ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC, GR NO.

174689, 2007-10-19
Facts:
petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his
birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.
Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted several doctors in... the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform
himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery[2] in
Bangkok, Thailand.
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his
sex from "male" to "female."
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals.[6] It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of
sex... alteration.
the Court of Appeals[7] rendered a decision[8] in favor of the Republic.
Issues:
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
Ruling:
Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to
make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change.[19] In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name.[20] In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner's first name was not
within that court's primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar
concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an... improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the
proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit... since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For
all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner's petition in so far as the change of
his first name was concerned.
The birth certificate of petitioner... contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to
his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts... and judicial decrees
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce... legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity,
status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor
even mentioned by... any law, expressly or impliedly.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time
of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by... examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error,[30] is immutable.
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the... correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.
Principles:

Page 1 of 15
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.[11]
A change of name is a privilege, not a right.[12] Petitions for change of name are controlled by
statutes.[13] In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA
9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or... nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.[14] It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions
for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications... for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103... and 108... f the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1)
The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce;
(2)
The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has
been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3)
The change will avoid confusion.
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:[24]
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of... citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that
occur after birth.[25] However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that
it covers the correction on the ground... of sex reassignment.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term... status… include such matters as the beginning and end of
legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.[28] (emphasis
supplied)

Page 2 of 15
 A person's sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person's legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance
at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for
the registration of a birth in the... civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp
tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time
of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by... examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error,[30] is immutable.

Fetalino vs Comelec
MARCH 30, 2018 BY LAWISKOOL

Facts:
President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to petitioners Evalyn Fetalino (Fetalino) and Amado Calderon
(Calderon) as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years. Congress, however, adjourned before the
Commission on Appointments (CA) could act on their appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential appointments
later took effect and Fetalino and Calderon were no longer re-appointed. Thus, Fetalino and Calderon merely served as
Comelec Commissioners for more than four months.
Subsequently, Fetalino and Calderon applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the Comelec, pursuant
to R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec initially approved the claims pursuant to its resolution. However, in its subsequent resolution,
the Comelec, on the basis of its Law Departments study, completely disapproved the Fetalino and Calderons claim, stating
that one whose ad interim appointment expires cannot be said to have completed his term of office so as to fall under the
provisions of Section 1 of RA 1568 that would entitle him to a lump sum benefit.
of five years salary. Petitioner-intervenor Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. (Barcelona) later joined the petitioners in questioning
the assailed subsequent resolution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an ad interim appointment qualifies as retirement under the law and entitles them to the full five-year lump
sum gratuity;
2. Whether or not the resolution that initially granted the five-year lump sum gratuity is already final and executory;
3. Whether or not Fetalino and Calderon acquired a vested right over the full retirement benefits provided by RA No. 1568.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
First Issue: Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568,
as amended.
The Court emphasized that the right to retirement benefits accrues only when two conditions are met: first, when the
conditions imposed by the applicable law in this case, R.A. No. 1568 are fulfilled; and second, when an actual retirement
takes place. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that retirement entails compliance with certain age and service
requirements specified by law and jurisprudence, and takes effect by operation of law.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the Chairman or any Member of the Comelec who
has retired from the service after having completed his term of office. Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona obviously did not
retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never completed the full seven-year term of office. While the Court
characterized an ad interim appointment in Matibag v. Benipayo as a permanent appointment that takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office, the Court have
also positively ruled in that case that an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on
Appointments does not constitute a term of office.

Second Issue: The Comelec did not violate the rule on finality of judgments.

Page 3 of 15
Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure reads: In ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional
remedies and special reliefs a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after
thirty (30) days from its promulgation.
A simple reading of this provision shows that it only applies to ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies
and special reliefs. Thus, it is clear that the proceedings that precipitated the issuance of the assailed resolution do not fall
within the coverage of the actions and proceedings under Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Thus,
the Comelec did not violate its own rule on finality of judgments.
Third Issue: No vested rights over retirement benefits.
Retirement benefits granted to Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous
in nature; thus, they have no vested right over these benefits. Retirement benefits as provided under R.A. No. 1568 must
be distinguished from a pension which is a form of deferred compensation for services performed; in a pension, employee
participation is mandatory, thus, employees acquire contractual or vested rights over the pension as part of their
compensation.
Petition is DENIED.

