Piandiong vs.

The Philippines

Facts:

Piandiong and Morallos were arrested on 27 February 1994, on suspicion of having participated, on 21
February 1994, in the robbery of passengers of a jeepney in Caloocan City, during which one of the
passengers, a policeman, was killed. After arriving in the police station, Piandiong and Morallos were hit
in the stomach in order to make them confess, but they refused. During a line up, the eyewitnesses
failed to recognize them as the robbers. The police then placed them in a room by themselves, and
directed the eyewitnesses to point them out. No counsel was present to assist the accused. During the
trial, Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan testified under oath, but the judge chose to disregard their
testimony, because of lack of independent corroboration.

Counsel further complains that the death sentence was wrongly imposed, because the judge considered
that an aggravating circumstance existed, as the crime was committed by more than three armed
persons. However, this was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, counsel states that the
judge should have taken into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, since they
came with the police without resisting. Counsel further states that the testimonies of the eyewitnesses
deserved no credence, because the eyewitnesses were close friends of the deceased and their
description of the perpetrators did not coincide with the way they actually looked. Counsel also states
that the judge erred when he did not give credence to the alibi defence. Finally, counsel complains that
the death penalty was unconstitutional and should not have been imposed for anything but the most
heinous crime.

On 7 November 1994, Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan were convicted of robbery with homicide and
sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The Supreme Court denied the appeal,
and confirmed both conviction and sentence by judgement of 19 February 1997. Further motions for
reconsideration were denied on 3 March 1998. After the execution had been scheduled, the Office of
the President granted a three month reprieve of execution. No clemency was however granted and
counsel presented a communication to the Committee under the Optional Protocol. The Committee
transmitted the communication to the State party with a request to provide information and
observations in respect of both admissibility and merits of the claims. The State party was also
requested not to carry out the death sentence against Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan, while their case
was under consideration by the Committee. The Committee was informed by counsel that a warrant for
execution had been issued. After having contacted the State party’s representative to the United
Nations Office at Geneva, the Committee was informed that the executions would go ahead as
scheduled, despite the Committee’s request, since the State party was of the opinion that the Authors
received a fair trial. Counsel for the Authors filed a petition with the Supreme Court seeking an
injunction, which was refused by the Court. However, Messrs. Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan were
executed by lethal injection. Counsel argues that Authors considered resort to the President as a
domestic remedy necessary for them to exhaust before presenting their communication to the Human
Rights Committee. They argue therefore that it was not improper for them to wait until it became clear
that clemency was not going to be granted. With respect to the State party’s argument that clemency
could not be granted because the crime could not be considered as poverty driven, counsel notes that
Messrs. Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan disputed the very finding of their supposed authorship of the
crime.
With regard to the State party’s argument that the Supreme Court has ruled the death penalty and
method of execution constitutional, counsel argues that the Supreme Court’s judgement deserves to be
reconsidered.

Issue/s:

1. The Human Rights Committee must decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional
Protocol to the Covenant.
2. Whether or not the accused were identified in Court by the eyewitnesses and that this identification
was sufficient.
3. Whether or not the courts of States parties, and not for the Committee, shall evaluate facts and
evidence in a particular case, and shall interpret the relevant domestic legislation.
4. Whether or not the crime for which they were convicted was a most serious crime as stipulated by
article 6(2), and whether the re-introduction of the death penalty in the Philippines is in compliance with
the State party’s obligations under article 6(1) (2) and (6) of the Covenant.

Ruling:
1. The Committee notes that the State party has not raised any objections to the admissibility of the
communication. The Committee is not aware of any obstacles to the admissibility of the communication
and accordingly declares the communication admissible and proceeds without delay with the
consideration of the merits
2. Counsel has claimed that the identification of Messrs. Piandiong and Morallos by eyewitnesses during
the police line-up was irregular, since the first time around none of the eyewitnesses recognized them,
upon which they were put aside in a room and policemen directed the eyewitnesses to point them out.
The Court rejected their claim in this respect, as it was uncorroborated by any disinterested and reliable
witness.
3. The Committee reiterates that it is for the courts of States parties, and not for the Committee, to
evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case, and to interpret the relevant domestic legislation. There
is no information before the Committee to show that the decisions by the courts were arbitrary or that
they amounted to denial of justice. In the circumstances, the Committee finds that the facts before it do
not reveal a violation of the Covenant in this respect.
4. The Committee is not in a position to address these issues, since neither counsel nor the State party
has made submissions in this respect.

