1. HONASAN VS.
THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING interpretandi,” or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other
PROSECUTORS OF THE DOJ
Preliminary Title/Effect and Application of Laws| April 13, 2004 | J. Austria-Martinez
DOCTRINE: A statue must be interpreted, not only to be consistent
with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject
matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system.
FACTS:
● Capt. Gambala made a public statement aired on national television stating
their withdrawal of support to the chain of command of the AFP and the
Government of President Arroyo, and that they are willing to risk their lives
in order to achieve the agenda of Sen. Honasan.
● An affidavit complaint was filed with the DOJ against petitioner Honasan for
the crime of coup d’etat.
● Petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification questioning the DOJ’s jurisdiction
over the case, asserting that since the imputed acts were committed in relation
to his public office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has
jurisdiction to conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation.
● The DOJ duly noted the motion and set to pass upon the issue upon resolution
of the case.
● Petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for grave abuse of
discretion.
● Petitioner claims that under the Constitution, it is the Ombudsman, not the
DOJ, that has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation
notwithstanding the fact that petitioner is a public officer and the provisions of Art.
XI of the Constitution.
a. Yes. The authority of respondent DOJ Panel is based on the provisions of the 1987
Administrative Code.
It cannot be denied that PD No. 1861 is in pari materia to Art. XI, Sec. 12 and 13 of
the COnstitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 because the Ombudsman’s power
to investigate is dependent on the cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Statutes are
in pari materia when they relate to the saem person or thing or to the same class of
persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter.
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not
only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the
same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The
rule is expressed in the maxim “interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus
statutes as to from a uniform system of jurisprudence.
Thus, in the application and interpretation of Ar. XI, Sec. 12 and 13 of the
COnstitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989, PD No. 1861 must be taken into
consideration. It must be assumed that when the 1987 Constitution was written, its
framers had in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. In the
absence of any express repeal or amendment, the 1987 Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 are deemed in accord with existing statute, specifically, PD
1861.
In summation, the aforementioned laws do not give the Ombudsman exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or employees. The
authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies. However, the
Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases.
In other words, the DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of
cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the case falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the SAndiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman
may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.
2. WON OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is ineffective on the grounds that it
was not published.
a. No. Only circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation should
be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that
before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provision, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically
informed of said contents and its penalties.
In the case of Tanada v Tuvera, the Court ruled that:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need
not be published.
OMB-DOJ Joint CIrcular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ
and the Office of the Ombudsman, outlining authorities and responsibilities among
prosecutors of the DOJ and the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary
investigation. It does not regulate the conduct of persons or the public in general.
Petition Dismissed.
2. GATBONTON VS. NLRC
Effect and Application of Laws | January 23 2006 | J. Austria-Martinez
 DOCTRINE: RULING: Given that the Mapua Rules implementing RA7877 was published after the
Included in the Doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera are issuances with the purpose issuance of Petitioner’s preventive suspension, nor does such preventive suspension find
of implementing or enforcing existing laws pursuant to a valid delegation. justification in the Labor Code, such suspension is illegal. However, it was held that Mapua
did not act in bad faith, thus damages may not be awarded.

FACTS:

● Petitioner was a professor of engineering from private respondent Mapua.

● In 1998, a student of the petitioner filed a complaint for unfair grading, sexual
harassment, and conduct unbecoming of an academician. During the
investigation, specifically on Jan 11, 1999, Mapua put petitioner on preventive
suspension because it believed it would be best for all parties.
● Petitioner then filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension which
the Labor Arbiter decided in his favor. However, not all reliefs prayed for
were granted prompting both parties to file an appeal.
● Simultaneous to the filing of the case before the NLRC, the petitioner filed a
complaint questioning Mapua’s administrative proceedings, however the
case was dismissed through a compromise when Mapua agreed to publish
the school’s rules and regulations to implement the Anti-Sexual Harassment
Act (RA7877) in its school organ.
● The NLRC granted Mapua’s appeal and set aside the LA decision.
● Petitioner’s MR was denied and in turn he filed a petition for certiotari before
the CA. The CA affirmed the NLRC decision.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON the preventive suspension of the petitioner was illegal? YES

