TAÑADA VS.

TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters
of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending
that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette….
The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be
given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement

of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not
as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date,
without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation
or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and
not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of
the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and
not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule
upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make
full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

TITLE: People of the Phils v Que Po Lay

CITATION: 94 Phil 640 | GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954

FACTS:

The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US
money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required
under Circular No. 20.
Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov.
1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.

Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central
Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months
imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become
effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.

HELD:

It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of
the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before
becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to
be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties.

TITLE: D.M. Consunji Inc. v Court of Appeals and Maria J. Juego

CITATION: GR No. 137873, April 20, 2001 | 357 SCRA 249

FACTS:

Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell
14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical
Center in Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival
(DOA) at around 2:15PM.

Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work as carpenter at
the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building were on board a
platform. Jose was crushed to death when the platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin,
which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a
safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed report dated
Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC
and was rendered a favorable decision to receive support from DM Consunji amounting to
P644,000.

DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE: Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death
benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.

HELD:

The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code. Maria Juergo was
unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. She filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police
investigation report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against
petitioner’s personnel.
Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its
decision is more than that of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). Should the award
decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private
respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom.

G.R. No. L-34882 August 24, 1976

J. AMADO ARANETA, petitioner,
vs.
ALFONSO DORONILA, A. DORONILA RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, INC., and COURT OF
APPEALS,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-35643 August 24, 1976

ALFONSO DORONILA and A. DORONILA RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL AS TRIBUNAL, JUDGE BENJAMIN H. AQUINO,
THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, and J. AMADO ARANETA,
respondents.

Facts:
Two separate but related petitions, being for certiorari and prohibition against the Court of Appeals
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of said court in refusing to dismiss the appeal of
private respondents from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a civil action between
the private parties the Doronilas took steps to appeal to the Court of Appeals, but in the said
appellate court, J. Amado Araneta moved to dismiss said appeal the motion was denied And when
Araneta moved to reconsider the foregoing resolution, the motion was denied In the present petition
with Us, Araneta maintains that under this Court's rulings in Valera vs. Court of Appeals, and other
cases of similar vein, the respondent Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal of the
Dornilas, there being no showing on the face of their amended record on appeal as to when their
original record on appeal was filed, hence said amended record "fails to show on its face that their
appeal was perfected within the period fixed by the rules", pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 50, counsel
for Araneta, filed a manifestation taking not only of the later more liberal rulings of this Court.

Issue:
Whether or not where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate
prospectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those who
relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof;

Unfair

Held:
No, Anent the ruling in Liceria relied upon by Araneta, We hold that the same is not applicable to
matters involving controversies regarding the application of the Rules of Court, if only for the reason
that it is within the power of this Court to excuse failure to literally observe any rule to avoid
possible injustice Liceria was predicated on the principle that changes in substantive law may not be
applied retroactively, specially when prejudice will result to the party that has followed the earlier
law. That principle does not obtain in remedial law.

People vs. Valdez

Posted on March 2, 2017 by thecasedigester in Criminal Procedure
G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000
FACTS:
Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The accused was allegedly caught
in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted, cultivated and cultured seven (7) fully
grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp from which dangerous drugs maybe manufactured
or derived. Appellant was arraigned and with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial on the merits then ensued.
The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2
Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut, all member of the police force,
who testified how the information was received, the commencement of their operation and its
details under the specific instruction of Inspector Parungao. Accordingly, they found appellant alone
in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and
saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters away
from his nipa hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to
Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. They uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took photos
of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and arrested him. One of the said plants was sent to
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for analysis which produced a positive result. The
prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources that the land cultivated by appellant where the growing marijuana plants were found, was
part of the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the
lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.
The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified he was weeding his vegetable farm
when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go with the latter
to see something. This unknown person then brought appellant to the place where the marijuana
plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut. Five armed policemen were
present and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew
anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao
poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. Appellant was so nervous and
afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana. The police team then brought him to the police
station at Villaverde. At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the
marijuana plants seized by the police. Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the
records show that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second,
that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the mantle
of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The right against unreasonable searches
and seizures is the immunity of one’s person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other
possessions.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is lawful and
the seized evidence admissible.
(2) Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against the accused.
(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.
HELD:
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of
the existence of probable cause given the fact that police had ample time to obtain said warrant. The
protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific
instances are searches allowed without warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of
Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers,
regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal
search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants
as evidence for the prosecution, the said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and
seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was,
therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the
seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.
In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be
convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime
was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. The evidence arrayed against the accused,
however, must not only stand the test of reason, it must likewise be credible and competent.
Competent evidence is “generally admissible” evidence. Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence “of
such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at
trial. And as earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court’s part to have admitted evidences
against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him for said evidence is doubly
tainted.
In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.” To justify the conviction of the accused, the
prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. Absent the required degree of proof of
an accused’s guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.

