Poli Rev Cases (De Leon-Sanders)

G.R. No.
78059 August 31, 1987
ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA,

JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M.
RESURRECCION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the
Province of Rizal, HON. ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC
Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G. MAGNO,
REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V.
MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L. TOLENTINO, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin

respondents from replacing them from their respective positions as Barangay
Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay,
Province of Rizal.
As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition,

and petitioner's their Reply to respondents' Comment.
In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon
was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C.
Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as
Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum

antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin
Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as
Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by
the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."
Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum,

antedated December 1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo
Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as
members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of
respondent OIC Governor, the pertinent portions of which read:
xxx xxx xxx
That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such

on March 20, 1986;
That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the

performance of my duties thereof, I among others, have signed as I
did sign the unnumbered memorandum ordering the replacement of
all the barangay officials of all the barangay(s) in the Municipality of
Taytay, Rizal;
That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was

signed by me personally on February 8,1987;
That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned

the following day, February 9. 1987.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.
Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.
Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be
declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their
positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners
maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg.
222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7,
1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have
qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to
replace them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional
Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986, which provided:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees

under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise
provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation
or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
appointment is made within a period of one year from February
25,1986.
By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office
of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in
office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their term of six
years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act
fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to
have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the
Provisional Constitution.
Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as

elective officials under the 1973 Constitution, may continue in office but should
vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events mentioned. 1
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no

proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay
officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation of
respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period
which ended on February 25, 1987.
Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that

February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective date of replacement and
not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping with the dictates of
justice.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the
aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been
overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading.
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the
purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that

date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been
superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no
longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective
positions occupied by petitioners.
Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially
considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the
State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities. 2 Similarly, the 1987 Constitution
ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which
the barangays form a part, 3 and limits the President's power to "general
supervision" over local governments. 4 Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same
1987 Constitution further provides in part:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay

officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years ...
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law,
therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election
Act of 1982 5 should still govern.
Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the

term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and
the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations

letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent,
with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed
or revoked.
WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on

February 8, 1987 designating respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to
be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining
respondents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over of petitioners'
positions subject of this Petition. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin
and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:
The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution
took effect on February 2, 1987, the date that the plebiscite for its ratification was
held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987, the date its ratification was
proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, Corazon
C. Aquino.
The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of Mr. Justice Sarmiento, holds that by
virtue of the provision of Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it
"shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite held for the purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2,
1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date.
The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to "take effect
on the date its ratification shall have been ascertained and not at the time the
people cast their votes to approve or reject it." This view was actually proposed at
the Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was withdrawn by its proponent
in the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will be
effective on the very day of the plebiscite."
The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully
supports the Court's judgment. It shows that the clear, unequivocal and express
intent of the Constitutional Conunission in unanimously approving (by thirty-five
votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of Transitory Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of ratification is the act of voting
by the people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter
[of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the
date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the official
confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people
in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the
plebiscite."
The record of the deliberations and the voting is reproduced hereinbelow: 1
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, may we now put to a vote the

original formulation of the committee as indicated in Section 12,
unless there are other commissioners who would like to present
amendments.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. May I propose the following amendments.
On line 2, delete the words "its ratification" and in lieu thereof insert
the following-. "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT
THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And on the last line, after
"constitutions," add the following: "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS."
MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam President. If

Commissioner Davide is going to propose an additional sentence, the
committee would suggest that we take up first his amendment to the
first sentence as originally formulated. We are now ready to comment
on that proposed amendment.
The proposed amendment would be to delete the words "its

ratification and in lieu thereof insert the words "THE
PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN
RATIFIED." And the second amendment would be: After the word
"constitutions," add the words" AND THEIR AMENDMENTS,"
The committee accepts the first proposed amendment. However, we

regret that we cannot accept the second proposed amendment after the
word "constitutions" because the committee feels that when we talk of
all previous Constitutions, necessarily it includes "AND THEIR
AMENDMENTS."
MR. DAVIDE. With that explanation, l will not insist on the second.
But, Madam President, may I request that I be allowed to read the
second amendment so the Commission would be able to appreciate
the change in the first.
MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, Madam President, we can now do that.
MR. DAVIDE. The second sentence will read: "THE

PROCLAMATION SHALL BE MADE WITHIN FIVE DAYS
FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE CANVASS BY THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH
PLEBISCITE."
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, after conferring with our

chairman, the committee feels that the second proposed amendment in
the form of a new sentence would not be exactly necessary and the
committee feels that it would be too much for us to impose a time
frame on the President to make the proclamation. As we would recall,
Madam President, in the approved Article on the Executive, there is a
provision which says that the President shall make certain that all laws
shall be faithfully complied. When we approve this first sentence, and
it says that there will be a proclamation by the President that the
Constitution has been ratified, the President will naturally comply
with the law in accordance with the provisions in the Article on the
Executive which we have cited. It would be too much to impose on
the President a time frame within which she will make that
declaration. It would be assumed that the President would
immediately do that after the results shall have been canvassed by the
COMELEC.
Therefore, the committee regrets that it cannot accept the second

sentence which the Gentleman is proposing, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I am prepared to withdraw the same on the

assumption that there will be an immediate proclamation of the results
by the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that understanding, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist on the second sentence.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. I would ask the committee to reconsider its acceptance

of the amendment which makes the effectivity of the new Constitution
dependent upon the proclamation of the President. The effectivity of
the Constitution should commence on the date of the ratification, not
on the date of the proclamation of the President. What is confusing, I
think, is what happened in 1976 when the amendments of 1976 were
ratified. In that particular case, the reason the amendments of 1976
were effective upon the proclamation of the President was that the
draft presented to the people said that the amendment will be effective
upon the proclamation made by the President. I have a suspicion that
was put in there precisely to give the President some kind of leeway
on whether to announce the ratification or not. Therefore, we should
not make this dependent on the action of the President since this will
be a manifestation of the act of the people to be done under the
supervision of the COMELECand it should be the COMELEC who
should make the announcement that, in fact, the votes show that the
Constitution was ratified and there should be no need to wait for any
proclamation on the part of the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Would the Gentleman answer a few clarificatory

questions?
FR. BERNAS. Willingly, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. The Gentleman will agree that a date has to be

fixed as to exactly when the Constitution is supposed to be ratified.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification of the Constitution is

on the date the votes were supposed to have been cast.
MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the mechanics of the whole thing,

Madam President. We present the Constitution to a plebiscite, the
people exercise their right to vote, then the votes are canvassed by the
Commission on Elections. If we delete the suggested amendment
which says: "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT
IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED," what would be, in clear terms, the date
when the Constitution is supposed to be ratified or not ratified, as the
case may be?
FR. BERNAS. The date would be the casting of the ballots. if the
President were to say that the plebiscite would be held, for instance,
on January 19, 1987, then the date for the effectivity of the new
Constitution would be January 19, 1987.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, it would not depend on the actual
issuance of the results by the Commission on Elections which will be
doing the canvass? That is immaterial Madam President
FR. BERNAS. It would not, Madam President, because "ratification"

is the act of saying "yes" is done when one casts his ballot.
MR. MAAMBONG. So it is the date of the plebiscite itself, Madam

President?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that statement of Commissioner Bernas,

we would like to know from the proponent, Commissioner Davide, if
he is insisting on his amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I am insisting on the amendment

because I cannot subscribe to the view of Commissioner Bernas, that
the date of the ratification is reckoned from the date of the casting of
the ballots. That cannot be the date of reckoning because it is a
plebiscite all over the country. We do not split the moment of casting
by each of the voters. Actually and technically speaking, it would be
all right if it would be upon the announcement of the results of the
canvass conducted by the COMELEC or the results of the plebiscite
held all over the country. But it is necessary that there be a body
which will make the formal announcement of the results of the
plebiscite. So it is either the President or the COMELEC itself upon
the completion of the canvass of the results of the plebiscite, and I
opted for the President.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Nolledo is recognized.
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President. I beg to disagree with

Commissioner Davide. I support the stand of Commissioner Bernas
because it is really the date of the casting of the "yes" votes that is the
date of the ratification of the Constitution The announcement merely
confirms the ratification even if the results are released two or three
days after. I think it is a fundamental principle in political law, even in
civil law, because an announcement is a mere confirmation The act of
ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the
ratification. If there should be any need for presidential proclamation,
that proclamation will merely confirm the act of ratification.
Thank you, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Does Commissioner Regalado want to contribute?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, I was precisely going to state

the same support for Commissioner Bernas, because the canvass
thereafter is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done
during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President
is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was
actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution
when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.
MR. LERUM. Madam President, may I be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Lerum is recognized.
MR. LERUM. I am in favor of the Davide amendment because we

have to fix a date for the effectivity of the Constitution. Suppose the
announcement is delayed by, say, 10 days or a month, what happens
to the obligations and rights that accrue upon the approval of the
Constitution? So I think we must have a definite date. I am, therefore,
in favor of the Davide amendment.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized.
MR. MAAMBONG. With the theory of the Commissioner, would

there be a necessity for the Commission on Elections to declare the
results of the canvass?
FR. BERNAS. There would be because it is the Commission on

Elections which makes the official announcement of the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. My next question which is the final one is: After
the Commision on Elections has declared the results of the canvass,
will there be a necessity for the President to make a proclamation of
the results of the canvass as submitted by the Commission on
Elections?
FR. BERNAS. I would say there would be no necessity, Madam

President.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the President may or may not

make the proclamation whether the Constitution has been ratified or
not.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the proclamation made by the

President would be immaterial because under the law, the
administration of all election laws is under an independent
Commission on Elections. It is the Commission on Elections which
announces the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. But nevertheless, the President may make the

proclamation.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, the President may. And if what he says

contradicts what the Commission on Elections says, it would have no
effect. I would only add that when we say that the date of effectivity is
on the day of the casting of the votes, what we mean is that the
Constitution takes effect on every single minute and every single
second of that day, because the Civil Code says a day has 24 hours.So
that even if the votes are cast in the morning, the Constitution is really
effective from the previous midnight.
So that when we adopted the new rule on citizenship, the children of

Filipino mothers or anybody born on the date of effectivity of the
1973 Constitution, which is January 17, 1973, are natural-born
citizens, no matter what time of day or night.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, safely say that whatever

date is the publication of the results of the canvass by the COMELEC
retroacts to the date of the plebiscite?

MR. MAAMBONG. I thank the Commissioner.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Mention was made about the need for having a
definite date. I think it is precisely the proposal of Commissioner
Bernas which speaks of the date (of ratification that would have a
definite date, because there would be no definite date if we depend
upon the canvassing by the COMELEC.
Thank you,
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Madam President.
Whoever makes the announcement as to the result of the plebiscite, be

it the COMELEC or the President, would announce that a majority of
the votes cast on a given date was in favor of the Constitution. And
that is the date when the Constitution takes effect, apart from the fact
that the provision on the drafting or amendment of the Constitution
provides that a constitution becomes effective upon ratification by a
majority of the votes cast, although I would not say from the very
beginning of the date of election because as of that time it is
impossible to determine whether there is a majority. At the end of the
day of election or plebiscite, the determination is made as of that
time-the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on such and
such a date. So that is the time when the new Constitution will be
considered ratified and, therefore, effective.
THE PRESIDENT. May we now hear Vice-President Padilla.
MR. PADILLA. Madam President, I am against the proposed

amendment of Commissioner Davide and I support the view of
Commissioner Bernas and the others because the ratification of the
Constitution is on the date the people, by a majority vote, have cast
their votes in favor of the Constitution. Even in civil law, if there is a
contract, say, between an agent and a third person and that contract is
confirmed or ratified by the principal, the validity does not begin on
the date of ratification but it retroacts from the date the contract was
executed.
Therefore, the date of the Constitution as ratified should retroact to

the date that the people have cast their affirmative votes in favor of
the Constitution.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized
MR. MAAMBONG. We will now ask once more Commissioner

Davide if he is insisting on his amendment
MR. DAVIDE. In view of the explanation and overwhelming tyranny

of the opinion that it will be effective on the very day of the plebiscite,
I am withdrawing my amendment on the assumption that any of the
following bodies the Office of the President or the COMELEC will
make the formal announcement of the results.
MR. RAMA. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the

original provision as stated by the committee.
MR. MAAMBONG. The committee will read again the formulation

indicated in the original committee report as Section 12.
This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by

a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and
shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
We ask for a vote, Madam President.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor, please raise their hand.

(Several Members raised their hands.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised
his hand.)
The results show 35 votes in favor and none against; Section 12 is
approved. 2
The Court next holds as a consequence of its declaration at bar that the
Constitution took effect on the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on
February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Constitution promulgated on March 25,
1986 must be deemed to have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution on the
same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date, February 2, 1987, absent
any saying clause to the contrary in the Transitory Article of the Constitution,
respondent OIC Governor could no longer exercise the power to replace petitioners
in their positions as Barangay Captain and Councilmen. Hence, the attempted
replacement of petitioners by respondent OIC Governor's designation on February
8, 1987 of their successors could no longer produce any legal force and effect.
While the Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year period expiring on
March 25, 1987 within which the power of replacement could be exercised, this
period was shortened by the ratification and effectivity on February 2, 1987 of the
Constitution. Had the intention of the framers of the Constitution been otherwise,
they would have so provided for in the Transitory Article, as indeed they provided
for multifarious transitory provisions in twenty six sections of Article XVIII, e.g.
extension of the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President to
noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections, the continued
exercise of legislative powers by the incumbent President until the convening of
the first Congress, etc.
A final note of clarification, as to the statement in the dissent that "the

appointments of some seven Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals and 55
city fiscals reported extended (by) the President on February 2, 1987 . . . could be
open to serious questions," in view of the provisions of Sections 8 (1) and 9,
Article VIII of the Constitution which require prior endorsement thereof by the
Judicial and Bar Council created under the Constitution. It should be stated for the
record that the reported date of the appointments, February 2, 1987, is incorrect.
The official records of the Court show that the appointments of the seven Court of
Appeals Justices were transmitted to this Court on February 1, 1987 and they were
all appointed on or before January 31, 1987. 3(Similarly, the records of the
Department of Justice likewise show that the appointment papers of the last batch
of provincial and city fiscals signed by the President in completion of the
reorganization of the prosecution service were made on January 31, 1987 and
transmitted to the Department on February 1, 1987.) It is also a matter of record
that since February 2, 1987, no appointments to the Judiciary have been extended
by the President, pending the constitution of the Judicial and Bar Council,
indicating that the Chief Executive has likewise considered February 2, 1987 as the
effective date of the Constitution, as now expressly declared by the Court.
CRUZ, J., concurring.
In her quiet and restrained manner, Justice Herrera is able to prove her point with
more telling effect than the tones of thunder. She has written another persuasive
opinion, and I am delighted to concur. I note that it in effect affirms my dissents in
the De la Serna, Zamora, Duquing and Bayas cases, where I submitted that the
local OICs may no longer be summarily replaced, having acquired security of
tenure under the new Constitution. Our difference is that whereas I would make
that right commence on February 25, 1987, after the deadline set by the Freedom
Constitution, Justice Herrera would opt for February 2, 1987, when the new
Constitution was ratified. I yield to that better view and agree with
her ponencia completely.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting.
With due respect to the majority I register this dissent.
While I agree that the one-year deadline prescribed by Section 2, Article III of the
Provisional Constitution with respect to the tenure of government functionaries, as
follows:

appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,
1986.
was cut short by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, I entertain serious doubts
whether or not that cut-off period began on February 2, 1987, the date of the
plebiscite held to approve the new Charter. To my mind the 1987 constitution took
effect on February 11, 1987, the date the same was proclaimed ratified pursuant to
Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, and not February 2, 1987,
plebiscite day.
I rely, first and foremost, on the language of the 1987 Charter itself, thus:
Sec. 27. This Constitution shag take effect immediately upon its
It is my reading of this provision that the Constitution takes effect on the date its
ratification shall have been ascertained, and not at the time the people cast their
votes to approve or reject it. For it cannot be logically said that Constitution was
ratified during such a plebiscite, when the will of the people as of that time, had
not, and could not have been, vet determined.
Other than that, pragmatic considerations compel me to take the view.
I have no doubt that between February 2, and February 11, 1987 the government
performed acts that would have been valid under the Provisional Constitution but
would otherwise have been void under the 1987 Charter. I recall, in particular, the
appointments of some seven Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals, and
55 city fiscals the President reportedly extended on February 2, 1987. 1 Under
Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII, of the l987 Constitution, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. (I)A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex oficio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar,
a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts
shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy,
Such appointments need no confirmation.
xxx xxx xxx
such appointments could be open to serious questions.

Since 1973, moreover, we have invariably reckoned the effectivity of the
Constitution as well as the amendments thereto from the date it is proclaimed
ratified.
In Magtoto v. Manguera, 2 we held that the 1973 Constitution became in force and
effect on January 17, 1973, the date Proclamation No. 1102, "Announcing the
Ratification by the Filipino People of the Constitution Proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention," was issued, although Mr. Justice, now Chief Justice,
Teehankee would push its effectivity date further to April 17, 1973, the date our
decision in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 3 became final. And this was so
notwithstanding Section 16, Article XVII, of the 1973 Constitution, thus:
SEC. 16. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose and, except as herein provided, shall supersede the
Constitution of nineteen-hundred and thirty- five and all amendments
thereto.
On October 27, 1976, then President Marcos promulgated Proclamation no. 1595,
proclaiming the ratification of the 1976 amendments submitted in the plebiscite of
October 16- 17, 1976. The Proclamation states, inter alia, that.
By virtue-of the powers vested in me by law, I hereby proclaim all the amendments
embodied in this certificate as duly ratified by the Filipino people in the
referendum- plebiscite held Oct. 16-17, 1976 and are therefore effective and in full
force and effect as of this date.
It shall be noted that under Amendment No. 9 of the said 1976 amendments.
These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President

shall have proclaimed that they have been ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite.
On April 1, 1980, the then Chief Executive issued Proclamation no. 1959,
"Proclaiming the Ratification by the Filipino People of the Amendments of Section
7, Article X of the Constitution" (lengthening the terms of office of judges and
justices). The Proclamation provides:
[t]he above-quoted amendment has been duly ratified by a majority of

the votes cast in the plebiscite held, together with the election for local
officials, on January 30, 1980, and that said amendment is hereby
declared to take effect immediately.
It shall be noted that under Resolution No. 21, dated December 18, 1979, the
proposed amendment shall take effect on the date the incumbent President/Prime
Minister shall proclaim its ratification.
On April 7, 1981, Proclamation No. 2077 was issued "Proclaiming the Ratification
in the Plebiscite of April 7, 1981 of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 122 and Declaring Them Therefore Effective and in Full
Force and Effect." The Proclamation, in declaring the said amendments duly
approved, further declared them "[e]ffective and in full force and in effect as of the
date of this Proclamation," It shall be noted, in this connection, that under
Resolutions Nos. I and 2 of the Batasang Pambansa, Third Regular Session, Sitting
as a Constituent Assembly, which parented these amendments, the same:
. . .shall become valid as part of the Constitution when approved by a

majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held pursuant to Section
2, Article XVI of the Constitution.
On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 122, "An Act to Submit to the Filipino
People, for Ratification or Rejection, the Amendment to the Constitution of the
Philippines, Proposed by the Batasang Pambansa, Sitting as a Constituent
Assembly, in its Resolutions Numbered Three, Two, and One, and to Appropriate
Funds Therefore," provides, as follows:
SEC. 7. The Commission on Elections, sitting en banc, shad canvass

and proclaim the result of the plebiscite using the certificates
submitted to it, duly authenticated and certified by the Board of
Canvassers of each province or city.
We have, finally, Proclamation No. 2332, "Proclaiming the Ratification in the

Plebiscite of January 27, 1984, of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied
in Batasang Pambansa Resolutions Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112 and 113." It states
that the amendments:
....are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of the date of
this Proclamation.
It carries out Resolution no. 104 itself (as well as Resolutions Nos. 110 and 112
and Section 9, Batas Blg. 643), which states, that:
The proposed amendments shall take effect on the date the President
of the Philippines shall proclaim that they have been ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite held for the purpose, but not
later than three months from the approval of the amendments.
albeit Resolutions Nos. 105, 111, and 113 provide, that:
These amendments shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when

approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election/plebiscite at
which it is submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant to
Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution, as amended.
That a Constitution or amendments thereto take effect upon proclamation of their

ratification and not at the time of the plebiscite is a view that is not peculiar to the
Marcos era.
The Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) in Joint Session on the March 11,
1947 plebiscite called pursuant to Republic Act No. 73 and the Resolution of Both
Houses (of Congress) adopted on September 18, 1946, was adopted on April
9,1947. The April 9, 1947 Resolution makes no mention of a retroactive
application.
Accordingly, when the incumbent President (Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino) proclaimed

on February 11, 1987, at Malacanang Palace:
... that the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines adopted by

the Constitutional Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance
appended thereto, has been duly ratified by the Filipino people and is
therefore effective and in full force and effect. 4
the 1987 Constitution, in point of fact, came into force and effect, I hold that it
took effect at no other time.
I submit that our ruling in Ponsica v. Ignalaga 5 in which we declared, in passing,

that the new Charter was ratified on February 2, 1987, does not in any way weaken
this dissent. As I stated, the remark was said in passing-we did not resolve the case
on account of a categorical holding that the 1987 Constitution came to life on
February 2, 1987. In any event, if we did, I now call for its re-examination.
I am therefore of the opinion, consistent with the views expressed above, that the
challenged dismissals done on February 8, 1987 were valid, the 1987 Constitution
not being then as yet in force.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:
The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution
took effect on February 2, 1987, the date that the plebiscite for its ratification was
held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987, the date its ratification was
proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, Corazon
C. Aquino.
The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of Mr. Justice Sarmiento, holds that by
virtue of the provision of Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it
"shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite held for the purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2,
1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date.
The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to "take effect
on the date its ratification shall have been ascertained and not at the time the
people cast their votes to approve or reject it." This view was actually proposed at
the Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was withdrawn by its proponent
in the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will be
effective on the very day of the plebiscite."
The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully
supports the Court's judgment. It shows that the clear, unequivocal and express
intent of the Constitutional Conunission in unanimously approving (by thirty-five
votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of Transitory Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of ratification is the act of voting
by the people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter
[of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the
date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the official
confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people
in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the
plebiscite."
The record of the deliberations and the voting is reproduced hereinbelow: 1
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, may we now put to a vote the

original formulation of the committee as indicated in Section 12,
unless there are other commissioners who would like to present
amendments.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. May I propose the following amendments.
On line 2, delete the words "its ratification" and in lieu thereof insert
the following-. "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT
THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And on the last line, after
"constitutions," add the following: "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS."
MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam President. If

Commissioner Davide is going to propose an additional sentence, the
committee would suggest that we take up first his amendment to the
first sentence as originally formulated. We are now ready to comment
on that proposed amendment.
The proposed amendment would be to delete the words "its

ratification and in lieu thereof insert the words "THE
PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN
RATIFIED." And the second amendment would be: After the word
"constitutions," add the words" AND THEIR AMENDMENTS,"
The committee accepts the first proposed amendment. However, we

regret that we cannot accept the second proposed amendment after the
word "constitutions" because the committee feels that when we talk of
all previous Constitutions, necessarily it includes "AND THEIR
AMENDMENTS."
MR. DAVIDE. With that explanation, l will not insist on the second.
But, Madam President, may I request that I be allowed to read the
second amendment so the Commission would be able to appreciate
the change in the first.
MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, Madam President, we can now do that.
MR. DAVIDE. The second sentence will read: "THE

PROCLAMATION SHALL BE MADE WITHIN FIVE DAYS
FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE CANVASS BY THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH
PLEBISCITE."
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, after conferring with our

chairman, the committee feels that the second proposed amendment in
the form of a new sentence would not be exactly necessary and the
committee feels that it would be too much for us to impose a time
frame on the President to make the proclamation. As we would recall,
Madam President, in the approved Article on the Executive, there is a
provision which says that the President shall make certain that all laws
shall be faithfully complied. When we approve this first sentence, and
it says that there will be a proclamation by the President that the
Constitution has been ratified, the President will naturally comply
with the law in accordance with the provisions in the Article on the
Executive which we have cited. It would be too much to impose on
the President a time frame within which she will make that
declaration. It would be assumed that the President would
immediately do that after the results shall have been canvassed by the
COMELEC.
Therefore, the committee regrets that it cannot accept the second

sentence which the Gentleman is proposing, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I am prepared to withdraw the same on the

assumption that there will be an immediate proclamation of the results
by the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that understanding, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist on the second sentence.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. I would ask the committee to reconsider its acceptance

of the amendment which makes the effectivity of the new Constitution
dependent upon the proclamation of the President. The effectivity of
the Constitution should commence on the date of the ratification, not
on the date of the proclamation of the President. What is confusing, I
think, is what happened in 1976 when the amendments of 1976 were
ratified. In that particular case, the reason the amendments of 1976
were effective upon the proclamation of the President was that the
draft presented to the people said that the amendment will be effective
upon the proclamation made by the President. I have a suspicion that
was put in there precisely to give the President some kind of leeway
on whether to announce the ratification or not. Therefore, we should
not make this dependent on the action of the President since this will
be a manifestation of the act of the people to be done under the
supervision of the COMELECand it should be the COMELEC who
should make the announcement that, in fact, the votes show that the
Constitution was ratified and there should be no need to wait for any
proclamation on the part of the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Would the Gentleman answer a few clarificatory

questions?
FR. BERNAS. Willingly, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. The Gentleman will agree that a date has to be

fixed as to exactly when the Constitution is supposed to be ratified.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification of the Constitution is

on the date the votes were supposed to have been cast.
MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the mechanics of the whole thing,

Madam President. We present the Constitution to a plebiscite, the
people exercise their right to vote, then the votes are canvassed by the
Commission on Elections. If we delete the suggested amendment
which says: "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT
IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED," what would be, in clear terms, the date
when the Constitution is supposed to be ratified or not ratified, as the
case may be?
FR. BERNAS. The date would be the casting of the ballots. if the
President were to say that the plebiscite would be held, for instance,
on January 19, 1987, then the date for the effectivity of the new
Constitution would be January 19, 1987.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, it would not depend on the actual

issuance of the results by the Commission on Elections which will be
doing the canvass? That is immaterial Madam President
FR. BERNAS. It would not, Madam President, because "ratification"

is the act of saying "yes" is done when one casts his ballot.
MR. MAAMBONG. So it is the date of the plebiscite itself, Madam

President?
MR. MAAMBONG. With that statement of Commissioner Bernas,

we would like to know from the proponent, Commissioner Davide, if
he is insisting on his amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I am insisting on the amendment

because I cannot subscribe to the view of Commissioner Bernas, that
the date of the ratification is reckoned from the date of the casting of
the ballots. That cannot be the date of reckoning because it is a
plebiscite all over the country. We do not split the moment of casting
by each of the voters. Actually and technically speaking, it would be
all right if it would be upon the announcement of the results of the
canvass conducted by the COMELEC or the results of the plebiscite
held all over the country. But it is necessary that there be a body
which will make the formal announcement of the results of the
plebiscite. So it is either the President or the COMELEC itself upon
the completion of the canvass of the results of the plebiscite, and I
opted for the President.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Nolledo is recognized.

MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President. I beg to disagree with
Commissioner Davide. I support the stand of Commissioner Bernas
because it is really the date of the casting of the "yes" votes that is the
date of the ratification of the Constitution The announcement merely
confirms the ratification even if the results are released two or three
days after. I think it is a fundamental principle in political law, even in
civil law, because an announcement is a mere confirmation The act of
ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the
ratification. If there should be any need for presidential proclamation,
that proclamation will merely confirm the act of ratification.
Thank you, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Does Commissioner Regalado want to contribute?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, I was precisely going to state

the same support for Commissioner Bernas, because the canvass
thereafter is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done
during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President
is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was
actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution
when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.
MR. LERUM. Madam President, may I be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Lerum is recognized.
MR. LERUM. I am in favor of the Davide amendment because we

have to fix a date for the effectivity of the Constitution. Suppose the
announcement is delayed by, say, 10 days or a month, what happens
to the obligations and rights that accrue upon the approval of the
Constitution? So I think we must have a definite date. I am, therefore,
in favor of the Davide amendment.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized.
MR. MAAMBONG. With the theory of the Commissioner, would

there be a necessity for the Commission on Elections to declare the
results of the canvass?
FR. BERNAS. There would be because it is the Commission on
Elections which makes the official announcement of the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. My next question which is the final one is: After
the Commision on Elections has declared the results of the canvass,
will there be a necessity for the President to make a proclamation of
the results of the canvass as submitted by the Commission on
Elections?
FR. BERNAS. I would say there would be no necessity, Madam

President.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the President may or may not

make the proclamation whether the Constitution has been ratified or
not.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the proclamation made by the

President would be immaterial because under the law, the
administration of all election laws is under an independent
Commission on Elections. It is the Commission on Elections which
announces the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. But nevertheless, the President may make the

proclamation.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, the President may. And if what he says

contradicts what the Commission on Elections says, it would have no
effect. I would only add that when we say that the date of effectivity is
on the day of the casting of the votes, what we mean is that the
Constitution takes effect on every single minute and every single
second of that day, because the Civil Code says a day has 24 hours.
So that even if the votes are cast in the morning, the Constitution is
really effective from the previous midnight. So that when we adopted
the new rule on citizenship, the children of Filipino mothers or
anybody born on the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution,
which is January 17, 1973, are natural-born citizens, no matter what
time of day or night.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, safely say that whatever
date is the publication of the results of the canvass by the COMELEC
retroacts to the date of the plebiscite?
MR. MAAMBONG. I thank the Commissioner.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Mention was made about the need for having a
definite date. I think it is precisely the proposal of Commissioner
Bernas which speaks of the date (of ratification that would have a
definite date, because there would be no definite date if we depend
upon the canvassing by the COMELEC.
Thank you,
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Madam President.
Whoever makes the announcement as to the result of the plebiscite, be

it the COMELEC or the President, would announce that a majority of
the votes cast on a given date was in favor of the Constitution. And
that is the date when the Constitution takes effect, apart from the fact
that the provision on the drafting or amendment of the Constitution
provides that a constitution becomes effective upon ratification by a
majority of the votes cast, although I would not say from the very
beginning of the date of election because as of that time it is
impossible to determine whether there is a majority. At the end of the
day of election or plebiscite, the determination is made as of that
time-the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on such and
such a date. So that is the time when the new Constitution will be
considered ratified and, therefore, effective.
THE PRESIDENT. May we now hear Vice-President Padilla.

MR. PADILLA. Madam President, I am against the proposed
amendment of Commissioner Davide and I support the view of
Commissioner Bernas and the others because the ratification of the
Constitution is on the date the people, by a majority vote, have cast
their votes in favor of the Constitution. Even in civil law, if there is a
contract, say, between an agent and a third person and that contract is
confirmed or ratified by the principal, the validity does not begin on
the date of ratification but it retroacts from the date the contract was
executed.
Therefore, the date of the Constitution as ratified should retroact to

the date that the people have cast their affirmative votes in favor of
the Constitution.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized
MR. MAAMBONG. We will now ask once more Commissioner

Davide if he is insisting on his amendment
MR. DAVIDE. In view of the explanation and overwhelming tyranny

of the opinion that it will be effective on the very day of the plebiscite,
I am withdrawing my amendment on the assumption that any of the
following bodies the Office of the President or the COMELEC will
make the formal announcement of the results.
MR. RAMA. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the

original provision as stated by the committee.
MR. MAAMBONG. The committee will read again the formulation

indicated in the original committee report as Section 12.
This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by

a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and
shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
We ask for a vote, Madam President.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor, please raise their hand.
(Several Members raised their hands.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised
his hand.)
The results show 35 votes in favor and none against; Section 12 is

approved. 2
The Court next holds as a consequence of its declaration at bar that the
Constitution took effect on the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on
February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Constitution promulgated on March 25,
1986 must be deemed to have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution on the
same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date, February 2, 1987, absent
any saying clause to the contrary in the Transitory Article of the Constitution,
respondent OIC Governor could no longer exercise the power to replace petitioners
in their positions as Barangay Captain and Councilmen. Hence, the attempted
replacement of petitioners by respondent OIC Governor's designation on February
8, 1987 of their successors could no longer produce any legal force and effect.
While the Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year period expiring on
March 25, 1987 within which the power of replacement could be exercised, this
period was shortened by the ratification and effectivity on February 2, 1987 of the
Constitution. Had the intention of the framers of the Constitution been otherwise,
they would have so provided for in the Transitory Article, as indeed they provided
for multifarious transitory provisions in twenty six sections of Article XVIII, e.g.
extension of the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President to
noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections, the continued
exercise of legislative powers by the incumbent President until the convening of
the first Congress, etc.
A final note of clarification, as to the statement in the dissent that "the

appointments of some seven Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals and 55
city fiscals reported extended (by) the President on February 2, 1987 . . . could be
open to serious questions," in view of the provisions of Sections 8 (1) and 9,
Article VIII of the Constitution which require prior endorsement thereof by the
Judicial and Bar Council created under the Constitution. It should be stated for the
record that the reported date of the appointments, February 2, 1987, is incorrect.
The official records of the Court show that the appointments of the seven Court of
Appeals Justices were transmitted to this Court on February 1, 1987 and they were
all appointed on or before January 31, 1987. 3(Similarly, the records of the
Department of Justice likewise show that the appointment papers of the last batch
of provincial and city fiscals signed by the President in completion of the
reorganization of the prosecution service were made on January 31, 1987 and
transmitted to the Department on February 1, 1987.) It is also a matter of record
that since February 2, 1987, no appointments to the Judiciary have been extended
by the President, pending the constitution of the Judicial and Bar Council,
indicating that the Chief Executive has likewise considered February 2, 1987 as the
effective date of the Constitution, as now expressly declared by the Court.
CRUZ, J., concurring.
In her quiet and restrained manner, Justice Herrera is able to prove her point with
more telling effect than the tones of thunder. She has written another persuasive
opinion, and I am delighted to concur. I note that it in effect affirms my dissents in
the De la Serna, Zamora, Duquing and Bayas cases, where I submitted that the
local OICs may no longer be summarily replaced, having acquired security of
tenure under the new Constitution. Our difference is that whereas I would make
that right commence on February 25, 1987, after the deadline set by the Freedom
Constitution, Justice Herrera would opt for February 2, 1987, when the new
Constitution was ratified. I yield to that better view and agree with
her ponencia completely.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting.
With due respect to the majority I register this dissent.
While I agree that the one-year deadline prescribed by Section 2, Article III of the
Provisional Constitution with respect to the tenure of government functionaries, as
follows:

appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,
1986.
was cut short by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, I entertain serious doubts
whether or not that cut-off period began on February 2, 1987, the date of the
plebiscite held to approve the new Charter. To my mind the 1987 constitution took
effect on February 11, 1987, the date the same was proclaimed ratified pursuant to
Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, and not February 2, 1987,
plebiscite day.
I rely, first and foremost, on the language of the 1987 Charter itself, thus:
Sec. 27. This Constitution shag take effect immediately upon its
It is my reading of this provision that the Constitution takes effect on the date its
ratification shall have been ascertained, and not at the time the people cast their
votes to approve or reject it. For it cannot be logically said that Constitution was
ratified during such a plebiscite, when the will of the people as of that time, had
not, and could not have been, vet determined.
Other than that, pragmatic considerations compel me to take the view.
I have no doubt that between February 2, and February 11, 1987 the government
performed acts that would have been valid under the Provisional Constitution but
would otherwise have been void under the 1987 Charter. I recall, in particular, the
appointments of some seven Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals, and
55 city fiscals the President reportedly extended on February 2, 1987. 1 Under
Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII, of the l987 Constitution, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. (I)A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex oficio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar,
a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
xxx xxx xxx
2Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower

courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy,
Such appointments need no confirmation.
xxx xxx xxx

such appointments could be open to serious questions.
Since 1973, moreover, we have invariably reckoned the effectivity of the

Constitution as well as the amendments thereto from the date it is proclaimed
ratified.
In Magtoto v. Manguera, 2 we held that the 1973 Constitution became in force and
effect on January 17, 1973, the date Proclamation No. 1102, "Announcing the
Ratification by the Filipino People of the Constitution Proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention," was issued, although Mr. Justice, now Chief Justice,
Teehankee would push its effectivity date further to April 17, 1973, the date our
decision in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 3 became final. And this was so
notwithstanding Section 16, Article XVII, of the 1973 Constitution, thus:
SEC. 16. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose and, except as herein provided, shall supersede the
Constitution of nineteen-hundred and thirty- five and all amendments
thereto.
On October 27, 1976, then President Marcos promulgated Proclamation no. 1595,
proclaiming the ratification of the 1976 amendments submitted in the plebiscite of
October 16- 17, 1976. The Proclamation states, inter alia, that.
By virtue-of the powers vested in me by law, I hereby proclaim all the amendments
embodied in this certificate as duly ratified by the Filipino people in the
referendum — plebiscite held Oct. 16-17, 1976 and are therefore effective and in
full force and effect as of this date.
It shall be noted that under Amendment No. 9 of the said 1976 amendments.
These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President

shall have proclaimed that they have been ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite.
On April 1, 1980, the then Chief Executive issued Proclamation no. 1959,
"Proclaiming the Ratification by the Filipino People of the Amendments of Section
7, Article X of the Constitution" (lengthening the terms of office of judges and
justices). The Proclamation provides:
[t]he above-quoted amendment has been duly ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in the plebiscite held, together with the election for local
officials, on January 30, 1980, and that said amendment is hereby
declared to take effect immediately.
It shall be noted that under Resolution No. 21, dated December 18, 1979, the
proposed amendment shall take effect on the date the incumbent President/Prime
Minister shall proclaim its ratification.
On April 7, 1981, Proclamation No. 2077 was issued "Proclaiming the Ratification
in the Plebiscite of April 7, 1981 of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 122 and Declaring Them Therefore Effective and in Full
Force and Effect." The Proclamation, in declaring the said amendments duly
approved, further declared them "[e]ffective and in full force and in effect as of the
date of this Proclamation," It shall be noted, in this connection, that under
Resolutions Nos. I and 2 of the Batasang Pambansa, Third Regular Session, Sitting
as a Constituent Assembly, which parented these amendments, the same:
... shall become valid as part of the Constitution when approved by a

majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held pursuant to Section
2, Article XVI of the Constitution.
On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 122, "An Act to Submit to the Filipino
People, for Ratification or Rejection, the Amendment to the Constitution of the
Philippines, Proposed by the Batasang Pambansa, Sitting as a Constituent
Assembly, in its Resolutions Numbered Three, Two, and One, and to Appropriate
Funds Therefore," provides, as follows:
SEC. 7. The Commission on Elections, sitting en banc, shad canvass

and proclaim the result of the plebiscite using the certificates
submitted to it, duly authenticated and certified by the Board of
Canvassers of each province or city.
We have, finally, Proclamation No. 2332, "Proclaiming the Ratification in the

Plebiscite of January 27, 1984, of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied
in Batasang Pambansa Resolutions Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112 and 113." It states
that the amendments:
....are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of the date of
this Proclamation.
It carries out Resolution no. 104 itself (as well as Resolutions Nos. 110 and 112
and Section 9, Batas Blg. 643), which states, that:
The proposed amendments shall take effect on the date the President
of the Philippines shall proclaim that they have been ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite held for the purpose, but not
later than three months from the approval of the amendments.
albeit Resolutions Nos. 105, 111, and 113 provide, that:
These amendments shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a

majority of the votes cast in an election/plebiscite at which it is submitted to the
people for their ratification pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the
Constitution, as amended.
That a Constitution or amendments thereto take effect upon proclamation of their

ratification and not at the time of the plebiscite is a view that is not peculiar to the
Marcos era.
The Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) in Joint Session on the March 11,
1947 plebiscite called pursuant to Republic Act No. 73 and the Resolution of Both
Houses (of Congress) adopted on September 18, 1946, was adopted on April
9,1947. The April 9, 1947 Resolution makes no mention of a retroactive
application. Accordingly, when the incumbent President (Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino)
proclaimed on February 11, 1987, at Malacanang Palace:
... that the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines adopted by

the Constitutional Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance
appended thereto, has been duly ratified by the Filipino people and is
therefore effective and in full force and effect. 4
the 1987 Constitution, in point of fact, came into force and effect, I hold that it
took effect at no other time.
I submit that our ruling in Ponsica v. Ignalaga 5 in which we declared, in passing,

that the new Charter was ratified on February 2, 1987, does not in any way weaken
this dissent. As I stated, the remark was said in passing-we did not resolve the case
on account of a categorical holding that the 1987 Constitution came to life on
February 2, 1987. In any event, if we did, I now call for its re-examination.
I am therefore of the opinion, consistent with the views expressed above, that the
challenged dismissals done on February 8, 1987 were valid, the 1987 Constitution
not being then as yet in force.
Today is Wednesday, June 19, 2013

Search
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPOR
COUNSEL, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privilege
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qua
Filipinos, 1 is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Co
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision
self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask
the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mant
Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 Decemb
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respon
MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertis
an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitabil
performance of the Manila Hotel. 2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bi
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to
of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, wi
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2
than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state —
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH

GSIS/MHC —
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by Oc
1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to
the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the oth
Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation Syst
Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidde
strategic plan for the Manila Hotel. . . .
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale
Agreement with GSIS . . . .
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGI

PARTNER —
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner aft
following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not late

October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committe

Privatization)/OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Coun
obtained. 3
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execut
necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched t
price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1
petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.00
as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . . 5 which res
GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of th
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.
October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecti
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred t
First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fe
and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submi
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historica
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of
generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its powe
capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has be
part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC c
with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a governm
owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tour
industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% o
shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, s
par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. 7
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its b
also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has match
bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that h
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid
of price per share. 8
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Consti
merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be existing law
down conditions under which business may be done." 9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term n
patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna a
marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second para
Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the gue
have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, t
alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimonyof the nation. What is more, the mandate of
Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of it
separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional pro
invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% o
equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposi
shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it righ
the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides tha
any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to th
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are will
match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the pr
submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highe
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is p
since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition givin
the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respon
GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its
discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner ha
legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act
of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and adminis
a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribe
permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respe
powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must co
and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any
the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive b
entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and ef
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is d
written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisio
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely esta
outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery an
certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a general p
such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provis
is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislat
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protec
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the rig
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determ
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is r
the legislature for action. 13
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a diff
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly up
people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conv
has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided th
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all pr
of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legis
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify th
mandate of the fundamental law. 14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, a
always been, that —
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rath

non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would giv
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. T
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which c
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implem
statute. 15
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self
executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as

Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of "PREFER
is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a
to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So
we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodri

to remove the word "QUALIFIED?".
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED

FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. W

word "QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or prospective la
always lay down conditions under which business may be done.
example, qualifications on the setting up of other financial struct
cetera (emphasis supplied by respondents)
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appe
is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not preclu
enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated sta
squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the s
executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate t
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the ri
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the ri
mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a
executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is t
executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subj
any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional rig
make it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the sub
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is i
from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not se
executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing beca
Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully o
Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise au
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori,
same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require
legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be se
executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely stat
principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights — are simply not in point. Basco v. P
Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional provisions on personal dignity,
sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 23 the promotion of social
justice, 24 and the values of education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers to the constit
provisions on social justice and human rights 27 and on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family lif
vital role of the youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and
development. 33 A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially en
constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manif
they are only principles upon which the legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing law
for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant o
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give prefe
qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Con
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enfo
right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no st
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inhere
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 34 explains
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers n
out rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of out race. It also r
our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop no
lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or
our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philip
the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural he
the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly F
Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant even
have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of
festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Gues
of the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded th
traditional Philippine hospitality. 36
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memo
City. 37During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration int
military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was sele
the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their final stand. Thereafter, in th
and 1960's, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every politic
convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international reco
an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed
etat where an aspirant for vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures
and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel
become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC co
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock
anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In t
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hote
stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that theFilipino First Policy provisio
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not
building nor the land upon which the building stands. 38
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution also inc
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings
1986 Constitutional Commission

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the N
amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting th
"QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following: "CITIZENS OF
PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS W
CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED
SUCH CITIZENS.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is a

but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that i
percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an indiv

Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citi
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if

that the preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because "QUAL

FILIPINOS" may refer only to individuals and not to juridical
personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President. 39
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendm

read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT O

RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING TH
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SH
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the w
"Filipinos" here, as intended by the proponents, will include not
individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entitie
controlled by Filipinos. 40
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus —
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissio

Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a quest
MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES

CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY A
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."
MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterp

qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filip
enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than

Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes."
MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues —
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHA

THE STATE SHALL GlVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. T
embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy. That means that Filipinos shou
given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering th
patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject pr
was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all ec

concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provisio
never found in previous Constitutions . . . .
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to
citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompeten
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counter product
inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice

made between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter sha
chosen over the former."
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS
selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance w
own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of
management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hote
company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the
Hotel. 44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject p
is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to vio
clear constitutional provision — by the government itself — is only too distressing. To adopt suc
reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the
provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life o
own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defen
arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the
discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt —
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, includ

Constitution, even before Congress acts — provided that there are discoverab
standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by
understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The resp
for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole pre
of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps
Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a consti
command. That is not how constitutional government operates. 45
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respon
GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approva
State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaq
Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a "state a
constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered "sta
covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public function;" (2) when th
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government respons
his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and thir
categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction. although entered into by res
GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. 46
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the governm
elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power — legisl
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondi
directed to the three(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject cons
injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a gover
instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bid
it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since
"Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the
tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning
Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to en
one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by th
of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and
interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it
be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nu
being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and co
must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose th
for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the Highest Bidder canno
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly su
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price p
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of s
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest
fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning th
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceed
bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Fi
must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rule
constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a p
skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors.
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. The
given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdictio
person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrume
presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong
since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the biddin
meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners
awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highes
tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the
of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offer
Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to
earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disrega
respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the awar
been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino gro
willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other o
market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the conseque
the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rath
remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develo
habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its acti
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bi
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of
and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only
bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent G
execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the lat
matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Const
not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it
enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reas
circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend.
emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermin
influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business
opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is or
the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately
articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute

judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and fea
legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticis
decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development . . . in
connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Court's First Division ag
sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statemen
published in a major daily to the effect that injunction "again demonstrates th
Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Co
intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of wh
are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not vi
Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that
matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing f
losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material valu
commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pri
dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court
always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is noth
sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution
involved. 49
Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican
with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emana
nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have
purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Pr
of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of natio
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to th
bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property
commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most impor
events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where head
would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the high
function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continue
significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In t
it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul — a place with a history of grandeur; a most
setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country. 51
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the
historical landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed,
conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephi
for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some pieces of fo
silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino
gained by the Filipinos Manila Hotel — and all that it stands for — is sold to a non-Filipino? Ho
of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On th
hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in th
a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filip
Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Co
and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and p
sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA H

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMEN
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares o
Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petition
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the M
Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to d
other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same time, I would like to expound a
on the concept of national patrimony as including within its scope and meaning institutions such
Manila Hotel.
It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under "national patrimony" over which qua
Filipinos have the preference, in ownership and operation. The Constitutional provision on point
xxx xxx xxx
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national econo
patrimony, the State shall Give preference to qualified Filipinos. 1
Petitioner's argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimony"
of the natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory (Article I) consist
land, sea, and air. 2study of the 1935 Constitution, where the concept of "national patrimony" orig
would show that its framers decided to adopt the even more comprehensive expression "Patrimon
Nation" in the belief that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not only their natural resource
country but practically everything that belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the materi
as the intangible and the spiritual assets and possessions of the people. It is to be noted that the fr
not stop with conservation. They knew that conservation alone does not spell progress; and that t
be achieved only through development as a correlative factor to assure to the people not only the
ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of their national patrimony). 3
Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich na
resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race. 4
There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimon
such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation. Thi
institution has played an important role in our nation's history, having been the venue of many a
event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign hea
state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others. 5
It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future generations of Filipinos. As President
L. Quezon once said, we must exploit the natural resources of our country, but we should do so w
eye to the welfare of the future generations. In other words, the leaders of today are the trustees o
patrimony of our race. To preserve our national patrimony and reserve it for Filipinos was the int
distinguished gentlemen who first framed our Constitution. Thus, in debating the need for nation
of our lands and natural resources, one expounded that we should "put more teeth into our laws,
make the nationalization of our lands and natural resources a subject of ordinary legislation but o
constitutional enactment" 6 To quote further: "Let not our children be mere tenants and trespasser
own country. Let us preserve and bequeath to them what is rightfully theirs, free from all foreign
encumbrances". 7
Now, a word on preference. In my view "preference to qualified Filipinos", to be meaningful, mu

not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the very "h
the existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to the na
patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal the
bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino
non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be made to the qualified Fil
Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the
of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at a
It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign investments in our co
stress is on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in the country. While gove
agencies, including the courts should re-condition their thinking to such a trend, and make it easy
attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we should not preclude ourselves from
to us Filipinos certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage are involved. In the
industry, for instance, foreign investors have established themselves creditably, such as in the Sh
the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels. This should not stop us from retaining 51% of th
stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with th
of the Filipino people to preserve our national patrimony, including our historical and cultural he
the hands of Filipinos.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut statements, shared by Mr. Justice Re
Puno in a well written separate (dissenting) opinion, that:
First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that "(I)n the grant of rights, privilege
Filipinos" 1 is self-executory. The provision verily does not need, although it can obviously be am
regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.
Second, the term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country's natural resources but also to
cultural heritage. A "historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Ma
Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.
Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government entity which
its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an act of th
subject to the Constitutional mandate.
On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," I find it somewhat diffic
the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the particular case before us
meaningful preference, it seems, would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the fore
for, as a particular matter, I cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of dollars to be at p
last cent) with another. The magnitude of the magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly
for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissenting view, could trig
right of preference.
It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared this great disappointment, a letdow
did not deserve, by a simple and timely advise of the proper rules of bidding along with the pecu
constitutional implications of the proposed transaction. It is also regrettable that the Court at time
to instead, be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequate which create the perception that it even take
justiciable controversies.
All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the petition.
MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:
I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the constitu
mandate that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national patrimony
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" 1 is to allow petitioner Philippine corporation to equa
of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the M
Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino of Philippine corporation can be
given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession given by the State, by favor
a foreign national corporation.
Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System, if petitioner
Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, "priority [would be given] to the bidder see
larger ownership interest in MHC," 2 so that petitioner bid for more shares, it would be preferred
Malaysian corporation for that reason and not because it is a Philippine corporation. Consequentl
only in cases like the present one, where an alien corporation is the highest bidder, that preferent
treatment of the Philippine corporation is mandated not by declaring it winner but by allowing it
the highest bid in terms of price per share" before it is awarded the shares of stocks. 3 That, to me
"preference to qualified Filipinos" means in the context of this case — by favoring Filipinos whe
they are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.
This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno 4 to a 1947 statute giving "preference to F
citizens in the lease of public market stalls." 5 This Court upheld the cancellation of existing lease
covering market stalls occupied by persons who were not Filipinos and the award thereafter of th
qualified Filipino vendors as ordered by the Department of Finance. Similarly, in Vda. de Salgad
Fuente, 6 this Court sustained the validity of a municipal ordinance passed pursuant to the statute
No. 37), terminating existing leases of public market stalls and granting preference to Filipino cit
the issuance of new licenses for the occupancy of the stalls. In Chua Lao v. Raymundo, 7 the pref
granted under the statute was held to apply to cases in which Filipino vendors sought the same st
occupied by alien vendors in the public markets even if there were available other stalls as good
occupied by aliens. "The law, apparently, is applicable whenever there is a conflict of interest be
Filipino applicants and aliens for lease of stalls in public markets, in which situation the right to p
immediately arises." 8
Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a century efforts began only in the 19
America to realize the promise of equality, through affirmative action and reverse discrimination
designed to remedy past discrimination against colored people in such areas as employment, con
and licensing. 9Indeed, in vital areas of our national economy, there are situations in which the on
place Filipinos in control of the national economy as contemplated in the Constitution 10 is to giv
preferential treatment where they can at least stand on equal footing with aliens.
There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either invite foreign retaliation or depr
country of the benefit of foreign capital or know-how. We are dealing here not with common trad
common means of livelihood which are open to aliens in our midst, 11 but with the sale of govern
property, which is like the grant of government largess of benefits and concessions covering the
economy" and therefore no one should begrudge us if we give preferential treatment to our citize
at any rate is the command of the Constitution. For the Manila Hotel is a business owned by the
Government. It is being privatized. Privatization should result in the relinquishment of the busine
favor of private individuals and groups who are Filipino citizens, not in favor of aliens.
Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of stocks to petitioner we would be tra
competence and capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the Malaysian firm are qualified,
hurdled the prequalification process. 12 It is only the result of the public bidding that is sought to
modified by enabling petitioner to up its bid to equal the highest bid.
Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to match the high
an alien could encourage speculation, since all that a Filipino entity would then do would be not
bid or make only a token one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder has submitted the highes
make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not possible under the rules on public bid
the GSIS. Under these rules there is a minimum bid required (P36.87 per share for a range of 9 to
million shares). 13 Bids below the minimum will not be considered. On the other hand, if the Filip
entity, after passing the prequalification process, does not submit a bid, he will not be allowed to
highest bid of the foreign firm because this is a privilege allowed only to those who have "validly
submitted bids." 14 The suggestion is, to say the least, fanciful and has no basis in fact.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.
TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:
Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I say this as we are not confronted in the
bar with legal and constitutional issues — and yet I am driven so to speak on the side of history.
reason perhaps is due to the belief that in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a "pag
history is worth a volume of logic."
I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the Manila Hotel has a historical and cu
aspect within the meaning of the constitution and thus, forming part of the "patrimony of the nati
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments withi
national goals and priorities.
The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same Constitution p
to "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" which ordain —
The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effec
Filipinos. (Sec. 19).
Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the highlights in
Constitution Commission proceedings thus:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. The Amendment will read: "IN T

GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCE
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFE
TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS". And the word "Filip
here, as intended by the proponents, will include no
individual Filipinos but also Filipino-Controlled ent
controlled by Filipinos (Vol. III, Records of the
Constitutional Commission, p. 608).
MR. MONSOD. We also wanted to add, as Commi

Villegas said, this committee and this body already
what is known as the Filipino First policy which wa
suggested by Commissioner de Castro. So that it is
our Constitution (Vol. IV, Records of the Constituti
Commission, p. 225).
Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision adverted to above, said:
MR. NOLLEDO. In the grant of rights, privileges a

concessions covering the national economy and patr
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a

enterprise is qualified and the Filipinos enterprise is
qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some

than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be
preferred:?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes". (Vol. III, p.

