Facts: On May 20, 1958 Olimpia Y. Co filed a bigamy case against Merardo L.

Zapanta alleging that the latter having previously married to Estrella Guarin,
and without having the said marriage dissolved contracted a second marriage
with the complainant. On June 16, 1958, Zapanta filed a case against Co for
the annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress force and
intimidation. Co filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that
it stated no cause of action but was denied after a few days. On Sept. 2,
1958, Zapanta filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that the
civil case was a prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the motion as
well as petitioners motion for reconsideration and ordered his arraignment.
After entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner field the present action.

Issues: The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before

the court and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court.

Should the question for annulment of the second marriage prosper on the
ground that Zapanta’s consent thereto was obtained by means of duress,
force and intimidation?

Held: Zapanta’s act was involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction
for bigamy. Thus, the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the
second marriage is determinative of petitioner’s guilt or innocence of the
crime of bigamy. The civil action for annulment must first be decided before
the action for bigamy can proceed. Wherefore, the writ prayed for in the
petition was hereby granted. Without any costs.
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

Facts: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, born and registered as a male, underwent
sex reassignment in Bangkok, Thailand, the fact of which was certified here in the
Philippines by virtue of a medical certificate issued by one Dr. Marcelino Reysio-
Cruz. He then lived his life as a woman. On November 26, 2002, Rommel filed a
petition for the change of his first name and sex before the RTC of Manila. The
court having underwent the jurisdictional requirements, and there having no
opposition, the court proceeded with the hearing where Rommel presented his
American Fiance as witness.

RTC gave due course to his petition, ruling based on equity, that “petitioner’s
misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be
taken against him” and that “no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody”
if the petition were to be granted. His name was thus changed to Mely, and sex to
“female.” Republic filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. The appellate court
reversed the decision of the RTC.

Petitioner’s claim / Issue:

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

Held: Petitioner, your contention is not meritorious.

Ratio decidendi:

1.) Change of Name, primarily Administrative in nature: Section 1 of RA

9048 provides in essence that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical
errors, which can be changed by concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general. The jurisdiction therefore is primarily lodged with these
officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first
 filed and subsequently denied. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial. Hence, the venue to which petitioner filed is improper.

2.) Grounds for change of name: RA 9048 provides the grounds for which
change of first name may be allowed: 1) petitioner finds the first name or
nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; 2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually
and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by
that first name or nickname in the community; or 3) The change will avoid
confusion.

From these grounds, it can be gleaned that RA 9048 does not sanction a
change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than
avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s name for his declared purpose may
only create grave complications. Before a person can legally change his given
name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced
by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true
and official name.

3.) No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex
On the Ground of Sex Reassignment: By virtue of RA 9048, Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register, excluding the clerical or typographical error. Section 2 of RA 9048
provides expressly that no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of
the Civil Code (*please see the codal provisions). The acts, events or factual
errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the
provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the
ground of sex reassignment.

4.) Purposes:
 A. Correction - To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove
the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace something
with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute." The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All
entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex,
were all correct. No correction is necessary.
B. Entry of Certain Acts under Article 407 - Article 407 of the Civil Code
authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and
deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization,
loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of
filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees
produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and
nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the
laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events
mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by
any law, expressly or impliedly.

5.) Status of a Person is permanent. The status of a person in law includes all
his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status…
include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity
to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as
birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes
even succession. (emphasis supplied)

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body
and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974.
They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the
shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the
children under the guardianship of EngraceNinal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito
and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an
affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from
securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977.
After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional
rights.Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause
of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
“annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the
nullity of Pepito’s marriage after his death?

RULING:

1. The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio. However, there are several instances
recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage.

In this case, they cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and
claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepito’s
first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20
months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to
Norma is still void.

2. No. Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. “A void marriage does not
require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make
the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary,
yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained
and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of
legal rights upon the parties is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And
therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or
after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof
of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-
existent by the courts.” It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of
the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and
is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that
there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though
void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can
be based only on a final judgment to that effect.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to

declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited
to determination of heir ship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
FACTS: Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a
complaint on two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial
Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in
offce and ignorance of the law.

It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
Borja on September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a
subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was
told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and been
heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of
Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction
on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he
solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40
to 50 km away.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.