Bustamante v. Cayas
(Interstate Estate of Claro Bustamante, deceased, JOSEFA MENDOZA,
petitioner-appellant, vs. TEODORA CAYAS, oppositor-appellee.)
G.R. No. L-8562-8563, December
17, 1955 Reyes, J.B. L., J.:
FACTS:
Born in 1893, allegedly begotten out of wedlock by Claro Bustamante, widower, and Paula Mendoza,
single, the claiman Josefa Mendoza was supported and reared by said Claro Bustamante and was
openly introduced as his daughter to his acquaintances. Shortly before his death in March 1929,
Claro delivered to Josefa a private document (Exhibit G) signed by him and attesting that she was
his natural daughter. This document Josefa kept until the outbreak of the second world war in 1941;
then, in the confusion caused by the hostilities, she lost the paper and did not find it again until
1953. Claro Bustamante's widow by a second marriage, Teodora Cayas, and his legitimate son,
Nicasio Bustamante, had extrajudicially partitioned his estate, composed of lots 1776 to 1778 and
1806 of the Naic Friar Lands.

On May 6, 1953, the natural child, Josefa Mendoza, instituted these proceedings against Teodora
Cayas and Monica Nazareno (heir of the late Nicasio Bustamante), for the judicial administration
and settlement of the estate of her natural father, Claro Bustamante, and for the recovery of her
corresponding share therein as his acknowledged natural child; but the defendants-oppositors
resisted her claims, alleging that she was never duly acknowledged and that her action for
acknowledgment was instituted too late.

The court having sustained the defense, Josefa Mendoza appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
latter certified the case to us because only questions of law are involved.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the appellant Josefa Mendozza was properly recognized by Claro Bustamante
as his natural daughter?

2. Whether or not the appellant compelled recognition as conditioned by law upon its being
commenced during the lifetime of the natural parent, unless the latter dies while the claimant was a
minor, or unless a document of recognition, previously unknown, is discovered after the parent's
death.

RULING:
NO, she is not properly recognized as a natural daughter and she didn't meet the requisites
conditioned by the law in effect during that time. The trial Court decided that she has not, and the
record amply sustains the ruling. In the first place there is no doubt that appellant never brought
action against the late Claro Bustamante to compel her recognition as his natural child. Hence, she
now is debarred from instituting such proceedings against his successors in interest, unless she
comes under any of the two exceptions declared in Article 137 of the Civil Code of 1889…
"Article 137. The actions for the recognition of natural children can only be exercised in life the
presumed parents, except in the following cases:

1. If the father or mother had died during the child's minor age, in case of underage or incapable,
the period shall count from the first four years of age or until reaching full legal capacity in he can
deduct the action.

2. If after the death of the father or mother, some document appears that had not been previously
reported, in which they expressly recognize the child, in this case, the action must be deducted
within six months of the document finding."

Josefa Mendoza does not come under the first exception, because she was already 36 years old
when her father died in 1929 (she was admittedly born in 1893). She avers under the second
exception because the lost document of recognition was only rediscovered in 1953. Even so, she had
full knowledge of its existence for 12 years, from 1929, when her father delivered it to her down to
1941, when she first mislaid it. The second exception of Article 137 requires that the document of
recognition should be
previously unknown and such terms do not include documents that the claimant once possessed
and subsequently lost or mislaid. Assuming that the limitation of actions set by the last
paragraph of Article 137 was repealed by the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) in force in
1929, still, ten years being the maximum period of limitation of actions fixed by said Act, Josefa
Mendoza's time limit to institute proceedings for the recognition expired in 1939, at the latest.

During all these ten years she had the document in her hands she made no more to sue upon it.
Her laches and delay can lead to only one conclusion: her action is now barred. It has been barred
at least since 1939; and the new Civil Code of 1950 cannot be retroactively applied to disturb the
vested rights of the appellees who have held the property as owners for the last fifteen years (Art.
2253). Again, vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura subveniunt: the laws aid the vigilant, not
those who slumber on their rights. Just as from the case of Go Jr. v. CA, "rights are considered
vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or
fixed and irreputable."

