#18 G.R. No.
L-24440 March 28, 1968 The principle itself is simple: If the property is
THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL
NORTE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF
FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,defendants-appellants.
Facts:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city,
the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the
provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province.
On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was
approved converting the Municipality of
Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the
Act also provided that “Buildings and properties
which the province shall abandon upon the transfer
of the capital to another place will be acquired and
paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be
fixed by the Auditor General.”
Such properties include lots of capitol site,
schools, hospitals, leprosarium, high school
playgrounds, burleighs, and hydro-electric sites.
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved
dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2):
Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As
to how the assets and obligations of the old
province were to be divided between the two new
ones, Sec. 6 of that law provided “Upon the
approval of this Act, the funds, assets and other
properties and the obligations of the province of
Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the
Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province
of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the
Philippines, upon the recommendation of the
Auditor General.”
However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act
3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of
Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that, “All
buildings, properties and assets belonging to the
former province of Zamboanga and located within
the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free
of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga.”
This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to
file on March 5, 1962, a complaint against
defendants-appellants Zamboanga City; that,
among others, Republic Act 3039 be declared
unconstitutional for depriving Zamboanga del Norte
of property without due process and just
compensation.
Lower court declared RA 3039
unconstitutional as it deprives Zamboanga del
Norte of its private properties.
Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether RA 3039 is unconstitutional on the
grounds that it deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its
private properties.
Held:
No. RA 3039 is valid. The properties petitioned by
Zamboanga del Norte is a public property.
The validity of the law ultimately depends on the
nature of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in
question. For, the matter involved here is the extent
of legislative control over the properties of a
municipal corporation, of which a province is one.
owned by the municipality (meaning municipal
corporation) in its public and governmental
capacity, the property is public and Congress has
absolute control over it. But if the property is owned
in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is
patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control.
The municipality cannot be deprived of it without
due process and payment of just compensation.
The capacity in which the property is held is,
however, dependent on the use to which it is
intended and devoted. Now, which of two norms,
i.e., that of the Civil Code or that obtaining under
the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in
classifying the properties in question?
Civil Code
The Civil provide: ART. 423. The property of
provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into
property for public use and patrimonial property;
ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces,
cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces,
cities, or municipalities. All other property
possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall
be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the
provisions of special laws.
Applying the above cited norm, all the
properties in question, except the two (2) lots used
as High School playgrounds, could be considered
as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga
province. Even the capital site, the hospital and
leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be
considered patrimonial for they are not for public
use. They would fall under the phrase “public works
for public service” for it has been held that under
the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must
be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just
like the preceding enumerated properties in the first
paragraph of Art 424. The playgrounds, however,
would fit into this category.
Law of Municipal Corporations
On the other hand, applying the norm
obtaining under the principles constituting the law
of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50
properties in question which are devoted to public
service are deemed public; the rest remain
patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered
public, it is enough that the property be held and,
devoted for governmental purposes like local
administration, public education, public health, etc.
Final Ruling
The controversy here is more along the
domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations —
State vs. Province — than along that of Civil Law. If
municipal property held and devoted to public
service is in the same category as ordinary private
property, then that would mean they can be levied
upon and attached; they can even be acquired thru
adverse possession — all these to the detriment of
the local community. It is wrong to consider those
properties as ordinary private property.
Lastly, the classification of properties other
than those for public use in the municipalities as
patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code — is
“… without prejudice to the provisions of special
laws.” For purpose of this article, the principles,
obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations
can be considered as “special laws”. Hence, the
classification of municipal property devoted for
distinctly governmental purposes as public should
prevail over the Civil Code classification in this
particular case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby
entered as follows:.
(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to
return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum
the amount of P43,030.11 which the former took
back from the latter out of the sum of P57,373.46
previously paid to the latter; and
(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect
payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever balance
remains of plaintiff’s 54.39% share in the 26
patrimonial properties, after deducting therefrom
the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution
No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal
Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way
of quarterly payments from the allotments of
defendant City, in the manner originally adopted by