HELD: The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and
bigamous there being a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda.
Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years and the spouse had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.

With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the
written request where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of
the Family Code. Their non-compliance did not invalidate their marriage however,
Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.
FACTS: On December 24, 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan

Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with “grossly immoral conduct,” consisting of

contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant, while

his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting No judicial action having been

initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of

respondent with complainant. Respondent was charged with abandonment of minor and

bigamy by complainant. Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo her

first cousin, with this fact, Atty. Jordan Terre succesfully convinced complainant that her

marriage was void ab initio and they are free to contract marriage. In their marriage

license, despite her objection, he wrote “single” as her status. After getting the

complainant pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted another

marriage to Helina Malicdem believing again that her previous marriage was also void ab

initio.

ISSUE: WON a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a subsequent

marriage

HELD: Yes. The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a

spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant’s evidence

as to the basic fact which underscores that bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second

place, the pretended defense is the same argument by which he inveigled complainant into

believing that her prior marriage or Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab

initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to

contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer,

knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of

the supreme Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is

legally free to contract a second marriage , a judicial declaration that the first marriage

was null and void ab initio is essential.

FACTS: Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are both medical practitioners.
They begot 3 children. 11 years later, Leonida sought to annul her marriage with
Manuel claiming that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. Leonida testified that Manuel is a harsh disciplinarian
and that his policy towards their children is often unconventional and was the cause
of their frequent fight. Manuel has an unreasonable way of imposing discipline
towards their children but is remarkably so gentle towards his mom. He is more
affectionate towards his mom and this is a factor which is unreasonable for
Leonida. Further, Leonida also testified that Manuel is a homosexual as evidenced
by his unusual closeness to his male companions and that he concealed his
homosexuality from Leonida prior to their marriage. She once caught Manuel
talking to a man affectionately over the phone and she confirmed all her fear when
she saw Manuel kiss a man. The RTC ruled that their marriage is null and void not
because of PI but rather due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his
homosexuality (Art 45 of the FC). The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and
void due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.

RULING: No. It is found out that there was no concealment of homosexuality done
by Manuel.

To nullify an existing marriage, there are requisites which are provided by the
Family Code. As expressly stated in Art. 45 part 3 of the Family Code, “That the
consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with
full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other
as husband and wife”. It was not proven that Manuel concealed his homosexuality
which would eventually lead to fraud.

The SC emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a marriage.

It is the concealment of homosexuality that would. In the case at bar however, it
is not proven that Manuel is a homosexual. The lower court should not have taken
the public’s perception against Manuel’s sexuality. His peculiarities must not be
ruled by the lower court as an indication of his homosexuality for those are not
conclusive and are not sufficient enough to prove so. Even granting that Manuel is
indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case
was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that
Leonida’s consent had been vitiated by such.
FACTS: Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32,
on February 24, 1948, before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered
with the local civil registrar. However, the two were unable to live together after
the marriage and as of June 1948, they were already estranged. Vicenta left for
the United Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified complaint for
divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final and absolute” was
issued in open court by the said tribunal. She married an American, lived with him
in California, had several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American
Citizenship.

On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of

Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents,
Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged
Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the
Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the
annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages. Vicenta’s parents denied that they had in any way influenced their
daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon
courts of the Philippines.

2. Whether or not the parents of Vicenta alienated the affections of their

daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband.

RULING:

1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent and
undissolved under the Philippine Law.

Pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code, laws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine
Law to which Escaño was bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued,
Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not
complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any justifiable
cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute
divorce, and finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful
infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation
under our law on the basis of adultery.

2. No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives,
aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce.

A portion of Section 529 reads: The law distinguishes between the right of a
parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of
rights in a tranger to intermeddle in such affairs. …A parent is liable for alienation
of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully
entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he
acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives.

Therefore, her parents, in respecting Vicenta’s independent decisions, certainly

cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or
unworthy motives.
FACTS:Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this perio
d, Felix Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two
were married. After the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner,
sought the nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code
“Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.”
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition
because the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent
were not yet married and were simply cohabitating.

ISSUE: W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.

