Page 1 of 19
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123137. October 17, 2001.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PO2 ALBERT
ABRIOL, MACARIO ASTELLERO, and JANUARIO DOS DOS, Accu sed-
Appellants.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J. :
On appeal is the decision dated May 17, 1995, of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 10, in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-30350 for
murder and CBU-33664 for illegal possession of firearms, finding
appellants Albert Abriol, Macario Astellero, and Januario Dosdos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1866 on Illegal Possession of Firearms. Its decretal portion
reads:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
In Criminal Case No. CBU-30350 for Murder, the Court finds accused
Albert Abriol, Macario Astellero and Januario Dosdos, GUILTY of murder
beyond reasonable doubt and each is hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify
the heirs of deceased Alejandro Flores the sum of P50,000.00; actual
damages of P30,000.00, representing a reasonable amount for the
embalming, vigil, wake, and burial expenses; P30,000.00 for attorney’s
fees; and to pay the costs.
For insufficiency of evidence, Accused Gaudioso Navales is hereby
ACQUITTED with costs de officio.
In Criminal Case No. CBU-33664 for Illegal Possession of
Firearms, Accused Albert Abriol, Macario Astellero and Januario Dosdos,
are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 14 years, 8
months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months and to pay the costs.
The .38 caliber revolver, SN P08445 and the two .45 caliber pistols with
SN PGO 13506 and SN 52469, are hereby confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the Government and accordingly, the Clerk of Court of this
Branch is directed to turn over the said firearms to the Chief of Police,
Cebu City, or to the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP
Region 7, upon proper receipt.
The Cebu City Chief of Police is directed to release immediately upon
receipt hereof, the person of Gaudioso Navales, unless there be any
other valid reason for his continued detention.
SO ORDERED. 1
This judgment was the culmination of proceedings beginning with the
Amended Information dated September 6, 1993, docketed as Criminal
Case No. CBU-30350, wherein appellants PO2 Albert Abriol of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), Macario Astellero, Januario Dosdos,
and PNP P/Chief Inspector Gaudioso Navales were charged with murder
allegedly committed as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That on or about the 5th day of June, 1993, at about 11:50 P.M., in the
City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, armed with handguns, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with
treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent, with intent
to kill, did then and there shot one Alejandro Flores alias Alex with the
said handguns, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon him the following physical injuries: chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO SHOCK AND HEMORRHAGE
SECONDARY TO MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS TO THE TRUNK AND THE
HEAD
as a consequence of which the said Alejandro Flores alias Alex died
later.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
At the time of the incident, appellant Abriol, a policeman previously
detailed as a jailguard at the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center
(BBRC) in Cebu City, was himself a detention prisoner in BBRC. He was
charged with murder, a non-bailable offense, in Criminal Case No. CBU-
28843 before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 14. 3
Appellant Astellero was a former prisoner at BBRC, who had served time
for grave threats. 4 The warden then, Chief Inspector Navales, 5
employed him as his personal driver and general factotum. 6 Navales
was found guilty of grave misconduct in Administrative Case No. 01-93
for allowing Abriol and Dosdos out of BBRC on the day of the murder
and was summarily dismissed from the police force.
Dosdos had been convicted by the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 10, of
highway robbery in Criminal Case No. CBU-18152 but Navales failed to
act on the mittimus ordering Dosdos’ transfer to the national
penitentiary, and he remained in BBRC. 7 Abriol and Dosdos enjoyed
special privileges at BBRC as the warden’s errand boys 8 or
"trustees."cralaw virtua1aw library
The victim, Alejandro Flores alias "Alex," was a former policeman. He
was dismissed from the PNP in August 1992 after testing positive for
prohibited drugs. 9

Abriol, Astellero, and Dosdos were also indicted for illegal possession of
firearms in Criminal Case No. CBU-33664. The charge sheet
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That on or about the 5th day of June 1993 at about 11:48 P.M. in the
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, did then and there
keep under their control and possession the following: chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
1. one (1) .38 cal. revolver (Armscor) with SN P08445 with six empty
shells;
2. one (1) .45 cal. pistol (Colt) with SN P6013506 with 9 live
ammunitions (sic);
3. one (1) .45 cal. Pistol (Colt) with SN 52469 with five live
ammunition.
without first obtaining a permit or license therefor from competent
authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 10
When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Since the indictments arose from the same incident, the cases were
jointly tried.
The facts of the case are as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
At around 11:50 P.M., June 5, 1993, Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., a radio news
reporter then aboard his jeep, had just reached the ABS-CBN compound
in P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, when he heard a couple of gunshots.
He looked around and saw a man running unsteadily towards the
intersection of P. del Rosario Street and Jones Avenue (Osmeña
Boulevard). The man was shouting "Tabang, tabang!" ("Help! Help!").
Sta. Cruz, Jr., saw a red "Jiffy" make a U-turn near the gate of the city
central school that nearly ran over the man shouting for help. The man
turned back and staggered towards the direction of Bacalso Avenue and
Urgello Private Road, but after a few meters on wobbly legs, he stopped
and collapsed.
Meanwhile, the "Jiffy" followed. It stopped beside the fallen figure and a
tall, thin man alighted. The man fired several shots at the prostrate
figure. He boarded the "Jiffy" which sped away towards Leon Kilat
Street. Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., moved his jeep and focused its headlights
on the victim.
In the meantime, PO3 Alexander Rustela was at a vulcanizing shop near
the intersection of Bacalso Avenue and Leon Kilat Street, when he heard
gunshots coming from the north. He ran towards where the gunshots
came and saw people scampering. All of a sudden, the "Jiffy" with three
Page 2 of 19
persons on board sped past him and made an abrupt left turn at Leon
Kilat Street. Rustela immediately radioed for assistance. Minutes later,
patrol car No. 201 with PO2 Herbert Ramos on board arrived. Rustela
boarded the car and they followed the "Jiffy," while broadcasting an
alarm to police headquarters and other mobile patrol cars.
On nearby Colon Street, SPO1 Eleazar Abrigana and PO2 Romeo
Abellana were cruising aboard patrol car No. 208, when they heard a
radio message that the suspects in the shooting incident were aboard a
"Jiffy." As they turned left at Leon Kilat Street, they saw the "Jiffy"
heading towards Carbon Market. They pursued the "Jiffy" which stopped
in front of the Don Bosco Building near BBRC, when police car No. 205,
with PO Eugenio Badrinas and PO2 Gerald Cue aboard, blocked the
"Jiffy’s" path. Cue fired a warning shot and three persons alighted. The
driver was appellant Astellero, whom Cue had recognized and seen
before at the BBRC. Abrigana and Cue approached the trio who stood a
meter away from the "Jiffy." SPO1 Abrigana frisked Abriol and seized
from his waist a .38 caliber revolver with serial number PO8485 with six
(6) empty shells in its cylinder. 11 Under Abriol’s seat, the police also
found a .45 caliber pistol bearing serial number PGO 13506 with nine
(9) live rounds in its magazine and another .45 caliber pistol with serial
number 52469 loaded with five (5) unfired bullets. 12
While the patrol cars were chasing the "Jiffy," another police team
proceeded to the crime scene in response to the alarm. This team from
Police Station No. 3 in San Nicolas, Cebu City rushed the victim to the
Cebu City Medical Center, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Meanwhile, PO3 Celso Seville, Jr., a homicide investigator of Police
Station No. 3 found four (4) .45 caliber shells some four (4) feet away
from the victim’s body, and two (2) deformed slugs where the victim
had lain, and submitted them to the Region 7 PNP Crime Laboratory for
ballistics testing. 13
Dr. Ladislao Diola, Jr., Chief of the PNP Region 7 Crime Laboratory
autopsied the victim’s body. He found that the cause of the victim’s
death was "cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage
secondary to multiple gunshot wounds to the trunk and head.’’ 14 Dr.
Diola recovered a .38 caliber slug from the corpse, which he later
submitted for ballistics examination.
SPO4 Lemuel Caser, ballistician of the PNP Crime Laboratory, reported
the following: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Fired cartridge cases marked "JA-1" to "JA-3" possesses similar
individual characteristics markings with the test cartridge cases fired
from cal .45 with SN: PGO13506;
2. Fired cartridge cases marked "JA-4" and "E-69-6" possesses similar
individual characteristics markings with the test cartridge cases fired
from cal .45 pistol with SN: 52469;
3. Fired bullet metal jacket marked "JA-5" possesses similar individual
characteristics markings with test bullets fired from cal .45 pistol with