a. Petitioner was put on preventive suspension on Jan 11, 1999, however

Mapua’s Rules and Regulations in implementing RA7877 was only published
in the school organ on Feb 23, 1999.
b. RA7877 requires schools to impose rules and regulations for its own
implementation, however it must be noted that according to Tanada v.
Tuvera: “all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the
legislature.”
c. Under this rule, Administrative Rules and Regulations must also be published
if their purpose is to implement or enforce existing law pursuant also to a
valid delegation.
d. The Mapua Rules are one of those issuances that require publication for its
effectivity because its purpose is to enforce and implement RA7877
3. MARCOS VS. JUDGE PAMINTUAN b. It is axiomatic that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes
Effect and Application of Laws | January 18, 2011 | Per Curiam immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either
by the court which rendered it or even by this Court.
DOCTRINE: c. The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-
When a judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and fold purpose: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus,
unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (2) to put
which rendered it or even by the Supreme Court. an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is
precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely
d. It is inexcusable for Judge Pamintuan to have overlooked such basic legal
FACTS:
principle no matter how noble his objectives were at that time.
● An administrative case was filed by Imelda Marcos against Judge Fernando e. When the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know
Pamintuan for Gross Ignorance of the Law for reversing motu proprio the it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
final and executory order of Acting Judge Antonio Reyes in a civil case
entitled ‘Umali vs. Roxas, et al’
RULING: As Judge Pamintuan reversed a final and executory judgment which as a
○ Judge Reyes dismissed the said case and ordered that the Buddha
rule is unalterable, the questioned Order is void ab initio. Judge Pamintuan is
statuette be released to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas to be
dismissed from service for gross violation of the law.
held in trust for his estate.
○ 10 years later, Judge Pamintuan set the case for hearing to formally
NOTE:
release the Golden Buddha to its rightful owner and issued an order
- This is not Judge Pamintuan’s first and sole administrative case.
that the “Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of Rogelio Roxas.
- He has been charged with numerous cases for grave misconduct,
However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under
conduct unbecoming of an officer of the judiciary and conduct
custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late
prejudicial to the best interest of service - previously suspended for
Rogelio Roxas.” He also declared that the Buddha is fake.
1 year.
● Marcos’ (an interested party who was subpoenaed) allegations:
- He was also charged in a recent case of manifest partiality, ignorance
○ Final and executory judgments of lower courts were not reviewable
of the law and unjust and malicious delay in the resolution of a
even by the SC .
criminal case for estafa.
○ Judge Pamintuan reversed a final order not upon the instance of any
parties.
○ Judge Pamtuan failed to indicate where he obtained the information
that the Golden Buddha was a “mere replica”.
○ The Order was in conflict with Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure - did not state clearly the facts & law on which it is based
● OCA recommended that Judge Pamintuan be dismissed from service with
forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and disqualification from re-
employment to the government service.
● The Court preventively suspended Judge Pamintuan pending resolution of
the Admin case. MR filed by Judge was granted. Suspension lifted.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON Judge Pamintuan manifested gross ignorance of the law - YES

a. Judge Pamintuan indeed made a serious error in making such a

pronouncement in the challenged order.
4. PEOPLE VS. QUIACHON
Effect and Application of Laws | August 31, 2006| J. Callejo

DOCTRINE:
Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive
effect.

FACTS:

● ACCUSED: Roberto Quiachon, for the crime of rape

● VICTIM: Rowena Quiachon, daughter of the accused, 8 years old, a deaf-
mute minor
● Roberto had sexual intercourse against the will of his daughter Rowena while
the latter is sleeping.
● After consideration of evidence, RTC found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape under Articles 266-A and B.
● The accused was sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of Death including
its accessory penalties.
● Upon automatic review to the CA, it affirmed the decision of RTC and
likewise imposed the supreme penalty of death upon him.
● However, in view of the enactment of RA 9346 on June 24, 2006, which
prohibits the imposition of death penalty, the penalty to be imposed to the
accused becomes reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 2 of RA 9346

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON RA 9346, which became effective in 2006, shall be applied in imposing the
penalty despite the fact that the accused was convicted in 2003. [YES]

Pursuant to the principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa

restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This
principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that
penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as defined in Rule 5 of Article 62.

In this case, RA 9346, a penal law, shall be given retroactive effect since it is favorable
to Roberto, who is not a habitual criminal. Clearly, reclusion perpetua is more favorable
to the accused than death penalty. Thus, it shall be applied retroactively.

RULING: Since RA 9346, which prohibits the imposition of death penalty is favorable to the
accused, it shall be applied retroactively.
5. JARILLO VS. PEOPLE RULING: By contracting a second marriage while her first marriage subsists,
Effect and Application of Laws | September 29, 2009 | J. Del Castillo Petitioner is guilty of Bigamy.

