SILVERIO v.
REPUBLIC (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual.
He’s a biological male who feels trapped in a male body.
Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok,
Thailand. The procedure was successful – he (she) now
has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a
petition for the change of his first name (from Rommel
to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth
certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila RTC.
He wanted to make these changes, among others, so that
he can marry his American fiancé.
The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that
it should be granted based on equity; that Silverio’s
misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own
doing and should not be in any way taken against him;
that there was no opposition to his petition (even the
OSG did not make any basis for opposition at this
point); that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused
to anybody or the community in granting the petition.
On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her]
fiancé and the realization of their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG
before the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the
RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and
first name in the birth certificate may be changed on the
ground of gender re-assignment.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of
such entries finds no support in existing legislation.
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING
THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR
THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A
CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN
ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR
NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT
NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was passed. This law
provides that it should be the local civil registrar that has
jurisdiction in petitions for the change of first names and
not the regular courts. Hence, the petition of Silverio
insofar as his first name is concerned is procedurally
infirm. Even assuming that the petition filed properly, it
cannot be granted still because the ground upon which it
is based(gender re-assignment) is not one of those
provided for by the law. Under the law, a change of
name may only be grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce;
and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been
publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above,
he merely alleged gender re-assignment as the basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before
the regular courts or a petition for the local civil registry.
Not with the courts because there is no law to support it.
And not with the civil registry because there is no
clerical error involved. Silverio was born a male hence it
was just but right that the entry written in his birth
certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of
the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not
attended by error, is immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial
legislation. To grant the changes sought by Silverio will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of
a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply
particularly to women such as the provisions of the
Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies
under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore
the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if Silverio’s petition were to be
granted.
But the SC emphasized: “If the legislature intends to
confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment
the privilege to change his name and sex to conform
with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying
down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of
that privilege.”
REPUBLIC v. CAGANDAHAN
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial
Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name
from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and
her gender from female to male. It appearing that
Jennifer Cagandahan is sufferingfrom Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition
where afflicted persons possess both male and female
characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics. To further her petition,
Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate
evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of
the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in
addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is
female but because her body secretes male hormones,
her female organs did not develop normally, thus has
organs of both male and female.” The lower court
decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor
General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking
that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court because the said petition did not
implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing
in her birth certificate be changed.
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the
Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright
denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the availale
evidence presented in court including the fact that
private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to
the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s
body produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen), which is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to
(1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual
deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the
Supreme Court respects the respondent’s congenital
condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is
already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court
added that a change of name is not a matter of right but
of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons and the consequences that will follow.
NAVARRO v. DOMAGOTOY
Rodolfo Navarro was the Municipal Mayor of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. He submitted evidence in relation to
two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial
Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends,
exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27,
1994, said judge solemnized the wedding between
Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the
knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his
first wife. On his part, Domagtoy claimed that he merely
relied on an affidavit acknowledged before him attesting
that Tagadan’s wife has been absent for seven years.
The said affidavit was alleged to have been sworn to
before another judge. Second, it is alleged that he
performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano
Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his
court’s jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy
counters that he solemnized the marriage outside of his
jurisdiction upon the request of the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without
jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. Domagtoy’s defense is not tenable and he
did display gross ignorance of the law. Tagadan did not
institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his
first wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial
declaration, he remains married to Ihis former wife.
Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error
on the part of Domagtoy to have accepted the joint
affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or
ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and
therefore void, marriage. On the second issue, the
request to hold the wedding outside Domagtoy’s
jurisdiction was only done by one party, the bride, NOT
by both parties. More importantly, the elementary
principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal
requisites of marriage is the “authority of the
solemnizing officer.” Under Article 7, marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, “any incumbent member
of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.” Article
8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the
venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or
qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
CARIÑO vs CARIÑO
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao
Cariño. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4
contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee
Cariño. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is
already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In
1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee.
Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of
SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00
while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In
1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money
against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k.
Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was
solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n
SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao
and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid
marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar.
Yee also claimed that she only found out about the
previous marriage on SPO4’s funeral.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage
may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.
HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null
and void due the absence of a valid marriage license.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null
and void for the same has been solemnized without the
judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage
between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC,
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such
as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case
for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. In such instances, evidence
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring
such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned
by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to
bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by
each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art.
148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned
by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void.