SN: PGO13506;
4. Fired cartridge cases marked "E-45-1" to "E-45-6" possesses similar
individual characteristics markings with the test cartridge cases fired
from cal .38 Rev. SN: P8445;
5. Fired bullets marked as "JA-6" and "LD" possesses similar individual
characteristic markings with the test bullets fired from cal .38 Rev. SN:
P8445. 15
The following day, appellants underwent a paraffin test. The hands of
appellants were found positive for gunpowder residues. A chemistry test
on the firearms showed that the three handguns were also positive.
Inspector Myrna Areola, Chief of the Chemistry Section of the PNP
Region 7 Crime Laboratory, stated in her testimony that the firearms
had been fired, 16 and that appellants had fired the guns within a
period of seventy-two (72) hours prior to the examination.
The widow and relatives of the victim testified on the possible motive
behind the killing. They claimed the victim, a confessed drug user, may
have been "rubbed out" on the orders of Navales for failure to remit
P31,000 as proceeds from pushing prohibited drugs. After failing to
deliver the drug money to Navales, for whom he was repeatedly pushing
drugs, the victim went into hiding, but later returned to Cebu City
because he missed his family. 17
Appellants deny the accusations. Abriol averred that he and Dosdos
were among the several "trustees" at BBRC assigned to work in the
kitchen. Appellant Astellero, who was the warden’s driver, was also in
charge of marketing for the prisoners’ food. On the day of the incident,
Astellero realized that there was no money for the next day’s marketing
so he asked Abriol to accompany him to the house of Navales, but since
he was not in, they returned to BBRC and saw Navales an hour later.
After they received the money from Navales’ niece on their way back to
BBRC, Dosdos heard gunshots. Abriol ordered Astellero, who was
driving, to turn back. Then Abriol claimed he saw a tall, slim man alight
from a "Jiffy" and shoot at a prone figure on the ground. Seconds later,
the gunman returned to the "Jiffy," which sped off. Abriol said he
ordered Astellero to chase that "Jiffy" but it had too much of a
headstart and they lost sight of it. Abriol ordered Astellero to proceed
to BBRC. At Colon Street, they heard gunshots behind them and the
blaring siren of a police car. They explained that since they were
detention prisoners, they had to evade meeting the police. They heard
more gun shots. Upon reaching BBRC, the gates were closed, so they
drove to the old airport. On their way back to BBRC several police cars
blocked them and arrested them. SPO4 Eleazar Abrigana frisked him
and took the .38 service revolver from his waist. 18
Abriol also testified that he surrendered his service firearm to the BBRC
Administrative Officer when he was served a warrant of arrest for
murder in Criminal Case No. CBU-28843. However, the handgun was
defective and it was returned to him for repair by Armscor, and upon
repair he handed it over to the BBRC armory. The armorer returned it
Page 3 of 19
to him since there was no place to keep it. He said that although he
was a detention prisoner, he had yet to be discharged from the service.
He was assigned guard and escort duties by the warden. 19 Abriol said
that on the day of the incident he was, as a BBRC jailguard, authorized
to carry his service firearm. 20 He presented a Memorandum Receipt 21
authorizing him to carry the government-issued .38 revolver. 22
On the witness stand, Astellero and Dosdos narrated a similar version
of the incident as did Abriol. Both vehemently denied having any
knowledge of the two .45 caliber pistols found by PO3 Cue in the "Jiffy."
23
The defense also presented Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, medico-legal officer of
the Cebu City PNP Command, to testify on the caliber of the firearms
which might have caused the gunshot wounds of the victim. Relying on
the Necropsy Report prepared by Dr. Diola, Dr. Cerna declared that
wound nos. 1 and 2, which each measured 0.6 cm. by 0.6 cm., may
have been caused by a .38 caliber firearm. As to wound nos. 3 and 4,
which each measured 0.5 cm. by 0.5 cm., it was possible that a .38
handgun was used, or one with a smaller bore. Dr. Cerna opined that
a .45 pistol could not have inflicted all the foregoing wounds, as the
entry points were too small for a .45 caliber bullet. With respect to the
grazing wounds found on the victim’s body, Dr. Cerna testified that it
was impossible to determine the caliber of the firearm used. 24
The trial court found appellants’ version of the incident neither
convincing and credible and, as earlier stated, it believed the
prosecution’s version. Petitioners’ were convicted of the offenses
charged.
Hence, this appeal, with appellants assigning the following
errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
OF THE CRIMES OF MURDER AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
DESPITE THE FLIMSY AND UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
At issue is whether the prosecution’s evidence, which is mainly
circumstantial, suffices to convict appellants for murder and violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, beyond reasonable doubt.

A. Criminal Case No. CBU-30350
On their conviction for murder, appellants argue that the prosecution’s
circumstantial evidence against them is weak, ambiguous, and
inconclusive. Specifically, appellants contend that they should be
acquitted because: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First, eyewitness Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., did not personally identify them
as the culprits. At no point in his testimony did eyewitness Sta. Cruz,
Jr., positively identify any of the appellants or appellant Abriol as the
gunman. Sta. Cruz, Jr. only gave a general description of the
assailants, despite attempts to make him give a categorical
identification. He admitted he found out the name of Abriol from
television and news reports and could not identify Abriol as the one
whom he saw shot the victim. The transcript of his testimony is
revealing.
Q: Then after the Jiffy stopped in front of the fallen victim, what
happened next?
A: I saw that there was a man who disembarked from the Jiffy. He was
a tall, thin fellow who disembarked from the Jiffy and at the same time,
he shot the fallen victim.
Q: How many times did he shoot the victim?
A: I cannot count attorney but I saw him shooting the victim.
Q: In your affidavit, you said that the person who disembarked from the
Jiffy, whose name you know later on as PO2 Albert Abriol, PNP, shot the
victim in the different parts of his body. If Albert Abriol is now in the
courtroom, will you please point to him?
A: I will know him attorney because of the TV shows and newspapers.
COURT: (TO WITNESS)
Q: You are referring to the name of that man who disembarked from the
Jiffy and fired several shots at the fallen victim?
A: Yes, I know his name Your Honor on (sic) the news cast.
COURT: (TO WITNESS)
Q: Alright, forget the news. The man you saw when he alighted from
the Jiffy and poured (sic) several bullets on the fallen man, look around
if he is in the courtroom?
A: I cannot identify Your Honor.
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: You cannot?
Page 4 of 19
A: But [because] what I saw is a man who is tall and thin because it
was dark.
x x x
Q: How many persons fired a shot at the fallen man?
A: I only saw that man Your Honor who alighted from the Jiffy.
Q: Did you see his physical features?
A: Only (t)his, I can only tell his height, he was tall and his body build
is thin. Tall and thin. ( Emphasis supplied)25cralaw:red
Since the sole eyewitness could not identify the gunman and his
companions, the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence from
which the trial court could draw its findings and conclusion of
culpability. 26 Circumstantial evidence may be relied upon, as in this
case, when to insist on direct testimony would result in setting felons
free.
Second, appellants assert that the paraffin tests are judicially
recognized as unreliable and inconclusive. A paraffin test could
establish the presence or absence of nitrates on the hand. However, it
cannot establish that the source of the nitrates was the discharge of
firearms. Nitrates are also found in substances other than gunpowder. A
person who tests positive may have handled one or more substances
with the same positive reaction for nitrates such as explosives,
fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, tobacco, and leguminous plants.
Hence, the presence of nitrates should only be taken as an indication of
a possibility that a person has fired a gun. 27 However, it must be
borne in mind that appellants were not convicted on the sole basis of
the paraffin test.
Third, appellants claim that the autopsy report of prosecution witness
Dr. Ladislao Diola revealed serious ambiguities. 28 Dr. Jesus P. Cerna,
using the same autopsy report, said that the gunshot wounds measuring
0.6 x 0.6 centimeters could not have been caused by a .45 caliber pistol
because an entrance wound of that size was too small for a .45 caliber
bullet. 29 Dr. Cerna claimed that a wound inflicted by a .45 pistol would
have an entry point of anywhere from 1.1 to 1.3 centimeters. He
declared that it was with more reason that an entrance wound
measuring .5 x .5 centimeters could not be caused by a caliber .45
bullet. 30 Since no firearm smaller than a .38 caliber pistol was seized
from appellants, they claim the observation of Dr. Cerna only shows
that they could not have shot the victim.
We note, however, that during cross-examination, Dr. Diola carefully
explained that a firearm ’s caliber is not the only basis for determining
the cause of the gunshot wound. He said: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ATTY. REMOTIQUE:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: So, normally the size of .5 cm x .5 cm which is the point of entry of
gunshot wound No. 3 this may have been caused by a firearm of lesser
caliber than caliber .38?
A: Not necessarily. There is a very small difference in the size and this
does not preclude that gunshot wound No. 3 may have also been caused
by the same firearm which caused gunshot wounds Nos. 1 and 2. There
are factors which often affect the size of the wounds at the time of the
examination, perhaps a recission (sic) of the skin in the area where
gunshot Wound No. 3 was inflicted so that gunshot wound becomes
smaller.
Q: Did you not say that normally the point of entry of the gunshot
wounds vary with the caliber of the firearm which caused it, so that the
point of entry caused by one firearm of a particular caliber may be
bigger than the point of entry of a gunshot wound caused by another
firearm of lesser caliber?
A: I told you of other factors that often affect the size of the entry of
the bullet although the caliber is one basis of the size of the wounds.
x x x
Q: Will you explain further on that because my understanding is that .5
cm wound must perforce be caused by a firearm of lesser caliber than
that which caused the .6 cm wound?
A: As I said there are ranges in the size of the wounds. The variance in
the size of the wound when it is minimal does not exclude the
possibility that a wound with a .5 cm size and .6 cm size could have
been caused by the same caliber. ( Emphasis supplied). 31
The Office of the Solicitor General points out that Dr. Diola’s testimony
is supported by Dr. Pedro P. Solis, a medical expert, in his book entitled
Legal Medicine. The factors which could make the wound of entrance
bigger than the caliber include: (1) shooting in contact or near fire; (2)
deformity of the bullet which entered; (3) a bullet which might have
entered the skin sidewise; and (4) an acute angular approach of the
bullet. However, where the wound of entrance is smaller than the
firearm’s caliber, the same may be attributed to the fragmentation of
the bullet before entering the skin or to a contraction of the elastic
tissues of the skin (stress supplied). 32 Dr. Diola testified that a .45
caliber pistol could have caused the grazing wounds on the victim’s
head and extremities. 33 Dr. Cerna corroborated Dr. Diola’s findings in
this regard. 34 Such expert opinions disprove appellants’ theory that
the .45 caliber handguns confiscated from them could not have been
used in killing the victim.
Page 5 of 19
Fourth, appellants allege that the testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel
Caser, the prosecution’s ballistics expert, clearly shows that: (1) He is
ignorant about such ballistics instruments such as the micrometer,
goniometer, and pressure barrel. 35 (2) He is not conversant with "the
required references concerning ballistics," particularly books on the
subject by foreign authorities. 36 (3) He could not "scientifically
determine the caliber of a bullet." 37 Since P/Inspector Caser lacked
adequate training and expertise in ballistics, they claim that his opinion
that the test bullets and cartridges matched the slugs and cartridges
recovered from the scene of the crime was not reliable. Appellants also
assail Caser’s failure to take the necessary photographs to support his
findings.
An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling to
which the subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses
special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to express an
opinion." 38 There is no definite standard of determining the degree of
skill or knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an
expert. It is sufficient that the following factors be present: (1) training
and education; (2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the
case; and (3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which his
opinion is based. 39 The question of whether a witness is properly
qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistics rests with the discretion
of the trial court. 40
In giving credence to Caser’s expert testimony, the trial court
explained: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The defense downgraded the capability of Caser in forensics ballistics
and identifying firearms. Much stress is given to the absence of
photographs of his examination. Nonetheless, the Court is satisfied
(with) Caser’s examination, findings and conclusions with the use of a
microscope. Caser’s conclusion based on his examination deserves
credit. He found the impressions on the primer of the fired cartridges
that were test-fired to have the same characteristics with those
recovered at the scene of the crime. Whenever a triggerman pumps a
bullet (into) the body of his victim, he releases a chunk of concrete
evidence that binds him inseparably to his act. Every gun barrel deeply
imprints on every bullet its characteristic marking peculiar to that gun
and that gun alone. These marking might be microscopic but they are
terribly vocal in announcing their origin. And they are as infallible for
purposes of identification, as the print left by the human finger. 41
We agree with the trial court that P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a
ballistics expert. He is a licensed criminologist, trained at the Ballistics
Command and Laboratory Center in Fort Bonifacio, in the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame, and in the National Bureau of Investigation.
He had previously testified as an expert witness in at least twenty-
seven (27) murder and homicide cases all over the country. 42 An
expert witness need not present comparative microphotographs of test
bullets and cartridges to support his findings. 43 Examination under a
comparison microscope showing that the test bullet and the evidence
bullet both came from the same gun is sufficient. 44 Moreover, the