Therefore, Josefa Mendoza is not properly recognized as a natural daughter of Claro Bustamante
and the judgement appealed from is affirmed.

BPI LEASING CORP. vs. CA, et al.

GR No. 127624, 18 Nov. 2003

FACTS:

BLC is a corporation engaged in the business of leasing properties. For the calendar year 1986,
it paid Commissioner of Internal Revenue a total of P 1,139,041.49 representing 4% contractor’s
percentage tax as imposed by the National Internal Revenue Code. However, in November 1986, CIR
issued a Revenue Regulation which provides that companies registered under RA 5980, like BLC, are
no longer liable for contractor’s percentage tax, instead, subject only to gross receipts tax. Thereafter,
BLC filed a claim for refund before the CIR and simultaneously filed a petition for review before the
Court of Tax Appeal in order to stop the running of the prescriptive period for refunds. Both cases
were denied, despite motion for reconsideration by BLC, hence, they appealed before the Court of
Appeals, which the latter affirmed the decision of CTA and CIR. Aggrieved by the decision, BLC
instituted a petition before the SC. However, the certification against non-forum shopping attached
to the petition was signed by the counsel on record of the BLC, who was not specifically authorized to
do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a lawyer is authorized to validly sign, for and in behalf of its client, the
certification of non-forum shopping.

HELD:

It was held that while the certification of non-forum shopping may be signed, for an on behalf
of a corporation, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required
to be disclosed in such document, it does not mean that any lawyer, acting on behalf of the corporation
he is representing, may routinely sign a certification of non-forum shopping – the lawyer must be
“specifically authorized” in order to validly sign the certification.

Since powers of corporations are exercised through their board of directors and/or duly
authorized officers and agents, physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by
natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by laws or by specific acts of the board
of directors. Being counsel of record does not vest upon a lawyer the authority to execute the
certification on behalf of his client.

PETITION DENIED.

NIEVES A. SAGUIGUIT vs. People

G.R. No. 144054 June 30, 2006
Petitioner was charged with eight counts of violations of the Bouncing Checks Law. The RTC
found petitioner guilty as charged. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The instant case calls
for a reexamination and modification, if not abandonment, of rulings to the effect that the mere
issuance of a check which is subsequently dishonored makes the issuer liable for violation of BP Blg.
22 regardless of the intent of the parties …. Petitioner respectfully submits that it was not the
intention of the lawmaking body, … to make the issuance of a bum check ipso facto a criminal
offense already; there must be an intent to commit the prohibited act, and subject check should be
issued to apply on account or for value.
Issue: Whether or not the Court can delve into the policy behind or wisdom of B.P. 22.
Held: No. Under the doctrine of Separation of Powers, the Court cannot delve into the
policy behind or wisdom of a statute, i.e., B.P. Blg. 22, matters of legislative wisdom being within the
domain of Congress.5 Even with the best of motives, the Court can only interpret and apply the law
and cannot, despite doubts about its wisdom, amend or repeal it. Courts of justice have no right to
encroach on the prerogatives of lawmakers, as long as it has not been shown that they have acted
with grave abuse of discretion. And while the judiciary may interpret laws and evaluate them for
constitutional soundness and to strike them down if they are proven to be infirm, this solemn power
and duty do not include the discretion to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.

G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL LICERA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and
Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for plaintiff-appellee.

Romeo Mercado (as Counsel de Oficio) for defendant-appellant.

CASTRO, J.:

Facts:

On December 3, 1965, Rafael Licera was charged with illegal possession of a

Winchester rifle by the Chief of Police on the municipal court of Abra de Ilog, Occidental
Mindoro. In August 14, 1968, the court acquitted Licera on the charge of assault upon an agent ofa
person in authority, but convicting him of illegal possession of firearm under the Mapa rule (1967).
In 1974, Licera appeal to the Court of Appeals invoking his legal justification to possess the
Winchester rifle because he was appointed as secret agent by Governor Feliciano Leviste on
December 11, 1961 pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in People vs Macarandang . People
vs Macarandang (1959) – the appointment of civilian as “secret agent” whom section 879
of the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in the application of Mapa rule retrospectively?

Held: Yes, at the time of Licera’s designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his
apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permi
t thereof in 1965, the Macarandang rule formed part of the jurisprudence and, hence, of
this jurisdiction’s legal system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967.

Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. These decisions, although in themselves
not law, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the
courts upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court’s
application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the
construed law purports to carry into effect.

Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates and old rule, the new doctrine should operate respectively
only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those who relied
thereon and acted on the faith thereof.
INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES/MARILYN C. PASCUAL, Petitioner, v.
ROEL P. LOGARTA, Respondent.

