REPUBLIC v ORBECIDO
In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myro
Villanueva in Lam-an, Ozamis City and had two children.
Wife went to US with his son to work and later became a
naturalized American citizen.
On 1986, he learned from his son that his wife obtained
divorce and married an American.
Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry under the
Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
RTC Zamboanga del Sur granted his petition.
The OSG’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the
Decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article
26 (2).
Yes. Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of
the solemnization of the marriage.
The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of
celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time the
divorce decree is obtained abroad by alien spouse
capacitating him/her to remarry.
However, Orbecido is barred from remarrying because he did
not present competent evidence showing his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried.
REPUBLIC v IYOY
Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu
City. They begot five children. After the celebration of their
marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-
tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the
Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
leaving all of their five children to the care of respondent
Crasus. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned,
through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got
married to an American, with whom she eventually had a
child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus.
Also, she had been openly using the surname of her American
husband in the Philippines and in the USA. Crasus filed a
declaration of nullity of marriage on March 25, 1997.
On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for
divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself
sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the
enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from
respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and
acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage
to her American husband was legal because now being an
American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of
her present nationality. Fely also prayed that the RTC declare
her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that
respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00
she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and
Fely null and void ab ignition on the ground of psychological
incapacity. One factor considered by the RTC is that Fely
obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and
married another man and has established another family of
her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is
married to a wife who is already married to another man in
another country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity
constitute psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was
valid.
RULING:
1st issue: The totality of evidence presented during the trial is
insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity
of Fely. Using the guidelines established by the cases of
Santos, Molina and Marcos, this Court found that the totality
of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably
to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife
Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said
Article.
2nd issue: As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a
special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is
a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the
marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal
interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case
of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time
Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself
admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after
she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married
her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she
alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At
the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen,
and pursuant to thenationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by
Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition,
and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad.
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could
not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent
Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and
subsisting.
CORPUZ v STO. TOMAS
Petitioner (Gerbert Corpuz) is a former Filipino citizen who
became a Canadian citizen through naturalization.
Subsequently, the petitioner married the respondent (Daisylyn
Sto. Tomas), a Filipina, in Pasig City. After the wedding,
petitioner went back to Canada due to work commitments;
however, when he came back he was shocked to discover that
the respondent is having an affair with another man. Thus,
petitioner went back to Canada and filed a petition for
divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario,
Canada granted the petitioner’s petition for divorce. The
divorce decree took effect a month later, January 8, 2006.
Two years later, the petitioner has already moved on and
found another woman that he wants to marry. Thus, for his
love to his fiancée; the petitioner went to the Pasig Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree
on his and the respondent’s marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National
Statistic’s Office (NSO) informed the petitioner that the
marriage between him and the respondent still subsists under
the Philippine Law and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, Series of
1982.
Accordingly, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage
dissolved with the RTC. The RTC denied his petition, hence
this recourse by the petitioner.
RTC: Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action
for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is
a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino
spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: W/N Art. 26(2) of the Family Code extends to aliens
the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree
RULING: The alien spouse can claim no right undert Art.
26(2) of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The legislative intent behind Art 26(2) is “to avoid the absurd
situation whre the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse”. The legislative intent is for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree
Art. 17 of the New Civil Code provides that the policy
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of Art. 26(2)
of the Family Code provides the direct exception to the rule
and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the
marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien
spouse
An action based on Art. 26(2) is not limited to the recognition
of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the aliens spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than
that already established by the decree) whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law
Remedy Available to Alien Spouse
The availability under Art 26(2) of the Family Code to aliens
does not necessarily strip the alien spouse of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the alien's national law have been duly
proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence in favor of the alien spouse, pursuant to
Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgment (Please see pertinent provisions of
the Rules of Court, particularly Sec. 48, Rule 39 and Sec. 24
Rule 132)
* Please take note: In this case, the SC considered the
recording of the divorce decree on Corpuz and Sto. Tomas'
marriage certificate as legally improper. No judicial order yet
exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree, thus, the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and
without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree of Corpuz and Sto. Tomas' marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree
presented by Corpuz (Please see Art. 407 of the New Civil
Code and the Law on Registry of Civil Status -Act No. 3753)
GARCIA v RECIO
The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as
husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family
court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the
marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian
citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina,
herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for
marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and
“Filipino”. Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in
1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were divided. In
1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned
of the respondent’s former marriage only in November. On
the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his
prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent
also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a
divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial
court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the
ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and
recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was
forwarded before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry
Grace Garcia.