ballistician conclusively found similar characteristic markings in the
evidence, test cartridges and slugs.
Fifth, appellants aver that the prosecution failed to show any plausible
motive for appellants to kill the victim. The prosecution tried to prove
that their co-accused Navales instigated them to kill the victim because
Navales had a grudge against him. However, as Navales was acquitted,
appellants insist that Navales’ acquittal should redound to their benefit
since no motive was imputed on their part.
Motive is not an essential element of a crime, 45 particularly of murder.
46 It becomes relevant only where there is no positive evidence of an
accused’s direct participation in the commission of a crime. 47 Stated
otherwise, proof of motive becomes essential to a conviction only where
the evidence of an accused’s participation in an offense is
circumstantial. 48 A careful perusal of the State’s evidence reveals that
the prosecution had established sufficient motive why appellants killed
the victim, independent of any grudge which Navales may have had
against the latter. At the time of the incident, appellants Abriol and
Dosdos were both BBRC detention prisoners during Navales’ term as
warden. Abriol and Dosdos were treated as highly favored "trustees" of
Navales and were never locked up. Abriol and Dosdos were even
allowed to go out of BBRC to do the marketing for the prison’s kitchen.
Appellant Astellero, a former detention prisoner, was also a recipient of
Navales’ favors. Navales hired Astellero as his personal driver after the
latter served his sentence. Navales and the victim, a former BBRC
jailguard, were associates in dealing with prohibited drugs, until they
had a falling out allegedly after the victim failed to remit to Navales
proceeds from the sale of illegal drugs amounting to P31,000.
Appellants apparently killed the victim to return the "special favors"
Navales had showered them. Lack of a motive does not necessarily
preclude conviction. Persons have been killed or assaulted for no reason
at all, and friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to the
commission of a crime. 49
Sixth, in the present case, appellants contend that the PNP cannot be
presumed to have done their work since it committed errors and
blunders in transferring possession and custody of the physical
evidence. They allege there was a possibility that the evidence was
tainted, planted, or manufactured. Besides, appellants point out that
the presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence of the accused.
The record shows that the police officers did not issue acknowledgment
receipts in some instances. However, minor lapses do not mean that the
State had failed to show an unbroken chain of custody of the subject
firearms and ammunition, nor that said firearms and ammunition were
tampered. The slugs and spent shells recovered from the scene of the
crime and the victim’s corpse were plainly identified in open court by
the PNP investigators. The ballistician testified that the bullets and
cartridges recovered from the crime scene had been fired from the
subject handguns. Under these circumstances, we must respect the
presumption of the regularity in the performance of duties.
Page 6 of 19
Seventh, appellants insist that the prosecution failed to show that the
red "Jiffy" used by them and seized by the police officers was the same
vehicle used by the gunmen who killed Alejandro Flores. Appellants
point out that PO3 Rustela, who was aboard police car No. 201, testified
that they lost sight of the red "Jiffy" while chasing it along Leon Kilat
Street. Appellants argue that the "Jiffy" which was chased by patrol car
No. 208 until it was cornered near BBRC by the other pursuing patrol
cars was not the same vehicle originally sighted and tailed by patrol car
No. 201.
In rejecting this theory, the trial court stated that: chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
. . . PO3 Rustela who was nearby, immediately ran to the scene of the
crime and met the red jiffy with three persons on board, that speedily
passed by him proceeding towards Leon Kilat Street. Car 208 readily
picked up the trail and pursued the red jiffy from Leon Kilat, then
making abrupt turns on downtown streets until other patrol cars joined
the chase and captured them in Lahug, near the BBRC. The identity of
the red jiffy was never interrupted. Members of the Mobile Patrol Cars
identified in court without batting an eyelash, the red jiffy which was
the object of the shooting alarm. There was no interruption, no let-up
in the chase, right after Alejandro Flores was shot and there was no
other red jiffy that the crews of the (pursuing) patrol cars noticed.
The Court rejects their claim of innocence, for their very acts belied the
same.
Astellero could have stopped the jeep upon noticing that patrol cars
were already running after them with sirens, blinkers and warning shots
fired. From Leon Kilat Street to Lahug airport, there were several police
stations that they could have sought shelter and police assistance. Guilt
has many ways of surfacing. Instead of stopping, Abriol ordered
Astellero to accelerate their speed. Their obvious purpose was to elude
the patrol cars. Flight is indicative of guilt. 50
But, in this case, is the totality of the circumstantial evidence relied
upon by the trial court sufficient to support a conviction?
Circumstantial evidence is that which indirectly proves a fact in issue.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the theory that the accused is guilty of the offense charged, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with
every other possible, rational hypothesis, except that of guilt. 51 An
accused can be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence where
all the circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of
all others, as the culprit. 52
In our assessment, the prosecution’s evidence constitutes an unbroken
chain of events leading to the inevitable conclusion of guilt on the part