FACTS: Sometime in 1997, the petitioner recruitment agency, International Management Services
(IMS), deployed respondent Roel P. Logarta to work for Petrocon Arabia Limited (Petrocon) in
Alkhobar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in connection with general engineering services of Petrocon for
the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco).

Saudi Aramco notified Petrocon that due to changes in the general engineering services work
forecast for 1998, the man-hours that were formerly allotted to Petrocon is going to be reduced by
40%, and as a consequence, Petrocon was constrained to reduce its personnel that were employed,
one of whom was respondent.

Thus, Petrocon gave respondent a written notice informing the latter that due to the lack of project
works related to his expertise, he is given a 30-day notice of termination, and that his last day of
work with Petrocon will be on July 1, 1998. Petrocon also informed respondent that all due benefits
in accordance with the terms and conditions of his employment contract will be paid to respondent,
including his ticket back to the Philippines.

Upon his return, respondent filed a complaint the NLRC against petitioner, seeking to recover his
unearned salaries covering the unexpired portion of his employment on the ground that he was
illegally dismissed.

The LA ruled in favor of respondent. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA decision. Upon further
appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed the NLRC decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Was there a valid retrenchment?

HELD: When the dismissal is for a just cause, the absence of proper notice should not nullify the
dismissal or render it illegal or ineffectual. Instead, the employer should indemnify the employee for
violation of his statutory rights.

***

All Filipino workers, whether employed locally or overseas, enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine
labor and social legislations.

As aptly found by the NLRC and justly sustained by the CA, Petrocon exercised its prerogative to
retrench its employees in good faith and the considerable reduction of work allotments of Petrocon
by Saudi Aramco was sufficient basis for Petrocon to reduce the number of its personnel.

As for the notice requirement, however, contrary to petitioners contention, proper notice to the
DOLE within 30 days prior to the intended date of retrenchment is necessary and must be complied
with despite the fact that respondent is an overseas Filipino worker. In the present case, although
respondent was duly notified of his termination by Petrocon 30 days before its effectivity, no
allegation or proof was advanced by petitioner to establish that Petrocon ever sent a notice to the
DOLE 30 days before the respondent was terminated. Thus, this requirement of the law was not
complied with.

Also, petitioners contention that respondent freely consented to his dismissal is unsupported by
substantial evidence. Respondents recourse of finding a new employer during the 30-day period
prior to the effectivity of his dismissal and eventual return to the Philippines is but logical and
reasonable under the circumstances. Faced with the eventuality of his termination from
employment, it is understandable for respondent to seize the opportunity to seek for other
employment and continue working in Saudi Arabia.

In the case at bar, notwithstanding the fact that respondents termination from his employment was
procedurally infirm, having not complied with the notice requirement, nevertheless the same
remains to be for a just, valid and authorized cause, i.e., retrenchment as a valid exercise of
management prerogative. To stress, despite the employers failure to comply with the one-month
notice to the DOLE prior to respondents termination, it is only a procedural infirmity which does
not render the retrenchment illegal.

InAgabon v. NLRC,this Court ruled that when the dismissal is for a just cause, the absence of proper
notice should not nullify the dismissal or render it illegal or ineffectual. Instead, the employer
should indemnify the employee for violation of his statutory rights.

Consequently, it is Article 283 of the Labor Code and not Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 that is
controlling. Thus, respondent is entitled to payment of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
pay, or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. Considering
that respondent was employed by Petrocon for a period of eight (8) months, he is entitled to receive
one (1) month pay as separation pay.

DENIED

Suntay vs. Suntay

G.R. No. L-3807 and L-3088, July 31, 1954

In 1934, Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines, died
in Amoy, China. He left real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in
Amoy. During his lifetime, he married twice, the first wife was Manuela Cruz, with whom he had
several children. The second marriage was with Maria Natividad Lim Brillian, with whom he had a
son, petitioner Silvino Suntay.

Intestate proceedings were instituted by the heirs from the first marriage. While
the second wife, the surviving widow who remained in Amoy China, filed a petition for
the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased which was claimed to have
been executed and signed in the Philippines on November, 1929. The petition was
denied due to the loss of the will before the hearing thereof. After the pacific war,
Silvino, claimed to have found among the records of his father, a last will and testament
in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on January, 1931 and
probated in the Amoy District Court. He filed a petition in the intestate proceedings for
the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 or the will
executed in Amoy China on November, 1931.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will executed in Amoy, China can still be validly probated in
the Philippines

The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court must
be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also
be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of the will in China in 1931 should
also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.

Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of
Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will
and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will.

The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport to
probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the
will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance
with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the
probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of
proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and
accepted as proceedings leading to the probate of allowance of a will and therefore, the
will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of
this country.

Albenson Enterprises v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 88694, 11 January 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. at Baltao
Building mild steel plates which the latter ordered and as part of the payment, a bouncing check was
issued by one “Eugenio Baltao”.
Petitioner, in a sincere attempt to collect the sum of money due them, filed a criminal complaint
against private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao after the latter refused to make good the amount of the
bouncing check despite demand. However, there was a mistake of identity as there were two
“Eugenio Baltaos” conducting business in the same building – Eugenio S. Baltao and his son,
Eugenio Baltao III.
It was found that the signature of the check was not of Eugenio S. Baltao and because of the alleged
unjust filing of a criminal case against him, respondent Baltao filed a complaint for damages
anchored on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code against petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights (Article 19) has been violated, resulting in damages
under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law.
RULING:
No, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of rights. What prompted
petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was
their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly
believed was issued to them by private respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding
the origin of the check. Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken
identity at first hand. Instead, private respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the
hapless petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for damages.
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article
20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for
their own sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal
right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby.
Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act
which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and
it is done with intent to injure.
There is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the case
against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith committed
by petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN vs REYES Case Digest

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND RUBY LIM VS. ROBERTO REYES a.k.a. “AMAY
BISAYA”
2005 Feb 28
G.R. No. 154259

FACTS: In the evening of October 13, 1994, while drinking coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,
respondent was invited by a friend, Dr. Filart to join her in a party in celebration of the birthday of
the hotel’s manager. During the party and when respondent was lined-up at the buffet table, he was
stopped by Ruby Lim, the Executive Secretary of the hotel, and asked to leave the party. Shocked and
embarrassed, he tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, who was herself a guest. Not long
after, a Makati policeman approached him and escorted him out of her party.

Ms. Lim admitted having asked respondent to leave the party but not under the ignominious
circumstances painted by Mr. Reyes, that she did the act politely and discreetly. Mindful of the wish
of the celebrant to keep the party intimate and exclusive, she spoke to the respondent herself when
she saw him by the buffet table with no other guests in the immediate vicinity. She asked him to leave
the party after he finished eating. After she had turned to leave, the latter screamed and made a big
scene.

Dr. Filart testified that she did not want the celebrant to think that she invited Mr. Reyes to the party.

Respondent filed an action for actual, moral and/or exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The lower
court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court,
consequently imposing upon Hotel Nikko moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On
motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. Thus, this instant petition for
review.
ISSUES: Whether or not Ms. Ruby Lim is liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code in asking
Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited by the celebrant thereof and whether or not Hotel
Nikko, as the employer of Ms. Lim, be solidarily liable with her.

RULING: The Court found more credible the lower court’s findings of facts. There was no proof of
motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and to expose him to ridicule and shame. Mr.
Reyes’ version of the story was unsupported, failing to present any witness to back his story. Ms. Lim,
not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be
made liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her
employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employees.

When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be responsible. Article 21 states that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act cannot amount to abusive conduct.

The maxim “Volenti Non Fit Injuria” (self-inflicted injury) was upheld by the Court, that is, to which
a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury, that consent to injury precludes the recovery of
damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger.

ABSCBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

REPUBLIC BROADCASTING CORP, VIVA PRODUCTION, INC., and VICENTE DEL
ROSARIO
G.R. No. 128690 January 21, 1999

FACTS:

