Court Rules on Amending Pleadings

G.R. No. 211113. June 29, 2015.
ADERITO Z. YUJUICO, petitioner, vs. UNITED RESOURCES ASSET

MANAGEMENT, INC., ATTY. RICHARD J. NETHERCOTT and ATTY. HONORATO
R. MATABAN, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice;Amendment of Pleadings; Our rules of
procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his pleading as a matter of right, so long as the
pleading is amended only once and before a responsive pleading is served (or, if the pleading sought to
be amended is a reply, within ten [10] days after it is served).—Our rules of procedure allow a party in
a civil action to amend his pleading as a matter of right, so long as the pleading is amended
only once and before a responsive pleading is served (or, if the pleading sought to be amended is a
reply, within ten days after it is served). Otherwise, a party can only amend his pleading upon prior
leave of court.
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* FIRST DIVISION.
611
VOL. 760, JUNE 29, 2015 611
Yujuico vs. United Resources Asset Management, Inc.
Same; Same; Same; Same; As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat motions for
leave to file amended pleadings with liberality.—As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to
treat motions for leave to file amended pleadings with liberality. This is especially true when a motion
for leave is filed during the early stages of proceedings or, at least, before trial. Our case law had long
taught that bona fide amendments to pleadings should be allowed in the interest of justice so that
every case may, so far as possible, be determined on its real facts and the multiplicity of suits thus be
prevented. Hence, as long as it does not appear that the motion for leave was made with bad faith or
with intent to delay the proceedings, courts are justified to grant leave and allow the filing of an
amended pleading. Once a court grants leave to file an amended pleading, the same becomes binding
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the court had abused its discretion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Matters involving the amendment of pleadings are primarily governed
by the pertinent provisions of Rule 10 and not by Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.—We
cannot subscribe to petitioner’s argument that Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court precludes
URAMI from filing its amended answer. To begin with, the said provision does not set the be-all and
end-all standard upon which amendments to pleadings may or may not be allowed. Matters involving
the amendment of pleadings are primarily governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule 10 and not by
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Hence, allegations (and admissions) in a pleading — even
if not shown to be made through “palpable mistake” — can still be corrected or amended provided that
the amendment is sanctioned under Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The mere fact that United Resources Asset Management, Inc. (Urami)
filed its motion for leave years after the original answer is also not reason enough in itself to discredit
the amended answer as a sheer dilatory measure.—The mere fact that URAMI filed its motion for
leave years after the original answer is also not reason enough in itself to discredit the amended
answer as a sheer dilatory measure. Readily observable from the established facts is that the perceived
delay between the filing of the motion for leave and the filing of the original answer is not purely
attributable to URAMI. It must be remembered that some time after the original answer was filed, we
issued a temporary restraining order in G.R.
612
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
No. 177068 that effectively suspended the proceedings in Civil Case No. 70027 for more than a
year. Thus, even if it wanted to, URAMI really could not have filed a motion for leave to file amended
answer sooner than it already had. On this score, we note that it only took URAMI a little over three
months after the lifting of the temporary restraining order to replace its previous counsel of record in
Civil Case No. 70027 and to file its amended answer.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; We should always remember that our rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.—We should always remember that our rules
IV – Rules 10-13 Page 1
of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their application should
never be allowed to frustrate the truth and the promotion of substantial justice. Were we to succumb
to petitioner’s arguments today, however, we would have sanctioned an outcome totally inconsistent
with the underlying purpose of our procedural laws. That, we simply cannot countenance.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Castillo, Laman, Tan, Pantaleon & San Jose for petitioner.
Arteche, Garrido & Associates for respondent United Resources Asset Mgt., Inc.
PEREZ, J.:
This case is an appeal1 from the Decision2 dated 12 August 2013 and Resolution3 dated 29
January 2014 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 117431.
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1 Rollo, pp. 12-40. The appeal was filed as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2 Id., at pp. 43-58. The decision was penned by Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba for the Fifth Division of the Court
of Appeals, with Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Ricardo R. Rosario, concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 59-60.
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VOL. 760, JUNE 29, 2015 613
The antecedents:
Prelude
The Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC) is a domestic corporation

operating as a business development and investment company.
In 2000, several stockholders4 of STRADEC executed Pledge Agreements5 whereby they
pledged a certain amount of their stocks6 in the said company in favor of the respondent
United Resources Asset Management, Inc. (URAMI). These pledges were meant to secure the
loan obligations of STRADEC to URAMI under their Loan Agreement7 of 28 December 2000.
One of the stockholders of STRADEC who so pledged his shares in STRADEC was
petitioner Aderito Z. Yujuico.
The Notice and Civil Case No. 70027
Apparently, STRADEC had not been able to comply with its payment obligations under
the Loan Agreement.
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4 These pledgors-stockholders were petitioner, Cezar T. Quiambao, Bonifacio C. Sumbilla, Ma. Cristina Ferreros,
Dolney S. Sumbilla, Bonifacio S. Sumbilla, Jr., Ramon M. Borromeo, Rafael F. Erfe, Jose Magno III, Ramon G. Reyes,
Oscar A. Cabading and Angel L. Umali.
5 Rollo, pp. 127-149. There were actually three (3) pledge contracts executed: (a) the Pledge Agreement, (b)
the Additional Pledge Agreement, and (c) the Pledge Agreement for the Third Pledged Shares. Petitioner, Cezar T.
Quiambao, Bonifacio C. Sumbilla, Ma. Cristina F. Ferreros, Dolney S. Sumbilla, Bonifacio S. Sumbilla, Jr. are pledgors
in all three contracts; whereas Ramon M. Borromeo, Rafel F. Erfe, Jose Magno III, Ramon G. Reyes, Oscar A.
Cabading and Angel L. Umali are pledgors only in the Additional Pledge Agreement, and the Pledge Agreement for the
Third Pledged Shares.
6 Around four million (4,000,000) STRADEC shares were pledged in favor of URAMI under the Pledge Agreements.
7 Rollo, pp. 95-117.
614
On 18 June 2004, STRADEC and its stockholders received a notice8 informing them about
an impending auction sale of the stocks pledged under the Pledge Agreements in order to

satisfy STRADEC’s outstanding obligations9 under the Loan Agreement. The notice was sent
and signed by respondent Atty. Richard J. Nethercott (Atty. Nethercott), who claimed to be
the attorney-in-fact of URAMI.
On 21 June 2004, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City an
injunction complaint12seeking to enjoin the sale at public auction mentioned in Atty.
Nethercott’s notice. Impleaded as defendants in such complaint were URAMI, Atty.
Nethercott and herein respondent Atty. Honorato R. Mataban (Atty. Mataban) — the notary
public referred to in the notice as the one requested by Atty. Nethercott to conduct the auction
of the pledged stocks.
In the complaint, petitioner argued that the planned auction sale of the stocks pledged
under the Pledge Agreements is void as the same suffers from a multitude of fatal defects; one
of which is the supposed lack of authority of Atty. Nethercott to initiate such a sale on behalf
of URAMI. As petitioner elaborated:
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8 Id., at pp. 178-180.

9 Then, supposedly amounting to US$7,137,349.00.
The notice stated that, pursuant to the request10 earlier filed by Atty. Nethercott before “the notary public of
Bayambang, Pangasinan,” the public auction of the pledged STRADEC stocks had been set at 8:30 in the morning of
23 June 2004 in front of the municipal building of Bayambang, Pangasinan. 11
10 Rollo, pp. 181-182.
11 Id., at p. 178. Atty. Nethercott further stated in the letter that, if necessary, a second public auction on the
28th of June 2004 would also take place at the same place and time as the first auction sale.
12 Id., at pp. 61-74.
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VOL. 760, JUNE 29, 2015 615
(k) [Atty. Nethercott] has no valid authority to represent URAMI for any purpose. x x x. He is
neither the counsel nor the agent of URAMI, whose authorized representative under Section 9,
paragraph 10 of the Loan Agreement is its Chief Operating Officer, Ms. Lorna P. Feliciano. There has
been no modification of this provision in accordance with paragraph 9.04 of the same provision. 13
The injunction complaint, which also contained prayers for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and of a writ of preliminary injunction, was docketed in the RTC as Civil
Case No. 70027.
The Sale and URAMI’s Answer with Counterclaim
As the RTC did not issue a temporary restraining order in Civil Case No. 70027, the public
auction of the pledged STRADEC stocks pushed through, as scheduled, on 23 June 2004. In
that auction, URAMI emerged as the winning bidder for all of the stocks pledged under
the Pledge Agreements.
On 5 July 2004, however, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction, which effectively
prevented URAMI from appropriating the stocks it had purchased during the auction sale. On
the same day, Atty. Nethercott filed his answer denying the material allegations of the
injunction complaint.
More than a year later, or on 21 April 2006, URAMI — which until then was still not able
to file an answer of its own — filed with the RTC a motion for leave to file an answer.
Attached to the motion was a copy of URAMI’s answer.14 On 5 September 2006, the RTC
granted URAMI’s motion and allowed the admission of its answer.
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13 Id., at p. 70.
14 Id., at pp. 195-206. The pleading was designated as “Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim.”
616

In its answer, URAMI agreed with the petitioner that the 23 June 2004 auction sale was
void; URAMI admitted that it never authorized Atty. Nethercott to cause the sale of the
stocks pledged under the Pledge Agreements. URAMI, however, pointed out that, since it
never sanctioned the 23 June 2004 auction sale, it similarly cannot be held liable to the
petitioner for any prejudice that may be caused by the conduct of such auction sale, viz.:
4.1 The [injunction complaint] dated 28 June 2004 fails to state a cause of action only insofar as it
seeks judgment ordering URAMI to pay [petitioner] the amounts of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php500,000.00) as attorney’s fees and One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) as legal
expenses.
4.1.1. It bears emphasizing that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the pledged shares conducted by
[Atty. Nethercott] was without valid authority from URAMI. Consequently, it cannot be made liable
for the acts of another.
4.1.2. URAMI never sanctioned or directed the questioned auction sale. Neither did URAMI give
its consent, explicit or otherwise, to said foreclosure or any subsequent acts of [Atty. Nethercott]
pursuant thereto. Hence, no liability whatsoever may be imputed to URAMI.
4.1.3. If at all, the recourse of the plaintiff is solely against [Atty. Nethercott].15
Hence, overall, URAMI prayed for the dismissal of the injunction complaint against it.
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15 Id., at p. 202.
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VOL. 760, JUNE 29, 2015 617
Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment
and the Suspension of Civil Case No. 70027
On 29 May 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC a motion for summary judgment16 arguing
that, in view of the admissions made by URAMI in its answer regarding Atty. Nethercott’s
lack of authority to cause the auction sale of pledged stocks, there was no longer any genuine
issue left to be resolved in trial.
URAMI and Atty. Nethercott both filed comments on petitioner’s motion for summary
judgment.
The resolution of petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, however, was deferred when,
on 25 July 2007, this Court issued in G.R. No. 17706817 a temporary restraining order18 calling
to a halt the conduct of further proceedings in Civil Case No. 70027. This temporary
restraining order remained in effect for more than a year until it was finally lifted by this
Court on 13 October 2008.19
Thereafter, proceedings in Civil Case No. 70027 resumed.
URAMI’s Change of Counsel and Amended Answer
On 26 January 2009, URAMI changed its counsel of record for Civil Case No. 70027. The
law firm Villanueva, Gabionza & De Santos (VGD law firm), which hitherto had been
URAMI’s counsel of record, was thus replaced by Atty. Edward P. Chico (Atty. Chico).
Under the counsel of Atty. Chico, URAMI filed with the RTC an amended answer with
compulsory counterclaim (amended answer)20 on 23 February 2009. The amended an-
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 210-219.

17 Entitled Cezar T. Quiambao v. Aderito Z. Yujuico.
18 Rollo, pp. 241-243.

19 Id., at p. 244.
20 Id., at pp. 253-267.
618
swer was meant to supplant URAMI’s original answer, which had been prepared by the
VGD law firm.
In its amended answer, URAMI still vouched for the dismissal of the injunction
complaint but reneged from its previous admissions under the original answer. This time,
URAMI claimed that the 23 June 2004 auction sale was valid and that it duly authorized
Atty. Nethercott to initiate such sale on its behalf.21
On 12 March 2009, petitioner filed with the RTC a motion to strike out URAMI’s amended
answer on the grounds that: (1) it was not timely filed; (2) it was filed without leave of court;
and (3) its admission would prejudice petitioner’s rights. In an order of even date, however,
the RTC denied petitioner’s motion and allowed admission of URAMI’s amended answer.
On 27 March 2009, petitioner filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration of the order
allowing admission of URAMI’s amended answer.
On 18 August 2009, the RTC issued an order granting petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and setting aside its earlier order allowing admission of URAMI’s amended
answer. In the said order, the RTC explained that the amended answer could not be admitted
just yet as the same had been filed by URAMI without first securing leave of court.
Thus, on 21 September 2009, URAMI filed with the RTC a motion for leave to file an
amended answer (motion for leave).22 In the said motion, URAMI formally asked permission
from the RTC to allow it to file the amended answer explaining that the original answer filed
by its previous counsel “does not bear truthful factual allegations and is indubitably not
supported by evidence on record.”23
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21 Id., at pp. 258-259.