Records of the Constitutional Commission).
The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of the Malolos
Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we have no reneged
nationalist policy is articulated in one of the earliest case, this Court said —
The nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the Constitu

cannot therefore be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit u
many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid or unconst
(Ichong, et al. vs. Hernandez, et al., 101 Phil. 1155).
I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and traditions are not legislated and is the p
events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and acceptance by the
collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people.
The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is w
historic events (too numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84 years.
As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to examine the single instances of the
largese which have given rise to this controversy. As I believe that has been exhaustively discuss
the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this point that the history of the Manila Hotel should not be plac
auction block of a purely business transaction, where profits subverts the cherished historical val
people.
As a historical landmark in this "Pearl of the Orient Seas", it has its enviable tradition which, in t
of the philosopher Salvador de Madarriaga tradition is "more of a river than a stone, it keeps flow
one must view the flowing , and one must view the flow of both directions. If you look towards t
from which the river flows, you see tradition in the form of forceful currents that push the river o
towards the future, and if you look the other way, you progress."
Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress depends on the kind of tradition. Let us
jettison the tradition of the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our colonial history.
I grant, of course the men of the law can see the same subject in different lights.
I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says — "He is always right who suspects that he
mistakes". On this note, I say that if I have to make a mistake, I would rather err upholding the b
the Filipino be first under his Constitution and in his own land.
I vote GRANT the petition.
PUNO, J., dissenting:
This is a. petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
corporation, to stop the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from selling the controllin
of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign corporation. Allegedly, the sale violates the second
of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution.
Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation. It is the sole owner of the M
Hotel which it operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel Corporation. Manila Hotel was i
in the privatization program of the government. In 1995, GSIS proposed to sell to interested buye
51% of its shares, ranging from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000 shares, in the Manila Hotel Corporation
absence of bids at the first public bidding, the block of shares offered for sale was increased from
maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner" of the GS
required to "provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system
financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel" 1 The prop
approved by respondent Committee on Privatization.
In July 1995, a conference was held where prequalification documents and the bidding rules wer
furnished interested parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic corporation, and Renong
Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as operator, prequalified. 2
The bidding rules and procedures entitled "Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification a
Bidding of the MHC Privatization" provide:
I INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS
DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER
The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below will be declared the Win
Bidder/Strategic Partner and will be awarded the Block of Shares:
First — Pass the prequalification process;
Second — Submit the highest bid on a price per share basis for the Block of
Third — Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not l
October 23, 1995;
xxx xxx xxx
IV GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION
A. PARTIES WHO MAP APPLY FOR PREQUALIFICATION
The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be expected to provid

management expertise and/or an international marketing reservat
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of The Manila Hotel. In this context, the GSIS is in
the prequalification process any local and/or foreign corporation
consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with at least one of th
following qualifications:
a. Proven management .expertise in the hotel indust
b. Significant equity ownership (i.e. board represent

another hotel company; or
c. Overall management and marketing expertise to

successfully operate the Manila Hotel.
Parties interested in bidding for MHC should be able to provide

the requisite management expertise and/or international
marketing/reservation system for The Manila Hotel.
xxx xxx xxx
D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
xxx xxx xxx
E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE
1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE REGISTRATION OFFIC
The prequalification documents can be secured at the Registratio

between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days within the pe
specified in Section III. Each set of documents consists of the fol
a. Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalificati

Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization
b. Confidential Information Memorandum: The Ma

Corporation
c. Letter of Invitation. to the Prequalification and Bi

Conference
xxx xxx xxx
4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING CONFERENCE
A prequalification and bidding conference will be held at The M

Hotel on the date specified in Section III to allow the Applicant t
clarifications and further information regarding the guidelines an
procedures. Only those who purchased the prequalification docu
be allowed in this conference. Attendance to this conference is st
advised, although the Applicant will not be penalized if it does n
5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
The applicant should submit 5 sets of the prequalification docum

original set plus 4 copies) at the Registration Office between 9:0
4:00 PM during working days within the period specified in Sect
F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS
1. The Applicant will be evaluated by the PBAC wi

assistance of the TEC based on the Information Pac
other information available to the PBAC.
2. If the Applicant is a Consortium/Joint Venture, th

evaluation will consider the overall qualifications of
group, taking into account the contribution of each m
the venture.
3. The decision of the PBAC with respect to the res

PBAC evaluation will be final.
4. The Applicant shall be evaluated according to the

set forth below:
a. Business management expertise, trac

and experience
b. Financial capability.
c. Feasibility and acceptability of the p

strategic plan for the Manila Hotel
5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of Applicants as it may

appropriate.
6. The parties that prequalified in the first MHC public bidding —

Sheraton, Marriot International Inc., Renaissance Hotels Internat
consortium of RCBC Capital/Ritz Carlton — may participate in
Bidding without having to undergo the prequalification process a
G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. A notice of prequalification results containing the shortlist of Q

Bidders will be posted at the Registration Office at the date spec
Section III.
2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture, the withdrawal by m

whose qualification was a material consideration for being includ
shortlist is ground for disqualification of the Applicant.
V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING
A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC BID
All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be eligible to

participate in the Public Bidding.
B. BLOCK OF SHARES
A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen Million Three Hu

Thousand (15,300,000) shares of stock representing Thirty Perce
Fifty-One Percent (30%-51%) of the issued and outstanding shar
MHC, will be offered in the Public Bidding by the GSIS. The Qu
Bidders will have the Option of determining the number of share
the range to bid for. The range is intended to attract bidders with
preferences and objectives for the operation and management of
Manila Hotel.
C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE PER SHARE BA
1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share basis. The minimu

required on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares is Thi
Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P36.67).
2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency payable to the GSIS
3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per share below the m

required will not considered.
D. TRANSFER COSTS
xxx xxx xxx
E. OFFICIAL BID FORM
1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed Official Bid Form, a

which is attached as Annex IV. The Official Bid Form must be p
accomplished in all details; improper accomplishment may be a
basis for disqualification.
2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified Bidder will submit th

Bid Form, which will indicate the offered purchase price, in a se
envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."
F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
During the Public Bidding, the following documents should be s

along with the bid in a separate envelop marked "SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS":
1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER OATH).
If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the representative of the

Bidder should submit a Board resolution which adequately autho
representative to bid for and in behalf of the corporation with ful
to perform such acts necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified
If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint Venture, each mem

Consortium/Joint venture should submit a Board resolution autho
one of its members and such member's representative to make th
behalf of the group with full authority to perform such acts neces
requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.
2. BID SECURITY
a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-Three Million Pes

(P33,000,00), in Philippine currency as Bid Security in the form
i. Manager's check or unconditional demand draft p
the "Government Service Insurance System" and iss
reputable banking institution duly licensed to do bus
the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS; or
ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued by a reputable b

institution acceptable to the GSIS.
b. The GSIS will reject a bid if:
i. The bid does not have Bid Security; or
ii. The Bid Security accompanying the bid is for les

required amount.
c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a manager's check or unco

demand draft, the interest earned on the Bid Security will be for
account of GSIS.
d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the winning Bidder/Strategic

the Bid Security will be applied as the downpayment on the Qua
Bidder's offered purchase price.
e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder will be returned imm

after the Public Bidding if the Qualified Bidder is not declared th
Bidder.
f. The Bid Security will be returned by October 23, 1995 if the H

Bidder is unable to negotiate and execute with GSIS/MHC the
Contract or other types of contract specified by the Highest Bidd
strategic plan for The Manila Hotel.
g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will be forfeited in fav

GSIS if the Highest Bidder, after negotiating and executing the
Contract specified by the Highest Bidder or other types of contra
strategic plan for The Manila Hotel, fails or refuses to:
i. Execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement w

not later than October 23, 1995; or
ii. Pay the full amount of the offered purchase price

than October 23, 1995; or
iii. Consummate the sale of the Block of Shares for

reason.
G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS
1. The Public Bidding will be held on September 7, 1995 at the f

location:
New GSIS Headquarters Building

Financial Center, Reclamation Area
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila.
2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be stationed at the Public Bi

accept any and all bids and supporting requirements. Representa
the Commission on Audit and COP will be invited to witness the
proceedings.
3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid using the Official B
The accomplished Official Bid Form should be submitted in a se
4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the following documents

in another sealed envelope marked "SUPPORTING BID DOCU
a. Written Authority Bid
b. Bid Security
5. The two sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" and

"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" must be submitted simult
to the Secretariat between 9:00 AM and 2:00 PM, Philippine Sta
Time, on the date of the Public Bidding. No bid shall be accepted
closing time. Opened or tampered bids shall not be accepted.
6. The Secretariat will log and record the actual time of submissi
two sealed envelopes. The actual time of submission will also be
by the Secretariat on the face of the two envelopes.
7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes will be dropped in

corresponding bid boxes provided for the purpose. These boxes w
full view of the invited public.
H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS
1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the date of the Public Bi

PBAC will open all sealed envelopes marked "SUPPORTING B
DOCUMENTS" for screening, evaluation and acceptance. Those
submitted incomplete/insufficient documents or document/s whi
not substantially in the form required by PBAC will be disqualifi
envelope containing their Official Bid Form will be immediately
to the disqualified bidders.
2. The sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" will be opene

PM. The name of the bidder and the amount of its bid price will
publicly as the envelopes are opened.
3. Immediately following the reading of the bids, the PBAC will

announce the highest bid and the Highest Bidder.
4. The highest bid will be, determined on a price per share basis
event of a tie wherein two or more bids have the same equivalen
share, priority will be given to the bidder seeking the larger owne
interest in MHC.
5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed bidding in case:
a. No single bid is submitted within the prescribed p
b. There is only one (1) bid that is submitted and ac

to the PBAC.

GSIS/MHC
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth
October 23, 1995 or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to pur
Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares
other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute w

GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, Internationa
Marketing Reservation System Contract or other typ
contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strate
for The Manila Hotel. If the Highest Bidder is inten
provide only financial support to The Manila Hotel,
separate institution may enter into the aforemention
contract/s with GSIS/MHC.
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purch

Sale Agreement with GSIS, a copy of which will be
distributed to each of the Qualified Bidder after the
prequalification process is completed.
2. In the event that the Highest Bidder chooses a Management C

The Manila Hotel, the maximum levels for the management fee s
that GSIS/MHC are prepared to accept in the Management Contr
follows:
a. Basic management fee: Maximum of 2.5% of gro

revenues.(1)
b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0% of gross operati

profit(1) after deducting undistributed overhead exp
the basic management fee.
c. Fixed component of the international marketing/r

system fee: Maximum of 2.0% of gross room reven
The Applicant should indicate in its Information Pa
is wishes to charge this fee.
Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of account for hotels
The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the acceptable parameters

hotel management fees to facilitate the negotiations with the Hig
Bidder for the Management Contract after the Public Bidding.
A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management Contract for The

Hotel should determine whether or not the management fee struc
above is acceptable before submitting their prequalification docu
GSIS.
J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the B

Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that h
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified are willing t
the highest bid in terms of price per share.
2. The order of priority among the interested Qualified Bidders w

accordance wit the equivalent price per share of their respective
their public Bidding, i.e., first and second priority will be given t
Qualified Bidders that submitted the second and third highest bid
the price per share basis, respectively, and so on.

PARTNER
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strateg

after the following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contract with GSIS/M

later than October 23, 1995; and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and CO

are obtained.
I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF SHARES
1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC, th

Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner must fully pay, not later than O
23, 1995, the offered purchase price for the Block of Shares after
deducting the Bid Security applied as downpayment.
2. All payments should be made in the form of a Manager's Chec

unconditional Demand Draft, payable to the "Government Servic
Insurance System," issued by a reputable banking institution lice
business in the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS.
M. GENERAL CONDITIONS
1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the right to reject any or al

applications, waive any formality therein, or accept such applica
maybe considered most advantageous to the GSIS. The GSIS sim
reserves the right to require the submission of any additional info
from the Applicant as the PBAC may deem necessary.
2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call off the Public Biddi
to acceptance of the bids and call for a new public bidding under
rules, and without any liability whatsoever to any or all the Qual
Bidders, except the obligation to return the Bid Security.
3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the date of the

prequalification/bidding conference, the deadline for the submiss
prequalification documents, the date of the Public Bidding or oth
pertinent activities at least three (3) calendar days prior to the res
deadlines/target dates.
4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights, interest and participation

the Block of Shares.
5. All documents and materials submitted by the Qualified Bidde

the Bid Security, may be returned upon request.
6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the results of the Public B

final. The Qualified Bidders, by participating in the Public Biddi
deemed to have agreed to accept and abide by these results.
7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless form any liability, su
allegation arising out of the Public Bidding by the Qualified Bidd
have participated in the Public Bidding. 3
The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995. Petitioner bidded P41.00 per share f
15,300,000 shares and Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also for 15,300,000 shares. The G
declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder and immediately returned petitioner's bid security.
On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to match th
price of Renong Berhad. It requested that the award be made to itself citing the second paragraph
Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It sent a manager's check for thirty-three million peso
(P33,000,000.00) as bid security.
Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong Berhad the terms and conditio
contract and technical agreements in the operation of the hotel, refused to entertain petitioner's re
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a temporary restraining order on October 1
Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of the Constitution
"National Economy and Patrimony" which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
The vital issues can be summed up as follows:
(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a sel
executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it int
(2) Assuming section 10 paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing whether

controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony
nation;
(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implem
section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;
(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to
petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a
corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporat
(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to R
Berhad, a foreign corporation.
Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the guiding policies
principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and general framework of the law and
government. 5 As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-executing and can be enforced without fu
legislative action. 6 Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only through appropria
enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.
To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing is a hard row to h
key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law oftentimes submerged in its language
searching inquiry should be made to find out if the provision is intended as a present enactment,
in itself as a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and enforcement. 7 The
demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context of the provision in question. 8
Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, 9 rather than as requ
future legislation for their enforcement. 10 The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they are no
as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be eas
ignored and nullified by Congress. 11 Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule tha
legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional in action should not
them. 12
Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches an
seizures, 13the rights of a person under custodial investigation, 14 the rights of an accused, 15 and t
privilege against self-incrimination, 16 It is recognize a that legislation is unnecessary to enable c
effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the pr
of property. 17 The same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the taking
damaging of property for public use without just compensation. 18
Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing wh
merely announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the means by
policy shall be carried into effect. 19 Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in Article II o
Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" should generally be construed
statements of principles of the State. 20 We have also ruled that some provisions of Article XIII o
Justice and Human Rights," 21 and Article XIV on "Education Science and Technology, Arts, Cu
Sports" 22 cannot be the basis of judicially enforceable rights. Their enforcement is addressed to t
discretion of Congress though they provide the framework for legislation 23 to effectuate their po
content. 24
Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10, Article XII of
Constitution is self-executing or not. It reads:
Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and plan
agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippin
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owne
citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas o
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the forma
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the
country 25 to Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per
cent 26 of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress
laws that will encourage the formation and operation of one hundred percent Filipin
enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the entire State to giv
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges covering the na
economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreig
investments in line with our national goals and well-set priorities.
The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a
categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in ce
of investments in the country and to encourage the formation and operation of whol
Filipino enterprises. The right granted by the provision is clearly still in esse. Congr
breathe life to the right by means of legislation. Parenthetically, this paragraph was
from section 3, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. 27 The provision in the 1973
Constitution affirmed our ruling in the landmark case of Lao Ichong v. Hernandez, 2
we upheld the discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize certain areas of
investments. 29 By reenacting the 1973 provision, the first paragraph of section 10 a
the power of Congress to nationalize certain areas of investments in favor of Filipin
The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State and no
Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our government. Their coverage is
broader for they cover "the national economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [th
national jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot
granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving preference to qu
Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges covering our national economy and patrimony.
language does not suggest that any of the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hed
refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional an
now. The second and the third paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.
This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principl

State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that "[T]he State shall develop a self-reliant and independ
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." It engrafts the all-important Filipino First
our fundamental law and by the use of the mandatory word "shall," directs its enforcement by the
State without any pause or a half- pause in time.
The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation
the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional Commission s
the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning. According to Commissioner No
"patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our ra
this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of the constitutional provision g
preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights involving our national patrimon
unique value of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic eye.
value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. As chronicled by Beth Day Romulo, 31 the ho
opened on July 4, 1912 as a first-class hotel built by the American Insular Government for Amer
living in, or passing through, Manila while traveling to the Orient. Indigenous materials and Filip
craftsmanship were utilized in its construction, For sometime, it was exclusively used by Americ
Caucasian travelers and served as the "official guesthouse" of the American Insular Government
visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos began coming to the Hotel as guests during the Commonwe
period. When the Japanese occupied Manila, it served as military headquarters and lodging for th
ranking officers from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the Intramuros that the Japanese made their
during the Liberation of Manila. After the war, the Hotel again served foreign guests and Filipino
Presidents and kings, premiers and potentates, as well as glamorous international film and sports
celebrities were housed in the Hotel. It was also the situs of international conventions and confer
the local scene, it was the venue of historic meetings, parties and conventions of political parties.
Hotel has reaped and continues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from international ho
travel award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent and ingenuity. These are
cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.
The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant to Republic A
4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patrimony. Republic Act No. 4846, "The Cul
Properties Preservation and Protection Act," merely provides a procedure whereby a particular cu
property may be classified a "national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural property. 32 Ap
June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 374 in 1974, the law is limited in its reach and cannot be rea
exclusive law implementing section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. To be sure, the law
equate cultural treasure and cultural property as synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the nati
The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent GSIS.
its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation that administe
that come from the monthly contributions of government employees and the government. 33 The
held in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of indifferently. 34 They are to be us
finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of the employees and the administrat
operational expenses of the GSIS, 35 Excess funds, however, are allowed to be invested in busine
other ventures for the benefit of the employees. 36 It is thus contended that the GSIS investment i
Manila Hotel Corporation is a simple business venture, hence, an act beyond the contemplation o
10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a pu
corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public purpose. It is su
the jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission 37 and the Commission on Audit. 38 As state-ow
controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the general welfare
people. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated as a constituti
command.
The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of phrase "qualified Filipinos" and their "pr
right." The Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This is as it ought to be for a Cons
only lays down flexible policies and principles which can bent to meet today's manifest needs an
tomorrow's unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with elasticity can grow as a living
constitution.
Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Nolledo to defin
phrase brushed aside a suggestion to define the phrase "qualified Filipinos." He explained that pr
prospective "laws" will take care of the problem of its interpretation, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT. What is the suggestion of Comm

Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word "QUALIFIED?"
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QU

FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against aliens ov
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is

understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" becau
existing laws or the prospective laws will always lay
conditions under which business map be done, for e
qualifications on capital, qualifications on the settin
other financial structures, et cetera.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. If we say, "PREFERENCE TO

QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," it can be understood as
preference to qualified Filipinos as against Filipinos
not qualified.
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, that was the in

the proponents. The committee has accepted the am
xxx xxx xxx
As previously discussed, the constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First po

addressed to the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws" should no
understood as limited to legislations but all state actions which include applicable ru
regulations adopted by agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of
making power. In the case at bar, the bidding rules and regulations set forth the stan
measure the qualifications of bidders Filipinos and foreigners alike. It is not seriousl
disputed that petitioner qualified to bid as did Renong Berhad. 39
Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference which GSIS should have accorded
petitioner, a qualified Filipino, over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the purchase of the controllin
of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after losing the bid, this right of preference gives it a s
chance to match the highest bid of Renong Berhad.
With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner's submission. I prescind from the premise that the se
paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Pilipino but not anti-alien. It is pro
for it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not, however, anti-alien per se for it does not absolutely b
in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. I
the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited from granting these rights, privilege
concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the weal of the nation.
In implementing the policy articulated in section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the stellar ta
State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between two desiderata — first, the need to
our economy and patrimony with the help of foreigners if necessary, and, second, the need to kee
economy controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the Constitution did not define the de
the right of preference to be given to qualified Filipinos. They knew that for the right to serve the
welfare, it must have a malleable content that can be adjusted by our policy-makers to meet the c
needs of our people. In fine, the right of preference of qualified Filipinos is to be determined by d
time dictates and circumstances warrant. The lesser the need for alien assistance, the greater the d
the right of preference can be given to Filipinos and vice verse.
Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to determine the degree of this privilege at
given time is addressed to the entire State. While under our constitutional scheme, the right prim
belongs to Congress as the lawmaking department of our government, other branches of governm
all their agencies and instrumentalities, share the power to enforce this state policy. Within the lim
their authority, they can act or promulgate rules and regulations defining the degree of this right o
preference in cases where they have to make grants involving the national economy and judicial
the other hand, our duty is to strike down acts of the state that violate the policy.
To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right. Consequent
must turn to the rules and regulations of on respondents Committee Privatization and GSIS to de
the degree of preference that petitioner is entitled to as a qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A t
look at the rules and regulations will show that they are silent on the degree of preferential right t
accorded qualified Filipino bidder. Despite their silence, however, they cannot be read to mean th
do not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for paragraph 2, section 10, Article XII of the
Constitution is deemed part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to legal hermeneutics which d
that we interpret rules to save them from unconstitutionality, I submit that the right of preference
petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Benong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand equal, a
bidder, as a qualified Pilipino bidder, should be preferred.
It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match the bi
Renong Berhad. Petitioner's submission must be supported by the rules but even if we examine th
inside-out .thousand times, they can not justify the claimed right. Under the rules, the right to ma
highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded block of shares .
reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as bidder. It complie
procedure of bidding. It tendered the highest bid. It was declared as the highest bidder by the GS
rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a matter of right for the rules clearly did n
the petitioner as a qualified Filipino privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the rul
grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our symphaties may be with petitioner but the court has no pow
extend the latitude and longtitude of the right of preference as defined by the rules. The paramete
right of preference depend on galaxy of facts and factors whose determination belongs to the pro
the policy-making branches and agencies of the State. We are duty-bound to respect that determi
even if we differ with the wisdom of their judgment. The right they grant may be little but we mu
the grant for as long as the right of preference is not denied. It is only when a State action amoun
denial of the right that the Court can come in and strike down the denial as unconstitutional.
Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad. Pe
was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and regulations do no
that a qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid submitting an inferior bid. It knew that
was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during the first bidding. Petitioner cann
allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot be allowed to obey the rules w
wins and disregard them when it loses. If sustained, petitioners' stance will wreak havoc on he es
bidding. Our laws, rules and regulations require highest bidding to raise as much funds as possib
government to maximize its capacity to deliver essential services to our people. This is a duty tha
discharged by Filipinos and foreigners participating in a bidding contest and the rules are careful
to attain this objective. Among others, bidders are prequalified to insure their financial capability
bidding is secret and the bids are sealed to prevent collusion among the parties. This objective wi
undermined if we grant petitioner that privilege to know the winning bid and a chance to match i
plainly, a second chance to bid will encourage a bidder not to strive to give the highest bid in the
bidding.
We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The visionary nationalist Don Claro
Recto has warned us that the greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is to be an alien in his own
The Constitution has embodied Recto's counsel as a state policy. But while the Filipino First poli
requires that we incline to a Filipino, it does not demand that we wrong an alien. Our policy mak
write laws and rules giving favored treatment to the Filipino but we are not free to be unfair to a
after writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are written, they must be obeyed as written, by
and foreigners alike. The equal protection clause of the Constitution protects all against unfairnes
be pro-Filipino without unfairness to foreigner.
I vote to dismiss the petition.
Narvasa, C.J., and Melo, J., concur.
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:
I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. P
I just add
1. The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding proc
concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest foreign bid, a
win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII] simply states that "in the grant of rights . .
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." The m
concedes that there is no law defining the extent or degree of such preference. Specifically, no sta
empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal that of the winning foreigner. In
absence of such empowering law, the majority's strained interpretation, I respectfully submit con
unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can
where no foreigner can win. Only in the Philippines!.
2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial is short-sighted and, viewed pro
gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interest. It encourages other countries — in the guise of
comity or worse, unabashed retaliation — to discriminate against us in their own jurisdictions by
authorizing their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the higher bids of Filipino enterprise
while on the other hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to remain unchallenged by thei
nationals. The majority's thesis will thus marginalize Filipinos as pariahs in the global marketpla
absolute no chance of winning any bidding outside our country. Even authoritarian regimes and
kingdoms have long ago found out unfairness, greed and isolation are self-defeating and in the lo
self-destructing.
The moral lesson here is simple: Do not do unto other what you dont want other to do unto you.
3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the Con
the constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where all the bids
In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead without self-destructing him and without being unfair t
foreigner.
In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are ti
not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same time, I would like to expound a
on the concept of national patrimony as including within its scope and meaning institutions such
Manila Hotel.
It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under "national patrimony" over which qua
Filipinos have the preference, in ownership and operation. The Constitutional provision on point
xxx xxx xxx
patrimony, the State shall Give preference to qualified Filipinos. 1
Petitioner's argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimony"
of the natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory (Article I) consist
land, sea, and air. 2study of the 1935 Constitution, where the concept of "national patrimony" orig
would show that its framers decided to adopt the even more comprehensive expression "Patrimon
Nation" in the belief that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not only their natural resource
country but practically everything that belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the materi
as the intangible and the spiritual assets and possessions of the people. It is to be noted that the fr
not stop with conservation. They knew that conservation alone does not spell progress; and that t
be achieved only through development as a correlative factor to assure to the people not only the
ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of their national patrimony). 3
Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich na
resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race. 4
There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony
such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation. Thi
institution has played an important role in our nation's history, having been the venue of many a
event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign hea
state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others. 5
It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future generations of Filipinos. As President
L. Quezon once said, we must exploit the natural resources of our country, but we should do so w
eye to the welfare of the future generations. In other words, the leaders of today are the trustees o
patrimony of our race. To preserve our national patrimony and reserve it for Filipinos was the int
distinguished gentlemen who first framed our Constitution. Thus, in debating the need for nation
of our lands and natural resources, one expounded that we should "put more teeth into our laws,
make the nationalization of our lands and natural resources a subject of ordinary legislation but o
constitutional enactment" 6 To quote further: "Let not our children be mere tenants and trespasser
own country. Let us preserve and bequeath to them what is rightfully theirs, free from all foreign
encumbrances". 7
Now, a word on preference. In my view "preference to qualified Filipinos", to be meaningful, mu

not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the very "h
the existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to the na
patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal the
bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino
non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be made to the qualified Fil
Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the
of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at
It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign investments in our co
stress is on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in the country. While gove
agencies, including the courts should re-condition their thinking to such a trend, and make it easy
attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we should not preclude ourselves from
to us Filipinos certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage are involved. In the
industry, for instance, foreign investors have established themselves creditably, such as in the Sh
the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels. This should not stop us from retaining 51% of th
stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with th
of the Filipino people to preserve our national patrimony, including our historical and cultural he
the hands of Filipinos.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut statements, shared by Mr. Justice Re
Puno in a well written separate (dissenting) opinion, that:
First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that "(I)n the grant of rights, privilege
Filipinos" 1 is self-executory. The provision verily does not need, although it can obviously be am
regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.
Second, the term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country's natural resources but also to
cultural heritage. A "historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Ma
Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.
Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government entity which
its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an act of th
subject to the Constitutional mandate.
On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," I find it somewhat diffic
the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the particular case before us
meaningful preference, it seems, would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the fore
for, as a particular matter, I cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of dollars to be at p
last cent) with another. The magnitude of the magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly
for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissenting view, could trig
right of preference.
It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared this great disappointment, a letdow
did not deserve, by a simple and timely advise of the proper rules of bidding along with the pecu
constitutional implications of the proposed transaction. It is also regrettable that the Court at time
to instead, be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequate which create the perception that it even take
justiciable controversies.
All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the petition.
MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:
I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the constitu
mandate that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national patrimony
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" 1 is to allow petitioner Philippine corporation to equa
of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the M
Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino of Philippine corporation can be
given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession given by the State, by favor
a foreign national corporation.
Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System, if petitioner
Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, "priority [would be given] to the bidder see
larger ownership interest in MHC," 2 so that petitioner bid for more shares, it would be preferred
Malaysian corporation for that reason and not because it is a Philippine corporation. Consequentl
only in cases like the present one, where an alien corporation is the highest bidder, that preferenti
treatment of the Philippine corporation is mandated not by declaring it winner but by allowing it
the highest bid in terms of price per share" before it is awarded the shares of stocks. 3 That, to me
"preference to qualified Filipinos" means in the context of this case — by favoring Filipinos whe
they are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.
This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno 4 to a 1947 statute giving "preference to F
citizens in the lease of public market stalls." 5 This Court upheld the cancellation of existing lease
covering market stalls occupied by persons who were not Filipinos and the award thereafter of th
qualified Filipino vendors as ordered by the Department of Finance. Similarly, in Vda. de Salgad
Fuente, 6 this Court sustained the validity of a municipal ordinance passed pursuant to the statute
No. 37), terminating existing leases of public market stalls and granting preference to Filipino cit
the issuance of new licenses for the occupancy of the stalls. In Chua Lao v. Raymundo, 7 the pref
granted under the statute was held to apply to cases in which Filipino vendors sought the same st
occupied by alien vendors in the public markets even if there were available other stalls as good
occupied by aliens. "The law, apparently, is applicable whenever there is a conflict of interest be
Filipino applicants and aliens for lease of stalls in public markets, in which situation the right to p
immediately arises." 8
Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a century efforts began only in the 19
America to realize the promise of equality, through affirmative action and reverse discrimination
designed to remedy past discrimination against colored people in such areas as employment, con
and licensing. 9Indeed, in vital areas of our national economy, there are situations in which the on
place Filipinos in control of the national economy as contemplated in the Constitution 10 is to giv
preferential treatment where they can at least stand on equal footing with aliens.
There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either invite foreign retaliation or depr
country of the benefit of foreign capital or know-how. We are dealing here not with common trad
common means of livelihood which are open to aliens in our midst, 11 but with the sale of govern
property, which is like the grant of government largess of benefits and concessions covering the
economy" and therefore no one should begrudge us if we give preferential treatment to our citize
at any rate is the command of the Constitution. For the Manila Hotel is a business owned by the
Government. It is being privatized. Privatization should result in the relinquishment of the busine
favor of private individuals and groups who are Filipino citizens, not in favor of aliens.
Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of stocks to petitioner we would be tra
competence and capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the Malaysian firm are qualified,
hurdled the prequalification process. 12 It is only the result of the public bidding that is sought to
modified by enabling petitioner to up its bid to equal the highest bid.
Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to match the high
an alien could encourage speculation, since all that a Filipino entity would then do would be not
bid or make only a token one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder has submitted the highes
make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not possible under the rules on public bid
the GSIS. Under these rules there is a minimum bid required (P36.87 per share for a range of 9 to
million shares). 13 Bids below the minimum will not be considered. On the other hand, if the Filip
entity, after passing the prequalification process, does not submit a bid, he will not be allowed to
highest bid of the foreign firm because this is a privilege allowed only to those who have "validly
submitted bids." 14 The suggestion is, to say the least, fanciful and has no basis in fact.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.
TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:
Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I say this as we are not confronted in the
bar with legal and constitutional issues — and yet I am driven so to speak on the side of history.
reason perhaps is due to the belief that in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a "pag
history is worth a volume of logic."
I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the Manila Hotel has a historical and cu
aspect within the meaning of the constitution and thus, forming part of the "patrimony of the nati
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx
national goals and priorities.
The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same Constitution p
to "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" which ordain —
The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effec
Filipinos. (Sec. 19).
Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the highlights in
Constitution Commission proceedings thus:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. The Amendment will read: "IN T

GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCE
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFE
TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS". And the word "Filip
here, as intended by the proponents, will include no
individual Filipinos but also Filipino-Controlled ent
controlled by Filipinos (Vol. III, Records of the
Constitutional Commission, p. 608).
MR. MONSOD. We also wanted to add, as Commi

Villegas said, this committee and this body already
what is known as the Filipino First policy which wa
suggested by Commissioner de Castro. So that it is
our Constitution (Vol. IV, Records of the Constituti
Commission, p. 225).
Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision adverted to above, said:
MR. NOLLEDO. In the grant of rights, privileges a

concessions covering the national economy and patr
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a

enterprise is qualified and the Filipinos enterprise is
qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some

than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be
preferred:?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes". (Vol. III, p. 6

Records of the Constitutional Commission).
The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of the Malolos
Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we have no reneged
nationalist policy is articulated in one of the earliest case, this Court said —
The nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the Constitu

cannot therefore be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit u
many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid or unconst
(Ichong, et al. vs. Hernandez, et al., 101 Phil. 1155).
I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and traditions are not legislated and is the p
events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and acceptance by the
collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people.
The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is w
historic events (too numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84 years.
As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to examine the single instances of the
largese which have given rise to this controversy. As I believe that has been exhaustively discuss
the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this point that the history of the Manila Hotel should not be plac
auction block of a purely business transaction, where profits subverts the cherished historical val
people.
As a historical landmark in this "Pearl of the Orient Seas", it has its enviable tradition which, in t
of the philosopher Salvador de Madarriaga tradition is "more of a river than a stone, it keeps flow
one must view the flowing , and one must view the flow of both directions. If you look towards t
from which the river flows, you see tradition in the form of forceful currents that push the river o
towards the future, and if you look the other way, you progress."
Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress depends on the kind of tradition. Let us
jettison the tradition of the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our colonial history.
I grant, of course the men of the law can see the same subject in different lights.
I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says — "He is always right who suspects that he
mistakes". On this note, I say that if I have to make a mistake, I would rather err upholding the be
the Filipino be first under his Constitution and in his own land.
I vote GRANT the petition.
PUNO, J., dissenting:
This is a. petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
corporation, to stop the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from selling the controllin
of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign corporation. Allegedly, the sale violates the second
of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution.
Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation. It is the sole owner of the M
Hotel which it operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel Corporation. Manila Hotel was i
in the privatization program of the government. In 1995, GSIS proposed to sell to interested buye
51% of its shares, ranging from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000 shares, in the Manila Hotel Corporation
absence of bids at the first public bidding, the block of shares offered for sale was increased from
maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner" of the GS
required to "provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system
financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel" 1 The prop
approved by respondent Committee on Privatization.
In July 1995, a conference was held where prequalification documents and the bidding rules wer
furnished interested parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic corporation, and Renong
Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as operator, prequalified. 2
The bidding rules and procedures entitled "Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification a
Bidding of the MHC Privatization" provide:
I INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS
DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER
The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below will be declared the Win
Bidder/Strategic Partner and will be awarded the Block of Shares:
First — Pass the prequalification process;
Second — Submit the highest bid on a price per share basis for the Block of
Third — Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not l
October 23, 1995;
xxx xxx xxx
IV GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION
A. PARTIES WHO MAP APPLY FOR PREQUALIFICATION
The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be expected to provid

management expertise and/or an international marketing reserva
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of The Manila Hotel. In this context, the GSIS is in
the prequalification process any local and/or foreign corporation
consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with at least one of th
following qualifications:
a. Proven management .expertise in the hotel indust
b. Significant equity ownership (i.e. board represent

another hotel company; or
c. Overall management and marketing expertise to

successfully operate the Manila Hotel.
Parties interested in bidding for MHC should be able to provide

the requisite management expertise and/or international
marketing/reservation system for The Manila Hotel.
xxx xxx xxx
D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
xxx xxx xxx
E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE
1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE REGISTRATION OFFIC
The prequalification documents can be secured at the Registratio

between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days within the pe
specified in Section III. Each set of documents consists of the fol
a. Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalificati

Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization
b. Confidential Information Memorandum: The Ma

Corporation
c. Letter of Invitation. to the Prequalification and Bi

Conference
xxx xxx xxx
4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING CONFERENCE
A prequalification and bidding conference will be held at The M

Hotel on the date specified in Section III to allow the Applicant t
clarifications and further information regarding the guidelines an
procedures. Only those who purchased the prequalification docu
be allowed in this conference. Attendance to this conference is st
advised, although the Applicant will not be penalized if it does n
5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
The applicant should submit 5 sets of the prequalification docum

original set plus 4 copies) at the Registration Office between 9:0
4:00 PM during working days within the period specified in Sect
F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS
1. The Applicant will be evaluated by the PBAC wi

assistance of the TEC based on the Information Pac
other information available to the PBAC.
2. If the Applicant is a Consortium/Joint Venture, th

evaluation will consider the overall qualifications of
group, taking into account the contribution of each m
the venture.
3. The decision of the PBAC with respect to the res

PBAC evaluation will be final.
4. The Applicant shall be evaluated according to the

set forth below:
a. Business management expertise, trac

and experience
b. Financial capability.
c. Feasibility and acceptability of the p

strategic plan for the Manila Hotel
5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of Applicants as it may

appropriate.
6. The parties that prequalified in the first MHC public bidding —

Sheraton, Marriot International Inc., Renaissance Hotels Internat
consortium of RCBC Capital/Ritz Carlton — may participate in
Bidding without having to undergo the prequalification process a
G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. A notice of prequalification results containing the shortlist of Q

Bidders will be posted at the Registration Office at the date spec
Section III.
2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture, the withdrawal by m

whose qualification was a material consideration for being includ
shortlist is ground for disqualification of the Applicant.
V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING
A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC BID
All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be eligible to

participate in the Public Bidding.
B. BLOCK OF SHARES
A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen Million Three Hu

Thousand (15,300,000) shares of stock representing Thirty Perce
Fifty-One Percent (30%-51%) of the issued and outstanding shar
MHC, will be offered in the Public Bidding by the GSIS. The Qu
Bidders will have the Option of determining the number of share
the range to bid for. The range is intended to attract bidders with
preferences and objectives for the operation and management of
Manila Hotel.
C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE PER SHARE BA
1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share basis. The minimu

required on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares is Thi
Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P36.67).
2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency payable to the GSIS
3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per share below the m

required will not considered.
D. TRANSFER COSTS
xxx xxx xxx
E. OFFICIAL BID FORM
1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed Official Bid Form, a

which is attached as Annex IV. The Official Bid Form must be p
accomplished in all details; improper accomplishment may be a
basis for disqualification.
2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified Bidder will submit th

Bid Form, which will indicate the offered purchase price, in a se
F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
During the Public Bidding, the following documents should be s

along with the bid in a separate envelop marked "SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS":
1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER OATH).
If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the representative of the

Bidder should submit a Board resolution which adequately autho
representative to bid for and in behalf of the corporation with ful
to perform such acts necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified
If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint Venture, each mem

Consortium/Joint venture should submit a Board resolution autho
one of its members and such member's representative to make th
behalf of the group with full authority to perform such acts neces
requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.
2. BID SECURITY
a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-Three Million Pes

(P33,000,00), in Philippine currency as Bid Security in the form
i. Manager's check or unconditional demand draft p

the "Government Service Insurance System" and iss
reputable banking institution duly licensed to do bus
the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS; or
ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued by a reputable b

institution acceptable to the GSIS.
b. The GSIS will reject a bid if:
i. The bid does not have Bid Security; or
ii. The Bid Security accompanying the bid is for les

required amount.
c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a manager's check or unco

demand draft, the interest earned on the Bid Security will be for
account of GSIS.
d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the winning Bidder/Strategic

the Bid Security will be applied as the downpayment on the Qua
Bidder's offered purchase price.
e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder will be returned imm

after the Public Bidding if the Qualified Bidder is not declared th
Bidder.
f. The Bid Security will be returned by October 23, 1995 if the H

Bidder is unable to negotiate and execute with GSIS/MHC the
Contract or other types of contract specified by the Highest Bidd
strategic plan for The Manila Hotel.
g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will be forfeited in fav

GSIS if the Highest Bidder, after negotiating and executing the
Contract specified by the Highest Bidder or other types of contra
strategic plan for The Manila Hotel, fails or refuses to:
i. Execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement w

not later than October 23, 1995; or
ii. Pay the full amount of the offered purchase price

than October 23, 1995; or
iii. Consummate the sale of the Block of Shares for

reason.
G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS
1. The Public Bidding will be held on September 7, 1995 at the f

location:
New GSIS Headquarters Building

Financial Center, Reclamation Area
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila.
2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be stationed at the Public Bi

accept any and all bids and supporting requirements. Representa
the Commission on Audit and COP will be invited to witness the
proceedings.
3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid using the Official B
The accomplished Official Bid Form should be submitted in a se
4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the following documents

in another sealed envelope marked "SUPPORTING BID DOCU
a. Written Authority Bid
b. Bid Security
5. The two sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" and

"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" must be submitted simult
to the Secretariat between 9:00 AM and 2:00 PM, Philippine Sta
Time, on the date of the Public Bidding. No bid shall be accepted
closing time. Opened or tampered bids shall not be accepted.
6. The Secretariat will log and record the actual time of submissi
two sealed envelopes. The actual time of submission will also be
by the Secretariat on the face of the two envelopes.
7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes will be dropped in

corresponding bid boxes provided for the purpose. These boxes w
full view of the invited public.
H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS
1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the date of the Public Bi

PBAC will open all sealed envelopes marked "SUPPORTING B
DOCUMENTS" for screening, evaluation and acceptance. Those
submitted incomplete/insufficient documents or document/s whi
not substantially in the form required by PBAC will be disqualifi
envelope containing their Official Bid Form will be immediately
to the disqualified bidders.
2. The sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" will be opene

PM. The name of the bidder and the amount of its bid price will
publicly as the envelopes are opened.
3. Immediately following the reading of the bids, the PBAC will

announce the highest bid and the Highest Bidder.
4. The highest bid will be, determined on a price per share basis
event of a tie wherein two or more bids have the same equivalen
share, priority will be given to the bidder seeking the larger owne
interest in MHC.
5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed bidding in case:
a. No single bid is submitted within the prescribed p
b. There is only one (1) bid that is submitted and ac

to the PBAC.