DOCTRINE: Contracting a second marriage while the first marriage still

subsists opens the contracting spouse to prosecution for bigamy despite
the fact that the first marriage is later declared as void. Hence, a criminal
case for bigamy cannot be suspended on the ground of the pendency of
the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the first marriage.

FACTS:

· Petitioner was first married to Alocillo. While this marriage subsisted she
married Uy.
· Petitioner was charged with Bigamy (1999), while petitioner filed for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Alocillo.
· The RTC found her guilty of bigamy.
· Petitioner questioned her conviction arguing that her marriage with Alocillo
was void for lack of marriage license and that Alocillo was already married. Likewise,
Petitioner argued that the action for bigamy had already prescribed since Uy already
knew of her marriage with Alocillo years before they were married.
· CA affirmed conviction.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE

SUBSEQUENT DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF HER FIRST MARRIAGE - YES

a. Without a judicial declaration of nullity, petitioner’s first marriage is

presumed to be subsisting. It is not disputed that when petitioner married Uy, her first
marriage has yet to be judicially declared as null and void therefore when she married
Uy, she was still regarded as a married woman. The subsequent declaration of nullity
is immaterial because at that point the crime had already been consummated.

2. WON THE CRIME OF BIGAMY HAS PRESCRIBED - NO

a. According to Art. 90 of RPC, crimes punishable by afflictive penalties prescribe in

fifteen years. While Art. 91 of RPC states that the prescriptive period shall commence
from the day of discovery of the crime.

Petitioner alleges that Uy knew of her previous marriage as far back as 1978
because her own mother told him, however, petitioner failed to present her
mother’s testimony therefore failing to provide sufficient evidence to prove her
claim. Uy’s knowledge of the prior marriage as far back as 1978 has not been
proven therefore the prescriptive period for bigamy cannot be counted from
such year.

6. ATTY. FERRER VS. SPS. DIAZ
Chapter 1: Effect and Application of Laws | April 23, 2010 | J. Del Castillo
DOCTRINE: Art. 6 of the NCC provides that rights may be waived.
However, this does not apply to alleged rights which are not yet in
existence, such as in the case of future inheritance.
FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed that Spouses Diaz, as represented by their daughter
Comandante through an SPA, obtained a loan from him which was secured by a REM
and a promissory note. She also issued post-dated check to secure the payment.
- Comandante executed an instrument entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights
and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) for P600k from the
secured loan.
- It pertains to a property still titled and registered under the name of her
parents.
Pursuant to Art. 1347 (2) of the Civil Code, “no contract may be entered into upon a
future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.” Since inheritance to be
considered “future”, the succession must not have been opened at the time of the
execution of the contract.
A contract is classified as a contract upon future inheritance which is prohibited if it
has the following requisites:
1. That the succession has not yet been opened
2. That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and
3. That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right
which is purely hereditary in nature.
Thus it is clear that at the time of the execution of Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interest Over a Real Property, succession to either of her parent’s properties
has not yet been opened since both of them are still living.
Further, the Waiver executed by Comandante in favor of the petitioner is invalid and
cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation between them for being
violative of Art. 1347 (2) of the Civil Code.

The Diazes reneged on the obligation and the checks issued were dishonored. Despite
RULING: The Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property as
repeated demands, the respondents still failed and refused to settle the loa.
executed by Comandante is null and void for being violative of Art. 1347 of the NCC,
therefore, the petitioner’s adverse claim which was based upon such waiver is likewise
Comandante alleged that she sought the help of Atty. Ferrer with regard to the
void and cannot confer any right or interests over the property.
mortgage with a bank of her parent’s property and sought financial accommodations
from them totalling P500k. Since she could not comply with her obligation, Atty. Ferrer
and his wife presented the document pertaining to waive her hereditary share over the
property.

Thus, Ferrer filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money secured by a REM
Contract against the Diazes and Comandante.

The Pangans asserted that the annotation of petitioner’s adverse claim on the TCT
cannot impair their rights as the new owner of the subject property. They claimed that
the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real property upon which
Ferrer’s adverse claim is anchored cannot be the source of any right of interest over the
property considering that is it null and void under Art. 1346 (2) of the Civil Code.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WON a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir

while the parents are still living is valid - NO
7. DIAZ VS. ENCANTO
HUMAN RELATIONS| Jan. 20, 2016 | De Castro
DOCTRINE:
Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code.
● Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by
the acts of the individuals concerned. It consists of the intention
to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous
advantage of another. It is presumed. Thus, he who alleges bad
faith has the duty to prove the same.
● Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple
negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty to some motives or
interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice
connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It
implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
Malice is bad faith or bad motive.
FACTS:
● Diaz has been in the teaching service of UP for 24 years.
● She filed for a sabbatical leave with pay for 1 year directly with the UP President
(Abueva)
● While the request was initially recommended to be granted, the Chair of the Broadcast
Dept recommended instead that she be granted any leave or absence she may be
qualified for.
○ In withdrawing the recommendation, she considered their experience with
Diaz from previous term where Diaz dropped her courses.
○ Diaz was then deleted from the payroll of professors
● Her request for Sabbatical was referred, recommending denial, to the Chancellor.
○ The Chancellor recommended that Diaz be granted leave without substitute
to enable the college to hire a substitute.
● Diaz was given several opportunities to present her historical background to aid her
cause, however, she had to be reminded several times before she finally acquiesced.
● The application for sabbatical was officially denied by reason of shortage of teaching
staff during the semester she was about to leave. Because of this denial, Diaz was
without any teaching load and therefore, without pay.
● When she wanted to return as a professor and to receive her salaries from before she
went on leave, she was told that she had to accomplish a Report to Duty Form to which
she complained to the Office of the Ombudsman and to which the Ombudsman
dismissed the same, ruling that Diaz was rightfully considered on leave without pay.
● Diaz → RTC: Complaint against UP, UP President, UP Chancellor, Chairperson
of the Board and CMC Dean
○ Alleging that they conspired together as joint tortfeasors in not paying her
salary.
○ RTC ruled in favour of Diaz.
■ Ruling that a sabbatical leave is not a right but a privilege, Diaz
was entitled to such privilege and found that the delay in the
resolution of her application was unreasonable and
unconscionable.
■ Did not assign liability to Dean as her functions were merely
recommendatory.
● CA found neither negligence nor bad faith on the part of the respondents in their denial
of Diaz’ sabbatical leave application and in withholding their salaries.
○ A sabbatical leave is not a right which could be demanded at will, wven by
a vetern professor of 24 years.
○ It would be unfair to impute negligence to respondents in the regular
discharge of their duties
○ Assuming there really was a delay in the resolution of her application, she
was the one who caused the same.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the respondents were in bad faith in denying Diaz’ request for sabbatical
leave? --- NO, upon the SC’s perusal of the evidence, there were no traces of bad faith
or malice in the respondents' denial of Diaz's application for sabbatical leave.
● They processed her application in accordance with their usual procedure -
with more leeway, in fact, since Diaz was given the chance to support her
application when she was asked to submit a historical background; and the
denial was based on the recommendation of respondent Encanto, who was in
the best position to know whether petitioner Diaz's application should be
granted or not.
● Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith
refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is presumed.
Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith
does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence; it involves a
dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong,
a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that
partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks
not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.
○ It is an elementary rule that good faith is presumed and that the
burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same.
○ Diaz has failed to prove bad faith on the part of the respondents.
There is nothing in the records to show that the respondents
purposely delayed the resolution of her application to prejudice and
injure her.
○ She has not even shown that the delay of six months in resolving a
sabbatical leave application has never happened prior to her case.
○ On the contrary, any delay that occurred was due to the fact that
petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical leave did not follow the
usual procedure; hence, the processing of said application took time.
8. CALIFORNIA CLOTHING VS. QUIÑONES
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente
DOCTRINE:
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code,
a person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He
would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice
another. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by
the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to
abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of
another. Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and
intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity
FACTS:
· Respondent Quiñones, and employee of Cebu Pacific, bought jeans from Guess
jeans. She was issued a receipt after payment and left. Afterwards, she was chased by and
employee of Guess, herein petitioner, informing her that she failed to pay the items that she
got.
· They talked in the office of Cebu Pacific where the employees of Guess allegedly
subjected her to humiliation in front of clients.
· On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of
Cebu Pacific Air narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not
concern the office and the same took place while respondent was off duty. Another letter
was allegedly prepared and was supposed to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in
Robinson’s, but the latter again refused to receive it.
· Respondent then filed a Complaint for Damages before the RTC against
petitioners.
· Petitioners admitted issuing a receipt of payment but claimed that it was due to
miscommunication and error.
· RTC denied the petition for damages. concluded that the petitioners and the other
defendants believed in good faith that respondent failed to make payment. Considering that
no motive to fabricate a lie could be attributed to the Guess employees, the court held that
when they demanded payment from respondent, they merely exercised a right under the
honest belief that no payment was made.
· CA reversed RTC. While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees
were in good faith when they confronted respondent inside the Cebu Pacific Office about
the alleged non-payment, the CA, however, found preponderance of evidence showing that
they acted in bad faith in sending the demand letter to respondent’s employer.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the petitioners abused its right when it sent a letter to the employee of
respondent – YES
a. The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to
verify from respondent whether she indeed made payment if they had reason to
believe that she did not. However, the exercise of such right is not without
limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the performance of duty
causing damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code
b. Under the abuse of rights principle found in Art. 19, a person must, in
the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead
acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Good faith refers to the state of
mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the
intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of
another. Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and intentional
design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity
c. Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent
whether she paid or not. Considering, however, that respondent was in possession
of the item purchased from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment
issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment was made on the
basis of a mere speculation. Their claim should have been proven by substantial
evidence in the proper forum.
d. It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard
and tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise
of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondent’s
employer not only informing it of the incident but obviously imputing bad acts on
the part of respondent.
e. It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to
respondent’s employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in
collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish respondent’s reputation in the eyes of
her employer. To malign respondent without substantial evidence and despite the
latter’s possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A
person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith,
otherwise, he opens himself to liability.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh. In this case, petitioners
obviously abused their rights.
RULING: Respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages and attorney’s fees
9. ARDIENTE VS. SPS. PASTORFIDE In this case, petitioners clearly failed to observe these standards.
Human Relations | July 17. 2013 | J. Peralta
2. WON THE PRESENT ACTION FOR DAMAGES SHOULD BE BASED ON
ARTICLE 19- NO
DOCTRINE:
While Art. 19 lays down the standards for the government of human a. Article 19 merely establishes the standard for the conduct of
human relations, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Instead, Art.
relations and the maintenance of social order, an action for damages for its
20 and 21, when applicable, are the proper provisions.
violation is not based on such provision but rather on Arts. 20 and 21.
Art. 20 provides a source of indemnity for victims when they suffer damage by
FACTS: reason of another when no other provision of law gives them such.