22 Id., at pp. 288-289.
23 Id.
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VOL. 760, JUNE 29, 2015 619
On 10 November 2009, the RTC issued an Order24granting URAMI’s motion for leave.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration against the 10 November 2009 Order, but the
same was denied by the RTC in its Order25 of 27 September 2010.
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 117431 and the Present Appeal
Defeated but undeterred, petitioner next challenged the Orders dated 10 November 2009
and 27 September 2010 of the RTC through a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals.
This certiorari petition was docketed in the Court of Appeals as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 117431.
On 12 August 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision26 sustaining the challenged
orders of the RTC and dismissing petitioner’s certiorari petition. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals remained steadfast.27
Hence, the present appeal.
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the
orders of the RTC allowing URAMI to file its amended answer. Petitioner argues that URAMI
should not have been so allowed for the following reasons:28
1. URAMI had not shown that the admissions it made under the original answer were
made through “palpable mistake.” Hence, pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court,29 URAMI is barred from contra-

_______________
24 Id., at pp. 297-298. The order was penned by Judge Franco T. Falcon of the RTC, Branch 71, of Pasig City.
25 Id., at p. 314.
26 Id., at pp. 43-58.
27 Id., at pp. 59-60.
28 Id., at pp. 12-40.
29 Section 4 of Rule 129 contains the rule prohibiting a party from contradicting his judicial admission unless it is
shown that
620
dicting such admissions through the filing of its amended answer.
2. The amended answer is merely a ploy of URAMI to further delay the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 70027.
Thus, petitioner prays that we set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, disallow
URAMI’s amended answer and direct the RTC in Civil Case No. 70027 to resolve his motion
for summary judgment with dispatch.30
Our Ruling
Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his pleading as a matter of
right, so long as the pleading is amended only once and before a responsive pleading is
served (or, if the pleading sought to be amended is a reply, within ten days after it is
served).31 Otherwise, a party can only amend his pleading upon prior leave of court.32
As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat motions for leave to file amended
pleadings with liberality.33 This is especially true when a motion for leave is filed during the
early stages of proceedings or, at least, before trial.34 Our case law had long taught that bona
fide amendments to
_______________
such admission is made through palpable mistake or no such admission is made, to wit:
Section 4. Judicial admissions.—An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
30 Rollo, p. 38.
31 See Section 2 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
32 See Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
33 Torres v. Tomacruz, 49 Phil. 913, 915 (1927).
34 Tiu v. Philippine Bank of Communications, 613 Phil. 56, 68; 596 SCRA 432, 445 (2009).
621
VOL. 760, JUNE 29, 2015 621
pleadings should be allowed in the interest of justice so that every case may, so far as
possible, be determined on its real facts and the multiplicity of suits thus be
prevented.35 Hence, as long as it does not appear that the motion for leave was made with bad
faith or with intent to delay the proceedings,36 courts are justified to grant leave and allow the
filing of an amended pleading. Once a court grants leave to file an amended pleading, the
same becomes binding and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the court
had abused its discretion.37
In this case, URAMI filed its motion for leave seeking the admission of its amended
answer more than two (2) years after it filed its original answer. Despite the considerable
lapse of time between the filing of the original answer and the motion for leave, the RTC still
granted the said motion. Such grant was later affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner, however, opposes the grant of leave arguing that URAMI is precluded from
filing an amended answer by Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court and claiming that
URAMI’s amended answer was only interposed for the purpose of delaying the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 70027.
We rule in favor of allowing URAMI’s amended answer. Hence, we deny the present
appeal.
First. We cannot subscribe to petitioner’s argument that Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court precludes URAMI from filing its amended answer. To begin with, the said provision
does not set the be-all and end-all standard upon which amendments to pleadings may or may
not be allowed. Matters involving the amendment of pleadings are primarily governed by the
pertinent provisions of Rule 10 and not by Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Hence,
allegations (and ad-
_______________
35 Quirao v. Quirao, 460 Phil. 605, 611; 414 SCRA 430, 435 (2003).
36 See Section 3 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
37 Supra note 33.
622
missions) in a pleading — even if not shown to be made through “palpable mistake” — can
still be corrected or amended provided that the amendment is sanctioned under Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court.
Nevertheless, even if we are to apply Section 4 of Rule 129 to the present case, we still find
the allowance of URAMI’s amended answer to be in order. To our mind, a consideration of the
evidence that URAMI plans to present during trial indubitably reveals that the admissions
made by URAMI under its original answer were a product of clear and patent mistake.
One of the key documents that URAMI plans to present during trial, which it also attached
in its amended answer as “Annex 8” thereof, is URAMI’s Board Resolution38 dated 21 June
2004 that evinces Atty. Nethercott’s authority to cause the foreclosure on the pledged stocks
on behalf of URAMI. With the existence of such board resolution, the statement in URAMI’s
original answer pertaining to the lack of authority of Atty. Nethercott to initiate the 23 June
2004 auction sale thus appears mistaken, if not entirely baseless and unfounded. Hence, we
find it only right and fair, that URAMI should be given a chance to file its amended answer in
order to rectify such mistakes in its original answer.
Second. We also cannot agree with the petitioner’s accusation that the amended
answer was only interposed to further delay the proceedings in Civil Case No. 70027. As the
previous discussion reveal, the amended answer aims to correct certain allegations of fact in
the original answer which, needless to state, are crucial to a full and proper disposition of
Civil Case No. 70027. It is, therefore, in the best interest of
_______________
38 Rollo, pp. 435-436. See also the Secretary’s Certificate (Rollo, p. 428) executed by URAMI’s corporate secretary
in October 2003 that evinces Atty. Nethercott’s authority to negotiate with STRADEC, on behalf of URAMI, for the
settlement, collection and payment of STRADEC’s obligations under the Loan Agreement.
623
VOL. 760, JUNE 29, 2015 623
justice and equity that URAMI should be allowed to file the amended answer.
Third. The mere fact that URAMI filed its motion for leave years after the original answer
is also not reason enough in itself to discredit the amended answer as a sheer dilatory
measure. Readily observable from the established facts is that the perceived delay between
the filing of the motion for leave and the filing of the original answer is not purely attributable
to URAMI. It must be remembered that some time after the original answer was filed, we
issued a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 177068 that effectively suspended the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 70027 for more than a year. Thus, even if it wanted to, URAMI
really could not have filed a motion for leave to file amended answer sooner than it already
had. On this score, we note that it only took URAMI a little over three months after the lifting
of the temporary restraining order to replace its previous counsel of record in Civil Case No.
70027 and to file its amended answer.
Fourth. All in all, we find absolutely no cause to overrule the grant of leave granted to
URAMI to file its amended answer. The said grant is consistent with our time-honored
judicial policy of affording liberal treatment to amendments to pleadings, especially those
made before the conduct of trial.
We should always remember that our rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their application should never be allowed to frustrate the
truth and the promotion of substantial justice.39 Were we to succumb to petitioner’s arguments
today, however, we would have sanctioned an outcome totally inconsistent with the
underlying purpose of our procedural laws. That, we simply cannot countenance.
_______________
39 Supra note 35 at p. 612; p. 435, citing Samala v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 1, 8; 363 SCRA 535, 541 (2001).
624
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
12 August 2013 and Resolution dated 29 January 2014 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 117431 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,
concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—The failure of a party to amend a pleading to conform to the evidence adduced
during trial does not preclude an adjudication by the court on the basis of such evidence which
may embody new issues not raised in the pleadings, or serve as a basis for a higher award of
damages. (Philippine National Bank vs. Manalo, 717 SCRA254 [2014])
Should the trial court find the allegations in the pleadings to be inadequate, it should allow
the party concerned to file proper amendments to pleadings in accordance with the mandate
of the Rules of Court that amendments to pleadings are favored and should be liberally
allowed. (Jalover vs. Osmeña, 736 SCRA 267 [2014])

G.R. No. 143264. April 23, 2012.*
LISAM ENTERPRISES, INC. represented by LOLITA A. SORIANO, and LOLITA A.
SORIANO, petitioners, vs.BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC. (formerly PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK),** LILIAN S. SORIANO, ESTATE OF
LEANDRO A. SORIANO, JR., REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LEGASPI CITY, and JESUS
L. SARTE, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Amendment of Pleadings; A responsive pleading having been filed,
amendments to the complaint may, therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter
of right.—It should be noted that respondents Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano,
Jr. already filed their Answer, to petitioners’ complaint, and the claims being asserted were made
against said parties. A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint may,
therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right.
Same; Same; Same; Amendments are generally favored.—Amendments are generally favored, it
would have been more fitting for the trial court to extend such liberality towards petitioners by
admitting the amended complaint which was filed before the order dismissing the original complaint
became final and executory. It is quite apparent that since trial proper had not yet even begun,
allowing the amendment would not have caused any delay. Moreover, doing so would have served the
higher interest of justice as this would provide the best opportunity for the issues among all parties to
be thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties finally determined. Hence, the Court overrules
the trial court’s denial of the motion to admit the amended complaint, and orders the admission of the
same.
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* THIRD DIVISION.
** Per Manifestation dated January 26, 2012, filed by said respondent.
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VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 2012 31
1
Lisam Enterprises, Inc. vs. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc.
Corporation Law; Derivative Suits; Requisites for Filing a Derivative Suit.—In Hi-Yield Realty,
Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 590 SCRA 548 (2009), the Court enumerated the requisites for filing
a derivative suit, as follows: a) the party bringing the suit should be a shareholder as of the time of the
act or transaction complained of, the number of his shares not being material; b) he has tried to
exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e.,has made a demand on the board of directors for the appropriate
relief but the latter has failed or refused to heed his plea; and c) the cause of action actually devolves
on the corporation, the wrongdoing or harm having been, or being caused to the corporation and not to
the particular stockholder bringing the suit. A reading of the amended complaint will reveal that all
the foregoing requisites had been alleged therein. Hence, the amended complaint remedied the defect
in the original complaint and now sufficiently states a cause of action.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Amendment of Pleadings; Due to the changes made by the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, amendments may now substantially alter the cause of action or defense.—
Respondent PCIB should not complain that admitting the amended complaint after they pointed out a
defect in the original complaint would be unfair to them. They should have been well aware that due
to the changes made by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amendments may now substantially alter
the cause of action or defense. It should not have been a surprise to them that petitioners would
redress the defect in the original complaint by substantially amending the same, which course of
action is now allowed under the new rules.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolution and order of the Regional Trial Court of
Legaspi City, Br. 4.
Perfecto Nixon C. Tabora for petitioner.
Emmanuel P.J. Tamase for BDO Unibank, Inc. (PCIB).
Nicolas A. Ocampo for respondent Soriano.
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VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 2012 311

PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
praying that the Resolution1of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (RTC), dated
November 11, 1999, dismissing petitioners’ complaint, and its Order2 dated May 15, 2000,
denying herein petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Admit Amended
Complaint, be reversed and set aside.
The records reveal the following antecedent facts.
On August 13, 1999, petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents for Annulment of
Mortgage with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction with
Damages with the RTC of Legaspi City. Petitioner Lolita A. Soriano alleged that she is a
stockholder of petitioner Lisam Enterprises, Inc. (LEI) and a member of its Board of
Directors, designated as its Corporate Secretary. The Complaint also alleged the following:
4. Sometime in 1993, plaintiff LEI, in the course of its business operation, acquired by purchase a
parcel of residential land with improvement situated at Legaspi City, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 37866, copy attached as Annex “A,” which property is more particularly described as
follows:
xxxx
5. On or about 28 March 1996, defendant Lilian S. Soriano and the late Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., as
husband and wife (hereafter “Spouses Soriano”), in their personal capacity and for their own use and
benefit, obtained a loan from defendant PCIB (Legaspi Branch) (now known as Banco de Oro Unibank,
Inc.) in the total amount of P20 Million;
6. That as security for the payment of the aforesaid credit accommodation, the late Leandro A.
Soriano, Jr. and defendant Lilian S. Soriano, as president and treasurer, respectively of plaintiff LEI,
but
_______________
1 Penned by Judge Gregorio A. Consulta.
2 Id.
313
VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 2012 313
without authority and consent of the board of said plaintiff and with the use of a falsified board
resolution, executed a real estate mortgage on 28 March 1996, over the above-described property of
plaintiff LEI in favor of defendant PCIB, and had the same registered with the Office of the Registry of
Deeds, Legaspi City, copy of the Real Estate Mortgage is hereto attached and marked as Annex “B,”
and made part hereof, to the prejudice of plaintiffs;
7. That specifically, the Spouses Soriano, with intent to defraud and prejudice plaintiff LEI and its
stockholders, falsified the signatures of plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano as corporate secretary and director
of plaintiff LEI, in a document denominated as board resolution purportedly issued by the board of
plaintiff LEI on 6 November 1995, making it appear that plaintiff LEI’s Board met and passed a board
resolution on said date authorizing the Spouses Soriano to mortgage or encumber all or substantially
all of the properties of plaintiff LEI, when in fact and in truth, no resolution of that nature was ever
issued by the board of plaintiff LEI, nor a meeting was called to that effect, copy of the resolution in
question is hereto attached and marked as Annex “C,” and made part hereof;
8. That plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano as Corporate Secretary of plaintiff LEI, had never signed a board
resolution nor issued a Secretary’s Certificate to the effect that on 6 November 1995 a resolution was
passed and approved by plaintiff LEI authorizing the Spouses Soriano as president and treasurer,
respectively, to mortgage the above-described property of plaintiff LEI, neither did she appear
personally before a notary public on 28 March 1996 to acknowledge or attest to the issuance of a
supposed board resolution issued by plaintiff LEI on 6 November 1995;
9. That defendant PCIB, knowing fully well that the property being mortgaged by the Spouses
Soriano belongs to plaintiff LEI, a corporation, negligently and miserably failed to exercise due care
and prudence required of a banking institution. Specifically, defendant PCIB failed to investigate and
to delve into the propriety of the issuance of or due execution of subject board resolution, which is the
very foundation of the validity of subject real estate mortgage. Further, it failed to verify the
genuineness of the signatures appearing in said board resolution nor to confirm the fact of its issuance
with plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano, as the corporate secretary of plaintiff LEI. Furthermore, the height of
its negligence was displayed when it disregarded or failed to notice that the questioned board
resolution
314
with a Secretary’s Certificate was notarized only on 28 March 1996 or after the lapse of more than four
(4) months from its purported date of issue on 6 November 1995. That these circumstances should
have put defendant PCIB on notice of the flaws and infirmities of the questioned board resolution.
Unfortunately, it negligently failed to exercise due care and prudence expected of a banking
institution;
10. That having been executed without authority of the board of plaintiff LEI said real estate
mortgage dated 28 March 1996 executed by the Spouses Soriano, as officers of plaintiff LEI in favor of
defendant PCIB, is the null and void and has no legal effect upon said plaintiff. Consequently, said
mortgage deed cannot be used nor resorted to by defendant PCIB against subject property of plaintiff
LEI as no right or rights whatsoever were created nor granted thereunder by reason of its nullity;
11. Worst, sometime in August 1998, in order to remedy the defects in the mortgage transaction
entered by the Spouses Soriano and defendant PCIB, the former, with the unlawful instigation of the
latter, signed a document denominated as “Deed of Assumption of Loans and Mortgage Obligations
and Amendment of Mortgage”; wherein in said document, plaintiff LEI was made to assume the P20
Million personal indebtedness of the Spouses Soriano with defendant PCIB, when in fact and in truth
it never so assumed the same as no board resolution duly certified to by plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano as
corporate secretary was ever issued to that effect, copy of said Deed is hereto attached and marked as
Annex “D,” and made part hereof;
12. Moreover, to make it appear that plaintiff LEI had consented to the execution of said deed of
assumption of mortgage, the Spouses Soriano again, through the unlawful instigation and connivance
of defendant PCIB, falsified the signature of plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano as corporate secretary of
plaintiff LEI in a document denominated as “Corporate Resolution to Borrow,” to make it appear that
plaintiff LEI so authorized the Spouses Soriano to perform said acts for the corporation, when in fact
and in truth no such authority or resolution was ever issued nor granted by plaintiff LEI, nor a
meeting called and held for said purpose in accordance with its By-laws; copy of which is hereto
attached and marked as Annex “E” and made part hereof;
13. That said irregular transactions of defendant Lilian S. Soriano and her husband Leandro A.
Soriano, Jr., on one hand, and defen-
315
VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 2012 315
dant PCIB, on the other, were discovered by plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano sometime in April 1999. That
immediately upon discovery, said plaintiff, for herself and on behalf and for the benefit of plaintiff LEI,
made demands upon defendants Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., to free
subject property of plaintiff LEI from such mortgage lien, by paying in full their personal indebtedness
to defendant PCIB in the principal sum of P20 Million. However, said defendants, for reason only
known to them, continued and still continue to ignore said demands, to the damage and prejudice of
plaintiffs;
14. Hence, on 25 June 1999, plaintiffs commenced a derivative suit against defendants Lilian S.
Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., before the Securities and Exchange Commission,
docketed as SEC Case No. 06-99-6339 for “Fraudulent Scheme and Unlawful Machination with
Damages” in order to protect and preserve the rights of plaintiffs, copy of said complaint is hereto
attached as Annex”F”;
15. That plaintiffs, in order to seek complete relief from the unauthorized mortgage transaction
between the Spouses Soriano and defendant PCIB, were further compelled to institute this instant
case to seek the nullification of the real estate mortgage dated 28 March 1999. Consequently, plaintiffs
were forced to retain the services of a lawyer with whom they contracted to pay P100,000.00 as and for
attorney’s fee;
16. That unfortunately, the plaintiffs learned that on 30 July 1999, defendant Sarte, in his capacity
as Notary Public of Daraga, Albay and upon application of defendant PCIB, issued a notice of

