's negligence was found to be the proximate cause
of her loss does not preclude her from recovering damages. The reason why the decision dealt on
a discussion on proximate cause is due to the error pointed out by petitioner as allegedly
committed by the respondent court. And in breaches of contract under Article 1173, due diligence
on the part of the defendant is not a defense.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the case is hereby ordered REMANDED to the trial court for the
reception of evidence to determine the exact amount of loss suffered by the petitioner, considering
that she partly benefited from the issuance of the questioned checks since the obligation for which
she issued them were apparently extinguished, such that only the excess amount over and above
the total of these actual obligations must be considered as loss of which one half must be paid by
respondent drawee bank to herein petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 89802 May 7, 1992 The petitioners appealed to the respondent court, reiterating their argument that the private
respondent had no cause of action against them and should have proceeded instead against the
companies that issued the checks. In disposing of this contention, the Court of Appeals 2 said:
ASSOCIATED BANK and CONRADO CRUZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and MERLE V. REYES, doing business under the name and The cause of action of the appellee in the case at bar arose from the illegal,
style "Melissa's RTW," respondents. anomalous and irregular acts of the appellants in violating common banking
practices to the damage and prejudice of the appellees, in allowing to be
deposited and encashed as well as paying to improper parties without the
Soluta, Leonidas, Marifosque, Javier, Liboon & aguila Law Offices for petitioners.
knowledge, consent, authority or endorsement of the appellee which totalled
P15,805.00, the six (6) checks in dispute which were "crossed checks" or "for
Roberto B. Lugue for private respondent. payee's account only," the appellee being the payee.
CRUZ, J.: The three (3) elements of a cause of action are present in the case at bar,
namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever
The sole issue raised in this case is whether or not the private respondent has a cause of action law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
against the petitioners for their encashment and payment to another person of certain crossed respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
checks issued in her favor. defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach thereof.
(Republic Planters Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 131 SCRA 631).
The private respondent is engaged in the business of ready-to-wear garments under the firm
name "Melissa's RTW." She deals with, among other customers, Robinson's Department Store, And such cause of action has been proved by evidence of great weight. The
Payless Department Store, Rempson Department Store, and the Corona Bazaar. contents of the said checks issued by the customers of the appellee had not
been questioned. There is no dispute that the same are crossed checks or for
These companies issued in payment of their respective accounts crossed checks payable to payee's account only, which is Melissa's RTW. The appellee had clearly shown
Melissa's RTW in the amounts and on the dates indicated below: that she had never authorized anyone to deposit the said checks nor to encash
the same; that the appellants had allowed all said checks to be deposited,
cleared and paid to one Rafael Sayson in violation of the instructions in the said
PAYOR BANK AMOUNT DATE crossed checks that the same were for payee's account only; and that the
appellee maintained a savings account with the Prudential Bank, Cubao Branch,
Payless Solid Bank P3,960.00 January 19, 1982 Quezon City which never cleared the said checks and the appellee had been
Robinson's FEBTC 4,140.00 December 18, 1981 damaged by such encashment of the same.
Robinson's FEBTC 1,650.00 December 24, 1981
Robinson's FEBTC 1,980.00 January 12, 1982 We affirm.
Rempson TRB 1,575.00 January 9, 1982
Corona RCBC 2,500.00 December 22, 1981
Under accepted banking practice, crossing a check is done by writing two parallel lines diagonally
on the left top portion of the checks. The crossing is special where the name of a bank or a
When she went to these companies to collect on what she thought were still unpaid accounts, she business institution is written between the two parallel lines, which means that the drawee should
was informed of the issuance of the above-listed crossed checks. Further inquiry revealed that the pay only with the intervention of that company. 3 The crossing is general where the words written
said checks had been deposited with the Associated Bank (hereinafter, "the Bank") and between the two parallel lines are "and Co." or "for payee's account only," as in the case at bar.
subsequently paid by it to one Rafael Sayson, one of its "trusted depositors," in the words of its This means that the drawee bank should not encash the check but merely accept it for deposit. 4
branch manager and co-petitioner, Conrado Cruz, Sayson had not been authorized by the private
respondent to deposit and encash the said checks.