RULING:
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it. In mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family
Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. A divorce
obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign
divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and
Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian
family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and
compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged
foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted
on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly because
he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local
Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which
was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his
legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However, there
are two types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the
marriage and limited divorce merely suspending the
marriage. In this case, it is not known which type of divorce
the respondent procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under
some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Under the
Australian divorce decree “a party to a marriage who marries
again before this decree becomes absolute commits the
offense of bigamy”. This shows that the divorce obtained by
the respondent might have been restricted. Respondent also
failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law
governing his status. Together with other evidences
submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to
remarry according to the alleged foreign law.
Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the
petitioner and respondent can not be declared null and void
based on lack of evidence conclusively showing the
respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. With the lack
of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity of the
parties’ marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.
REPUBLIC v CA & CASTRO
Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were
married in a civil ceremony performed by a City Court Judge
of Pasig City and was celebrated without the knowledge of
Castro's parents.
Defendant Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the
documents required for the celebration of the marriage,
including the procurement of the marriage license.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and
wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents.
They decided to live together when Castro discovered she
was pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only for four months.
Thereafter, the couple parted ways.
Castro gave birth and the baby was adopted by his brother
who is now in the US. Desiring to follow her daughter in the
U.S, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before
leaving for the U.S. She then discovered that there was no
marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of
their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of Pasig,
Metro Manila.
Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon
City seeking for the judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to
them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
The trial court denied the petition holding that the
certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-
issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the
marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the
certifying official to locate the marriage license is not
conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed.
ISSUE: Is the marriage valid? Is there such a thing as a
"secret marriage"?
HELD:
At the time of the subject marriage was solemnized on June
24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New
Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a marriage license first issued by the
local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a
valid marriage, absence of a license would render the
marriage void ab initio.
It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil
ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject
marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret
marriage" - a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used
to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge
of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the
contracting parties. The records show that the marriage
between Castro and Cardenas as initially unknown to the
parents of the former.
SANTOS v CA
Note: This was the first case where the term “psychological
incapacity” was discussed by the Supreme Court.
Leouel Santos, a member of the Army, met Julia Rosario
Bedia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married.
The couple latter lived with Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth to
their son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by
the frequent interference of Julia’s parents, as averred by
Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarreled about as to,
among other things, when should they start living
independently from Julia’s parents. In 1988, Julia went to the
US to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s opposition. 7 months
later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return
home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990,
Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military
training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his
wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his
wife come home, filed a petition to nullify their marriage due
to Julia’s alleged psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted
that due to Julia’s failure to return home or at least
communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes
psychological incapacity. Julia filed an opposition; she said
that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor
ascertained that there is no collusion between the two.
Leouel’s petition is however denied by the lower and
appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant
to the case at bar.
HELD: No. Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that
the Family Code did not define the term “psychological
incapacity”, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law.
But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less
specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some
resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any
examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would
limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may
be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law. The term “psychological incapacity” defies any
precise definition since psychological causes can be of an
infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. The intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his
petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife
is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The
factual settings do not come close to to the standard required
to decree a nullity of marriage.
TSOI v. CA
Sometime on May 22, 1988, Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were
married as evidence by their marriage contract. From May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. Gina made attempts for sexual
activity to no avails. Medical examinations showed that both
Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were capaple of sexual conduct.
Gina was still a virgin at the time of the medical examination.
Gina filed a motion for declaration of nullity and the Trial
Court declared their marriage as void. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s decision. Petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi
subsequently filed a motion to the Supreme Court citing that
it was she and not he that had the problem regarding sexual
intimacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not non-desire of sexual consumation be
an indicator of psychological incapacity?