the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. No costs. So ordered.
_________________________________________
G.R. No. L-29788 August 30, 1972
#19 RAFAEL S. SALAS, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary; CONRADO F. ESTRELLA,
in his capacity as Governor of the Land
Authority; and LORENZO GELLA, in his
capacity as Register of Deeds of
Manila, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding
Judge of Branch XXIII, Court of First Instance of
Manila; ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity
as Mayor of the City of Manila; and the CITY OF
MANILA, respondents-appellees.
Facts:
City of Manila – owner in fee simple of a parcel of
land known as Lot 1, Block 557 of Cadastral Survey
of City of Manila, containing an area of 9689.80
sqm. On various dates in 1927, City of Manila sold
portions of the parcel of land. When the last sale
was effected August 1924, Transfer Certificate of
Title 22547 covering the residue of the land
7490.10 sam was issued in the name of City of
Manila.
On September 1960, Municipal Board of Manila
adopted a resolution requesting the President to
consider the feasibility of declaring the land under
Transfer Certificate of Title 25545-25547 as
patrimonial property of Manila for the purpose of
selling these lots to the actual occupants thereof.
The resolution was then transmitted to the
Congress. The bill was then passed by Congress
and approved by President, and became Republic
Act 4118, converting the land from communal
property to disposable and alienable land of State.
To implement RA 4118, Land Authority requested
City of Manila to deliver the City’s TCT 22547 in
order to obtain title thereto in the name of Land
Authority. The request was granted with the
knowledge and consent of City mayor, cancelling
TCT 22547 and issuing TCT 80876 in the name of
Land Authority.
City of Manila, for some reasons, brought an action
to restrain, prohibit, and enjoin Land Authority and
Register of Deeds from implementing RA 4118, and
praying for the declaration of RA 4118 as
unconstitutional.
Trial court declared RA 4118 to be unconstitutional
and invalid on the ground that it deprived City of its
property without due process of law and payment of
just compensation.
Land Authority and Register of Deeds argued that
the land is a communal land, or a portion of public
domain owned by State; that the land has not been
used by City of Manila for any public purpose; that
it was originally a communal land not because it
was needed in connection with its organisation as a
municipality but rather for the common use of its
inhabitants; that the City mayor merely enjoys the
usufruct over said land and its exercise of acts of
ownership by selling parts thereof did not
necessarily convert the land into a patrimonial
property of City of Manila nor divert the State of its
paramount title.
Issue:
Whether the aforementioned land is a private or
patrimonial property of the City of Manila.
Held:
The land is public property.
As a general rule, regardless of the source
or classification of the land in the possession of
municipality, excepting those which it acquired in its
own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such
property is held for the State for the benefit of its
inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or
proprietary purposes. The legal situation is the
same if the State itself holds the property and puts
it to a different use.
When it comes to property of municipality which it
did not acquire in its private or corporate capacity
with its own funds (the land was originally given to
City by Spain), the legislature can transfer its
administration and disposition to an agency of the
National Government to be disposed of according
to its discretion. Here it did so in obedience to the
constitutional mandate of promoting social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of the
people.
The property was not acquired by the City of Manila
with its own funds in its private or proprietary
capacity. The land was part of the territory of City of
Manila granted by sovereign in its creation.
Furthermore, City expressly recognised the
paramount title of the State over its land when it
requested the President to consider the feasibility
of declaring the lot as patrimonial property for
selling.
There could be no more blatant recognition of the
fact that said land belongs to the State and was
simply granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for
municipal purposes. But since the City did not
actually use said land for any recognized public
purpose and allowed it to remain idle and
unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by
squatters, no presumption of State grant of
ownership in favor of the City of Manila may be
acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is its own
private or patrimonial property.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is
hereby reversed, and petitioners shall proceed with
the free and untrammeled implementation of
Republic Act No. 4118 without any obstacle from
the respondents. Without costs.
_________________________________________
#20 CEBU OXYGEN AND ACETYLENE CO. V.
BERCILLES
66 SCRA 431
FACTS:
The land sought to be registered in this
case was formerly a part of a street. Through
a resolution, it was declared to be an abandoned
road and not part of the City development
plan. Thereafter, it was sold through a
public bidding and petitioner was the highest bid
der. He then sought to register said land but his
application was dismissed.
HELD:
The portion of the city street subject to
petitioner’s application for
registration of title was withdrawn from public u
se. Then it follows that
such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial pro
perty of the State. It is also very clear from the
Charter that property thus withdrawn from public
servitude may be used or conveyed for any pu
rpose for which other real property belonging to
the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.
_________________________________________
#21 Municipality of San Miguel Bulacan vs. Hon.
Oscar C. Fernandez
Facts:
The Court of First Instance of Bulacan
rendered a judgment holding petitioner liable to
private respondents and ordering the municipality,
among others, to pay private respondents the loss
of income from rentals on subject lots and
attorney’s fees.
Issue:
W/N the funds of the Municipality of San
Miguel, Bulacan are public funds which are exempt
from execution.
Held:
YES. It is a well settled doctrine of the law
that not only the public property but also the taxes
and public revenues of such [municipal]
corporations cannot be seized under execution
against them, either in the treasury or when in
transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the
proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers
of the law, are not subject to execution unless so
declared by statute.
_________________________________________
#22 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS V. CONSORCIA CABANGIS, ET AL
G.R. No. L-28379 March 27, 1929
FACTS
Lots 36, 39 and 40, which are subject to cadastral
proceeding of the City of Manila were formerly a
part of a large parcel of land belonging to the
predecessor of the herein claimants and appellees.
