MORA ADONG v. CHEONG SENG GEE, GR No.

18081, 1922-03-03
Facts:
Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on
August 5, 1919. He left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased was
claimed, on the one hand, by Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate
child by a marriage... contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The
estate was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged that she had
been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her
daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and
Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried.
the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between the Mora Adong and
the deceased had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine
Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage;
Cheong Boo then left China for the Philippine ;lands and sometime thereafter took to
himself a... concubine Mora by whom he had two children
Issues:

2. Validity of the Mohammedan Marriage

Ruling:
Principles:
"The inhabitants of the territories... over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion."
"that no law shall... be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination ox preference, shall forever be allowed.
no minister of religion shall be interfered with or molested in following his calling, and
that the separation between state and church shall be real, entire, and... absolute.
"with all... solemnity to the Sultan and other inhabitants of Sulu the free exercise of their
religions with which it will not interfere in the slightest way, and it will also respect their
customs."
"Judges of the Court of First Instance and justices of the peace deciding civil cases in
which the parties are Mohammedans or pagans, when such action is deemed wise, may
modify the application of the law of the
Philippine Islands, except laws of the United States applicable to the Philippine Islands,
taking into account local laws and customs.
Quotable quotes on marriage

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment
of... the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties... were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful... contract of marriage.
Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts
intended to invalidate marriages.

Trinidad v. CA 289 SCRA 189

Facts
Arturio Trinidad claims to be the son of Inocentes Trinidad, who together with Felix and Lourdes, his
siblings, are heirs to four parcels of land of their deceased father. He presented the following
evidence.

a. testimony of Gerardo that Inocentes and his wife cohabited and had a child
b. testimony of Meren that she was present in the marriage of Inocentes
c. His own baptismal certificate (his birth certificate had been destroyed)
d. Family pictures and his own testimony that he lived with Lourdes, until he got married.

Lourdes, the aunt of Inocentes, presented the following evidence to refute Arturio’s claims:
a. testimony of Briones that Inocentes was never married
b. her own testimony that Inocentes died childless and she claimed that Arturio was simply a
neighbor. She denied knowledge of the pictures Arturio presented, where she is shown holding the
baby of Arturio, together with Arturio and his wife.
Issue
Whether or not evidence of the marriage of Inocentes and Arturio’s filiation are sufficient.
Held
Yes. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient proof of marriage: fact
of marriage ceremony, open cohabitation of the parties, birth certificate of the child, and other
documents. Arturio presented the first 3. For filiation, when the birth certificate can’t be produced,
other evidence like the baptismal certificate, is admissible. Use of surname without objection is also
presumptive evidence of legitimacy.

ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) andLOURDES TRINIDAD,
respondents
April 20, 1998
FACTS:
On August 10, 1978, plaintiff and petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance and
action for partition of four (4) parcels of land. He was claiming that he was the son of
the deceasedInocentes Trinidad. Patricio Trinidad, the father of the deceased, owned
four (4) parcels of land,which he left to his three children namely, Inocentes, Lourdes,
and Felix. The refusal of the defendants, Lourdes and Felix, to the demand of Arturo
to the partition of the land into three (3)equal parts caused Arturo to file a case which
was decided in his favour.The Appellate court did not decide in favor of Arturo and
reversed the ruling of the lower court onthe ground that he was not able to present
sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to present a marriage contract would mean that there was
no marriage that transpired.
RULING:
While it is true that a marriage contract is the primary evidence of a marriage, the
failure topresent it does not prove that no marriage took place because there are other
evidences thatcould have the same bearing as a marriage contract. He failed
to present the marriage contractdue to the destruction of such records. His act of
presenting witnesses who were present duringthe nuptial of his parents, his baptismal
certificate and the affirmation of the cohabitation of hisparents is enough evidence
to prove the marriage of his parents.

ISIDRO ABLAZA V. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010

DOCTRINE:

The plaintiff must be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a “proper
interest” can file the action.

FACTS:

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a petition
for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26,
1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January
9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized
without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real
properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party
in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that petition is
filed out of time and that petitioner is not a party to marriage. Motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal order of the RTC on the ground that the action must be filed by the proper
party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. Hence,
this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest inthe action to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother?

HELD:

Yes. The applicable law when marriage was contracted between Cresenciano and
Leonila on December 26, 1949, is the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the
marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The case was reinstated and its records returned to RTC for further proceedings.

Ratio:

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SCexplicitly provides the limitation that
a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.
This specifically extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took
effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application,
is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.

Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material
interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in
the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir, has the
right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in
Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The plaintiff must still be the party who
stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is
basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name
of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a “proper
interest” can file the action. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real
party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.

LLAVE V. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011]

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated August 17, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated
September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita)
marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.

FACTS:

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanomarried Estrellita twice – initially
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao
del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was
indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the
whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda)
and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the
rest of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC
of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen.
Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married
Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting
when he married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

HELD:

Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio.

RATIO:

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950,
under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under
the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws.
However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that
the law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein
only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does
not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim
rites.”
HELD:

The petition is DENIED.

REPUBLIC vs ALBIOS

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

This is a case of MARRIAGE FOR CONVENIENCE.

FACTS

Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. She
later on filed a petition to nullify their marriage. She alleged that immediately after
their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they
never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with
any of their essential marital obligations. She said that she contracted Fringer to
enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United
States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay
him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. She
described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.

The RTC ruled in her favor.

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage
was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and
family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its
resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to
explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give
their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and
used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA, however,
upheld the RTC decision.

Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the
marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered
into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of
$2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared null and
void.

RULING:

No, respondent’s marriage is not void.

The court said:

“Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact,
there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any
vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real
and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application
for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that
would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was
necessary to accomplish their goal.”

The court also explained that “There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as
the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and
formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under
the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.”

“No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It
must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered
into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no
longer needed.”

Aranas v. Judge Occiano

A.M. No. MTJ-02- 1309, 11 April 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of
the law. Occiano is the presiding judge in Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, he
solemnized the marriage of Aranes and DominadorOrobia on February 17, 2000 at the couple’s
residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction and without the
requisite of marriage license.

It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application of marriage license on
January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be issued on January 17, 2000 but neither of them
claimed it. In addition, no record also appeared with the Office of the Civil Registrar General for
the alleged marriage.

Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents and first
refused to conduct the marriage and advised them to reset the date considering the absence of
the marriage license. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors and
fear that the postponement of the wedding might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who
just suffered from stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the assurance of the couple that they
will provide the license that same afternoon. Occiano denies that he told the couple that their
marriage is valid.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage
license and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction.

RULING:

Yes. The Court held that Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued
marriage license and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction. The territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur.

Article 7 of the Family Code provides that marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction; (2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of
any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with
the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or
religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing
officer’s church or religious sect; (3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned
in Article 31; (4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence
of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32; (5)
Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10.

Previous jurisprudence (Navarro v. Domagtoy) established that a priest who is commissioned

and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area
or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court
has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as
long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore
is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
 SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN CARINO, defendant
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Facts:

During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first
with Susan Nicdao Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and
with Susan Yee Carino with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago passed away under the care of Susan Yee who spent
for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee
received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money
against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter with Santiago is void ab
initio because their marriage was solemnized without the required marriage license.
The trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half of acquired death
benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of
marriage license.

Ruling:

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and
Carino was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and
the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.
In the case at bar, the marriage does not fall within any of those exceptions and a
marriage license therefore was indispensable to the validity of it. This fact is certified
by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the
presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao and Carino has been sufficiently overcome
and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab initio as well for lack of
judicial decree of nullity of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was
contracted. The marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of the Family Code,
properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong
to the co-ownership. The decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, Aug. 28, 2007

FACTS:

On 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the
Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They
met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding. They got married on the same day. Another
marriage was held in a church in Tondo. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties
securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing
on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went
to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. A petition for annulment
of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent. Rosita however asserts the validity of their
marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from
the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three
children. Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.
Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restituto.

ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.

HELD: A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Art 53 of NCC. Their marriage contract
reflects a marriage license number. A certification was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona,
Cavite. The certification is precise since it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license
was issued. Issuance of a marriage license where none of the parties is resident, is just an irregularity.
Marriage is still valid even if the marriage license is issued in a place not the domicile of the parties.

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors

BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000

Facts:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot
by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action
since they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of
marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at least
five years exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.

(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with
her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G.
Niñal is already dead

Ruling:
(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife
for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed
on the basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the
special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year
common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. The five-year period should be the years immediately before the day the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years, and continuity—
that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period is computed without
any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during
the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with
those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, v.

JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001

Facts:

Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late
David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel
Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage.
On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said
marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated.”

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated
the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally
married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife
for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint
affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he
would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, Manzano could be
charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit
and for being designed merely to harass him.

The Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of

gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent Judge alleges that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Is the reason of the respondent Judge in solemnizing the marriage valid?

Ruling:

No. In Article 34 of the Family Code provides “No license shall be necessary for the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. Respondent
Judge cannot take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just
like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five
years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation
for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry
each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve
as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by
the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

G.R. No. 179474

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

Chico-Nazario, J.:

FACTS: On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City
through the execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained
the age of maturity and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years. Then Jose contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993 Felisa filed an action for
bigamy against Jose. Then on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment
and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Biñan, Laguna. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no
marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the
sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least
five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. The
RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for the ground that the
testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and
Felisa was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the
Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose assertion that his
marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. Jose filed a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites
for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article
34 of the New Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the
legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he
maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa
was false.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio?

RULING: Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the
requirements of valid marriage in which the sworn affidavit that Felisa executed is
merely a scrap of paper because they started living together five months before the
celebration of their marriage. That according to the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 34 “No license shall be necessary for the
marriage for a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years and without any legal impediments to marry each other… “ it
means that a five years period computed back from the date of celebration of
marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage,
characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the five years and continuity that is unbroken.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law
and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against
innocent and unwary parties.

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed
itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision that the marriage between
Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson is void ab initio.

Arsenio de Loria vs Felipe Felix

G R No. L- 9005, June 20, 1958

Bengzon, J.:

FACTS: Matea dela Cruz and Felipe Felix lived together as wife and husband in
Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no children. Matea became seriously
ill. Knowing her critical condition, Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra visited
and convinced her to go for confession. They fetched Father Bautista, Catholic
priest of Pasay and the latter upon hearing the confession of the bed-ridden Matea
and knowing that she is living with Felipe without the benefit of marriage then
ratified the union of the two by solemnizing their marriage in articulo mortis with
the consent of Felix. Matea recovered from her illnes but died subsequently after
few months. Arsenio and Ricarda de Loria, granchildren of Matea’s sister filed a
complaint and complete delivery of the property of the deceased contending that
they are the succeeding heirs of the deceased and that the marriage of the latter is
not valid because of lack of marriage contract signed by the contracting parties.
Felix resisted the action standing his rights as the widower. CFI ruled in favor of
the complainants but was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage of Matea to Felix in articulo mortis is valid.

HELD:

YES. The marriage is valid. Its celebration in articulo mortis, where all the
requisites are present renders its validity. The failure of the solemnizing priest to
make and file an affidavit as required under Sec 20 and 21 of the Marriage Law
does not affect the validity nor renders the nullity of said marriage. Hence, CA’s
devision is affirmed.

Morigo v. People
G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004

FACTS:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but
after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts.
They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for
divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He
subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no
marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of
arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo
pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented
he contracted second marriage in good faith.
ISSUE:

Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his
second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

RULING:

No. considering that the first marriage was void ab initio makes Morigo acquitted in the Bigamy
case.

As provided by Art. 3, part 3 of the Family Code “A marriage ceremony which takes place with
the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age”. “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.” As provided by Art. 4. Given these 2 articles, Morigo’s first marriage is considered
void ab initio.

Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a
marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage
when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is
acquitted in the case filed.

Imbong v. Ochoa (G.R. No. 204819)

Date: July 13, 2018Author: jaicdn0 Comments

Facts:

The increase of the country’s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the

executive and the legislative’s decision that prior measures were still not adequate.
Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of
modern family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the
peoples’ right to reproductive health be achieved. Stated differently, the RH Law is
an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women’s health and population control.

Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the
constitutionality of RH Law. Meanwhile, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the
assailed legislation took effect. The Court then issued a Status Quo Ante Order
enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation.
Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming
that it violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one
subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards
of due process by concealing its true intent – to act as a population control measure.
On the other hand, respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population
control measure, and that the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and
“reproductive health” are both interrelated as they are inseparable.

Issue:

Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the Constitution

Ruling: NO

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared
towards the reduction of the country’s population. While it claims to save lives and
keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing
products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range
of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods,
natural or modern, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the
number of births in the country. The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners’
contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law.

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.

In Cawaling, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was written: It is well-settled that the “one title-
one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the
title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks
to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not
to cripple or impede legislation.”

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
“reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and
germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed
in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human
rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these
rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose
and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions,
ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must
not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed
of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”

Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible

parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable
human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe
that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the
assailed legislation.

The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to certain provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the
provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.