HELD: Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what

is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written.
Since the reason
for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to
prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being
exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition
shall not apply also to common law relationships.
The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the d
eceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the
Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the
relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage.
FACTS: Respondent Shirley B. Nuega (Shirley) was married to Rogelio A. Nuega
(Rogelio) on September 1, 1990. Upon the request of Rogelio, Shirley sent him
money for the purchase of a residential lot in Marikina where they had planned to
eventually build their home. The following year, or on September 13, 1989, Rogelio
purchased the subject house and lot for One Hundred Two Thousand Pesos
(P102,000.00) from Rodeanna Realty Corporation. Shirley claims that upon her
arrival in the Philippines sometime in 1989, she settled the balance for the equity
over the subject property with the developer through SSS8 financing. She likewise
paid for the succeeding monthly amortizations.

On September 1, 1990, Shirley and Rogelio got married and lived in the subject
property. The following year, Shirley returned to Israel for work. While overseas,
she received information that Rogelio had brought home another woman, Monica
Escobar, into the family home. She also learned and was able to confirm upon her
return to the Philippines in May 1992, that Rogelio had been introducing Escobar as
his wife.

In June 1992, Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for Concubinage before
the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal, and another for Legal Separation and
Liquidation of Property before the RTC of Pasig City. In between the filing of
these cases, Shirley learned that Rogelio had the intention of selling the subject
property. Shirley then advised the interested buyers one of whom was their
neighbor and petitioner Josefina V. Nobleza (petitioner) – of the existence of the
cases that she had filed against Rogelio and cautioned them against buying the
subject property until the cases are closed and terminated. Nonetheless, under a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992, Rogelio sold the subject
property to petitioner without Shirley’s consent in the amount of Three Hundred
Eighty Thousand Pesos (P380,000.00), including petitioner’s undertaking to assume
the existing mortgage on the property with the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation and to pay the real property taxes due thereon.

ISSUE: Is the Deed of Sale null and void for lack of the consent of the wife?
HELD: Yes. The petitioner is not a buyer in good faith. A buyer cannot claim to be
an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT of the seller while
ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances relevant to the sale.

The nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of respondent’s
financial contribution in the purchase of the subject property. Actual contribution
is not relevant in determining whether a piece of property is community property
for the law itself defines what constitutes community property.

Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:

Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements,
the community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at
the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.

The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute
community by the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement.

Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in
Article 92, it, therefore, forms part of the absolute community property of
Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to its acquisition
before their marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio’s name appears in the
TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley and Rogelio.
Facts: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo were spouses, they were married on
August 8, 1967. During their marriage the spouses bought a house and lot at San
Pablo City. The husband Marcelino, without the consent of his wife mortgaged the
aforementioned property to the petitioner. Marcelino made no payments for the
said mortgage thus the petitioner foreclosed the property. Marcelino eventually
died, this was the only time that Miguela came to the knowledge of the
foreclosure. Upon finding out Miguela instituted with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 29, San Pablo City, a Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and
Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against
petitioner. The Regional Trial Court Ruled in favor of Miguela, also, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the petitioner filed this petition
for review on Certiorari Rule 45.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the mortgage constituted by the late Marcelino Dailo,
Jr. on the subject property as co-owner thereof is valid as to his undivided share.

(2) Whether or not the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. the same having redounded to the benefit
of the family

Held: (1) In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the sale of a conjugal
property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article
124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one
renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.

(2) Under Article 121 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership shall be liable
for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent
of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . . For the
subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There
must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the
welfare of the spouses. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant
claiming as such. The petitioner failed to prove such claim.
Wherefore, the petition is Denied.
Facts: A lot was owned by Santiago Garcia, who has 9 children and a wife named
Consuelo Garcia. Santiago already died when this controversy arose. Petitioners,
the spouses Estonina, filed a case against Consuelo Garcia and was able to obtain an
attachment over the land. While the case was pending, the 9 children sold their
1/10 share in the lot to Spouses Atayan, who are the respondents here. Estonina
were able to obtain a favorable judgment against Consuelo Garcia. The land was
sold at public auction and a TCT was issued in the name of Estonina. Atayan
however filed a complaint for annulment of the sheriff sale and the TCT claiming
that they own 9/10 of the land. The RTC said that the land was presumed to be
conjugal hence Consuelo Garcia owned 50% of the land plus 5% as her share in the
intestate estate of her husband Santiago Garcia. RTC ordered the amendment of
the TCT to show that Estonina owns 55% while Atayan owns 45%. Both parties
appealed. The CA modified the judgment. The CA held that lot was the exclusive
property of Santiago Garcia and not conjugal. It held that Estonina only owns 1/10
or 10% and Atayan owns 9/10 or 90%.