of appellants. First, the fatal shooting of Alejandro Flores occurred at
around 11:50 P.M. of June 5, 1993 in front of the ABS-CBN compound in
Cebu City. The gunman, who was tall and thin, alighted from a red
"Jiffy," pumped several bullets into the prone victim, and got back
aboard the "Jiffy" which then sped towards Leon Kilat Street. Second,
eyewitness Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr.’s description of the gunman as "tall
and thin" perfectly matches the physique of appellant Abriol. Third, PO3
Alexander Rustela, who was close to the crime scene, heard the
gunshots and ran towards the place where the sound of gunshots
emanated. A red "Jiffy" with three persons aboard whizzed by him and
abruptly turned at Leon Kilat Street. After Sta. Cruz, Jr. informed him
that the gunmen were aboard a red "Jiffy," Rustela boarded patrol car
No. 201, radioed an alarm, and commenced a pursuit of the fleeing
vehicle. Police car no. 208 received the alarm, and on turning into Leon
Kilat Street, encountered the speeding red "Jiffy." They immediately
chased the "Jiffy" but failed to catch it. Police cars Nos. 208 and 205
cornered the vehicle in front of the Don Bosco building near BBRC. PO2
Gerald Cue, on patrol car no. 205 fired a warning shot at the vehicle
and directed all those aboard to disembark. Three men got out, with
their hands raised. SPO1 Abrigana, on patrol car no. 208 and PO2 Cue
approached the trio. Abrigana frisked the man who was seated in the
front passenger seat, who turned out to be appellant Abriol, and
recovered from his waist a .38 caliber revolver with six empty shells.
Cue searched the red "Jiffy" and found two loaded .45 caliber pistols
under the front seat where Abriol had sat. Other police officers
immediately went to the crime scene where they found the victim barely
alive. PO3 Seville retrieved four .45 caliber slugs and two deformed
slugs at the spot where the victim was shot. The autopsy of the victim’s
remains showed that he died of cardio respiratory arrest due to shock
and hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wounds. A deformed metal jacket
of a .38 caliber slug was recovered from the corpse. Ballistics tests
showed that the bullets and cartridges had identical individual
characteristics with those of the test bullets and cartridges. Paraffin
tests conducted on each of the appellants, one day after the incident,
revealed that all were positive for gunpowder residues. The subject
firearms were also chemically examined and found positive for
gunpowder residue. Before the shooting incident, appellants were seen
at Navales’ house until around 7:30 P.M., when they left aboard
Navales’ red "Jiffy" with Astellero driving, Abriol in the front passenger
seat, and Dosdos in the back seat. 53 Appellants’ seating arrangements
were exactly the same, several hours later, after they were pursued and
cornered by police cars near BBRC. Appellants admitted that they
dropped by the Navales residence at around 7:00 P.M. and 11:00 P.M.
These unbroken chain of events prove not only appellants’ identities but
also their participation and collective responsibility in the murder of
Alejandro Flores. They reveal a unity of purpose and concerted action
evidencing their conspiracy to kill him. Against this matrix of facts and
circumstances, appellants’ bare denials cannot stand. Their story of
chasing a red "Jiffy" is merely a disingenuous diversion of no
evidentiary value for the defense.
Finally, the information for murder alleged treachery and evident
Page 7 of 19
premeditation. We note, though, that the trial court did not state which
circumstance qualified the killing into murder.
A review of the record would reveal that there was no evident
premeditation. There is evident premeditation when the following are
shown: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime;
(b) an act or acts manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to
his determination; and (c) a lapse of time between the determination to
commit the crime and the execution thereof sufficient to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. 54 Evident premeditation
indicates deliberate planning and preparation. Nowhere in the record is
it shown when and how appellants planned and prepared to kill the
victim.
Concerning treachery, however, it was shown that: (1) the means of
execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted. 55 These twin requisites were adequately proved.
Appellants had superiority in numbers and weapons. The victim was
without any means to defend himself as no weapon was found or even
intimated to be in his possession. The victim was running away from the
"Jiffy" prior to the killing. That he was warned or threatened earlier is
of no moment. Even when the victim is warned of danger to his person,
if the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself or to retaliate, treachery can still be appreciated. 56 The
victim was lying prostrate on the ground when he was deliberately and
mercilessly riddled with bullets. The weapons used, the number of
assailants, the swift and planned manner of the attack, and the multiple
number of wounds inflicted upon the victim all demonstrate a
determined assault with intent to kill the victim. No doubt there was
treachery.
B. Criminal Case No. CBU-33664
On their conviction for illegal possession of firearms, appellants contend
that the handguns and ammunition allegedly taken from them by the
police officers were illegally seized. They assert that the police had no
warrant to effect a search and seizure, such that these illegally seized
firearms were inadmissible as evidence, and it was error for the trial
court to admit them.
There are eight (8) instances where a warrantless search and seizure is
valid. They are: (1) consented searches; 57 (2) as an incident to a
lawful arrest; 58 (3) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of
immigration, customs, and drug laws; 59 (4) searches of moving
vehicles; 60 (5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive
borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;" 61 (7)
searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and
building regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations. 62
In this case, the warrantless search and seizure of the subject
handguns and ammunition is valid for two reasons. It was a search

incidental to a lawful arrest. It was made after a fatal shooting, and
pursuit of a fast-moving vehicle seeking to elude pursuing police
officers, and a more than reasonable belief on the part of the police
officers that the fleeing suspects aboard said vehicle had just engaged
in criminal activity. The urgent need of the police to take immediate
action in the light of the foregoing exigencies clearly satisfies the
requirements for warrantless arrests under the Rules of Court. 63
Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with firearms and
ammunition which they were not authorized to carry, appellants were
actually violating P.D. No. 1866, another ground for valid arrest under
the Rules. 64
Appellants further contend that the trial court erred in convicting
appellants Astellero and Dosdos of illegal possession of firearms. They
point out that the .38 caliber revolver was recovered from appellant
Abriol, who as a policeman was authorized to carry and possess said
firearm, as evidenced by his Memorandum Receipt (MR), which had "not
been recalled, cancelled or revoked until the time of the trial of these
cases." Appellants claim that the two .45 caliber pistols could have
been left in the vehicle by PNP personnel assigned at BBRC, considering
that the red "Jiffy" was generally used as a service vehicle by BBRC
personnel. They also argue that the prosecution failed to prove
appellants’ ownership, control, and possession of the .45 caliber pistols,
considering that appellants were six meters away from the "Jiffy" when
said handguns were allegedly found.
To sustain a conviction for violation of P.D. No. 1866, the prosecution
must prove two elements of the offense: (1) the existence of the
subject firearm; (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed
the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess it. 65 These the prosecution did. It presented a .38 caliber
revolver with serial number PO8445, a .45 caliber pistol with serial
number PGO 13506 Para Ordinance, and a .45 caliber pistol with serial
number 52469. The .38 caliber handgun was recovered from appellant
Abriol, while the two .45 caliber automatics were found and seized from
under the front passenger seat of appellants’ vehicle. SPO4 Aquilles
Famoso of the Cebu City PNP Metropolitan District Command’s Firearms
and Explosive Unit testified that appellants were not listed as licensed
firearm owners in Cebu City. 66 The prosecution also presented a
certification from P/Senior Inspector Edwin Roque of the Firearms and
Explosives Division of PNP Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City
that appellant Abriol is not licensed to hold any firearm; that the .45
caliber pistols were unlicensed; and that a certification from the PNP
Firearms and Explosives Office attesting that a person is not a licensee
of any firearm, proves beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
illegal possession of firearm. 67
Abriol insists that he had a valid MR authorizing him to carry the .38
revolver. We agree with the observation of the trial court
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The claim of Abriol that .38 caliber was issued to him, as evidenced by
the corresponding receipt (MR), is of no moment. While an MR is an
Page 8 of 19
authority of Abriol to possess the government firearm that was issued
to him, when he was charged and detained at BBRC for an earlier case
of murder, other than the case at bar, he was already then at that
moment a detained prisoner and therefore, (un)authorized to carry a
firearm. A military man or a member of the PNP who commits a crime,
is immediately disarmed upon his arrest and stripped of all the rights
and privileges that go with the function of his office, and this includes,
in the case of Abriol, his MR. Thus, when he shot Alejandro Flores with
his .38 caliber revolver, this firearm was already unauthorized and its
use and possession illegal. 68
Even if Abriol’s MR was valid, said authorization was limited only to
the .38 caliber revolver and not the two .45 caliber automatic pistols
found under the front passenger seat of the "Jiffy." Appellants were still
in the unlawful possession of the .45 caliber pistols. Under P.D. No.
1866, possession is not limited to actual possession. 69 In this case,
appellants had control over the pistols. They were all liable since
conspiracy was established and the act of one is the act of all. 70
Appellants claim that they were six meters away from the "Jiffy" when
it was searched and the two .45 caliber pistols were seized. They
suggest that the policemen who searched the vehicle could have planted
said firearms. The trial court found that they were in fact only one
meter away from the vehicle. Findings of fact of the trial court, when
supported by the evidence on record, are binding and conclusive upon
appellate courts. 71
All told, on the charge of illegal possession of firearms, no reversible
error was committed by the trial court when it found appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Office of the Solicitor General recommends that although appellants
were charged with and convicted of two separate offenses of murder
and violation of P.D. No. 1866, R.A. No. 8294, which amended said
decree, should be applied to appellants retroactively, citing People v.
Molina, 292 SCRA 742, 779 (1998) interpreting R.A. No. 8294.
We agree. We ruled in Molina that with the passage of R.A. No. 8294 on
June 6, 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is
not a separate crime, but merely a special aggravating circumstance.
This was recently reiterated in People v. Castillo, G.R. Nos. 131592-93,
February 15, 2000. 72 Appellants are thus guilty only of murder with
the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. The
imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua cannot however be
modified since the murder took place before the effectivity of R.A. No.
7659.
A final word on the damages. In addition to the award of P50,000 as
indemnity ex delicto, the trial court awarded P30,000 in actual
damages, "representing a reasonable amount for the embalming, vigil,
wake and burial expenses," and P30,000 as attorney’s fees. To be
entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount
of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent

proof, and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. 73 No
such evidence was offered. The award of actual damages must,
therefore, be deleted. However, temperate damages may be awarded
since the family of the victim has demonstrably spent for the wake,
funeral and burial arrangements. The amount of P20,000 should suffice
as temperate damages. In addition, we find an award of exemplary
damages in order, pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 74 The
killing was attended by the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearms. Moreover, the public good demands that detained
prisoners should not abuse their status as "trustees." Had the police
been unsuccessful in their pursuit of appellants, the latter would have
used the BBRC as shelter and as an alibi that they could not have
committed the crime since they were then in detention. Thus, we find
an award of P10,000 as exemplary damages in order. Accordingly, the
award of attorney’s fees is sustained. 75
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 10, in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-30350 and CBU-33664 is
hereby MODIFIED. Appellants Albert Abriol, Macario Astellero, and
Januario Dosdos are hereby found GUILTY of murder, qualified by
treachery, with the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearms and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided for by law.
Appellants Abriol, Astellero, and Dosdos are also ordered to pay, jointly
and severally, the heirs of Alejandro Flores the sum of P50,000 as
death indemnity, P20,000 as temperate damages, P10,000 as exemplary
damages, and P30,000 as attorney’s fees, as well as the
costs.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 158015 : August 11, 2004]
LAURA and ERIBERTO BAUTISTA, Petitioner , v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and FERNANDO MORELOS, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On appeal by Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure is a Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 45549, 1 reversing and setting aside the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch VII in Civil Case No. 83-
17900 2 and entering a new one declaring the April 5, 1982 Deed of
Absolute Sale between the late Cesar Morelos and Laura Bautista null
and void.
Page 9 of 19
The dispute involves a parcel of land situated along Maceda (formerly
Washington) Street, Sampaloc, Manila, containing an area of
approximately 105 square meters. This parcel of land was previously
owned and registered in the name of the late Cesar Morelos under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27604. Cesar is the uncle of petitioner
Laura Morelos Bautista, being the brother of her mother, Rosario
Morelos. 3
Cesar, who was married to Rosario Duran, did not have any children.
Rosario died in 1972. Cesar died of cardiac arrest on April 15, 1982.
During his lifetime, Cesar sold and conveyed the above-mentioned
parcel of land in favor of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista, as
evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale" notarized by Luis M. de
Guzman. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 254843 was
issued in the name of petitioner Laura Bautista. 4
Respondent Fernando Morelos, claiming to be the illegitimate child of
Cesar Morelos with Angelina Lim-Gue, instituted a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of sale and title with damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. 83-17900, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
VII. At the trial, he presented testimonies of expert witnesses who
claimed that the signature of Cesar Morelos on the Deed of Absolute
Sale and the fingerprint appearing on his Residence Certificate were not
his. 5
Petitioners countered that the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid. The
witness to the Deed, Carmelita Marcelino, testified that she saw Cesar
Morelos and petitioner Laura Bautista sign the same. 6
After hearing, the court a quo rendered judgment declaring the Deed of
Sale dated April 5, 1982 executed between the late Cesar Morelos in
favor of Laura Bautista valid, and dismissed for insufficient evidence
the claims and counterclaims for damages of the parties. 7
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set
aside the judgment of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another one is entered
declaring AS NULL AND VOID the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 5,
1982, executed between the late Cesar G. Morelos and defendant-
appellee Laura R. Bautista. The Register of Deeds of Manila is
DIRECTED to cause the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
154043 in the name of defendant-appellee LAURA R. BAUTISTA and to
issue another one in the name of the ESTATE OF CESAR G. MORELOS.
Defendants-appellees are also directed to surrender possession of the
disputed property to plaintiff-appellant.

SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following
issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TESTIMONIES OF EXPERT WITNESSES ARE
CONCLUSIVE TO BE A STRONG BASIS TO NULLIFY A DULY EXECUTED
AND NOTARIZED DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE (ANNEX "3") IS VALID.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS THE LEGAL PERSONALITY
TO SEEK THE ANNULMENT OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE. 9
Petitioner asserts the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale and invoke
the testimony of Carmelita Marcelino, the instrumental witness to the
signing of the document, who confirmed that it was the decedent Cesar
Morelos who affixed his signature to the document.
On the other hand, respondent contends that the decedent's signature
on the Deed was forged. He presented the testimony of Francisco Cruz,
Jr., Chief Examiner of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, that the
signature of decedent on the questioned instrument, when compared to
other documents bearing the authentic signature of Cesar Morelos, did
not match and appeared to have been authored by a different person.
Cruz, Jr. declared that the latest document bearing the genuine
signature of the decedent is dated March 31, 1982, while the alleged
forged signature was made on April 5, 1982, or a mere lapse of five
days. According to him, it is not possible to have significant variation
between the two signatures, considering the proximity of time when the
signatures where affixed. 1 0
Another witness, Major Braulio Monge, Chief of the Fingerprint Division
of the PC-INP, testified that the thumbmark of Cesar Morelos appearing
on the residence certificate indicated in the Deed of Absolute Sale,
when compared to those affixed on previous residence certificates
issued to the decedent, did not match and appears to be the thumbmark
of another person.
Page 10 of 19
Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of
handwriting may be proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness
who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has
seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon
which the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a comparison,
made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party, against whom the evidence is offered, or proved
to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
It is well-settled that a duly notarized contract enjoys the prima
facie presumption of authenticity and due execution as well as the full
faith and credence attached to a public instrument. 1 1 To overturn this
legal presumption, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than
merely preponderant to establish that there was forgery that gave rise
to a spurious contract.
As a general rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by
clear, positive and convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the
party alleging forgery. In Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals , 1 2 we held that due to the technicality of the procedure
involved in the examination of the forged documents, the expertise of
questioned document examiners is usually helpful; however, resort to
questioned document examiners is not mandatory and while probably
useful, they are not indispensable in examining or comparing
handwriting.
Hence, a finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony
of handwriting experts. Although such testimony may be useful, the
judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity
of the signatures under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the mere testimony
of the handwriting expert. 1 3
The authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the
same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or
topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly
technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on the
genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling
upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly
technical issue. 1 4
In the case at bar, the presumption of validity and regularity prevails
over allegations of forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence
consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically present at
the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof,
the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial
evidence at best. Carmelita Marcelino, the witness to the Deed of
Absolute Sale, confirmed the genuineness, authenticity and due
execution thereof. 1 5 Having been physically present to see the decedent
Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura Bautista affix their signatures on the
document, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of petitioners.
 Page 11 of 19

Witness Francisco Cruz, Jr. failed to establish the fact that the prove fraud, mistake or undue influence indicative of vitiated consent
signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was not that of Cesar Morelos. was presented other than the respondent's self-serving allegations.
He merely concluded that the document was a forgery without citing
any factual basis for arriving at that conclusion. Cruz did not point out
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED. The
distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45549 is REVERSED
genuine and false specimens of writing, which would ordinarily escape
and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
detection by an ordinary lay person. 1 6
Branch VII in Civil Case No. 83-17900, declaring the Deed of Absolute
Sale between petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista and Cesar Morelos over
When the trial court and the appellate court arrived at divergent factual the subject parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
assessments in their respective decisions and the bases therefor refer 2760 as valid is REINSTATED. No costs.
to documents made available to the scrutiny of both courts, the well-
settled rule that factual findings of trial courts deserve respect and
SO ORDERED.
even finality will not apply. 1 7 In the case at bar, the varying factual
assessments pertained to the authenticity of the signature of the late
Cesar Morelos on the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the
105-square meter property in favor of his niece, Laura Bautista.
SECOND DIVISION
In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the
United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America , 1 8 we held [G.R. Nos. 134074-75. January 16, 2001.]
that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined
solely upon its general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EMILIANO
the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, DURANAN, a.k.a. "Kalbo," Accused-Appellant .
pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, that
may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one D E C I S I O N
are not decisive on the question of the former's authenticity. The result
of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid
of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There MENDOZA, J. :
are other factors that must be taken into consideration, such as the
position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper
where the questioned signature is written, his state of mind, feelings This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
and nerves, and the kind of pen and paper used. These play an 220, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Emiliano Duranan, a.k.a.
important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, "Kalbo," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and
therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the character count of rape and to indemnify private complainant Nympha Lozada y
of a questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to de Lara in the amount of P50,000.00. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between a questioned
handwriting and an authentic one. The information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-55711 alleged —

Besides, a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear That on or about the 8th of March 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines,
unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor the said accused with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation,
presumption of regularity. 1 9 The authenticity and due execution of the to wit, by then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously taking
Deed of Absolute Sale must therefore be upheld. advantage of undersigned complainant, Maria Nympha Lozada y de
Lara’s feeblemindedness and thereafter have carnal knowledge with
(sic) the undersigned complainant against her will and without her
As to the alleged insufficient consideration of the sale of the property,
consent.
the mere inadequacy of the price does not affect its validity when both
parties are in a position to form an independent judgment concerning
Contrary to law. 2
the transaction, 2 0 unless fraud, mistake or undue influence indicative of
a defect in consent is present. 2 1 A contract may consequently be
The information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-55712 averred —
annulled on the ground of vitiated consent and not due to the
inadequacy of the price. In the case at bar, however, no evidence to
That on or about the 7th of March 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the