Rural Bank of San Miguel v Monetary Board

G.R. No. 150886 February 16, 2007
MARCH 16, 2014LEAVE A COMMENT

It is well-settled that the closure of a bank may be considered as an exercise of police power. The action of
the MB on this matter is final and executory. Such exercise may nonetheless be subject to judicial inquiry
and can be set aside if found to be in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Facts: Monetary Board (MB), the governing board of respondent Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), issued
Resolution No. 105 prohibiting RBSM from doing business in the Philippines, placing it under receivership and
designating respondent Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) as receiver on the basis of the
comptrollership reports of the banks supervising head. To assist its impaired liquidity and operations, the
RBSM was granted emergency loans on different occasions in the aggregate amount of P375. As early as
November 18, 1998, Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) advised RBSM that it will terminate the clearing of
RBSM’s checks in view of the latter’s frequent clearing losses and continuing failure to replenish its Special
Clearing Demand Deposit with LBP. The BSP interceded with LBP not to terminate the clearing arrangement of
RBSM to protect the interests of RBSM’s depositors and creditors. On the basis of reports prepared by PDIC
stating that RBSM could not resume business with sufficient assurance of protecting the interest of its
depositors, creditors and the general public, the MB passed Resolution No. 966 directing PDIC to proceed with
the liquidation of RBSM under Section 30 of RA 7653.

Issue: Whether or not the Monetary Board can unilaterally close a bank without prior hearing

Held: No. It is well-settled that the closure of a bank may be considered as an exercise of police power. The
action of the MB on this matter is final and executory. Such exercise may nonetheless be subject to judicial
inquiry and can be set aside if found to be in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

This case essentially boils down to one core issue: whether Section 30 of RA 7653 (also known as the New
Central Bank Act) and applicable jurisprudence require a current and complete examination of the bank before
it can be closed and placed under receivership. The actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or
under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court
except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such
grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only be
filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock within ten (10) days from
receipt by the board of directors of the institution of the order directing receivership, liquidation or
conservatorship.

Page 4 of 15
A Digest of David Reyes vs. Jose Lim, G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003

Facts: Petitioner David Reyes filed a complaint for annulment of contract and damages against respondents.
The complaint alleged that Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land
located along F.B. Harrison Street, Pasay City with a monthly rental of P35,000.

The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the Property before the end of
January 1995. Reyes also informed Keng and Harrison Lumber that if they failed to vacate by 8 March 1995, he
would hold them liable for the penalty of P400,000 a month as provided in the Contract to Sell. It was also
alleged that Lim connived with Harrison Lumber not to vacate the Property until the P400,000 monthly penalty
would have accumulated and equaled the unpaid purchase price of P18,000,000.

Keng and Harrison Lumber denied that they connived with Lim to defraud Reyes, and that Reyes approved their
request for an extension of time to vacate the Property due to their difficulty in finding a new location for their
business. Harrison Lumber claimed that it had already started transferring some of its merchandise to its new
business location in Malabon.

Lim filed his Answer stating that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of the purchase price. Lim
requested a meeting with Reyes through the latter’s daughter on the signing of the Deed of Absolute Sale and
the payment of the balance but Reyes kept postponing their meeting. Reyes offered to return the P10 million
down payment to Lim because Reyes was having problems in removing the lessee from the Property. Lim
rejected Reyes’ offer and proceeded to verify the status of Reyes’ title to the Property. Lim learned that Reyes
had already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation Lim denied conniving with Keng and Harrison
Lumber to defraud Reyes.Reyes filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint due to supervening facts.
These included the filing by Lim of a complaint for estafa against Reyes as well as an action for specific
performance and nullification of sale and title plus damages before another trial court. The trial court granted
the motion.

In his Amended Answer Lim prayed for the cancellation of the Contract to Sell and for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against Reyes. The trial court denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment.

Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10 million down payment with the cashier
of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The trial court granted this motion.

Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order on the ground the Order practically granted the reliefs Lim prayed
for in his Amended Answer. The trial court denied Reyes’ motion.

The trial court denied Reyes’ Motion for Reconsideration. In the same order, the trial court directed Reyes to
deposit the P10 million down payment with the Clerk of Court.

Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals and prayed that the orders of the trial court be set
aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. But the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition for review.

Issue: Whether on not the equity jurisdiction is an applicable law on the matter?

Held: The instant case, the Supreme Court held that if this was a case where there is hiatus in the law and in the
Rules of Court. If this case was left alone, the hiatus will result in unjust enrichment to Reyes at the expense of
Lim. Here the court excercised equity jurisdiction.The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case
is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution so that substantial justice may be attained in cases
where the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.

The Supreme Court also state that rescission is possible only when the person demanding rescission can return
whatever he may be obliged to restore. A court of equity will not rescind a contract unless there is restitution,
that is, the parties are restored to the status quo ante.

In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the P10 million down
payment. The decision of the Court of Appeals.was affirmed.

Page 5 of 15
G.R. No. L-30642 (April 30, 1985)

Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation

FACTS:

Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28,
1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the deceased claimed
their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.
They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages, pointing out in the complaint
'gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take necessary security for the protection of the lives
of its employees working underground'. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners
have already claimed benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds jurisdiction over
provisions for remedies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between availing themselves of the worker’s right
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages
(actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether
they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions.

RULING:

The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of
the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving
compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by
Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a
mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded
to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower
court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may
be decreed in their favor.

CASE DIGEST – Article 26

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981.
They were blessed with a with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few years,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Page 6 of 15
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in California.

He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the
same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision
of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Held:
Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code be
interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration
of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,one of them became naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtained a divorce decree.

The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a
divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed, she remarried an American citizen while
residing in the US. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he was still barred
from remarrying.

— CONSTITUTIONAL LAW —

OMBUDSMAN Carpio-Morales v. CA and Jejomar Binay G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015 Doctrine of
Condonation Abandoned

APRIL 1, 2019

FACTS:

A complaint/affidavit was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers
and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder and violation of RA
3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,” in connection with the five phases of the
procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building.

Before Binay, Jr., et al.’s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman issued the order placing Binay, Jr., et
al. under preventive suspension for not more than six months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB
Cases.

Page 7 of 15
The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer are present, and that
their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them.

Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order,
and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.

Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity
attending any of the five phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were
undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first
term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative
liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic.

Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, the Ombudsman filed the present petition before this
Court, assailing the CA’s Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.’s prayer for TRO.

The Ombudsman claims that the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.’s prayer for a TRO.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of condonation should apply in Binay’s case.

RULING:

The petition is partly meritorious.

This Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. It was a
doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from – and now rendered
obsolete by – the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation
doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima,
Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be
prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.

The condonation doctrine was first enunciated in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, There is no
truth in Pascual’s postulation that the courts would be depriving the electorate of their right to elect their
officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by which a
particular constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office.
Page 8 of 15
In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically implies condonation.
Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and republican state has an inherent regime of
condonation. If condonation of an elective official’s administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this
jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be
at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional
or statutory provision, exists.

Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate’s will has been abdicated.

DE CASTRO VS. JBC

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process
of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated
January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.

Page 9 of 15
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because
the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to
appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be
filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains
why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article
VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court
to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political
pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the
specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could
only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of
course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint
one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc
or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and
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surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and
surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect
the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also
applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent
of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section
15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

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Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]

03

OCT

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by its Secretary General George “FGBF
George” Duldulao, petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]

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FACTS:

Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through its resolution, denying also the
latter’s motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941),
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

x x x x

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%)
of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]

Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among others the misapplication in the ruling
of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the
excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.

ISSUES:

Political Law

(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.

(2) Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)

(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.

RULINGS:

Political Law
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(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain
PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions
under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which
provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative
intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore
simply cannot stand.

(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated for [it] was given an
opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC resolution]. The essence of due process,
consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process
is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement
is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that]
under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)

(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis
et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule
established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in
subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case
override the great benefits derived by [SC’s] judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is
justified in setting it aside. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the
legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing
validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC] now abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling case law.