GSIS/MHC
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth
October 23, 1995 or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to pur
Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares
other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute w

GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, Internationa
Marketing Reservation System Contract or other typ
contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strate
for The Manila Hotel. If the Highest Bidder is inten
provide only financial support to The Manila Hotel,
separate institution may enter into the aforemention
contract/s with GSIS/MHC.
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purch

Sale Agreement with GSIS, a copy of which will be
distributed to each of the Qualified Bidder after the
prequalification process is completed.
2. In the event that the Highest Bidder chooses a Management C

The Manila Hotel, the maximum levels for the management fee s
that GSIS/MHC are prepared to accept in the Management Contr
follows:
a. Basic management fee: Maximum of 2.5% of gro
revenues.(1)
b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0% of gross operati

profit(1) after deducting undistributed overhead exp
the basic management fee.
c. Fixed component of the international marketing/r

system fee: Maximum of 2.0% of gross room reven
The Applicant should indicate in its Information Pa
is wishes to charge this fee.
Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of account for hotels
The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the acceptable parameters

hotel management fees to facilitate the negotiations with the Hig
Bidder for the Management Contract after the Public Bidding.
A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management Contract for The

Hotel should determine whether or not the management fee struc
above is acceptable before submitting their prequalification docu
GSIS.
J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the B

Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that h
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified are willing t
the highest bid in terms of price per share.
2. The order of priority among the interested Qualified Bidders w

accordance wit the equivalent price per share of their respective
their public Bidding, i.e., first and second priority will be given t
Qualified Bidders that submitted the second and third highest bid
the price per share basis, respectively, and so on.

PARTNER
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strateg

after the following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contract with GSIS/M

later than October 23, 1995; and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and CO

are obtained.
I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF SHARES
1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC, th

Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner must fully pay, not later than O
23, 1995, the offered purchase price for the Block of Shares after
deducting the Bid Security applied as downpayment.
2. All payments should be made in the form of a Manager's Chec

unconditional Demand Draft, payable to the "Government Servic
Insurance System," issued by a reputable banking institution lice
business in the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS.
M. GENERAL CONDITIONS
1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the right to reject any or al

applications, waive any formality therein, or accept such applica
maybe considered most advantageous to the GSIS. The GSIS sim
reserves the right to require the submission of any additional info
from the Applicant as the PBAC may deem necessary.
2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call off the Public Biddi
to acceptance of the bids and call for a new public bidding under
rules, and without any liability whatsoever to any or all the Qual
Bidders, except the obligation to return the Bid Security.
3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the date of the

prequalification/bidding conference, the deadline for the submiss
prequalification documents, the date of the Public Bidding or oth
pertinent activities at least three (3) calendar days prior to the res
deadlines/target dates.
4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights, interest and participation

the Block of Shares.
5. All documents and materials submitted by the Qualified Bidde

the Bid Security, may be returned upon request.
6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the results of the Public B

final. The Qualified Bidders, by participating in the Public Biddi
deemed to have agreed to accept and abide by these results.
7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless form any liability, su
allegation arising out of the Public Bidding by the Qualified Bidd
have participated in the Public Bidding. 3
The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995. Petitioner bidded P41.00 per share f
15,300,000 shares and Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also for 15,300,000 shares. The G
declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder and immediately returned petitioner's bid security.
On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to match th
price of Renong Berhad. It requested that the award be made to itself citing the second paragraph
Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It sent a manager's check for thirty-three million peso
(P33,000,000.00) as bid security.
Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong Berhad the terms and conditio
contract and technical agreements in the operation of the hotel, refused to entertain petitioner's re
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a temporary restraining order on October 1
Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of the Constitution
"National Economy and Patrimony" which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
The vital issues can be summed up as follows:
(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a sel
executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it int
(2) Assuming section 10 paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing whether
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony
nation;
(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implem
section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;
(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to
petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a
corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporat
(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to R
Berhad, a foreign corporation.
Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the guiding policies
principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and general framework of the law and
government. 5 As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-executing and can be enforced without fu
legislative action. 6 Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only through appropria
enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.
To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing is a hard row to h

key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law oftentimes submerged in its language
searching inquiry should be made to find out if the provision is intended as a present enactment,
in itself as a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and enforcement. 7 The
demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context of the provision in question. 8
Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, 9 rather than as requ
future legislation for their enforcement. 10 The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they are no
as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be eas
ignored and nullified by Congress. 11 Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule tha
legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional in action should not
them. 12
Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches an
seizures, 13the rights of a person under custodial investigation, 14 the rights of an accused, 15 and t
privilege against self-incrimination, 16 It is recognize a that legislation is unnecessary to enable c
effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the pr
of property. 17 The same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the taking
damaging of property for public use without just compensation. 18
Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing wh
merely announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the means by
policy shall be carried into effect. 19 Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in Article II o
Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" should generally be construed
statements of principles of the State. 20 We have also ruled that some provisions of Article XIII o
Justice and Human Rights," 21 and Article XIV on "Education Science and Technology, Arts, Cu
Sports" 22 cannot be the basis of judicially enforceable rights. Their enforcement is addressed to t
discretion of Congress though they provide the framework for legislation 23 to effectuate their po
content. 24
Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10, Article XII of
Constitution is self-executing or not. It reads:
Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and plan
agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippin
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owne
citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas o
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the forma
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the
country 25 to Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per
cent 26 of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress
laws that will encourage the formation and operation of one hundred percent Filipin
enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the entire State to giv
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges covering the na
economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreig
investments in line with our national goals and well-set priorities.
The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a
categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in ce
of investments in the country and to encourage the formation and operation of whol
Filipino enterprises. The right granted by the provision is clearly still in esse. Congr
breathe life to the right by means of legislation. Parenthetically, this paragraph was
from section 3, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. 27 The provision in the 1973
Constitution affirmed our ruling in the landmark case of Lao Ichong v. Hernandez, 2
we upheld the discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize certain areas of
investments. 29 By reenacting the 1973 provision, the first paragraph of section 10 a
the power of Congress to nationalize certain areas of investments in favor of Filipin
The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State and no
Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our government. Their coverage is
broader for they cover "the national economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [t
national jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot
granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving preference to qu
Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges covering our national economy and patrimony.
language does not suggest that any of the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hed
refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional an
now. The second and the third paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.
This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principl

State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that "[T]he State shall develop a self-reliant and independ
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." It engrafts the all-important Filipino First
our fundamental law and by the use of the mandatory word "shall," directs its enforcement by the
State without any pause or a half- pause in time.
The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation
the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional Commission s
the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning. According to Commissioner No
"patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our ra
this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of the constitutional provision g
preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights involving our national patrimon
unique value of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic eye.
value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. As chronicled by Beth Day Romulo, 31 the ho
opened on July 4, 1912 as a first-class hotel built by the American Insular Government for Amer
living in, or passing through, Manila while traveling to the Orient. Indigenous materials and Filip
craftsmanship were utilized in its construction, For sometime, it was exclusively used by Americ
Caucasian travelers and served as the "official guesthouse" of the American Insular Government
visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos began coming to the Hotel as guests during the Commonwe
period. When the Japanese occupied Manila, it served as military headquarters and lodging for th
ranking officers from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the Intramuros that the Japanese made their
during the Liberation of Manila. After the war, the Hotel again served foreign guests and Filipino
Presidents and kings, premiers and potentates, as well as glamorous international film and sports
celebrities were housed in the Hotel. It was also the situs of international conventions and confer
the local scene, it was the venue of historic meetings, parties and conventions of political parties.
Hotel has reaped and continues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from international ho
travel award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent and ingenuity. These are
cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.
The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant to Republic A
4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patrimony. Republic Act No. 4846, "The Cul
Properties Preservation and Protection Act," merely provides a procedure whereby a particular cu
property may be classified a "national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural property. 32 Ap
June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 374 in 1974, the law is limited in its reach and cannot be rea
exclusive law implementing section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. To be sure, the law
equate cultural treasure and cultural property as synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the nati
The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent GSIS.
its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation that administe
that come from the monthly contributions of government employees and the government. 33 The
held in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of indifferently. 34 They are to be us
finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of the employees and the administrat
operational expenses of the GSIS, 35 Excess funds, however, are allowed to be invested in busine
other ventures for the benefit of the employees. 36 It is thus contended that the GSIS investment i
Manila Hotel Corporation is a simple business venture, hence, an act beyond the contemplation o
10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a pu
corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public purpose. It is su
the jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission 37 and the Commission on Audit. 38 As state-ow
controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the general welfare
people. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated as a constituti
command.
The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of phrase "qualified Filipinos" and their "pr
right." The Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This is as it ought to be for a Cons
only lays down flexible policies and principles which can bent to meet today's manifest needs an
tomorrow's unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with elasticity can grow as a living
constitution.
Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Nolledo to defin
phrase brushed aside a suggestion to define the phrase "qualified Filipinos." He explained that pr
prospective "laws" will take care of the problem of its interpretation, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT. What is the suggestion of Comm

Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word "QUALIFIED?"
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QU

FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against aliens ov
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is

understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" becau
existing laws or the prospective laws will always lay
conditions under which business map be done, for e
qualifications on capital, qualifications on the settin
other financial structures, et cetera.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. If we say, "PREFERENCE TO

QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," it can be understood as
preference to qualified Filipinos as against Filipinos
not qualified.
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, that was the in

the proponents. The committee has accepted the am
xxx xxx xxx
As previously discussed, the constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First po

addressed to the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws" should no
understood as limited to legislations but all state actions which include applicable ru
regulations adopted by agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of
making power. In the case at bar, the bidding rules and regulations set forth the stan
measure the qualifications of bidders Filipinos and foreigners alike. It is not seriousl
disputed that petitioner qualified to bid as did Renong Berhad. 39
Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference which GSIS should have accorded
petitioner, a qualified Filipino, over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the purchase of the controllin
of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after losing the bid, this right of preference gives it a s
chance to match the highest bid of Renong Berhad.
With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner's submission. I prescind from the premise that the se
paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Pilipino but not anti-alien. It is pro
for it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not, however, anti-alien per se for it does not absolutely b
in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. I
the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited from granting these rights, privilege
concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the weal of the nation.
In implementing the policy articulated in section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the stellar ta
State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between two desiderata — first, the need to
our economy and patrimony with the help of foreigners if necessary, and, second, the need to kee
economy controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the Constitution did not define the de
the right of preference to be given to qualified Filipinos. They knew that for the right to serve the
welfare, it must have a malleable content that can be adjusted by our policy-makers to meet the c
needs of our people. In fine, the right of preference of qualified Filipinos is to be determined by d
time dictates and circumstances warrant. The lesser the need for alien assistance, the greater the d
the right of preference can be given to Filipinos and vice verse.
Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to determine the degree of this privilege at
given time is addressed to the entire State. While under our constitutional scheme, the right prim
belongs to Congress as the lawmaking department of our government, other branches of governm
all their agencies and instrumentalities, share the power to enforce this state policy. Within the lim
their authority, they can act or promulgate rules and regulations defining the degree of this right o
preference in cases where they have to make grants involving the national economy and judicial
the other hand, our duty is to strike down acts of the state that violate the policy.
To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right. Consequent
must turn to the rules and regulations of on respondents Committee Privatization and GSIS to de
the degree of preference that petitioner is entitled to as a qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A t
look at the rules and regulations will show that they are silent on the degree of preferential right t
accorded qualified Filipino bidder. Despite their silence, however, they cannot be read to mean th
do not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for paragraph 2, section 10, Article XII of the
Constitution is deemed part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to legal hermeneutics which d
that we interpret rules to save them from unconstitutionality, I submit that the right of preference
petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Benong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand equal, a
bidder, as a qualified Pilipino bidder, should be preferred.
It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match the bi
Renong Berhad. Petitioner's submission must be supported by the rules but even if we examine th
inside-out .thousand times, they can not justify the claimed right. Under the rules, the right to ma
highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded block of shares .
reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as bidder. It complie
procedure of bidding. It tendered the highest bid. It was declared as the highest bidder by the GS
rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a matter of right for the rules clearly did n
the petitioner as a qualified Filipino privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the rul
grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our symphaties may be with petitioner but the court has no pow
extend the latitude and longtitude of the right of preference as defined by the rules. The paramete
right of preference depend on galaxy of facts and factors whose determination belongs to the pro
the policy-making branches and agencies of the State. We are duty-bound to respect that determi
even if we differ with the wisdom of their judgment. The right they grant may be little but we mu
the grant for as long as the right of preference is not denied. It is only when a State action amoun
denial of the right that the Court can come in and strike down the denial as unconstitutional.
Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad. Pe
was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and regulations do no
that a qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid submitting an inferior bid. It knew that
was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during the first bidding. Petitioner cann
allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot be allowed to obey the rules w
wins and disregard them when it loses. If sustained, petitioners' stance will wreak havoc on he es
bidding. Our laws, rules and regulations require highest bidding to raise as much funds as possib
government to maximize its capacity to deliver essential services to our people. This is a duty tha
discharged by Filipinos and foreigners participating in a bidding contest and the rules are careful
to attain this objective. Among others, bidders are prequalified to insure their financial capability
bidding is secret and the bids are sealed to prevent collusion among the parties. This objective wi
undermined if we grant petitioner that privilege to know the winning bid and a chance to match i
plainly, a second chance to bid will encourage a bidder not to strive to give the highest bid in the
bidding.
We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The visionary nationalist Don Claro
Recto has warned us that the greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is to be an alien in his own
The Constitution has embodied Recto's counsel as a state policy. But while the Filipino First poli
requires that we incline to a Filipino, it does not demand that we wrong an alien. Our policy mak
write laws and rules giving favored treatment to the Filipino but we are not free to be unfair to a
after writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are written, they must be obeyed as written, by
and foreigners alike. The equal protection clause of the Constitution protects all against unfairnes
be pro-Filipino without unfairness to foreigner.
I vote to dismiss the petition.
Narvasa, C.J., and Melo, J., concur.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:
I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. P
I just add
1. The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding proc
concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest foreign bid, a
win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII] simply states that "in the grant of rights . .
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." The m
concedes that there is no law defining the extent or degree of such preference. Specifically, no sta
empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal that of the winning foreigner. In
absence of such empowering law, the majority's strained interpretation, I respectfully submit con
unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can
where no foreigner can win. Only in the Philippines!.
2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial is short-sighted and, viewed pro
gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interest. It encourages other countries — in the guise of
comity or worse, unabashed retaliation — to discriminate against us in their own jurisdictions by
authorizing their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the higher bids of Filipino enterprise
while on the other hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to remain unchallenged by thei
nationals. The majority's thesis will thus marginalize Filipinos as pariahs in the global marketpla
absolute no chance of winning any bidding outside our country. Even authoritarian regimes and
kingdoms have long ago found out unfairness, greed and isolation are self-defeating and in the lo
self-destructing.
The moral lesson here is simple: Do not do unto other what you dont want other to do unto you.
3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the Con
the constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where all the bids
In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead without self-destructing him and without being unfair t
foreigner.
In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are t
not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score.
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO
C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA

RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO
QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,

INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT,
AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM
BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-
SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS
BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR
ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON,
JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO
SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS
LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR,
WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE
GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO
DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON,
LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE
SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR.,
EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO,
CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO,
JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN,
MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS
COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE
VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN
DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE
ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV
BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX
SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING
MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO,
MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA,
ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS,
RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS
LOPEZ, respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA.

CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR.,
ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.
MALLARI, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P.
NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M.

GONZALES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR,

MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO,
EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE,
LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA,
MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA,
WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL,
ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA,
LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY
EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON
ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ,
ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS,
ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER
QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA,
FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO
LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX
VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON.
SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED
BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX
FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF

THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND
ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER
AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83
HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON.
REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C.
PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA
D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P.
NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B.
CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR
THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX
FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND
AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT
COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO
G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST

CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U.
VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE
FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY

CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU
PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD
MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU,
INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI,
CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R.
POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW],
REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION
INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY
THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND
BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE
G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how

passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the
determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and
extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself
provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at
times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This
Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary
which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our
countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present
controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House
of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and
whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political
crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political
crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to
address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally
pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional
methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its
resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure
from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever
mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers
among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means
prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these
three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-
equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government,

intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the
good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination
among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and
enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by
what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est
suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees

must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the

Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of

the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote
of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at

least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official

more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person
shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively

carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th
Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November
28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the
11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House
Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW

RULES
RULE II RULE V
INITIATING BAR AGAINST

IMPEACHMENT INITIATION OF
IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating PROCEEDINGS
Impeachment. – AGAINST THE SAME
Impeachment shall be OFFICIAL
initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment Section 16. – Impeachment
filed by any Member of the Proceedings Deemed
House of Representatives or Initiated. – In cases where a
by any citizen upon a Member of the House files a
resolution of endorsement by verified complaint of
any Member thereof or by a impeachment or a citizen
verified complaint or files a verified complaint
resolution of impeachment that is endorsed by a
filed by at least one-third Member of the House
(1/3) of all the Members of through a resolution of
the House. endorsement against an
impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings
against such official are
deemed initiated on the day
the Committee on Justice
finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the
case may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date the
House votes to overturn or
affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified
complaint and/or resolution,
as the case may be, is not
sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified

complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may
be, by at least one-third (1/3)
of the Members of the
House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the
filing of such verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the
Secretary General.
RULE V Section 17. Bar Against

Initiation Of Impeachment
BAR AGAINST Proceedings. – Within a
IMPEACHMENT period of one (1) year from
the date impeachment
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – proceedings are deemed
No impeachment proceedings initiated as provided in
shall be initiated against the Section 16 hereof, no
same official more than once impeachment proceedings,
within the period of one (1) as such, can be initiated
year. against the same official.
(Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored

by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on
Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment

complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint
was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and
Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any

Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution
of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to
the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee
Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance
with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint
or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary
General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District,
Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members
of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most
of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has
a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available
legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in
his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental
importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary
changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the
12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against
then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and
arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on
November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V,
Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared
unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents
House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and
(5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it
off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are
consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent
House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and
taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance,
pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a
writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin
Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in
the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as

citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the
use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second
impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining
Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has
recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases
of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment
complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and
members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting,
approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and
respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy

Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of
Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional
impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have
a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money
and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice,
and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House
Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances
emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the
Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and
deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition
commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any
proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are
citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer
and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not
state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint
involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House
Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of
Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a

member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their
petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent
Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is
mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution,
prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule
V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be
declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently
enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in
their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in
behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of
succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting
respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as
unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent
House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino,

alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and
transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial
Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of
the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with
the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and
the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due
course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his
petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they
filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power
to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment
assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L.

Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the
subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a
constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their
students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and
the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging
his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on
the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in
accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive
jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare
Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the
second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues
raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of
transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1)
the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be
declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited
from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent
Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from
conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and
taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second
impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment
by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2)
respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from
accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event
that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first
three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the
House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising
from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket
number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28,
2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which
were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing
docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling
for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF)
infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct
violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a
motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally
transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of
Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the
Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003,
Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their
offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to
participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of
October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent
House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to
comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the
petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed
distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on
petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and
others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would
render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through

Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special
appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction
to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an
independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the
performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases.
On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion
to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting
the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of
the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases,
including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and
upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to
(a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents
to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include
them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President
Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the
petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of
the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it
since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court
commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not,
and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene"
in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning
the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground
that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional
deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question
is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra

filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit
the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga

Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261.
On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment
and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the
arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal,
and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an
Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked;

who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be
exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-

vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from
the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for
and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined
them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the
power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings;
(2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of
judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining.
These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial
review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis
supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by

Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions,
unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article
VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel
discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great

landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the
only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection

and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people,
acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican
government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under
a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in
no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations
are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be
mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the
limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they
should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period
of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is
granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article
VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to

determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to
it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under
the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy
the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is
in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More
than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper
allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a
necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly
conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be
sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of
judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be

the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not
the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made
in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States

confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all
written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void;
and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the
1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to
invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law
professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive
and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this
power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution,

the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid

only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an
integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together
with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our
republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for
the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of

government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution
has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise
of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano,

"x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the
separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is
the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention
– of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of
discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its
history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this
Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt
from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional
Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of
the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our

experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents
in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was
marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases
against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the
solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away
with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ
of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of
political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of
martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have
no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that
this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not
merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in
effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law
regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the

agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In
other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or
not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or
lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the
courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature,
by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in
the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles
of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It
is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the
people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according
to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where
the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And
so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention

underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the
Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to
be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented
or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the
history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular
provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order
to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason
and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking

through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the

fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain
and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed
that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a

whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel
Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have

dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one
person without considering that it could also affect others. When they
adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision
should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by
itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed
that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one

provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to
effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not
to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the
two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean
in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather
than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis
supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other
aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and

proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason
and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only
when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the
terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much
less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and

jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker
De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that
the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of
judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that
impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence,
any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding
is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to
try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review
over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional
questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are

outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the
majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that
the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate
since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers
to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and
balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary;
and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning
relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to
show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American

Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support the
proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as
provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to
the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and
restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably
support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently
judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment
proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution,
are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our
jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs.
COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because
they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs." 53 Indeed,
although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United
States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words
of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court
and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is
only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,
that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly
provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it
was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse
of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine
Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation,54 our
Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power
to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of
such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These
limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year
bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines
their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary.
Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle
that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people
expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and
pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-
mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not
intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the
exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by

respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the
scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of
petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-
ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of
judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this
Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire
whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or
grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the
ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a
justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this
Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article
VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether
the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18,
Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it
held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from
the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v.
Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is
vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts
to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election
of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential
before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks
and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of
the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial

review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More
than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that
petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will
sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor
General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing
since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest70 and
transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the
need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not
abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of
the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance
and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is
unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the
Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of
this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the
rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has
constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding
standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real
party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has
been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing
because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very
different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real
party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are
directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action,
standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as
broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain
areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases

suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the
question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is

"the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party
entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners
before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the
contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers;
members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the
bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when
specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality
of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the
law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a
citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that
he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common
to all members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners,
given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles
of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve
the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official

action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a
member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially

when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital
interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any
member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing
more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its
interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents.86It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on
standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens,
persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of
all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the
suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class,
is, under theres judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or
not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can
be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous
petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their
petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of
transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397,
is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following

instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in
the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government;
and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in
raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is
satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus
standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance
to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a
party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the
very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts
can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest
in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as
to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of
right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which
satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they
seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one
additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection
on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as
earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-
Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et.

al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as
citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the
minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found
the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance,
World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-
Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not
the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on
any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang

Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to
intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited
purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate
President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the
Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will
sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it
from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which
the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all
substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was
granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for,
while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing
requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of

public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their
tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there is
a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners
seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the
act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public
money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as
a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had
by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done,
if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the
second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the
House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of
which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second
impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the
2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite
that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before
suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are
premature. Amicus curiaeformer Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that
there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being
the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that
all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who
suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage
signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and
opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members
to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are
presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains
that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice
can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives
of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their
constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the
questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the
ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore,
petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both
Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as
previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is
clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality,
whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is
exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of
the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power
to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion

defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in

ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the
language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any
rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases
which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover
of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial
review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the
therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive
Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified,
hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took
cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political
question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to
refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated
Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to
clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues involving
political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual
comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the
service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the
judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the
power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God,
and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with
the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the
Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of
the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our

experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in
the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was
marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases
against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the
solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away
with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the
writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release
of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of
political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political,
we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary
feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did
not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but
it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial
law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this
situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not
lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme
Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am
not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the
proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in
its publication was that the administration had apprehended and detained
prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was
announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it.
In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our main
writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded
them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of
the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1,
1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had
barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that
upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971
Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them
was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished
draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacañang.
In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of
the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President around December 1,
1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which
suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which
prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of
public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on
the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime
in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague,
Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the
Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that
Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended
indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would
consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15.
But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced
until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not
of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as
"citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence.
The questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers
thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the
answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the
plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying
that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was
being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to
the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution
was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in
the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of
the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was
being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential
proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the
people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation

null and void. The main defense put up by the government was that the issue
was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the
case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January

15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all
members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them
had been notified of any referendum in their respective places of residence,
much less did they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw
any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of
the members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big

difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of
justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question.
Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in
which the plea of "political question" was set up. There have been a
number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue
was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions,

it faced the following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political
question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle
actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and
enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be
enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that
his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We
can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to
comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main
marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but
they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be
highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical

questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court
has, also another important function. The powers of government are
generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere
and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to
determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of
justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the

agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In
other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or
not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or
lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that

the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this
nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may
have an initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in
the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice

Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but
judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in
other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to
identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a
difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary

cases but where there is a question as to whether the government had
authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking
jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question.
Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by

the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the

political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of

discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended
to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is

judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power
includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make
may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising
from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly
political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis
supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty,
a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however,
that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of
the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue
of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which
are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of
Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions
which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene

Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and
broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under
previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments
to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla,

this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must

perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he
political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot
abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although
said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the
principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less
tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the
issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political
questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these
two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear
standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political

question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or thepotentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not
separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of
one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of
judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in
determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-

justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch
or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court
shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint

constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with
Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into
the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment

adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5)

of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint
over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion
of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of
the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for

impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust,
elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to
approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than
by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at
their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon
this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope
of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the

constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus,
in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a

constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid,
unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the
record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest
its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question
will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon
such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian

Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No.
6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of
a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must
be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have
been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case
itself.118[Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity
of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional
issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest.
In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should
be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the
court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other
reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted
from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which
Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional
for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of
legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a
violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d)
an assault on the independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the
studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said
Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the
validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said
issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law
touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general,
which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated
cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have
raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely
affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries
has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of

Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article
VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective

committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of

legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as
provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It
follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not be compelled
to testify against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra,
while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the
new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed
only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the
same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is

filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed
a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites
for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members
of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the
signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a
"Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the
Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the

abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix
William B. Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution
requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically become
the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that
the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the
Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this
requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have
been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section
3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any

Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution
of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to
the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that

for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or
more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint
as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of
impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the
House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment
contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary
only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment
complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does
indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on
impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as
the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact
that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have
raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint.
Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant
consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original
petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as
well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the
determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors
Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting
the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly
prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they
are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15
and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment
complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that
the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide
all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial
review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a
moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment
because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But this argument
is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws
with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject
to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this
Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally
disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to
which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking
from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being
clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the
instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas,
"jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced.
To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other
office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an
interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with
officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with
detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the
public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally
and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason,
they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to
displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber
strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office." 130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already
been settled in the case ofAbbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the
petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing
and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were
interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the
Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification
was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any

Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate
without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the
proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can
perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation
of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not
prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform,
the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its
being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of
the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an
election contest that would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom would
inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might
surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the
last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution
provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the
substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification
may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and
hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of
the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate

Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment
on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case
where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in
the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying
is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot
legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that
no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone
the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a

majority of them, is nothing short ofpro tanto depriving the Court itself of its
jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a
judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one
designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is
the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial
power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court
itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no
alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn
of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the
original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it
exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven
pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme
Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a

friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such
questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It
never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the
legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality
of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance

of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide
questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision
of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied
application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one
involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory
construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals
from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under
the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can
be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of
one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many
applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of
challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge
by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty
will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the
dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth
Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by
the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the
instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even
if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that
this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander

v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be
encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the

facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the

operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the
exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible

opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial
restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to
embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the
need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial
hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk
serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the
vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes
this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against
Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public
confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the
Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a
reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment
cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action
may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is

not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the
constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical
effects but also political consequences. Those political consequences may
follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an
act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act
explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the
respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the
end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain
respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which
paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate
branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their
duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet
there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in
a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by
encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the
doctrine in People v. Veneracion, towit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If
[public officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were
allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes
meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of
broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this
system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to
protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal
beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure

for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that

Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate
Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term
"initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House
of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because
filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be
accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by
any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members
of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year
bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate."
Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution,

Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of
this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and
explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional
Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus
curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on
November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of
taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word
"initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to
file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to

begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform
or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that
of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions
on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus

of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the
transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists
of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of
impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint
and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by

Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is
"deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of
impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee.
Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but
rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation
happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a
time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into
the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution
can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure

and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have
been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for
Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a

resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been
furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as a
member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government
which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First
Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the
resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting
with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of
report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and
judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a

reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we
do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the
floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the
initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually
done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles
of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on

Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I
could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President
Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the
recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the
body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body
which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on
that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these
words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing
with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress.
The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard
Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has
already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the

approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the
substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of
the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this

provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the
words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings"and the
comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH
THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and
replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A
vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the
Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the

House of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts
from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach
always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the
words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the
direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the
House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not
vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform
procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress.
Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and
accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the
complaint. In his amicus curiaebrief, Commissioner Maambong explained that
"the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings"
as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it
understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings
starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a
resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which
was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3,
paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is

Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both
adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the
complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word
"initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx

more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to
initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the
second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle
of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term
"proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided
by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of
one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that
the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other
body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate,
a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be
"initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin.
On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle,
and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several
steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the
House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the
House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the
proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether
the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution
must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the
processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either
affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution
by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members
upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to
the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at
this point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he
or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as
impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated

when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of
the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial.
Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on
the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that
has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the
proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or
begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice
for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning.
Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third
of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… toinitiate impeachment
proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the
vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of
a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present
Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this
interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to
initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the
people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary
people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they
ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the
principle of reddendo singula singulisby equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of
two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to
initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress'
taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or,
by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives
with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules,

impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the
House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding
of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not
sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a
meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not
use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of
Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal
opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention)
on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a
different footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and
proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former
members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their
emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning
because of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There

are at present only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986
Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna.
Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons.
Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by
members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the
deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article

XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and
interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the
assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This
assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules
on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its
power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot
contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to
effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other
specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of

the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote
of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at

least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it
would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either
House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what
constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary
of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique
Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v.
Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons
other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature.
In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph &
Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not
by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It
is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the
determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice
Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more
emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for
courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner
are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of
separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even
in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an
impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases
involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a

window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US
Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to
review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this
authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the

names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who
do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and
reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be
counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do
business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question,
therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the
Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a
quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition
place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are
open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule
to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more
just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not
one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always
subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested,
absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the

validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule
XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it
did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any
fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship with the
result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow
its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of
separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to

categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition
will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not
granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also
xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power
were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political
question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of
the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of
government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not
a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this
disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike
down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its
officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the
checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government
despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators
being elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of
justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the
efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court
vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This provision was dictated by
our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more
independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution
transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation,
dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court
approached constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot
do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it
should not do but what itmust do. The Court must discharge this solemn
duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this
new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define
the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the
House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against
government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield
it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the
judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of
government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I
endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision
stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable
foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own
history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions.
Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution
are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis

for arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16
and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal
Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole
power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to
how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus,
the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of
Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power
of the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier
enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is
to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules

which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a
finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the
House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term
"initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against
the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a

phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective
consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or
tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the
Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an
exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have
fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to
be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as
demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to
the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the
matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the
academe and denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return to a state of
normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate
any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had
been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take
no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of
Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent
public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the
doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through
what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and
"judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a
bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of
the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found
the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its
constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose
resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of
the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine
constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address
and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our
system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely
falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to
pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process
of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently
without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on
the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated
against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time
bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none,
nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions.
Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over
the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the
judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their
own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and
ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the

impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court
have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in
ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing
could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long
held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights
regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has
dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to
benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could
be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts.
Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just
because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an
incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a
government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of
course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking
part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now
from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non
sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal
system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's
moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its
commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is
most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme
Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its
application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other
member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that
he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every
individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test
once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide.
Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for
a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it
is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock
of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a
democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the
use of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in

Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives
on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella
with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on
October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and
AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28224 November 9, 1967
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
No. 28196:
Ramon A. Gonzales for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Juan T. David as amicus curiae
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
No. 28224:
Salvador Araneta for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary

injunction.
Petitioner therein prays for judgment:
1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act No.
4913, or from performing any act that will result in the holding of the plebiscite for
the ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in Joint Resolutions
Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of Congress of the Philippines, approved on March
16, 1967; (b) the Director of Printing from printing ballots, pursuant to said Act
and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor General from passing in audit any
disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in said Republic Act No. 4913;
and
2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article

VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the
membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided
in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the
several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective
inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said

Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from
each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the
second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution,
be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of
Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional
convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on

June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to
the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be
submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held
on November 14, 1967.
The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the hearing thereof, on
October 28, 1967, the Solicitor General appeared on behalf of respondents.
Moreover, Atty. Juan T. David and counsel for the Philippine Constitution
Association — hereinafter referred to as the PHILCONSA — were allowed to
argue as amici curiae. Said counsel for the PHILCONSA, Dr. Salvador Araneta,
likewise prayed that the decision in this case be deferred until after a substantially
identical case brought by said organization before the Commission on
Elections,1 which was expected to decide it any time, and whose decision would, in
all probability, be appealed to this Court — had been submitted thereto for final
determination, for a joint decision on the identical issues raised in both cases. In
fact, on October 31, 1967, the PHILCONSA filed with this Court the petition in G.
R. No. L-28224, for review bycertiorari of the resolution of the Commission on
Elections2 dismissing the petition therein. The two (2) cases were deemed
submitted for decision on November 8, 1967, upon the filing of the answer of
respondent, the memorandum of the petitioner and the reply memorandum of
respondent in L-28224.
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen, a

taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for
and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Although
respondents and the Solicitor General have filed an answer denying the truth of this
allegation, upon the ground that they have no knowledge or information to form a
belief as to the truth thereof, such denial would appear to be a perfunctory one. In
fact, at the hearing of case L-28196, the Solicitor General expressed himself in
favor of a judicial determination of the merits of the issued raised in said case.
The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a corporation duly

organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit
and non-partisan organization the objective of which is to uphold the rule of law in
the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or onslaughts from
whatever source. Despite his aforementioned statement in L-28196, in his answer
in L-28224 the Solicitor General maintains that this Court has no jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of L-28224, upon the ground that the same is "merely political"
as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.3 Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, who appeared
before the Commission on Elections and filed an opposition to the PHILCONSA
petition therein, was allowed to appear before this Court and objected to said
petition upon the ground: a) that the Court has no jurisdiction either to grant the
relief sought in the petition, or to pass upon the legality of the composition of the
House of Representatives; b) that the petition, if granted, would, in effect, render in
operational the legislative department; and c) that "the failure of Congress to enact
a valid reapportionment law . . . does not have the legal effect of rendering illegal
the House of Representatives elected thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and
void."
JURISDICTION
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission,4 this Court — speaking through one
of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor
of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared that "the judicial department
is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof." It is true that in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,5 this Court
characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one, declined to pass upon
the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a
proposed amendment to the Constitution — which was being submitted to the
people for ratification — satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the
fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been weakened, however,
by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate,6 Avelino vs. Cuenco,7 Tañada vs.
Cuenco,8 and Macias vs. Commission on Elections.9 In the first, we held that the
officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision
and control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the
second, this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for
a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by Senators
belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in said chamber,
purporting to act on behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes
therein, of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second
party, of the, Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared
unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the representative
districts for the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment
had not been made as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of
each province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that
the issues therein raised were political questions the determination of which is
beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is

not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress.10 It is part of
the inherent powers of the people — as the repository of sovereignty in a
republican state, such as ours11 — to make, and, hence, to amend their own
Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely
because the same explicitly grants such power.12Hence, when exercising the same,
it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, notas
members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When
acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function,13 for their
authority does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the very source of all
powers of government, including the Constitution itself .
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution,

the members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it
follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts
are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and
set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of
laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is
stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme
Court,14 the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,15 despite the eminently
political character of treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a

constituent assembly — violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not
political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view
may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,16 the latter
should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous
on this point.
THE MERITS
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amended, reads:
The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three-fourths of all the

Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be proposed, either

by Congress, or by a convention called by Congress for that purpose. In either
case, the vote of "three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House
of Representatives voting separately" is necessary. And, "such amendments shall
be valid as part of" the "Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification."
In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been
approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately. This, notwithstanding, it is urged that
said resolutions are null and void because:
1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well

as the resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de
facto Congressmen;
2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose — amendments or

call a convention therefore but may not avail of both — that is to say, propose
amendment and call a convention — at the same time;
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be

submitted for ratification, must be aspecial election, not a general election, in
which officers of the national and local governments — such as the elections
scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 — will be chosen; and
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals for
amendment shall be submitted to the people for ratification, must be held under
such conditions — which, allegedly, do not exist — as to give the people a
reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of said
amendments.
Legality of Congress and Legal Status of the Congressmen
The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, which
provides:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one

hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several
provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective
inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one Member. The Congress
shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of
every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have
been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of
Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be
elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each
representative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous and
compact territory.
It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960; that, no
apportionment having been made within three (3) years thereafter, the Congress of
the Philippines and/or the election of its Members became illegal; that Congress
and its Members, likewise, became a de facto Congress and/or de
facto congressmen, respectively; and that, consequently, the disputed Resolutions,
proposing amendments to the Constitution, as well as Republic Act No. 4913, are
null and void.
It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an apportionment within three
years after the enumeration or census made in 1960. It did actually pass a bill,
which became Republic Act No. 3040,17 purporting to make said apportionment.
This Act was, however, declared unconstitutional, upon the ground that the
apportionment therein undertaken had not been made according to the number of
inhabitants of the different provinces of the Philippines.18
Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of the failure of
Congress to make a valid apportionment within the period stated in the
Constitution, Congress became an "unconstitutional Congress" and that, in
consequence thereof, the Members of its House of Representatives are de
facto officers. The major premise of this process of reasoning is that the
constitutional provision on "apportionment within three years after the return of
every enumeration, and not otherwise," is mandatory. The fact that Congress is
under legal obligation to make said apportionment does not justify, however, the
conclusion that failure to comply with such obligation rendered Congress illegal or
unconstitutional, or that its Members have become de facto officers.
It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935, Congress has
not made a valid apportionment as required in said fundamental law. The effect of
this omission has been envisioned in the Constitution, pursuant to which:
. . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of

Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by
law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors
from the present Assembly districts. . . . .
The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the period to
make the apportionment, a Congress which fails to make it is dissolved or becomes
illegal. On the contrary, it implies necessarily that Congress shall continue to
function with the representative districts existing at the time of the expiration of
said period.
It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the elections held in
1935. This theory assumes that an apportionment had to be made
necessarily before the first elections to be held after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, or in 1938.19 The assumption, is, however,
unwarranted, for there had been no enumeration in 1935, and nobody could foretell
when it would be made. Those who drafted and adopted the Constitution in 1935
could be certain, therefore, that the three-year period, after the earliest possible
enumeration, would expire after the elections in 1938.
What is more, considering that several provisions of the Constitution, particularly

those on the legislative department, were amended in 1940, by establishing a
bicameral Congress, those who drafted and adopted said
amendment, incorporating therein the provision of the original Constitution
regarding the apportionment of the districts for representatives, must have known
that the three-year period therefor would expire after the elections scheduled to be
held and actually held in 1941.
Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and ratification of the original
Constitution in 1935 and of the amendment thereof in 1940 strongly indicate that
the provision concerning said apportionment and the effect of the failure to make it
were expected to be applied to conditions obtaining after the elections in 1935 and
1938, and even after subsequent elections.
Then again, since the report of the Director of the Census on the last enumeration
was submitted to the President on November 30, 1960, it follows that the three-
year period to make the apportionment did not expire until 1963, or after the
Presidential elections in 1961. There can be no question, therefore, that the Senate
and the House of Representatives organized or constituted on December 30, 1961,
were de jure bodies, and that the Members thereof were de jure officers. Pursuant
to the theory of petitioners herein, upon expiration of said period of three years, or
late in 1963, Congress became illegal and its Members, or at least, those of the
House of Representatives, became illegal holder of their respective offices, and
were de facto officers.
Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year period without a
reapportionment, had the effect of abrogating or repealing the legal provision
creating Congress, or, at least, the House of Representatives, and are not aware of
any rule or principle of law that would warrant such conclusion. Neither do they
allege that the term of office of the members of said House automatically expired
or that they ipso facto forfeited their seats in Congress, upon the lapse of said
period for reapportionment. In fact, neither our political law, nor our law on public
officers, in particular, supports the view that failure to discharge a mandatory duty,
whatever it may be, would automatically result in the forfeiture of an office, in the
absence of a statute to this effect.
Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election Law relative to
the election of Members of Congress in 1965 were not repealed in consequence of
the failure of said body to make an apportionment within three (3) years after the
census of 1960. Inasmuch as the general elections in 1965 were presumably held in
conformity with said Election Law, and the legal provisions creating Congress —
with a House of Representatives composed of members elected by qualified voters
of representative districts as they existed at the time of said elections — remained
in force, we can not see how said Members of the House of Representatives can be
regarded as de facto officers owing to the failure of their predecessors in office to
make a reapportionment within the period aforementioned.
Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the impeachment of the President,
the Vice-President, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Auditor General
for, inter alia, culpable violation of the Constitution,20 the enforcement of which is,
not only their mandatory duty, but also, their main function. This provision
indicates that, despite the violation of such mandatory duty, the title to their
respective offices remains unimpaired, until dismissal or ouster pursuant to a
judgment of conviction rendered in accordance with Article IX of the Constitution.
In short, the loss of office or the extinction of title thereto is not automatic.
Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of Congress are merely de
facto officers, it would not follow that the contested resolutions and Republic Act
No. 4913 are null and void. In fact, the main reasons for the existence of the de
facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under
color of title, an office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar
as the public — as distinguished from the officer in question — is
concerned.21 Indeed, otherwise, those dealing with officers and employees of the
Government would be entitled to demand from them satisfactory proof of their title
to the positions they hold,before dealing with them, or before recognizing their
authority or obeying their commands, even if they should act within the limits of
the authority vested in their respective offices, positions or employments.22 One
can imagine this great inconvenience, hardships and evils that would result in the
absence of the de facto doctrine.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally.23 It

may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may
the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de
facto officer.24 And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into
the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence
of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned.
It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases at bar because the acts
therein involved have not been completed and petitioners herein are not third
parties. This pretense is untenable. It is inconsistent withTayko vs. Capistrano.25 In
that case, one of the parties to a suit being heard before Judge Capistrano objected
to his continuing to hear the case, for the reason that, meanwhile, he had reached
the age of retirement. This Court held that the objection could not be entertained,
because the Judge was at least, a de facto Judge, whose title can not be assailed
collaterally. It should be noted that Tayko was not a third party insofar as the Judge
was concerned. Tayko was one of the parties in the aforementioned suit. Moreover,
Judge Capistrano had not, as yet, finished hearing the case, much less rendered
decision therein. No rights had vested in favor of the parties, in consequence of the
acts of said Judge. Yet, Tayko's objection was overruled. Needless to say, insofar
as Congress is concerned, its acts, as regards the Resolutions herein contested and
Republic Act No. 4913, are complete. Congress has nothing else to do in
connection therewith.
The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the objection under consideration is
untenable.
Available Alternatives to Congress
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress may either propose
amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that purpose, but it can not
do both, at the same time. This theory is based upon the fact that the two (2)
alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the disjunctive "or." Such basis is,
however, a weak one, in the absence of other circumstances — and none has
brought to our attention — supporting the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae.
In fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa, when
the spirit or context of the law warrants it.26
It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the

constitutional provision on Congress, to be submitted to the people for ratification
on November 14, 1967, whereas R. B. H. No. 2 calls for a convention in 1971, to
consider proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general. In other words,
the subject-matter of R. B. H. No. 2 is different from that of R B. H. Nos. 1 and 3.
Moreover, the amendments proposed under R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be
submitted for ratification several years before those that may be proposed by the
constitutional convention called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again, although the three (3)
resolutions were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a vote
separately, or one after the other. In other words, they were notpassed at the same
time.
In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof
anything that would negate the authority of different Congresses to approve the
contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in, different
sessions or different days of the same congressional session. And, neither has any
plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt said
resolutions on the same day.
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention to

propose amendments, why not let the whole thing be submitted to said convention,
instead of, likewise, proposing some specific amendments, to be submitted for
ratification before said convention is held? The force of this argument must be
conceded. but the same impugns the wisdom of the action taken by Congress, not
its authority to take it. One seeming purpose thereof to permit Members of
Congress to run for election as delegates to the constitutional convention and
participate in the proceedings therein, without forfeiting their seats in Congress.
Whether or not this should be done is a political question, not subject to review by
the courts of justice.
On this question there is no disagreement among the members of the Court.
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General