said accused with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation,
to wit, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously taking
(sic) advantage of the undersigned (sic) feeblemindedness, and
thereafter have carnal knowledge with (sic) the undersigned
complainant against her will and without her consent.
Contrary to law. 3
Upon arraignment, Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to each charge
of rape against him, whereupon he was tried.
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, complainant
Nympha Lozada y de Lara, complainant’s mother Virginia de Lara
Lozada, and the attending medico-legal officer at Camp Crame, Dr.
Rosalina O. Cosidon.
Complainant Nympha Lozada, who was 25 years old at the time of the
incidents in question, is considered to be retarded and finished up to
the sixth grade only. She is unemployed and simply does household
chores for her family. Accused-appellant lived with the complainant’s
family in the same apartment in K-6 No. 28 Kamuning St., Quezon City
where he rented a room that he shared with several other people.
The first rape took place in the afternoon of March 7, 1994. 4 Nympha
was standing by the door of her grandfather’s house when accused-
appellant suddenly placed his arm on her neck and dragged her inside
the common bathroom. 5 Complainant said that accused-appellant
kissed her and then removed her shorts and underwear as he held her
hands with his other hand. She did not cry for help because accused-
appellant threatened her that he would get angry if she did. 6 She
claimed that accused-appellant was able to rape her while standing up
despite her resistance. 7 After the incident, complainant was sent out of
the bathroom and went directly home. 8
The second incident occurred in the early morning of March 8, 1994, 9
according to complainant. She said she was cleaning the premises of
her family residence when accused-appellant pulled her from her house
and took her to his room. According to complainant, Accused-appellant
asked his brother, who was then cooking, to leave the room. As soon as
his brother had left, Accused-appellant laid her on the floor and raped
her. 10 Complainant said she was forced to submit to accused-
appellant’s lust because of his threats. 11 After the incident, Accused-
appellant sent her letters professing love for her and telling her how
beautiful she was. Complainant said she tore up the letters after
reading them. 12
In another incident, on March 12, 1994, Accused-appellant asked
complainant to let him use their bathroom. However, after being given
permission, he grabbed complainant by the hand, pulled her inside the
bathroom, and started kissing her on the lips and neck after closing the
door behind them. He only stopped molesting her when he heard
somebody coming. 13
Page 12 of 19
Virginia Lozada testified that she saw her daughter leave the bathroom,
quickly followed by Accused-Appellant . Virginia noticed that her
daughter’s lower lip was bruised. When she confronted her daughter
about it, the latter revealed for the first time what had happened to
her. Virginia went to Camp Karingal, together with complainant and her
other children, Teresa and Fernando, where they filed affidavits and two
informations. They then took complainant to Camp Crame for
examination. 14 Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon, who examined complainant,
submitted a report which contained the following findings: chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
GENERAL AND EXTRA GENITAL: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts
are hemispherical with pale brown areola and nipples from which no
secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft. There is
injury noted at the head;
Contusion, mucosa of the lower lip, measuring 1.2 x 0.3 cm, and 1 cm
left of the anterior midline.
GENITAL
There is an abundant growth of pubic hair. Labia minora are full, convex
and gaping with the pinkish brown and congested labia minor
presenting in between. On separating, the same is disclosed an abraded
posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type hymen with shallow
healing laceration at 5 o’clock position. External vaginal orifice offers
strong resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger and
the virgin-sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with
prominent rugosities.
CONCLUSION
Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency.
Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity.
Barring unforeseen complications, it is estimated that the above injury
will resolve in 7 to 9 days
REMARKS
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-negative
diplococci and for spermatozoa. 15
Dr. Cosidon explained that the term "congested" used in reference to
the labia minora meant that there was some inflammation that could
have been caused by friction due to intercourse. 16 Taken together with
the presence of a shallow hymenal laceration, this finding indicates the
possibility of intercourse that caused complainant’s loss of virginity
within the last five days. 17

Accused-appellant filed a demurrer to the evidence, but the trial court
denied it in its November 17, 1995 order. 18 The defense thereafter
presented its witnesses, namely, Accused-appellant Emiliano
Duranan, Accused-appellant’s alleged roommates, Rico Bariquit and
Carlito Catubig, and his wife Carlita Duranan.
With respect to the first incident of rape, which allegedly took place in
the afternoon of March 7, 1994, it is contended that accused-appellant
could not have committed such, because his daily schedule was such
that he was not at home at that time. He said that because of his work,
he used to leave the house at 3 a.m., arri ve home at 1 p.m., and leave
for work again at 3 p.m. and arri ve home at 6:30 p.m. 19 He also
alleged that on March 7, 1994 he left and was with Rico Bariquit
throughout the day. 20 As to the second incident of rape, Accused-
appellant contends that it was impossible for him to commit rape in his
room because there were at least six other people there at the time
(i.e., morning of March 8, 1994) of the alleged rape. 21 He charged
that the complaints were filed against him because complainant’s family
wanted to evict him and his housemates from their house. 22
Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig confirmed accused-appellant’s
schedule. 23 Bariquit claimed that he was always with accused-
appellant and knew where he was all the time. Both witnesses said rape
could not have been committed in a room where at least five other
people were sleeping. 24
Virginia Lozada and complainant denied seeing Rico Bariquit and Carlito
Catubig before the two testified in court.25 cralaw:red
Based on the evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision
on April 22, 1998, finding the accused-appellant guilty of two counts of
rape. The dispositive portion of its decision reads: 26
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for two (2) counts of rape
punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of R. A. 7659, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) counts of reclusion perpetua with all its
accessory penalties and to indemnify the private complainant the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Hence this appeal.
Accused-appellant assigns two errors as having been allegedly
committed by the trial court: chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE
OFFENDED PARTY IS "DEPRIVED OF REASON" DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
TESTIMONY BY A COMPETENT MEDICAL EXPERT TO THAT EFFECT AND
DESPITE STRONG EVIDENCE ON THE RECORD TO THE CONTRARY.
Page 13 of 19
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ALTERNATIVELY HOLDING
THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF RAPING THE PRIVATE OFFENDED
WOMAN THROUGH "FORCE AND INTIMIDATION" .
First. Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape
since the victim’s mental age was not proven. He argues that under Art.
335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, an essential element for the
prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of
the complainant’s mental age to determine if her mental age is under
twelve. 27 He further claims that only in cases where the retardation is
apparent due to the presence of physical deformities symptomatic of
mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived.
The contention has no merit.
Rule 130, §50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. — The opinion of a witness for which
proper basis is given may be received in evidence regarding —
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted.
Discussing this provision of the Rules on Evidence, Sen. Vicente J.
Francisco writes in his treatise: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a
psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition of the
party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her
attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.
x x x
It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the
sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had
sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and
conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is required that the
witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion
before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court of Vermont
said "A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or
insanity of another, when based upon conversations or dealings which
he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact
bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness’ own knowledge and
observation, he having first testified to such conversations, dealings,
appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion. 28

In the case at bar, Virginia Lozada testified on the mental condition of
her daughter, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: How would you described your daughter? (sic)
A: When she was still a child while walking she accidentally bumped her
head and then on she acted quite not normal from then on we noticed
changes because she acted like a child.
Q: How old is (sic) Nympha Lozada when this happened?
A: 3 to 4 years old.
Q: At the age of 25, how would you described? (sic)
A: She still thinks like a child but from her narration or statement we
can see that her declaration are (sic) true or believable.
Q: You mean to say that she could be intelligent.
A: Yes, ma’am. She finished her elementary and I can say she is quite
intelligent.
Q: So she can somewhat understand what is happening around us?
A: Yes, she can understand things around as along as she would be
provided some basis and some reference inorder (sic) to establish time,
places and incident (sic).
Q: At your house do you still assigned (sic) household chores(?)
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Could she relied (sic) upon madam witness?
A: Yes ma’am. 29
To rebut this, Accused-appellant points to the mother’s statement that
complainant is "quite intelligent." The statement that complainant is
"quite intelligent" must be read in the context of Virginia Lozada’s
previous statement that complainant "thinks like a child but from her
narration or statement we can see that her declaration are (sic) true or
believable." Thus, what complainant’s mother meant was that
complainant, although she thought like a child, nevertheless could tell
others what happened to her. Indeed, even the trial court admonished
the defense counsel not to use inculpatory questions because
complainant might give inculpatory answers. 30 At another stage of the
trial, the trial court reminded counsel, "The witness [complainant] is
not very intelligent. I think the witness cannot even distinguish dates."
31
Thus, the trial court itself found in dealing with complainant that she
was mentally deficient. The rule that findings of fact of the trial court
Page 14 of 19
should not be disturbed since the trial court is in the best position to
determine the findings of fact 32 cannot be more apt than in this
case.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Accused-appellant cites the medico-legal report which describes
complainant as "coherent" and contends that this is an evaluation of the
mental state of complainant. This contention is totally without basis.
The medico-legal report categorically states that the purpose of the
medical examination is limited to determining whether the complainant
had been sexually abused. 33 In other words, the purpose of the
examination was to determine her physical, not her mental, state.
Second. On the alternative, Accused-appellant argues that indeed,
complainant could not be a competent witness if she is a retardate.
Under Rule 130, §20, any person who can perceive and make known
his/her perception is qualified to be a witness. In this case, although
complainant is a retardate, she was nevertheless able to tell the court
what accused-appellant had done to her and to answer the questions of
both the prosecutor and the defense counsel. This is clear from her
testimony, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: Now, you said that you were raped by Emiliano Duranan. Where did
this happen?
A: In the bathroom of my Tiya Ineng.
Q: Where is this bathroom of your Tiya Ineng?
A: This bathroom is located at an alley, a "pasillo" towards our house.
Q: Where is your house, Miss Witness?
A: Our house is located at No. 28, K-6, Kamuning, Quezon City.
Q: You said that you were raped inside the bathroom of your Tiya
Ineng. How were you able to get inside that bathroom of your Tiya
Ineng?
A: I was able to get inside the bathroom of Tiya Ineng because Emiliano
Duranan pulled me inside.
Q: How did Emiliano Duranan pulled you? (sic)
A: He pulled me inside the bathroom by holding his arm against my
neck, pulling me towards the bathroom.
x x x
Q: When Emiliano Duranan pulled you inside the bathroom, what
happened after that?
 Page 15 of 19

A: He kissed me.
A: Yes, Ma’am.
(Witness is gesturing his (sic) hands towards her neck) And he had my
panty removed. Q: When was the second time?