Issue: Is the property exclusive or conjugal? Exclusive share of the deceased

Santiago

What’s the real share of Estonina and Atayan? 10% and 90%, respectively.

Held: SC affirms CA in toto. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to

the conjugal partnership only when there is proof that the property was acquired
during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is
a condition sine qua nonfor the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership. Here, Estonino failed to present any proof that the property
was acquired during the marriage. Estonino merely relies on the certificate of title
which was issued during the marriage. The TCT does not suffice to establish the
conjugal nature of the property. Acquisition of property and registration of title
are two different acts. Registration does not confer title but merely confirms one
already existing. Thus, the property is the exclusive property of the deceased
Santiago and when he died leaving 10 compulsory heirs, each one got 10% of the lot.
Hence, what the Estonino spouses purchased in the public auction was merely the
rights of Consuelo Garcia consisting of 10% of the lot.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is ‘that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.’ Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio — Always presume marriage.”

EMERGENCY RECIT: Calimag and Silvestra were co-owners of the subject

property. 3 years after Silvestra’s death (died without issue), the TCT was
cancelled pursuant to a Deed of Sale allegedly executed by Calimag and Silvestra.
Hence, respondents, as children of Silvestra’s brother, Anastasio, Sr., and Fidela.
Calimag argues that respondents have no legal standing to sue since they are
illegitimate children of Anastasio and Fidela, and are prohibited from inheriting
from Silvestra pursuant to Art. 992 of the Civil Code. In other words, Anastasio
and Fidela were allegedly not married. RTC ruled in favor of respondents. CA
affirmed. SC: Anastasio and Fidela were married therefore respondents are legal
heirs of Silvestra. Respondents presented their respective Certificates of Live
Birth to prove filiation. Item no. 24 of said documents show the date and place of
marriage of Anastasio and Fidela as “May 25, 1955 in Alang-alang, Leyte.”
Moreover, the respondents’ certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio,
Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as
a result of which they had two children — the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being
born more than three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is
admissible proof to establish the validity of marriage. A man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.
FACTS:

 Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of

this case, with Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra).
 Respondents are children of Silvestra’s brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr.
(Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).
 The subject property was duly registered in the names of the petitioner and
Silvestra under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088. In said
certificate of title, appearing as Entry No. 02671 is an annotation of an
Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of the said
property measuring 49.5 sq. m.
 November 11, 2002: Silvestra died without issue.
 July 7, 2005: TCT No. 183088 was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT
No. 221466,7 was issued in the name of the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of
Sale8 dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq.-m.
portion to the petitioner for P300,000.00.
 Included among the documents submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No.
183088 was an Affidavit dated July 12, 2005 purportedly executed by both the
petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated therein that the affidavit of adverse
claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati
City, making the same legally ineffective.
 September 16, 2005: Fidela passed away.
 Respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the
action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with
Damages against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati City.
 In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,13 the petitioner averred that the
respondents have no legal capacity to institute said civil action on the ground
that they are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right
over Silvestra’s estate pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits
illegitimate children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and
relatives of their father and mother.
RTC found for the respondents. CA affirmed.

ISSUE(S): WoN Anastasio, Sr. and Fidela were married, therefore, respondents
are legal heirs of Silvestra. –YES.
RATIO:

 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant

evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between
his parents.
 Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented
their respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the NSO where Fidela
signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.
 A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were apparently born
to the same parents — their father’s name is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while
their mother’s maiden name is Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof
where it asks: “24. DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For
legitimate birth)” it was stated therein that respondents’ parents were married
on “May 25, 1955 in Alang-alang, Leyte.”
 The respondents’ certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and
Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as a
result of which they had two children — the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being
born more than three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is
admissible proof to establish the validity of marriage.
 Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what other proofs can be
offered to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage, viz.:
In Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of
marriage may be presented: a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony; b)
the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the
alleged wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal certificate of children born
during such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Moreover, in a catena of cases, it has been held that, “[p]ersons dwelling together
in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency
and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is ‘that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage.’ Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always
presume marriage.”