 1. In 1990, ABSCBN and Viva executed a Film Exhibition Agreement whereby Viva
gave ABSCBN an exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films.
 2. One of the provisions of the agreement states that ABSCBN shall have the right
of first refusal to the next twenty-four Viva films for TV telecast provided, however, that such
right shall be exercised by ABSCBN from the actual offer in writing.
 3. Viva, through defendant Del Rosario, offered ABSCBN, through its vice-
president Charo Santos Concio, a list of 3 film packages (36 title) from which ABSCBN may
exercise its right of first refusal under the aforesaid agreement
 4. ABSCBN, however through Mrs. Concio, "can tick off only ten (10) titles" (from
the list) "we can purchase" and therefore did not accept said list.
 5. On February 27, 1992, defendant Del Rosario approached ABSCBN's Ms. Concio,
with a list consisting of 52 original movie titles (i.e. not yet aired on television) including the
14 titles subject of the present case, as well as 104 reruns (previously aired on television)
from which ABSCBN may choose another 52 titles.
  6. On April 2, 1992, defendant Del Rosario and ABSCBN general manager, Eugenio
Lopez III, met at the Tamarind Grill Restaurant in Quezon City to discuss the package
proposal of Viva.
 7. What transpired in that lunch meeting is the subject of conflicting versions.
 8. Mr. Lopez testified that he and Mr. Del Rosario allegedly agreed that ABSCRN
was granted exclusive film rights to 14 films for a total consideration of P36 million; that he
allegedly put this agreement as to the price and number of films in a "napkin'' and signed it
and gave it to Mr. Del Rosario.
 9. On the other hand, Del Rosario denied having made any agreement with Lopez
regarding the 14 Viva films; Denied the existence of a napkin in which Lopez wrote
something; and insisted that what he and Lopez discussed at the lunch meeting was Viva's
film package offer of 104 films for a total price of P60 million. Mr. Lopez promising to make
a counter proposal which came in the form of a proposal contract.
 10. On April 06, 1992, Del Rosario and Mr. Graciano Gozon of RBS Senior vice-
president for Finance discussed the terms and conditions of Viva's offer to sell the 104 films,
after the rejection of the same package by ABSCBN.
 11. On April 07, 1992, defendant Del Rosario received through his secretary, a
handwritten note from Ms. Concio – a draft of the counter proposal
 12. The said counter proposal was however rejected by Viva's Board of Directors in
the evening of the same day
 13. On April 29, 1992, after the rejection of ABSCBN and following several
negotiations and meetings defendant Del Rosario and Viva's President Teresita Cruz, in
consideration of P60 million, signed a letter of agreement dated April 24, 1992. granting RBS
the exclusive right to air 104 Viv produced and/or acquired films including the 14 films
subject of the present case.
 14. RTC rendered a decision favoring respondents.
 15. According to the RTC, there was no meeting of minds on the price and terms of
the offer.
 16. The alleged agreement between Lopez III and Del Rosario was subject to the
approval of the VIVA Board of Directors, and said agreement was disapproved during the
meeting of the.
 17. Hence, there was no basis for ABSCBN's demand that VIVA signed the 1992 Film
Exhibition Agreement.
 18. Furthermore, the right of first refusal under the 1990 Film Exhibition Agreement
had previously been exercised per Ms. Concio's letter to Del Rosario ticking off ten titles
acceptable to them, which would have made the 1992 agreement an entirely new contract.


ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a perfected contract between ABSCBN and VIVA films

RULING:
A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself to give
something or to render some service to another for a consideration. There is no contract unless the
following requisites concur: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the
subject of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation, which is established.
Once there is concurrence between the offer and the acceptance upon the subject matter,
consideration, and terms of payment a contract is produced. The offer must be certain. To convert the
offer into a contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must not qualify the terms of the offer; it
must be plain, unequivocal, unconditional, and without variance of any sort from the proposal. A
qualified acceptance, or one that involves a new proposal, constitutes a counteroffer and is a rejection
of the original offer.
ABSCBN, sent, through Ms. Concio, a counterproposal in the form of a draft contract proposing
exhibition of 53 films for a consideration of P35 million. This counterproposal could be nothing less
than the counteroffer of Mr. Lopez during his conference with Del Rosario at Tamarind Grill
Restaurant. Clearly, there was no acceptance of VIVA's offer, for it was met by a counteroffer which
substantially varied the terms of the offer.
In the case at bar, ABSCBN made no unqualified acceptance of VIVA's offer. Hence, they
underwent a period of bargaining. ABSCBN then formalized its counterproposals or counteroffer in a
draft contract, VIVA through its Board of Directors, rejected such counteroffer, Even if it be conceded
arguendo that Del Rosario had accepted the counteroffer, the acceptance did not bind VIVA, as there
was no proof whatsoever that Del Rosario had the specific authority to do so.
Under Corporation Code, unless otherwise provided by said Code, corporate powers, such as
the power; to enter into contracts; are exercised by the Board of Directors. However, the Board may
delegate such powers to either an executive committee or officials or contracted managers. The
delegation, except for the executive committee, must be for specific purposes.

Del Rosario did not have the authority to accept ABSCBN's counteroffer was best evidenced
by his submission of the draft contract to VIVA's Board of Directors for the latter's approval. In any
event, there was between Del Rosario and Lopez III no meeting of minds.