Auction/Foreclosure Sale of the property subject of the mortgage in question and has set the auction
sale on 7 September 1999 x x x;
17. That by reason of the fraudulent and surreptitious schemes perpetrated by defendant Lilian S.
Soriano and her husband, the late Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., in unlawful connivance and through the
gross negligence of defendant PCIB, plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano, as stockholder, suffered sleepless
nights, moral shock, wounded feeling, hurt pride and similar injuries, hence, should be awarded moral
damages in the amount of P200,000.00.”
After service of summons on all defendants, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order
on August 25, 1990 and, after
316
hearing, went on to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent PCIB (now
known as Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc.) from proceeding with the auction sale of the subject
property.
Respondents Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. filed an Answer
dated September 25, 1999, stating that the Spouses Lilian and Leandro Soriano, Jr. were duly
authorized by LEI to mortgage the subject property; that proceeds of the loan from respondent
PCIB were for the use and benefit of LEI; that all notarized documents submitted to PCIB by
the Spouses Soriano bore the genuine signature of Lolita Soriano; and that although the
Spouses Soriano indeed received demands from petitioner Lolita Soriano for them to pay the
loan, they gave satisfactory explanations to the latter why her demands could not be honored.
It was, likewise, alleged in said Answer that it was respondent Lilian Soriano who should be
entitled to moral damages and attorney’s fees.
On September 28, 1999, respondent PCIB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on
grounds of lack of legal capacity to sue, failure to state cause of action, and litis pendencia.
Petitioners filed an Opposition thereto, while PCIB’s co-defendants filed a Motion to Suspend
Action.
On November 11, 1999, the RTC issued the first assailed Resolution dismissing petitioners’
Complaint. Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution. While
awaiting resolution of the motion for reconsideration, petitioners also filed, on January 4,
2000, a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, amending paragraph 13 of the original
complaint to read as follows:
“13. That said irregular transactions of defendant Lilian S. Soriano and her husband Leandro A.
Soriano, Jr., on one hand, and defendant PCIB, on the other, were discovered by plaintiff Lolita A.
Soriano sometime in April 1999. That immediately upon discovery, said plaintiff, for herself and on
behalf and for the benefit of plaintiff LEI, made demands upon defendant Lilian S. Soriano and the
Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., to free subject property of plaintiff LEI
317
VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 2012 317
from such mortgage lien, by paying in full their personal indebtedness to defendant PCIB in the
principal sum of P20 Million. However, said defendants, for reason only known to them, continued and
still continue to ignore said demands, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiffs; that plaintiff Lolita A.
Soriano likewise made demands upon the Board of Directors of Lisam Enterprises, Inc., to make legal
steps to protect the interest of the corporation from said fraudulent transaction, but unfortunately,
until now, no such legal step was ever taken by the Board, hence, this action for the benefit and in
behalf of the corporation”;
On May 15, 2000, the trial court issued the questioned Order denying both the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Motion to Admit Amended Complaint. The trial court held that no
new argument had been raised by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration to address
the fact of plaintiffs’ failure to allege in the complaint that petitioner Lolita A. Soriano made
demands upon the Board of Directors of Lisam Enterprises, Inc. to take steps to protect the

interest of the corporation against the fraudulent acts of the Spouses Soriano and PCIB. The
trial court further ruled that the Amended Complaint can no longer be admitted, because the
same absolutely changed petitioners’ cause of action.
Petitioners filed the present petition with this Court, alleging that what are involved are
pure questions of law, to wit:
FIRST, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DISMISSED THE ACTION ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER LOLITA A. SORIANO HAS NO
LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE AS SHE IS NOT A REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST;
SECOND, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DISMISSED THE ACTION ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS ANOTHER ACTION PENDING
BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES FOR THE SAME CAUSE;
THIRD, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DISMISSED THE ACTION ON THE
318
GROUND THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION;
FOURTH, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DENIED THE ADMISSION OF PETITIONERS’ AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED AS A MATTER OF
RIGHT, AFTER THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL WAS ISSUED BUT BEFORE ITS FINALITY.
FIFTH, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE ACTION, INSTEAD OF
MERELY SUSPENDING THE SAME FOLLOWING THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN UNION
GLASS.3
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Court shall first delve into the matter of the propriety of the denial of the motion to
admit amended complaint. Pertinent provisions of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court provide as
follows:
“Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right.—A party may amend his pleadings once as a matter of
right at any time before a responsive pleading is served x x x.
Sec. 3 Amendments by leave of court.—Except as provided in the next preceding section,
substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it
appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. x x x”
It should be noted that respondents Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano,
Jr. already filed their Answer, to petitioners’ complaint, and the claims being asserted were
made against said parties. A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the
complaint may, therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right.
However, in Tiu v. Philippine Bank of Communications,4 the Court discussed this rule at
length, to wit:
_______________
3 Rollo, p. 5.
4 G.R. No. 151932, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 432.
319
VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 2012 319
“x x x [A]fter petitioners have filed their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
specifically allows amendment by leave of court. The said Section states:
SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court.—Except as provided in the next preceding
section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be
refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the
court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and
after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
This Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, thus:
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former
rule in such manner that the phrase “or that the cause of action or defense is substantially

altered” was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment
in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, “the amendment may (now) substantially alter
the cause of action or defense.” This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial
change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall
serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the
laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a “just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding.”
The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the
amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that
it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment
substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is
sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice, prevent delay, and secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity
of suits and in order that
320
the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined, and the
case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the
early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was made before the
trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed by law to answer and to
prepare for trial.
Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real facts
and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary
expense. That is, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse
party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to amend.” 5
Since, as explained above, amendments are generally favored, it would have been more
fitting for the trial court to extend such liberality towards petitioners by admitting the
amended complaint which was filed before the order dismissing the original complaint became
final and executory. It is quite apparent that since trial proper had not yet even begun,
allowing the amendment would not have caused any delay. Moreover, doing so would have
served the higher interest of justice as this would provide the best opportunity for the issues
among all parties to be thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties finally
determined. Hence, the Court overrules the trial court’s denial of the motion to admit the
amended complaint, and orders the admission of the same.
With the amendment stating “that plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano likewise made demands upon
the Board of Directors of Lisam Enterprises, Inc., to make legal steps to protect the interest of
the corporation from said fraudulent transaction, but unfortunately, until now, no such legal
step was ever taken by the Board, hence, this action for the benefit and in behalf of the
corporation,” does the amended complaint now
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 444-445. (Emphasis supplied.)
321
VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 2012 321
sufficiently state a cause of action? In Hi-Yield Realty, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,6 the
Court enumerated the requisites for filing a derivative suit, as follows:
a) the party bringing the suit should be a shareholder as of the time of the act or transaction
complained of, the number of his shares not being material;
b) he has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e., has made a demand on the board of
directors for the appropriate relief but the latter has failed or refused to heed his plea; and

c) the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation, the wrongdoing or harm having been,
or being caused to the corporation and not to the particular stockholder bringing the suit.7
A reading of the amended complaint will reveal that all the foregoing requisites had been
alleged therein. Hence, the amended complaint remedied the defect in the original complaint
and now sufficiently states a cause of action.
Respondent PCIB should not complain that admitting the amended complaint after they
pointed out a defect in the original complaint would be unfair to them. They should have been
well aware that due to the changes made by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amendments
may now substantially alter the cause of action or defense. It should not have been a surprise
to them that petitioners would redress the defect in the original complaint by substantially
amending the same, which course of action is now allowed under the new rules.
The next question then is, upon admission of the amended complaint, would it still be
proper for the trial court to dismiss the complaint? The Court answers in the negative.
Saura v. Saura, Jr.8 is closely analogous to the present case. In Saura,9 the petitioners
therein, stockholders of a
_______________
6 G.R. No. 168863, June 23, 2009, 590 SCRA 548.
7 Id., at p. 556.
8 G.R. No. 136159, September 1, 1999, 313 SCRA 465.
9 Supra.
322
corporation, sold a disputed real property owned by the corporation, despite the existence of a
case in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) between stockholders for annulment
of subscription, recovery of corporate assets and funds, etc. The sale was done without the
knowledge of the other stockholders, thus, said stockholders filed a separate case for
annulment of sale, declaration of nullity of deed of exchange, recovery of
possession, etc., against the stockholders who took part in the sale, and the buyer of the
property, filing said case with the regular court (RTC). Petitioners therein also filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint for annulment of sale filed with the RTC, on the ground of forum
shopping, lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and litis pendentia among others. The
Court held that the complaint for annulment of sale was properly filed with the regular court,
because the buyer of the property had no intra-corporate relationship with the stockholders,
hence, the buyer could not be joined as party-defendant in the SEC case. To include said
buyer as a party-defendant in the case pending with the SEC would violate the then existing
rule on jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes. The Court also struck down the argument
that there was forum shopping, ruling that the issue of recovery of corporate assets and funds
pending with the SEC is a totally different issue from the issue of the validity of the sale, so a
decision in the SEC case would not amount to res judicata in the case before the regular court.
Thus, the Court merely ordered the suspension of the proceedings before the RTC until the
final outcome of the SEC case.
The foregoing pronouncements of the Court are exactly in point with the issues in the
present case. Here, the complaint is for annulment of mortgage with the mortgagee bank as
one of the defendants, thus, as held in Saura,10jurisdiction over said complaint is lodged with
the regular courts because the
_______________
10 Supra.
323
VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 2012 323
mortgagee bank has no intra-corporate relationship with the stockholders. There can also be
no forum shopping, because there is no identity of issues. The issue being threshed out in the

SEC case is the due execution, authenticity or validity of board resolutions and other
documents used to facilitate the execution of the mortgage, while the issue in the case filed by
petitioners with the RTC is the validity of the mortgage itself executed between the bank and
the corporation, purportedly represented by the spouses Leandro and Lilian Soriano, the
President and Treasurer of petitioner LEI, respectively. Thus, there is no reason to dismiss
the complaint in this case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi
City, Branch 4, dated November 11, 1999, dismissing petitioners’ complaint in Civil Case No.
9729, and its Order dated May 15, 2000, denying herein petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 4, is hereby DIRECTED to ADMIT
the Amended Complaint.
Considering further, that this case has been pending for some time and, under R.A. No.
8799, it is now the regular courts which have jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes, the
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 4 is hereby DIRECTED to PROCEED with
dispatch in trying Civil Case No. 9729.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Resolution and order reversed and set aside.
Notes.—The rule on amendment of pleadings need not be applied rigidly, particularly
where no surprise or prejudice is caused the objecting party. (Bormaheco, Incorporated vs.
Malayan Insurance Company, Incorporated, 625 SCRA 309 [2010])324
An amended complaint that changes the plaintiff’s cause of action is technically a new
complaint; The action is deemed filed on the date of the filing of such amended pleading, not
on the date of the filing of its original version; An amendment supplements or amplifies the
facts previously alleged, does not affect the reckoning date of filing based on the original
complaint. (Dionisio vs. Linsangan, 644 SCRA 424 [2011])

G.R. No. 151932. August 19, 2009.*
HENRY CHING TIU, CHRISTOPHER HALIN GO, and GEORGE CO, petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, respondent.
Actionable Documents; The pertinent rule on actionable documents is found in Section 7, Rule 8 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that when the cause of action is anchored on a document, its
substance must be set forth, and the original or a copy thereof “shall” be attached to the pleading as an
exhibit and deemed a part thereof.—As to the substitution of the earlier surety agreement that was
annexed to the complaint with the original thereof, this Court finds that the RTC did not err in
allowing the substitution. The pertinent rule on actionable documents is found in Section 7, Rule 8 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that when the cause of action is anchored on a document, its
substance must be set forth, and the original or a copy thereof “shall” be attached to the pleading as an
exhibit and deemed a part thereof, to wit: Section 7. Action or defense based on document.—Whenever
an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such
instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be
attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy
may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
433
VOL. 596, AUGUST 19, 2009 43
3
Tiu vs. Philippine Bank Communications
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter
particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and that discretion is broad, subject
only to the limitations that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter
the theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action.—The granting of leave to file
amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and
that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not substantially
change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action.
Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of
action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest
of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions
and proceedings.
Same; Same; The courts should be liberal in allowing the amendments to pleadings to avoid a
multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their
rights determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay.—The courts should
be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in order that the
real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined, and the case decided on
the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit,
especially in this case where the amendment was made before the trial of the case, thereby giving the
petitioners all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.
Same; Same; Amendments of Pleadings; Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and
should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent
the circuity of action and unnecessary expense.—Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and
should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be
determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuity of
action and unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or
the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to
amend.434