Election?
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all

the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention
for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution
when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to
is a "special," not a general, election. The circumstance that three previous
amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in
special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed
amendments for ratification in general elections.
It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the proposed

amendments, that the same be submitted to the people's approval independently of
the election of public officials. And there is no denying the fact that an adequate
appraisal of the merits and demerits proposed amendments is likely to be
overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the choice of
personalities involved in general elections, particularly when provincial and
municipal officials are to be chosen. But, then, these considerations are addressed
to the wisdom of holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public
officer. They do not deny the authority of Congress to choose either alternative, as
implied in the term "election" used, without qualification, in the abovequoted
provision of the Constitution. Such authority becomes even more patent when we
consider: (1) that the term "election," normally refers to the choice or selection of
candidates to public office by popular vote; and (2) that the word used in Article V
of the Constitution, concerning the grant of suffrage to women is, not "election,"
but "plebiscite."
Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV of the
Constitution, should be construed as meaning a special election. Some members of
the Court even feel that said term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite," without any
"election," general or special, of public officers. They opine that constitutional
amendments are, in general, if not always, of such important, if not transcendental
and vital nature as to demand that the attention of the people be focused
exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so that their votes thereon may reflect no
more than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the merits of the
proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by extraneous, if not
insidious factors, let alone the partisan political considerations that are likely to
affect the selection of elective officials.
This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the attainment of which

should be promoted. The ideal conditions are, however, one thing. The question
whether the Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for amendment to the
people except under such conditions, is another thing. Much as the writer and those
who concur in this opinion admire the contrary view, they find themselves unable
to subscribe thereto without, in effect, reading into the Constitution what they
believe is not written thereon and can not fairly be deduced from the letter thereof,
since the spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer speculation.
The majority view — although the votes in favor thereof are insufficient to declare
Republic Act No. 4913 unconstitutional — as ably set forth in the opinion penned
by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is, however, otherwise.
Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the People Violate the
Spirit of the Constitution?
It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on March 16,
1967, so that, by November 14, 1967, our citizenry shall have had practically eight
(8) months to be informed on the amendments in question. Then again, Section 2
of Republic Act No. 4913 provides:
(1) that "the amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette, at least twenty days prior to the election;"
(2) that "a printed copy of the proposed amendments shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in every municipality, city and provincial office building and in
every polling place not later than October 14, 1967," and that said copy "shall
remain posted therein until after the election;"
(3) that "at least five copies of said amendment shall be kept in each polling place,
to be made available for examination by the qualified electors during election day;"
(4) that "when practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be
determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling place;"
(5) that "the Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said
amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the principal native
languages, for free distributing:" and
(6) that the contested Resolutions "shall be printed in full" on the back of the
ballots which shall be used on November 14, 1967.
We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are palpably inadequate to
comply with the constitutional requirement that proposals for amendment be
"submitted to the people for their ratification," and that said measures are
manifestly insufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint, to inform the people of the
amendment sought to be made.
These were substantially the same means availed of to inform the people of the
subject submitted to them for ratification, from the original Constitution down to
the Parity Amendment. Thus, referring to the original Constitution, Section 1 of
Act No. 4200, provides:
Said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be published

in the Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive
issues at least fifteen days prior to said election, and a printed copy of said
Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial government office
building and in each polling place not later than the twenty-second day of
April, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, and shall remain posted therein
continually until after the termination of the election. At least ten copies of
the Constitution with the Ordinance appended thereto, in English and in
Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place available for examination by the
qualified electors during election day. Whenever practicable, copies in the
principal local dialects as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior
shall also be kept in each polling place.
The provision concerning woman's suffrage is Section 1 of Commonwealth Act

No. 34, reading:
Said Article V of the Constitution shall be published in the Official Gazette,

in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least fifteen days
prior to said election, and the said Article V shall be posted in a conspicuous
place in each municipal and provincial office building and in each polling
place not later than the twenty-second day of April, nineteen and thirty-
seven, and shall remain posted therein continually until after the termination
of the plebiscite. At least ten copies of said Article V of the Constitution, in
English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place available for
examination by the qualified electors during the plebiscite. Whenever
practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined
by the Secretary of the Interior, shall also be kept in each polling place.
Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, referring to the 1940

amendments, is of the following tenor:
The said amendments shall be published in English and Spanish in three

consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the
election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in
every municipal, city, and provincial government office building and in
every polling place not later than May eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty,
and shall remain posted therein until after the election. At least ten copies of
said amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be made available for
examination by the qualified electors during election day. When practicable,
copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the
Secretary of the Interior, shall also be kept therein.
As regards the Parity Amendment, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 73 is to the effect
that:
The said amendment shall be published in English and Spanish in three

consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the
election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in
every municipal, city, and provincial government office building and in
every polling place not later than February eleven, nineteen hundred and
forty-seven, and shall remain posted therein until after the election. At least,
ten copies of the said amendment shall be kept in each polling place to be
made available for examination by the qualified electors during election day.
When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be
determined by the Commission on Elections, shall also be kept in each
polling place.
The main difference between the present situation and that obtaining in connection
with the former proposals does not arise from the law enacted therefor. The
difference springs from the circumstance that the major political parties had taken
sides on previous amendments to the Constitution — except, perhaps, the woman's
suffrage — and, consequently, debated thereon at some length before the plebiscite
took place. Upon the other hand, said political parties have not seemingly made an
issue on the amendments now being contested and have, accordingly, refrained
from discussing the same in the current political campaign. Such debates or
polemics as may have taken place — on a rather limited scale — on the latest
proposals for amendment, have been due principally to the initiative of a few civic
organizations and some militant members of our citizenry who have voiced their
opinion thereon. A legislation cannot, however, be nullified by reason of the failure
of certain sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality or
unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those existing at the time of
the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law enforcing
agencies, particularly those that take place subsequently to the passage or approval
of the law.
Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or

insufficiency, from a constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification
to the people on November 14, 1967, depends — in the view of those who concur
in this opinion, and who, insofar as this phase of the case, constitute the minority
— upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fairly
apprise the people of the gist, the main idea or the substance of said proposals,
which is — under R. B. H. No. 1 — the increase of the maximum number of seats
in the House of Representatives, from 120 to 180, and — under R. B. H. No. 3 —
the authority given to the members of Congress to run for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to discharge the duties of such
delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We — who constitute the
minority — believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that
said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.
A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160 of the proposed
maximum of representative districts are actually apportioned by R. B. H. No. 1
among the provinces in the Philippines. It is not improbable, however, that they are
not interested in the details of the apportionment, or that a careful reading thereof
may tend in their simple minds, to impair a clear vision thereof. Upon the other
hand, those who are more sophisticated, may enlighten themselves sufficiently by
reading the copies of the proposed amendments posted in public places, the copies
kept in the polling places and the text of contested resolutions, as printed in full on
the back of the ballots they will use.
It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more, may fail to realize or
envisage the effect of R. B. H. No. 3 upon the work of the Constitutional
Convention or upon the future of our Republic. But, then, nobody can foretell such
effect with certainty. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the
Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3
permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for
and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.
We are impressed by the factors considered by our distinguished and esteemed

brethren, who opine otherwise, but, we feel that such factors affect the wisdom of
Republic Act No. 4913 and that of R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, not theauthority of
Congress to approve the same.
The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power to strike down
acts of the Executive or of Congress transcending the confines set forth in the
fundamental laws is not in derogation of the principle of separation of powers,
pursuant to which each department is supreme within its own sphere. The
determination of the conditions under which the proposed amendments shall be
submitted to the people is concededly a matter which falls within the legislative
sphere. We do not believe it has been satisfactorily shown that Congress has
exceeded the limits thereof in enacting Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it
could have done something better to enlighten the people on the subject-matter
thereof. But, then, no law is perfect. No product of human endeavor is beyond
improvement. Otherwise, no legislation would be constitutional and valid. Six (6)
Members of this Court believe, however, said Act and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3
violate the spirit of the Constitution.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act
4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these
two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for
denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs fully with the above opinion, adding a few words on the
question of jurisdiction.
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., concurring:
I concur in the foregoing opinion of the Chief Justice. I would make some
additional observations in connection with my concurrence. Sections 2 and 4 of
Republic Act No. 4913 provide:
Sec. 2. The amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of the

Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy
thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipality, city and
provincial office building and in every polling place not later than October
fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and shall remain posted therein
until after the election. At least five copies of the said amendments shall be
kept in each polling place to be made available for examination by the
qualified electors during election day. When practicable, copies in the
principal native languages, as may be determined by the Commission on
Elections, shall be kept in each polling place. The Commission on Elections
shall make available copies of each amendments in English, Spanish and,
whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free distribution.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. The ballots which shall be used in the election for the approval of
said amendments shall be printed in English and Pilipino and shall be in the
size and form prescribed by the Commission on Elections:Provided,
however, That at the back of said ballot there shall be printed in full
Resolutions of both Houses of Congress Numbered One and Three, both
adopted on March sixteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, proposing the
amendments: Provided, further, That the questionnaire appearing on the face
of the ballot shall be as follows:
Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to Section five of Article VI of

our Constitution printed at the back of this ballot?
Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to section sixteen of Article VI
of our Constitution printed at the back of this ballot?
To vote for the approval of the proposed amendments, the voter shall write
the word "yes" or its equivalent in Pilipino or in the local dialect in the blank
space after each question; to vote for the rejection thereof, he shall write the
word "No" or its equivalent in Pilipino or in the local dialect.
I believe that intrinsically, that is, considered in itself and without reference to
extraneous factors and circumstances, the manner prescribed in the aforesaid
provisions is sufficient for the purpose of having the proposed amendments
submitted to the people for their ratification, as enjoined in Section 1, Article XV
of the Constitution. I am at a loss to say what else should have been required by the
Act to make it adhere more closely to the constitutional requirement. Certainly it
would have been out of place to provide, for instance, that government officials
and employees should go out and explain the amendments to the people, or that
they should be the subject of any particular means or form of public discussion.
The objection of some members of the Court to Republic Act No. 4913 seems to
me predicated on the fact that there are so many other issues at stake in the coming
general election that the attention of the electorate, cannot be entirely focused on
the proposed amendments, such that there is a failure to properly submit them for
ratification within the intendment of the Constitution. If that is so, then the defect
is not intrinsic in the law but in its implementation. The same manner of submitting
the proposed amendments to the people for ratification may, in a different setting,
be sufficient for the purpose. Yet I cannot conceive that the constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of a law may be made to depend willy-nilly on factors not
inherent in its provisions. For a law to be struck down as unconstitutional it must
be so by reason of some irreconcilable conflict between it and the Constitution.
Otherwise a law may be either valid or invalid, according to circumstances not
found in its provisions, such as the zeal with which they are carried out. To such a
thesis I cannot agree. The criterion would be too broad and relative, and dependent
upon individual opinions that at best are subjective. What one may regard as
sufficient compliance with the requirement of submission to the people, within the
context of the same law, may not be so to another. The question is susceptible of as
many views as there are viewers; and I do not think this Court would be justified in
saying that its own view on the matter is the correct one, to the exclusion of the
opinions of others.
On the other hand, I reject the argument that the ratification must necessarily be in
a special election or plebiscite called for that purpose alone. While such procedure
is highly to be preferred, the Constitution speaks simply of "an election at which
the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," and I do not
subscribe to the restrictive interpretation that the petitioners would place on this
provision, namely, that it means only a special election.
BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring:
It is the glory of our institutions that they are founded upon law, that no one can
exercise any authority over the rights and interests of others except pursuant to and
in the manner authorized by law.1 Based upon this principle, petitioners Ramon A.
Gonzales and Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) come to this
Court in separate petitions.
Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and allegedly in representation

thru class suit of all citizens of this country, filed this suit for prohibition with
preliminary injunction to restrain the Commission on Elections, Director of
Printing and Auditor General from implementing and/or complying with Republic
Act 4913, assailing said law as unconstitutional.
Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, non-profit and non-partisan corporation,

assails the constitutionality not only of Republic Act 4913 but also of Resolutions
of Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3 of March 16, 1967.
Republic Act 4913, effective June 17, 1967, is an Act submitting to the Filipino
people for approval the amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines
proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in Resolutions of Both Houses
Numbered 1 and 3, adopted on March 16, 1967. Said Republic Act fixes the date
and manner of the election at which the aforesaid proposed amendments shall be
voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds for said election. Resolutions of
Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3 propose two amendments to the Constitution: the first,
to amend Sec. 5, Art. VI, by increasing the maximum membership of the House of
Representatives from 120 to 180, apportioning 160 of said 180 seats and
eliminating the provision that Congress shall by law make an apportionment within
three years after the return of every enumeration; the second, to amend Sec. 16,
Art. VI, by allowing Senators and Representatives to be delegates to a
constitutional convention without forfeiting their seats.
Since both petitions relate to the proposed amendments, they are considered
together herein.
Specifically and briefly, petitioner Gonzales' objections are as follows: (1)

Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution, in submitting the
proposed amendments to the Constitution, to the people for approval, at the general
election of 1967 instead of at a special election solely for that purpose; (2)
Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution, since it was not
passed with the 3/4 vote in joint session required when Congress proposes
amendments to the Constitution, said Republic Act being a step in or part of the
process of proposing amendments to the Constitution; and (3) Republic Act 4913
violates the due process clause of the Constitution (Sec. 1, Subsec. 1, Art. III), in
not requiring that the substance of the proposed amendments be stated on the face
of the ballot or otherwise rendering clear the import of the proposed amendments,
such as by stating the provisions before and after said amendments, instead of
printing at the back of the ballot only the proposed amendments.
Since observance of Constitutional provisions on the procedure for amending the

Constitution is concerned, the issue is cognizable by this Court under its powers to
review an Act of Congress to determine its conformity to the fundamental law. For
though the Constitution leaves Congress free to propose whatever Constitutional
amendment it deems fit, so that the substance or content of said proposed
amendment is a matter of policy and wisdom and thus a political question, the
Constitution nevertheless imposes requisites as to the manner orprocedure of
proposing such amendments, e.g., the three-fourths vote requirement. Said
procedure or manner, therefore, from being left to the discretion of Congress, as a
matter of policy and wisdom, is fixed by the Constitution. And to that extent, all
questions bearing on whether Congress in proposing amendments followed the
procedure required by the Constitution, is perforce justiciable, it not being a matter
of policy or wisdom.
Turning then to petitioner Gonzales' first objection, Sec. 1, Art. XV clearly does
not bear him on the point. It nowhere requires that the ratification be thru an
election solely for that purpose. It only requires that it be at "an election at which
the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification." To join it with
an election for candidates to public office, that is, to make it concurrent with such
election, does not render it any less an election at which the proposed amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification. To prohibition being found in the
plain terms of the Constitution, none should be inferred. Had the framers of
requiring Constitution thought of requiring a special election for the purpose only
of the proposed amendments, they could have said so, by qualifying the phrase
with some word such as "special" or "solely" or "exclusively". They did not.
It is not herein decided that such concurrence of election is wise, or that it would
not have been better to provide for a separate election exclusively for the
ratification of the proposed amendments. The point however is that such separate
and exclusive election, even if it may be better or wiser, which again, is not for this
Court to decide, is not included in the procedure required by the Constitution to
amend the same. The function of the Judiciary is "not to pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation".2 It is limited to determining whether
the action taken by the Legislative Department has violated the Constitution or not.
On this score, I am of the opinion that it has not.
Petitioner Gonzales' second point is that Republic Act 4913 is deficient for not
having been passed by Congress in joint session by 3/4 vote.
Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths

of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election to
which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
Does Republic Act 4913 propose amendments to the Constitution? If by the term
"propose amendment" is meant to determine WHAT said amendment shall be, then
Republic Act 4913 does not; Resolutions of Both Houses 1 and 3 already did that.
If, on the other hand, it means, or also means, to provide for how, when, and by
what means the amendments shall be submitted to the people for approval, then it
does.
A careful reading of Sec. 1, Art. XV shows that the first sense. is the one intended.
Said Section has two sentences: in the first, it requires the 3/4 voting in joint
session, for Congress to "propose amendments". And then in the second sentence,
it provides that "such amendments . . . shall be submitted to the people for their
ratification". This clearly indicates that by the term "propose amendments" in the
first sentence is meant to frame the substance or the content or the WHAT-element
of the amendments; for it is this and this alone that is submitted to the people for
their ratification. The details of when the election shall be held for approval or
rejection of the proposed amendments, or the manner of holding it, are not
submitted for ratification to form part of the Constitution. Stated differently, the
plain language of Section 1, Art. XV, shows that the act of proposing amendments
is distinct from — albeit related to — that of submitting the amendments to the
people for their ratification; and that the 3/4 voting requirement applies only to the
first step, not to the second one.
It follows that the submission of proposed amendments can be done thru an

ordinary statute passed by Congress. The Constitution does not expressly state by
whom the submission shall be undertaken; the rule is that a power not lodged
elsewhere under the Constitution is deemed to reside with the legislative body,
under the doctrine of residuary powers. Congress therefore validly enacted
Republic Act 4913 to fix the details of the date and manner of submitting the
proposed amendments to the people for their ratification. Since it does not
"propose amendments" in the sense referred to by Sec. 1, Art. XV of the
Constitution, but merely provides for how and when the amendments, already
proposed, are going to be voted upon, the same does not need the 3/4 vote in joint
session required in Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution. Furthermore, Republic Act
4913 is an appropriation measure. Sec. 6 thereof appropriates P1,000,000 for
carrying out its provisions. Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution states that "All
appropriation . . . bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives".
Republic Act 4913, therefore, could not have been validly adopted in a joint
session, reinforcing the view that Sec. 1, Art. XV does not apply to such a measure
providing for the holding of the election to ratify the proposed amendments, which
must perforce appropriate funds for its purpose.
Petitioner Gonzales contends, thirdly, that Republic Act 4913 offends against
substantive due process. An examination of the provisions of the law shows no
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. The publication in the
Official Gazette at least 20 days before the election, the posting of notices in public
buildings not later than October 14, 1967, to remain posted until after the elections,
the placing of copies of the proposed amendments in the polling places, aside from
printing the same at the back of the ballot, provide sufficient opportunity to the
voters to cast an intelligent vote on the proposal. Due process refers only to
providing fair opportunity; it does not guarantee that the opportunity given will in
fact be availed of; that is the look-out of the voter and the responsibility of the
citizen. As long as fair and reasonable opportunity to be informed is given, and it
is, the due process clause is not infringed.
Non-printing of the provisions to be amended as they now stand, and the printing
of the full proposed amendments at the back of the ballot instead of the substance
thereof at the face of the ballot, do not deprive the voter of fair opportunity to be
informed. The present wording of the Constitution is not being veiled or
suppressed from him; he is conclusively presumed to know them and they are
available should he want to check on what he is conclusively presumed to know.
Should the voters choose to remain ignorant of the present Constitution, the fault
does not lie with Congress. For opportunity to familiarize oneself with the
Constitution as it stands has been available thru all these years. Perhaps it would
have been more convenient for the voters if the present wording of the provisions
were also to be printed on the ballot. The same however is a matter of policy. As
long as the method adopted provides sufficiently reasonable chance to intelligently
vote on the amendments, and I think it does in this case, it is not constitutionally
defective.
Petitioner Gonzales' other arguments touch on the merits or wisdom of the

proposed amendments. These are for the people in their sovereign capacity to
decide, not for this Court.
Two arguments were further advanced: first, that Congress cannot both call a
convention and propose amendments; second, that the present Congress is a de
facto one, since no apportionment law was adopted within three years from the last
census of 1960, so that the Representatives elected in 1961 are de facto officers
only. Not being de jure, they cannot propose amendments, it is argued.
As to the first point, Sec. 1 of Art. XV states that Congress "may propose
amendments or call a convention for that purpose". The term "or", however, is
frequently used as having the same meaning as "and" particularly in permissive,
affirmative sentences so that the interpretation of the word "or" as "and" in the
Constitution in such use will not change its meaning (Vicksburg S. & P. R. Co. v.
Goodenough, 32 So. 404, 411, 108 La, 442). And it should be pointed out that the
resolutions proposing amendments (R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3) are different from that
calling for a convention (R.B.H. No. 2). Surely, if Congress deems it better or wise
to amend the Constitution before a convention called for is elected, it should not be
fettered from doing so. For our purposes in this case, suffice it to note that the
Constitution does not prohibit it from doing so.
As to the second argument, it is also true that Sec. 5 of Art. VI of the Constitution
provides in part that "The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within
three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise". It however
further states in the next sentence: "Until such apportionment shall have been
made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as
that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified
electors from the present assembly districts." The failure of Congress, therefore, to
pass a valid redistricting law since the time the above provision was adopted, does
not render the present districting illegal or unconstitutional. For the Constitution
itself provides for its continuance in such case, rendering legal and de
jure the status quo.
For the above reasons, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of Republic Act 4913,
and fully concur with the opinion of the Chief Justice.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
At the outset, we are faced with a question of jurisdiction. The opinion prepared by
the Chief Justice discusses the matter with a fullness that erases doubts and
misgivings and clarifies the applicable principles. A few words may however be
added.
We start from the premise that only where it can be shown that the question is to be
solved by public opinion or where the matter has been left by the Constitution to
the sole discretion of any of the political branches, as was so clearly stated by the
then Justice Concepcion in Tañada v. Cuenco,1 may this Court avoid passing on
the issue before it. Whatever may be said about the present question, it is hard to
speak with certitude considering Article XV, that Congress may be entrusted with
the full and uncontrolled discretion on the procedure leading to proposals for an
amendment of the Constitution.
It may be said however that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,2 this Court through Justice
Tuason followed Coleman v. Miller,3 in its holding that certain aspects of the
amending process may be considered political. His opinion quoted with approval
the view of Justice Black, to which three other members of the United States
Supreme Court agreed, that the process itself is political in its entirety, "from
submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not
subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point." In a sense that
would solve the matter neatly. The judiciary would be spared the at times arduous
and in every case soul-searching process of determining whether the procedure for
amendments required by the Constitution has been followed.
At the same time, without impugning the motives of Congress, which cannot be
judicially inquired into at any rate, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a
failure to observe the requirements of Article XV would occur. In the event that
judicial intervention is sought, to rely automatically on the theory of political
question to avoid passing on such a matter of delicacy might under certain
circumstances be considered, and rightly so, as nothing less than judicial
abdication or surrender.
What appears regrettable is that a major opinion of an esteemed jurist, the late
Justice Tuason, would no longer be controlling. There is comfort in the thought
that the view that then prevailed was itself a product of the times. It could very
well be that considering the circumstances existing in 1947 as well as the particular
amendment sought to be incorporated in the Constitution, the parity rights
ordinance, the better part of wisdom in view of the grave economic situation then
confronting the country would be to avoid the existence of any obstacle to its being
submitted for ratification. Moreover, the Republic being less than a year old,
American Supreme Court opinions on constitutional questions were-invariably
accorded uncritical acceptance. Thus the approach followed by Justice Tuason is
not difficult to understand. It may be said that there is less propensity now, which
is all to the good, for this Court to accord that much deference to constitutional
views coming from the quarter.
Nor is this mode of viewing the opinion of Justice Tuason to do injustice to his
memory. For as he stated in another major opinion in Araneta v. Dinglasan,4 in
ascertaining the meaning to be given the Emergency Powers Act,5 one should not
ignore what would ensue if a particular mode of construction were followed. As he
so emphatically stated, "We test a rule by its results."
The consequences of a judicial veto on the then proposed amendment on the

economic survival of the country, an erroneous appraisal it turned out later,
constituted an effective argument for its submission. Why not then consider the
question political and let the people decide? That assumption could have been
indulged in. It could very well be the inarticulate major premise. For many it did
bear the stamp of judicial statesmanship.
The opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion renders crystal-clear why as of this date
and in the foreseeable future judicial inquiry to assure the utmost compliance with
the constitutional requirement would be a more appropriate response.
SANCHEZ, J., in separate opinion:
Right at the outset, the writer expresses his deep appreciation to Mr. Justice Calixto
O. Zaldivar and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro for their invaluable contribution to
the substance and form of the opinion which follows.
Directly under attack in this, a petition for prohibition, is the constitutionality of

Republic Act 4913, approved on June 17, 1967. This Act seeks to implement
Resolutions 1 and 3 adopted by the Senate and the House of Representatives on
March 16, 1967 with the end in view of amending vital portions of the
Constitution.
Since the problem here presented has its roots in the resolutions aforesaid of both
houses of Congress, it may just as well be that we recite in brief the salient features
thereof. Resolution No. 1 increases the membership of the House of
Representatives from 120 to 180 members, and immediately apportions 160 seats.
A companion resolution is Resolution No. 3 which permits Senators and
Congressmen — without forfeiting their seats in Congress — to be members of the
Constitutional Convention1 to be convened, as provided in another resolution —
Resolution No. 2. Parenthetically, two of these proposed amendments to the
Constitution (Resolutions I and 3) are to be submitted to the people for their
ratification next November 14, 1967. Resolution No. 2 just adverted to calls for a
constitutional convention also to propose amendments to the Constitution. The
delegates thereto are to be elected on the second Tuesday of November 1970; the
convention to sit on June 1, 1971; and the amendments proposed by the convention
to be submitted to the people thereafter for their ratification.
Of importance now are the proposed amendments increasing the number of

members of the House of representatives under Resolution No. 1, and that in
Resolution No. 3 which gives Senators and Congressmen the right to sit as
members of the constitutional convention to be convened on June 1, 1971.
Because, these are the two amendments to be submitted to the people in the general
elections soon to be held on November 14, 1967, upon the provisions of Section 1,
Republic Act 4913, which reads:
The amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines proposed by the

Congress of the Philippines in Resolutions of both Houses Numbered One
and Three, both adopted on March sixteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-
seven, shall be submitted to the people for approval at the general election
which shall be held on November fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-
seven, in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Republic Act 4913 projects the basic angle of the problem thrust upon us — the
manner in which the amendments proposed by Congress just adverted to be
brought to the people's attention.
First, to the controlling constitutional precept. In order that proposed amendments

to the Constitution may become effective, Section 1, Article XV thereof commands
that such amendments must be "approved by a majority of the votes cast at an
election at which amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification."2 The accent is on two words complementing each other, namely,
"submitted" and "ratification."
1. We are forced to take a long hard look at the core of the problem facing us. And
this, because the amendments submitted are transcendental and encompassing. The
ceiling of the number of Congressmen is sought to be elevated from 120 to 180
members; and Senators and Congressmen may run in constitutional conventions
without forfeiting their seats. These certainly affect the people as a whole. The
increase in the number of Congressmen has its proportional increase in the people's
tax burdens. They may not look at this with favor, what with the constitutional
provision (Section 5, Article VI) that Congress "shall by law make an
apportionment", without the necessity of disturbing the present constitutionally
provided number of Congressmen. People in Quezon City, for instance, may balk
at the specific apportionment of the 160 seats set forth in Resolution No. 1, and ask
for a Congressman of their own, on the theory of equal representation. And then,
people may question the propriety of permitting the increased 180 Congressmen
from taking part in the forthcoming constitutional convention and future
conventions for fear that they may dominate its proceedings. They may entertain
the belief that, if at all, increase in the number of Congressmen should be a proper
topic for deliberation in a constitutional convention which, anyway, will soon take
place. They probably would ask: Why the hurry? These ponderables require the
people's close scrutiny.
2. With these as backdrop, we perforce go into the philosophy behind the

constitutional directive that constitutional amendments be submitted to the people
for their ratification.
A constitutional amendment is not a temporary expedient. Unlike a statute which
may suffer amendments three or more times in the same year, it is intended to
stand the test of time. It is an expression of the people's sovereign will.
And so, our approach to the problem of the mechanics of submission for
ratification of amendments is thatreasoning on the basis of the spirit of the
Constitution is just as important as reasoning by a strict adherence to the
phraseology thereof. We underscore this, because it is within the realm of
possibility that a Constitution maybe overhauled. Supposing three-fourths of the
Constitution is to be amended. Or, the proposal is to eliminate the all important;
Bill of Rights in its entirety. We believe it to be beyond debate that in some such
situations the amendments ought to call for a constitutional convention rather than
a legislative proposal. And yet, nothing there is in the books or in the Constitution
itself. which would require such amendments to be adopted by a constitutional
convention. And then, too, the spirit of the supreme enactment, we are sure, forbids
that proposals therefor be initiated by Congress and thereafter presented to the
people for their ratification.
In the context just adverted to, we take the view that the words "submitted to the
people for their ratification", if construed in the light of the nature of the
Constitution — a fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people, an
— expression of their sovereign will — is that it can only be amended by the
people expressing themselves according to the procedure ordained by the
Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their
blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to
vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original
provisions compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a
conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of
extraneous or possibly in insidious influences. We believe, the word "submitted"
can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain
every effort to inform very citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the
proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we are
not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000 citizens
cannot be reached, then there is no submission within the meaning of the word as
intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs
is that the government, in submitting an amendment for ratification, should put
every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten the
people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we
have earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must
be fair submission, intelligent, consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the
people still approve the amendment no matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so
be it. For, the people decree their own fate.
Aptly had it been said:
. . . The great men who builded the structure of our state in this respect had
the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has
said "A good Constitution should beyond the reach of temporary excitement
and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it
must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people, or the
thought evolved the excitement or hot blood, but the sober second thought,
which alone, if the government is to be safe, can be allowed efficiency. . .
. Changes in government are to be feared unless the benefit is certain. As
Montaign says: "All great mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does
not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a worse." Am.
Law Rev. 1889, p. 3113
3. Tersely put, the issue before us funnels down to this proposition: If the people
are not sufficiently informed of the amendments to be voted upon, to
conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine manner can it
be said that in accordance with the constitutional mandate, "the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification?" Our answer is "No".
We examine Republic Act 4913, approved on June 17, 1967 — the statute that
submits to the people the constitutional amendments proposed by Congress in
Resolutions 1 and 3. Section 2 of the Act provides the manner of propagation of
the nature of the amendments throughout the country. There are five parts in said
Section 2, viz:
(1) The amendment shall be published in three consecutive issues of the

Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election.
(2) A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every

municipality, city and provincial office building and in every polling place
not later than October fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and shall
remain posted therein until after the election.
(3) At least five copies of the said amendments shall be kept in each polling
place to be made available for examination by the qualified electors during
election day.
(4) When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be
determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling
place.
(5) The Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said

amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the principal
native languages, for free distribution.
A question that comes to mind is whether the procedure for dissemination of

information regarding the amendments effectively brings the matter to the people.
A dissection of the mechanics yields disturbing thoughts. First, the Official Gazette
is not widely read. It does not reach the barrios. And even if it reaches the barrios,
is it available to all? And if it is, would all under stand English? Second, it should
be conceded that many citizens, especially those in the outlying barrios, do not go
to municipal, city and/or provincial office buildings, except on special occasions
like paying taxes or responding to court summonses. And if they do, will they
notice the printed amendments posted on the bulletin board? And if they do notice,
such copy again is in English (sample submitted to this Court by the Solicitor
General) for, anyway, the statute does not require that it be in any other language
or dialect. Third, it would not help any if at least five copies are kept in the polling
place for examination by qualified electors during election day. As petitioner puts
it, voting time is not study time. And then, who can enter the polling place, except
those who are about to vote? Fourth, copies in the principal native languages shall
be kept in each polling place. But this is not, as Section 2 itself implies, in the
nature of a command because such copies shall be kept therein only "when
practicable" and "as may be determined by the Commission on Elections." Even if
it be said that these are available before election, a citizen may not intrude into the
school building where the polling places are usually located without disturbing the
school classes being held there. Fifth, it is true that the Comelec is directed to make
available copies of such amendments in English, Spanish or whenever practicable,
in the principal native languages, for free distribution. However, Comelec is not
required to actively distribute them to the people. This is significant as to people in
the provinces, especially those in the far-flung barrios who are completely
unmindful of the discussions that go on now and then in the cities and centers of
population on the merits and demerits of the amendments. Rather, Comelec, in this
case, is but a passive agency which may hold copies available, but which copies
may not be distributed at all. Finally, it is of common knowledge that Comelec has
more than its hands full in these pre-election days. They cannot possibly make
extensive distribution.
Voters will soon go to the polls to say "yes" or "no". But even the official sample
ballot submitted to this Court would show that only the amendments are printed at
the back. And this, in pursuance to Republic Act 4913 itself.
Surely enough, the voters do not have the benefit of proper notice of the proposed
amendments thru dissemination by publication in extenso. People do not have at
hand the necessary data on which to base their stand on the merits and demerits of
said amendments.
We, therefore, hold that there is no proper submission of the proposed

constitutional amendments within the meaning and intendment of Section 1,
Article XV of the Constitution.
4. Contemporary history is witness to the fact that during the present election
campaign the focus is on the election of candidates. The constitutional
amendments are crowded out. Candidates on the homestretch, and their leaders as
well as the voters, gear their undivided efforts to the election of officials; the
constitutional amendments cut no ice with them. The truth is that even in the ballot
itself, the space accorded to the casting of "yes" or "no" vote would give one the
impression that the constitutional amendments are but a bootstrap to the electoral
ballot. Worse still, the fortunes of many elective officials, on the national and local
levels, are inextricably intertwined with the results of the votes on the plebiscite. In
a clash between votes for a candidate and conscience on the merits and demerits of
the constitutional amendments, we are quite certain that it is the latter that will be
dented.
5. That proper submission of amendments to the people to enable them to equally

ratify them properly is the meat of the constitutional requirement, is reflected in the
sequence of uniform past practices. The Constitution had been amended thrice —
in 1939, 1940 and 1947. In each case, the amendments were embodied in
resolutions adopted by the Legislature, which thereafter fixed the dates at which
the proposed amendments were to be ratified or rejected. These plebiscites have
been referred to either as an "election" or "general election". At no time, however,
was the vote for the amendments of the Constitution held simultaneously with the
election officials, national or local. Even with regard to the 1947 parity
amendment; the record shows that the sole issue was the 1947 parity amendment;
and the special elections simultaneously held in only three provinces, Iloilo,
Pangasinan and Bukidnon, were merely incidental thereto.
In the end we say that the people are the last ramparts that guard against
indiscriminate changes in the Constitution that is theirs. Is it too much to ask that
reasonable guarantee be made that in the matter of the alterations of the law of the
land, their true voice be heard? The answer perhaps is best expressed in the
following thoughts: "It must be remembered that the Constitution is the people's
enactment. No proposed change can become effective unless they will it so through
the compelling force of need of it and desire for it."4
For the reasons given, our vote is that Republic Act 4913 must be stricken down as
in violation of the Constitution.
Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Angeles, JJ., concur in the result.
MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner,

vs.
JAIME FERRER, as Chairman of the Comelec, LINO M. PATAJO and
CESAR MILAFLOR, as members thereof, respondents.
G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF R.A. No. 6132, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1970. RAUL M.
GONZALES,petitioner,
vs.
COMELEC, respondent.
Manuel B. Imbong in his own behalf.
Raul M. Gonzales in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General
Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr., and Solicitors Raul I. Goco, Bernardo P. Pardo, Rosalio
A. de Leon, Vicente A. Torres and Guillermo C. Nakar for respondents.
Lorenzo Tañada, Arturo Tolentino, Jovito Salonga and Emmanuel Pelaez as amici
curiae.
MAKASIAR, J.:
These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to
Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales,
both members of the Bar, taxpayers and interested in running as candidates for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as
such candidates. After the Solicitor General had filed answers in behalf the
respondents, hearings were held at which the petitioners and the amici curiae,
namely Senator Lorenzo Tañada, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Senator Jovito
Salonga, and Senator Emmanuel Pelaez argued orally.
It will be recalled that on March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent

Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which
among others called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional
amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district
who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on
the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election
Code.
After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the November elections of
that year, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914
implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 and practically restating in toto the
provisions of said Resolution No. 2.
On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed

Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by
providing that the convention "shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned
among the existing representative districts according to the number of their
respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at
least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required of
members of the House of Representatives," 1 "and that any other details relating to
the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding
of, the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing
legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this
Resolution." 2
On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act
No. 6132, implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A.
No.
4914. 3
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the
particular provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner
Manuel B. Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said
R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds advanced by petitioner Gonzales.
The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public officers and
employees, whether elective or appointive, including members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, as well as officers and employees of corporations or
enterprises of the government, as resigned from the date of the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, was recently sustained by this Court, on the grounds,
inter alia, that the same is merely an application of and in consonance with the
prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and that it does not constitute a
denial of due process or of the equal protection of the law. Likewise, the
constitutionality of paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 was upheld. 4
II
Without first considering the validity of its specific provisions, we sustain the
constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress acting as a
legislative body in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, and not as a
Constituent Assembly, because —
1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art.

XV of the Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose
Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by
a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but
voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a constitutional
convention were passed by the required three-fourths vote.
2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary

authority to call a constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the
doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the
effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power to
fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation of
the delegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the expenses
for the election of delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional
Convention itself, as well as all other implementing details
indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4
already embody the above-mentioned details, except the appropriation
of funds.
3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by

the present Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details,
which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in
R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within
the competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive
legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly
or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the
Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as lone as such
statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the
constitution, they are valid.
4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly,

omits to provide for such implementing details after calling a
constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can
enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which
authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended
by Res. No. 4.
5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be
vetoed by the President is no argument against conceding such power
in Congress as a legislative body nor present any difficulty; for it is
not irremediable as Congress can override the Presidential veto or
Congress can reconvene as a Constituent Assembly and adopt a
resolution prescribing the required implementing details.
III
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates

is not in accordance with proportional representation and therefore violates the
Constitution and the intent of the law itself, without pinpointing any specific
provision of the Constitution with which it collides.
Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does not

expressly or impliedly require such apportionment of delegates to the convention
on the basis of population in each congressional district. Congress, sitting as a
Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally allocate one delegate for, each
congressional district or for each province, for reasons of economy and to avoid
having an unwieldy convention. If the framers of the present Constitution wanted
the apportionment of delegates to the convention to be based on the number of
inhabitants in each representative district, they would have done so in so many
words as they did in relation to the apportionment of the representative districts. 5
The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly
conflict with its own intent expressed therein; for it merely obeyed and
implemented the intent of Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly expressed in
Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320 delegates should be apportioned
among the existing representative districts according to the number of their
respective inhabitants, but fixing a minimum of at least two delegates for a
representative district. The presumption is that the factual predicate, the latest
available official population census, for such apportionment was presented to
Congress, which, accordingly employed a formula for the necessary computation
to effect the desired proportional representation.
The records of the proceedings on Senate Bill No. 77 sponsored by Senator Pelaez
which is now R.A. No. 6132, submitted to this Tribunal by the amici curiae, show
that it based its apportionment of the delegates on the 1970 official preliminary
population census taken by the Bureau of Census and Statistics from May 6 to June
30, 1976; and that Congress adopted the formula to effect a reasonable
apportionment of delegates. The Director of the Bureau of Census and Statistics
himself, in a letter to Senator Pelaez dated July 30, 1970, stated that "on the basis
of the preliminary count of the population, we have computed the distribution of
delegates to the Constitutional Convention based on Senate Bill 77 (p. 2 lines 5 to
32 and p. 3 line 12) which is a fair and an equitable method of distributing the
delegates pursuant to the provisions of the joint Resolution of both Houses No. 2,
as amended. Upon your request at the session of the Senate-House Conference
Committee meeting last night, we are submitting herewith the results of the
computation on the basis of the above-stated method."
Even if such latest census were a preliminary census, the same could still be a valid
basis for such apportionment.6 The fact that the lone and small congressional
district of Batanes, may be over-represented, because it is allotted two delegates by
R.A. No. 6132 despite the fact that it has a population very much less than several
other congressional districts, each of which is also allotted only two delegates, and
therefore under-represented, vis-a-vis Batanes alone, does not vitiate the
apportionment as not effecting proportional representation. Absolute proportional
apportionment is not required and is not possible when based on the number of
inhabitants, for the population census cannot be accurate nor complete, dependent
as it is on the diligence of the census takers, aggravated by the constant movement
of population, as well as daily death and birth. It is enough that the basis employed
is reasonable and the resulting apportionment is substantially proportional.
Resolution No. 4 fixed a minimum of two delegates for a congressional district.
While there may be other formulas for a reasonable apportionment considering the
evidence submitted to Congress by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, we are not
prepared to rule that the computation formula adopted by, Congress for
proportional representation as, directed in Res. No. 4 is unreasonable and that the
apportionment provided in R.A. No. 6132 does not constitute a substantially
proportional representation.
In the Macias case, relied on by petitioner Gonzales, the apportionment law, which
was nullified as unconstitutional, granted more representatives to a province with
less population than the provinces with more inhabitants. Such is not the case here,
where under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 Batanes is allotted only two delegates, which
number is equal to the number of delegates accorded other provinces with more
population. The present petitions therefore do not present facts which fit the mould
of the doctrine in the case of Macias et al. vs. Comelec, supra.
The impossibility of absolute proportional representation is recognized by the

Constitution itself when it directs that the apportionment of congressional districts
among the various provinces shall be "as nearly as may be according to their
respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one member" (Sec. 5,
Art. VI, Phil. Const., emphasis supplied). The employment of the phrase "as nearly
as may be according to their respective inhabitants" emphasizes the fact that the
human mind can only approximate a reasonable apportionment but cannot effect an
absolutely proportional representation with mathematical precision or exactitude.
IV
Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue deprivation of

liberty without due process of law and denies the equal protection of the laws. Said
Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected delegate from running "for any public office in any
election" or from assuming "any appointive office or position in any branch of the
government government until after the final adjournment of the Constitutional
Convention."
That the citizen does not have any inherent nor natural right to a public office, is
axiomatic under our constitutional system. The State through its Constitution or
legislative body, can create an office and define the qualifications and
disqualifications therefor as well as impose inhibitions on a public officer.
Consequently, only those with qualifications and who do not fall under any
constitutional or statutory inhibition can be validly elected or appointed to a public
office. The obvious reason for the questioned inhibition, is to immunize the
delegates from the perverting influence of self-interest, party interest or vested
interest and to insure that he dedicates all his time to performing solely in the
interest of the nation his high and well nigh sacred function of formulating the
supreme law of the land, which may endure for generations and which cannot
easily be changed like an ordinary statute. With the disqualification embodied in
Sec. 5, the delegate will not utilize his position as a bargaining leverage for
concessions in the form of an elective or appointive office as long as the
convention has not finally adjourned. The appointing authority may, by his
appointing power, entice votes for his own proposals. Not love for self, but love for
country must always motivate his actuations as delegate; otherwise the several
provisions of the new Constitution may only satisfy individual or special interests,
subversive of the welfare of the general citizenry. It should be stressed that the
disqualification is not permanent but only temporary only to continue until the
final adjournment of the convention which may not extend beyond one year. The
convention that framed the present Constitution finished its task in approximately
seven months — from July 30, 1934 to February 8, 1935.
As admitted by petitioner Gonzales, this inhibition finds analogy in the

constitutional provision prohibiting a member of Congress, during the time for
which he was elected, from being appointed to any civil office which may have
been created or the emolument whereof shall have been increased while he was a
member of the Congress. (Sec. 16, Art. VI, Phil. Constitution.)
As observed by the Solicitor General in his Answer, the overriding objective of the
challenged disqualification, temporary in nature, is to compel the elected delegates
to serve in full their term as such and to devote all their time to the convention,
pursuant to their representation and commitment to the people; otherwise, his seat
in the convention will be vacant and his constituents will be deprived of a voice in
the convention. The inhibition is likewise "designed to prevent popular political
figures from controlling elections or positions. Also it is a brake on the appointing
power, to curtail the latter's desire to 'raid' the convention of "talents" or attempt to
control the convention." (p. 10, Answer in L-32443.)
Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a
valid limitation on the right to public office pursuant to state police power as it is
reasonable and not arbitrary.
The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention

is likewise constitutional; for it is based on a substantial distinction which makes
for real differences, is germane to the purposes of the law, and applies to all
members of the same class. 7 The function of a delegate is more far-reaching and
its effect more enduring than that of any ordinary legislator or any other public
officer. A delegate shapes the fundamental law of the land which delineates the
essential nature of the government, its basic organization and powers, defines the
liberties of the people, and controls all other laws. Unlike ordinary statutes,
constitutional amendments cannot be changed in one or two years. No other public
officer possesses such a power, not even the members of Congress unless they
themselves, propose constitutional amendments when acting as a Constituent
Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution. The classification, therefore, is
neither whimsical nor repugnant to the sense of justice of the community.
As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the object of the law, which is
to insure that the proposed amendments are meaningful to the masses of our people
and not designed for the enhancement of selfishness, greed, corruption, or
injustice.
Lastly, the disqualification applies to all the delegates to the convention who will
be elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970.
Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by both petitioners as

violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection of the
laws, freedom of expressions, freedom of assembly and freedom of association.
This Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due process, equal protection of
the laws, peaceful assembly, free expression, and the right of association are
neither absolute nor illimitable rights; they are always subject to the pervasive and
dormant police power of the State and may be lawfully abridged to serve
appropriate and important public interests. 8
In said Gonzalez vs. Comelec case the Court applied the clear and present danger
test to determine whether a statute which trenches upon the aforesaid
Constitutional guarantees, is a legitimate exercise of police power. 9
Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits:
1. any candidate for delegate to the convention
(a) from representing, or
(b) allowing himself to be represented as being a

candidate of any political party or any other organization;
and
2. any political party, political group, political committee, civic,

religious, professional or other organizations or organized group of
whatever nature from
(a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate

or in the filing of his certificate, or
(b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly,

material or otherwise, favorable to or against his
campaign for election.
The ban against all political parties or organized groups of whatever nature
contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a), is confined to party or organization support or
assistance, whether material, moral, emotional or otherwise. The very Sec. 8(a) in
its provisos permits the candidate to utilize in his campaign the help of the
members of his family within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity,
and a campaign staff composed of not more than one for every ten precincts in his
district. It allows the full exercise of his freedom of expression and his right to
peaceful assembly, because he cannot be denied any permit to hold a public
meeting on the pretext that the provision of said section may or will be violated.
The right of a member of any political party or association to support him or
oppose his opponent is preserved as long as such member acts individually. The
very party or organization to which he may belong or which may be in sympathy
with his cause or program of reforms, is guaranteed the right to disseminate
information about, or to arouse public interest in, or to advocate for constitutional
reforms, programs, policies or constitutional proposals for amendments.
It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec. 8(a) is so narrow that the
basic constitutional rights themselves remain substantially intact and inviolate.
And it is therefore a valid infringement of the aforesaid constitutional guarantees
invoked by petitioners.
In the aforesaid case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, this Court unanimously
sustained the validity of the limitation on the period for nomination of candidates
in Sec. 50-A of R.A. No. 4880, thus:
The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates presents a

question that is not too formidable in character. According to the act:
"It shall be unlawful for any political party, political committee, or
political group to nominate candidates for any elective public office
voted for at large earlier than one hundred and fifty days immediately
preceding an election, and for any other elective public office earlier
than ninety days immediately preceding an election.
The right of association is affected. Political parties have less freedom

as to the time during which they may nominate candidates; the
curtailment is not such, however, as to render meaningless such a
basic right. Their scope of legitimate activities, save this one, is not
unduly narrowed. Neither is there infringement of their freedom to
assemble. They can do so, but not for such a purpose. We sustain its
validity. We do so unanimously. 10
In said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court likewise held that the period for the
conduct of an election campaign or partisan political activity may be limited
without offending the aforementioned constitutional guarantees as the same is
designed also to prevent a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil, the
debasement of the electoral process." 11
Even if the partisan activity consists of (a) forming organizations, associations,

clubs, committees or other group of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or
candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings,
rallies, parades or other similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or
party; and (c) giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for election campaign
either directly or indirectly, (Sec. 50-B, pars. (a), (b), and (c), R.A. 4880), the
abridgment was still affirmed as constitutional by six members of this Court, which
could not "ignore ... the legislative declaration that its enactment was in response to
a serious substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in danger of
happening, but actually in existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or
remedied. To assert otherwise would be to close one's eyes to the reality of the
situation." 12;
Likewise, because four members dissented, this Court in said case of Gonzales vs.
Comelec, supra, failed to muster the required eight votes to declare as
unconstitutional the limitation on the period for (a) making speeches,
announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election
of any party or candidate for public office; (b) publishing or distributing campaign
literature or materials; and (e) directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party
specified in Sec. 50-B, pars. (c), (d) & (e) of R.A. 4880. 13
The debasement of the electoral process as a substantive evil exists today and is
one of the major compelling interests that moved Congress into prescribing the
total ban contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, to justify such ban. In
the said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court gave "due recognition to the
legislative concern to cleanse, and if possible, render spotless, the electoral
process," 14 impressed as it was by the explanation made by the author of R.A. No.
4880, Sen. Lorenzo Tañada, who appeared as amicus curiae, "that such provisions
were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and
appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual
existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and
corruption as well as violence that of late has marred election campaigns and
partisan political activities in this country. He did invite our attention likewise to
the well-settled doctrine that in the choice of remedies for an admitted malady
requiring governmental action, on the legislature primarily rests the responsibility.
Nor should the cure prescribed by it, unless clearly repugnant to fundamental
rights, be ignored or disregarded." 15
But aside from the clear and imminent danger of the debasement of the electoral
process, as conceded by Senator Pelaez, the basic motivation, according to Senate
Majority Floor Leader Senator Arturo Tolentino, the sponsor of the Puyat-
Tolentino amendment embodied in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, is to
assure the candidates equal protection of the laws by according them equality of
chances. 16 The primary purpose of the prohibition then is also to avert the clear
and present danger of another substantive evil, the denial of the equal protection of
the laws. The candidates must depend on their individual merits and not on the
support of political parties or organizations. Senator Tolentino and Senator Salonga
emphasized that under this provision, the poor candidate has an even chance as
against the rich candidate. We are not prepared to disagree with them, because
such a conclusion, predicated as it is on empirical logic, finds support in our recent
political history and experience. Both Senators stressed that the independent
candidate who wins in the election against a candidate of the major political
parties, is a rare phenomenon in this country and the victory of an independent
candidate mainly rests on his ability to match the resources, financial and
otherwise, of the political parties or organizations supporting his opponent. This
position is further strengthened by the principle that the guarantee of social justice
under Sec. V, Art. II of the Constitution, includes the guarantee of equal
opportunity, equality of political rights, and equality before the law enunciated by
Mr. Justice Tuazon in the case Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration. 17
While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per se it is
equally true that Congress in the exercise of its broad law-making authority can
declare certain acts as mala prohibita when justified by the exigencies of the times.
One such act is the party or organization support proscribed in Sec. 8(a),which ban
is a valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as expression, for the
reasons aforestated.
Senator Tolentino emphasized that "equality of chances may be better attained by

banning all organization support." 18
The questioned par. 1 of Sec. 8 (a) likewise can easily pass the balancing-of-
interest test. 19
In the apt words of the Solicitor General:
It is to be noted that right now the nation is on the threshold of

rewriting its Constitution in a hopeful endeavor to find a solution to
the grave economic, social and political problems besetting the
country. Instead of directly proposing the amendments Congress has
chosen to call a Constitutional Convention which shall have the task
of fashioning a document that shall embody the aspirations and ideals
of the people. Because what is to be amended is the fundamental law
of the land, it is indispensable that the Constitutional Convention be
composed of delegates truly representative of the people's will. Public
welfare demands that the delegates should speak for the entire nation,
and their voices be not those of a particular segment of the citizenry,
or of a particular class or group of people, be they religious, political,
civic or professional in character. Senator Pelaez, Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Codes and Constitutional Amendments,
eloquently stated that "the function of a constitution is not to represent
anyone in interest or set of interests, not to favor one group at the
expense or disadvantage of the candidates — but to encompass all the
interests that exist within our society and to blend them into one
harmonious and balanced whole. For the constitutional system means,
not the predominance of interests, but the harmonious balancing
thereof."
So that the purpose for calling the Constitutional Convention will not
be deflated or frustrated, it is necessary that the delegatee thereto be
independent, beholden to no one but to God, country and conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The evil therefore, which the law seeks to prevent lies in the election
of delegates who, because they have been chosen with the aid and
resources of organizations, cannot be expected to be sufficiently
representative of the people. Such delegates could very well be the
spokesmen of narrow political, religious or economic interest and not
of the great majority of the people. 20
We likewise concur with the Solicitor General that the equal protection of the laws
is not unduly subverted in par. I of Sec. 8(a); because it does not create any hostile
discrimination against any party or group nor does it confer undue favor or
privilege on an individual as heretofore stated. The discrimination applies to all
organizations, whether political parties or social, civic, religious, or professional
associations. The ban is germane to the objectives of the law, which are to avert the
debasement of the electoral process, and to attain real equality of chances among
individual candidates and thereby make real the guarantee of equal protection of
the laws.
The political parties and the other organized groups have built-in advantages
because of their machinery and other facilities, which, the individual candidate
who is without any organization support, does not have. The fact that the other
civic of religious organizations cannot have a campaign machinery as efficient as
that of a political party, does not vary the situation; because it still has that much
built-in advantage as against the individual candidate without similar support.
Moreover, these civic religious and professional organization may band together to
support common candidates, who advocates the reforms that these organizations
champion and believe are imperative. This is admitted by petitioner Gonzales thru
the letter of Senator Ganzon dated August 17, 1970 attached to his petition as
Annex "D", wherein the Senator stated that his own "Timawa" group had agreed
with the Liberal Party in Iloilo to support petitioner Gonzales and two others as
their candidates for the convention, which organized support is nullified by the
questioned ban, Senator Ganzon stressed that "without the group moving and
working in joint collective effort" they cannot "exercise effective control and
supervision over our
leaders — the Women's League, the area commanders, etc."; but with their joining
with the LP's they "could have presented a solid front with very bright chances of
capturing all seats."
The civic associations other than political parties cannot with reason insist that
they should be exempted from the ban; because then by such exemption they
would be free to utilize the facilities of the campaign machineries which they are
denying to the political parties. Whenever all organization engages in a political
activity, as in this campaign for election of delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, to that extent it partakes of the nature of a political organization. This,
despite the fact that the Constitution and by laws of such civic, religious, or
professional associations usually prohibit the association from engaging in partisan
political activity or supporting any candidate for an elective office. Hence, they
must likewise respect the ban.
The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join with
others or join any existing organization. A person may run independently on his
own merits without need of catering to a political party or any other association for
support. And he, as much as the candidate whose candidacy does not evoke
sympathy from any political party or organized group, must be afforded equal
chances. As emphasized by Senators Tolentino and Salonga, this ban is to assure
equal chances to a candidate with talent and imbued with patriotism as well as
nobility of purpose, so that the country can utilize their services if elected.
Impressed as We are by the eloquent and masterly exposition of Senator Tañada

for the invalidation of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, demonstrating once
again his deep concern for the preservation of our civil liberties enshrined in the
Bill of Rights, We are not persuaded to entertain the belief that the challenged ban
transcends the limits of constitutional invasion of such cherished immunities.
WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132
including Secs. 2, 4, 5, and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared
unconstitutional. Without costs.
SAMUEL C. OCCENA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
THE NATIONAL TREASURER, THE DIRECTOR OF
PRINTING, respondents.
G.R. No. L-56404 April 2, 1981
RAMON A. GONZALES, MANUEL B. IMBONG, JO AUREA MARCOS-

