"the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life." - William Shakespeare v.
“for the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life.” - 2 Corinthians 3:6
People v. Mapa
Class Topic: NECESSITY OF CONSTRUCTION
GR L-22301, August 30 1967
FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1967/aug1967/gr_l-22301_1967.html
DECISION:
“Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.”
Plaintiff-appellee: People case for illegal possession of fire arms against defendant (without
secured the necessary license or permit)
defendant-appellant: MAPA, secret agent to the provincial governor possess firearms (
(without secured the necessary license/permit)
[LOST]
FACTS:
1. The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether
or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial
governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.
ISSUE: When is construction necessary?
RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not
exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law.
"Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them." The conviction of the accused must
stand. It cannot be set aside.
CODALS: [Act No. 2711 Also Known As Revised Administrative Code]
Section 878 Unlawful manufacture, dealing in, acquisition, disposition, or possession of firearms,
parts of firearms, or ammunition therefor, or instruments or implements used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. — Save as allowable under this Article it
shall be unlawful for any person to import, manufacture, deal in, receive, acquire, buy, sell,
dispose of, or possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition.
Section 879 Exception as to firearms and ammunition used by military and naval forces or by
peace officers. — This Article shall not apply to firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines of the United States Army and Navy, the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal
police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal
treasurers, municipal (presidents) mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and
jails, when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties.
DAOANG v. MUNICIPAL JUDGE
Class Topic: NECESSITY OF CONSTRUCTION
G.R. No. L-34568, March 28 1988
FULL TEXT: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/mar1988/gr_l_34568_1988.html
DECISION:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED.”
PETITIONER: The adopted children, with their real father, opposing the adoption
RESPONDENT: Municipal judge deciding: Court renders judgment declaring that henceforth
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, the children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero
Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy
FACTS:
1. March 1971, Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte,
seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos.
2. April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian
ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for adoption,
claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella
Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were
disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
3. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by
the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.
ISSUE: When is construction necessary?
RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and
unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only
statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory
construction.
1. We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children
mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent
judge, do not include grandchildren.
CODALS: paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code “The following cannot adopt: (1) Those who
have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction;”
 "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life." - William Shakespeare v. “for the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life.” - 2 Corinthians 3:6

Alonzo v. IAC
Class Topic: CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSTRUCTION (legislative intent, justice) Endencia v. David
G.R. No. 72873, May 28 1987 Class Topic: CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSTRUCTION
FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/may1987/gr_72873_1987.html
G.R. No. L-6355-56, August 31 1953
FULL TEXT: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1953/aug1953/gr_l-6355-6_1953.html
DECISION:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and
DECISION:
that of the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.”
“In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs.” [voided doctrine by 1987]
PETITIONER: vendees (trial court ruled in their favor on Art 1088) (WON)
RESPONDENT: vendor + respondent court who ruled in their favor but REVERSED
plaintiffs-appellees: Justices collected “income tax” from, directed by Court of First Instance of
(INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT)
Manila
defendant-appellant: DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue
FACTS:
1. On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the
FACTS:
herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22,
1. This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring
1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an instrument
section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional. (AFFIRMED)
denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00.
2. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area
RATIO DECIDENDI:
corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees
1. Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit
subsequently enclosed the same with a fence.
or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution (the interpretation and application
of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department.).
RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the
1. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing;
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
1. The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it
of the legislature, is to render justice.
so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as
1. Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
not to violate the constitutional inhibition.
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so.
1. In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to
the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution
CODALS: Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as follows: “Should any of the heirs sell his
thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application
hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated
of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial
to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the
vendor.”
hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation
already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

CODALS: section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution:. SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall
hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of
sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.
section 13 of Republic Act No. 590: SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law.
 "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life." - William Shakespeare v. “for the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life.” - 2 Corinthians 3:6

Nitafan v. CIR People v. Concepcion

Class Topic: PURPOSE OF CONSTRUCTION = LEGISLATIVE INTENT Class Topic: PURPOSE OF CONSTRUCTION = LEGISLATIVE INTENT
G.R. No. 78780, July 23 1987 G.R. No. L-19190 November 29, 1922
FULL TEXT: http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1987julydecisions.php?id=347 FULL TEXT: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1922/nov1922/gr_l-19190_1922.html