Q: Now, you said that when you were inside the bathroom of your Tiya A: The second time at their house that was Tuesday.
Ineng, Emiliano Duranan kissed you in (sic) your lips?
Q: Is that the next day? After the incident in the bathroom?
A: Yes, ma’am.
A: Yes, Ma’am.
Q: Aside from kissing you, what did Emiliano do, if any?
x x x
A: Aside from kissing me on my lips and my neck, he removed my
underwear, my panty and he inserted his sex organ into my sex organ.
Q: So you said that you were laid down by Kalbo on the floor and then
Q: When "Kalbo" inserted his sex organ in your sex organ, what Kalbo kissed you, where did Kalbo kiss you?
position were you then?
A: From (sic) my lips.
A: We were standing.
Q: After that what did Kalbo do if any?
Q: Inside the bathroom?
A: Proceeded to removed (sic) my panty and inserted his organ to mine.
A: Yes, ma’am. 35
Q: Nympha, do you know how to tell the days of the week? At all events, any objection to the competency of complainant to testify
should have been raised by the defense at the outset. It cannot be
A: No, ma’am. raised for the first time in this appeal. It has been held: chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Q: How about the dates?
A party may waive his objections to the competency of a witness and
A: No, ma’am. permit him to testify . . . . [I]f, after such incompetency appears, there
is failure to make timely objection, by a party having knowledge of the
Q: Do you know what day is today? incompetency, the objection will be deemed waived, whether it is on the
ground of want of mental capacity or for some other reason. If the
A: Wednesday. objection could have been taken during the trial, a new trial will be
refused and the objection will not be available on writ of error. 36
Q: How about yesterday, what date was that?
Third. Accused-appellant contends that the absence of injury sustained
A: Tuesday. by complainant negates the presence of any force and intimidation. This
contention is likewise without merit. The presence or absence of
Q: Do you know what date is today? injuries is not essential in proving rape. What is essential is proof that
sexual intercourse with a woman was accomplished without her consent.
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library In this case, the absence of consent is shown by the fact that
complainant is a mental retardate vulnerable to intimidation by
She knows that today is Wednesday but she doesn’t know the exact accused Appellant.
date. 34
Indeed, the degree of force or intimidation required for the act to
x x x constitute rape is relative, and must be viewed in the light of the
complainant’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission
of the offense. 37 What is vital is that such force or intimidation be
Q: You also testified before that you were rape (sic) by Kalbo twice, is sufficient to consummate the purpose that accused-appellant had in
that correct? mind. 38 In this case, due to the complainant’s mental retardation, the

force or intimidation required is not very great since it does not take
much to force a child into submission. Indeed, complainant said she
submitted to accused-appellant’s demands because she was afraid he
would get angry at her if she refused them. In People v. Rosare, 39 it
was held that, in the instances where the victim is so weak in intellect
that she is incapable of rational consent, the force applied may be
constructive.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In sum, the mental retardation of the complainant is proven by the
testimony of her mother, 40 the trial court’s observations during the
trial of her demeanor, behavior, and her intelligence, 41 while the fact
of sexual intercourse is proven by the medico-legal certificate. 42 In
addition, the prosecution proved the presence of force and intimidation,
and the court appreciated such. 43 The intimidation, in this case, is
constituted by the threats that accused-appellant made to the
complainant, 44 not to mention the force employed by accused-
appellant in placing his arm on the complainant’s neck 45 and holding
her hands while undressing her. 46
However, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity should be doubled
because there are two counts of rape. In addition, complainant should
also be awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape,
or a total of P100,000.00 in accordance with our rulings. 47
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 220,
Quezon City, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity is increased to P100,000.00 and, in
addition, Accused-appellant is ordered to pay complainant Nympha
Lozada y de Lara the further sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130601. December 4, 2000.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAFAEL
DIOPITA y GUZMAN, Accused -Appellant .
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J. :
RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN appeals from the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City finding him guilty of Robbery with Rape,
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him
to pay the victim, Dominga Pikit-pikit, P8,500.00 for actual damages
and P50,000.00 for moral damages. 1
Page 16 of 19
Culled principally from the testimonies of Dominga Pikit-pikit and PO3
Steve dela Cruz, the inculpatory facts follow: At about 9:00 o’clock in
the evening of 16 April 1995 complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit,
24 years old, was walking towards Emiville Subdivision, Diversion Road,
Sasa, Davao City, on her way home from work. Suddenly, a man
appeared from behind, looped his arm around her neck and warned her
not to shout or else she would die. 2 The man then dragged her through
the banana plantation towards the cornfields where the plants were a
meter high and far apart. 3 When Dominga shouted for help, the man
pushed her to the ground and punched her on the stomach saying,
"Leche ka, why are you shouting? What do you want me to do, make
you unconscious?" 4
Dominga Pikit-pikit got a good look at the man, who turned out to be
accused-appellant Rafael Diopita y Guzman, as he sat on her thighs and
proceeded to divest her of her belongings — ladies watch, bracelet, ring
with Russian diamonds, wedding ring and P1,000.00 cash. With the full
moon shining on his face, the victim clearly saw Diopita place the items
on the right pocket of his shorts. 5
Thereafter, Accused-appellant Diopita announced his desire to have
carnal knowledge of Dominga. Forthwith, he pulled up her t-shirt and
unfastened her brassiere. He also loosened her belt, unzipped her pants
and struggled to pull it down, nearly ripping her zipper. Annoyed at the
tightness of her pants, Diopita hit her and ordered her to help him pull
them down. 6 Dominga, fearing for her life and thinking of Diopita’s
punches, obeyed. She pulled her pants to her hips. Then accused-
appellant forcibly pulled them down further and got irritated in fact
when he was told that she was wearing a girdle and panty. In
frustration, he punched her repeatedly and kept on muttering, "Why is
this very tight? What kind of panty is this?" Finally, he succeeded in
pulling the girdle and panty down. 7
Accused-appellant Diopita then took off his shorts. He kissed the victim,
lasciviously caressed her breasts, bit her nipples, and fornicated with
her. As he was sexually assaulting her, Dominga made desperate
struggles and frantic calls for help but her efforts proved futile until he
finally satiated his lust. He then warned Dominga not to tell anyone and
that should he hear that she told anybody about the incident he would
shoot her to death. Then he dressed up and left, walking casually to the
opposite direction of the subdivision before disappearing in the
darkness. 8
Exhausted, Dominga slowly stood up, put on her clothes and walked
away in the direction of her house. Finding it locked, she asked help
from her neighbors who called the police. Thereafter, Dominga was
brought to Precinct No. 4 of Sasa, Davao City, where SPO1 Stephen
Batacan entered her complaint in the police blotter. Later, she was
examined by Dr. Floranne Lam-Vergara at the Davao Medical Center
who found her "positive for spermatocytes." 9
PO3 Steve dela Cruz, who was on duty at the Intelligence and