TITLE: Limjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro Fragante

CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397

FACTS:

Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public
convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially
capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of
public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its
special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to
maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the
estate is a contravention of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality.

HELD:

The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil
Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of
the settlement and distribution of his properties”. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical
administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after
his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience
before the Public Service Commission.

Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of
the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro
O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as
amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed”.
Limjoco vs. Estate of Fragrante
G.R. No. L-770
April 27, 1948

FACTS:

On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to the
Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said intestate estate through its
Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to
maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons
in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from the said plant in the Municipalities
of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City; that Fragante’s intestate estate is financially
capable of maintaining the proposed service.

Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Fragante for
the latter as party applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied for is a contravention of
the law.

ISSUE:

Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial personality.

HELD:

The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante had lived, in
view of the evidence of record, would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which
he was applying. The situation has not changed except for his death, and the economic ability of his
estate to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same
that it received from the decedent himself.

It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the
decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after
his demise. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased person is considered a
"person", as deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice or
prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal
obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.

The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the
settlement and distribution of his estate which, include the exercise during the judicial
administration of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his estate which survived
after his death.

The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and
parcel of the assets of his estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the
heirs of the decedent. It includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which
survived after his death like his pending application at the commission.

Martinez v Martinez March 31, 1902 G.R. No. 445

J. Cooper
Facts:
This is an action brought by Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the compulsory legal heir, against
Francisco Martinez Garcia for a declaration of prodigality against the father.
The son claimed that the father is dissipating and squandering his estate by making donations to his
second wife and to her parents of properties amounting to over $200,000; that he has given over the
administration of this estate to the management of his wife; that the defendant has a propensity for
litigation and has instituted groundless actions against the plaintiff in order to take possession of the
property held in common with the plaintiff to give it to his wife and her relatives.
The defendant alleged that he has executed in favor of the plaintiff a general power of attorney under
which the plaintiff has administered the community estate for several years; that the plaintiff has
caused the ships Germana, Don Francisco, and Balayan, belonging to the estate, to be registered in
his own name without the consent of the father and is otherwise mismanaging and misappropriating
the property of the estate, which caused the defendant to revoke the power of attorney given to
plaintiff, and that the suit brought by the defendant against the plaintiff was due to the attitude of the
son, who, notwithstanding the fact that the power of attorney had been revoked, refused to render an
account of his administration.
The Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the plaintiff and adjudged the costs against
him. The plaintiff has appealed to this court.

Issue: Is the father suffering from prodigality thereby injuring the estate of his son?

Held: No. Petition dismissed

Ratio:
The acts which constitute prodigality are not defined in the Civil Code owing to the difficulty of
applying general rules to the varying circumstances of the case and the different situations of persons.
Under our law it may inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of mind and a
disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to
want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate.
Donations are considered as acts of liberality dictated by generosity and affection. All persons who
can contract and dispose of property may make donations. (Art. 624 of the Civil Code.)
Public policy requires that limitations of the character mentioned should be imposed upon the owner,
but a law which would impose restrictions further than such as are required by public policy may well
be regarded unjust and tending in a contrary direction, as destroying the incentive to acquire property,
and as subduing the generous impulse of the heart.
While some of the witnesses state that the possessions of the wife have greatly increased since her
marriage, there is no evidence whatever to show that there has been any perceptible diminution of the
defendant’s property. This can be accounted for only on the grounds that the father, so far from being
a prodigal, is still in the full exercise of his faculties and still possesses the industry, thrift, and ability
that resulted in the accumulation of a splendid estate after the date of his marriage with the mother
of the plaintiff, to one-half of which estate the plaintiff has succeeded as heir of the mother.
A careful consideration of the evidence is sufficient to induce the belief that the plaintiff himself
possesses that propensity for instituting lawsuits which he unjustly attributes to his father.

QUIMIGUING vs Icao G.R. No. 26795

Quimiguing v Icao G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

J. J.B.L. Reyes

Facts:
Icao, a married man, impregnated Quimiging, a minor. As a result, she had to pay for hospitalization
and stopped studying. The latter claimed damages Php 120 a month. Duly summoned, defendant Icao
moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been
born. The trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, she had later given
birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was
allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. The plaintiff appealed directly to
this Court.

Issue: Is a conceived child entitled to support?

Held: Yes. Petition granted.

Ratio:
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is
an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet
unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text
of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born
for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb).
Auxiliary reason: A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man
to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim
that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts
Hence, the girl has a cause of action.