DECISION:
“WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition (deduction
salaries) is hereby dismissed.”
FACTS:
PETITIONER: Nitafan et.al are qualified judges seeks to prohibit
RESPONDENT: COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
DECISION:
of withholding taxes from their “Judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.”
FACTS:
PETITIONER: plaintiff-appellee: WIN, WIN. People case against violation of Section 35 of Act No.
2747 = “loans are not allowed to members of the board”
RESPONDENT: defendant-appellant: LOSE, LOSE. President of the Philippine National Bank,

RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain and give
RATIO DECIDENDI:
effect to the intention of the Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of the Legislature is
1. LEGAL INTENT from Constitutional debate: "FR. BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an
plainly to erect a wall of safety against temptation for a director of the bank. The prohibition
article will be found in the General Provisions. But at any rate, when we put a period (.) after
against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar maxim that no man may serve two masters
‘DECREASED,’ it is on the understanding that the doctrine in Perfecto v. Meer and Dencia v.
— that where personal interest clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost always suffers. If,
David will not apply anymore."
therefore, it is shown that the husband is financially interested in the success or failure of his
1. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in
wife's business venture, a loan to partnership of which the wife of a director is a member, falls
question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the
within the prohibition.
framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
1. That it was the intention of the Legislature to prohibit exactly such an occurrence is shown by
Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
the acknowledged fact that in this instance the defendant was tempted to mingle his personal
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
and family affairs with his official duties, and to permit the loan P300,000 to a partnership of no
the people adopting it should be given effect. 10 The primary task in constitutional construction
established reputation and without asking for collateral security.
is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. 11 It may also be safely assumed that the people in
CODALS: Section 35 of Act No. 2747, effective on February 20, 1918, just mentioned, to which
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
reference must hereafter repeatedly be made, reads as follows: "The National Bank shall not,
1. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in
directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the board of directors of the bank nor
the light of the discussion (intent) in the Constitutional Commission.
to agents of the branch banks." Section 49 of the same Act provides: "Any person who shall
violate any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished by a fine not to exceed ten thousand
CODALS: section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution:. SEC. 9, ibid.
pesos, or by imprisonment not to exceed five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
These two sections were in effect in 1919 when the alleged unlawful acts took place,
but were repealed by Act No. 2938, approved on January 30, 1921.
 "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life." - William Shakespeare v. “for the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life.” - 2 Corinthians 3:6
Tañada v. Yulo
Class Topic: LIMITATION ON THE POWER TO CONSTRUE (a. Legislative intent from
the language of the statute itself, b. To not depart to the meaning of the expressed
words even if it seems legislative intent misenacted. To do so is judicial legislation.)
G.R. No. 43575, May 31 1935
FULL TEXT: http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1935maydecisions.php?id=68
DECISION:
“we reach the conclusion that the special defenses interposed by the Solicitor-General must be
overruled. Accordingly, the writ will be granted and the petitioner Juan Tañada will be placed in
possession of the office of justice of the peace of Perez, Tayabas. So ordered, without special
pronouncement as to the costs.”
FACTS:
Pursuant to
PETITIONER: justice of the peace of “Alabat, Tayabas” transferred by his request,
the provisions of section 206 of the Revised Administrative Code, to “Perez, Tayabas”.
RESPONDENT: YULO, Secretary of Justice, assails that Philippine Senate must concur and ACT
3899 requires petitioner to cease to hold office.
1. a justice of the peace like the petitioner who became sixty-five years of age on October
5, 1934, was not included in a law which required justices of the peace sixty-five years of age
to cease to hold office on January 1, 1933. (Act No. 3899)
ISSUES:
1. W/N Senate concurrence is required
2. W/N ACT 3899 applies and W/N solicitor general is correct in assuming that the legislative
intent should prevail over the clear words indicated in the statute.
HELD:
1. It is to be deduced from what has been stated above that according to the United States
Supreme Court, the transfer simply amounted to an enlargement or change of jurisdiction
grounded on the original appointment and thus did not require a new appointment. (me:
thus, doesn’t require the concurrence of Senate)
2. Acceding to this petition, we have again examined microscopically word for word the
terminology used in Act No. 3899. Having done so, all of us are agreed that a justice of the
peace like the petitioner who became sixty-five years of age on October 5, 1934, was not
included in a law which required justices of the peace sixty-five years of age to cease to hold
office on January 1, 1933. That result is now arrived at in banc.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
2. In substantiation of what has just been said, it is of course fundamental that the
determination of the legislative intent is the primary consideration. However, it is equally
fundamental that that legislative intent must be determined from the language of the
statute itself. This principle must be adhered to even though the court be convinced by
extraneous circumstances that the Legislature intended to enact something very
different from that which it did enact. An obscurity cannot be created to be cleared up by
construction and hidden meanings at variance with the language used cannot be sought out. To
attempt to do so is a perilous undertaking, and is quite apt to lead to an amendment of a law by
judicial construction. To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the
statute, is to legislate not to interpret.
2. "that the language of the proviso in question is somewhat defective and does not clearly
convey the legislative intent", and at the hearing in response to questions was finally forced to
admit that what the Government desired was for the court to insert words and phrases
in the law in order to supply an intention for the legislature. That we cannot do. By
liberal construction of statutes, courts from the language used, the subject matter, and the
purposes of those framing them are able to find out their true meaning. There is a sharp
distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting
upon a law something that has been omitted which someone believes ought to have
been embraced. The former is liberal construction and is a legitimate exercise of judicial
power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of powers
among the three departments of government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.
CODALS: Act No. 3899, and in the proviso to section 206 of the same Code as last amended by
Act No. 2768, which read as follows:
"SEC. 203. Appointment and distribution of justices of the peace. — . . . Provided, further, That
the present justices and auxiliary justices of the peace who shall, at the time this Act
takes effect, have completed sixty-five years of age, shall cease to hold office on
January first, nineteen hundred and thirty-three; and the Governor-General, with the advice and
consent of the Philippine Senate, shall make new appointments to cover the vacancies occurring
by operation of this Act."
"SEC. 206. Tenure of office — Transfer from one municipality to another. — A justice of the
peace having the requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during good behavior unless his
office be lawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other justice: Provided, That in
case the public interest requires it, a justice of the peace of one municipality may be transferred
to another."cralaw
 "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life." - William Shakespeare v. “for the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life.” - 2 Corinthians 3:6