In State Investment House vs. IAC, 5 this Court declared that "the effects of crossing a check are: respondent's account. Its failure to inquire into Sayson's authority was a breach of a duty it owed
(1) that the check may not be encashed but only deposited in the bank; (2) that the check may be to the private respondent.
negotiated only once –– to one who has an account with a bank; and (3) that the act of crossing
the check serves as a warning to the holder that the check has been issued for a definite purpose As the Court stressed in Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Equitable Banking
so that he must inquire if he has received the check pursuant to that purpose." Corp., 9 "the law imposes a duty of diligence on the collecting bank to scrutinize checks deposited
with it, for the purpose of determining their genuineness and regularity. The collecting bank, being
The effects therefore of crossing a check relate to the mode of its presentment for payment. Under primarily engaged in banking, holds itself out to the public as the expert on this field, and the law
Sec. 72 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, presentment for payment, to be sufficient, must be thus holds it to a high standard of conduct."
made by the holder or by some person authorized to receive payment on his behalf. Who the
holder or authorized person is depends on the instruction stated on the face of the check. The petitioners insist that the private respondent has no cause of action against them because
they have no privity of contract with her. They also argue that it was Eddie Reyes, the private
The six checks in the case at bar had been crossed and issued "for payee's account only." This respondent's own husband, who endorsed the checks.
could only signify that the drawers had intended the same for deposit only by the person indicated,
to wit, Melissa's RTW. Assuming that Eddie Reyes did endorse the crossed checks, we hold that the Bank would still be
liable to the private respondent because he was not authorized to make the endorsements. And
The petitioners argue that the cause of action for violation of the common instruction found on the even if the endorsements were forged, as alleged, the Bank would still be liable to the private
face of the checks exclusively belongs to the issuers thereof and not to the payee. Moreover, respondent for not verifying the endorser's authority. There is no substantial difference between an
having acted in good faith as they merely facilitated the encashment of the checks, they cannot be actual forging of a name to a check as an endorsement by a person not authorized to make the
made liable to the private respondent. signature and the affixing of a name to a check as an endorsement by a person not authorized to
endorse it. 10
The subject checks were accepted for deposit by the Bank for the account of Rafael Sayson
although they were crossed checks and the payee was not Sayson but Melissa's RTW. The Bank The Bank does not deny collecting the money on the endorsement. It was its responsibility to
stamped thereon its guarantee that "all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements (were) inquire as to the authority of Rafael Sayson to deposit crossed checks payable to Melissa's RTW
guaranteed." By such deliberate and positive act, the Bank had for all legal intents and purposes upon a prior endorsement by Eddie Reyes. The failure of the Bank to make this inquiry was a
treated the said checks as negotiable instruments and, accordingly, assumed the warranty of the breach of duty that made it liable to the private respondent for the amount of the checks.
endorser.
There being no evidence that the crossed checks were actually received by the private
The weight of authority is to the effect that "the possession of check on a forged or unauthorized respondent, she would have a right of action against the drawer companies, which in turn could go
indorsement is wrongful, and when the money is collected on the check, the bank can be held 'for against their respective drawee banks, which in turn could sue the herein petitioner as collecting
moneys had and received." 6 The proceeds are held for the rightful owner of the payment and may bank. In a similar situation, it was held that, to simplify proceedings, the payee of the illegally
be recovered by him. The position of the bank taking the check on the forged or unauthorized encashed checks should be allowed to recover directly from the bank responsible for such
indorsement is the same as if it had taken the check and collected without indorsement at all. The encashment regardless of whether or not the checks were actually delivered to the payee. 11We
act of the bank amounts to conversion of the check. 7 approve such direct action in the case at bar.
It is not disputed that the proceeds of the subject checks belonged to the private respondent. As It is worth repeating that before presenting the checks for clearing and for payment, the Bank had
she had not at any time authorized Rafael Sayson to endorse or encash them, there was stamped on the back thereof the words: "All prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements
conversion of the funds by the Bank. guaranteed," and thus made the assurance that it had ascertained the genuineness of all prior
endorsements.
When the Bank paid the checks so endorsed notwithstanding that title had not passed to the
endorser, it did so at its peril and became liable to the payee for the value of the checks. This We find that the respondent court committed no reversible error in holding that the private
liability attached whether or not the Bank was aware of the unauthorized endorsement. 8 respondent had a valid cause of action against the petitioners and that the latter are indeed liable
to her for their unauthorized encashment of the subject checks. We also agree with the reduction
The petitioners were negligent when they permitted the encashment of the checks by Sayson. The of the award of the exemplary damages for lack of sufficient evidence to support them.
Bank should have first verified his right to endorse the crossed checks, of which he was not the
payee, and to deposit the proceeds of the checks to his own account. The Bank was by reason of WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
the nature of the checks put upon notice that they were issued for deposit only to the private