GELUZ vs CA G.R. No. L-16439

ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
2 SCRA 801

FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married. Desiring to
conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz. After
her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than 2 years
later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00.
Her husband did not know of, nor consented to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent,
sued petitioner for damages based on the third and last abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00
as attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his parents may
recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child?

RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of course,
essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as never having
possessed legal personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the one
injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn
child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its
parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same
was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one
that lacked juridical personality.
It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the
Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child was dead
when separated from its mother’s womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages must be
those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of the
deceased child.

DE JESUS vs Syquia G.R. No. L-39110

De Jesus vs Syquia
TITLE: De Jesus v Syquia
CITATION: 58 Phil 866

FACTS:

Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the
defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an
unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said
barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence,
Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.
In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he
even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given
to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding
her to eat on time for her and “junior’s” sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at
the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila
where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy,
defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the
arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia
Jr. that was first planned.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to
Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.

2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted
possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a
consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael
Loanco.

HELD:

The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are
sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that
the writing shall be indubitable.

“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of
a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit
the status”.

Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia
Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as
to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per
month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the
order as to the amount of pension.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, vs Comelec G.R. No. 119976

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO,respondents.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was
seven (7) months.
On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with
the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for
residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the
House of Representative.
In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to since
childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing that
she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte.
The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of
petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming winner
of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Issue:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.
Held:
Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile
in the First District of Leyte.
Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of domicile
for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s
qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.
An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in different
places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as
required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of
choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for
the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to
petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.
Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in
the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions
dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to
proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
UYTENGSU vs. REPUBLIC
95 P.R. 890

Facts: Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October
6, 1927, where he also finished his primary and secondary education. He went to the United States,
where, from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California. In
April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. Then, to be exact,
on July 15, 1950, his present application for naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he returned to the
United States and took a postgraduate course, in chemical engineering, in another educational
institution. He finished this course in July 1951; but did not return to the Philippines until October
13, 1951.

Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word “residence”, as used in the aforesaid
provision of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile, which, once acquired, is not lost
by physical absence, until another domicile is obtained, and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to
be domiciled in, and hence a resident of the Philippines, his purpose in staying in the United States,
at that time, being, merely to study therein.
Issue: Whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the fact
that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until
several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof.

Held: While, generally speaking, domicile and residence mean one and the same thing, residence
combined with intention to remain, constitutes domicile while an established abode, fixed
permanently for a time for business or other purposes, constitutes a residence, though there may be
an intent, existing all the while, to return to the true domicile.

Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition for naturalization
and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof, notwithstanding
his explicit promise, under oath, that he would reside continuously in the Philippines “from the date
of the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship”, he has not
complied with the requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not
entitled to a judgment in his favor.

Mayor Jose UGDORACION vs. COMELEC & Ephraim TUNGOL

GR No. 179851 – April 18, 2008 – Nachura

SUBJECT:

FACTS:
Jose Ugdoracion (petitioner) & Ephraim Tungol (PR) were rival mayoralty candidates in the Mun of
Albuquerque, Bohol.

PR filed a petition to deny due or cancel the COC of petitioner contending that petitioner committed
material misrepresentation in declaring his eligibility because he is actually a “greencard” holder or
permanent resident of the US.

It appears that petitioner became a permanent resident of USA on Sept. 26, 2001. However, petitioner
stated in his COC that he had resided in Albuquerque for 41 years before May 14, 2007 & he is not a
permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign country.

The COMELEC 1st Div. cancelleged petitioner’s COC. Petitioner filed an MR alleging that his status as
a “greencard” holder was not of his own making but a mere offshoot of a petition filed by his sister.

COMELEC En Banc denied the MR & affirmed the 1st Div.’s ruling.

ISSUE: WON petitioner committed material misrepresentation in his COC.

HELD: Yes.
It has been settled that a Filipino’s acquisition of a permanent resident status abroad constitutes an
abandonment of his domicile & residence in the PH. In short, the “greencard” holder state in the USA
is a renunciation of one’s status as a resident of the PH.

The contention that petitioner’s permanent resident status in the US was acquired involuntarily does
not persuade because a petitioned party is very much free to accept/reject the grant of such resident
status.

Under sec. 40 (f) of the LGC, a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country,
disqualifies a candidate on elective position unless said person waives his status.
The waiver of permanent resident status presented by petitioner, however, is a mere application for
abandonment of his status as lawful permanent resident of the USA. It does not bear any not of
approval by the concerned US official.

Lastly, petitioner’s win in the election does not substitute for the specific requirements of law on a
person’s eligibility of for public office which petitioner lacked.