From the year 1896 said land began to wear away,
due to the action of the waves of Manila Bay, until
the year 1901 when the said lots became
completely submerged in water in ordinary tides,
and remained in such a state. On 1912, the
Government undertook the dredging of Vitas
Estuary in order to facilitate navigation, depositing
all the sand and silt taken from the bed of the
estuary on the low lands which were completely
covered with water, surrounding that belonging to
the Philippine Manufacturing Company, thereby
slowly and gradually forming the lots, the subject
matter of this proceeding.
Nobody had declared lot 39 for the purposes of
taxation, and it was only in the year 1926 that Dr.
Pedro Gil, in behalf of the claimants and appellees,
declared lot No. 40 for such purpose.
The claimants-appellees contend that inasmuch as
the said lots once formed a part of a large parcel of
land belonging to their predecessors, whom they
succeeded, and their immediate predecessor in
interest having taken possession thereof, said lots
belong to them.
ISSUE
To which does the ownership of the reclaimed land
belong to?
RULING
The Government owns the reclaimed land in the
sense that it has become property of public
dominion, because in letting it remained
submerged, the claimants-appellees may be said to
have abandoned the same. Having become part of
the sea or seashore, it became property for public
use. When the government took steps to make it
land again, its status as public dominion remained
unchanged. As provided by Article 5 of the Law of
Waters,
ART. 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in
consequence of works constructed by the State, or
by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with
proper permission, shall become the property of the
party constructing such works, unless otherwise
provided by the terms of the grant of authority.
Therefore, the claimants- appellees are not entitled
to the land.
_________________________________________
#23 CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY
FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of
Manila Bay were being reclaimed. A law was
passed creating the Public Estate Authority which
was granted with the power to transfer reclaimed
lands. Now in this case, PEA entered into a Joint
Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private
corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement
between AMARI and PEA, several hectares of
reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands
and several portions of submerged areas of Manila
Bay were going to be transferred to AMARI .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended
JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed
or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution
RULING: YES!
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended),
reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain Section 3 of
the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable
lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these
lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the
1987 Constitution and existing laws. Clearly, the
Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article
1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose “object or
purpose is contrary to law,” or whose “object is
outside the commerce of men,” are “inexistent and
void from the beginning.” The Court must perform
its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and
therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void
ab initio.
_________________________________________
#24 Heirs of Simplicio Santiago vs. Heirs of
Mariano E. Santiago
G.R. No. 151440, June 17, 2003
- free patents issued over private lands are not
valid
- difference between direct attack and collateral
attack on title
FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Santiago and Magdalena
Sanchez are the original owners of the parcel of
land in dispute (Lot No. 2344). Simplicio Santiago
purchased the land from his father, Pablo (one of
Spouses Santiago's sons) and brother, Guillermo.
After acquiring the same, he then applied for a free
patent over it on May 6, 1983, which free patent
was granted, thus, an Original Certificate of Title
was issued in his name.
On the other hand, Mariano Santiago contended
that Lot No. 2344 was subdivided into three
portions: Lot 2344-A, Lot 2344-B, and Lot 2344-C.
Simplicio and his heirs owned only Lot 2344-B, and
Lots 2344-A and 2344-C were fraudelently included
in the free patent and certificate of title issued to
Simplicio Santiago. Mariano testified that he and
his sister bought Lot 2344-A from Simplicio
Santiago for the price of Php 5,000.00, as
evidenced by a deed of sale dated Sept. 15, 1972.
Immediately after sale, they constructed a house on
the lot.
The trial court ruled in favor of Simplicio's heirs and
held that Mariano's claim over the controverted lot
lacks basis and that his defense consitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of a Torrens title.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N the free patent and the certificate of title
issued to Simplicio Santiago are valid
(2) W/N respondents' claim over Lots 2344-C and
2344-A is supported by the evidence
(3) Indefeasibility of Torrens Title
HELD:
First Issue: Validity of Free Patent
A free patent issued over a private land is null and
void, and produces no legal effects whatsoever.
Private ownership of land - as when there is a
prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered
possessory information or a clear showing of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession,
by present or previous occupants - is not affected
by the issuance of a free patent over the same
land, because the Public Land law applies only to
lands of the public domain. Consequently, a
certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead
patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued
in a judicial proceeding only if the land covered by it
is really a part of the disposable land of the public
domain.
It was established that Lot 2344 is a private
property of the Santiago clan since time
immemorial, and that they have declared the same
for taxation.
Also, considering the open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the
land by respondents and their predecessors in
interests, they are deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a government grant
without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued. Hence, the free patent covering Lot 2344, a
private land, and the certificate of title issued
pursuant thereto, are void.
Second Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence of Claim of
Ownership
Respondents' claim of ownership over Lot 2344-C
and Lot 2344-A is fully substantiated. Their open,
contnuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
Lot 2344-C in the concept of owners for more than
seventy years supports their contention that the lot
was inherited by Mariano from his grandmother
Marta. This was corroborated by respondents'
witnesses. It is worthy to note that although Lot
2344-C was within the property declared for
taxation purposes by the late Simplicio Santiago,
he did not disturb the possession of Marta and
Mariano.