· Petitioners owned a housing unit; they sold the said housing unit to In determining whether indemnity is already provided for by a certain
respondents through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). provision of law (and corollary whether art. 20 is applicable) depends wholly
· Among the provisions of the MOA is the assumption of respondent of the on the facts of the case. In this case, the SC found it proper to affirm the decision
payment of the power and water bills over the housing unit and for the transfer of the of the RTC finding petitioners liable for damages for causing the disconnection
accounts of the bill to the respondent’s name. of the water line without even notice to respondents.
· Despite the above provision, the accounts remained in the name of petitioner
Joyce Ardiente but respondent paid the water bills for over 4 years until March 12, 1999
when the water line was abruptly disconnected without notice to respondents. RULING: By unjustly causing the disconnection of respondent’s water line without
· Respondents later found out that the water line was disconnected was done notice, petitioners are liable for damages,
at the instance of petitioner Joyce Ardiente.
· Respondents filed an action for damages against petitioners before the RTC;
RTC ruled in their favor-affirmed by CA, hence the present petition.

-Note: Petitioners admitted to having caused the disconnection of the water line but
they claim to do so in order to compel respondents to transfer the water bill account to
their name.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON PETITIONERS SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR CAUSING THE

DISCONNECTION OF THE WATER LINE - YES

a. While it is well within petitioner’s right to compel respondents to

cause the transfer of the water bill in their name, she should have done it while
respecting respondent’s right. Causing the disconnection of the water line
without even giving notice to the respondent constitutes an abuse of
petitioner’s rights.

b. Art. 19 sets the standards for the government of human relations

and the maintenance of social order. Under the provision one must (in the
exercise of a right or performance of a duty):

- Act with justice

- Give everyone his due
- Observe honesty and good faith.
10. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN VS. REYES
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente RULING: In order to be liable under Artilce 19 and 21, the act must be intentional and
done with bad faith.
DOCTRINE: A person who did not abuse her right in asking a person to
leave a party to which he was not invited cannot be made to pay for
damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
NOTE:

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances.
FACTS:

· Roberto Reyes, a known celebrity was in the lobby of Hotel Nikko having
coffee when he was invited by a friend Dr. Filart to attend the birthday party of the
hotel’s manager at the penthouse. ( October 13, 1994)
· Robert Reyes was not on the guest list which was suppose to be for close
friends of the hotel manager only. Reyes opted to go and stayed in the party until
dinner where there was a buffet. While he was in line he was approached by the
Executive Secretary Ruby Lim ( a hotel employee) who allegedly shouted at him to
leave the party because he was not invited. This caused a commotion which led a
makati policeman to escort him out of the Hotel.
· Reyes then filed an action for damages for the humiliation that he suffered in
the way that he was asked to leave the party.
· Trail Court dismissed the case based on the testimony that Ruby Lim was
discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
· CA reversed the Trial Court and asked Hotel Nikko and Lim to pay damages.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Elsewhere, we explained that when “a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.”
The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed
not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These
standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent
to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When
Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the
Civil Code.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON Hotel Nikki and Lim are liable – NO

a. It is a basic rule in civil cases the he who alleges proves. In this case,
Mr. Reyes was not able to prove that Lim shouted at him and asked him to leave
in such a manner that would humiliate him. In fact based on his testimony, Lim
approached him in such a distance that they were close enough to kiss. There is
no reason therefore for Lim to shout if she approached him in that distance. The
testimony of Lim that she approached Reyes discreetly and asked him to leave
quietly is therefore more believable.

b. Lim not having abused the right of Reyes in leaving the party is
therefore not liable under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. The manner by
which Lim asked Reyes to leave the party was acceptable and humane under
the circumstances.
11. SPS. HING VS. CHOACHUY
Human Relations | June 26, 2013 | Del Castillo, J.
DOCTRINE: The right to privacy is the right of an individual “to be free from
unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public
in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned.” It is the right to be let
alone.
An individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right
to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of
another’s residence,” therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which
an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society,
other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy.
FACTS:
● On Aug. 2005, Petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the RTC a
complaint for Injunction and Damages against respondents Alexander
Choachuy Sr. and Allan Choachuy alleging the following:
○ Petitioner-spouses Hing are the registered owners of a parcel of land
in Cebu;
○ Respondents Choachuy are the owners of Aldo Development and
Resources, Inc. (Aldo) which constructed an auto-repair shop
building located beside petitioner’s property.
○ In April 2005 (separate case), Aldo filed a complaint for injunction
and damages against petitioner-spouses claiming that the latter were
constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said
construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent
to petitioners’ property.
○ In order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents
illegally set-up and installed on their building two video surveillance
cameras facing petitioner’s property.
○ Respondents, through their employees and without the consent of
petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners’ on-going construction.
● Petitioners claim that the acts of respondents violate their right to privacy.
Thus, petitioners prayed that respondent be ordered to remove the video
surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.
● RTC granted petitioners’ application for TRO. CA reversed the decision of the
RTC and explained that the right to privacy of residence under Art. 26 (1) of
the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of the controversy
is not used as a residence. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON there is a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy - YES
a. The right to privacy is the right to be let alone
● The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. It is
defined as “the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s
person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to
cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities.”
● It is the right of an individual “to be free from unwarranted publicity, or
to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which
the public is not necessarily concerned.” Simply put, the right to privacy
is “the right to be let alone.”
b. The right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business
offices where the public are excluded therefrom and only certain individuals
are allowed to enter.
● Art. 26 (1) recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to
privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes “any act
of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of
another without the consent of the latter.”
● An individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code
should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to
places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access.
● The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” therefore,
covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers
as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other
individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy.
● The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the
Civil Code only to residences.
c. The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test is used to determine whether
there is a violation of the right to privacy.
● In Ople v. Torres, “the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of
privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the
individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.”
● In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of
these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual,
whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained.
● The RTC correctly ruled that there is basis to grant the application of a
TRO. The operation by [respondents] of a revolving camera, even if it
were mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy of
[petitioners], who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not
only focus on [respondents’] property or the roof of the factory at the back
 (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a
good portion of [the] land of [petitioners]