Tung Chin Hui v Rodriguez

G.R. No. 137571 September 21, 2000 THIRD DIVISION J. Panganiban
FACTS:
Petitioner, Tung Chin Hui is an alien who has allegedly entered the Philippines illegally, and was thus turned over to the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation (BID). Petitioner then filed for a writ of habeas corpus for illegal detention while Respondent, Rufus B.
Rodriguez as Commissioner of Immigration filed for an appeal five (5) days after its receipt of the order of releasing Petitioner. Petitioner

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however, contends that the appeal was already late under sec 18, rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court. Respondent on the other hand
avers that Petitioner’s claim has no merit because such provision was completely abrogated by sec. 3, rule 41 of the 1997 rules of court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal made by respondent should be considered to be late.
HELD:
NO. Sec. 18, rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court is deemed omitted from and thereby repealed by the 1997 Rules of Court,
which completely replaces Rules 1 to 71. This is because provisions of an old law that were not reproduced in the revision thereof
covering the same subject are deemed repealed and discarded; which in this case is the intention of the Supreme Court. Thus, declaring
the appeal of respondent to be not considered late in its submission to the court.

David v COMELEC
GR No. 127116 April 8, 1997 EN BANC J. Panganiban
FACTS:
Petitioner, Alex L. David in his capacity as a Barangay Chairman petitioned for the prohibition and rescheduling of holding the
barangay elections on May 2, 1997 under RA 7160 or the Local Government Code (LGC) instead of holding the barangay elections on
a later date under RA 6679. This is because under RA 6679, the earlier law, Petitioner together with other barangay officials will hold
office for five (5) terms while under RA 7160, the later law, reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three (3) years.
ISSUE:
WON RA 6679 should prevail over RA 7160 in terms of the term of office of barangay officials.
HELD:
No. In this case it would seem that RA 6679 ad RA 7160 are irreconcilable laws and in cases where irreconcilable conflict
between two laws of different vintages, the latter enactment prevails. Legis posteri ores priores contrarias abrogant. A later law repeals
an earlier one because it is the later legislative will wherein it is presumed that the lawmakers knew the older law and intended to change
it. Thus, the barangay election will continue as scheduled by COMELEC for May 2, 1994.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA

GR Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995 FIRST DIVISION J. Hermosisima, Jr.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Laguna Lake Development Authority was created under RA 4850 which enables such government agency to be the
sole authority in charge of the development and preservation of the Laguna Bay region. Petitioner was given the exclusive jurisdiction to
issue permits for the use of all surface waters for any projects in or affecting the said region, including the operation of fish pens.
Respondent cities and municipalities, on the other hand under RA 7160 was granted exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in
municipal waters; which, allowed for the construction and operation of fish pens in the Laguna Bay region without permit from the
Petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON respondent cities and municipalities had the authority and jurisdiction to issue permits for the construction and operation
of fish pens in the Laguna Bay region.
HELD:
No. The Court held that RA 7160 did not necessarily repeal RA 4850 and its amendments for it did not have had any express
provisions repealing the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority which is a special law. This is because the enactment of a
later general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law; and that repeal of laws, specially of special laws should be made
clear and expressed for a special law cannot be repealed, amended, or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Thus,
the issued permits by respondent cities and municipalities are declared null and that whatever constructions made due to such permits
are to be subject to the demolition of the Laguna Bay Dev’t Authority.

Bagatsing v Ramirez
GR No. L-41631 December 17, 1976 EN BANC J. Martin
FACTS:
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 Petitioners, officials of the City of Manila through Ramon Bagatsing as Mayor claims that Ordinance No. 7522 is a valid ordinance
under the Local Tax Code because it requires on a post-publication which was made by the Petitioners. Respondents on the other hand
alleges that such ordinance is invalid because under the City Charter of Manila regarding publication of ordinances which requires before
enactment and after approval of the ordinance which was not followed by Petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 7522 is valid under the provision of the Local Tax Code and the City Charter of Manila.
HELD:
Yes. A charter of a city, which is a special law, may be impliedly modified or superseded by a later statute, and where a statute
is controlling, it must be read in the charter, notwithstanding any of its particular provisions. A subsequent general law similarly applicable
to all cities prevails over ay conflicting charter provisions, for the reason that a charter must not be inconsistent with the general laws and
public policy of the State which are deemed incorporated therein the general laws affecting local governments. Thus, Ordinance No.
7522 is deemed valid and enforceable.

Department of Agrarian Reform v Sutton

GR No. 162070 October 19, 2005 EN BANC J. Puno
FACTS:

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