34
Evidence; Documentary Evidence; It is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality
but of substance, that the written document is the best evidence of its own contents.—It is a cardinal
rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of substance, that the written document is the best
evidence of its own contents. It is also a matter of both principle and policy that when the written
contract is established as the repository of the parties’ stipulations, any other evidence is excluded,
and the same cannot be used to substitute for such contract, or even to alter or contradict the latter.
The original surety agreement is the best evidence that could establish the parties’ respective rights
and obligations. In effect, the RTC merely allowed the amendment of the complaint, which
consequently included the substitution of the altered surety agreement with a copy of the original.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; It is well to remember at this point that rules of procedure are
but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice—their strict and rigid application that
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always
be avoided.—It is well to remember at this point that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application that would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. Applied to the
instant case, this not only assures that it would be resolved based on real facts, but would also aid in
the speedy disposition of the case by utilizing the best evidence possible to determine the rights and
obligations of the party- litigants.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Courts; The Regional Trial Court (RTC) committed no reversible
error when it allowed the substitution of the altered surety agreement with that of the original.—
Contrary to petitioners’ contention, they could not be prejudiced by the substitution since they can still
present the substituted documents, Annexes “A” to A-2,” as part of the evidence of their affirmative
defenses. The substitution did not prejudice petitioners or delay the action. On the contrary, it tended
to expedite the determination of the controversy. Besides, the petitioners are not precluded from filing
the appropriate criminal action against PBCOM for attaching the altered copy of the surety agreement
to the complaint. The substitution of the documents would not, in any way, erase the existence
435
VOL. 596, AUGUST 19, 2009 43
5
of falsification, if any. The case before the RTC is civil in nature, while the alleged falsification is
criminal, which is separate and distinct from another. Thus, the RTC committed no reversible error
when it allowed the substitution of the altered surety agreement with that of the original.
Certiorari; A petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.—A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the essential requisites that have to
concur are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there
is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Jurisdiction; The phrase without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of
authority or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered
either in general or with reference to a particular matter.—The phrase without jurisdiction means that
the court acted with absolute lack of authority or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and
determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It
means lack of power to exercise authority. Excess of jurisdictionoccurs when the court transcends its
power or acts without any statutory authority; or results when an act, though within the general
power of a tribunal, board or officer (to do) is not authorized, and is invalid with respect to the

particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power
in respect of it are wanting. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; simply put, power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is
so
436
36
patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The present case failed to comply
with the above-stated requisites. In the instant case, the soundness of the RTC’s Order allowing the
substitution of the document involves a matter of judgment and discretion, which cannot be the proper
subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. This rule is only intended to correct defects of
jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or matters in the trial court’s findings or conclusions.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Adrian L. Barba and Joy G. Elumba for petitioners.
Teogenes X. Velez for respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision1 dated September 28, 2001, rendered by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57732, dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed Orders of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 21 in Civil Case No. 99-352,
dated December 14, 1999 and January 11, 2000.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
In June 1993, Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI), represented by herein petitioners,
applied for a real estate loan with the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM) to fund
its purified water distribution business. In support of the
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice B. A. Adefuin-De la Cruz, with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Amelita
G. Tolentino, concurring, Rollo, pp. 25-30.
437
VOL. 596, AUGUST 19, 2009 437
loan application, petitioners submitted a Board Resolution2dated June 7, 1993. The loan was
guaranteed by collateral over the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
13020.3 The loan was eventually approved.4
In August 1996, AWRI applied for a bigger loan from PBCOM for additional capitalization
using the same Board Resolution, but without any additional real estate collateral.
Considering that the proposed additional loan was unsecured, PBCOM required all the
members of the Board of Directors of AWRI to become sureties. Thus, on August 16, 1996, a
Surety Agreement5 was executed by its Directors and acknowledged by a notary public on the
same date. All copies of the Surety Agreement, except two, were kept by PBCOM. Of the two
copies kept by the notary public, one copy was retained for his notarial file and the other was
sent to the Records Management and Archives Office, through the Office of the RTC Clerk of
Court.6
Thereafter, on December 16, 1998, AWRI informed the bank of its desire to surrender
and/or assign in its favor, all the present properties of the former to apply as dacion en
pago for AWRI’s existing loan obligation to the bank.7 On January 11, 1999, PBCOM sent a

reply denying the request. On May 12, 1999, PBCOM sent a letter to petitioners demanding
full payment of its obligation to the bank.8
Its demands having remained unheeded, PBCOM instructed its counsel to file a complaint
for collection against petitioners. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-352.
_______________
2 CA Rollo, p. 113.
3 Id., at p. 114.
4 Rollo, p. 26.
5 CA Rollo, pp. 116-118.
6 Rollo, p. 26.
7 CA Rollo, p. 122.
8 Id., at p. 37.
438
On July 3, 1999, petitioners filed their Answer. It alleged, among other things, that they
were not personally liable on the promissory notes, because they signed the Surety Agreement
in their capacities as officers of AWRI. They claimed that the Surety Agreement attached to
the complaint as Annexes “A” to “A-2”9 were falsified, considering that when they signed the
same, the words “In his personal capacity” did not yet appear in the document and were
merely intercalated thereon without their knowledge and consent.10
In support of their allegations, petitioners attached to their Answer a certified photocopy of
the Surety Agreement issued on March 25, 1999 by the Records Management and Archives
Office in Davao City,11 showing that the words “In his personal capacity” were not found at the
foot of page two of the document where their signatures appeared.12
Because of this development, PBCOM’s counsel searched for and retrieved the file copy of
the Surety Agreement. The notarial copy showed that the words “In his personal capacity” did
not appear on page two of the Surety Agreement.13
Petitioners’ counsel then asked PBCOM to explain the alteration appearing on the
agreement. PBCOM subsequently discovered that the insertion was ordered by the bank
auditor. It alleged that when the Surety Agreement was inspected by the bank auditor, he
called the attention of the loans clerk, Kenneth Cabahug, as to why the words “In his personal
capacity” were not indicated under the signature of each surety, in accordance with bank
standard operating procedures. The auditor then ordered Mr. Cabahug to type the words “In
his personal capacity” below the second signatures of petitioners. However, the notary public
was never informed of the inser-
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 55-58.

10 Rollo, p. 26.
11 CA Rollo, pp. 38-40.
12 Id.
13 Rollo, p. 27.
439
VOL. 596, AUGUST 19, 2009 439
tion.14 Mr. Cabahug subsequently executed an affidavit15attesting to the circumstances why
the insertion was made.
PBCOM then filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim with Motion for Leave of Court to
Substitute Annex “A” of the Complaint,16 wherein it attached the duplicate original copy
retrieved from the file of the notary public. PBCOM also admitted its mistake in making the
insertion and explained that it was made without the knowledge and consent of the notary

public. PBCOM maintained that the insertion was not a falsification, but was made only to
speak the truth of the parties’ intentions. PBCOM also contended that petitioners were
already primarily liable on the Surety Agreement whether or not the insertion was made,
having admitted in their pleadings that they voluntarily executed and signed the Surety
Agreement in the original form. PBCOM, invoking a liberal application of the Rules,
emphasized that the motion incorporated in the pleading can be treated as a motion for leave
of court to amend and admit the amended complaint pursuant to Section 3, Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court.
On December 14, 1999, the RTC issued an Order17allowing the substitution of the altered
document with the original Surety Agreement, the pertinent portion of which reads:
“August 16, 1996 attached as Annexes “A” to “A-2” of the reply and answer Resolving the Motion to
Substitute Annexes “A” to “A-2” of the complaint and the opposition thereto by the defendant, this
Court, in the interest of justice, hereby allows the substitution of said Annexes “A” to “A-2” of the
complaint with the duplicate original of notarial copy of the Agreement dated to counter-claim.
SO ORDERED.”
_______________
14 Id., at p. 26.
15 CA Rollo, p. 115.
16 Id., at pp. 50-57.
17 Id., at p. 68.
440
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,18 but it was denied in the Order19 dated
January 11, 2000, to wit:
“Resolving the motion for reconsideration and the opposition thereto, the Court finds the motion
substantially a reiteration of the opposition to plaintiff’s motion.
Additionally, the instant motion for reconsideration treats on evidentiary matter which can be
properly ventilated in the trial proper, hence, there is no cogent reason to disturb the Court’s order of
December 14, 1999.
SO ORDERED.”
Aggrieved, petitioners sought recourse before the CA via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 57732.
Petitioners claimed that the RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying their motion for
reconsideration and in allowing PBCOM to substitute the altered copy of the Surety
Agreement with the duplicate original notarial copy thereof considering that the latter’s cause
of action was solely and principally founded on the falsified document marked as Annexes “A”
to “A-2.”20
On September 28, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of
merit, the decretal portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and, accordingly, DISMISSEDfor lack of merit. The assailed Orders dated December 14,
1999 and January 11, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 21, are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.”21
_______________
18 Id., at pp. 69-72.

19 Id., at p. 81.
20 Rollo, p. 28.
21 Id., at p. 30.

441
VOL. 596, AUGUST 19, 2009 441
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
I
THE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE ORDER OF
THE LOWER COURT ALLOWING THE SUBSTITUTION OF THE FALSIFIED DOCUMENT BY
RELYING ON THE PROVISION OF SECTION 3, RULE 10 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
II
ACTING AS THE COURT ON THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, THE COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR HAVING NO JURISDICTION TO RULE ON THE OBLIGATION OF THE
PETITIONERS BASED ON THE FALSIFIED DOCUMENT
III
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE ALLEGATION OF RESPONDENT BANK
THAT FROM AUGUST 15 TO DECEMBER 9, 1997 ASIAN WATER RESOURCES INC. OBTAINED
SEVERAL AVAILMENTS OF NEW BIGGER AND ADDITIONAL LOANS TOTALLING
P2,030,000.00 EVIDENCED BY 4 PROMISSORY NOTES MARKED AS ANNEXES “B,” “B-1,” “B-2”
AND “B-3.”
IV
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE MISAPPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY
COMMITTED BY THE LOWER COURT IN ORDERING THE SUBSTITUTION OF THE FALSIFIED
DOCUMENT.22
Petitioners argue that the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the Order of the
RTC allowing the substitution of the document by relying on Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioners assert that the Rules do not allow the withdrawal and substitution of a
“falsified document” once discovered by the opposing party.
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 60-61.

442
Petitioners maintain that PBCOM’s cause of action was solely and principally founded on
the alleged “falsified document” originally marked as Annexes “A” to “A-2.” Thus, the
“withdrawal” of the document results in the automatic withdrawal of the whole complaint on
the ground that there is no more cause of action to be maintained or enforced by plaintiff
against petitioners. Also, petitioners argue that if the substitution will be allowed, their
defenses that were anchored on Annexes “A” to “A-2” would be gravely affected. Moreover,
considering that the said document was already removed, withdrawn, and disregarded by the
RTC, the withdrawal and substitution of the document would prevent petitioners from
introducing the falsified documents during the trial as part of their evidence.23
Petitioners submit that the RTC misapplied the principle of equity when it allowed
PBCOM to substitute the document with the original agreement. Petitioners also claim that
the remedy of appeal after the termination of the case in the RTC would become ineffective
and inadequate if the Order of the RTC allowing the “withdrawal” and “substitution” of the
document would not be nullified, because the falsified document would no longer be found in
the records of the case during the appeal.24
Petitioners contend that the CA went beyond the issue raised before it when it interpreted
the provisions of the Surety Agreement, particularly paragraph 4 thereof, and then ruled on
the obligations of the parties based on the document. Petitioners posit that the CA
prematurely ruled on petitioners’ obligations, considering that their obligations should be
determined during trial on the merits, after the parties have been given the opportunity to

present their evidence in support of their respective claims. Petitioners stress that the CA
went into the merit of the case when it gave credence to the
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 61-64.

24 Id., at pp. 71-73.
443
VOL. 596, AUGUST 19, 2009 443
statement of fact of PBCOM that “From August 15 to December 9, 1997, Asian Water
Resources, Inc. obtained several availments on its additional loans totalling P2,030,000.00 as
evidenced by 4 promissory notes marked as Annexes ‘B,’ ‘B-1,’ ‘B-2,’ and ‘B-3.’ ” Thus, the
conclusion of the CA in declaring the petitioners liable as sureties violated their right to due
process.25
For its part, PBCOM argues that since the complaint is based on an actionable
document, i.e., the surety agreement, the original or a copy thereof should be attached to the
pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed part of the pleading. Considering that the
surety agreement is annexed to the complaint, it is an integral part thereof and its
substitution with another copy is in the nature of a substantial amendment, which is allowed
by the Rules, but with prior leave of court.
Moreover, PBCOM alleges that since the Rules provides that substantial amendments may
be made upon leave of court, the authority of the RTC to allow the amendment is
discretionary. Thus, the CA correctly held that the act of granting the said substitution was
within the clear and proper discretion of the RTC.
The petition is without merit.
As to the substitution of the earlier surety agreement that was annexed to the complaint
with the original thereof, this Court finds that the RTC did not err in allowing the
substitution.
The pertinent rule on actionable documents is found in Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court, which provides that when the cause of action is anchored on a document, its substance
must be set forth, and the original or a copy thereof “shall” be attached to the pleading as an
exhibit and deemed a part thereof, to wit:
_______________
25 Id., at pp. 64-71.

444
“Section 7. Action or defense based on document.—Whenever an action or defense is based upon a
written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in
the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which
shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the
pleading.”
With respect to PBCOM’s right to amend its complaint, including the documents annexed
thereto, after petitioners have filed their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
specifically allows amendment by leave of court. The said Section states:
“SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court.—Except as provided in the next preceding section,
substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it
appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the
matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the
adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.”

This Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals,26 thus:
“Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in
such manner that the phrase “or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered” was
stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule
10 is that under the new rules, “the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or
defense.” This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the
cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of
substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laud-
_______________
26 416 Phil. 289; 363 SCRA 779 (2001).

445
VOL. 596, AUGUST 19, 2009 445
able objective of the rules which is to secure a “just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.”27
The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations
that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory
of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action.28 Nevertheless, as enunciated
in Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such
amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial
justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and
proceedings.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of
suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights
determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is
greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was
made before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed by law to
answer and to prepare for trial.29
Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally
allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be
determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the
circuity of action and unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are circumstances such as
inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might
justify a refusal of permission to amend.30
_______________
27 Id., at p. 297; pp. 787-788.

