LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner v PAMINTUAN DEVELOPMENT CO.

, respondent,
GR No. 167886, October 25, 2005 (First Division), J. Ynares-Santiago

I. Facts:
On June 2004, Attys. Engilberto F. Montarde and Felix F. Mesa, legal counsels of
Landbank, filed a notice of entry of appearance, in behalf of the petitioner, before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

DARAB, however, denied due course to the said notices, contending that Attys.
Montarde and Mesa failed to show that their appearance was duly authorized by Landbank,
despite already having a Special Power of Attorney executed by Landbank’s Vice President.

DARAB added that the said counsels failed to effect a valid substitution of the former
counsels of Lanbank.

The petitioner files a motion for reconsideration appending two memoranda, signed by
the petitioner’s department head, thereby confirming the authority of said counsels. DARAB,
however, still denied their motion for reconsideration.

A motion for certiorari was filed by the petitioner before the Court of Appeals but the
latter sustained DARAB’s findings that the said counsels did not have the authority to file
notice of appeal in behalf of Landbank. Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court.
II. Issue:
Whether or not an evidence of proper substitution is necessary before Attys. Montarde and
Mesa may be considered authorized representatives of Landbank?

III. Ruling:
NO. Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that:
“...An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he
appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for
his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds
therefor being shown, require any attorney... to produce or prove the authority under which he
appears...”
It is evident that the above provision neither requires the concerned counsels to present
an evidence of authority nor an evidence of substitution. There is no need to resort to
determination and interpretation, but only to its application because the provision is clear and
unambiguous.
Meanwhile, the appearance of second attorney would not even mean that the authority
of the first attorney is withdrawn.
DARAB gravely abused its discretion in denying the appeal of the said counsels.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming DARAB’s decision.
Wherefore, the decision of DARAB and CA is hereby reversed and set aside. DARAB is
also directed to give due course to the petitioner’s Notice of Entry and Appearance and Notice
of Appeal.