Floresca v. Philex 2. This is not judicial legislation, instead it is: It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social
justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code,
Class Topic: LIMITATION ON THE POWER TO CONSTRUE (RIGHT AND JUSTICE) is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of
the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned. [the hierarchy of laws]
G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985 2. It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as
FULL TEXT: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1985/apr1985/gr_l30642_1985.html
implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of
law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the
DECISION:
implementing legislation aforementioned.
“WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET
CODALS: Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, was amended by
ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A
Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:
GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE
PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.”
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other
rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or
FACTS:
nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury.
PETITIONER: Floresca et.al., Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining
[This provision is not heeded to by the decision of this case]
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines
underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
buried them in the tunnels of the mine.
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply to injuries received
RESPONDENT: PHILEX MINING CORPORATION
outside the Island through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of
the employment. Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of
ISSUES:
the Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be
1. W/N the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice for
more favorable to them (As amended by section 5 of Republic Act No. 772).
damages between the Civil Code particularly Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and 2231, OR the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable
2. W/N in interpreting the law the way the ponente did, a judicial legislation has been committed
provisions of the New Civil Code, because said Article 173 provides:
HELD:
1. WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State
preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the
in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on
said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title
Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on
shall bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in (a) Section 699 of the Revised
ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments Administrative Code, (b) Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, ©
made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor. Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty- six, as amended, (d) Commonwealth Act
1. with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacana, Valencia and Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, (e) Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred
Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice guarantees Sixty-four, as amended, and (f) other laws whose benefits are administered by the System
enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. during the period of such payment for the same disability or death, and conversely (emphasis
1. The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer. The right to life is guaranteed
supplied).
specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. To relieve the employer from liability for the death of his workers arising from
his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers against the dangers which
are inherent in underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to recover indemnity for the loss of the More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case
life of the worker and the consequent loss to his family without due process of law. The dissent in effect condones and therefore
encourages such gross or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety measures for of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the
the protection of the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is un-Christian.
safety and decent living of the laborer."
RATIO DECIDENDI:
2. Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. "