RULING: The Supreme Court found the petition to be bereft
of merit. Since the action to declare the marriage void may be
filed by either party, the question of who refuses to have sex
with the other becomes immaterial. If a spouse, although
physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Aligned
with this is the essential marital obligation, “the procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
After ten months of marriage, the reluctance to perform the
sexual act was indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a
serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code.
Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically
Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their marriage incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
contract. After the celebration they had a reception and then of marriage
proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming Tsoi’s mother.
There they slept together on the same bed in the same room
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial
for the first night of their married life.
court and Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID the
Gina’s version: that contrary to her expectations that as marriage entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988.
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love that No costs.
night of their marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with
each other, Ching however just went to bed, slept on one side
and then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a
sexual intercourse between them that night. The same thing spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
happened on the second, third and fourth nights. considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse,
although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his
In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where
or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
they can enjoy together during their first week as husband
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
and wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
with Ching’s mother, uncle and nephew as they were all
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
invited by her husband. There was no sexual intercourse
psychological incapacity.
between them for four days in Baguio since Ching avoided
her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just One of the essential marital obligations under the Family
sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. Code is “to procreate children basedon the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed
basic end of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this
since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage) until March 15,
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of
1989 (ten months). But during this period there was no
the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted
attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Gina claims that
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation is
she did not even see her husband’s private parts nor did he
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
see hers.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
obliged to live together, observer mutual love, respect and
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results were that
fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the “spontaneous,
Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Ching’s
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
examination was kept confidential up to this time.
mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil.
The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said she had Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.” This is so
cleansing cream of his mother. She also said her husband because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has
only married her to acquire or maintain his residency status nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy
here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy
a normal man is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
Ching’s version: he claims that if their marriage shall be function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures
annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies the continuation of family relations.
with Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled for
reasons of (1) that he loves her very much (2) that he has no
defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically
capable (3) since the relationship is still very young and if
there is any differences between the two of them, it can still
be reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them
has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not
be cured.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no
sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to
have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided
him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands.
CADIZ v BRENT employment opportunities for all."50 The Labor Code of the
Cadiz – petitioner, HR officer employed to the respondent Philippines, meanwhile, provides:
Brent Hospital & Colleges Inc. – respondent Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for
an employer to require as a condition of employment or
Cadiz was suspended. The cause was unprofessionalism and
continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not
unethical behavior resulting to unwed pregnancy.
get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon
Cadiz then filed a complaint for: getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned
Unfair labor practice or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
Constructive dismissal otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of
Non payment of wages her marriage.
Damages with prayer for reinstatement Weighed against these safeguards, it becomes apparent that
Brent's condition is coercive, oppressive and discriminatory.
LA – Cadiz was not illegally dismissed as there was a just
cause for her dismissal. Not only because of unwed
pregnancy but by the fact that the institution is of the
Episcopal Church in the Philippines
- Also ruled that she was not entitled to reinstatement at least
until she marries her boyfriend
NLRC – affirmed LA decision
CA – dismissed her petition due to technical defects in the
petition
Cadiz contends that getting unwed pregnancy is not grossly
immoral. She says that the condition to get married for her to
be reinstated violates the stipulation against marriage Under
article 136 of the Labor Code. She contends that there was a
substantial compliance with the rules of procedure

W/O cadiz’s petition is dismissible on ground of technical

deficiencies
Despite the defects that court finds that the ends of substantial
justice would be better be served by relaxing the application
of technical rules of procedure.
W/O the act constitutes immorality
Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with
which an act should be gauged - it is public and secular, not
religious.
The totality of the circumstances of this case does not justify
the conclusion that Cadiz committed acts of immorality.
Similar to Leus, Cadiz and her boyfriend were both single
and had no legal impediment to marry at the time she
committed the alleged immoral conduct.
As declared in Leus’ case, "there is no law which penalizes
an unmarried mother by reason of her sexual conduct or
proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two
unmarried persons; that neither does such situation
contravene[s] any fundamental state policy enshrined in the
Constitution.

W/O marriage is a valid condition for reinstatement

The doctrine of management prerogative gives an employer
the right to "regulate, according to his own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment…
Constitution mandates that the "State shall afford full
protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of