IMBONG, RAY ALLAN T. DRILON, NELSON B. MALANA and GIL M.
TABIOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL TREASURER and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three
Batasang Pambansa Resolutions 1proposing constitutional amendments, goes
further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Petitioners
Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and
former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present
Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these
petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the
Javellana 2 ruling to the contrary notwithstanding. To put it at its mildest, such an
approach has the arresting charm of novelty – but nothing else. It is in fact self
defeating, for if such were indeed the case, petitioners have come to the wrong
forum. We sit as a Court duty-bound to uphold and apply that Constitution. To
contend otherwise as was done here would be, quite clearly, an exercise in futility.
Nor are the arguments of petitioners cast in the traditional form of constitutional
litigation any more persuasive. For reasons to be set forth, we dismiss the petitions.
The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 3 and March 12,
1981. 4 On March 10 and 13 respectively, respondents were required to answer
each within ten days from notice. 5 There was a comment on the part of the
respondents. Thereafter, both cases were set for hearing and were duly argued on
March 26 by petitioners and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for respondents.
With the submission of pertinent data in amplification of the oral argument, the
cases were deemed submitted for decision.
It is the ruling of the Court, as set forth at the outset, that the petitions must be
dismissed.
1. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973
Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive
Secretary, 6 dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid
its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six 7 to four. 8 It then
concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle
to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." 9 Such a statement
served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served
to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that, as of January 17, 1973, the present
Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the
Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the
Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor
for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were
resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that.
What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both
a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by
Professors Black 10 and Murphy, 11 the Supreme Court can check as well as
legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of
coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is
an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally
deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the
meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has
invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v.
Sola, 12 promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the
effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited. 13
2. We come to the crucial issue, the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to
propose amendments and how it may be exercised. More specifically as to the
latter, the extent of the changes that may be introduced, the number of votes
necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper
submission. As was stated earlier, petitioners were unable to demonstrate that the
challenged resolutions are tainted by unconstitutionality.
(1) The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable.
The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as
pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same
powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights,
privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular
National Assembly and the Members thereof." 14One of such powers is precisely
that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions
vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be
ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. 15When, therefore,
the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister
Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue Of such
impotence Its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose
the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be
observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is Concerned, the question
of the authority of the InterimBatasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not
new. In Occena v. Commission on Elections, 16 filed by the same petitioner,
decided on January 28, 1980, such a question was involved although not directly
passed upon. To quote from the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Antonio in
that case: "Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of
the Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and
judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a
restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been
intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as
through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of
the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment." 17
(2) Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition that the amendments proposed
are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority
conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National
Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise and not to amend. It suffices to
quote from the opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del Rosario
v. Commission on Elections 18 to dispose of this contention. Thus: "3. And whether
the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or
entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution
based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because
the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the
sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution.
4. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new
one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes
the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the
Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become
immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people." 19 There is
here the adoption of the principle so well-known in American decisions as well as
legal texts that a constituent body can propose anything but conclude
nothing. 20 We are not disposed to deviate from such a principle not only sound in
theory but also advantageous in practice.
(3) That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as
well as the standard for proper submission. Again, petitioners have not made out a
case that calls for a judgment in their favor. The language of the Constitution
supplies the answer to the above questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa,
sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a
majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the
three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it
has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed.
That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is
not a requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa
exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. Moreover, even on the
assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary
majority was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an
amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a
foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved
by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1
abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the
Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is
the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the
question may be viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse
before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such
amendments having been called to the attention of the people so that it could not
plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to the proposed
changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be
resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: "Any amendment to,
or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three resolutions were approved
by the InterimBatasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5
and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for
April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.
Thus any argument to the contrary is unavailing. As for the people being
adequately informed, it cannot be denied that this time, as in the cited 1980 Occena
opinion of Justice Antonio, where the amendment restored to seventy the
retirement age of members of the judiciary, the proposed amendments have "been
intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as
through the mass media, [ so that ] it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are
unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment [ s ]." 22
WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.
Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and

Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I vote to give due course to the petitions at bar and to grant the application for a
temporary restraining order enjoining the plebiscite scheduled for April 7, 1981.
1. Consistently with my dissenting opinion in Sanidad vs. Comelec 1 on the

invalidity of the October 1976 amendments proposals to the 1973 Constitution for
not having been proposed nor adopted in accordance with the mandatory
provisions thereof, as restated by me in Hidalgo vs. Marcos 2 and De la Llana vs.
Comelec 3 , questioning the validity of the December 17, 1977 referendum –
exercise as to the continuance in office as incumbent President and to be Prime
Minister after the organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for
in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments, I am constrained to dissent from
the majority decision of dismissal of the petitions.
I had held in Sanidad that the transcendental constituent power to propose and
approve amendments to the Constitution as well as to set up the machinery and
prescribe the procedure for the ratification of the amendments proposals has been
withheld by the Constitution from the President (Prime Minister) as sole repository
of executive power and that so long as the regular National Assembly provided for
in Article VIII of the Constitution had not come to existence and the proposals for
constitutional amendments were now deemed necessary to be discussed and
adopted for submittal to the people, strict adherence with the mandatory
requirements of the amending process as provided in the Constitution must be
complied with. This means, under the prevailing doctrine ofTolentino vs.
Comelec 4 that the proposed amendments to be valid must come from the
constitutional agency vested with the constituent power to do so, i.e. in the Interim
National Assembly provided in the Transitory Article XVII which would then have
to be convened and not from the executive power as vested in the President (Prime
Minister) from whom such constituent power has been withheld.
2. As restated by me in the 1977 case of Hidalgo, under the controlling doctrine

of Tolentino, the October 1976 constitutional amendments which created the
Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the Interim National Assembly were invalid
since as ruled by the Court therein, constitutional provisions on amendments
"dealing with the procedure or manner of amending the fundamental law are
binding upon the Convention and the other departments of the government (and)
are no less binding upon the people" and "the very Idea of deparcing from the
fundamental law is anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and repugnant to
the essence of the rule of law." The proposed amendments at bar having been
adopted by the Interim Batasang Pambansa as the fruit of the invalid October, 1976
amendments must necessarily suffer from the same Congenital infirmity.
3. Prescinding from the foregoing and assuming the validity of the proposed
amendments, I reiterate my stand inSanidad that the doctrine of fair and proper
submission firs enunciated by a simple majority of six Justices (of an eleven
member Court prior to the 1973 Constitution which increased the official
composition of the Court to fifteen) in Gonzales vs. Comelec 5 and subsequently
officially adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds majority vote of the
Court (of eight votes, then) in Tolentino is fully applicable in the case at bar. The
three resolutions proposing complex, complicated and radical amendments of our
very structure of government were considered and approved by the Interim
Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 27, 1981. It set
the date of the plebiscite for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally
inadequate and far short of the ninety-day period fixed by the Constitution for
submittal to the people to "sufficiently inform them of the amendments to be voted
upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their will in a genuine
manner." 6
4. "The minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper
submission to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment" as stated by
retired Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in his separate opinion inGonzales bears
repeating as follows: "... we take the view that the words 'submitted to the people
for their ratification,' if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution – a
fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people, an expression of their
sovereign will – is that it can only be amended by the people expressing
themselves according to the procedure ordained by the Constitution. Therefore,
amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning.
The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They
must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare
them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates
of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly
insidious influences. We believe the word 'submitted' can only mean that the
government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every short to inform
every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and
the meaning, nature and effects thereof. ... What the Constitution in effect directs is
that the government, in submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every
instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten the people,
educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have
earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair
submission, intelligent consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the people
still approve the amendments no matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it.
For the people decree their own fate."
Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that "... The great
men who builded the structure of our state in this respect had the mental vision of a
good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said 'A good Constitution
should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or
passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the
people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement, or hot
blood, but the sober second thought, which alone if the government is to be safe,
can be allowed efficacy ... Changes in government are to be feard unless benefit is
certain.' As Montaign says: 'All great mutation shake and disorder a state. Good
does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a worse."'
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I vote to give due course to the petitions at bar and to grant the application for a
temporary restraining order enjoining the plebiscite scheduled for April 7, 1981.
1. Consistently with my dissenting opinion in Sanidad vs. Comelec 1 on the

invalidity of the October 1976 amendments proposals to the 1973 Constitution for
not having been proposed nor adopted in accordance with the mandatory
provisions thereof, as restated by me in Hidalgo vs. Marcos 2 and De la Llana vs.
Comelec 3 , questioning the validity of the December 17, 1977 referendum –
exercise as to the continuance in office as incumbent President and to be Prime
Minister after the organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for
in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments, I am constrained to dissent from
the majority decision of dismissal of the petitions.
I had held in Sanidad that the transcendental constituent power to propose and
approve amendments to the Constitution as well as to set up the machinery and
prescribe the procedure for the ratification of the amendments proposals has been
withheld by the Constitution from the President (Prime Minister) as sole repository
of executive power and that so long as the regular National Assembly provided for
in Article VIII of the Constitution had not come to existence and the proposals for
constitutional amendments were now deemed necessary to be discussed and
adopted for submittal to the people, strict adherence with the mandatory
requirements of the amending process as provided in the Constitution must be
complied with. This means, under the prevailing doctrine ofTolentino vs.
Comelec 4 that the proposed amendments to be valid must come from the
constitutional agency vested with the constituent power to do so, i.e. in the Interim
National Assembly provided in the Transitory Article XVII which would then have
to be convened and not from the executive power as vested in the President (Prime
Minister) from whom such constituent power has been withheld.
2. As restated by me in the 1977 case of Hidalgo, under the controlling doctrine

of Tolentino, the October 1976 constitutional amendments which created the
Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the Interim National Assembly were invalid
since as ruled by the Court therein, constitutional provisions on amendments
"dealing with the procedure or manner of amending the fundamental law are
binding upon the Convention and the other departments of the government (and)
are no less binding upon the people" and "the very Idea of deparcing from the
fundamental law is anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and repugnant to
the essence of the rule of law." The proposed amendments at bar having been
adopted by the Interim Batasang Pambansa as the fruit of the invalid October, 1976
amendments must necessarily suffer from the same Congenital infirmity.
3. Prescinding from the foregoing and assuming the validity of the proposed
amendments, I reiterate my stand inSanidad that the doctrine of fair and proper
submission firs enunciated by a simple majority of six Justices (of an eleven
member Court prior to the 1973 Constitution which increased the official
composition of the Court to fifteen) in Gonzales vs. Comelec 5 and subsequently
officially adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds majority vote of the
Court (of eight votes, then) in Tolentino is fully applicable in the case at bar. The
three resolutions proposing complex, complicated and radical amendments of our
very structure of government were considered and approved by the Interim
Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 27, 1981. It set
the date of the plebiscite for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally
inadequate and far short of the ninety-day period fixed by the Constitution for
submittal to the people to "sufficiently inform them of the amendments to be voted
upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their will in a genuine
manner." 6
4. "The minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper
submission to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment" as stated by
retired Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in his separate opinion inGonzales bears
repeating as follows: "... we take the view that the words 'submitted to the people
for their ratification,' if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution – a
fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people, an expression of their
sovereign will – is that it can only be amended by the people expressing
themselves according to the procedure ordained by the Constitution. Therefore,
amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning.
The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They
must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare
them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates
of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly
insidious influences. We believe the word 'submitted' can only mean that the
government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every short to inform
every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and
the meaning, nature and effects thereof. ... What the Constitution in effect directs is
that the government, in submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every
instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten the people,
educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have
earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair
submission, intelligent consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the people
still approve the amendments no matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it.
For the people decree their own fate."
Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that "... The great
men who builded the structure of our state in this respect had the mental vision of a
good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said 'A good Constitution
should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or
passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the
people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement, or hot
blood, but the sober second thought, which alone if the government is to be safe,
can be allowed efficacy ... Changes in government are to be feard unless benefit is
certain.' As Montaign says: 'All great mutation shake and disorder a state. Good
does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a worse."'
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE
AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS,
JESUS G. BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA,
MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA,
VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.
Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf.
Ramon A. Gonzales for respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the 1971
Constitutional Convention.
Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco and Tomas L. Echivarre for respondent

Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
Intervenors in their own behalf.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on

Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which
the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of
Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be,
submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of
the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing
resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law
in so far as they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts
of the respondent Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be done by it in
obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for being
violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.
As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent only the COMELEC,
the Count required that copies thereof be served on the Solicitor General and the
Constitutional Convention, through its President, for such action as they may deem
proper to take. In due time, respondent COMELEC filed its answer joining issues
with petitioner. To further put things in proper order, and considering that the fiscal
officers of the Convention are indispensable parties in a proceeding of this nature,
since the acts sought to be enjoined involve the expenditure of funds appropriated
by law for the Convention, the Court also ordered that the Disbursing Officer,
Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Convention be made respondents. After the
petition was so amended, the first appeared thru Senator Emmanuel Pelaez and the
last two thru Delegate Ramon Gonzales. All said respondents, thru counsel, resist
petitioner's action.
For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary duplication of arguments and

even possible confusion, and considering that with the principal parties being duly
represented by able counsel, their interests would be adequately protected already,
the Court had to limit the number of intervenors from the ranks of the delegates to
the Convention who, more or less, have legal interest in the success of the
respondents, and so, only Delegates Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S.
Trillana III, Victor de la Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo
Siguion Reyna, Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all distinguished lawyers in their
own right, have been allowed to intervene jointly. The Court feels that with such
an array of brilliant and dedicated counsel, all interests involved should be duly
and amply represented and protected. At any rate, notwithstanding that their
corresponding motions for leave to intervene or to appear as amicus curiae 1 have
been denied, the pleadings filed by the other delegates and some private parties, the
latter in representation of their minor children allegedly to be affected by the result
of this case with the records and the Court acknowledges that they have not been
without value as materials in the extensive study that has been undertaken in this
case.
The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention of 1971
came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines
approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of
calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely,
Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and
June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected
under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof,
Republic Act 6132. The pertinent portions of Resolution No 2 read as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose

amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, to be composed of
two elective Delegates from each representative district who shall
have the same qualifications as those required of Members of the
House of Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be

valid and considered part of the Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast in an election at which they are submitted to
the people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the
Constitution.
Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the

different cities and provinces fixed originally in Resolution No 2.
After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention
held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Its preliminary labors of election of
officers, organization of committees and other preparatory works over, as its first
formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its session which began on September
27, 1971, or more accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of September 28, 1971,
the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus: .
CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1
A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER
THE VOTING AGE TO 18
BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional

Convention:
Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the

Philippines is amended to as follows:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens
of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who
are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and are able
to read and write, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein
they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the
election.
Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of

the Philippines when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite to coincide with the local elections in November 1971.
Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age

qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to
other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971
Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section
or on other portions of the entire Constitution.
Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the sum of

P75,000.00 from its savings or from its unexpended funds for the
expense of the advanced plebiscite; provided, however that should
there be no savings or unexpended sums, the Delegates waive P250.00
each or the equivalent of 2-1/2 days per diem.
By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal, called upon
respondent Comelec "to help the Convention implement (the above) resolution."
The said letter reads:
September 28, 1971
The Commission on Elections Manila
Thru the Chairman
Gentlemen:
Last night the Constitutional Convention passed Resolution No. 1

quoted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

(see above)
Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No. 6132

otherwise known as the Constitutional Convention Act of 1971, may
we call upon you to help the Convention implement this resolution:
Sincerely,
(Sgd.)
DIOSDADO P.
MACAPAGAL
DIOSDADO P.
MACAPAGAL
President
On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the Constitutional

Convention that it will hold the plebiscite on condition that:
(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the printing of

separate official ballots, election returns and tally sheets for the use of
said plebiscite at its expense;
(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own security

measures for the printing and shipment of said ballots and election
forms; and
(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be delivered to the
Commission in time so that they could be distributed at the same time
that the Commission will distribute its official and sample ballots to
be used in the elections on November 8, 1971.
What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from intervenors'

Governors' statement of the genesis of the above proposal:
The President of the Convention also issued an order forming an Ad

Hoc Committee to implement the Resolution.
This Committee issued implementing guidelines which were approved

by the President who then transmitted them to the Commission on
Elections.
The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report on the
progress of the implementation of the plebiscite in the afternoon of
October 7,1971, enclosing copies of the order, resolution and letters of
transmittal above referred to (Copy of the report is hereto attached as
Annex 8-Memorandum).
RECESS RESOLUTION
In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, the

Convention approved a resolution authored by Delegate Antonio
Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a recess of the Convention
from November 1, 1971 to November 9, 1971 to permit the delegates
to campaign for the ratification of Organic Resolution No. 1. (Copies
of the resolution and the transcript of debate thereon are hereto
attached as Annexes 9 and 9-A Memorandum, respectively).
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION
On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution No. 24

submitted by Delegate Jose Ozamiz confirming the authority of the
President of the Convention to implement Organic Resolution No. 1,
including the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee ratifying all acts
performed in connection with said implementation.
Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1
and the other implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the
Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the
holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the elections of eight senators and all city,
provincial and municipal officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all of
Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and tending to carry out the holding of the
plebiscite directed by said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the
calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged
exclusively in Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised by the
Convention, and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the
proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification
separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed
by the Convention. On the other hand, respondents and intervenors posit that the
power to provide for, fix the date and lay down the details of the plebiscite for the
ratification of any amendment the Convention may deem proper to propose is
within the authority of the Convention as a necessary consequence and part of its
power to propose amendments and that this power includes that of submitting such
amendments either individually or jointly at such time and manner as the
Convention may direct in discretion. The Court's delicate task now is to decide
which of these two poses is really in accord with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution.
As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question of

jurisdiction. They contend that the issue before Us is a political question and that
the Convention being legislative body of the highest order is sovereign, and as
such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of the Congress and
the courts. In this connection, it is to be noted that none of the respondent has
joined intervenors in this posture. In fact, respondents Chief Accountant and
Auditor of the convention expressly concede the jurisdiction of this Court in their
answer acknowledging that the issue herein is a justifiable one.
Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of the decision of

this Court in the case of Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774, wherein the
members of the Court, despite their being divided in their opinions as to the other
matters therein involved, were precisely unanimous in upholding its jurisdiction.
Obviously, distinguished counsel have either failed to grasp the full impact of the
portions of Our decision they have quoted or would misapply them by taking them
out of context.
There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding its
jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the acts of the Congress, acting as a
constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a constitutional convention
called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution, which
concededly is at par with the former. A simple reading of Our ruling in that very
case of Gonzales relied upon by intervenors should dispel any lingering misgivings
as regards that point. Succinctly but comprehensively, Chief Justice Concepcion
held for the Court thus: .
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139, 157), this
Court — speaking through one of the leading members of the
Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional
Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared that "the judicial department is
the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine
the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof."
It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court
characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one declined to
pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in
Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution —
which was being submitted to the people for ratification — satisfied
the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force
of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes v. Chief
Accountant of the Senate (81 Phil. 818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851,
March 4 & 14, 1949), Tañada v. Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957)
and Macias v. Commission on Elections, (L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). In
the first we held that the officers and employees of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of
the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court
proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary
for quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by
Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in
said chamber, purporting to act, on behalf of the party having the
second largest number of votes therein of two (2) Senators belonging
to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an
act of Congress purporting to apportion the representatives districts
for the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the
apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to the
number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the theory,
advanced in these four (4) cases that the issues therein raised were
political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial
review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose

amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative
powers to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the
Philippines). It is part of the inherent powers of the people — as the
repository sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours (Section 1,
Art. 11, Constitution of the Philippines) — to make, and, hence, to
amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose
amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly
grants such power. (Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution of the
Philippines) Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators
and members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of
Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly.
When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority
from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same
function, (Of amending the Constitution) for their authority
does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the very source of
all powers of government including the Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the

Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the
final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond
constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the
same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of
laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such
rigidity is stressed by the fact that the Constitution expressly confers
upon the Supreme Court, (And, inferentially, to lower courts.) the
power to declare a treaty unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the
Constitution), despite the eminently political character of treaty-
making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting

as a constituent assembly — violates the Constitution is essentially
justiciable not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to
the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken
in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, (supra) the latter should be deemed
modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on
this point.
No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate authority, the
Convention is not supreme. Nowhere in his petition and in his oral argument and
memoranda does petitioner point otherwise. Actually, what respondents and
intervenors are seemingly reluctant to admit is that the Constitutional Convention
of 1971, as any other convention of the same nature, owes its existence and derives
all its authority and power from the existing Constitution of the Philippines. This
Convention has not been called by the people directly as in the case of a
revolutionary convention which drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new
government born of either a war of liberation from a mother country or of a
revolution against an existing government or of a bloodless seizure of power a la
coup d'etat. As to such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the convention
is completely without restrain and omnipotent all wise, and it is as to such
conventions that the remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas of the Constitutional
Convention of 1934 quoted by Senator Pelaez refer. No amount of rationalization
can belie the fact that the current convention came into being only because it was
called by a resolution of a joint session of Congress acting as a constituent
assembly by authority of Section 1, Article XV of the present Constitution which
provides:
ARTICLE XV — AMENDMENTS
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of

three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such amendments
shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted
to the people for their ratification.
True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed with extra
ordinary powers generally beyond the control of any department of the existing
government, but the compass of such powers can be co-extensive only with the
purpose for which the convention was called and as it may propose cannot have
any effect as part of the Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the people,
it necessarily follows that the acts of convention, its officers and members are not
immune from attack on constitutional grounds. The present Constitution is in full
force and effect in its entirety and in everyone of its parts the existence of the
Convention notwithstanding, and operates even within the walls of that assembly.
While it is indubitable that in its internal operation and the performance of its task
to propose amendments to the Constitution it is not subject to any degree of
restraint or control by any other authority than itself, it is equally beyond cavil that
neither the Convention nor any of its officers or members can rightfully deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, deny to anyone
in this country the equal protection of the laws or the freedom of speech and of the
press in disregard of the Bill of Rights of the existing Constitution. Nor, for that
matter, can such Convention validly pass any resolution providing for the taking of
private property without just compensation or for the imposition or exacting of any
tax, impost or assessment, or declare war or call the Congress to a special session,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, pardon a convict or render
judgment in a controversy between private individuals or between such individuals
and the state, in violation of the distribution of powers in the Constitution.
It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may not and cannot
validly assert, much less exercise, in the light of the existing Constitution, the
simple question arises, should an act of the Convention be assailed by a citizen as
being among those not granted to or inherent in it, according to the existing
Constitution, who can decide whether such a contention is correct or not? It is of
the very essence of the rule of law that somehow somewhere the Power and duty to
resolve such a grave constitutional question must be lodged on some authority, or
we would have to confess that the integrated system of government established by
our founding fathers contains a wide vacuum no intelligent man could ignore,
which is naturally unworthy of their learning, experience and craftsmanship in
constitution-making.
We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We have posed. The very
decision of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales, so much invoked by
intervenors, reiterates and reinforces the irrefutable logic and wealth of principle in
the opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice Laurel in Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 134, reading:
... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and
in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and
the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments,
however, sometimes makes it hard to say where the one leaves off and
the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement,
the great landmark of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production our Constitution is of course lacking

perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power
of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of check and
balances and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided
in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers
and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it
would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a
mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be
mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly
the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real
as they should be in any living Constitution. In the United States
where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its
historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and half centuries. In our
case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers or government. Who is

to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to strike conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed
as its functions is in this manner the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by
the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of
the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power
provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered
that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the
chief palladium of constitutional liberty ... the people who are authors
of this blessing must also be its guardians ... their eyes must be ever
ready to mark, their voices to pronounce ... aggression on the
authority of their Constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis then,
must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be
tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation
rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of

December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to
the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last
day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly; notwithstanding
the previous confirmations made by the National Assembly as
aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the
National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the
Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
submitted after December 3, 1935 then the resolution of the Electoral
Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no
effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral
Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the
exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December
9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last
day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a

conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National
Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the other.
From the very nature of the republican government established in our
country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation
of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries.
The Electoral Commission as we shall have occasion to refer
hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose,
namely, to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while
acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the
people and that it is not subject to constitutional restriction. The
Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government,
and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the
fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the
government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable
and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other
European types of constitutional government, the framers of our
Constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution
is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some
countries which have declined to follow the American example,
provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the
courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law.
This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that
in the absence of direct prohibition, courts are bound to assume what
is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of
1921 expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine
the validity of statutes (art. 81, Chap. IV). The former Austrian
Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose
constitution are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power.
This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas,
in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional
Charter of the Czechoslavak, Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain
(arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of 1931)
especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity
of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy
shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the
conflict of authority between two agencies created by the
Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the
controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were
left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in
our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive
of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer
them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our
constitutional system. Upon principle, reason, and authority, we are
clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case,
this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant
to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly." .
As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did
in Angara, these postulates just quoted do not apply only to conflicts of authority
between the three existing regular departments of the government but to all such
conflicts between and among these departments, or, between any of them, on the
one hand, and any other constitutionally created independent body, like the
electoral tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and the Constituent assemblies
constituted by the House of Congress, on the other. We see no reason of logic or
principle whatsoever, and none has been convincingly shown to Us by any of the
respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling should not apply to the present
Convention, even if it is an assembly of delegate elected directly by the people,
since at best, as already demonstrated, it has been convened by authority of and
under the terms of the present Constitution..
Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the
Court over the present case. It goes without saying that We do this not because the
Court is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is subject to the control
of the Court, but simply because both the Convention and the Court are subject to
the Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per
Justice Laurel, supra, it is within the power as it is the solemn duty of the Court,
under the existing Constitution to resolve the issues in which petitioner,
respondents and intervenors have joined in this case.
II
The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of the petition. Is it
within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own
fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment
reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1 of
Article V of the Constitution proposed in the Convention's Organic Resolution No.
1 in the manner and form provided for in said resolution and the subsequent
implementing acts and resolution of the Convention?
At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case demand the most
accurate and unequivocal statement of the real issue which the Court is called upon
to resolve. Petitioner has very clearly stated that he is not against the constitutional
extension of the right of suffrage to the eighteen-year-olds, as a matter of fact, he
has advocated or sponsored in Congress such a proposal, and that, in truth, the
herein petition is not intended by him to prevent that the proposed amendment here
involved be submitted to the people for ratification, his only purpose in filing the
petition being to comply with his sworn duty to prevent, Whenever he can, any
violation of the Constitution of the Philippines even if it is committed in the course
of or in connection with the most laudable undertaking. Indeed, as the Court sees
it, the specific question raised in this case is limited solely and only to the point of
whether or not it is within the power of the Convention to call for a plebiscite for
the ratification by the people of the constitutional amendment proposed in the
abovequoted Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and form provided in said
resolution as well as in the subject question implementing actions and resolution of
the Convention and its officers, at this juncture of its proceedings, when as it is a
matter of common knowledge and judicial notice, it is not set to adjourn sine die,
and is, in fact, still in the preliminary stages of considering other reforms or
amendments affecting other parts of the existing Constitution; and, indeed, Organic
Resolution No. 1 itself expressly provides, that the amendment therein proposed
"shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended section or
on other portions of the entire Constitution." In other words, nothing that the Court
may say or do, in this case should be understood as reflecting, in any degree or
means the individual or collective stand of the members of the Court on the
fundamental issue of whether or not the eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to
vote, simply because that issue is not before Us now. There should be no doubt in
the mind of anyone that, once the Court finds it constitutionally permissible, it will
not hesitate to do its part so that the said proposed amendment may be presented to
the people for their approval or rejection.
Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire and enthusiasm of
the youth have not blinded them to the absolute necessity, under the fundamental
principles of democracy to which the Filipino people is committed, of adhering
always to the rule of law. Surely, their idealism, sincerity and purity of purpose
cannot permit any other line of conduct or approach in respect of the problem
before Us. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 itself was born, in a great
measure, because of the pressure brought to bear upon the Congress of the
Philippines by various elements of the people, the youth in particular, in their
incessant search for a peaceful and orderly means of bringing about meaningful
changes in the structure and bases of the existing social and governmental
institutions, including the provisions of the fundamental law related to the well-
being and economic security of the underprivileged classes of our people as well as
those concerning the preservation and protection of our natural resources and the
national patrimony, as an alternative to violent and chaotic ways of achieving such
lofty ideals. In brief, leaving aside the excesses of enthusiasm which at times have
justifiably or unjustifiably marred the demonstrations in the streets, plazas and
campuses, the youth of the Philippines, in general, like the rest of the people, do
not want confusion and disorder, anarchy and violence; what they really want are
law and order, peace and orderliness, even in the pursuit of what they strongly and
urgently feel must be done to change the present order of things in this Republic of
ours. It would be tragic and contrary to the plain compulsion of these perspectives,
if the Court were to allow itself in deciding this case to be carried astray by
considerations other than the imperatives of the rule of law and of the applicable
provisions of the Constitution. Needless to say, in a larger measure than when it
binds other departments of the government or any other official or entity, the
Constitution imposes upon the Court the sacred duty to give meaning and vigor to
the Constitution, by interpreting and construing its provisions in appropriate cases
with the proper parties, and by striking down any act violative thereof. Here, as in
all other cases, We are resolved to discharge that duty.
During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the urgent need for
constitutional reforms, to the point of being convinced that meaningful change is
the only alternative to a violent revolution, this Court would be the last to put any
obstruction or impediment to the work of the Constitutional Convention. If there
are respectable sectors opining that it has not been called to supplant the existing
Constitution in its entirety, since its enabling provision, Article XV, from which
the Convention itself draws life expressly speaks only of amendments which shall
form part of it, which opinion is not without persuasive force both in principle and
in logic, the seemingly prevailing view is that only the collective judgment of its
members as to what is warranted by the present condition of things, as they see it,
can limit the extent of the constitutional innovations the Convention may propose,
hence the complete substitution of the existing constitution is not beyond the ambit
of the Convention's authority. Desirable as it may be to resolve, this grave
divergence of views, the Court does not consider this case to be properly the one in
which it should discharge its constitutional duty in such premises. The issues raised
by petitioner, even those among them in which respondents and intervenors have
joined in an apparent wish to have them squarely passed upon by the Court do not
necessarily impose upon Us the imperative obligation to express Our views
thereon. The Court considers it to be of the utmost importance that the Convention
should be untrammelled and unrestrained in the performance of its constitutionally
as signed mission in the manner and form it may conceive best, and so the Court
may step in to clear up doubts as to the boundaries set down by the Constitution
only when and to the specific extent only that it would be necessary to do so to
avoid a constitutional crisis or a clearly demonstrable violation of the existing
Charter. Withal, it is a very familiar principle of constitutional law that
constitutional questions are to be resolved by the Supreme Court only when there
is no alternative but to do it, and this rule is founded precisely on the principle of
respect that the Court must accord to the acts of the other coordinate departments
of the government, and certainly, the Constitutional Convention stands almost in a
unique footing in that regard.
In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already made it clear that the
Convention came into being by a call of a joint session of Congress pursuant to
Section I of Article XV of the Constitution, already quoted earlier in this opinion.
We reiterate also that as to matters not related to its internal operation and the
performance of its assigned mission to propose amendments to the Constitution,
the Convention and its officers and members are all subject to all the provisions of
the existing Constitution. Now We hold that even as to its latter task of proposing
amendments to the Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section I of
Article XV. This must be so, because it is plain to Us that the framers of the
Constitution took care that the process of amending the same should not be
undertaken with the same ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation.
Constitution making is the most valued power, second to none, of the people in a
constitutional democracy such as the one our founding fathers have chosen for this
nation, and which we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And because
the Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future and every other conceivable
aspect of the lives of all the people within the country and those subject to its
sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in preparing and drafting it. A
constitution worthy of the people for which it is intended must not be prepared in
haste without adequate deliberation and study. It is obvious that correspondingly,
any amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance than the whole
Constitution itself, and perforce must be conceived and prepared with as much care
and deliberation. From the very nature of things, the drafters of an original
constitution, as already observed earlier, operate without any limitations, restraints
or inhibitions save those that they may impose upon themselves. This is not
necessarily true of subsequent conventions called to amend the original
constitution. Generally, the framers of the latter see to it that their handiwork is not
lightly treated and as easily mutilated or changed, not only for reasons purely
personal but more importantly, because written constitutions are supposed to be
designed so as to last for some time, if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they
can be adopted to the needs and exigencies of the people, hence, they must be
insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing
political moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with
them limitations and conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people
themselves, in regard to the process of their amendment. And when such
limitations or conditions are so incorporated in the original constitution, it does not
lie in the delegates of any subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore and
disregard such conditions because they are as powerful and omnipotent as their
original counterparts.
Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in any degree the

number and nature and the scope and extent of the amendments the Convention
may deem proper to propose. Nor does the Court propose to pass on the issue
extensively and brilliantly discussed by the parties as to whether or not the power
or duty to call a plebiscite for the ratification of the amendments to be proposed by
the Convention is exclusively legislative and as such may be exercised only by the
Congress or whether the said power can be exercised concurrently by the
Convention with the Congress. In the view the Court takes of present case, it does
not perceive absolute necessity to resolve that question, grave and important as it
may be. Truth to tell, the lack of unanimity or even of a consensus among the
members of the Court in respect to this issue creates the need for more study and
deliberation, and as time is of the essence in this case, for obvious reasons,
November 8, 1971, the date set by the Convention for the plebiscite it is calling,
being nigh, We will refrain from making any pronouncement or expressing Our
views on this question until a more appropriate case comes to Us. After all, the
basis of this decision is as important and decisive as any can be.
The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation or
condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated by the
act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained
in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition
and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention
must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It being
indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is
only the first amendment the Convention propose We hold that the plebiscite being
called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on
November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that
direction are null and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:
1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt

says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a
convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution,"
thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the
Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that
"such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to
the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many
"elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments
proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the
provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and
appropriateness of this provision. As already stated, amending the Constitution is
as serious and important an undertaking as constitution making itself. Indeed, any
amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it if only because
the Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be
viable as the framework of the government it establishes, on the one hand, and
adequately formidable and reliable as the succinct but comprehensive articulation
of the rights, liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic
policies and aspirations of the people, on the other. lt is inconceivable how a
constitution worthy of any country or people can have any part which is out of tune
with its other parts..
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the
purpose. Once the original constitution is approved, the part that the people play in
its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted to
them, more or less they can assumed its harmony as an integrated whole, and they
can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it
before casting their vote and determine for themselves from a study of the whole
document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a
whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part
of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the
proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its
parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already
from the fact that under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no
fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will be
concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the
constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the
right of suffrage, there are other considerations which make it impossible to vote
intelligently on the proposed amendment, although it may already be observed that
under Section 3, if a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to eighteen
under conditions he feels are needed under the circumstances, and he does not see
those conditions in the ballot nor is there any possible indication whether they will
ever be or not, because Congress has reserved those for future action, what kind of
judgment can he render on the proposal?
But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in
the fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to
approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether the
right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not
later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each
level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty
in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing
substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the
existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a
voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction
of the voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may
establish and of which presently he is not given any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of
an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter
not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of
the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution
with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of
things, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of
hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to
present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this
requirement. We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not
contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the
people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We
reject the rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible frame of
reference, for the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the sole
purpose of the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part
in the election for the ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the
Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of
Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no
proper submission".
III
The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of the
Constitutional Convention. Much less does the Court want to pass judgment on the
merits of the proposal to allow these eighteen years old to vote. But like the
Convention, the Court has its own duties to the people under the Constitution
which is to decide in appropriate cases with appropriate parties Whether or not the
mandates of the fundamental law are being complied with. In the best light God
has given Us, we are of the conviction that in providing for the questioned
plebiscite before it has finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the
constitution it has been called to formulate, the Convention's Organic Resolution
No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same violate the
condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or
plebiscite for the ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose.
We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment;
We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same
should be submitted to them not separately from but together with all the other
amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic

Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing
acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a
plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent
Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null
and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and
Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any
action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory.
No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., reserves his vote —
I reserve my vote. The resolution in question is voted down by a sufficient majority

of the Court on just one ground, which to be sure achieves the result from the legal
and constitutional viewpoint. I entertain grave doubts as to the validity of the
premises postulated and conclusions reached in support of the dispositive portion
of the decision. However, considering the urgent nature of this case, the lack of
time to set down at length my opinion on the particular issue upon which the
decision is made to rest, and the fact that a dissent on the said issue would
necessarily be inconclusive unless the other issues raised in the petition are also
considered and ruled upon — a task that would be premature and pointless at this
time — I limit myself to this reservation.
REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ., concurring:
We concur in the main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barredo in his usual
inimitable, forthright and vigorous style. Like him, we do not express our
individual views on the wisdom of the proposed constitutional amendment, which
is not in issue here because it is a matter that properly and exclusively addresses
itself to the collective judgment of the people.
We must, however, articulate two additional objections of constitutional dimension

which, although they would seem to be superfluous because of the reach of the
basic constitutional infirmity discussed in extenso in the main opinion, nevertheless
appear to us to be just as fundamental in character and scope.
Assuming that the Constitutional Convention has power to propose piecemeal

amendments and submit each separately to the people for ratification, we are
nonetheless persuaded that (1) that there is no proper submissionof title proposed
amendment in question within the meaning and intendment of Section 1 of Article
XV of the Constitution, and (2) that the forthcoming election is not the proper
election envisioned by the same provision of the Constitution.
Mr. Justice C. V. Sanchez, in his dissent in Gonzales vs. Commission on