This is because the two were capacitated to marry each
other for there were no impediments but their marriage
was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their
situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147
of the FC which provides that everything they earned
during their cohabitation is presumed to have been
equally contributed by each party – this includes salaries
and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact
that the other may not have contributed at all.
REPUBLIC v CA, CASTRO
Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas
were married in a civil ceremony performed by a City
Court Judge of Pasig City and was celebrated without
the knowledge of Castro's parents.Defendant Cardenas
personally attended the procuring of the documents
required for the celebration of the marriage, including
the procurement of the marriage license.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband
and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's
parents. They decided to live together when Castro
discovered she was pregnant. The cohabitation lasted
only for four months. Thereafter, the couple parted
ways. Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S, Castro
wanted to put in order he marital status before leaving
for the U.S. She then discovered that there was no
marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila.
Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of
Quezon City seeking for the judicial declaration of
nullity of her marriage claiming that no marriage license
was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of
their marriage.
The trial court denied the petition holding that the
certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-
issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of
the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the
"inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage
license is not conclusive to show that there was no
marriage license issued. On appeal, the decision of the
trial court was reversed.
ISSUE: Is the marriage valid? Is there such a thing as a
"secret marriage"?
HELD: At the time of the subject marriage was
solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital
relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that
no marriage license shall be solemnized without a
marriage license first issued by the local civil registrar.
Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a license would render the marriage void ab
initio.
It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a
civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The
subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a
"secret marriage" - a legally non-existent phrase but
ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated
without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of
either or both of the contracting parties. The records
show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas as
initially unknown to the parents of the former.
NIÑAl v. BAYADOG
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. She was shot by Pepito resulting in
her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof,
Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December
11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997,
Pepito died in a car accident
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for
annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the Family
Code.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as
husband and wife for at least five years exempts them
from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action
against defendant in asking for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G.
Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the
filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is
already dead
Ruling:
(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived
together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of cohabitation as “husband and
wife” where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other
words, the five-year common law cohabitation period,
which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of the marriage. The five-year
period should be the years immediately before the day
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the five years, and
continuity—that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-
year cohabitation period is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse.
(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will
be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
BORJA-MANZANO v. SANCHEZ
Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David
Manzano on May 21, 1966. They had four children.
However, on March 22, 1993, David contracted another
marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Infanta,
Pangasinan MTC Judge Roque Sanchez. During that
time,
Payao was also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and
David issued an affidavit stating that they were both
married however due to incessant quarrels, they both left
their families and they no longer communicated with
them. They have lived together as husband & wife for 7
years. Judge agreed to solemnize the marriage. Herminia
filed charges of gross ignorance of the law against
Sanchez.
ISSUE: WON David Manzano’s marriage with Payao is
valid?
HELD: NO. Sanchez fined P20,000.00
RATIO:
1. FC Art. 34: legal ratification of marital cohabitation
exempts a couple from obtaining a marriage license but
the ff requisites must be present: lived together as
husband & wife for at least five years, no legal
impediment to marry each other, fact of absence of legal
impediment must be present at time of marriage
, affidavit stating that they’ve been living together for at
least 5 years & without legal impediments , solemnizing
officer should execute sworn statement that he
ascertained qualifications of contracting parties.
2. None of requisites were present. They declared that
they were separated but judge still solemnized marriage.
Mere separation and free & voluntary cohabitation with
another person do not dissolve the marriage tie.
Cohabitation for at least five years exempts them from
the marriage license but it does not free them of their
legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.
3. Marriage was void & bigamous. Judge displayed
gross ignorance of the law.
MORIGO v. PEOPLE
August 30, 1990: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete
contracted marriage on.
January 17, 1992: the Ontario Court granted the petition
for divorce to Lucia.
October 4, 1992: Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago
September 21, 1993: Lucio filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage with
Lucia on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually
took place
October 19, 1993: Lucio was charged with Bigamy in an
information filed with the RTC
Lucio moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his
marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. Motion was granted but subsequently
denied.
RTC convicted Lucio for the crime of Bigamy on the
ground that it discounted the claim that his first marriage
to Lucia was null and void ab initio.
Case was appealed to CA. CA affirmed RTC's decision
ISSUE:
WON the 1st marriage is void
WON he is guilty of bigamy
HELD:
Yes.Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio
considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between them by a solemnizing officer
instead they just merely signed a marriage contract.
No. The petitioner does not need to file a declaration of
the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his
second marriage with Lumabago. Hence, he did not
commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
The effect of the final judgment declaring nullity
acquitted Lucio Morigo from the crime of Bigamy.