28 Refugia v. Alejo, 389 Phil. 568, 576; 334 SCRA 230, 238 (2000).
29 Id., at pp. 576-577; pp. 238-239.
30 Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45770, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 433, 444.
446
In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM in submitting
the altered surety agreement. In fact, the bank admitted that it was a mistake on their part to
have submitted it in the first place instead of the original agreement. It also admitted that,
through inadvertence, the copy that was attached to the complaint was the copy wherein the
words “IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY” were inserted to conform to the bank’s standard
practice. This alteration was made without the knowledge of the notary public. PBCOM’s
counsel had no idea that what it submitted was the altered document, thereby necessitating
the substitution of the surety agreement with the original thereof, in order that the case
would be judiciously resolved.
Verily, it is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of substance, that
the written document is the best evidence of its own contents. It is also a matter of both
principle and policy that when the written contract is established as the repository of the
parties’ stipulations, any other evidence is excluded, and the same cannot be used to
substitute for such contract, or even to alter or contradict the latter.31 The original surety
agreement is the best evidence that could establish the parties’ respective rights and
obligations. In effect, the RTC merely allowed the amendment of the complaint, which
consequently included the substitution of the altered surety agreement with a copy of the
original.
It is well to remember at this point that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application that would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be
avoided.32Applied to the instant case, this not only assures that it would be resolved
_______________
31 ACI Philippines, Inc. v. Coquia, G.R. No. 174466, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 300, 309-310.
32 Philippine National Bank v. Sanao Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 153951, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 287, 307.
447
VOL. 596, AUGUST 19, 2009 447
based on real facts, but would also aid in the speedy disposition of the case by utilizing the
best evidence possible to determine the rights and obligations of the party- litigants.
Moreover, contrary to petitioners’ contention, they could not be prejudiced by the
substitution since they can still present the substituted documents, Annexes “A” to A-2,” as
part of the evidence of their affirmative defenses. The substitution did not prejudice
petitioners or delay the action. On the contrary, it tended to expedite the determination of the
controversy. Besides, the petitioners are not precluded from filing the appropriate criminal
action against PBCOM for attaching the altered copy of the surety agreement to the
complaint. The substitution of the documents would not, in any way, erase the existence of
falsification, if any. The case before the RTC is civil in nature, while the alleged falsification is
criminal, which is separate and distinct from another. Thus, the RTC committed no reversible
error when it allowed the substitution of the altered surety agreement with that of the
original.
A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.33
For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the essential requisites that have to concur are: (1)
the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3)
_______________

33 People v. Court of Appeals, 468 Phil. 1, 10; 423 SCRA 605, 612 (2004).
448
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.34
The phrase without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority
or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered
either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise
authority. Excess of jurisdiction occurs when the court transcends its power or acts without
any statutory authority; or results when an act, though within the general power of a
tribunal, board or officer (to do) is not authorized, and is invalid with respect to the particular
proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in
respect of it are wanting. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; simply put, power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.35
The present case failed to comply with the above-stated requisites. In the instant case, the
soundness of the RTC’s Order allowing the substitution of the document involves a matter of
judgment and discretion, which cannot be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. This rule is only intended to correct defects of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
procedure or matters in the trial court’s findings or conclusions.
However, this Court agrees with the petitioners’ contention that the CA should not have
made determinations as regards the parties’ respective rights based on the surety agreement.
_______________
34 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 1.

35 Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 172299, April 22, 2008, 552 SCRA 424, 437.
449
VOL. 596, AUGUST 19, 2009 449
The CA went beyond the issues brought before it and effectively preempted the RTC in
making its own determinations. It is to be noted that the present case is still pending
determination by the RTC. The CA should have been more cautious and not have gone beyond
the issues submitted before it in the petition for certiorari; instead, it should have squarely
addressed whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
issuing the Orders dated December 14, 1999 and January 11, 2000.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. Subject to the above
disquisitions, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57732, dated September
28, 2001, and the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 21, in
Civil Case No. 99-352, dated December 14, 1999 and January 11, 2000, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales,** Chico-Nazario*** (Actg. Chairperson), Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ.,
concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Note.—Once a case has already been set for hearing, regardless of whether a responsive
pleading has been served, substantial amendments may only be made upon leave of court.
(Maranan vs. Manila Banking Corporation, 519 SCRA 572 [2007])
——o0o——

G.R. No. 133657. May 29, 2002. *
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS and BRITISH STEEL (ASIA), LTD., respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Amendment of Complaints; A complaint can still be amended as
a matter of right before an answer has been filed, even if there is a pending proceeding for its dismissal
before the higher court—before the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the
complaint whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced.—The basic issue in this
case is whether or not the Court of Appeals, by granting the extraordinary writ of certiorari, correctly
ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, despite the fact that
petitioner exercised its right to amend the defective complaint under Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court. Stated differently, the query posed before us is: can a complaint still be amended as a matter of
right before an answer has been filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for its dismissal before
the higher court? Section 2, Rule 10
______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
500
00
Remington Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals
of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states that a pleading may be amended as a matter of
right before a responsive pleading is served. This only means that prior to the filing of an answer, the
plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the complaint whether a new cause of action or change in
theory is introduced. The reason for this rule is implied in the subsequent Section 3 of Rule 10. Under
this provision, substantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed without leave of court after an
answer has been served, because any material change in the allegations contained in the complaint
could prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his defense in the answer.
Same; Same; Same; It cannot be said that the defendant’s rights are violated by changes made in
the complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto.—Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendant’s
rights have been violated by changes made in the complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. In
such an event, the defendant has not presented any defense that can be altered or affected by the
amendment of the complaint in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10. The defendant still retains the
unqualified opportunity to address the allegations against him by properly setting up his defense in
the answer. Considerable leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, as a
matter of right, prior to the filing of an answer by the defendant.
Same; Same; Same; The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the
complaint before an answer has been served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss.—The
right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint before an answer has been
served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss or any other proceeding contesting its
sufficiency. Were we to conclude otherwise, the right to amend a pleading under Section 2, Rule 10 will
be rendered nugatory and ineffectual, since all that a defendant has to do to foreclose this remedial
right is to challenge the adequacy of the complaint before he files an answer.
Same; Same; Same; The Court finds no practical advantage in ordering the dismissal of the
complaint and for the plaintiff to re-file the same, when he can still clearly amend the complaint as a
matter of right.—In this case, the remedy espoused by the appellate court in its assailed judgment will
precisely result in multiple suits, involving the same set of facts and to which the defendants would
likely raise the same or, at least, related defenses. Plainly stated, we find no practical advantage in
ordering the dismissal of the complaint against respondent and for petitioner to re-file the same, when
the latter can still clearly amend the complaint as a matter of right. The amendment of the complaint
would not prejudice respon-
501
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 501
Remington Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals
dents or delay the action, as this would, in fact, simplify the case and expedite its disposition.
Same; Same; Same; Where some but not all the defendants have answered, the plaintiff may still
amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-
answering defendant, but not as to claims asserted against the other defendants.—The fact that the
other defendants below has filed their answers to the complaint does not bar petitioner’s right to
amend the complaint as against respondent. Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have
answered, the plaintiff may still amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims
asserted solely against the non-answering defendant, but not as to claims asserted against the other
defendants.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Renato H. Collado for petitioner.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Angeles for respondent British Steel
(Asia) Ltd.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44529 dated February 24, 1998, which granted the 1
petition for certiorari filed by respondent British Steel Asia Ltd. (British Steel) and ordered
the dismissal of petitioner Remington Industrial Sales Corporation’s (Remington) complaint
for sum of money and damages. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution of the Court of 2
Appeals denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
______________
1 Rollo, p. 21; per Special Second Division composed of Associate Justices Corona Ibay-Somera, Ramon U. Mabutas
and Hilarion L. Aquino, ponente.
2 Ibid., at 34.
502
Remington Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
On August 21, 1996, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages arising from
3
breach of contract, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-79674, before the sala of Judge Marino M.
De la Cruz of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 22. Impleaded as principal
defendant therein was Industrial Steels, Ltd. (ISL), with Ferro Trading GMBH (Ferro) and
respondent British Steel as alternative defendants.
ISL and respondent British Steel separately moved for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that it failed to state a cause of action against them. On April 7, 1997, the RTC
denied the motions to dismiss, as well as the ensuing motion for reconsideration. ISL then
4 5
filed its answer to the complaint.

On the other hand, respondent British Steel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44529. Respondent claimed therein
6
that the complaint did not contain a single averment that respondent committed any act or is
guilty of any omission in violation of petitioner’s legal rights. Apart from the allegation in the
complaint’s “Jurisdictional Facts” that:
1.05. Defendants British Steel (Asia) Ltd. and Ferro Trading GMBH, while understood by the plaintiff
as mere suppliers of goods for defendant ISL, are impleaded as party defendants pursuant to Section
13, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. 7

no other reference was made to respondent that would constitute a valid cause of action
against it. Since petitioner failed to plead any cause of action against respondent as
alternative defendant under Section 13, Rule 3, the trial court should have ordered the
8
dismissal of the complaint insofar as respondent was concerned.
______________
3 Id., at 36.
4 Id., at 74-83.
5 Id., at 84.
6 Id., at 85-94.
7 Id., at 37.
8 SEC. 13. Alternative Defendants.—Where the plaintiff is uncertain against who of several persons he is entitled to
relief, he may join any

503
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 503
Meanwhile, petitioner sought to amend its complaint by incorporating therein additional
factual allegations constitutive of its cause of action against respondent. Pursuant to Section
2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, petitioner maintained that it can amend the complaint as a
9
matter of right because respondent has not yet filed a responsive pleading thereto. 10
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion in CA-G.R. SP No. 44529

11
stating that it had filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint together with said Amended
Complaint before the trial court. Hence, petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the special
civil action be suspended.
On January 29, 1998, the trial court ruled on petitioner’s Motion to Admit Amended
Complaint thus:
“WHEREFORE, the Amended Complaint is NOTED and further proceedings thereon and action on
the other incidents as aforementioned are hereby held in abeyance until final resolution by the
Honorable Court of Appeals (Special 6th Division) of the petition for certiorari and prohibition of
petitioner (defendant British) and/or Manifestations and Motions of therein private respondent, herein
plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.” 12
Thereafter, on February 24, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 44529 as follows:
“WHEREFORE, this Court grants the writ of certiorari and orders the respondent judge to dismiss
without prejudice the Complaint in Civil Case No. 96-79674 against petitioner British Steel (Asia) Ltd.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.” 13
______________
or all of them as defendants in the alternative, although a right to relief against one may be inconsistent with a
right of relief against the other.
9 SEC. 2. Amendments as a matter of right.—A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time
before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
10 CA Records, p. 100.
11 Id., at 114-115.
12 Supra, Note 1 at 197-198.
13 Id., at 32.
504
In the same decision, the Court of Appeals addressed petitioner’s prayer for suspension of
proceedings in this wise:
The incident which transpired after the filing of the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition are
immaterial in the resolution of this petition. What this Court is called upon to resolve is whether the

lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss the
complaint against it. The admission or rejection by the lower court of said amended complaint will not,
insofar as this Court is concerned, impinge upon the issue of whether or not said court gravely abused
its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
14
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, which was
denied in a resolution dated April 28, 1998. Hence, this petition, anchored on the following
grounds:
-I-
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT
AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT EVEN AS SAID COMPLAINT WAS ALREADY AMENDED AS A MATTER
OF RIGHT AND SUFFICIENT CAUSES OF ACTION ARE AVERRED IN THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT, IN GROSS VIOLATION OF SEC. 2, RULE 10 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
-II-
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IF THE PETITIONER WANTS
TO PURSUE ITS CASE AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT, IT HAS TO REFILE THE
COMPLAINT, THUS PRE-EMPTING THE RIGHT OF THE LOWER COURT TO RULE ON THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND COMPELLING THE PETITIONER TO LITIGATE ITS CAUSES OF
ACTION AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE DEFENDANT IN A
SEPARATE ACTION, THEREBY ABETTING MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS. 15
The basic issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals, by granting the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, correctly
______________
Id., at 31-32.
14
Id., at 6.
15
505
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 505
ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, despite the fact
that petitioner exercised its right to amend the defective complaint under Section 2, Rule 10
of the Rules of Court. Stated differently, the query posed before us is: can a complaint still be
amended as a matter of right before an answer has been filed, even if there was a pending
proceeding for its dismissal before the higher court?
Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states that a pleading may be
16
amended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served. This only means that
prior to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the complaint
whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced. The reason for this rule is
17
implied in the subsequent Section 3 of Rule 10. Under this provision, substantial amendment
18
of the complaint is not allowed without leave of court after an answer has been served,
because any material change in the allegations contained in the complaint could prejudice the
rights of the defendant who has already set up his defense in the answer.
Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendant’s rights have been violated by changes
made in the complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. In such an event, the defendant
has not presented any defense that can be altered or affected by the amendment of the
19
complaint in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10. The defendant still retains the unqualified
opportunity to address the allegations against him by properly setting up his defense in the
______________

16 Supra, Note 8.
17 See Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) v. Court of Appeals, Daity Salvosa, and Ray Dean
Salvosa, 271 SCRA 286, 289 (1997), citing Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1979 ed., p. 362.
18 SEC. 3. Amendments by Leave of Court.—Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial
amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the
motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made
upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
19 Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 186, 195 (1999).
506
answer. Considerable leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, as a
matter of right, prior to the filing of an answer by the defendant.
The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint before an
answer has been served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss or any other 20
proceeding contesting its sufficiency. Were we to conclude otherwise, the right to amend a
pleading under Section 2, Rule 10 will be rendered nugatory and ineffectual, since all that a
defendant has to do to foreclose this remedial right is to challenge the adequacy of the
complaint before he files an answer.
Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the
furtherance of justice in order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits without
regard to technicalities. This principle is generally recognized to speed up trial and save party
litigants from incurring unnecessary expense, so that a full hearing on the merits of every
case may be had and multiplicity of suits avoided. 21
In this case, the remedy espoused by the appellate court in its assailed judgment will
precisely result in multiple suits, involving the same set of facts and to which the defendants
would likely raise the same or, at least, related defenses. Plainly stated, we find no practical
advantage in ordering the dismissal of the complaint against respondent and for petitioner to
re-file the same, when the latter can still clearly amend the complaint as a matter of right.
The amendment of the complaint would not prejudice respondents or delay the action, as this
would, in fact, simplify the case and expedite its disposition.
The fact that the other defendants below has filed their answers to the complaint does not
bar petitioner’s right to amend the com-
______________
20F.D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, 1997 ed., p. 183.

21Heirs of Marcelino Pagobo v. Court of Appeals, et al., 280 SCRA 870, 882 (1997), citing Sedeco v. Court of
Appeals, 115 SCRA 96, 103 (1982); Calabig v. Villanueva, 135 SCRA 300, 307 (1985); Cabutin v. Amacio, 170 SCRA
750, 756 (1989); Eugenio v. Velez, 185 SCRA 425, 435 (1990).
507
VOL. 382, MAY 29, 2002 507
plaint as against respondent. Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have answered,
the plaintiff may still amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims
asserted solely against the non-answering defendant, but not as to claims asserted against
the other defendants. 22
Furthermore, we do not agree with respondent’s claim that it will be prejudiced by the
admission of the Amended Complaint because it had spent time, money and effort to file its
petition before the appellate court. We cannot see how the result could be any different for
23
respondent, if petitioner merely re-filed the complaint instead of being allowed to amend it. As
adverted to earlier, amendment would even work to respondent’s advantage since it will
undoubtedly speed up the proceedings before the trial court. Consequently, the amendment
should be allowed in the case at bar as a matter of right in accordance with the rules.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44529 dated February 24, 1998 and April 28, 1998,
respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
22 is further ordered to ADMIT petitioner’s Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 96-79674
and to conduct further proceedings in said case.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Kapunan and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside. RTC-Manila, Br. 22
ordered to admit petitioner’s amended complaint.
Notes.—The new Section 3 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court relaxes further the rule on
amendment of pleadings—refusal to allow amendments other than those which may be made
as a matter of
______________
Supra, Note 19 at 194, citing Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court, Vol. 1, p. 646 and case cited therein.
22
Supra, Note 1 at 216.