RULING: It was correct for the RTC to consider that petitioners have a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” in their property, whether they use it as a business office or as
a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing
petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their consent,
is a clear violation of their right to privacy.
12. DE ZUZUARREGUI VS. HON. VILLAROSA
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente
DOCTRINE:
The rules of court provided that a criminal action may be suspended
upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action.
Requisities:
1. The civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based
2. In the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined
3. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another
tribunal
FACTS:
- Rosemary filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of Bella (mother)
in the RTC.
- They entered into a compromise agreement which was approved by the
RTC.
- Peter and Catherine (alleged siblings of rosemary) filed a petition for annulment of
judgment of the compromise entered into.
- They claimed that they are also biological children of Bella and thus entitled
to the estate.
- Fannie calimed that the was also a biological child of Bella thus filed a petition in
intervention in the annulment of judgment.
- Peter, Catherin and Fannie claimed that upon the death of Bella, they already had
discussions regarding the settlement of the estate.
- They claimed that Rosemary promised to take care of the processing of
papers so that the estate will be divided among them according to law.
- however, rosemary suddenly made known to them her intention to get a
larger share of the estate, but they did not agree.
- they also claimed that they were not aware that rosemary filed a petition for
issuance of letters of administration and that judgment by compromise agreement was
granted by the RTC based on the false claims of rosemary.
- Petitioner and rosemary filed their answers and denied that peter, catherine and
fannie were heirs of Bella.
- they claimed that the 3 were merely abandoned children and that Bella
merely brought them up as her own.
- Fannie filed a complaint for falsification and perjury against petitioner and rosemary.
- she claimed that both parties falsely and maliciously stated in their pleadings
that Bella had only 2 heirs (petitioner and bella).
- Petitioner and rosemary filed a joint motion to suspend the preliminary investigation
on the ground of a pending prejudicial question before the CA.
- they claimed that the issue of WON peter, catherine and fannie are related
to bella and therefore legal heirs of the same was pending before the CA.
- the prosecutor DENIED the joint motion and found probable cause against
petitioner and rosemary for 2 counts each of falsification.
- Thus 3 informations against petitioner and rosemary were filed with the MeTC.
- Petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ and a motion to defer proceedings
but was denied.
- Petitioner filed for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC but was also denied.
- Petitioner again filed for certiorari and prohibition with the CA but was dismissed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the CA erred in denying the petitioner’s prayer for writ of certiorari
and prohibition?
Rule 111 Section 6 of the Rules of Criminal procedure states that a criminal
action may be suspended upon the pendency f a prejudicial question in a civil
action.
The court stated this is possible not only if the said said civil case involves facts
intimitaley related to those upon which the criminal prosecutun would be based but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. This is done in order to
avoid 2 conflicting decisions.
Thus if the resolution of the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility
of the accused in the criminal action based on the facts or there is no necessity that the
civil case be determined first before taking upo the criminal case, the civil case does not
involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law proceed independently of each other.
In this case, the allegations in the petition to annul judgment shows that the the case
pending before the CA is principally for determination of the validity of the
compromise which did not include peter, fannie and catherine as heirs of Bella. On the
other hand, the criminal case before the MeTC involve the determination of whether
the petitioner committed falsification of public documents in executing pleadings
containing untruthful statements that she and rosemary were the only legal heirs of
bella.
Thus it is evident that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt
of the petitioner in the criminal case for falsification.
RULING: since the result of the civil case is clearly determinative of the issues in the
criminal case, then a prejudicial question arises and thus calls for the suspension of
the criminal case until the civil case is decided.

13. PIMENTEL VS. PIMENTEL
Prejudicial Question | September 13, 2010 | Carpio, J.
DOCTRINE: The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key
element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person "who shall kill
his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants or descendants, or his spouse." The relationship between the
offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or
homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.
FACTS:
Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for
frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner). During its pendency,
an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 of the FC was also
filed by respondent against petitioner.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the
relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him.
The RTC ruled that the pendency of the civil case before the RTC is not a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.
The issues in the criminal case are the injuries sustained by respondent and
whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioner's marriage with
respondent is in question.
The CA ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is
whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide
directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the
other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. It further ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime
of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled
that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time
of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting. Petitioner filed a
petition for review questioning the CA decision.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide.
NO. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved
before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case.
Rule 111, Sec 7 of the ROC provides: Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused
killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated
parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would
have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner's will. At the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The
subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in the civil case is
granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time
of the subsistence of the marriage.
In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled,
petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition Denied. CA affirmed.
14. TOMLIN II VS. ATTY. MOYA II
Preliminary Title/Prejudicial Question | February 23, 2006 | J. Ynares-Santiago
 It is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case
DOCTRINE: Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court
their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently will be rendered helpless from applying the rules on admission to and
of criminal cases. The burden of proof in a criminal case is guilt beyond continuing membership in the legal profession during the whole period that the
reasonable doubt while in an administrative case, only preponderance criminal case is pending final disposition when the objectives of the two
of evidence is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute proceedings are vastly disparate.
a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are
RULING: Atty. Moya is found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the CPR and
attendant in the administrative proceedings.
is suspended from the practice of law for 2 years.