Investigation Section, made a follow-up on the case. He went to the
victim’s house and interviewed her between the hours of 1:00 o’clock
and 3:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day, 17 April 1995,
Dominga gave a description of the suspect and his possible
whereabouts. 10 Acting on that information, PO3 dela Cruz went to the
scene of the crime to investigate and there he recovered a colored
white/yellow, size ten (10) slipper. Since the victim earlier disclosed
that the suspect headed north after committing the crime, he proceeded
to that direction where he came upon four (4) houses about fifteen (15)
to fifty (50) meters away from the scene of the crime. A back-up team
was called and they rounded up all the residents therein. Afterwards,
four (4) men who fitted the description of the suspect were invited to
the police station for questioning. They were Placido Laput, William
Silvano, Vicente Silvano and accused-appellant Rafael Diopita y
Guzman. 11
At about 6:00 o’clock in the morning of 17 April 1995, the police invited
Dominga to identify the suspect at the police station. Thereat, Dominga
saw the four (4) men in a police line-up and readily pointed at Accused-
Appellant. 12 The police then had him try on the recovered slipper; it
easily fitted him. 13 Thus, Diopita was detained while the others were
released.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The defense denied the charge and invoked alibi. Accused-appellant
claimed that between 8:30 to 12:00 o’clock in the evening of 16 April
1995 he was with his wife Flora, son Ryan and fellow Jehovah’s
Witnesses Roger Custorio and Ruben Suarez at the house of Eulalio
Nisnisan for an informal Bible session upon the invitation of Juan
Nisnisan. 14 Accused-appellant also claimed that during those hours, he
never left the place. Flora, Roger, Ruben, Eulalio and Juan corroborated
his alibi and testified on his good moral character as a ministerial
servant of their faith.
On 18 June 1997, the trial court formally rejected his defense of alibi
and convicted him of the crime charged; consequently, Accused-
appellant is now before us on appeal. The trial court ruled —
Alibi is a weak defense because it can easily be fabricated that it is so
easy for witnesses to get confused as to dates and time. The precision
with which the witnesses for the defense, who are his co-members in
the Jehovah’s Witnesses, quoted the respective hours when the
participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at best,
self-serving and deserves scant consideration because of the facility
with which it may be concocted and fabricated.
On the other hand, private complainant Dominga Pikit-Pikit positively
identified Rafael Diopita as the person who robbed and raped her on
April 16, 1995. She testified in a clear, straightforward and convincing
manner and no ill-motive on her part had been shown to have prompted
her to testify falsely. The failure of the defense to attribute any ill-
motive on the part of Pikit-Pikit to pin responsibility on Diopita adds
more credence to complainant’s testimony.
Page 17 of 19
In a long line of cases, it has been held that the defense of alibi cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the victim.
Pikit-Pikit testified that she was able to see the face of her attacker
because the moon was shining brightly that evening. This Court takes
judicial notice of the fact that in the month of April 1995 the full moon
came out on April 15, 1995, a day before the date of the crime.
We affirm his conviction; the guilt of accused-appellant has been
established by the evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
First. Complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit positively and
categorically identified accused-appellant as her assailant, first during
the police line-up where she singled him out from among the four (4)
suspects and, later during the trial where she pointed at accused-
appellant as the one who robbed and sexually molested her —
Q: Where did you go?
A: To the Police Station, there were four persons who lined up for
identification.
Q: And then?
A: First, when I arri ved, I peeped behind the place where there were
four persons lining up. After that I went to the place where they were
receiving visitors and I saw the four persons who were there already
and lined up.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Q: And then?
A: After that the police told me to identify the person who molested me,
and I pointed to that person there (witness pointing to the accused
whom she previously identified). 15
From the circumstances of this case, it cannot be denied that
complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit had a good look at the face and
physical features of accused-appellant during the commission of the
crime. While the robbery was in progress, the moonlight sufficiently
illumined his face and clothes, thus making it possible for private
complainant to identify him. 16 During the rape, private complainant
was as close to accused-appellant as was physically possible, for a man
and a woman cannot be more physically close to each other than during
a sexual act. 17 Victims of criminal violence naturally strive to know
the identity of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was
perpetrated, creating a lasting impression which may not be erased
easily in their memory. 18 There is therefore no reason to doubt the
accuracy of private complainant’s visual perception of accused-appellant
as the criminal. Nor is there any reason to doubt her honesty of
intention for there is no showing that she implicated accused-appellant
due to an evil or corrupt motive.
We do not subscribe to accused-appellant’s contentions that the
complaining witness hesitated to point at him during the police line-up,

and that she was just forced by the police to choose him from among
the four (4) suspects. The identification was made with such certainty
by the complaining witness that even accused-appellant had to
comment on it —
Atty. Galicia:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
What made you say she was hesitant to point at you? . . .
Rafael Diopita: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Because during that time, sir, when we confronted each other in the
police station, she was looking at me when there were four of us there.
So, I asked why . . . 19
The foregoing testimony belied the allegation of hesitancy on the part
of Dominga Pikit-pikit to pinpoint accused-appellant during the line-up.
His very own words project his guilt as well. Only the guilty experiences
neurotic fear in the face of imminent discovery of his malefaction. His
paranoia colors his interpretation of the events during the line-up.
Consider accused-appellant’s assertion that Dominga Pikit-pikit was
forced by the police to point at him, and Prosecutor Esparagoza’s
objection thereto —
Sur-rebuttal of Atty. Galicia: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Mr. Diopita, according to private complainant Dominga Pikit-pikit during
her rebuttal testimony that she was not forced by the police to point at
you when you were in the police station. What can you say to that?
Rafael Diopita: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That woman hesitated to point at me but the police said you point at
him.
Q: What made you say she was hesitant to point at you?
Prosecutor Esparagoza: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The witness said "ITUDLO! ITUDLO!" (YOU POINT! YOU POINT!). He did
not say he was the one pointed to, your Honor. 20
Gleaned from the aforequoted testimony was the absence of
suggestiveness in the identification process. There were four (4) men in
the line-up and the police did not specifically suggest to Dominga to
point particularly at Accused-Appellant . Not even the shodding of the
slipper recovered from the scene of the crime could provide any
suggestiveness to the line-up as it came after accused-appellant was
already identified by Dominga Pikit-pikit. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
Second. In light of this positive and direct evidence of accused-
appellant’s culpability, the trial court correctly discarded his defense of
Page 18 of 19
alibi. It is an elementary rule that alibi cannot prevail over the clear
and positive identification of the accused as the very person who
committed the crime. Moreover, in order to justify an acquittal based on
this defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that (a) he was in another place at the time of the commission
of the offense; and, (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at the time it was committed. 21 This, Accused-
appellant miserably failed to do.
Accused-appellant admitted that at the time in question he was with his
wife, son and fellow members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses at the house
of one Eulalio Nisnisan supposedly attending Bible studies, which is
merely fifteen (15) to fifty (50) meters away from the crime scene.
Considering the short and insignificant distance, it was not impossible
for accused-appellant to surreptitiously slip away from the house of
Nisnisan, commit the crime and then return without arousing the
suspicion of his companions who were then busy with their Bible
session. This is obviously the situation in this case and, taken together
with the preceding considerations, we likewise reject this poor and
discredited defense as did the trial court. Verily, even if the defense of
alibi is corroborated by the testimony of the friends of accused-
appellant, it deserves the barest consideration and will not be given
weight if it would not preclude any doubt that he could have been
physically present at the locus criminis or its immediate vecino at the
time of its commission. 22
Third. Perhaps aware of the crushing impact of complainant’s positive
identification of accused-appellant, the defense attacked the supposed
inconsistencies and discrepancies in her testimony in a vain attempt to
make it completely unreliable, claiming that: (a) the victim declared
that the culprit wore short pants with a zipper, and he had no short
pants with zipper; (b) the yellow slipper retrieved by the police did not
belong to him as his slippers were colored blue, with his initials
inscribed thereon; and, (c) the description given by complainant in the
police blotter did not fit the physical appearance of Accused-Appellant .
We are not persuaded. Suffice it to say that these are mere trifles
which do not detract from complainant’s straightforward and consistent
identification of accused-appellant as the one who robbed and raped
her. Trivial inconsistencies do not shake the pedestal upon which the
complainant’s credibility rests. On the contrary, they are taken as
badges of truth rather than as indicia of falsehood for they manifest
spontaneity and erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. 23
Furthermore, entries in police blotters should not be given undue
significance or probative value for they are normally incomplete and
inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestion or want of
suggestion or inquiry. 24
Fourth. We now deal with the more substantial arguments raised by
accused-appellant in his brief. He tenaciously maintains that it was
impossible for him to have committed the crime charged since he is a
person of good moral character, holding as he does the position of
"Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and
 Page 19 of 19

that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible family man prosecution as to call for our affirmance of the judgment of the court a
and a good Christian who preaches the word of God. quo. 28

We are not impressed. The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with
such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the conclusion that he is
innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the
position of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against any
sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed,
religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the
unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An
accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous
good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or
reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of
whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt
beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in
the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good
moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing. chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
However, in addition to the actual and moral damages awarded by the
trial court in the amounts of P8,500.00 and P50,000.00, respectively,
another amount of P50,000.00 should have also been awarded to the
victim Dominga Pikit-pikit for civil indemnity, as it is mandatory upon a
conviction of rape. Such indemnity is distinct from moral damages and
based on different jural foundations. 29
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, convicting accused-appellant RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN of
ROBBERY WITH RAPE, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and
ordering him to pay DOMINGA PIKIT-PIKIT the sums of P8,500.00 for
actual damages and P50,000.00 for moral damages, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that, in addition, civil indemnity of another
P50,000.00 is further awarded to her. Costs against Accused-
Appellant.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Accused-appellant likewise bewails and assigns as reversible error the SO ORDERED.

failure of the trial court to give credence to the testimonies of the
defense witnesses. He argues that these are Jehovah’s Witnesses, and
as such, they are God-fearing people who would never lie as to his
whereabouts at the time in question. This argument is as puerile as the
first. We quote once more, and with approval, the pertinent portion of
the trial court’s ruling on this point —

. . . it is so easy for witnesses to get confused as to dates and time.

The precision with which the witnesses for the defense, who are his co-
members in the Jehovah’s Witnesses, quoted the respective hours when
the participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at
best, self-serving and deserves scant consideration because of the
facility with which it may be concocted and fabricated ( Emphasis
supplied).

The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is best

and most competently performed by the trial court who had the
unmatched opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while
testifying, and to assess their credibility using various indicia available
but not reflected in the records. 25 Hence, the court a quo’s appraisal
on the matter is entitled to the highest respect, and will not be
disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case. 26 There is no
compelling reason in the present case to depart from this rule.

In sum, we find that all the elements of robbery with rape are present
in this case. There was asportation of the jewelry and cash of the victim
by means of force and violence on her person, showing the initial
animus lucrandi of accused-appellant, 27 and then his lecherous intent
when he raped his victim. Accordingly, we hold that the court below did
not commit any reversible error in ruling that the requisite quantum of
evidence for a finding of guilt has been sufficiently met by the