23
508
People vs. Coca, Jr.
right under Section 2 may be based only on the ground that the motion was made with intent
to delay. (Heirs of Marcelino Pagobo vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 870[1997])
The filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original,
hence, the statute of limitations runs until the submission of the amendment. (Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan, 293 SCRA 440 [1998])
An order granting or denying a motion to amend the complaint on substantial matters is
discretionary with the court. (Zarate vs. RTC of Kalibo, Aklan (Branch 2), 316 SCRA
594 [1999])
Where some but not all the defendants have answered, plaintiffs may amend their
Complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-
answering defendants, but not as to claims asserted against the other defendants. (Siasoco vs.
Court of Appeals,303 SCRA 186 [1999])

G.R. No. 193650. October 8, 2014.*
GEORGE PHILIP P. PALILEO and JOSE DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. PLANTERS
DEVELOPMENT BANK, respondent.
Pleadings and Practice; Service of Pleadings by Courier Service; Service and filing of pleadings by
courier service is a mode not provided in the Rules.—Indeed, its filing or service of a copy thereof to
petitioners by courier service cannot be trivialized. Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is
a mode not provided in the Rules. This is not to mention that PDB sent a copy of its omnibus
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
2
Palileo vs. Planters Development Bank
motion to an address or area which was not covered by LBC courier service at the time. Realizing
its mistake, PDB refiled and resent the omnibus motion by registered mail, which is the proper mode
of service under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-day period had expired.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Doctrine of Finality of Judgments; Finality of a
judgment or order becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is
perfected, and is conclusive as to the issues actually determined and to every matter which the parties
might have litigated and have decided as incident to or essentially connected with the subject matter of
the litigation, and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in
respect to matters of claim and of defense.—Since PDB’s Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for
New Trial was filed late and the 15-day period within which to appeal expired without PDB filing the
requisite notice of appeal, it follows that its right to appeal has been foreclosed; it may no longer
question the trial court’s Decision in any other manner. “Settled is the rule that a party is barred from
assailing the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him.” The “presumption that a party who
did not interject an appeal is satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower court” applies to it.
There being no appeal taken by PDB from the adverse judgment of the trial court, its Decision has
become final and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. “Finality of a judgment
or order becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected,
and is conclusive as to the issues actually determined and to every matter which the parties might
have litigated and have x x x decided as incident to or essentially connected with the subject matter of
the litigation, and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in
respect to matters of claim and of defense.” And “[i]n this jurisdiction, the rule is that when a
judgment becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of
execution to enforce the judgment”; “execution will issue as a matter of right x x x (a) when the
judgment has become final and executory; (b) when the judgment debtor has renounced or waived his
right of appeal; [or] (c) when the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been filed.
3
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 8, 2014 3
PETITION for review on certiorari of the amended decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Nepthali P. Solilapsi for petitioners.
Janda, Asia and Associates for respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the July 28, 2009 Amended Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 01317-MIN, entitled “Planters Development Bank,
petitioner, versus Hon. Eddie R. Roxas (in his capacity as the former Pairing Judge), Hon.
Panambulan M. Mimbisa (in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 37, General
Santos City), Sheriff Marilyn P. Alano, Sheriff Ramon A. Castillo, George Philip P. Palileo,
and Jose Dela Cruz, respondents,” as well as its August 23, 2010 Resolution3 denying
reconsideration of the assailed amended judgment.
Factual Antecedents
In a June 15, 2006 Decision4 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos
City, Branch 37, in an action for specific performance/sum of money with damages docketed
as Civil Case No. 6474 and entitled “George Philip P. Palileo and Jose Dela Cruz, plaintiffs,
versus, Planters Development Bank, Engr. Edgardo R. Torcende, Arturo R. delos Reyes,
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 12-27. Erroneously titled “Petition for Certiorari.”

2 Id., at pp. 41-62; penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja and concurred in by Associate Justices Michael P.
Elbinias and Ruben C. Ayson.
3 Id., at pp. 6-9; penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo T.
Lloren and Ramon Paul L. Hernando.
4 Id., at pp. 106-112; penned by Judge Eddie R. Rojas.
4
Benjamin N. Tria, Mao Tividad and Emmanuel Tesalonia, defendants,” it was held thus:
Before this Court is a complaint for specific performance and/or sum of money and damages with
prayer for the issuance of writs of preliminary attachment and preliminary injunction filed by Plaintiff
George Philip Palileo and Jose L. Dela Cruz against Engr. Edgardo R. Torcende, Planters
Development Bank (defendant Bank), Arturo R. Delos Reyes, Benjamin N. Tria, Mao Tividad, and
Emmanuel Tesalonia on 22 December 1998.
After summons together with the verified Complaint and its annexes were duly served upon
defendants, the latter answered. During Pre-Trial conference defendant Bank manifested [its]
intention of settling the case amicably and several attempts to explore the said settlement [were]
made as per records of this case. In the last pretrial hearing dated 17 November 2000, only plaintiffs[,]
George Philip Palileo and Jose L. Dela Cruz[,] and their counsel appeared, thus, the latter move [sic]
for the presentation of evidence ex parte, which was granted by the Court with the reservation of
verifying the return card [to determine] whether the order for the pretrial was indeed received by
defendants. Finally, [at the] 21 November 2001 hearing, x x x defendants [again] failed to appear and
their failure to file pretrial brief was noted; thus [plaintiffs were] allowed to present evidence ex
parte before the Clerk of Court.
xxxx
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, defendants are hereby ORDERED to jointly and severally PAY
plaintiffs as follows:
i) Actual Damages;
a) Plaintiff George Philip Palileo[,] the amount of Two Million Six Hundred Five Thousand Nine
[sic] Seventy-Two Pesos and Ninety-Two Centavos (P2,605,972.92), with 12% compounded interest
[per annum] reckoned from the filing of this case until full settlement thereof;
5
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 8, 2014 5
b) Plaintiff Jose R. Dela Cruz[,] the amount of One Million Five Hundred Twenty-Nine Thousand
Five Hundred Eight Thousand [sic] and Eighty Centavos (P1,529,508.80), with 12% compounded
interest [per annum] reckoned from the filing of this case until full settlement thereof;
ii) Moral damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each;
iii) Exemplary Damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each;
iv) Attorney’s Fees in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand [Pesos] (P500,000.00) each x x x and
to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.5

Respondent Planters Development Bank (PDB) received a copy of the RTC Decision on
July 17, 2006.
On July 31, 2006, PDB filed by private courier service — specifically LBC6 — an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial,7 arguing therein that the trial court’s Decision
was based on speculation and inadmissible and self-serving pieces of evidence; that it was
declared in default after its counsel failed to attend the pretrial conference on account of the
distance involved and difficulty in booking a flight to General Santos City; that it had
adequate and sufficient defenses to the petitioners’ claims; that petitioners’ claims are only
against its codefendant, Engr. Edgardo R. Torcende [Torcende]; that the award of damages
and attorney’s fees had no basis; and that in the interest of justice, it should be given the
opportunity to cross-examine the petitioners’ witnesses, and thereafter present its evidence.
5 Id., at p. 112.
6 LBC Express is a domestic corporation that offers cargo and courier services to and from different parts of the
country. http://www.lbcexpress.com/.
7 Rollo, pp. 93-99.
6
Petitioners’ copy of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was
likewise sent on July 31, 2006 by courier service through LBC, but in their address of record
— Tupi, South Cotabato — there was no LBC service at the time.
On August 2, 2006, PDB filed with the RTC another copy of the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for New Trial via registered mail; another copy thereof was
simultaneously sent to petitioners by registered mail as well.
Meanwhile, petitioners moved for the execution of the Decision pending appeal.
In an August 30, 2006 Order,8 the RTC denied the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and for New Trial, while it granted petitioners’ motion for execution pending appeal, which it
treated as a motion for the execution of a final and executory judgment. The trial court held,
as follows:
Anent the first motion, records show that the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New
Trial dated 28 July 2006 was initially filed via an LBC courier on 28 July 2006 and was actually
received by the Court on 31 July 2006, which was followed by filing of the same motion thru registered
mail on 2 August 2006. Said motion was set for hearing by the movant on 18 August 2006 or 16 days
after its filing.
The motion fails to impress. Section 5, Rule 159 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended is
pertinent thus:
Section 5. Notice of hearing.—The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned,
and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the
filing of the motion. (Underscoring and italics supplied)
_______________
8 Id., at pp. 119-120.

9 On Motions.
7
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 8, 2014 7
The aforesaid provision requires [that] every motion shall be addressed to all parties concerned,
and shall specify the time and date of the hearing NOT later than ten (10) days after the filing of the
motion. Being a litigated motion, the aforesaid rule should have been complied [with]. Its
noncompliance renders it defective.
[The] Rule is settled that a motion in violation thereof is pro forma and a mere scrap of paper. It
presents no question which the court could decide [upon]. In fact, the court has NO reason to consider
it[;] neither [does] the clerk of court [have] the right to receive the same. Palpably, the motion is
nothing but an empty formality deserving no judicial cognizance. Hence, the motion deserves a short
shrift and peremptory denial for being procedurally defective.

As such, it does not toll the running of the reglementary period thus making the assailed decision
final and executory. This supervening situation renders the Motion for Execution pending appeal
academic but at the same time it operates and could serve [as] well as a motion for execution of the
subject final and executory decision. Corollarily, it now becomes the ministerial duty of this Court to
issue a writ of execution thereon.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial is
hereby DENIED, and the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal (which is treated as a motion for
execution of a final and executory judgment) is also GRANTED as explained above. Accordingly, let A
WRIT OF EXECUTION be issued against herein defendants to enforce the FINAL and EXECUTORY
Decision dated 15 June 2006.
SO ORDERED.10
PDB received a copy of the above August 30, 2006 Order on September 14, 2006.11
_______________
10 Rollo, pp. 119-120.

11 Id., at p. 158. PDB’s Comment to the instant Petition.
8
On August 31, 2006, a Writ of Execution12 was issued. PDB filed an Urgent Motion to
Quash Writ of Execution,13arguing that it was prematurely issued as the June 15, 2006
Decision was not yet final and executory; that its counsel has not received a copy of the writ;
and that no entry of judgment has been made with respect to the trial court’s Decision. Later
on, it filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash Writ of Execution,14 claiming that the writ was
addressed to its General Santos branch, which had no authority to accept the writ.
On September 7, 2006, PDB filed a Notice of Appeal.15
In an October 6, 2006 Order,16 the RTC denied the motion to quash the writ of execution.
On October 9, 2006, the RTC issued a second Writ of Execution.17
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On October 11, 2006, PDB filed with the CA an original Petition for Certiorari, which was
later amended,18assailing 1) the trial court’s August 30, 2006 Order — which denied the
omnibus motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision and for new trial; 2) its October 6,
2006 Order — which denied the motion to quash the writ of execution; and 3) the August 31,
2006 and October 9, 2006 writs of execution.
_______________
12 CA Rollo, pp. 62-63.

13 Id., at pp. 186-189.
14 Id., at pp. 195-198.
15 Id., at pp. 190-191.
16 Rollo, pp. 121-124.
17 CA Rollo, pp. 200-201.
18 Rollo, pp. 125-145; Amended Petition (with Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction).
9
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 8, 2014 9
On May 31, 2007, the CA issued a Decision19 dismissing PDB’s Petition for lack of merit. It
sustained the trial court’s pronouncement, that by setting the hearing of the Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration and for New Trial on August 18, 2006 — or 16 days after its filing on

August 2, 2006 — PDB violated Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court which categorically
requires that the notice of hearing shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must
not be later than 10 days after the filing of the motion. Citing this Court’s ruling in Bacelonia
v. Court of Appeals,20 the CA declared that the 10-day period prescribed in Section 5 is
mandatory, and a motion that fails to comply therewith is pro forma and presents no question
which merits the attention and consideration of the court.
The appellate court further characterized PDB’s actions as indicative of a deliberate
attempt to delay the proceedings, noting that it did not timely move to reconsider the trial
court’s November 17, 2000 ruling21allowing petitioners to present their evidence ex parte, nor
did it move to be allowed to present evidence in support of its defense. It was only after the
RTC rendered its June 15, 2006 Decision that PDB moved to be allowed to cross-examine
petitioners’ witnesses and to present its evidence on defense.
The CA likewise held that the RTC did not err in ruling that the omnibus motion for
reconsideration did not toll the running of the prescriptive period, which thus rendered the
June 15, 2006 Decision final and executory. It noted as well that PDB’s September 7, 2006
notice of appeal was tardy.
_______________
19 Id., at pp. 28-40; penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario V.
Lopez and Michael P. Elbinias.
20 445 Phil. 300; 397 SCRA 286 (2003).
21 Rollo, p. 36; ruling of the RTC during pretrial hearing of even date.
10
The CA found no irregularity with respect to the writs of execution, which contained
the fallo of the June 15, 2006 Decision of the RTC — thus itemizing the amount of the
judgment obligation. Additionally, it held that the fact that the judgment debtors are held
solidarily liable does not require that the writs should be served upon all of the defendants;
that it is not true that the sheriffs failed to make a demand for the satisfaction of judgment
upon PDB, as the mere presentation of the writ to it operated as a demand to pay; and that
PDB failed to attach the Sheriff’s Return to its Petition, which thus prevents the appellate
court from resolving its claim that the writs were not validly served.
PDB filed a Motion for Reconsideration,22 arguing that Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court should be relaxed in view of the fact that judgment against it was based on a
technicality — and not on a trial on the merits; that there was no deliberate intention on its
part to delay the proceedings; that the court acted with partiality in declaring that the
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was pro forma; that its notice of
appeal was timely; and that the writs of execution are null and void.
On July 28, 2009, the CA made a complete turnaround and issued the assailed Amended
Decision, which decreed thus:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. This Court’s May 31, 2007 Decision is
SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered GRANTING the petition for certiorari. The trial court’s Order
dated August 30, 2006 is SET ASIDE and the Writ of Execution issued by the trial court is
QUASHED. The trial court is ORDERED to hear and rule on the merits of petitioner’s “Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial.”
SO ORDERED.23
_______________
22 CA Rollo, pp. 337-351.