FACTS:

● Complainant Tomlin filed a complaint before the Commission on Bar

Discipline against respondent Atty. Moya for reneging on his monetary
obligations and for having issued bouncing checks.
● Complainant also instituted a case for 7 counts of violation of BP Blg. 22
against respondent.
● Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the administrative complaint for
violation of the rule on non-forum shopping. This was denied.
● The IBP Board of Governors suspended respondent from the practice of law
for 1 year to 2 years, observing that the pending criminal action against
respondent does not pose a prejudicial question to the resolution of the issues
in the present administrative case.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON there is forum shopping.

a. No. Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings,

not to disbarment proceedings. The criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 refer
to the respondent’s act of making or drawing and issuance of worthless checks;
while the present administrative case seeks to discipline respondent as a lawyer
for his dishonest act of failing to pay his debt in violation of the CPR.

2. WON the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 poses a prejudicial

question to the resolution of the present administrative case.

a. No. Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their

own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal
cases. The burden of proof in a criminal case is guilt beyond reasonable doubt
while in an administrative case, only preponderance of evidence is required.
Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even
if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings.
15. GELUZ VS. CA
Natural Persons | July 20, 1961 | J. Reyes

DOCTRINE:
Article 40 does not apply to an aborted fetus because it imposes the
condition that the child must be subsequently born alive.

FACTS:

● Before respondent Lazo and his wife Villanueva were legally married,
Villanueva became pregnant. To conceal her pregnancy, they approached Dr.
Geluz who performed the abortion of their unborned child. However,
Villanueva became pregnant for 2 more times, and approached Dr. Geluz
again, who performed the abortion twice more. Lazo alleges that he had no
knowledge of the 2 subsequent abortions.
● Lazo then filed a complaint against Dr. Geluz for damages for the loss of the
last 2 fetuses.
● The Trial Court and the CA awarded damages pursuant to Article 2206 of the
Civil Code covering the death of a person.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON Article 2206 of the Civil Code covers the abortion of an unborn fetus? No

a. An unborn fetus is not endowed with personality being incapable of rights

and obligations.
b. An action for damages pertains to the one primarily injured, thus if no
action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the injuries
sustained by the unborn fetus, no damages may accrue to its heirs. Even if
the cause of action did accrue, the same is extinguished upon its pre-natal
death.
c. Article 40 does not apply because it imposes the condition that the child
must be subsequently born alive. In this case, it was never born alive
because it was dead when it was separated from the womb.

RULING: Because of the condition in Article 40 of the Civil Code “provided that it be
born later with thecondition specified in the following article”, damages may not be
awarded. Reversed.
16. CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING VS. HON. VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATOR
Natural Persons| October 13, 2009 | J. Chico-Nazario
DOCTRINE:
One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child
inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the
life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the
life of the mother.
FACTS:
● Rolando Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel and member
of respondent Union (Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corp) filed
a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident
Insurance pursuant to a CBA.
○ The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. His
wife had a premature delivery in the 38th week of pregnancy.
● Coninental Steel granted claim for paternity leave but denied claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of death and accident
insurance.
● Case was submitted to Voluntary Arbitration. Parties chose Atty. Montaño to
resolve the issue.
● Union’s allegations:
1. CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first
been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that
his subsequent death could be covered by CBA death benefits.
2. MMK steel corp, sister company of Continental Steel, granted
bereavement leave for Steve Dugan, whose child was only 24 weeks
in the womb and died before labor.
● Continental Steel’s allegations:
1. There are 2 elements for entitlement to benefits: (1) death and (2)
status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s
case.
2. Relying on Art. 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code, contends that only
one with civil personality could die.
3. A fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a
person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a
fetus that never acquired juridical personality.
4. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a
dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever
acquire the right to be supported.
5. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the
legally accepted definitions were deemed automatically accepted by
both parties.
● Voluntary Arbitrator favored Hortillano: No dispute that death of an
employee’s legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be
supported by the parents the moment he/she was conceived. Ordered
payment of bereavement leave and death benefits. CA affirmed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality - NO.
a. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code
for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a
conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41
defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil
personality is extinguished by death.
b. Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of
death. While the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have
acquired juridical personality could die.
c. Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with
civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die.
d. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must
protect equally with the life of the mother.
e. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the
child being delivered, qualifies as death.
2. WON the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA - YES.
a. A dependent is “one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or
sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else.”
b. Under said general definition, even an unborn child is a dependent of its
parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38- 39 weeks of its
gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for
sustenance.
c. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the
child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as
Continental Steel avers.
RULING: An unborn child already has life which the Constitution mandates to be
protected. Hence, an unborn child qualifies as a dependent in the absence of any
qualification in the CBA.