Elections 1 and Philippine Constitution Association vs. Commission on
Elections, 2 expounded his view, with which we essentially agree, on the minimum
requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the
people of a proposed constitutional amendment. This is what he said:
... amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing
or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are
not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull
over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed
amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their
conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly
insidious influences. We believe the word "submitted" can only mean
that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain
every effort to inform citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the
proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By
this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100
citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then there is no
submission within the meaning of the word as intended by the framers
of the Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the
government, in submitting an amendment for ratification, should put
every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to
enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of
ratification or rejection. For we have earlier stated, one thing
is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair
submission, intelligent consent or rejection." .
The second constitutional objection was given expression by one of the writers of
this concurring opinion, in the following words:
I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its framers

that such amendment should be submitted and ratified by just "a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification", if the concentration of
the people's attention thereon is to be diverted by other extraneous
issues, such as the choice of local and national officials. The framers
of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof, and of
the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could have
only meant that any amendments thereto should be debated,
considered and voted upon an election wherein the people could
devote undivided attention to the subject. 4
True it is that the question posed by the proposed amendment, "Do you or do you
not want the 18-year old to be allowed to vote?," would seem to be uncomplicated
and innocuous. But it is one of life's verities that things which appear to be simple
may turn out not to be so simple after all.
A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and logically assail the

average voter. Why should the voting age be lowered at all, in the first place? Why
should the new voting age be precisely 18 years, and not 19 or 20? And why not
17? Or even 16 or 15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the 21-year old so that there
is no need of an educational qualification to entitle him to vote? In this age of
permissiveness and dissent, can the 18-year old be relied upon to vote with
judiciousness when the 21-year old, in the past elections, has not performed so
well? If the proposed amendment is voted down by the people, will the
Constitutional Convention insist on the said amendment? Why is there an
unseemly haste on the part of the Constitutional Convention in having this
particular proposed amendment ratified at this particular time? Do some of the
members of the Convention have future political plans which they want to begin to
subserve by the approval this year of this amendment? If this amendment is
approved, does it thereby mean that the 18-year old should now also shoulder the
moral and legal responsibilities of the 21-year old? Will he be required to render
compulsory military service under the colors? Will the age of contractual consent
be reduced to 18 years? If I vote against this amendment, will I not be unfair to my
own child who will be 18 years old, come 1973? .
The above are just samplings from here, there and everywhere — from a domain
(of searching questions) the bounds of which are not immediately ascertainable.
Surely, many more questions can be added to the already long litany. And the
answers cannot be had except as the questions are debated fully, pondered upon
purposefully, and accorded undivided attention.
Scanning the contemporary scene, we say that the people are not, and by election
time will not be, sufficiently informed of the meaning, nature and effects of the
proposed constitutional amendment. They have not been afforded ample time to
deliberate thereon conscientiously. They have been and are effectively distracted
from a full and dispassionate consideration of the merits and demerits of the
proposed amendment by their traditional pervasive involvement in local elections
and politics. They cannot thus weigh in tranquility the need for and the wisdom of
the proposed amendment.
Upon the above disquisition, it is our considered view that the intendment of the
words, "at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification," embodied in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, has not
been met.
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
There is much to be said for the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Barredo,
characterized by clarity and vigor, its manifestation of fealty to the rule of law
couched in eloquent language, that commands assent. As the Constitution occupies
the topmost rank in the hierarchy of legal norms, Congress and Constitutional
Convention alike, no less than this Court, must bow to its supremacy. Thereby
constitutionalism asserts itself. With the view I entertain of what is allowable, if
not indeed required by the Constitution, my conformity does not extend as far as
the acceptance of the conclusion reached. The question presented is indeed novel,
not being controlled by constitutional prescription, definite and certain. Under the
circumstances, with the express recognition in the Constitution of the powers of the
Constitutional Convention to propose amendments, I cannot discern any objection
to the validity of its action there being no legal impediment that would call for its
nullification. Such an approach all the more commends itself to me considering
that what was sought to be done is to refer the matter to the people in whom,
according to our Constitution, sovereignty resides. It is in that sense that, with due
respect, I find myself unable to join my brethren.
I. It is understandable then why the decisive issue posed could not be resolved by
reliance on, implicit in the petition and the answer of intervenors, such concepts as
legislative control of the constitutional convention referred to by petitioner on the
one hand or, on the other, the theory of conventional sovereignty favored by
intervenors. It is gratifying to note that during the oral argument of petitioner and
counsel for respondents and intervenors, there apparently was a retreat from such
extreme position, all parties, as should be the case, expressly avowing the primacy
of the Constitution, the applicable provision of which as interpreted by this Court,
should be controlling on both Congress and the Convention. It cannot be denied
though that in at least one American state, that is Pennsylvania, there were
decisions announcing the doctrine that the powers to be exercised by a
constitutional convention are dependent on a legislative grant, in the absence of
any authority conferred directly by the fundamental law. The result is a convention
that is subordinate to the lawmaking body. Its field of competence is
circumscribed. It has to look to the latter for the delimitation of its permissible
scope of activity. It is thus made subordinate to the legislature. Nowhere has such a
view been more vigorously expressed than in the Pennsylvania case of Wood's
Appeal. 1 Its holding though finds no support under our constitutional provision.
It does not thereby follow that while free from legislative control, a constitutional
convention may lay claim to an attribute sovereign in character. The Constitution is
quite explicit that it is to the people, and to the people alone, in whom sovereignty
resides. 2 Such a prerogative is therefore withheld from a convention. It is an
agency entrusted with the responsibility of high import and significance it is true; it
is denied unlimited legal competence though. That is what sovereignty connotes. It
has to yield to the superior force of the Constitution. There can then be no basis for
the exaggerated pretension that it is an alter ego of the people. It is to be admitted
that there are some American state decisions, the most notable of which is Sproule
v. Fredericks, 3 a Mississippi case, that dates back to 1892, that yield a different
conclusion. The doctrine therein announced cannot bind us. Our Constitution
makes clear that the power of a constitutional convention is not sovereign. It is
appropriately termed constituent, limited as it is to the purpose of drafting a
constitution or proposing revision or amendments to one in existence, subject in
either case to popular approval.
The view that commends itself for acceptance is that legislature and constitutional
convention, alike recognized by the Constitution, are coordinate, there being no
superiority of one over the other. Insofar as the constituent power of proposing
amendments to the Constitution is concerned, a constitutional convention enjoys a
wide sphere of autonomy consistently with the Constitution which can be the only
source of valid restriction on its competence. It is true it is to the legislative body
that the call to a convention must proceed, but once convened, it cannot in any
wise be interfered with, much less controlled by Congress. A contrary conclusion
would impair its usefulness for the delicate, and paramount task assigned to it. A
convention then is to be looked upon as if it were one of the three coordinate
departments which under the principle of separation of powers is supreme within
its field and has exclusive cognizance of matters properly subject to its jurisdiction.
A succinct statement of the appropriate principle that should govern the
relationship between a constitutional convention and a legislative body under
American law is that found in Orfield's work. Thus: "The earliest view seems to
have been that a convention was absolute. The convention was sovereign and
subject to no restraint. On the other hand, Jameson, whose views have been most
frequently cited in decisions, viewed a convention as a body with strictly limited
powers, and subject to the restrictions imposed on it by the legislative call. A third
and intermediate view is that urged by Dodd — that a convention, though not
sovereign, is a body independent of the legislature; it is bound by the existing
constitution, but not by the acts of the legislature, as to the extent of its constituent
power. This view has become increasingly prevalent in the state decisions." 4
2. It is to the Constitution, and to the Constitution alone then, as so vigorously

stressed in the opinion of the Court, that any limitation on the power the
Constitutional, Convention must find its source. I turn to its Article XV. It reads:
"The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three fourths of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may
propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose.
Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to
the people for their ratification."
Clearly, insofar as amendments, including revision, are concerned, there are two
steps, proposal and thereafter ratification. Thus as to the former, two constituent
bodies are provided for, the Congress of the Philippines in the mode therein
provided, and a constitutional convention that may be called into being. Once
assembled, a constitutional convention, like the Congress of the Philippines,
possesses in all its plenitude the constituent power. Inasmuch as Congress may
determine what amendments it would have the people ratify and thereafter take all
the steps necessary so that the approval or disapproval of the electorate may be
obtained, the convention likewise, to my mind, should be deemed possessed of all
the necessary authority to assure that whatever amendments it seeks to introduce
would be submitted to the people at an election called for that purpose. It would
appear to me that to view the convention as being denied a prerogative which is not
withheld from Congress as a constituent body would be to place it in an inferior
category. Such a proposition I do not find acceptable. Congress and constitutional
convention are agencies for submitting proposals under the fundamental law. A
power granted to one should not be denied the other. No justification for such a
drastic differentiation either in theory or practice exists.
Such a conclusion has for me the added reinforcement that to require ordinary
legislation before the convention could be enabled to have its proposals voted on
by the people would be to place a power in the legislative and executive branches
that could, whether by act or omission, result in the frustration of the amending
process. I am the first to admit that such likelihood is remote, but if such a risk
even if minimal could be avoided, it should be, unless the compelling force of an
applicable constitutional provision requires otherwise. Considering that a
constitutional convention is not precluded from imposing additional restrictions on
the powers of either the executive or legislative branches, or, for that matter, the
judiciary, it would appear to be the better policy to interpret Article XV in such a
way that would not sanction such restraint on the authority that must be recognized
as vested in a constitutional convention. There is nothing in such a view that to my
mind would collide with a reasonable interpretation of Article XV. It certainly is
one way by which freed from pernicious abstractions, it would be easier to
accommodate a constitution to the needs of an unfolding future. That is to facilitate
its being responsive to the challenge that time inevitably brings in its wake.
From such an approach then, I am irresistibly led to the conclusion that the
challenged resolution was well within the power of the convention. That would be
to brush aside the web of unreality spun from a too-restrictive mode of appraising
the legitimate scope of its competence. That would be, for me, to give added vigor
and life to the conferment of authority vested in it, attended by such grave and
awesome responsibility.
3. It becomes pertinent to inquire then whether the last sentence of Article XV

providing that such amendment shall be valid when submitted and thereafter
approved by the majority of the votes cast by the people at an election is a bar to
the proposed submission. It is the conclusion arrived at by my brethren that there is
to be only one election and that therefore the petition must be sustained as only
when the convention has finished its work should all amendments proposed be
submitted for ratification. That is not for me, and I say this with respect, the
appropriate interpretation. It is true that the Constitution uses the word "election"
in the singular, but that is not decisive. No undue reliance should be accorded rules
of grammar; they do not exert a compelling force in constitutional interpretation.
Meaning is to be sought not from specific language in the singular but from the
mosaic of significance derived from the total context. It could be, if it were not
thus, self-defeating. Such a mode of construction does not commend itself. The
words used in the Constitution are not inert; they derive vitality from the obvious
purposes at which they are aimed. Petitioner's stress on linguistic refinement, while
not implausible does not, for me, carry the day.
It was likewise argued by petitioner that the proposed amendment is provisional

and therefore is not such as was contemplated in this article. I do not find such
contention convincing. The fact that the Constitutional Convention did seek to
consult the wishes of the people by the proposed submission of a tentative
amendatory provision is an argument for its validity. It might be said of course that
until impressed with finality, an amendment is not to be passed upon by the
electorate. There is plausibility in such a view. A literal reading of the Constitution
would support it. The spirit that informs it though would not, for me, be satisfied.
From its silence I deduce the inference that there is no repugnancy to the
fundamental law when the Constitutional Convention ascertains the popular will.
In that sense, the Constitution, to follow the phraseology of Thomas Reed Powel,
is not silently silent but silently vocal. What I deem the more important
consideration is that while a public official, as an agent, has to locate his source of
authority in either Constitution or statute, the people, as the principal, can only be
limited in the exercise of their sovereign powers by the express terms of the
Constitution. A concept to the contrary would to my way of thinking be
inconsistent with the fundamental principle that it is in the people, and the people
alone, that sovereignty resides.
4. The constitutional Convention having acted within the scope of its authority, an
action to restrain or prohibit respondent Commission on Elections from conducting
the plebiscite does not lie. It should not be lost sight of that the Commission on
Elections in thus being charged with such a duty does not act in its capacity as the
constitutional agency to take charge of all laws relative to the conduct of election.
That is a purely executive function vested in it under Article X of the
Constitution. 5 It is not precluded from assisting the Constitutional Convention if
pursuant to its competence to amend the fundamental law it seeks, as in this case,
to submit a proposal, even if admittedly tentative, to the electorate to ascertain its
verdict. At any rate, it may be implied that under the 1971 Constitutional
Convention Act, it is not to turn a deaf ear to a summons from the Convention to
aid it in the legitimate discharge of its functions. 6
The aforesaid considerations, such as they are, but which for me have a force that I
mind myself unable to overcome, leave me no alternative but to dissent from my
brethren, with due acknowledgement of course that from their basic premises, the
conclusion arrived at by them cannot be characterized as in any wise bereft of a
persuasive quality of a high order.
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE
NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976
VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976
RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO

SALAPANTAN, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE
MARTIN, J,:
The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction
relates to the power of the incumbent President of the Philippines to propose
amendments to the present Constitution in the absence of the interim National
Assembly which has not been convened.
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree

No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law,
the I . assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present
powers.1
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related
decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree
No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for
the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies)
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite
relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree
No. 991, the full text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below. 2
On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree
No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the
people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces
their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to
the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:
(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the
following amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question,
the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of
Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang
Pambansa. Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more
than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall include the incumbent President
of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation,
those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective
sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the
Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio while the sectors shall be determined by law. The
number of representatives from each region or sector and the, manner of their
election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members
shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National
Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not exercise the power
provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the
election and selection of the members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa
and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall have been elected. The
incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall
continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is
organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to
exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five.
Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under
this Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and
functions, and discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime
Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be subject only to such disqualifications as the
President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President (Prime Minister) if he so
desires may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers
as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until

martial law shall have been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on
any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may,
in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters of
instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.
7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their
functions, powers, and composition may be altered by law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the
Commission on Elections may be called at any time the government deems it
necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any important matter
whether of national or local interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these

amendments shall continue in full force and effect.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have
proclaimed that they have been ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the
referendum-plebiscite."
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and
control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD,

father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-
Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to
the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments
to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October
16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent
Commission on Elections, The Solicitor General principally maintains that
petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond
judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the
incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the
referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary

Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose
amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is
expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article
XVII of the Constitution.3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on
October 5, 1976 by RAUL M. GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO
SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the implementation of
Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October
16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under
Martial Law, the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is untenable
under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the proposed
amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a
nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via
referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of
the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the
Philippines 18 years of age and above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.
Justiciability of question raised.

1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C.
Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad) possess locus standi to challenge the
constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033. It is now
an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature Presidential Decrees are of such
nature-may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of
its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement
of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public
funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The breadth of Presidential Decree
No. 991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective
implementation of its purposes. 5 Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the
sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. 6 The interest of the
aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of
public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity
of the Decrees appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this
Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not. 7 For the present
case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the
authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.
2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one,
lying outside the domain of judicial review. We disagree. The amending process
both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. 8 This is especially
true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally
exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973
Constitution, the power to propose amendments o the constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory
provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active
session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of
the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973
constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the
National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly the incumbent
President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of the procedure
for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be
amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos.
991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of
legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is
plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section
2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be heard and
decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law
may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members.
..." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties
and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The amending, like all other powers
organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so
that the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that
power has been discharged within its limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a
particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity
of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in
the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to
perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the
amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is
therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the
actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution
provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed
was valid or not. 10
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-
justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments
and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposal to the
people ultimately lie in the judgment of the A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious
circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the
authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present
Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been
followed or not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of
course who exercise no power of judicial but by the Supreme Court in whom the
people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to
determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or
not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the
submission to and ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases underline
the preference of the Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the
amending process as one of non-political impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, 11 the
contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on the legality of Presidential
Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Pilipino people (on January 15, 1973) for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating fund s therefore
"is a political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously considered the issue as
justiciable in nature. Subsequently in the Ratification Cases 12 involving the issue
of whether or not the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102. announcing
the Ratification by the Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question, the
affirmative stand of' the Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled that the
question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority
view, said, Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory of
the respondents therein that the question whether Presidential Decree No. 73
calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection
of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of
judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it partook of a political nature, and We
unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With Identical
unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus
cases, questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the
factual bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court
in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda, insofar as it adhered to the
former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply. For the
same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales vs.
Commission on Elections, the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito." 13 The return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,
urged by the Solicitor General, was decisively refused by the Court. Chief Justice
Concepcion continued: "The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however,
substantially the same as those given in support on the political question theory
advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were carefully
considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally
untenable. As a consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus
cases partakes of the nature and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight
by its virtual reiteration."
II
The amending process as laid out
in the new Constitution.

1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution

may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The
National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members,
call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the
electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution

shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the
Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the
Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by

the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its
Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such
amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article
Sixteen hereof.
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the
nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normally, the
amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a
Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the
National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be
submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the
members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be
proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the National Assembly upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister,.
2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent
President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially
convene the interim National Assembly. Speaking for the majority opinion in that
case, Justice Makasiar said: "The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to
the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the
interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and
order in the country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member of that
Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen the Delegates to the Constitutional
Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that
under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he
could convene the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the
sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact, the proposal that it be convened
'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel (V) was rejected. The President's
decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found
support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at
which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted
against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of July
24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to
withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the
referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim
National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the
members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were
deemed automatically members of the I interim National Assembly, were against
its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973, the people had already
resolved against it.
3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals
of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of
lawmaking. lt is not legislating when engaged in the amending process.16 Rather,
it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself.
In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973
Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory
Provisions (for the National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the
legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment
amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a
distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that
of a legislative character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of
law. 17 Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment
is a misnomer 18 The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies
only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with
proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. 19
III
Concentration of Powers
in the President during
crisis government.
1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the Philippines is a

crisis government today are more or less concentrated in the
President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of government power in a
democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies
inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. In most free states it has
generally been regarded as imperative that the total power of the government be
parceled out among three mutually independent branches executive, legislature,
and judiciary. It is believed to be destructive of constitutionalism if any one branch
should exercise any two or more types of power, and certainly a total disregard of
the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the very
definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct
obstruction to arbitrary governmental action. By this same token, in abnormal
times it may form an insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency action in
behalf of the state and its independent existence. There are moments in the life of
any government when all powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and
action, even if this means the temporary union of executive, legislative, and
judicial power in the hands of one man. The more complete the separation of
powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more necessary
will be their fusion in time of crisis. This is evident in a comparison of the crisis
potentialities of the cabinet and presidential systems of government. In the former
the all-important harmony of legislature and executive is taken for granted; in the
latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be to confidently expected. As a result, cabinet
is more easily established and more trustworthy than presidential dictatorship. The
power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded; it must
also be freed from the normal system of constitutional and legal limitations. 21 John
Locke, on the other hand, claims for the executive in its own right a broad
discretion capable even of setting aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of special
exigencies for which the legislative power had not provided. 22 The rationale
behind such broad emergency powers of the Executive is the release of the
government from "the paralysis of constitutional restrains" so that the crisis may be
ended and normal times restored.
2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a

conceded valid at. That sun clear authority of the President is saddled on Section 3
(pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions, thus: 23
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the
interim National Assembly and shall preside over its sessions until the
interim Speaker shall have been elected. He shall continue to exercise
his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-
five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime
Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the interim
National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim
Prime Minister, who shall then exercise their respective powers vested
by this Constitution.
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated,

issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of
the land, and shall remain valid, binding, and effective even after
lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless
modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President,
or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular
National Assembly.
"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention

delegate, "that the Constitutional Convention, while giving to the President the
discretion when to call the interim National Assembly to session, and knowing that
it may not be convened soon, would create a vacuum in the exercise of legislative
powers. Otherwise, with no one to exercise the lawmaking powers, there would be
paralyzation of the entire governmental machinery."24 Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is
an extremely important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which extends over
a period of time. The separation of executive and legislature ordained in the
Constitution presents a distinct obstruction to efficient crisis government. The
steady increase in executive power is not too much a cause for as the steady
increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the President has been
called upon by the Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion,
subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and economic crisis-a crisis greater than
war. In short, while conventional constitutional law just confines the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the national
forces, yet the facts of our political, social, and economic disturbances had
convincingly shown that in meeting the same, indefinite power should be attributed
to tile President to take emergency measures 25
IV
Authority of the incumbent
President t to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the

interim National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial
convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the
incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to
defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference.
Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the
President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of
the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly.
Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President
to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption
of that body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been
legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is
no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar,
to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has
converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted
by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and
only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute
necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of
the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very
constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments
without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from that actuality
and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the governmental
machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive
vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis
and restore normal times." In these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to
reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After
all, constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now,
are mere agents of the people .26
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of

January 1973 and February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of the
interim National Assembly. The Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng
mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, and the
Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, about
the same number of Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458
municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had informed the
President that the prevailing sentiment of the people is for the abolition of the
interim National Assembly. Other issues concerned the lifting of martial law and
amendments to the Constitution .27 The national organizations of Sangguniang
Bayan presently proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly,
its replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise
by the President of its present powers in a referendum to be held on October 16
. 28 The Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under Presidential Decree 995
of September 10, 1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials with cabinet
rank, 91 members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the
Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in session to submit directly to the
people in a plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted proposed amendments
to the Constitution, including the issue of martial law .29 Similarly, the
"barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of the
proposed amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the
President to initiate the proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the
subsequent issuance of Presidential Decree No, 1033 on September 22, 1976
submitting the questions (proposed amendments) to the people in the National
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
The People is Sovereign
1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily

seen. In the Philippines, a republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.30 In its fourth meaning,
Savigny would treat people as "that particular organized assembly of individuals in
which, according to the Constitution, the highest power exists." 31 This is the
concept of popular sovereignty. It means that the constitutional legislator, namely
the people, is sovereign 32 In consequence, the people may thus write into the
Constitution their convictions on any subject they choose in the absence of express
constitutional prohibition. 33 This is because, as Holmes said, the Constitution "is
an experiment, as all life is all experiment." 34"The necessities of orderly
government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that one generation should be
permitted to permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is based,
therefore, upon a self-limiting decision of the people when they adopt it. 35
2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to
exercise their sovereign power as constitutional legislator. The proposed
amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from the thinking of a single man.
Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only into
enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the powers of the
government. In equal vein, the submission of those proposed amendments and the
question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the
people themselves implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it
may well be said that the amending process is a sovereign act, although the
authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be followed reside somehow in a
particular body.
VI
Referendum-Plebiscite not
rendered nugatory by the
participation of the 15-year olds.
1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you

want martial law to be continued? - is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year
olds may participate. This was prompted by the desire of the Government to reach
the larger mas of the people so that their true pulse may be felt to guide the
President in pursuing his program for a New Order. For the succeeding question on
the proposed amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may participate.
This is the plebiscite aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the new
Constitution. 36 On this second question, it would only be the votes of those 18
years old and above which will have valid bearing on the results. The fact that the
voting populace are simultaneously asked to answer the referendum question and
the plebiscite question does not infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing
objectionable in consulting the people on a given issue, which is of current one and
submitting to them for ratification of proposed constitutional amendments. The
fear of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year olds above) is readily
dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for every barangay center, one
containing the ballots of voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another
containing the ballots of voters eighteen years of age and above. 37 The ballots in
the ballot box for voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen shall be counted
ahead of the ballots of voters eighteen years and above contained in another ballot
box. And, the results of the referendum-plebiscite shall be separately prepared for
the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes. 38
2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A

"referendum" is merely consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing
public reaction to the given issues submitted to the people foe their consideration,
the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of
the President. 39 It is participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen,
regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex- convicts
. 40 A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens
of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age
or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in
the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the
election Literacy, property or any other substantive requirement is not imposed. It
is generally associated with the amending process of the Constitution, more
particularly, the ratification aspect.
VII
1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law
stultifies in main the freedom to dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial
law regime which, in the observation of Justice Fernando, 41 is impressed with a
mild character recorded no State imposition for a muffled voice. To be sure, there
are restraints of the individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total suppression
of that liberty is aimed at. The for the referendum-plebiscite on October 16
recognizes all the embracing freedoms of expression and assembly The President
himself had announced that he would not countenance any suppression of
dissenting views on the issues, as he is not interested in winning a "yes" or "no"
vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at hand. 42 Thus, the
dissenters soon found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear
their adverse views on the proposed amendments and even (in the valid ratification
of the 1973 Constitution, which is already a settled matter. 43 Even government
employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to participate in
public discussion and even campaign for their stand on the referendum-plebiscite
issues. 44
VIII
Time for deliberation
is not short.
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too
short for free debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The
questions are not new. They are the issues of the day. The people have been living
with them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The referendums
of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the
contested brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in previous
plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum
Case, recalls: "Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in
three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette of the women's suffrage
amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937
(Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as ordinance the
complicated Tydings-Kocialskowski was published in only three consecutive
issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite (Com.
Act 492). For the 1940 Constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral
Congress, the reelection of the President and Vice President, and the creation of the
Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette was fixed (Com Act No. 517). And the Parity Amendment, an
involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy as well as the
independence of the Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73)." 45
2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to

the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be
held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision."
In Coleman v. Miller, 46 the United States Supreme court held that this matter of
submission involves "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions,
political, social and economic," which "are essentially political and not justiciable."
The constituent body or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time within
which the people may act. This is because proposal and ratification are not treated
as unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference
being that they are not to be widely separated in time; second, it is only when there
is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the
reasonable implication being that when proposed, they are to be considered and
disposed of presently, and third, ratification is but the expression of the
approbation of the people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously. 47 In the
words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation
to the sentiment and the felt needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that
sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist. it ought to be regarded as waived, and
not again to be voted upon, unless a second time proposed by proper body
IN RESUME
The three issues are
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031

and 1033 political or justiciable?
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental
circumstances now obtaining, does the President possess power to propose
amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and
prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time
frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique
M. Fernando, Claudio Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma,
Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G. Martin are of the view that the
question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q.
Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative,
while Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted in the negative.
Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and dissenting opinion
in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from the proposition that
there is concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis, thus
raising serious doubts as to the power of the President to propose amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo,
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin are of the view that there is a
sufficient and proper submission of the proposed amendments for ratification by
the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar expressed the hope, however
that the period of time may be extended. Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar
and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and therefore beyond the
competence and cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to
his concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs.
COMELEC (21 SCRA 774).Associate Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma
hold that prescinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise the
constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair
and proper submission with sufficient information and time to assure intelligent
consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in the controlling cases of
Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted to dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons
as expressed in his separate opinion, Associate Justice Fernando concurs in the
result. Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted to grant the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby
dismissed. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE
G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976
VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976
RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO

SALAPANTAN, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE
MARTIN, J,:
The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction
relates to the power of the incumbent President of the Philippines to propose
amendments to the present Constitution in the absence of the interim National
Assembly which has not been convened.
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree

No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law,
the I . assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present
powers.1
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related
decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree
No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for
the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies)
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite
relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree
No. 991, the full text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below. 2
On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree
No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the
people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces
their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to
the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:
(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the
following amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question,
the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of
Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang
Pambansa. Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more
than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall include the incumbent President
of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation,
those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective
sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the
Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio while the sectors shall be determined by law. The
number of representatives from each region or sector and the, manner of their
election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members
shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National
Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not exercise the power
provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the
election and selection of the members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa
and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall have been elected. The
incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall
continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is
organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to
exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five.
Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under
this Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and
functions, and discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime
Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be subject only to such disqualifications as the
President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President (Prime Minister) if he so
desires may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers
as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until

martial law shall have been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on
any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may,
in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters of
instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.
7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their
functions, powers, and composition may be altered by law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the
Commission on Elections may be called at any time the government deems it
necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any important matter
whether of national or local interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these

amendments shall continue in full force and effect.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have
proclaimed that they have been ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the
referendum-plebiscite."
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and
control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD,

father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-
Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to
the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments
to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October
16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent
Commission on Elections, The Solicitor General principally maintains that
petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond
judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the
incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the
referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary

Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose
amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is
expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article
XVII of the Constitution.3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on
October 5, 1976 by RAUL M. GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO
SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the implementation of
Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October
16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under
Martial Law, the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is untenable
under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the proposed
amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a
nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via
referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of
the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the
Philippines 18 years of age and above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.
Justiciability of question raised.
1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C.

Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad) possess locus standi to challenge the
constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033. It is now
an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature Presidential Decrees are of such
nature-may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of
its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement
of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public
funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The breadth of Presidential Decree
No. 991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective
implementation of its purposes. 5 Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the
sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. 6 The interest of the
aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of
public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity
of the Decrees appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this
Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not. 7 For the present
case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the
authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.
2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one,
lying outside the domain of judicial review. We disagree. The amending process
both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. 8 This is especially
true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally
exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973
Constitution, the power to propose amendments o the constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory
provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active
session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of
the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973
constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the
National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly the incumbent
President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of the procedure
for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be
amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos.
991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of
legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is
plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section
2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be heard and
decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law
may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members.
..." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties
and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The amending, like all other powers
organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so
that the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that
power has been discharged within its limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a
particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity
of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in
the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to
perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the
amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is
therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the
actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution
provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed
was valid or not. 10
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-
justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments
and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposal to the
people ultimately lie in the judgment of the A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious
circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the
authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present
Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been
followed or not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of
course who exercise no power of judicial but by the Supreme Court in whom the
people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to
determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or
not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the
submission to and ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases underline
the preference of the Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the
amending process as one of non-political impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, 11 the
contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on the legality of Presidential
Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Pilipino people (on January 15, 1973) for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating fund s therefore
"is a political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously considered the issue as
justiciable in nature. Subsequently in the Ratification Cases 12 involving the issue
of whether or not the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102. announcing
the Ratification by the Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question, the
affirmative stand of' the Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled that the
question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority
view, said, Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory of
the respondents therein that the question whether Presidential Decree No. 73
calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection
of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of
judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it partook of a political nature, and We
unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With Identical
unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus
cases, questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the
factual bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court
in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda, insofar as it adhered to the
former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply. For the
same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales vs.
Commission on Elections, the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito." 13 The return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,
urged by the Solicitor General, was decisively refused by the Court. Chief Justice
Concepcion continued: "The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however,
substantially the same as those given in support on the political question theory
advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were carefully
considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally
untenable. As a consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus
cases partakes of the nature and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight
by its virtual reiteration."
II
The amending process as laid out
in the new Constitution.
1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution

may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The
National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members,
call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the
electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution

shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the
Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the
Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by
the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its
Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such
amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article
Sixteen hereof.
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the
nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normally, the
amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a
Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the
National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be
submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the
members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be
proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the National Assembly upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister,.
2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent
President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially
convene the interim National Assembly. Speaking for the majority opinion in that
case, Justice Makasiar said: "The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to
the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the
interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and
order in the country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member of that
Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen the Delegates to the Constitutional
Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that
under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he
could convene the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the
sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact, the proposal that it be convened
'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel (V) was rejected. The President's
decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found
support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at
which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted
against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of July
24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to
withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the
referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim
National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the
members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were
deemed automatically members of the I interim National Assembly, were against
its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973, the people had already
resolved against it.
3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals
of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of
lawmaking. lt is not legislating when engaged in the amending process.16 Rather,
it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself.
In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973
Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory
Provisions (for the National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the
legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment
amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a
distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that
of a legislative character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of
law. 17 Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment
is a misnomer 18 The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies
only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with
proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. 19
III
Concentration of Powers
in the President during
crisis government.
1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the Philippines is a

crisis government today are more or less concentrated in the
President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of government power in a
democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies
inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. In most free states it has
generally been regarded as imperative that the total power of the government be
parceled out among three mutually independent branches executive, legislature,
and judiciary. It is believed to be destructive of constitutionalism if any one branch
should exercise any two or more types of power, and certainly a total disregard of
the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the very
definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct
obstruction to arbitrary governmental action. By this same token, in abnormal
times it may form an insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency action in
behalf of the state and its independent existence. There are moments in the life of
any government when all powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and
action, even if this means the temporary union of executive, legislative, and
judicial power in the hands of one man. The more complete the separation of
powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more necessary
will be their fusion in time of crisis. This is evident in a comparison of the crisis
potentialities of the cabinet and presidential systems of government. In the former
the all-important harmony of legislature and executive is taken for granted; in the
latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be to confidently expected. As a result, cabinet
is more easily established and more trustworthy than presidential dictatorship. The
power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded; it must
also be freed from the normal system of constitutional and legal limitations. 21 John
Locke, on the other hand, claims for the executive in its own right a broad
discretion capable even of setting aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of special
exigencies for which the legislative power had not provided. 22 The rationale
behind such broad emergency powers of the Executive is the release of the
government from "the paralysis of constitutional restrains" so that the crisis may be
ended and normal times restored.
2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a

conceded valid at. That sun clear authority of the President is saddled on Section 3
(pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions, thus: 23
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the

interim National Assembly and shall preside over its sessions until the
interim Speaker shall have been elected. He shall continue to exercise
his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-
five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime
Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the interim
National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim
Prime Minister, who shall then exercise their respective powers vested
by this Constitution.
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated,

issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of
the land, and shall remain valid, binding, and effective even after
lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless
modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President,
or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular
National Assembly.
"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention
delegate, "that the Constitutional Convention, while giving to the President the
discretion when to call the interim National Assembly to session, and knowing that
it may not be convened soon, would create a vacuum in the exercise of legislative
powers. Otherwise, with no one to exercise the lawmaking powers, there would be
paralyzation of the entire governmental machinery."24 Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is
an extremely important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which extends over
a period of time. The separation of executive and legislature ordained in the
Constitution presents a distinct obstruction to efficient crisis government. The
steady increase in executive power is not too much a cause for as the steady
increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the President has been
called upon by the Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion,
subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and economic crisis-a crisis greater than
war. In short, while conventional constitutional law just confines the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the national
forces, yet the facts of our political, social, and economic disturbances had
convincingly shown that in meeting the same, indefinite power should be attributed
to tile President to take emergency measures 25
IV
Authority of the incumbent
President t to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the

interim National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial
convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the
incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to
defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference.
Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the
President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of
the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly.
Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President
to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption
of that body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been
legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is
no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar,
to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has
converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted
by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and
only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute
necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of
the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very
constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments
without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from that actuality
and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the governmental
machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive
vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis
and restore normal times." In these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to
reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After
all, constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now,
are mere agents of the people .26
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of

January 1973 and February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of the
interim National Assembly. The Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng
mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, and the
Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, about
the same number of Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458
municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had informed the
President that the prevailing sentiment of the people is for the abolition of the
interim National Assembly. Other issues concerned the lifting of martial law and
amendments to the Constitution .27 The national organizations of Sangguniang
Bayan presently proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly,
its replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise
by the President of its present powers in a referendum to be held on October 16
. 28 The Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under Presidential Decree 995
of September 10, 1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials with cabinet
rank, 91 members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the
Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in session to submit directly to the
people in a plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted proposed amendments
to the Constitution, including the issue of martial law .29 Similarly, the
"barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of the
proposed amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the
President to initiate the proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the
subsequent issuance of Presidential Decree No, 1033 on September 22, 1976
submitting the questions (proposed amendments) to the people in the National
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
The People is Sovereign
1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily

seen. In the Philippines, a republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.30 In its fourth meaning,
Savigny would treat people as "that particular organized assembly of individuals in
which, according to the Constitution, the highest power exists." 31 This is the
concept of popular sovereignty. It means that the constitutional legislator, namely
the people, is sovereign 32 In consequence, the people may thus write into the
Constitution their convictions on any subject they choose in the absence of express
constitutional prohibition. 33 This is because, as Holmes said, the Constitution "is
an experiment, as all life is all experiment." 34"The necessities of orderly
government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that one generation should be
permitted to permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is based,
therefore, upon a self-limiting decision of the people when they adopt it. 35
2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to

exercise their sovereign power as constitutional legislator. The proposed
amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from the thinking of a single man.
Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only into
enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the powers of the
government. In equal vein, the submission of those proposed amendments and the
question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the
people themselves implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it
may well be said that the amending process is a sovereign act, although the
authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be followed reside somehow in a
particular body.
VI
Referendum-Plebiscite not
rendered nugatory by the
participation of the 15-year olds.

1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you
want martial law to be continued? - is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year
olds may participate. This was prompted by the desire of the Government to reach
the larger mas of the people so that their true pulse may be felt to guide the
President in pursuing his program for a New Order. For the succeeding question on
the proposed amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may participate.
This is the plebiscite aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the new
Constitution. 36 On this second question, it would only be the votes of those 18
years old and above which will have valid bearing on the results. The fact that the
voting populace are simultaneously asked to answer the referendum question and
the plebiscite question does not infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing
objectionable in consulting the people on a given issue, which is of current one and
submitting to them for ratification of proposed constitutional amendments. The
fear of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year olds above) is readily
dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for every barangay center, one
containing the ballots of voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another
containing the ballots of voters eighteen years of age and above. 37 The ballots in
the ballot box for voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen shall be counted
ahead of the ballots of voters eighteen years and above contained in another ballot
box. And, the results of the referendum-plebiscite shall be separately prepared for
the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes. 38
2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A

"referendum" is merely consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing
public reaction to the given issues submitted to the people foe their consideration,
the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of
the President. 39 It is participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen,
regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex- convicts
. 40 A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens
of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age
or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in
the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the
election Literacy, property or any other substantive requirement is not imposed. It
is generally associated with the amending process of the Constitution, more
particularly, the ratification aspect.
VII
1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law
stultifies in main the freedom to dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial
law regime which, in the observation of Justice Fernando, 41 is impressed with a
mild character recorded no State imposition for a muffled voice. To be sure, there
are restraints of the individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total suppression
of that liberty is aimed at. The for the referendum-plebiscite on October 16
recognizes all the embracing freedoms of expression and assembly The President
himself had announced that he would not countenance any suppression of
dissenting views on the issues, as he is not interested in winning a "yes" or "no"
vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at hand. 42 Thus, the
dissenters soon found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear
their adverse views on the proposed amendments and even (in the valid ratification
of the 1973 Constitution, which is already a settled matter. 43 Even government
employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to participate in
public discussion and even campaign for their stand on the referendum-plebiscite
issues. 44
VIII
Time for deliberation
is not short.
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too

short for free debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The
questions are not new. They are the issues of the day. The people have been living
with them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The referendums
of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the
contested brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in previous
plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum
Case, recalls: "Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in
three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette of the women's suffrage
amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937
(Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as ordinance the
complicated Tydings-Kocialskowski was published in only three consecutive
issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite (Com.
Act 492). For the 1940 Constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral
Congress, the reelection of the President and Vice President, and the creation of the
Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette was fixed (Com Act No. 517). And the Parity Amendment, an
involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy as well as the
independence of the Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73)." 45
2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to

the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be
held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision."
In Coleman v. Miller, 46 the United States Supreme court held that this matter of
submission involves "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions,
political, social and economic," which "are essentially political and not justiciable."
The constituent body or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time within
which the people may act. This is because proposal and ratification are not treated
as unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference
being that they are not to be widely separated in time; second, it is only when there
is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the
reasonable implication being that when proposed, they are to be considered and
disposed of presently, and third, ratification is but the expression of the
approbation of the people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously. 47 In the
words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation
to the sentiment and the felt needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that
sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist. it ought to be regarded as waived, and
not again to be voted upon, unless a second time proposed by proper body
IN RESUME
The three issues are
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031

and 1033 political or justiciable?
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental
circumstances now obtaining, does the President possess power to propose
amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and
prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time
frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique
M. Fernando, Claudio Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma,
Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G. Martin are of the view that the
question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q.
Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative,
while Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted in the negative.
Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and dissenting opinion
in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from the proposition that
there is concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis, thus
raising serious doubts as to the power of the President to propose amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo,
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin are of the view that there is a
sufficient and proper submission of the proposed amendments for ratification by
the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar expressed the hope, however
that the period of time may be extended. Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar
and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and therefore beyond the
competence and cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to
his concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs.
COMELEC (21 SCRA 774).Associate Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma
hold that prescinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise the
constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair
and proper submission with sufficient information and time to assure intelligent
consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in the controlling cases of
Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted to dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons
as expressed in his separate opinion, Associate Justice Fernando concurs in the
result. Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted to grant the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby
dismissed. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH

6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------ x
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL

L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and
CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.
x------------------------------------------------------ x
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo,

BAYAN MUNA represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca,
KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary General Joel
Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona
Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito
Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-
Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana de
Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina
Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman,
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer
Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned
Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of
Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health
Action for Human Rights, Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA

THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),

CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON,
FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P.
AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO

BAYA, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS

ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL

VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A.

LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL
TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU

PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors.
x --------------------------------------------------------x
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and

SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY
ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG

PILIPINO, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V.

SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S.
ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V.
SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter
Doe,, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative
petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino
and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups1 and individuals,
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under
Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least twelveper centum (12%) of all registered voters,
with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum(3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by

modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4
of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled
"Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The
Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC
should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII

OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL
TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING
ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of their initiative.7
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to
the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative
petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling
in Santiago v. Commission on Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.9
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of
certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August
2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition.
The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding
precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the
parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the
"will of the sovereign people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require
respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they should not be
cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for
"entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction
in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-
intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined
causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite
the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735
and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the system of
initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or

opposing the Lambino Group's petition. The supporting intervenors10 uniformly
hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying
on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary view
and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also
challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of
the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting
an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; 12 (4)
the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as
provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the
Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735
limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September
2006. After receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case
submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's
initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
"incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due

course to the Lambino Group's petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to
revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the
Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional

provision that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed

by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of
an amendment "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want
to propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people when they
are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and
shown to them before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft
shown to them and they are asked whether or not they want to propose this
constitutional amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal

and pass it around for signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before"
they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is
already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people
should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative

upon a petition" is thatthe entire proposal on its face is a petition by the
people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must
author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on
their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such
complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the
petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove
that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of people's

initiative from the United States where various State constitutions incorporate an
initiative clause. In almost all States15 which allow initiative petitions, the
unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the
proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the
people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments.16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several
decisions of various courts. Thus, inCapezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals,
declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying

the signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing.
Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription
requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to
describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer,
without the signer having actually examined the petition, could easily
mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly
misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to the signer's
liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the
person giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who
obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite
signatures to qualify for the ballot.17 (Boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:

The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative
commonly are described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full
text requirement is to provide sufficient information so that registered
voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition.");
x x x (publication of full text of amended constitutional provision required
because it is "essential for the elector to have x x x the section which is
proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he
must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would be
required to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of

the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive
and misleading" which renders the initiative void.19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition
must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the
deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers
intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In
particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly
reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full text of the
proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a
petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735,
the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid,
requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The
proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public
officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain
the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The
proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the
arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay
those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional

requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of
proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full
text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy
of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group
submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet20 after the oral arguments of 26
September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The
signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet
attached21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by
intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet
attached to the Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below
the signature sheet in full:
Province: City/Municipality: No. of

Legislative Barangay:
District: Verified
Signatures:
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES

VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN
ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND
ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE
SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My

signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.
Precinct Name Address Birthdate Signature Verification

Number
Last Name, MM/DD/YY
First Name,
M.I.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
_________________ _________________ __________________
Barangay Official Witness Witness
(Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign)
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's
proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state
that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul
Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26
September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from
the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of
government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the
proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly,
the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution
envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering

from February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the
signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition which they
later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his group also
circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the
COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However,
Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated that what his group circulated was
the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August
2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of
the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost seven months earlier in February
2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's
"Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30
August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my
personal capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of
Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of signatories
hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to
the present petition. However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local
Authorities of the Philippines"22 has posted the full text of Resolution No. 2006-02,
which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE

PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER
CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the

Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the approach to support the
proposals of the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her

Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as
embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed
by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the House of
Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change

created by Her Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987
Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in

Congress which militates against the use of the expeditious form of
amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the

failure of Congress to amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly,
ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform agenda
through People's Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other
pragmatic means to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED,
THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL
AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE
PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC)
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on
14 January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel, Manila.23 (Underscoring
supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to

prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed
with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals
(sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through
people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution."
The proposals of the Consultative Commission24 arevastly different from the
proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30
August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all
provisions of the existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory
Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and the
National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that the
Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed
changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution,
including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six
months before the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006
amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of the
draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with
the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave
doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition
together with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not
refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC,
the Lambino Group declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed
amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of
Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were
inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because
the amended petition was what they had shown to the people during the February
to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the
petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their
proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30
August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed
copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the
Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this Court that they
circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets.
The signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition is
attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the

Lambino Group first claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed
with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic)
fraud, a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum
petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan,
224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the
signature sheets circulated together with the petition for initiative filed
with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the
proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for
initiative filed with the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the
intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu
Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did
not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the
Lambino Group alleged that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed
to mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally
stated during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of
the amended petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a
signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot
question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the
act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed
changeattached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the
Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be attached to the
petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign
on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be

incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the
present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were not incorporated
with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus
Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from
February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the
petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino
Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that they printed
and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or amended
petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the
amended petition during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group
admitted circulating only very limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed
only 100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than six months later
with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to
print additional copies of the draft petition but he could not state with certainty
how many additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could
only assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself
caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the

Lambino Group expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated the
printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x
x."25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any
doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the proposed
changes to the great majority of the people who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received
with certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution
with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition
to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with
the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten
people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the
maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the signature
sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible
for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition
before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the
Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the
proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition
before they signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of
the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment
with an indication in the signature sheet of such attachment.Petitioner Atty.
Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this admission binds
the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the
signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the
proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-
compliance with the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The
signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the
Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature
sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before signing. They could
not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus
members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its

members, who are almost all the present members of Congress, decide to
call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim
Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or revisions to
the Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino
Group's signature sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea
that they were proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes are
highly controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these proposed
changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his
group assured the people during the signature-gathering that the elections for
the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local elections if the
proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However, the text
of the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the
amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the
members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held
simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the
elections for the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local
elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed
changes, could have easily written the word "next" before the phrase "election of
all local government officials." This would have insured that the elections for the
regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections following the
ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next"
allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneously with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their
own term of office. This allows incumbent members of the House of
Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of office, and
possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the
Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino
and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty.
Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the
entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition
that contains the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or
misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely
on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the
signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result is
a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe that the
proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular
Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed
the signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to
make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section
4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments,

the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or
revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local
autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a
"surplusage" and the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far from being
a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-
Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on
initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates an
unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma
since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them
to sign a petition that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may
find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire
proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v.
Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes

"logrolling," which, if our judicial responsibility is to mean anything,
we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment amounts
to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the
amendment's proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the
iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of the
proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the
instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes it
impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement
that proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v.
McAlpine,30 the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth
and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems
that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a
greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase
the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a greater opportunity for
"inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The
drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or supervised
process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while
remaining silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when
communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically use
simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers
and eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative
before the election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting
the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly
distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further
amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a
constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not have
known that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the
interim Parliament to amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from
ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the
absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion
whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4),
the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to immediately
amend or revise again the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending
or revising again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain
what specific amendments or revisions the initiative proponents want the interim
Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or
revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect
of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by
the people" because the people do not even know the nature and effect of the
proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended

petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions
states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members
of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of
Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular
Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision for the
present members of the House of Representatives even if their term of office will
all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present
Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain members of the
interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime
Minister exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does
not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime
Minister will come only from the present members of the House of Representatives
to theexclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The
6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that
their signatures would be used to discriminate against the Senators. They
could not have known that their signatures would be used to limit, after 30
June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members
of the existing House of Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the
people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can
operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution requires
that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition" -
meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental
law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot behidden from the
people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and
unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members
of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition. However,
this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the
proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition,
not after they have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it

dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing

Revision through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of

the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional
convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article
XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be

proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or

(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly

proposed by the people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the

Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its
Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode
is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to
"[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of
Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission

that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this
afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed
provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section
2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members,
may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held,
directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon
petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7.
This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative,
which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has
to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as
embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of
initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and
should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we
removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of
initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the
sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning
Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as
another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while

ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and
should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul
of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the
Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to

distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the
process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is
given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the
Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed

amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the
word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision"

should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it
can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and
wrote, a clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution.
The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional
convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and
wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution.
Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people
the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose
revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States.
Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan,32the Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the

Constitution x x x applies only to the proposing and the adopting or
rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the Constitution' and does not
purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a
revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification
by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for
that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the
proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed 'the measure') now before us
is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our
present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not
properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon
by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought by petitioner should
issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which

it may be amended or revised, it can be altered by those who favor
amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one of the
specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference
between an amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from an
examination of the measure here in question that it is not an amendment as
that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1.
The document appears to be based in large part on the revision of the
constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision'
authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the
1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in the Assembly the two-
third's majority vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and
hence failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the measure

sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the
present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.

Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can
be submitted to the people through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to
the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can
only be proposed at a convention called in the manner provided in Article
XVII, Section 1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can
only propose amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits
initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the constitutionally
prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed
by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes
prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:34
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or

amended in the manner prescribed by the instrument itself, and that
any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner other than the one
provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as extra-
constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded
that the people are sovereign and that they have power to adopt a
constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so, act
in an orderly manner and according to the settled principles of constitutional
law. And where the people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the
method by which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the
fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is
unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution,
cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear
command of the Constitution ― that a people's initiative may only amend, never
revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or
revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a
revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the scope
of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision
of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described
the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and
abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision
indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which
it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a
like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the
term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within the lines of the
original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the
purpose for which it was framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the

constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of
checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial
entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions
of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that
adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved.
Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment
generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to
the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part
test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether
the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
existing provisions."36 The court examines only the number of provisions affected
and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in
the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper
subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan"
includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of
check and balances."39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is
a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's
proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article
VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan
of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when

the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are
reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A
shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and
executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power
alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of
checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-
Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the
Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond
doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's
proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the
framework of government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin
Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable

provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific
parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to
suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be
dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine
how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from
the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because
of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch
from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on
other important provisions of the Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida

State constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The
issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized where [the]
proposed amendment would x x x affect several other provisions of [the]
Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as
outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution
to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other
provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in the form of
the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence in the
United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one,
since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more
revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the
American form of government. It would not only radically change the
whole pattern of government in this state and tear apart the whole
fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities
necessary to carry on government.
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were

adopted by the people at the General Election and if the Legislature at its
next session should fail to submit further amendments to revise and clarify
the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or if after
submission of appropriate amendments the people should refuse to adopt
them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of this State. The same
result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article
V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could
be other examples too numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly
to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and
women and many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the
Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to
give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date document.
All of this could disappear very quickly if we were to hold that it could be
amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition here.43 (Emphasis
supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present
petition. The Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to
a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and legislative
departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida

Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature. In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no less than 105 provisions
of the Constitution would be affected based on the count of Associate Justice
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present
initiative seeks far more radical changes in the structure of government than the
initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and
"revision" is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits
that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution,
substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of the deliberative
body work full-time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes,
when proposed through an initiative, are called "amendments" because the
changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an "occupation,
profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their
Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions
expressly provide for both "amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of
legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same provisions expressly
provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the people. It would seem
that the apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the people,
that on one hand the common people in general are not expected to work
full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their
occupation, profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators
and constitutional convention delegates are expected to work full-time on
the same matter because that is their occupation, profession or
vocation. Thus, the difference between the words "revision" and
"amendment" pertain only to the process or procedure of coming up
with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional
provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and
"revision" cannot reasonably be in the substance or extent of the
correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention

had drafted the same proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the
present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the
Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in
the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional
convention had drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino Group as
private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely
amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter
of changing the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the
framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do
not deviate from such categorical intent and language.45 Any theory espousing a
construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration.
More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of
government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any
jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only
exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating
that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does
not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in

American jurisdictions have attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v.
Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the
constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section
2 merely provides a procedure by which the legislature can propose a
revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions
initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale

change to the constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative
process. They assert that the distinction between amendment and revision is
determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed
enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the
constitution." They argue that this ballot measure proposes far reaching
changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound
impacts on existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the
government's relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert
that, because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic
principles of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it
violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the
prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not
prohibit revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the
Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be
accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII,
section 2. After reviewing Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed
amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use
of the initiative as a means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but it
contains no similar sanction for its use as a means of revising the
constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is
the only section of the constitution which provides the means for
constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an individual, through
the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2,

does not apply to constitutional revisions proposed by initiative.
(Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the
express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for
amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the
spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there is an
amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end
of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical
overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal
departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections
and articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution
without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be
considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the
voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an amendment and not a revision.
Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from
100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision.48 Also, a change
requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the
Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.49
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or

articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These
changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-
and-balances among or within the three branches. These three examples are located
at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision
sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a

revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a
revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word
"republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II50 of the
Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the
fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will
have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as
well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of
checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing
Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a

constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to
undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions,
but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions
normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional
conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's
initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded
proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory
Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and
Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18
and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby
retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to
26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of
government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably

inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also applies to
construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of
the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that
in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be
amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government." The
effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be
amended," which requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty.
Lambino readily conceded during the oral arguments that the requirement of a
future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the
rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically prevails in
case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the

Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is
between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the
"Parliamentary system of government," and the inconsistency shall be resolved
in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino

Group's proposed changes refer to ― the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or
New Zealand models, which are among the few countries withunicameral
parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the traditional and
well-known parliamentary forms of government ― the British, French, Spanish,
German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have
all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize
that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand
parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of
the Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several
provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution
through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a

revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic
requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and
scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit
this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to
amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the
outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to
revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments
to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute
if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such
avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not
pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some
other grounds.51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional

provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result
here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first comply with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires
that the "petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories."
Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as
signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the
amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty.
Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the
petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act
"together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to
the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed
with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735
that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735
stating, "No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to
the electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions,
mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to
the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of
government. Since the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter,
RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even
if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the
Lambino Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc

merely followed this Court's ruling inSantiago and People's Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For following this Court's
ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this
ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court
should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion
could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the
petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated
on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect
and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the
Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly
specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in
unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of
the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the
constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that
comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and
unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the
rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the

total votes cast53 − approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11
February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the people, the full
expression of the people's sovereign will. That approval included the
prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the
Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that
the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the
Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which
means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding the Constitution.
This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of
the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and
protect the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people

decide" cannot override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as
prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution ― the people's
fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society ― becomes
easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures
through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the
nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However,
the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the
verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains
its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits
that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of the
incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be
wary of incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will" in the present
initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution.
The Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this
Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this
constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to
alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the
Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this Court's raison
d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA, respondent..
Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Special Attorney Jose G. Azurin,
(O.S.G.) for petitioner.
Ramirez and Ortigas for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
The basic issue posed by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue in this appeal
from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals as to whether or not the requisites of
statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an
international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the
exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code 1 is now ripe for
adjudication. The Court of Tax Appeals answered the question in the negative, and
thus reversed the action taken by petitioner Collector, who would hold respondent
Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate of the late Estrella Soriano
Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the sum of P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and
inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the
Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national having been a resident of Tangier,
Morocco from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955. In an earlier resolution
promulgated May 30, 1962, this Court on the assumption that the need for
resolving the principal question would be obviated, referred the matter back to the
Court of Tax Appeals to determine whether the alleged law of Tangier did grant
the reciprocal tax exemption required by the aforesaid Section 122. Then came an
order from the Court of Tax Appeals submitting copies of legislation of Tangier
that would manifest that the element of reciprocity was not lacking. It was not until
July 29, 1969 that the case was deemed submitted for decision. When the petition
for review was filed on January 2, 1958, the basic issue raised was impressed with
an element of novelty. Four days thereafter, however, on January 6, 1958, it was
held by this Court that the aforesaid provision does not require that the "foreign
country" possess an international personality to come within its
terms. 2 Accordingly, we have to affirm.
The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, now under review, sets forth the
background facts as follows: "This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Antonio
Campos Rueda as administrator of the estate of the deceased Doña Maria de la
Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, from the decision of the respondent Collector of
Internal Revenue, assessing against and demanding from the former the sum
P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, including interest and
penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties situated in the
Philippines and belonging to said Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira.
Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira (Maria Cerdeira for short) is a
Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a resident
of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to her death on January 2, 1955. At the time of
her demise she left, among others, intangible personal properties in the
Philippines." 3 Then came this portion: "On September 29, 1955, petitioner filed a
provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all the properties of the late Maria
Cerdeira. On the same date, respondent, pending investigation, issued an
assessment for state and inheritance taxes in the respective amounts of
P111,592.48 and P157,791.48, or a total of P369,383.96 which tax liabilities were
paid by petitioner ... . On November 17, 1955, an amended return was filed ...
wherein intangible personal properties with the value of P396,308.90 were claimed
as exempted from taxes. On November 23, 1955, respondent, pending
investigation, issued another assessment for estate and inheritance taxes in the
amounts of P202,262.40 and P267,402.84, respectively, or a total of P469,665.24
... . In a letter dated January 11, 1956, respondent denied the request for exemption
on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Hence, respondent demanded the payment of the
sums of P239,439.49 representing deficiency estate and inheritance taxes
including ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise penalties ... .
In a letter dated February 8, 1956, and received by respondent on the following
day, petitioner requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim
for tax exemption of the intangible personal properties and the imposition of the
25% and 5% ad valorem penalties ... . However, respondent denied request, in his
letter dated May 5, 1956 ... and received by petitioner on May 21, 1956.
Respondent premised the denial on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with
Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country.
Consequently, respondent demanded the payment of the sums of P73,851.21 and
P88,023.74 respectively, or a total of P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and
inheritance taxes including surcharges, interests and compromise penalties." 4
The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals. As there was no dispute
between the parties regarding the values of the properties and the mathematical
correctness of the deficiency assessments, the principal question as noted dealt
with the reciprocity aspect as well as the insisting by the Collector of Internal
Revenue that Tangier was not a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122.
In ruling against the contention of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the appealed
decision states: "In fine, we believe, and so hold, that the expression "foreign
country", used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an
international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or
death upon intangible person properties of our citizens not residing therein, or
whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not
necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government order to
entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our
Tax. Code." 5
Hence appeal to this court by petitioner. The respective briefs of the parties duly
submitted, but as above indicated, instead of ruling definitely on the question, this
Court, on May 30, 1962, resolve to inquire further into the question of reciprocity
and sent back the case to the Court of Tax Appeals for the motion of evidence
thereon. The dispositive portion of such resolution reads as follows: "While section
122 of the Philippine Tax Code aforequoted speaks of 'intangible personal
property' in both subdivisions (a) and (b); the alleged laws of Tangier refer to
'bienes muebles situados en Tanger', 'bienes muebles radicantes en Tanger',
'movables' and 'movable property'. In order that this Court may be able to
determine whether the alleged laws of Tangier grant the reciprocal tax exemptions
required by Section 122 of the Tax Code, and without, for the time being, going
into the merits of the issues raised by the petitioner-appellant, the case is
[remanded] to the Court of Tax Appeals for the reception of evidence or proof on
whether or not the words `bienes muebles', 'movables' and 'movable properties as
used in the Tangier laws, include or embrace 'intangible person property', as used
in the Tax Code." 6 In line with the above resolution, the Court of Tax Appeals
admitted evidence submitted by the administrator petitioner Antonio Campos
Rueda, consisting of exhibits of laws of Tangier to the effect that "the transfers by
reason of death of movable properties, corporeal or incorporeal, including furniture
and personal effects as well as of securities, bonds, shares, ..., were not subject, on
that date and in said zone, to the payment of any death tax, whatever might have
been the nationality of the deceased or his heirs and legatees." It was further noted
in an order of such Court referring the matter back to us that such were duly
admitted in evidence during the hearing of the case on September 9, 1963.
Respondent presented no evidence." 7
The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code. It reads thus: "That no tax shall be collected under this
Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his
death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not
impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person
property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of
the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death
allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in
respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not
residing in that foreign country." 8 The only obstacle therefore to a definitive ruling
is whether or not as vigorously insisted upon by petitioner the acquisition of
internal personality is a condition sine qua non to Tangier being considered a
"foreign country". Deference to the De Lara ruling, as was made clear in the
opening paragraph of this opinion, calls for an affirmance of the decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals.
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it
is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized
sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of
nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government
functioning under a regime of
law. 9 It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an
organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact
obedience to its commands. 10 It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by
common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the general
welfare. 11Correctly has it been described by Esmein as "the juridical
personification of the nation." 12 This is to view it in the light of its historical
development. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite
territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign
will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international
personality. Laski could speak of it then as a territorial society divided into
government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all
other institutions. 13 McIver similarly would point to the power entrusted to its
government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to
enter into international relations. 14 With the latter requisite satisfied, international
law do not exact independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine. 15
Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality,

petitioner has not successfully made out a case. It bears repeating that four days
after the filing of this petition on January 6, 1958 in Collector of Internal Revenue
v. De Lara, 16 it was specifically held by us: "Considering the State of California as
a foreign country in relation to section 122 of our Tax Code we believe and hold,
as did the Tax Court, that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled the exemption
from the inheritance tax on the intangible personal property found in the
Philippines." 17 There can be no doubt that California as a state in the American
Union was in the alleged requisite of international personality. Nonetheless, it was
held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code. 18
What is undeniable is that even prior to the De Lara ruling, this Court did commit
itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an
international personality in the sense, did fall under this exempt category. So it
appears in an opinion of the Court by the then Acting Chief Justicem Bengson who
thereafter assumed that position in a permanent capacity, in Kiene v. Collector of
Internal Revenue. 19 As was therein noted: 'The Board found from the documents
submitted to it — proof of the laws of Liechtenstein — that said country does not
impose estate, inheritance and gift taxes on intangible property of Filipino citizens
not residing in that country. Wherefore, the Board declared that pursuant to the
exemption above established, no estate or inheritance taxes were collectible,
Ludwig Kiene being a resident of Liechtestein when he passed away." 20 Then
came this definitive ruling: "The Collector — hereafter named the respondent —
cites decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of this Court, holding that
intangible personal property in the Philippines belonging to a non-resident
foreigner, who died outside of this country is subject to the estate tax, in disregard
of the principle 'mobilia sequuntur personam'. Such property is admittedly taxable
here. Without the proviso above quoted, the shares of stock owned here by the
Ludwig Kiene would be concededly subject to estate and inheritance taxes.
Nevertheless our Congress chose to make an exemption where conditions are such
that demand reciprocity — as in this case. And the exemption must be honored." 21
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals of October

30, 1957 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA

HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA
BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ,
FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA,
JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA
BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ,
RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO,
RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER,
CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY
KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY,
MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA
PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT
REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA
IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO,
MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA
ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO
VELOSO III, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON.
ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY
VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY,
and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED
NATIONS,Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221(RA 9522) adjusting the country’s
archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating the
maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.3 This law followed
the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in
1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties
over their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined.
Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in
1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained
unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic
Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the
drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now
under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant
with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among others,
UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of
archipelagic States like the Philippines7 and sets the deadline for the filing of
application for the extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these
requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some
basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories,
namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes
of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective

capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators,"9 as the case may be, assail
the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522
reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine
state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987
Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary
treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to
maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty
and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and
damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions. 13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of

islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their argument of territorial
diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included –
its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS
III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues

questioning (1) the petition’s compliance with the case or controversy requirement
for judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged lack of locus standiand (2) the
propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of
RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the country’s
compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the
KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the
country’s security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the
Philippines’ claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of

petitioners’ assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty
of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the
rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Preliminarily –
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper

remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring
this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper
remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis
to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
On the Threshold Issues

Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and

taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative
prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and
implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as
citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the
case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent
resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably
difficult to find other litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to
bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship
standing.17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition

Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents

seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition,
noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion
in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of
respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.18
Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court
exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by
tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles
to test the constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of
government.20Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes
which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry
such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself
constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-
compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought
to be reviewed here is one such law.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional

RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national

territory"21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine
territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the
definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory
provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the
territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly
ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’
technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends
hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the
rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22
Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones
(i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone
[24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical
miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among
United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the
world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’
graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their
coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III
States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which
baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting
points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article
48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone,
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States
parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental
shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the
scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial
waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the
living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands
and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the
baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA
9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with
UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions
of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago."24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional
international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through
occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,25 not by executing multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the
treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims
to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on
general international law.26
RA 9522’s Use of the Framework

of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands
framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable
maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over that
area.27 Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and Scarborough Shoal’s) exclusion from
the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of "about 15,000 square
nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA
3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law,
coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional
deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines’ obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this
view.1avvphi1
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that
RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least
nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and
adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation
on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine
archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners’
argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines’ claim
over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial

waters" under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the
contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the
Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and
exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table
below:29
Extent of Extent of
maritime area maritime area
using RA 3046, using RA 9522,
as amended, taking into
taking into account
account the UNCLOS III (in
Treaty of Paris’ square nautical
delimitation (in miles)
square nautical
miles)
Internal or
archipelagic
waters 166,858 171,435
Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106
Exclusive
Economic
Zone 382,669
TOTAL 440,994 586,210
Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn
under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular
demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping
exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a
delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.30
Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory
because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by
RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines’ continued
claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise
exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of
Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No.
1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis

supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of
the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The
Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III.
First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines
shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of
the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of
the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles. 31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and
the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest
basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago."
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-

Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the
Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if
we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of
international law which states: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to
any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." So sa
loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang
Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are
still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our
archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline.
Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough
Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the
Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating
archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila
magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule
that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis
supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III’s
limits.1avvphi1 The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the
location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by
respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to
draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf
in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046,
as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to
wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock
Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the
maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which
states that "The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles,
except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any
archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical
miles."
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be

skipped or deleted from the baselines system. This will enclose an additional
2,195 nautical miles of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not
established by geodetic survey methods. Accordingly, some of the points,
particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later
found to be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and
drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47.35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent
with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible
observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under
Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by
water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies
under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones.37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under
RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the
Philippines’ claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA
5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the
baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Actis without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion
and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not

Incompatible with the Constitution’s
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that
the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters,
hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under
UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights
indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution
hazards, in violation of the Constitution.38
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the

Constitution39 or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the
Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.
UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic
waters and of their bed and subsoil. –
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters

enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47,
described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from
the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters,
as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall
not in other respects affect the status of the archipelagic
waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State
of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil,
and the resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and
international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle
of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the
Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers,
may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate
innocent and sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea
lanes passage are now pending in Congress.41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in

UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or
archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their
exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international
law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.44 No
modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent
passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without
risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both
the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser
footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea,
to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through
international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic
waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange
for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines,regardless of their
depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial
sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago
and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the
treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands
generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated
by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty,
subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.47
Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II

(Declaration of Principles and State Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of
jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides,
which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights x x x."49 Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating
and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory
provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a
healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the
present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional
violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine
wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 251 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article
XIII, Section 752 ), are not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its
exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all
living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation
binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of
UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the
international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III
creates a sui generis maritime space – the exclusive economic zone – in waters
previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to
exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical
miles.53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of
other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS
III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III,
Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at the relevant
provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners’ reading plausible.
Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to
this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep
price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like
the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from
where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is
recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring
powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas
around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences
Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-
recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and
continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the
Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and
our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-9657. November 29, 1956.]

LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO, Plaintiffs-Appellees, vs.
NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, ET AL., Defendants,
NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION and BOARD OF
LIQUIDATORS, Defendants-Appellants.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court,
entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate
Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel forDefendant, requested said stenographers for
copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the
hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the
needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills
for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount
of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at
the rate of P1 per page.
Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the
payment of these fees and sought the recovery of the amounts paid. On January 19,
1953, the Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the
strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was
expressed that the National Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was
exempt from the payment of the fees in question. On February 6, 1954, the Auditor
General issued an order directing the Cashier of the Department of Justice to
deduct from the salary of Leopoldo T. Bacani the amount of P25 every payday and
from the salary of Mateo A. Matoto the amount of P10 every payday beginning
March 30, 1954. To prevent deduction of these fees from their salaries and secure a
judicial ruling that the National Coconut Corporation is not a government entity
within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, this action was
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Defendants set up as a defense that the National Coconut Corporation is a
government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. After trial, the court found for
the Plaintiffs declaring (1) “that Defendant National Coconut Corporation is not a
government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) that the payments already made by
said Defendant to Plaintiffs herein and received by the latter from the former in the
total amount of P714, for copies of the stenographic transcripts in question, are
valid, just and legal; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (3) that Plaintiffs are under no
obligation whatsoever to make a refund of these payments already received by
them.” This is an appeal from said decision.
Under section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the Government of the
Philippines is exempt from paying the legal fees provided for therein, and among
these fees are those which stenographers may charge for the transcript of notes
taken by them that may be requested by any interested person (section 8). The fees
in question are for the transcript of notes taken during the hearing of a case in
which the National Coconut Corporation is interested, and the transcript was
requested by its assistant corporate counsel for the use of said corporation.
On the other hand, section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope
of the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“‘The Government of the Philippine Islands’ is a term which refers to the corporate
governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised
throughout the Philippine Islands, including, save as the contrary appears from the
context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in
said Islands, whether pertaining to the central Government or to the provincial or
municipal branches or other form of local government.”
The question now to be determined is whether the National Coconut Corporation
may be considered as included in the term “Government of the Republic of the
Philippines” for the purposes of the exemption of the legal fees provided for in
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
As may be noted, the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” refers
to a government entity through which the functions of government are exercised,
including the various arms through which political authority is made effective in
the Philippines, whether pertaining to the central government or to the provincial
or municipal branches or other form of local government. This requires a little
digression on the nature and functions of our government as instituted in our
Constitution.
To begin with, we state that the term “Government” may be defined as “that
institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and
carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a
social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those
who possess the power or authority of prescribing them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil.,
332). This institution, when referring to the national government, has reference to
what our Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the
legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of
government are exercised. These functions are
twofold:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary constitute and ministrant. The former are
those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in
nature; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythe latter are those that are undertaken only by
way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional.
President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“‘(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and
property from violence and robbery.
‘(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents
and children.
‘(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and
the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
‘(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
‘(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
‘(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
‘(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.
‘(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the
preservation of the state from external danger or encroachment and the
advancement of its international interests.’“ (Malcolm, The Government of the
Philippine Islands, p. 19.)
The most important of the ministrant functions
are:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary public works, public education, public charity,
health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The principles
deter mining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional
functions are:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) that a government should do for the
public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and
(2) that a government should do these things which by its very nature it is better
equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or
group of individuals. (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, pp. 19-
20.)
From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there are functions which our
government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our
Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those
which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of
the people. To this latter class belongs the organization of those corporations
owned or controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic
life of our people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we
call government-owned or controlled corporations which may take on the form of a
private enterprise or one organized with powers and formal characteristics of a
private corporations under the Corporation Law.
The question that now arises is:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Does the fact that these
corporation perform certain functions of government make them a part of the
Government of the Philippines?
The answer is simple:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary they do not acquire that status
for the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of municipal or
public corporation. Take for instance the National Coconut Corporation. While it
was organized with the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position
independent of trade preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities
for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-
products”, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the
coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct
from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation
Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are
concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued
in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an
entity different from our government. As this Court has aptly said, “The mere fact
that the Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a
public corporation” (National Coal Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 46 Phil.,
586-587). “By becoming a stockholder in the National Coal Company, the
Government divested itself of its sovereign character so far as respects the
transactions of the corporation cralaw. Unlike the Government, the corporation
may be sued without its consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet the National Coal
Company remains an agency or instrumentality of government.” (Government of
the Philippine Islands vs. Springer, 50 Phil., 288.)
To recapitulate, we may mention that the term “Government of the Republic of the
Philippines” used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to
that government entity through which the functions of the government are
exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through
which political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal
or other form of local government. These are what we call municipal corporations.
They do not include government entities which are given a corporate personality
separate and distinct from the government and which are governed by the
Corporation Law. Their powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined in the
light of that law and of their corporate charters. They do not therefore come within
the exemption clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court.
“Public corporations are those formed or organized for the government of a portion
of the State.” (Section 3, Republic Act No. 1459, Corporation Law).
“‘The generally accepted definition of a municipal corporation would only include
organized cities and towns, and like organizations, with political and legislative
powers for the local, civil government and police regulations of the inhabitants of
the particular district included in the boundaries of the corporation.’ Heller vs.
Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309, 312.”
“In its more general sense the phrase ‘municipal corporation’ may include both
towns and counties, and other public corporations created by government for
political purposes. In its more common and limited signification, it embraces only
incorporated villages, towns and cities. Dunn vs. Court of County Revenues, 85
Ala. 144, 146, 4 So. 661.” (McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, p.
385.)
“We may, therefore, define a municipal corporation in its historical and strict sense
to be the incorporation, by the authority of the government, of the inhabitants of a
particular place or district, and authorizing them in their corporate capacity to
exercise subordinate specified powers of legislation and regulation with respect to
their local and internal concerns. This power of local government is the distinctive
purpose and the distinguishing feature of a municipal corporation proper.” (Dillon,
Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., Vol. I, p. 59.)
It is true that under section 8, Rule 130, stenographers may only charge as fees
P0.30 for each page of transcript of not less than 200 words before the appeal is
taken and P0.15 for each page after the filing of the appeal, but in this case the
National Coconut Corporation has agreed and in fact has paid P1.00 per page for
the services rendered by the Plaintiffs and has not raised any objection to the
amount paid until its propriety was disputed by the Auditor General. The payment
of the fees in question became therefore contractual and as such is valid even if it
goes beyond the limit prescribed in section 8, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
As regards the question of procedure raised by Appellants, suffice it to say that the
same is insubstantial, considering that this case refers not to a money claim
disapproved by the Auditor General but to an action of prohibition the purpose of
which is to restrain the officials concerned from deducting from Plaintiffs’ salaries
the amount paid to them as stenographers’ fees. This case does not come under
section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court relative to appeals from a decision of the
Auditor General.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, REUEL ABRAHAM, MILAGROS ABUEG, AVELINO
ACOSTA, CAROLINA ACOSTA, MARTIN AGSALUD, JOSEFINA AGUINALDO, GLORIA
ALBANO, ANTONIO ALUNING, COSME ALVAREZ, ISABEL ALZATE, AURORA APUSEN,
TOMAS ARCANGEL, LOURDES ARJONELLO, MANUEL AROMIN, DIONISIO ASISTIN, JOSE
AURE, NICASIO AZNAR, EUGENIO AZURIN, CLARITA BACUGAN, PIO BALAGOT, HEREDIO
BALMACEDA, ESTHER BANAAG, JOVENCIO BARBERO, MONICO BARBADILLO,
HERNANDO BARROZO, FILIPINA BARROZO, REMEDIO BARTOLOME, ANGELINA BASCOS,
JOSE BATALLA, ALMARIO BAUTISTA, EUGENIO BAUTISTA, JR., HERMALO BAUTISTA,
JUANITO BAUTISTA, SEVERINO BARBANO, CAPPIA BARGONIA, ESMERALDA
BERNARDEZ, RUBEN BERNARDEZ, ALFREDO BONGER, TOMAS BOQUIREN, ANGELINA
BRAVO, VIRGINIA BRINGA, ALBERTO BUNEO, SIMEON CABANAYAN, LUCRECIA
CACATIAN, LEONIDES CADAY, ANGELINA CADOTTE, IGNACIO CALAYCAY, PACIFICO
CALUB, RUFINO CALUZA, CALVIN CAMBA, ALFREDO CAMPOSENO, BAGUILITA CANTO,
ALFREDO CARRERA, PEDRO CASES, CRESCENTE CASIS, ERNESTO CASTANEDA,
HERMINIO CASTILLO, JOSE CASTRO, LEONOR CASTRO, MADEO CASTRO, MARIA PINZON
CASTRO, PABLO CATURA, RESTITUTO CESPADES, FLORA CHACON, EDMUNDO CORPUZ,
ESTHER CRUZ, CELIA CUARESMA, AQUILINO DACAYO, DIONISIA DASALLA, SOCORRO
DELFIN, ABELARDO DIAZ, ARTHUR DIAZ, CYNTHIA DIZON, MARCIA DIZON, ISABELO
DOMINGO, HONORATA DOZA, CAROLINA DUAD, JUSTINIANO EPISTOLA, ROMEO
ENCARNACION, PRIMITIVO ESCANO, ELSA ESPEJO, JUAN ESPEJO, RIZALINA ESQUILLO,
YSMAEL FARINAS, LORNA FAVIS, DAN FERNANDEZ, JAIME FERNANDEZ, ALFREDO
FERRER, MODESTO FERRER, JR., EUGENIO FLANDEZ, GUILLERMO FLORENDO, ALFREDO
FLORES, DOMINGA FLORES, ROMEO FLORES, LIGAYA FONTANILLA, MELCHOR GASMEN,
LEILA GASMENA, CONSUELO GAROLAGA, ALFONSO GOROSPE, CESAR GOROSPE,
RICARDO GOROSPE, JR., CARLITO GUZMAN, ERNESTO DE GUZMAN, THELMA DE
GUZMAN, FELIX HERNANDEZ, SOLIVEN HERNANDO, FRANCISCO HIDALGO, LEONILO
INES, SIXTO JAQUIES, TRINIDAD JAVIER, FERMIN LAGUA, GUALBERTO LAMBINO, ROMAN
LANTING, OSCAR LAZO, ROSARIO LAZO, JOSEFINA DE LARA, AMBROSIO LAZOL, NALIE
LIBATIQUE, LAMBERTO LLAMAS, ANTONIO LLANES, ROMULA LOPEZ, ADRIANO
LORENZANA, ANTONIO MACARAEG, ILDEFONSO MAGAT, CECILIO MAGHANOY, ALFONSO
MAGSANOC, AVELINA MALLARE, AUGUSTO MANALO, DOMINADOR MANASAN, BENITO
MANECLANG, JR., TIRSO MANGUMAY, EVELIA MANZANO, HONORANTE MARIANO,
DOMINGO MEDINA, MARTIN MENDOZA, PERFECTO MILANA, EMILIO MILLAN, GREGORIO
MONEGAS, CONSOLACION NAVALTA, NOLI OCAMPO, VICENTE CLEGARIO, ELPIDIO
PALMONES, ARACELI PANGALANGAN, ISIDORO PANLASIGUI, JR., ARTEMIO PARIS, JR.,
FEDERICO PAYUMO, JR., NELIA PAYUMO, BITUEN PAZ, FRANCISCO PENGSON, OSCAR
PERALTA, PROCORRO PERALTA, RAMON PERALTA, MINDA PICHAY, MAURO PIMENTEL,
PRUDENCIO PIMENTEL, LEOPOLDO PUNO, REYNALDO RABE, ROLANDO REA,
CONSTANTINO REA, CECILIA RICO, CECILIO RILLORAZA, AURORA ROMAN, MERCEDES
RUBIO, URSULA RUPISAN, OLIVIA SABADO, BERNARDO SACRAMENTO, LUZ SALVADOR,
JOSE SAMSON, JR., ROMULA DE LOS SANTOS, ANTONIO SAYSON, JR., FLORANTE SERIL,
MARIO SISON, RUDY SISON, PROCEDIO TABIN, LUCENA TABISULA, HANNIBAL TAJANO,
ENRIQUE TIANGCO, JR., JUSTINIANO TOBIAS, NYMIA TOLENTINO, CONSTANTE
TOLENTINO, TEODORO TOREBIO, FEDERICO TRINIDAD, JOVENCINTO TRINIDAD, LAZARO
VALDEZ, LUDRALINA VALDEZ, MAXIMINA VALDEZ, FRANCISCO VELASCO, JR., ROSITA
VELASCO, SEVERO VANTANILLA, VENANCIO VENTIGAN, FELICITAS VENUS, NIEVES DE
VERA, ELISEO VERSOZA, SILVESTRE VILA, GLORIA VILLAMOR, ALEJANDRO
VELLANUEVA, DAVID VILLANUEVA, CAROLINA VILLASENOR ORLANDO VILLASTIQUE,
MAJELLA VILORIN, ROSARIO VILORIA, MAY VIRATA, FEDERICO VIRAY, MELBA YAMBAO,
MARIO ZAMORA, AUTENOR ABUEG, SOTERO ACEDO, HONRADO ALBERTO, FELIPE
ALIDO, VICENTE ANCHUELO, LIBERTAD APEROCHO, MARIANO BALBAGO, MARIO
BALMACEDA, DAISY BICENIO, SYLVIA BUSTAMANTE, RAYMUNDO GEMERINO, LAZARO
CAPURAS, ROGELIO CARUNGCONG, ZACARIAS CAYETANO, JR., LILY CHUA, ANDRES
CRUZ, ARTURO CRUZ, BIENVENIDO ESTEBAN, PABLO JARETA, MANUEL JOSE, NESTORIA
KINTANAR, CLEOPATRIA LAZEM. MELCHOR LAZO, JESUS LUNA, GASPAR MARINAS,
CESAR MAULSON, MANUEL MEDINA, JESUS PLURAD, LAKAMBINI RAZON, GLORIA
IBANEZ, JOSE SANTOS, ELEAZAR SQUI, JOSE TAMAYO, FELIPE TENORIO, SILVINO UMALI,
VICENTE ZARA, SATURNINO GARCIA, WILLIAM GARCIA, NORMA GARINGARAO, ROSARIO
ANTONIO, RUBEN BAUTISTA, QUIRINO PUESTO, NELIA M. GOMERI, OSCAR R. LANUZA,
AURORA M. LINDAYA, GREGORIO MOGSINO, JACRM B. PAPA, GREGORIO R. RIEGO,
TERESITA N. ROZUL, MAGTANGOL SAMALA, PORFIRIO AGOCOLIS, LEONARDO MONTE,
HERMELINO PATI, ALFREDO PAYOYO, PURIFICACION ROJAS, ODANO TEANO, RICARDO
SANTIAGO, and MARCELO MANGAHAS, respondents.
Gov't. Corp. Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera, Trial Attorneys Manuel M. Lazaro and Vicente
Constantine, Jr., for petitioner.
Renato B. Kare and Simeon C. Sato for private respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
The principal issue that calls for resolution in this appeal by certiorari from an order of respondent
Court of Industrial Relations is one of constitutional significance. It is concerned with the expanded
role of government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.
More specifically, it deals with the question of whether petitioner, the Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration, discharges governmental and not proprietary functions. The landmark opinion of the
then Justice, row Chief Justice, Makalintal in Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration v. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and offices, points the way to
the right answer. 1 It interpreted the then fundamental law as hostile to the view of a limited or
negative state. It is antithetical to the laissez faire concept. For as noted in an earlier decision, the
welfare state concept "is not alien to the philosophy of [the 1935] Constitution." 2 It is much more so
under the present Charter, which is impressed with an even more explicit recognition of social and
economic rights. 3 There is manifest, to recall Laski, "a definite increase in the profundity of the social
conscience," resulting in "a state which seeks to realize more fully the common good of its
members." 4 It does not necessarily follow, however, just because petitioner is engaged in
governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the
jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not
come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive. 5 We cannot then grant the
reversal sought. We affirm.
The facts are undisputed. On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private respondents, filed with
respondent Court a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime
services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them
overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer was for the
differential between the amount actually paid to them and the amount allegedly due them. 6 There
was an answer filed by petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denying the allegations
and raising the special defenses of lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. 7 The issues
were thereafter joined, and the case set for trial, with both parties presenting their evidence. 8 After
the parties submitted the case for decision, the then Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of
respondent Court issued an order sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime services
from December 23, 1963 up to the date the decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing
petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid. 9 There was a motion for reconsideration,
but respondent Court en banc denied the same. 10 Hence this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, as had been noted, would predicate its plea for
the reversal of the order complained of on the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of
respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation
of Commonwealth Act No. 444. 11While, to repeat, its submission as to the governmental character
of its operation is to be given credence, it is not a necessary consequence that respondent Court is
devoid of jurisdiction. Nor could the challenged order be set aside on the additional argument that
the Eight-Hour Labor Law is not applicable to it. So it was, at the outset, made clear.
1. A reference to the enactments creating petitioner corporation suffices to demonstrate the merit of
petitioner's plea that it performs governmental and not proprietary functions. As originally established
by Republic Act No. 2265, 12 its purposes and objectives were set forth thus: "(a) To promote the
effective merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those
engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis of economic security; (b) To establish and maintain
balanced production and consumption of Virginia tobacco and its manufactured products, and such
marketing conditions as will insure and stabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of
production plus reasonable profit both in the local as well as in the foreign market; (c) To create,
establish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing and marketing facilities in suitable centers
and supervise the selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable
prices that secure a fair return of their investments; (d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing
the grading, classifying, and inspecting of Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and
economic conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco industry." 13 The amendatory statute,
Republic Act No. 4155, 14 renders even more evident its nature as a governmental agency. Its first
section on the declaration of policy reads: "It is declared to be the national policy, with respect to the
local Virginia tobacco industry, to encourage the production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities
needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign markets, to establish this industry
on an efficient and economic basis, and, to create a climate conducive to local cigarette manufacture
of the qualities desired by the consuming public, blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco
to improve the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes." 15 The objectives are set forth thus: "To
attain this national policy the following objectives are hereby adopted: 1. Financing; 2. Marketing; 3.
The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration (PVTA) at the best obtainable prices and conditions in order that a
reinvigorated Virginia tobacco industry may be established on a sound basis; and 4. Improving the
quality of locally manufactured cigarettes through blending of imported and native Virginia leaf
tobacco; such importation with corresponding exportation at a ratio of one kilo of imported to four
kilos of exported Virginia tobacco, purchased by the importer-exporter from the Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration." 16
It is thus readily apparent from a cursory perusal of such statutory provisions why petitioner can
rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration decision 17and why the objection of private respondents with its overtones of the
distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v.
National Coconut Corporation 18 if futile. The irrelevance of such a distinction considering the needs
of the times was clearly pointed out by the present Chief Justice, who took note, speaking of the
reconstituted Agricultural Credit Administration, that functions of that sort "may not be strictly what
President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"),such as those
relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and
property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties
of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional
classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and
not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these latter functions
being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government." 19 Nonetheless, as
he explained so persuasively: "The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered
this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The
areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called
upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public
welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals", continue to lose their well-defined
boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign
capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else
the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this
development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its
declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice." 20 Thus was laid to rest the
doctrine in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation, 21 based on the Wilsonian classification of the
tasks incumbent on government into constituent and ministrant in accordance with the laissez
faire principle. That concept, then dominant in economics, was carried into the governmental sphere,
as noted in a textbook on political science, 22 the first edition of which was published in 1898, its
author being the then Professor, later American President, Woodrow Wilson. He took pains to
emphasize that what was categorized by him as constituent functions had its basis in a recognition
of what was demanded by the "strictest [concept of] laissez faire, [as they] are indeed the very bonds
of society." 23 The other functions he would minimize as ministrant or optional.
It is a matter of law that in the Philippines, the laissez faire principle hardly commanded the
authoritative position which at one time it held in the United States. As early as 1919, Justice
Malcolm in Rubi v. Provincial Board 24could affirm: "The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted
freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern
period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government
activity." 25 The 1935 Constitution, as was indicated earlier, continued that approach. As noted in Edu
v. Ericta: 26 "What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the
concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping with
social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control over economic affairs.
Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state
action." 27 Nor did the opinion in Edu stop there: "To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in
1935 erased whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its philosophy is a repudiation of laissez-
faire. One of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first
President of the Republic, made it clear when he disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes
of Sorsogon, who noted the "vast extensions in the sphere of governmental functions" and the
"almost unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry and agriculture as well as to compete
with existing business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted by [the then] current tendencies' in
other jurisdictions. He spoke thus: "My answer is that this constitution has a definite and well defined
philosophy, not only political but social and economic.... If in this Constitution the gentlemen will find
declarations of economic policy they are there because they are necessary to safeguard the interest
and welfare of the Filipino people because we believe that the days have come when in self-
defense, a nation may provide in its constitution those safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to
grow, the freedom to develop national aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered by the
artificial boundaries which a constitutional provision automatically imposes." 28
It would be then to reject what was so emphatically stressed in the Agricultural Credit Administration
decision about which the observation was earlier made that it reflected the philosophy of the 1935
Constitution and is even more in consonance with the expanded role of government accorded
recognition in the present Charter if the plea of petitioner that it discharges governmental function
were not heeded. That path this Court is not prepared to take. That would be to go backward, to
retreat rather than to advance. Nothing can thus be clearer than that there is no constitutional
obstacle to a government pursuing lines of endeavor, formerly reserved for private enterprise. This is
one way, in the language of Laski, by which through such activities, "the harsh contract which [does]
obtain between the levels of the rich and the poor" may be minimized. 29 It is a response to a trend
noted by Justice Laurel in Calalang v. Williams 30 for the humanization of laws and the promotion of
the interest of all component elements of society so that man's innate aspirations, in what was so
felicitously termed by the First Lady as "a compassionate society" be attained. 31
2. The success that attended the efforts of petitioner to be adjudged as performing governmental
rather than proprietary functions cannot militate against respondent Court assuming jurisdiction over
this labor dispute. So it was mentioned earlier. As far back as Tabora v. Montelibano, 32 this Court,
speaking through Justice Padilla, declared: The NARIC was established by the Government to
protect the people against excessive or unreasonable rise in the price of cereals by unscrupulous
dealers. With that main objective there is no reason why its function should not be deemed
governmental. The Government owes its very existence to that aim and purpose — to protect the
people." 33 In a subsequent case, Naric Worker's Union v. Hon. Alvendia, 34 decided four years later,
this Court, relying on Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Tan, 35 which specified the
cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, included among which is
one that involves hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, ruled that it is precisely
respondent Court and not ordinary courts that should pass upon that particular labor controversy.
For Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the ponente, the fact that there were judicial as well as administrative and
executive pronouncements to the effect that the Naric was performing governmental functions did
not suffice to confer competence on the then respondent Judge to issue a preliminary injunction and
to entertain a complaint for damages, which as pointed out by the labor union, was connected with
an unfair labor practice. This is emphasized by the dispositive portion of the decision: "Wherefore,
the restraining orders complained of, dated May 19, 1958 and May 27, 1958, are set aside, and the
complaint is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the National Rice and Corn Corporation's
seeking whatever remedy it is entitled to in the Court of Industrial Relations." 36 Then, too, in a case
involving petitioner itself, Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, 37 where the point in dispute
was whether it was respondent Court or a court of first instance that is possessed of competence in
a declaratory relief petition for the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, one that could
readily be thought of as pertaining to the judiciary, the answer was that "unless the law speaks
clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on the Court of Industrial Relations." 38 Reference to
a number of decisions which recognized in the then respondent Court the jurisdiction to determine
labor controversies by government-owned or controlled corporations lends to support to such an
approach. 39 Nor could it be explained only on the assumption that proprietary rather than
governmental functions did call for such a conclusion. It is to be admitted that such a view was not
previously bereft of plausibility. With the aforecited Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration decision rendering obsolete the Bacani doctrine, it has, to use a Wilsonian phrase,
now lapsed into "innocuous desuetude." 40 Respondent Court clearly was vested with jurisdiction.
3. The contention of petitioner that the Eight-Hour Labor Law 41 does not apply to it hardly deserves
any extended consideration. There is an air of casualness in the way such an argument was
advanced in its petition for review as well as in its brief. In both pleadings, it devoted less than a full
page to its discussion. There is much to be said for brevity, but not in this case. Such a terse and
summary treatment appears to be a reflection more of the inherent weakness of the plea rather than
the possession of an advocate's enviable talent for concision. It did cite Section 2 of the Act, but its
very language leaves no doubt that "it shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or
occupation, whether public or private ... ." 42 Nor are private respondents included among the
employees who are thereby barred from enjoying the statutory benefits. It cited Marcelo v. Philippine
National Red Cross 43 and Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Araos. 44 Certainly, the activities to which
the two above public corporations devote themselves can easily be distinguished from that engaged
in by petitioner. A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 on which
it relies to obtain a ruling as to its governmental character should render clear the differentiation that
exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it
has only itself to blame. It need not have required private respondents to render overtime service. It
can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be
a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on this ground
certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of March 21, 1970 and the Resolution of respondent Court en
banc of May 8, 1970 denying a motion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed. The last sentence of
the Order of March 21, 1970 reads as follows: "To find how much each of them [private respondents]
is entitled under this judgment, the Chief of the Examining Division, or any of his authorized
representative, is hereby directed to make a reexamination of records, papers and documents in the
possession of respondent PVTA pertinent and proper under the premises and to submit his report of
his findings to the Court for further disposition thereof." Accordingly, as provided by the New Labor
Code, this case is referred to the National Labor Relations Commission for further proceedings
conformably to law. No costs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORROS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.
William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellant.