Lot 2344-C was sold by Simplicio Santiago to

Mariano Santiago and Belen Sanchez. The
document of sale evidencing the transaction is duly
notarized and, as such, is considered a public
document and enjoys the presumption of validity as
to its authenticity and due execution. This legal
presumption was not overcome by petitioners.

Third Issue: Indefeasibility of Torrens Title

A certificate of title issued under an administrative

proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent
covering a disposable public land within the
contemplation of the Public Land Law or
Commonwealth Act No. 141 is as indefeasible as a
certificate of title issued under a judicial registration
proceeding. Under theh Land Registration Act, title
to the property covered by a Torrens certificate
becomes indefeasible after the expiration of one
year from the entry of the decree of registration.
The date of the issuance of the patent corresponds
to the date of the issuance of the decree.

The one-year prescriptive period, however, does

not apply when the person seeking annulment of
title or reconveyance is in possession of the lot.
This is because the action partakes of a suit to
quiet title which is imprescriptible.

Inasmuch as respondents are in possession of the

disputed portions of Lot 2344, their action to annul
the Original Certificate of Title, being in the nature
of an action to quiet title, is therefore not barred by
prescription.

Section 48 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration

Decree, provides that a certificate of title shall not
be subject to collateral attack and can not be
altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct
proceeding. The attack is direct when the object of
an action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or
enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the
attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to
obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment
or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident
thereof.

In the case at bar, the original action filed was

accion publiciana or recovery of possession, but
the Court may rule on the validity of the free patent
and the OCT because of the counterclaim filed by
respondents. A counterclaim can be considered a
direct attack on the title, not a collateral attack.