23 Rollo, p. 61.
11
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 8, 2014 11

The CA reversed its original finding that the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for
New Trial was pro forma. This time, it held just the opposite, ruling that PDB’s “tacit
argument” that the “distances involved in the case at bench call for a relaxation of the
application of Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court” deserved consideration. It held that
Section 5 should be read together with Section 424 of the same Rule, thus:
When a pleading is filed and served personally, there is no question that the requirements in
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure pose no problem to the party
pleading. Under this mode of service and filing of pleadings, the party pleading is able to ensure
receipt by the other party of his pleading at least three days prior to the date of hearing while at the
same time setting the hearing on a date not later than ten days from the filing of the pleading.
When, as in the case at bench, the address of the trial court as well as that of the opposing counsel
is too distant from the office of the counsel of the party pleading to personally effect the filing and
service of the pleading, the latter counsel faces a real predicament. In a perfect world with the best
postal service possible, it would be problematic enough to ensure that both requisites are fully met:
that opposing counsel receives the pleading at least three days before the date of hearing and that the
date of hearing is no more than ten days after the filing (mailing) of the pleading. But, as a matter of
fact, given
_______________
24 Sec. 4. Hearing of motion.—

Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written
motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to
ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause
sets the hearing on shorter notice.
12
the state of the postal service today — a matter the Court takes judicial notice of — the party pleading
often finds himself [locked] between the horns of a dilemma.
The case at bench presents the Court with the novel issue of whether the same rigid application of
the cited Sections-and-Rule is warranted when the filing and service of pleadings is by mail. The Court
is of the opinion that when confronted between [sic] the demands of sufficient notice and due process
on the one hand and the requirement that the date of hearing be set no later than ten days from filing,
the stringent application of the Rules is not warranted and a liberal posture is more in keeping with
Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
SECTION 6. Construction.—These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.25
The CA further sustained PDB’s argument that since judgment against it was arrived at
by mere default or technicality, it is correspondingly entitled to a relaxation of the Rules, in
line with the principles of substantial justice. It likewise held that PDB counsel’s act of
setting the hearing of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial 16 days
after its filing was an excusable lapse; that no scheme to delay the case is evident from PDB’s
actions; that more telling is the trial court’s “blurring in cavalier fashion” the distinction
between Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,26 as
_______________
25 Rollo, pp. 54-55.

26 Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders.—
Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or
proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
13
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 8, 2014 13
well as its unequal treatment of the parties from its strict application of Section 5, Rule 15
against respondent, while it bent backward to accommodate petitioners by converting the

latter’s motion for execution pending appeal into a motion for execution of a final and
executory judgment.
Lastly, the appellate court concluded that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion, which thus warrants the grant of PDB’s Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioners filed their Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,27 which the CA denied through
its assailed August 23, 2010 Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition.
_______________
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of
origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or
final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin
to issue the writ of execution.
Sec. 2. Discretionary execution.—
(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal.—On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original
record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its
discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
(b) Execution of several, separate or partial judgments.—A several, separate or partial judgment may be executed
under the same terms and conditions as execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal.
27 Rollo, pp. 63-80.
14
Issues
Petitioners frame the issues involved in this Petition, as follows:

Being assailed herein is the refusal of the Court of Appeals, which is a patent error, for not giving
credence to petitioners-appellants’ arguments that the respondent-appellees’ special civil action
for certiorari before it is clearly devoid of merit as (i) the Decision dated June 15, 2006 of the RTC,
Branch 37, General Santos City had become final and executory before the special civil action
for Certiorari was filed before it which should have been dismissed outright, and which issue of
“finality” was never ruled upon, (ii) granting arguendo that a certiorari proceeding could still be had,
the same should be filed under Rule 45 instead of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, (iii) the
alleged attendant abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent judges, even
granting arguendo that it exist [sic], were [sic] not grave but on the contrary were purely errors of
judgment and, (iv) the substantial and glaring defects of the petition in the special civil action
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals were consistently and clearly called to its attention but were
unjustifiably ignored by it.28
Petitioners’ Arguments
In their Petition and Reply,29 petitioners seek to reverse the assailed CA dispositions and to
reinstate the appellate court’s original May 31, 2007 Decision, arguing that the trial court’s
June 15, 2006 Decision became final and executory on account of PDB’s failure to timely file
its Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, as it properly filed the same only
on August 2, 2006 — or beyond the 15-day period allowed by the Rules of Court.
_______________
28 Id., at pp. 13-14.

29 Id., at pp. 166-177.
15
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 8, 2014 15

Petitioners argue that PDB’s filing of its Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New
Trial on July 31, 2006 by courier service through LBC was improper, since there was no LBC
courier service in Tupi, South Cotabato at the time; naturally, they did not receive a copy of
the omnibus motion. This is precisely the reason why PDB refiled its omnibus motion on
August 2, 2006 through registered mail, that is, to cure the defective service by courier; but by
then, the 15-day period within which to move for reconsideration or new trial, or to file a
notice of appeal, had already expired, as the last day thereof fell on August 1, 2006 —
counting from PDB’s receipt of the trial court’s Decision on July 17, 2006.
Petitioners add that PDB’s notice of appeal — which was filed only on September 7, 2006
— was tardy as well; that PDB’s resort to an original Petition for Certiorari to assail the trial
court’s August 30, 2006 Order denying the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New
Trial was improper, for as provided under Section 9, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, 30 an order
denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an
appeal from the judgment or final order; that certiorariwas resorted to only to revive PDB’s
appeal, which was already lost; and that it was merely a face-saving measure resorted to by
PDB to recover from its glaring blunders, as well as to delay the execution of the RTC
Decision. They also assert that certiorari is not an available remedy, since PDB did not file a
motion for reconsideration with respect to the other assailed orders of the trial court.
Petitioners maintain as well that the CA erred in relaxing the application of the Rules of
Court as to PDB, a banking
_______________
30 On New Trial or Reconsideration.

Sec. 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration.—
An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the
judgment or final order.
16
institution with adequate resources to engage counsel within General Santos City and not
relegate Civil Case No. 6474 to its Manila lawyers who are thus constrained by the distance
involved.
Respondent’s Arguments
Seeking the denial of the Petition, PDB in its Comment31 maintains that the CA did not err
in declaring that its Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was not pro
forma; that there are justifiable grounds to move for reconsideration and/or new trial; that it
had no intention to delay the proceedings; that it was correct for the appellate court to relax
the application of Section 5, Rule 15; and that the CA is correct in finding that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in misapplying the Rules and in exhibiting partiality.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.

The proceedings in the instant case would have been greatly abbreviated if the court a
quo and the CA did not overlook the fact that PDB’s Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and
for New Trial was filed one day too late. The bank received a copy of the trial court’s June 15,
2006 Decision on July 17, 2006; thus, it had 15 days — or up to August 1, 2006 — within
which to file a notice of appeal, motion for reconsideration, or a motion for new trial, pursuant
to the Rules of Court.32 Yet, it filed the omnibus motion for reconsideration and new trial only
on August 2, 2006.
_______________

31 Rollo, pp. 155-164.
32 RULE 37. NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION.
Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration.—
17
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 8, 2014 17
Indeed, its filing or service of a copy thereof to petitioners by courier service cannot be
trivialized. Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in the
Rules.33 This is not to mention that PDB sent a copy of its omnibus motion to an address or
area which was not covered by LBC courier service at the time. Realizing its mistake, PDB
refiled and resent the omnibus motion by registered mail, which is the proper mode of service
under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-day period had expired.
PDB’s Notice of Appeal, which was filed only on September 7, 2006, was tardy; it had only
up to August 1, 2006 within
_______________
Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or
final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes x x x.
RULE 41. APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS.
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal.—
(a) Ordinary appeal.—The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. x x x
Sec. 3. Period of ordinary appeal.—
The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a
record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days
from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension
of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
33 Rule 13, on Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers; Heirs of Numeriano Miranda, Sr. v.
Miranda, G.R. No. 179638, July 8, 2013, 700 SCRA 746, 755.
18
which to file the same. The trial court therefore acted regularly in denying PDB’s notice of
appeal.
Since PDB’s Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed late and the
15-day period within which to appeal expired without PDB filing the requisite notice of
appeal, it follows that its right to appeal has been foreclosed; it may no longer question the
trial court’s Decision in any other manner. “Settled is the rule that a party is barred from
assailing the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him.” 34 The “presumption that a
party who did not interject an appeal is satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower
court”35 applies to it. There being no appeal taken by PDB from the adverse judgment of the
trial court, its Decision has become final and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed,
by this Court. “Finality of a judgment or order becomes a fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, and is conclusive as to the issues
actually determined and to every matter which the parties might have litigated and have
x x x decided as incident to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation,
and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect
to matters of claim and of defense.”36 And “[i]n this jurisdiction, the rule is that when a
judgment becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of
execution to enforce the judgment”;37 “execution will issue as a matter of right x x x (a) when
the judgment has become final and executory; (b) when the judgment debtor has renounced or
waived
_______________

34 Heirs of Juan Oclarit v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96644, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA 239, 249.
35 Spouses Catungal v. Hao, 407 Phil. 309, 325; 355 SCRA 29, 45 (2001).
36 Amarante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 49698, May 3, 1994, 232 SCRA 104, 109-110.
37 Torres v. National Labor Relations Commission, 386 Phil. 513, 520; 330 SCRA 311, 316 (2000).
19
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 8, 2014 19
his right of appeal; [or] (c) when the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having
been filed x x x.”38
Neither can the Court lend a helping hand to extricate PDB from the effects of its mistake;
indeed, PDB erred more than once during the course of the proceedings. For one, it did not
attempt to set right its failure to appear during pretrial, which prompted the court to allow
petitioners to present evidence ex parte and obtain a favorable default judgment. Second,
assuming for the sake of argument that it timely filed its Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and for New Trial, it nonetheless violated the ten-day requirement on the notice of hearing
under Section 5 of Rule 15. Third, even before it could be notified of the trial court’s resolution
of its omnibus motion on September 14, 2006 — assuming it was timely filed, it filed a notice
of appeal on September 7, 2006 — which thus implies that it abandoned its bid for
reconsideration and new trial, and instead opted to have the issues resolved by the CA
through the remedy of appeal. If so, then there is no Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and
for New Trial that the trial court must rule upon; its August 30, 2006 Order thus became
moot and academic and irrelevant. “[W]here [an action] or issue has become moot and
academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value.”39
Fourth, instead of properly pursuing its appeal to free itself from the unfavorable effects of
the trial court’s denial of its notice of appeal, PDB chose with disastrous results to gamble on
its Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial by filing an original Petition
for Certiorari to assail the trial court’s denial thereof. Time and again, it has been said
that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if
_______________
38 Florendo v. Paramount Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 167976, January 20, 2010, 610 SCRA 377, 384.
39 The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, 519 Phil. 15, 29; 484 SCRA 16, 31
(2006).
20
one’s own negligence or error in one’s choice of remedy occasioned such loss.40
What remains relevant for this Court to resolve, then, is the issue relative to the trial
court’s October 6, 2006 Order — which denied the motion to quash the writ of execution —
and the August 31, 2006 and October 9, 2006 writs of execution. The Court observes that the
October 6, 2006 Order and the August 31, 2006 and October 9, 2006 writs of execution were
set aside and quashed merely as a necessary consequence of the CA’s directive in the
Amended Decision for the trial court to hear and rule on the merits of PDB’s Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration and for New Trial. Other than this singular reason, the CA would have
sustained them, and this is clear from a reading of both its original May 31, 2007 Decision
and its subsequent Amended Decision. Now, since the Court has herein declared that PDB’s
omnibus motion may not be considered for being tardy and for having been superseded by the
bank’s filing of a notice of appeal, then the CA’s original pronouncement regarding the
October 6, 2006 Order and the August 31, 2006 and October 9, 2006 writs of execution should
necessarily be reinstated as well.
In light of the above conclusions, the Court finds no need to further discuss the other issues
raised by the parties. They are rendered irrelevant by the above pronouncements.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 28, 2009 Amended Decision
and August 23, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 01317-MIN
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch
37 is ORDERED to proceed with the execution of its June 15, 2006 Decision in Civil Case No.
6474.
_______________
40 Teh v. Tan, G.R. No. 181956, November 22, 2010, 635 SCRA 593, 604.
21
VOL. 738, OCTOBER 8, 2014 21
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe** and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, amended decision and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.—Where there is considerable distance between the offices of two opposing counsels,
and personal service of pleadings and motions by one upon the other is clearly not practicable,
a written explanation as to why personal service was not done would only be superfluous.
(City of Dumaguete vs. Philippine Ports Authority, 656 SCRA 102 [2011])
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.
(Escalante vs. People, 688 SCRA 362 [2013])