Attorney-General Avaceña for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of P138,790.12, with interest at 6 per cent per
annum from the 4th day of March 1915.
The action is to recover internal revenue taxes assessed on the monthly deposits and the
capital employed by the defendant bank in the business of banking from the first day of August,
1904, to June 30, 1914, together with the statutory penalties for refusing to pay the taxes as required
by law.
The case is before us on a stipulation of facts. Some evidence, both oral and documentary,
was introduced.
From the agreed facts it appears that the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Manila is an
institution organized in accordance with the canon law, having been created by the the royal order of
the King of Spain of July 8, 1880, made under the royal patronate powers then existing in the Crown
of Spain. Various decrees affecting the organization of the defendant had been promulgated by the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, as vice royal patron prior to the royal order of the 8th of
July 1880, which decrees were referred to and continued in said royal order.
The royal order referred to created, according to the purpose expressed therein, an institution
for the safe investment of the savings of the poor classes and to assist the needy in time of need by
loaning such savings to them at a low rate of interest. Its statutes and by-laws are subject to the will
of the Catholic Archbishop of Manila, and may be changed by him at his pleasure. They provide for
an annual interest of 4 per cent to the depositors, which is the limit to which the depositors are
entitled to participate in the profits or earnings of the institution.
During the entire period for which the taxes in litigation are assessed, defendant had a place
of business in the city of Manila where credits were opened by the deposit or collection of money or
currency subject to be paid by order.
The theory on which the tax involved in this suit is assessed and sought to be collected is that
the defendant institution is a bank within the definition of section 110 of Act No. 1189, known as the
Internal Revenue Law, and that, as such, it is subject to a tax of one-eighteenth of one per centum
each month upon the average amount of deposits of money, subject to payment by check or draft, or
represented by certificates of deposit or otherwise, whether payable on demand or at some future
day, imposed by section 111 of said Act, and to a further tax of one-twenty-fourth of one per centum
each month upon the capital employed by the defendant in the business of banking, imposed by
paragraph 2 of said section 111.
The defendant seeks to escape the payment of the tax on its deposits by a claim that it is a
savings bank as denied by the exception contained in paragraph 4 of section 111 which provides
that:
The deposits in associations or companies known as provident institutions, savings

banks, savings funds, or savings institutions, having no capital stock and which do no other
business than receiving deposits to be loaned or invested for the sole benefit of the parties
making such deposits and without profit or compensation to the association or company,
shall be exempt from this tax on so much of their deposits as such institutions have invested
in securities satisfactory to the Insular Treasurer, and on all deposits, not exceeding four
thousand pesos, made in the name of any person.
The particular reason urged why there should be no tax on the capital employed by the
defendant is that it has none.
There is no real denial of the fact that defendant is engaged in banking business. Neither is
there any contention as to the amount of the tax or the penalties imposed provided the right to tax be
established. The amount of the deposits is admitted, as is also the amount of the accrued profits,
surplus or capital of the defendant.
It stands substantially conceded, therefore, that the decision of the lower court is correct in
every particular, except those wherein it holds that the defendant does not fall within the exception
contained in paragraph 4 of section 111 of Act No. 1189, and that the so called accrued profits or
surplus falls within the definition of capital found in the Internal Revenue Law referred to.
It being undenied that the defendant is engaged in the banking business and, therefore,
presumptively, at least, liable to the payment of the taxes imposed on banks, the burden is on the
defendant to show clearly that it falls within the exception created by the statute imposing the taxes.
In the performance of this obligation an attempt was made to demonstrate that the defendant is a
savings bank as denied by the exception referred to. The trial court held that it was not a savings
bank for the reason that its deposits were not "to be loaned or invested for the sole benefit of the
parties making such deposits and without profit or compensation to the association or company."
We are of the opinion that no successful attacks can be made on this finding. It is undisputed
in this case that the defendant is a profit making institution, although it may not have been designed
as such, and that the profits derived from the investment or the deposits go and belong to the
institution itself. The only participation of the depositors in the results of the business of the institution
is the right to a return of the deposits with interest at 4 per cent. In this particular respect the
defendant is not different from any other banking institution. Whatever profit is made belongs, as in
the case of an ordinary bank, to the bank itself. In that profit the depositor has no interest or
participation; and it is conceded that, if the defendant institution were wound up today , the so-called
surplus, or reserve, or accrued profits of P549,912.52, on which one of the taxes imposed in this
case was assessed, would belong and be turned over to the defendant institution. That being the
case, the defendant bank is a profit making institution and has been such during the period for which
the taxes involved in this case were imposed. As a necessary result the finding of the trial court that
it did not fall within the exception of the statute was correct.
The appellant argues that, inasmuch as various persons holding the office of Collector of
Internal Revenue during the ten years for which the taxes in suit were imposed failed to levy and
assess them against the defendant, such failure is a practical construction of the statute by officials
charged with its execution, and that that construction should be followed in this case.
That would be a strong argument if the statute alleged to be so construed needed

construction. The statute itself is perfectly clear as to what is and what is not a savings bank; and,
accordingly, needs no construction to determine whether a given institution is or is not a savings
bank. The constitution of the bank itself, its by-laws and its method of doing business, together with
the destination of the profits made in the conduct of its business, determine whether it falls within the
definition of the exception. In making that determination a construction of the statute is unnecessary.
The elements which an institution must possess to be savings bank are set out with perfect
clearness in the statute. The difficulty in the case is not that resulting from an ambiguity in the statute
but is met in determining whether a given institution has those elements. The question is in one
aspect a question of fact. The statute clearly and distinctly specifies all of the requisites of a savings
bank. Whether or not an institution has those requisites does not depend upon an interpretation of
the statute. If, in stating those elements, the Legislature had fallen into ambiguity of expression, or
had used language the import of which is doubtful, there would then be presented an opportunity for
interpretation or construction, or both. But where the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous no interpretation or construction is necessary; for, the determination of whether a
given institution has the requisites named by the statute, does not involve, primarily, an interpretation
or a construction of the statute.
Even giving this contention all the weight that is claimed for it we still would hesitate to apply it
with all its force in the present case. The conditions under which the tax laws of the Philippine
Islands were administered and executed during the first years of American civil government,
immediately following the change of sovereignty brought about by force of arms, were such as to
relieve the government, in a measure at least, from the burden of a presumption which, under
ordinary conditions, arises from the practical construction of a statute given by the officials charged
with its execution. Everything was new and strange; the officials were confronted with a system of
laws theretofore unknown to them;they were met by institutions they had never seen before; a
strange country, a strange people, and strange laws left them, in some instances embarrassed, in
others uncertain. The fact that they did not meet all of their obligations with that fullness required
should not be urged too strongly against either them or the Government. lawphil.net
It might be added, in this connection, that there was never a direct or press ruling on the
question by any official. The mere fact that no tax was levied or assessed is the main reliance.
The appellant also complains of the finding of the trial court to the effect that:
The estimate and the assessment of the Collector of Internal Revenue carries with it a
presumption, not only of the correctness of the taxes, but also of other matters affecting
defendant's liability, thereby making it necessary for it to assume the burden of showing any
illegal defect or grounds of non-liability upon which it relies to defeat the action.
Even though the complaint in this regard were well founded, it would have little bearing on the
result of the litigation when we take into consideration the universal rule that he who claims an
exemption from his share of the common burden of taxation must justify his claim by showing that
the Legislature intended to exempt him by words too plain to be mistaken. It being undisputed in this
case that the defendant is a bank engaged in the banking business it immediately falls within the
imposing clause of the statute placing certain taxes on banks and institutions doing a banking
business. To escape that imposition the defendant must produce an Act of the Legislature showing
an intention to exempt it from the operation of the imposing clause by words too plain to be
mistaken. That being the case it matters little whether we say that the assessment and levy of the
tax carries with it a presumption of liability, or whether we say that the admission of the defendant
that it is engaged in banking business carries with it the presumption that it is liable to pay the taxes
which the law imposes on all persons engaged in that business which the defendant must overcome.
The argument of counsel for appellant based on the fact that certain savings banks in the
United States have enormous reserve or accrued profits and that it would be a practical impossibility
to distribute those profits among the depositors, we regard as without merit. The essential point is
that, in those cases, the ownership of the depositors of the reserve funds or accrued profits is
admitted; and their right to share in the distribution thereof is undisputed. Here the ownership of the
fund is claimed by the defendant and the right of the depositors to participate therein is denied.
The question whether the P549,912.52 is capital and taxable as such is one which presents
some difficulties. The word "capital" seems to have been used and understood by the Legislature of
the Philippine Islands in a nontechnical sense. It is not "capital stock," or any other stated or fixed
sum. It is, rather, the amount of money which the bank uses in its business; and this seems to be the
sense in which the word is used in the Internal Revenue Law imposing a tax on the capital employed
by a banking institution. The tax is levied by that Act "upon the capital employed by any bank . . .
engaged in the business of banking." It is worthy of note that the proviso immediately following the
phrase imposing the tax speaks of what is not capital, and provides that money borrowed and
received from time to time in the usual course of business from any person not a partner of or
interested in the bank shall not be considered as capital employed. This proviso may be viewed in
two aspects. In the first place, giving a definition of what is not capital, it might, perhaps, be
legitimate to assume that everything else used by the bank in the usual course of
business was capital. n the second place, the phraseology would indicate that the Legislature, in
speaking of capital, did not refer to a fixed sum which should be paid by the incorporators or
stockholders in cash to the bank before or after it began business. If it were not for that proviso it
would seem that in the word "capital" would be included "money borrowed or received from time to
time in the usual course of business from any person not a partner of or interested in said bank." In
other words, by the exclusion of money so borrowed the Legislature indicated that the capital upon
which the tax was imposed was broad enough to cover whatever money, from whatever source
except deposits, the bank used in the usual course of business.
The third proviso is also not without significance in determining what the Legislature had in
mind when it used the word "capital." It deals with what shall be considered capital for the purpose of
taxation of banks which are branches of banks incorporated and located in foreign countries and in
the United States. In the case of such branches the Legislature, by virtue of this proviso, gives no
importance or significance to the actual capital of the branch bank at any given moment in levying
tax upon the capital employed in the Philippine Islands; and it provides that the "capital employed" by
any branch bank shall be determined by a comparison between the total amount of the earnings of
the parent bank during a given period and also the total amount of the earnings of the branch bank
on its business conducted in the Philippine Islands during the same period, and such a part of the
total capital of the bank shall be deemed to have been employed in the Philippine Islands as the
earnings in the Philippine Islands bear to the total earnings of the parent bank. Under this proviso a
branch bank having an actual capital or a capital stock of one million pesos would not pay a tax on
the one million. It might pay a tax on one-half million or it might pay a tax on two millions, the precise
amount depending on the relation which the business of the branch bank in the Philippine Islands
bore to the total business of the parent bank. If the capital of the parent bank was twenty millions
and the branch bank did a business in the Philippine Islands of 50 per cent of the total business of
the parent bank, the branch bank would pay a tax on capital of ten million. This would seem to
indicate that the word "capital" has not so strict and definite a meaning as is given to the words
"capital stock," actual capital, or fixed capital. It seems to have the wider signification of the word
which, popularly speaking, means the amount of money which one uses in his business.
Upon the whole we are satisfied that the P549,912.52 involved in this litigation was money
which the defendant institution used in its banking business, although it may have been held for the
time being, or for a considerable length of time, for the payment of depositors in times of
extraordinary withdrawals from the bank or to meet unusual demands upon its loan department. The
mere fact that it is for the time being inactive is not conclusive in the determination of its nature..
The judgement appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
CO KIM CHAM (alias CO CHAM), petitioner,

vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of
Manila, respondents.
Marcelino Lontok for petitioner.

Revilla and Palma for respondent Valdez Tan Keh.
Respondent Judge Dizon in his own behalf.
Vicente Hilado and J. A. Wolfson as amici curiae.
RESOLUTION
FERIA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of our decision rendered in this case filed by the respondent.
Two attorneys at law, who were allowed to appear as amici curiae, have also presented memoranda
to discuss certain points on which the dissenting opinions rely.
(1) It is contended that the military occupation of the Philippine Islands by the Japanese was not
actual and effective because of the existence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains and even
towns and villages; and consequently, no government de facto could have been validly established
by the Japanese military forces in the Philippines under the precepts of the Hague Conventions and
the law of nations.
The presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and even in towns of the Philippines
whenever these towns were left by Japanese garrisons or by the detachments of troops sent on
patrol to these places, was not sufficient to make the military occupation ineffective, nor did it cause
that occupation to cease, or prevent the constitution or establishment of a de facto government in
the Islands. The belligerent occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese invaders became an
accomplished fact from the time General Wainwright, Commander of the American and Filipino
forces in Luzon, and General Sharp, Commander of the forces in Visayas and Mindanao,
surrendered and ordered the surrender of their forces to the Japanese invaders, and the
Commonwealth Government had become incapable of publicly exercising its authority, and the
invader had substituted his own authority for that of the legitimate government in Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao.
"According to the rules of Land Warfare of the United States Army, belligerent or so-called military
occupation is a question of fact. It presupposes a hostile invasion as a result of which the invader
has rendered the invaded government incapable of publicly exercising its authority, and that the
invader is in position to substitute and has substituted his own authority for that of the legitimate
government of the territory invaded." (International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the
United States, by Hyde Vol. II, pp. 361, 362.) " Belligerent occupation must be both actual and
effective. Organized resistance must be overcome and the forces in possession must have taken
measures to establish law and order. It doubtless suffices if the occupying army can, within a
reasonable time, send detachments of troops to make its authority felt within the occupied district."
(Id., p. 364.) "Occupation once acquired must be maintained . . . . It does not cease, however, . . .
Nor does the existence of a rebellion or the operations of guerrilla bands cause it to cease, unless
the legitimate government is re-established and the occupant fails promptly to suppress such
rebellion or guerrilla operations." (Id., p. 365.)
But supposing arguendo that there were provinces or districts in these Islands not actually and
effectively occupied by the invader, or in which the latter, consequently, had not substituted his own
authority for that of the invaded government, and the Commonwealth Government had continued
publicly exercising its authority, there is no question as to the validity of the judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts functioning in said territory, under the municipal law, just as there can be
no question as to the validity of the judgments and proceedings of the courts continued in the
territory occupied by the belligerent occupant, under the law of nations.
(2) It is submitted that the renunciation in our Constitution and in the Kellog-Briand Pact of war as an
instrument of national policy, rendered inapplicable the rules of international law authorizing the
belligerent Japanese army of occupation to set up a provisional or de facto government in the
Philippines, because Japan started war treacherously and emphasized was as an instrument of
national policy; and that to give validity to the judicial acts of courts sponsored by the Japanese
would be tantamount to giving validity to the acts of these invaders, and would be nothing short of
legalizing the Japanese invasion of the Philippines.
In reply to this contention, suffice it to say that the provisions of the Hague Conventions which
impose upon a belligerent occupant the duty to continue the courts as well as the municipal laws in
force in the country unless absolutely prevented, in order to reestablish and insure "I" ordre et al vie
publice," that is, the public order and safety, and the entire social and commercial life of the country,
were inserted, not for the benefit of the invader, but for the protection and benefit of the people or
inhabitants of the occupied territory and of those not in the military service, in order that the ordinary
pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged.
This is the opinion of all writers on international law up to date, among then Wheaton (Vol. II, p. 236)
and Oppenheim (Vol. II, p. 338) in their recently revised Treatises on International Law, edited in the
year 1944, and the Interpretation of the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, specially
in the case of Dow vs.Johnson (106 U. S., 158), in which that Court said: "As a necessary
consequence of such occupation and domination, the political relations of its people to their former
government are, for the time being, severed. But for their protection and benefit, and the protection
and benefit of others not in the military service, or, in other words, in order that the ordinary pursuits
and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, the municipal laws, that is, such as
affect private rights of persons and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are generally
allowed to continue in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals as they were
administered before the occupation. They are considered as continuing, unless suspended or
superseded by the occupying belligerent." (Dow vs. Johnson, 100 U. S., 158; 25 U. S. [Law, ed.],
632).
The fact that the belligerent occupant is a treacherous aggressor, as Japan was, does not, therefore,
exempt him from complying with the said precepts of the Hague Conventions, nor does it make null
and void the judicial acts of the courts continued by the occupant in the territory occupied. To deny
validity to such judicial acts would benefit the invader or aggressor, who is presumed to be intent
upon causing as much harm as possible to the inhabitants or nationals of the enemy's territory, and
prejudice the latter; it would cause more suffering to the conquered and assist the conqueror or
invader in realizing his nefarious design; in fine, it would result in penalizing the nationals of the
occupied territory, and rewarding the invader or occupant for his acts of treachery and aggression.
(3) We held in our decision that the word "processes," as used in the proclamation of General
Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944, cannot be interpreted to mean judicial processes; and
because of the cogent reasons therein set forth, we did not deem it necessary to specify the
processes to which said proclamation should be construed to refer. As some doubt still lingers in the
minds of persons interested is sustaining a contrary interpretation or construction, we are now
constrained to say that term as used in the proclamation should be construed to mean legislative
and constitutional processes, by virtue of the maxim "noscitur a sociis." According to this maxim,
where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is
found. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d ed., pp. 194-196.) Since the proclamation provides that
"all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void," the word "processes" must be interpreted or construed to refer to
the Executive Orders of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission, Ordinances
promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and the Constitution itself
of said Republic, and others that are of the same class as the laws and regulations with which the
word "processes" is associated.
To illustrate, "an English act required licenses for "houses, rooms, shops, or buildings, kept open for
public refreshment, resort, and entertainment." It was adjudged that the word "entertainment," in this
connection, did not necessarily mean a concert, dramatic performance, or other divertissement, nor
did it necessarily imply the furnishing of food or drink, but that, judged from its associations, it meant
the reception and accommodation of the public. So where a policy of marine insurance is specified
to protect the assured against "arrests, restraints, and detainments of all kings, princes, and people,"
the word "people" means the ruling or governing power of the country, this signification being
impressed upon it by its association with the words "kings" and "princes." Again, in a statute relating
to imprisonment for debt, which speaks of debtors who shall be charged with "fraud" or undue
preference to one creditor to the prejudice of another, the word "undue" means fraudulent. A statute
of bankruptcy, declaring that any fraudulent "gift, transfer or delivery" of property shall constitute an
act of bankruptcy, applies only to such deliveries as are in the nature of a gift — such as change the
ownership of the property, to the prejudice of creditors; it does not include a delivery to a bailee for
safekeeping." (Black on Interpretation of Laws, supra.)
(4) The state of Wheaton (International Law), 7th ed., p. 245) that "when it is said that an occupier's
acts are valid, it must be remembered that no crucial instances exist to show that if his acts should
all be reversed (by the restored government or its representatives) no international wrong would be
committed," evidently does not mean that the restored government or its representatives may
reverse the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts during the belligerent occupation without
violating the law of nations and doing any wrong at all. A violation of the law of nations does not
always and necessarily cause an international wrong. As the said judicial acts which apply the
municipal laws, that is, such as affect private rights of persons and property, and provide for the
punishment of crimes, are good and valid even after occupation has ceased, although it is true that
no crucial instances exist to show that, were they reversed or invalidated by the restored or
legitimate government, international wrong would be committed, it is nonetheless true and evident
that by such abrogation national wrong would be caused to the inhabitants or citizens of the
legitimate government. According to the law of nations and Wheaton himself, said judicial acts are
legal and valid before and after the occupation has ceased and the legitimate government has been
restored. As there are vested rights which have been acquired by he parties by virtue of such
judgments, the restored government or its representative cannot reverse or abrogate them without
causing wrong or injury to the interested parties, because such reversal would deprive them of their
properties without due process of law.
In this connection, it may not be amiss to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U. S., 712), quoted in our decision as applicable by
analogy. In said case, the Commander in Chief of the United States forces in South Carolina, after
the end of the Civil War and while the territory was still under Military Government, issued a special
order annulling a decree rendered by a court of chancery in a case within its jurisdiction, on the
wrong assumption that he had authority to do so under the acts of Congress approved March 2, and
July 19, 1867, which defined his powers and duties. That Supreme Court declared void the said
special order on the ground "that it was an arbitrary stretch of authority needful to no good end that
can be imagined. Whether Congress could have conferred power to do such an act is a question we
are not called upon to consider. It is an unbending rule of law that the exercise of military power
where the rights of the citizen are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what the exigency
requires."
(5) It is argued with insistence that the courts of the Commonwealth continued in the Philippines by
the belligerent occupant became also courts of Japan, and their judgments and proceedings being
acts of foreign courts cannot now be considered valid and continued by the courts of the
Commonwealth Government after the restoration of the latter. As we have already stated in our
decision the fundamental reasons why said courts, while functioning during the Japanese regime,
could not be considered as courts of Japan, it is sufficient now to invite attention to the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of The Admittance, Jecker vs. Montgomery (13
How., 498; 14 Law. ed., 240), which we did not deem necessary to quote in our decision, in which it
was held that "the courts, established or sanctioned in Mexico during the war by the commanders of
the American forces, were nothing more than the agents of the military power, to assist it in
preserving order in the conquered territory, and to protect the inhabitants in their persons and
property while it was occupied by the American arms. They were subject to the military power, and
their decisions under its control, whenever the commanding officer thought proper to interfere. They
were not courts of the United States, and had no right to adjudicate upon a question of prize or no
prize." (The Admittance, Jecker vs. Montgomery, 13 How., 498; 14 Law. ed., 240.).
(6) The petition for mandamus in the present case is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
The mandamusapplied for is not to compel the respondent judge to order the reconstitution of the
record of the case, because the record had already been reconstituted by order of the court. It is
sought to compel the respondent judge to continue the proceedings in said case. As the judge
refused to act on the ground that he had no power or jurisdiction to continue taking cognizance of
the case, mandamus and not appeal is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy. For it is a well
established rule that "if a a court has erroneously decided some question of law or of practice,
presented as a preliminary objection, and upon such erroneous construction has refused to go into
the merits of the case, mandamus will lie to compel it to proceed." (High on Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, section 151; Castro Revilla vs. Garduño, 53 Phil., 934.)
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents is denied. The
petition for oral argument on said motion for reconsideration, based on the resolution of division of
this Court dated July 3, 1945, amendatory of section 2, Rule 54, of the Rules of Court, is also
denied, since said resolution has not yet been adopted by this Court in banc, and the respondents
and amici curiae were allowed to file, and they filed, their arguments in writing.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LORETA GOZO, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M. Lantin and
Solicitor Norberto P. Eduardo for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose T. Nery for defendant-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, convicting her of
a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for
the construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair or demolition
thereof. She questions its validity, or at the very least, its applicability to her, by invoking due
process, 1 a contention she would premise on what for her is the teaching of People v. Fajardo. 2 If
such a ground were far from being impressed with solidity, she stands on quicksand when she would
deny the applicability of the ordinance to her, on the pretext that her house was constructed within
the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it
does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she would, in effect, seek to emasculate our
sovereign rights by the assertion that we cannot exercise therein administrative jurisdiction. To state
the proposition is to make patent how much it is tinged with unorthodoxy. Clearly then, the lower
court decision must be affirmed with the sole modification that she is given thirty days from the
finality of a judgment to obtain a permit, failing which, she is required to demolish the same.
The facts are undisputed. As set forth in the decision of the lower court: "The accused bought a
house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of
Olongapo City. She demolished the house and built another one in its place, without a building
permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, because she was told by one Ernesto Evalle, an
assistant in the City Mayor's office, as well as by her neighbors in the area, that such building permit
was not necessary for the construction of the house. On December 29, 1966, Juan Malones, a
building and lot inspector of the City Engineer's Office, Olongapo City, together with Patrolman
Ramon Macahilas of the Olongapo City police force apprehended four carpenters working on the
house of the accused and they brought the carpenters to the Olongapo City police headquarters for
interrogation. ... After due investigation, Loreta Gozo was charged with violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 14, S. of 1964 with the City Fiscal's Office." 3 The City Court of Olongapo City found
her guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964 and sentenced her to an
imprisonment of one month as well as to pay the costs. The Court of Instance of Zambales, on
appeal, found her guilty on the above facts of violating such municipal ordinance but would sentence
her merely to pay a fine of P200.00 and to demolish the house thus erected. She elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals but in her brief, she would put in issue the validity of such an ordinance on
constitutional ground or at the very least its applicability to her in view of the location of her dwelling
within the naval base. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, in a resolution of January 29, 1973, noting
the constitutional question raised, certified the case to this Court.
There is, as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this petition, no support in law for the stand
taken by appellant.
1. It would be fruitless for her to assert that local government units are devoid of authority to require
building permits. This Court, from Switzer v. Municipality of
Cebu, 4 decided in 1911, has sanctioned the validity of such measures. It is much too late in the day
to contend that such a requirement cannot be validly imposed. Even appellant, justifiably concerned
about the unfavorable impression that could be created if she were to deny that such competence is
vested in municipal corporations and chartered cities, had to concede in her brief: "If, at all; the
questioned ordinance may be predicated under the general welfare clause ... ." 5 Its scope is wide,
well-nigh all embracing, covering every aspect of public health, public morals, public safety, and the
well being and good order of the community. 6
It goes without saying that such a power is subject to limitations. Certainly, if its exercise is violative
of any constitutional right, then its validity could be impugned, or at the very least, its applicability to
the person adversely affected could be questioned. So much is settled law. Apparently, appellant
has adopted the view that a due process question may indeed be raised in view of what for her is its
oppressive character. She is led to such a conclusion, relying on People v. Fajardo. 7 A more careful
scrutiny of such a decision would not have led her astray, for that case is easily distinguishable. The
facts as set forth in the opinion follow: "It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of
defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the
municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows: "... 1. Any person or
persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a
written permit from the Municipal Mayor. ... 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for
each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued. ... 3. [Penalty]-Any violation of the
provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the violator liable to pay a fine of not less than
P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at
the discretion of the court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any
public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. ... ." Four
years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son-in-law,
appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's
name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek ... . On
January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building
would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza ... . On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated
their request for a building permit ..., but again the request was turned down by the mayor.
Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because
they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a
typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property." 8
Clearly then, the application of such an ordinance to Fajardo was oppressive. A conviction therefore
for a violation thereof both in the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur as well as in the
Court of First Instance could not be sustained. In this case, on the contrary, appellant never
bothered to comply with the ordinance. Perhaps aware of such a crucial distinction, she would assert
in her brief: "The evidence showed that even if the accused were to secure a permit from the Mayor,
the same would not have been granted. To require the accused to obtain a permit before
constructing her house would be an exercise in futility. The law will not require anyone to perform an
impossibility, neither in law or in fact: ... ." 9 It would be from her own version, at the very least then,
premature to anticipate such an adverse result, and thus to condemn an ordinance which certainly
lends itself to an interpretation that is neither oppressive, unfair, or unreasonable. That kind of
interpretation suffices to remove any possible question of its validity, as was expressly announced
in Primicias v. Fugoso. 10 So it appears from this portion of the opinion of Justice Feria, speaking for
the Court: "Said provision is susceptible of two constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of
Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for the holding of a
lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City
of Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the
Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used for the purpose, with a view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure
convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper
policing to minimize the risk of disorder. After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the
conclusion that we must adopt the second construction, that is, construe the provisions of the said
ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit,
but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places
where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held." 11 If, in a case affecting such
a preferred freedom as the right to assembly, this Court could construe an ordinance of the City of
Manila so as to avoid offending against a constitutional provision, there is nothing to preclude it from
a similar mode of approach in order to show the lack of merit of an attack against an ordinance
requiring a permit. Appellant cannot therefore take comfort from any broad statement in the Fajardo
opinion, which incidentally is taken out of context, considering the admitted oppressive application of
the challenged measure in that litigation. So much then for the contention that she could not have
been validly convicted for a violation of such ordinance. Nor should it be forgotten that she did suffer
the same fate twice, once from the City Court and thereafter from the Court of First Instance. The
reason is obvious.Such ordinance applies to her.
2. Much less is a reversal indicated because of the alleged absence of the rather novel concept of
administrative jurisdiction on the part of Olongapo City. Nor is novelty the only thing that may be said
against it. Far worse is the assumption at war with controlling and authoritative doctrines that the
mere existence of military or naval bases of a foreign country cuts deeply into the power to govern.
Two leading cases may be cited to show how offensive is such thinking to the juristic concept of
sovereignty, People v. Acierto, 12 and Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 13 As was so
emphatically set forth by Justice Tuason in Acierto: "By the Agreement, it should be noted, the
Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases.
The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine
Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or
divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the
treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such
offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all
such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make
use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the
second from the express provisions of the treaty." 14 There was a reiteration of such a view in
Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign,
its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its
power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein,
and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both
territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a
diminution of sovereignty." 15 Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation:
"It is to be admitted any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character.
That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is
the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and
self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is
illimitable competence." 16 The opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the
most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance. The words employed follow: "Its laws
may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It
is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over
certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become
impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its
authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under
lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not
and cannot be foreign territory." 17
Can there be anything clearer, therefore, than that only a turnabout, unwarranted and unjustified,
from what is settled and orthodox law can lend the slightest degree of plausibility to the contention of
absence of administrative jurisdiction. If it were otherwise, what was aptly referred to by Justice
Tuason "as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency" becomes one of obeisance and submission.
If on a concern purely domestic in its implications, devoid of any connection with national security,
the Military-Bases Agreement could be thus interpreted, then sovereignty indeed becomes a
mockery and an illusion. Nor does appellant's thesis rest on less shaky foundation by the mere fact
that Acierto and Reagan dealt with the competence of the national government, while what is sought
to be emasculated in this case is the so-called administrative jurisdiction of a municipal corporation.
Within the limits of its territory, whatever statutory powers are vested upon it may be validly
exercised. Any residual authority and therein conferred, whether expressly or impliedly, belongs to
the national government, not to an alien country. What is even more to be deplored in this stand of
appellant is that no such claim is made by the American naval authorities, not that it would do them
any good if it were so asserted. To quote from Acierto anew: "The carrying out of the provisions of
the Bases Agreement is the concern of the contracting parties alone. Whether, therefore, a given
case which by the treaty comes within the United States jurisdiction should be transferred to the
Philippine authorities is a matter about which the accused has nothing to do or say. In other words,
the rights granted to the United States by the treaty insure solely to that country and can not be
raised by the offender." 18 If an accused would suffer from such disability, even if the American
armed forces were the beneficiary of a treaty privilege, what is there for appellant to take hold of
when there is absolutely no showing of any alleged grant of what is quaintly referred to as
administrative jurisdiction? That is all, and it is more than enough, to make manifest the futility of
seeking a reversal.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed insofar as it found the
accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14,
series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and modified insofar as she is required to demolish the house that is the subject matter
of the case, she being given a period of thirty days from the finality of this decision within which to
obtain the required permit. Only upon her failure to do so will that portion of the appealed decision
requiringdemolition be enforced. Costs against the accused.
ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition
for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who
adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in
the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was
then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute
and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his
government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be
confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in
return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the
government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State
Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works,
526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or
severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases
of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain
vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government
(which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the
state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be
destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the
existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting
the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be
suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the
territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of
the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of
the enemy during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the
supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim,
6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44,
45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the
sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance
of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is
no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the
petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in
Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253,
decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan
Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question,
not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de factotherein and its power to
promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on the
theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation
of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case,
the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights
of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not
transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or
divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion
or doctrine refers to the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the
adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present
case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by

Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of
the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government established over them,
such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a
foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return
for the protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with the absolute
and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own
government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may
be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way
an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason
against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter
by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his
government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the
protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign
country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has
enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection
he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would
not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not
receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty
by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because
the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant
(Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights,
duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during
military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason
that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are
inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes
against national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence
with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as
rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political
complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as
crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as
against the occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter
(Peralta vs.Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against public order to be
preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for
the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted
government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the
occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason
committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the
inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the
enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force,
unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and
regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers
of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make
new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is
necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his
army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages
established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public
conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land
Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these
limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them,
and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those
which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier,
shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and
obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him
a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by
giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding
consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the
preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or
compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such
action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the
control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is
tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular
government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were
compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him
aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit
thereto without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to
disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to
the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to
legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their
own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and
even compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against the resisting
enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive
them all of their own independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the action
of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the
nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and
repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a
political suicide;
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined
and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime
against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the
United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the
President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth
Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by
authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to
section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section
2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable,
to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though
not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and
incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the
Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law
above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that
"Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them"
(section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late
President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on
August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the
status as a government of other independent nations — in fact all the attributes of complete
and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is
a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in
the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question
of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and
executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other
officers, citizens and subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides
that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All
citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of the few
limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these
limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that
the people of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that
of the United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be
committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way
treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty
of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and
that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect
the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the
Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same
sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The government
established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall
thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the
petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to
be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs.
Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in
a separate opinion.
RAMON RUFFY, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY, ET AL., respondents.
Placido C. Ramos for petitioners.

Lt. Col. Fred Ruiz Castro and Capt. Ramon V. Diaz, JAGS, PA., for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
This was a petition for prohibition, praying that the respondents, the Chief of Staff and the General
Court Martial of the Philippine Army, be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of
petitioners before that body. Preliminary injunction having been denied by us and the General Court
Martial having gone ahead with the trial, which eventually resulted in the acquittal of one of the
defendants, Ramon Ruffy, the dismissal of the case as to another, Victoriano Dinglasan, and the
conviction of Jose L. Garcia, Prudente M. Francisco, Dominador Adeva and Andres Fortus, the last-
named four petitioners now seek in their memorandum to convert the petition into one for certiorari,
with the prayer that the records of the proceedings before the General Court Martial be ordered
certified to this court for review.
The ground of the petition was that the petitioners were not subject to military law at the time the
offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed. In their memorandum they have
raised an additional question of law — that the 93d Article of War is unconstitutional.
An outline of the petitioner's previous connection with the Philippine Army, the Philippine
Constabulary, and/or with guerrilla organizations will presently be made. This outline is based on
allegations in the petition and the answer, and on exhibits attached thereto and to the parties'
memoranda, exhibits which were offered in the course of the oral argument and admitted without
objection. The said exhibits are public documents certified by the officials who had them in custody
in their official capacity. They are presumed to be authentic, as we have no doubt they are.
It appears that at the outbreak of war on December 8, 1941, Ramon Ruffy was the Provincial
Commander, Prudente M. Francisco, a junior officer, and Andres Fortus, a corporal, all of the
Philippine Constabulary garrison stationed in Mindoro. When, on February 27, 1942, the Japanese
forces landed in Mindoro, Major Ruffy retreated to the mountains instead of surrendering to the
enemy, disbanded his company, and organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as Bolo Combat
team of Bolo Area. Lieutenant Francisco, Corporal Fortus and Jose L. Garcia, the last then a civilian
joined Major Ruffy's organization towards the latter part of 1942, while Dominador Adeva and
Victoriano Dinglasan, then likewise civilians, became its members some time in 1943..
Meanwhile, Brigadier General Macario Peralta, Jr., then a lieutenant colonel of the Philippine Army,
also took to the hills of Panay and led the operation of the 6th Military District, one of the districts into
which the Philippine Army had been divided before the war. About November, 1942, Colonel Peralta
succeeded in contacting the General Headquarters of General MacArthur in Australia as the result of
which on February 13, 1943, the 6th Military District was recognized by the Headquarters of the
Southwest Pacific Area as a military unit and part of its command.
Even before General MacArthur's recognition of the 6th Military District Colonel Peralta had
extended its sphere of operation to comprise Mindoro and Marinduque, and had, on January 2,
1943, named Major Ruffy as Acting Commander for those two provinces and Commanding Officer of
the 3rd Battalion, 66 Infantry 61st Division, Philippine Corps. After the recognition, 2d Lieut.
Prudente M. Francisco, by virtue of Special Orders No. 99, dated November 2, 1943, and signed by
Enrique L. Jurado, Major, OSE, Commanding, was assigned as S-3 in the Bolo Area. Major, later
Lieut. Col., Jurado, it should be noted, had been dispatched by the 6th Military District to Mindoro to
assume operational control supervision over the Bolo Area unit and to make and direct the
necessary report to the Headquarters, 6th Military District, in Panay. On April 26, 1944, by General
Orders No. 40 of the 6th Military District, 2d Lieutenant Francisco was promoted to the rank of 1st
Lieutenant (Brevet), effective April 15, 1944, subject to approval by the President of the Philippines,
and was re-assigned to the Bolo Area. As to Andres Fortus he was assigned to the same Bolo Area
as probationary 3d lieutenant for two-month probationary training, by the Headquarters of the 6th
Military District, as per Special Orders No. 70, dated May 15, 1944.
According to a memorandum of the Chief of Staff, 6th Military District, dated January 1943, and
signed by L.R. Relunia, Lieut. Col., CE, Chief of Staff, Jose L. Garcia and Dominador Adeva were
appointed 3d lieutenants, infantry as of December 31, 1942. Garcia later was promoted to the rank
of captain, effective March 15, 1943, as per Special Orders No. 82, issued in the field, 6th Military
District, and dated August 28, 1943. On May 24, 1943, Jose L. Garcia took his oath before Captain
Esteban P. Beloncio, then Acting Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment, 61st
Division, 6th Military District.
As has been said, the 6th Military District sent Lieut. Col. Enrique L. Jurado to be Commanding
Officer of the Bolo Combat Team in Mindoro and to undertake other missions of Military character.
Pursuant to instructions, Colonel Jurado on November 2, 1943, assigned Major Ruffy as
Commanding Officer of the Bolo Area with 3d Lieut. Dominador Adeva and 2d Lieut. Prudente M.
Francisco as members of his staff and Victoriano Dinglasan as Finance Officer, as per Special
Orders No. 99 dated November 2, 1943. In a memorandum of Colonel Jurado for Major Ruffy
bearing date 25 June, 1944, it was stated that Captain Garcia had been given P5,000 for palay and
Lieut. Francisco P9,000, P5,000 for palay and P4,000 for salary of the personnel B. Company.
A change in the command of the Bolo Area was effected by Colonel Jurado on June 8, 1944: Major
Ruffy was relieved of his assignment as Commanding Officer, Bolo Battalion, and Capt. Esteban P.
Beloncio was put in Ruffy's place. On October 19, 1944, Lieut. Col. Jurado was slain allegedly by the
petitioners. After the commission of this crime, the petitioners, it is alleged, seceded from the 6th
Military District. It was this murder which gave rise to petitioner's trial, the legality of which is now
being contested.
On July 26, 1941, the President of the Untied States issued a military order the pertinent paragraph
of which stated: ". . . as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, I hereby
call and order into the service of the armed forces of the United States Army, for the period of the
existing emergency, and place under the command of the general officer, United States Army, to be
designated by the Secretary of War, from time to time, all of the organized military forces of the
Government of the Commonwealth." Following the issuance of President Roosevelt's order General
Douglas MacArthur was appointed Commanding General of the United States Armed Forces in the
Far East.
It is contended, in behalf of Captain Francisco and Lieutenant Fortus, that "by the enemy occupation
of the Philippines, the National Defense Act and all laws and regulations creating and governing the
existence of the Philippine Army including the Articles of War, were suspended and in abeyance
during such belligerent occupation."
The paragraph quoted in the petitioner's memorandum from Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents
and the subsequent paragraph which has been omitted furnish a complete answer to petitioner's
contention of the Philippines by Japanese forces, the officers and men of the Philippine Army did not
cease to be fully in the service, though in a measure,' only in a measure, they were not subject to the
military jurisdiction, if they were not active duty. In the latter case, like officers and soldiers on leave
of absence or held as prisoners of war, they could not be held guilty of a breach of the discipline of
the command or of a neglect of duty, or disobedience of orders, or mutiny, or subject to a military
trial therefor; but for an act unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, or an act which constitutes an
offense of the class specified in the 95th Article of War, they may in general be legally held subject
to military jurisdiction and trial. "So a prisoner of war, though not subject, while held by the enemy, to
the discipline of his own army, would, when exchanged of paroled, be not exempt from liability for
such offenses as criminal acts or injuriuos conduct committed during his captivity against other
officers or soldiers in the same status." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, pp. 91,
92.)
The rule invoked by counsel, namely, that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are
considered superseded or in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing
of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and does not bind the enemies
in arms. This is self-evident from the very nature of things. The paradox of a contrary ruling should
readily manifest itself. Under the petitioner's theory the forces of resistance operating in an occupied
territory would have to abide by the outlawing of their own existence. They would be stripped of the
very life-blood of an army, the right and the ability to maintain order and discipline within the
organization and to try the men guilty of breach thereof.
The surrender by General Wainright of the Fil-American Forces does not profit the petitioner's who
were former members of the Philippine Constabulary any more than does the rule of war or
international law they cite. The fall of Bataan and Corregidor did not end the war. It did not, legally or
otherwise, keep the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines from organizing a new
army, regular or irregular, out of new men and men in the old service who had refused to surrender
or who having surrendered, had decided to carry on the fight through other diverse means and
methods. The fall of Corregidor and Bataan just marked the beginning of the gigantic preparation for
the gigantic drive that was to fight its way to and beyond the Philippines in fulfillment of General
MacArthur's classic promise, "I shall return." The heroic role which the guerrillas played in that
preparation and in the subsequent liberation of the Philippines is now history.
Independently of their previous connection with the Philippine Army and the Philippine Constabulary,
Captain Francisco and Lieutenant Fortus as well as Major Garcia and Lieutenant Adeva were
subject to military jurisdiction.
The 2d Article of War defines and enumerates the persons subject to military law as follows:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. — The following persons are subject to these articles
and shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or
"persons subject to military law," whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers belonging to the Regular Force of
the Philippine Army; all reservists, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on
such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully
called, drafted, or order to obey the same;
(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary third lieutenants;
(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Army of the
Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though not otherwise
subject to these articles;
(d) All persons under sentences adjudged by courts-martial.
It is our opinion that the petitioners come within the general application of the clause in sub-
paragraph (a); "and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty for training in,
the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the
same." By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the General
Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they became members of the Philippine Army amendable to
the Articles of War. The Bolo Area, as has been seen, was a contigent of the 6th Military District
which, as has also been pointed out, had been recognized by and placed under the operational
control of the United States Army in the Southwest Pacific. The Bolo Area received supplies and
funds for the salaries of its officers and men from the Southwest Pacific Command. As officers in the
Bolo Area and the 6th Military District, the petitioners operated under the orders of duly established
and duly appointed commanders of the United States Army.
The attitude of the enemy toward underground movements did not affect the military status of
guerrillas who had been called into the service of the Philippine Army. If the invaders refused to look
upon guerrillas, without distinctions, as legitimate troops, that did not stop the guerillas who had
been inducted into the service of the Philippine Army from being component parts thereof, bound to
obey military status of guerrillas was to be judged not by the concept of the army of the country for
which they fought.
The constitutionality of the 93d Article of War is assailed. This article ordains "that any person
subject to military law who commits murder in time of was shall suffer death or imprisonment for life,
as the court martial may direct." It is argued that since "no review is provided by that law to be made
by the Supreme Court, irrespective of whether the punishment is for life imprisonment or death", it
violates Article VIII, section 2, paragraph 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines which provides that
"the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment."
We think the petitioners are in error. This error arose from failure to perceive the nature of courts
martial and the sources of the authority for their creation.
Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities "for the ordering of
courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as
Commander in Chief, independently of legislation." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d
Edition, p. 49.) Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary. "The Supreme Court of
the United States referring to the provisions of the Constitution authorizing Congress to provide for
the government of the army, excepting military offenses from the civil jurisdiction, and making the
President Commander in Chief, observes as follows: "These provisions show that Congress has the
power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then and
now practiced by civilized nations, and that the power to do so is given without any connection
between it and the 3d Article of the United States; indeed that the two powers are entirely
independent of each other."
"Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-martial must pertain to
the executive department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power,
provided by Congress for the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding
the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his
authorized military representatives." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Of
equal interest Clode, 2 M. F., 361, says of these courts in the British law: "It must never be lost sight
of that the only legitimate object of military tribunals is to aid the Crown to maintain the discipline and
government of the Army." (Footnote No. 24, p. 49, Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d
Edition.)
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the petition has no merit and that it should be dismissed with costs.
It is so ordered.
DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners,

vs.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of
Zambales, Olongapo City, ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the petitioners were performing their
official duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private
respondents. Once this question is decided, the other answers will fall into place and this petition
need not detain us any longer than it already has.
Petitioner Sanders was, at the time the incident in question occurred, the special services director of
the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. 1 Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer
of the Subic Naval Base, which includes the said station. 2 Private respondent Rossi is an American
citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines, 3 as so was private respondent Wyer, who died
two years ago. 4 They were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services
department of the NAVSTA, the former having been hired in 1971 and the latter in 1969. 5
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been
converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time, effective October 18, 1975. 6 Their
reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the
pertinent rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The result was a
recommendation from the hearing officer who conducted the proceedings for the reinstatement of
the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages. The report on the hearing
contained the observation that "Special Services management practices an autocratic form of
supervision." 7
In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau on May 17, 1976 (Annex "A" of the complaint), Sanders
disagreed with the hearing officer's report and asked for the rejection of the abovestated
recommendation. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-
workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate
supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under
oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not
involved in the case could hear."
On November 7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter (Annex "B" of the
complaint) purportedly corning from petitioner Moreau as the commanding general of the U.S. Naval
Station in Subic Bay was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private
respondent's employment status and requesting concurrence therewith. The letter did not carry his
signature but was signed by W.B. Moore, Jr. "by direction," presumably of Moreau.
On the basis of these antecedent facts, the private respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of
Olongapo City a for damages against the herein petitioners on November 8, 1976. 8 The plaintiffs
claimed that the letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused
them mental anguish and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their
personal and proprietary rights.
The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or
personal capacity. However, in a motion to dismiss filed under a special appearance, the petitioners
argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties
and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.
After extensive written arguments between the parties, the motion was denied in an order dated
March 8, 1977, 9on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their
acts were official in nature and not personal torts, moreover, the allegation in the complaint was that
the defendants had acted maliciously and in bad faith. The same order issued a writ of preliminary
attachment, conditioned upon the filing of a P10,000.00 bond by the plaintiffs, against the properties
of petitioner Moreau, who allegedly was then about to leave the Philippines. Subsequently, to make
matters worse for the defendants, petitioner Moreau was declared in a default by the trial court in its
order dated August 9, 1977. The motion to lift the default order on the ground that Moreau's failure to
appear at the pre-trial conference was the result of some misunderstanding, and the motion for
reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss, which was filed by the petitioner's new
lawyers, were denied by the respondent court on September 7, 1977.
This petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction was thereafter filed before this Court,
on the contention that the above-narrated acts of the respondent court are tainted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
We return now to the basic question of whether the petitioners were acting officially or only in their
private capacities when they did the acts for which the private respondents have sued them for
damages.
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his
personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers
and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official
character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a
personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are
applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts
pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.
The respondent judge, apparently finding that the complained acts were prima facie personal and
tortious, decided to proceed to trial to determine inter alia their precise character on the strength of
the evidence to be submitted by the parties. The petitioners have objected, arguing that no such
evidence was needed to substantiate their claim of jurisdictional immunity. Pending resolution of this
question, we issued a temporary restraining order on September 26, 1977, that has since then
suspended the proceedings in this case in the courta quo.
In past cases, this Court has held that where the character of the act complained of can be
determined from the pleadings exchanged between the parties before the trial, it is not necessary for
the court to require them to belabor the point at a trial still to be conducted. Such a proceeding would
be superfluous, not to say unfair to the defendant who is subjected to unnecessary and avoidable
inconvenience.
Thus, in Baer v. Tizon, 10 we held that a motion to dismiss a complaint against the commanding
general of the Olongapo Naval Base should not have been denied because it had been sufficiently
shown that the act for which he was being sued was done in his official capacity on behalf of the
American government. The United States had not given its consent to be sued. It was the reverse
situation in Syquia v. Almeda Lopez," where we sustained the order of the lower court granting a
where we motion to dismiss a complaint against certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown
to be acting officially in the name of the American government. The United States had also not
waived its immunity from suit. Only three years ago, in United States of America v. Ruiz, 12 we set
aside the denial by the lower court of a motion to dismiss a complaint for damages filed against the
United States and several of its officials, it appearing that the act complained of was governmental
rather than proprietary, and certainly not personal. In these and several other cases 13 the Court
found it redundant to prolong the other case proceedings after it had become clear that the suit could
not prosper because the acts complained of were covered by the doctrine of state immunity.
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to
account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the
special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including
the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline,
dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a reply
to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the
private respondents. 14 Moreover, even in the absence of such request, he still was within his rights
in reacting to the hearing officer's criticism—in effect a direct attack against him—-that Special
Services was practicing "an autocratic form of supervision."
As for Moreau,what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for
concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before the
grievance proceedings had even commenced. Disregarding for the nonce the question of its
timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of
Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services
department of NAVSTA In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the
department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the re-designation of the
private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it.
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners
were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted
on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not
the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it
is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be
satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as
their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus
making the action a suit against that government without its consent.
There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government
sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to' be sued. So we have ruled not only in
Baer but in many other decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not
only to our own government but also to foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our
courts. 15
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against
the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. 16 In the case of foreign states, the
rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par
in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of
nations." 17 Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our
Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as such without the previous
consent of the state. To be sure, there are a number of well-recognized exceptions. It is clear that a
public officer may be sued as such to compel him to do an act required by law, as where, say, a
register of deeds refuses to record a deed of sale; 18or to restrain a Cabinet member, for example,
from enforcing a law claimed to be unconstitutional; 19 or to compel the national treasurer to pay
damages from an already appropriated assurance fund; 20 or the commissioner of internal revenue to
refund tax over-payments from a fund already available for the purpose; 21 or, in general, to secure a
judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by himself without the government itself having to do
a positive act to assist him. We have also held that where the government itself has violated its own
laws, the aggrieved party may directly implead the government even without first filing his claim with
the Commission on Audit as normally required, as the doctrine of state immunity "cannot be used as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice." 22
This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as Festejo v. Fernando, 23 where the Court
held that a bureau director could be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he
acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly taking private property without paying just
compensation therefor although he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary
to secure the previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party defendant,
as it was not responsible for the defendant's unauthorized act.
The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under any of the recognized exceptions.
The government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the
petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is the
American government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of appropriating the amount
that may be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by
the presumption of good faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even
mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown
that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 24 This, to, is well
settled . 25 Furthermore, applying now our own penal laws, the letters come under the concept of
privileged communications and are not punishable, 26 let alone the fact that the resented remarks are
not defamatory by our standards. It seems the private respondents have overstated their case.
A final consideration is that since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo Naval Base by the
petitioners in the performance of their official duties and the private respondents are themselves
American citizens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this country to refrain from taking
cognizance of this matter and to treat it as coming under the internal administration of the said base.
The petitioners' counsel have submitted a memorandum replete with citations of American cases, as
if they were arguing before a court of the United States. The Court is bemused by such attitude.
While these decisions do have persuasive effect upon us, they can at best be invoked only to
support our own jurisprudence, which we have developed and enriched on the basis of our own
persuasions as a people, particularly since we became independent in 1946.
We appreciate the assistance foreign decisions offer us, and not only from the United States but also
from Spain and other countries from which we have derived some if not most of our own laws. But
we should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable
mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our
own endowments We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of
our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always
with our own concept of law and justice.
The private respondents must, if they are still sominded, pursue their claim against the petitioners in
accordance with the laws of the United States, of which they are all citizens and under whose
jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed. Even assuming that our own laws are applicable,
the United States government has not decided to give its consent to be sued in our courts, which
therefore has not acquired the competence to act on the said claim,.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated March 8,1977, August
9,1977, and September 7, 1977, are SET ASIDE. The respondent court is directed to DISMISS Civil
Case No. 2077-O. Our Temporary restraining order of September 26,1977, is made PERMANENT.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

78059 August 31, 1987

ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA,

An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin

As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition,

On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum

Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum,

xxx xxx xxx

That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such

That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the

That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was

That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.

Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.

SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees

Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as

Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no

Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay

Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations

WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on

TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:

The record of the deliberations and the voting is reproduced hereinbelow: 1

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, may we now put to a vote the

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. May I propose the following amendments.

MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam President. If

The proposed amendment would be to delete the words "its

The committee accepts the first proposed amendment. However, we

MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, Madam President, we can now do that.

MR. DAVIDE. The second sentence will read: "THE

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, after conferring with our

Therefore, the committee regrets that it cannot accept the second

MR. DAVIDE. I am prepared to withdraw the same on the

MR. MAAMBONG. With that understanding, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist on the second sentence.

FR. BERNAS. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. I would ask the committee to reconsider its acceptance

MR. MAAMBONG. Would the Gentleman answer a few clarificatory

FR. BERNAS. Willingly, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. The Gentleman will agree that a date has to be

FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification of the Constitution is

MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the mechanics of the whole thing,

FR. BERNAS. It would not, Madam President, because "ratification"

MR. MAAMBONG. So it is the date of the plebiscite itself, Madam

FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. With that statement of Commissioner Bernas,

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I am insisting on the amendment

xxx xxx xxx

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Nolledo is recognized.

MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President. I beg to disagree with

Thank you, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Does Commissioner Regalado want to contribute?

MR. REGALADO. Madam President, I was precisely going to state

MR. LERUM. Madam President, may I be recognized.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Lerum is recognized.

MR. LERUM. I am in favor of the Davide amendment because we

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.