G.R. No. 179638. July 8, 2013.*
HEIRS OF NUMERIANO MIRANDA, SR., namely: CIRILA (deceased), CORNELIO,
NUMERIANO, JR., ERLINDA, LOLITA, RUFINA, DANILO, ALEJANDRO, FELIMON,
TERESITA, ELIZABETH and ANALIZA, all surnamed MIRANDA, petitioners, vs.
PABLO R. MIRANDA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should
be filed “within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.”―It is basic
and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed “within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from.” Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may
be filed in court either personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of
receipt. In the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt. In this case, however, the counsel
for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not provided in the
Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules, we cannot consider the filing of petitioners’ Notice of
Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is established jurisprudence that “the date of delivery of pleadings to a
private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court”; instead,
“the date of actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of filing of that pleading.” Records
show that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the 16th
day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal
was filed out of time.
Same; Same; Judgments; Revival of Judgments; An action for revival of judgment is a new and
independent action. It is different and distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or
enforced.―An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action. It is different and
distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. As such, a party aggrieved by a
decision of a court in an action for revival of judgment may appeal the decision, but only insofar as the
merits of the action for revival is concerned.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
747
VOL. 700, JULY 8, 2013 747
Heirs of Numeriano Miranda, Sr. vs. Miranda
The original judgment, which is already final and executory, may no longer be reversed, altered,
or modified.
Same; Same; Same; An action for revival of judgment may be filed either “in the same court where
said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other
place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general.”―As to whether the RTC
has jurisdiction, we rule in the affirmative. An action for revival of judgment may be filed either “in
the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant
resides, or in any other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in
general.” In this case, respondent filed the Petition for Revival of Judgment in the same court which
rendered the Decision dated August 30, 1999.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
David H. Enano Law Offices for petitioners.
Epino Law Office for respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
An action for revival of a judgment cannot modify, alter, or reverse the original judgment,
which is already final and executory.1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
Decision3 dated June 14, 2007 and
_______________
1 Arcenas v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 122, 132; 299 SCRA 733, 743 (1998).
2 Rollo, pp. 3-32.
3 CA Rollo, pp. 134-139; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Vicente S. E. Veloso and Marlene Gonzales-Sison.
748

the Resolution4 dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
97350.
Factual Antecedents
In 1994, petitioners Cirila, Cornelio, Numeriano, Jr., Erlinda, Lolita, Rufina, Danilo,
Alejandro, Felimon, Teresita, Elizabeth, and Analiza, all surnamed Miranda, representing
themselves as the heirs of Numeriano Miranda, Sr., filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Muntinlupa City, a Complaint5 for Annulment of Titles and Specific Performance,
docketed as Civil No. 94-612, against the heirs of Pedro Miranda, namely: Pacita and Oscar
Miranda; the heir of Tranquilino Miranda, Rogelio Miranda; and the spouses respondent
Pablo Miranda and Aida Lorenzo. After trial, the RTC, Branch 256, rendered a
Decision6 dated August 30, 1999, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court resolves:
1. To [u]phold and [s]ustain the validity of TCT Nos. 186011, 186012, and 186013;
2. Ordering Pablo Miranda to indemnify all other heirs of NUMERIANO MIRANDA the
amount equivalent to 12/13 fair market value of the co-owned residential house, erected on the
lot 826-A-3 covered by TCT No. 186013 corresponding to their shares, and for the said heirs to
divide among themselves the aforesaid amount as follows:
1/13 to CIRILA MIRANDA
1/13 to CORNELIO MIRANDA
1/13 to NUMERIANO MIRANDA, JR.
1/13 to ERLINDA MIRANDA
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 180-181.
5 Records, Volume I, Civil Case No. 94-612, pp. 1-7.
6 Records, Civil Case No. 05-131, pp. 8-20; penned by Presiding Judge Alberto L. Lerma.
749
VOL. 700, JULY 8, 2013 749
1/13 to LOLITA MIRANDA
1/13 to RUFINA MIRANDA
1/13 to DANILO MIRANDA
1/13 to ALEJANDRO MIRANDA
1/13 to FELIMON MIRANDA
1/13 to TERESITA MIRANDA
1/13 to ELIZABETH MIRANDA
1/13 to ANALIZA MIRANDA
3. Ordering Plaintiffs Lolita Miranda, Alejandro Miranda, Teresita Miranda, Rufina
Miranda and all persons claiming rights under them to immediately vacate the abovementioned
residential house and to jointly and severally pay to the spouses Pablo and Aida Miranda a
monthly rental of P2,000.00 from the date of notice of the promulgation of this judgment up to
the time that they have actually vacated the property;
4. Proclaiming that ROGELIO MIRANDA is not the biological son or child by nature of
TRANQUILINO MIRANDA, and therefore is not entitled to inherit from the latter;
5. Declaring CORNELIO MIRANDA, NUMERIANO MIRANDA, JR., ERLINDA
MIRANDA, LOLITA MIRANDA, RUFINA MIRANDA, DANIL[O] MIRANDA, ALEJANDRO
MIRANDA, FELIMON MIRANDA, TERESITA MIRANDA, ELIZABETH MIRANDA, ANALIZA
MIRANDA, PABLO MIRANDA and PACITA MIRANDA as the lawful legal heirs of the
deceased TRANQUILINO MIRANDA and ordering them to partition among themselves Lot 826-
A-1 covered by TCT No. 186011 registered in the name of TRANQUILINO MIRANDA,
containing an area of 213 square meters, as follows:
1/13 aliquot share to Cornelio Miranda
1/13 aliquot share to Numeriano Miranda, Jr.
1/13 aliquot share to Erlinda Miranda

1/13 aliquot share to Lolita Miranda
1/13 aliquot share to Rufina Miranda
1/13 aliquot share to Danilo Miranda
1/13 aliquot share to Alejandro Miranda750
1/13 aliquot share to Felimon Miranda
1/13 aliquot share to Teresita Miranda
1/13 aliquot share to Elizabeth Miranda
1/13 aliquot share to Analiza Miranda
1/13 aliquot share to Pablo Miranda
1/13 aliquot share to Pacita Miranda
6. Ordering all the abovenamed heirs to commission the survey of Lot 826-A-1 or to
authorize in writing, one of them to commission such survey, in order to avoid a chaotic situation
similar to the case at bar. Should they not agree as to what particular portion shall belong to one
another, they may agree that it be allotted to one or two or several of them, who shall indemnify
the others at a price agreed upon by all of them. Should they not agree as to whom shall the
property be allotted, to sell the property to a third person at [a] price agreed upon by a majority
of all [of] them, and to partition the proceeds of the sale in accordance with No. 5 above.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners did not file any appeal hence the Decision became final and executory.8
On December 11, 2001, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution,9 which was not implemented.10
On July 8, 2005, respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion11praying that the RTC issue a
“Break-Open and Demolition Order” in order to compel the petitioners to vacate his
property.12 But since more than five years have elapsed from the time the Writ of Execution
should have been enforced, the RTC denied the Motion in its Order13 dated August 16, 2005.
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 18-20.
8 Id., at p. 31.
9 Id., at pp. 21-23.
10 Id., at p. 24.
11 Id., at pp. 25-29.
12 Id., at p. 28.
13 Id., at p. 31.
751
VOL. 700, JULY 8, 2013 751
This prompted respondent to file with the RTC a Petition14 for Revival of Judgment, which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 05-131. Petitioners opposed the revival of judgment assailing,
among others, the jurisdiction of the RTC to take cognizance of the Petition for Revival of
Judgment.15
On June 20, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision16granting the Petition. Thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition to be meritorious, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. Pursuant to Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, the Decision
dated August 30, 1999 in Civil Case No. 94-612 is hereby REVIVED.
SO ORDERED.17
On July 13, 2006, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal 18via LBC,19 which was opposed by
respondent on the ground that the Decision dated August 30, 1999 has long become final and
executory.20 Petitioners, in turn, moved for the transmittal of the original records of the case
to the CA, insisting that respondent’s opposition is without merit.21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Finding the appeal barred by prescription, the RTC denied the Notice of Appeal in its
Order22 dated October 10, 2006, to wit:
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 1-7.
15 Id., at pp. 199-205.

16 Id., at pp. 268-270; penned by Presiding Judge Alberto L. Lerma.
17 Id., at p. 270. Emphases in the original.
18 Id., at pp. 282-283.
19 Id., at p. 284.
20 Id., at pp. 286-288.
21 Id., at pp. 292-297.
22 Id., at p. 305; penned by Presiding Judge Alberto L. Lerma.
752
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the notice of appeal herein filed is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.23
Feeling aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus24 with the CA praying that
their Notice of Appeal be given due course.25
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 14, 2007, the CA denied the Petition for Mandamus on the ground that the Notice
of Appeal was filed out of time.26 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The appeal is
hereby DISMISSED for having been filed out of time.
SO ORDERED.27
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in its
Resolution28 dated September 11, 2007.
Issues
Hence, this recourse, with petitioners raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER X X X THE APPEAL WAS PERFECTED ON TIME?
_______________
23 Id.
24 CA Rollo, pp. 2-16; Amended Petition, pp. 39-63.
25 Id., at pp. 12 and 60.
26 Id., at pp. 134-139.
27 Id., at p. 139.
28 Id., at pp. 180-181.
753
VOL. 700, JULY 8, 2013 753
2. WHETHER X X X THE LATE (ONE DAY) FILING WAS JUSTIFIED?
3. WHETHER X X X AN ACTION FOR REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT IS APPEALABLE?
4. WHETHER THE APPEAL IS MERITORIOUS?
a. Whether the [RTC] below has exclusive original jurisdiction over an action for revival of judgment?
b. Whether xxx respondent herein, plaintiff therein, as one of the judgment creditors can file the said action for
revival ALONE?
c. Whether subsequent events or laws have rendered the judgment sought to be revived modified [or] altered[,] or
prevent its enforcement?
d. Whether res judicata or laches has seeped in, other judgment creditors not suing for any such implementation of
the 1999 judgment, ONLY PLAINTIFF ALONE?
e. Whether x x x the Petitioners are entitled to damages?29
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners assert that an action to revive judgment is appealable, 30 and that their appeal
was perfected on time.31They insist that the Notice of Appeal, which they filed on the 15th day
via LBC, was seasonably filed since the law does not require a specific mode of service for
filing a notice of appeal.32
_______________
29 Rollo, pp. 12-13.
30 Id., at p. 412.
31 Id., at p. 404.
32 Id.
754

Besides, even if their appeal was belatedly filed, it should still be given due course in the
interest of justice,33considering that their counsel had to brave the storm and the floods caused
by typhoon “Florita” just to file their Notice of Appeal on time.34
Petitioners further contend that their appeal is meritorious.35 They insist that it is the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the Petition for
Revival of Judgment since the amount in the tax declarations of the properties involved is less
than Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).36 They likewise assail the Decision dated August 30,
1999, claiming that the deeds and certificates of title subject of Civil Case No. 94-612 were
falsified.37
Respondent’s Arguments
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the Notice of Appeal was belatedly
filed,38 and that the revival of judgment is unappealable as it is barred by prescription.39
Our Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
The Notice of Appeal was belatedly
filed.
_______________
33 Id., at pp. 411-412.
34 Id., at pp. 408-410.
35 Id., at p. 417.
36 Id., at pp. 418-419.
37 Id., at pp. 413-415.
38 Id., at p. 464.
39 Id., at p. 466.
755
VOL. 700, JULY 8, 2013 755
It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed “within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.”40
Under Section 3,41 Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either
personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In
the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt.
In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private
courier, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules, we
cannot consider the filing of petitioners’ Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is
established jurisprudence that “the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding
agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court”; instead, “the date of
actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of filing of that pleading.”42 Records show
that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the
16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the
Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.
_______________
40 RULES OF COURt, Rule 41, Section 3.
41 Sec. 3. Manner of filing.—The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders, judgments and all
other papers shall be made by presenting the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as such, personally to the clerk
of court or by sending them by registered mail. In the first case, the clerk of court shall endorse on the pleading the
date and hour of filing. In the second case, the date of the mailing of motions, pleadings, or any other papers or
payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as
the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the record of the case.
42 Philippine National Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 172458, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA
424, 433-434, citing Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 89070, May
18, 1992, 209 SCRA 55, 60-61.
756

Neither can petitioners use typhoon “Florita” as an excuse for the belated filing of the
Notice of Appeal because work in government offices in Metro Manila was not suspended on
July 13, 2006, the day petitioners’ Notice of Appeal was mailed via LBC.43
And even if we, in the interest of justice, give due course to the appeal despite its late
filing, the result would still be the same. The appeal would still be denied for lack of merit.
The Decision dated August 30, 1999
is already final and executory.
An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action. 44 It is different and
distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. 45 As such, a party
aggrieved by a decision of a court in an action for revival of judgment may appeal the decision,
but only insofar as the merits of the action for revival is concerned. The original judgment,
which is already final and executory, may no longer be reversed, altered, or modified.46
In this case, petitioners assail the Decision dated August 30, 1999, which is the original
judgment sought to be revived or enforced by respondent. Considering that the said Decision
had already attained finality, petitioners may no longer question its correctness. As we have
said, only the merits of the action for revival may be appealed, not the merits of the original
judgment sought to be revived or enforced.
RTC has jurisdiction over the Petition
for Revival of Judgment
_______________
43 Rollo, p. 46.
44 Juco v. Heirs of Tomas Siy Chung Fu, 491 Phil. 641, 650; 451 SCRA 464, 473 (2005).
45 Id.
46 Arcenas v. Court of Appeals, supra note 1 at p. 132; p. 743.
757
VOL. 700, JULY 8, 2013 757
As to whether the RTC has jurisdiction, we rule in the affirmative. An action for revival of
judgment may be filed either “in the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the
place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place designated by the statutes
which treat of the venue of actions in general.”47 In this case, respondent filed the Petition for
Revival of Judgment in the same court which rendered the Decision dated August 30, 1999.
All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in denying the Petition and dismissing the
appeal for having been filed out of time.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated June 14, 2007 and
the Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97350 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Perez, Mendoza** and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.―Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it
executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five years from the date of entry of
judgment; After the lapse of five years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which
must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten years from the
time the judgment becomes final. (Villeza vs. German Management and Services, Inc., 627
SCRA 425 [2010])
_______________
47 Infante v. Aran Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 123, 129, citing Aldeguer v. Gemelo,
68 Phil. 421, 424-425 (1939).
** Per Special Order No. 1484 dated July 9, 2013.

758
Article 1144 of the Civil Code requires, that an action to revive a judgment must be
brought before it is barred by prescription, which was ten years from the accrual of the right
of action. (Bañez, Jr. vs. Concepcion, 679 SCRA 237 [2012])

Court Rules on Amending Pleadings

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G.R. No. 211113. June 29, 2015.

ADERITO Z. YUJUICO, petitioner, vs. UNITED RESOURCES ASSET

The Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC) is a domestic corporation

The Notice and Civil Case No. 70027

IV – Rules 10-13 Page 2

8 Id., at pp. 178-180.

The Sale and URAMI’s Answer with Counterclaim

IV – Rules 10-13 Page 3

URAMI’s Change of Counsel and Amended Answer

16 Id., at pp. 210-219.

IV – Rules 10-13 Page 4

21 Id., at pp. 258-259.

C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 117431 and the Present Appeal

IV – Rules 10-13 Page 5

IV – Rules 10-13 Page 8

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IV – Rules 10-13 Page 12

IV – Rules 10-13 Page 13

IV – Rules 10-13 Page 14

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9 Id., at pp. 55-58.

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18 Id., at pp. 69-72.

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22 Id., at pp. 60-61.

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23 Id., at pp. 61-64.

25 Id., at pp. 64-71.

IV – Rules 10-13 Page 23

26 416 Phil. 289; 363 SCRA 779 (2001).

27 Id., at p. 297; pp. 787-788.

IV – Rules 10-13 Page 25

34 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 1.

IV – Rules 10-13 Page 26

REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Appeals denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

filed its answer to the complaint.

IV – Rules 10-13 Page 28

dismissal of the complaint insofar as respondent was concerned.

relief, he may join any

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion in CA-G.R. SP No. 44529

12 Supra, Note 1 at 197-198.

IV – Rules 10-13 Page 29

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20F.D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, 1997 ed., p. 183.

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Supra, Note 1 at 216.

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DEL CASTILLO, J.:

1 Rollo, pp. 12-27. Erroneously titled “Petition for Certiorari.”

IV – Rules 10-13 Page 34

8 Id., at pp. 119-120.

IV – Rules 10-13 Page 35

10 Rollo, pp. 119-120.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

12 CA Rollo, pp. 62-63.