The Human Rights Committee of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, is of the view that it cannot make a finding of a violation of any of the articles of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee reiterates its conclusion that the
State committed a grave breach of its obligations under the Protocol by putting the alleged victims to
death before the Committee had concluded its consideration of the communication.

Baroy vs. The Philippines

Facts:
The author and an (adult) co-accused were thereafter charged with three counts of rape. It is alleged
that on the date of the offence, the author would have been 14 years, 1 month and 14 days old, by
virtue of being born on 19 January 1984. At trial, the defense introduced the issue of minority through
the author, who claimed to have been born in 1982. The trial court instructed the appropriate
government agencies to submit evidence on his true age. Three documents were submitted. A
Certificate of Live Birth listed the date as 19 January 1984, while a Certificate of Late Registration of
Birth showed the date as 19 January 1981, and an Elementary School permanent record as 19 January
1980. The trial court considered, in the light of the author's physical appearance, that the author's true
date of birth was 19 January 1980, thus making him over 18 years of age at the time the offence was
committed.

On 1999, the author and his (adult) co-accused were each convicted of three counts of rape with a
deadly weapon and sentenced to death by lethal injection. In imposing the maximum penalty available,
the Court considered that there were the aggravating circumstances of night-time and confederation,
and no mitigating circumstances. On 2002, the Supreme Court, on automatic review, affirmed the
conviction but reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, on the basis that no aggravating
circumstances had been sufficiently alleged and proven to exist.

The author claims to have been a victim of a violation of article 6, paragraph 2, both alone and in
conjunction with paragraph 6. The author explains that following the constitutional abolition of capital
punishment in 1987, the Congress in 1994 reintroduced the death penalty by electrocution through the
Republic Act 7659. The author claims a violation of article 10, paragraph 3, as after his conviction he was
detained on death row with other convicts sentenced to death, regardless of his age. The author further
claims a violation of article 14, in particular paragraph 4. He was not accorded a separate procedure that
would protect his rights considering his legal status as a minor. No preliminary determination was made
as to his minority, with the trial court simply placing the burden of proof on the defense. The author
finally claims a violation of article 26, in that his age was arbitrarily determined to be 18, despite
evidence of his birth being either in 1981 or 1984. The trial court refused to treat him as a minor and
singled him out with the intention of arbitrarily determining the year of his birth, contrary to the
evidence presented.

Issues:

1. Whether or not there is a violation of article 10, paragraph 3, as after his conviction he was detained
on death row with other convicts sentenced to death, regardless of his age.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of article 14, in particular paragraph 4 when he was not accorded a
separate procedure that would protect his rights considering his legal status as a minor.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of article 26, in that his age was arbitrarily determined to be 18,
despite evidence of his birth being either in 1981 or 1984.

Ruling:
In spite of this conclusion with respect to the claims under article 6, the Committee observes that
sentencing a person to death and placing him or her on death row in circumstances where his or her
minority has not been finally determined raises serious issues under articles 10 and 14, as well as
potentially under article 7, of the Covenant. The Committee observes, however, with respect to the
exhaustion of domestic remedies, that the author has filed a "partial motion for reconsideration",
currently pending before the Supreme Court, requesting the Court to reconsider its treatment of his
minority in its judgment of 9 May 2002. The Committee recalls that its position in relation to issues of
exhaustion of domestic remedies is that, absent exceptional circumstances, this aspect of a registered
communication is to be assessed at the time of its consideration of the case. In the present case,
accordingly, the Committee considers that the questions of the authors' age and the means by which it
was determined by the courts are, by the author's own action, currently before a judicial forum with
authority to resolve definitively these particular claims. It follows that issues arising under articles 10
and 14 and, potentially, article 7 from the author's age and the manner in which the courts sought to
determine this question are inadmissible, for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.

Pimentel vs. The Philippines

Facts:
Human rights victims (Pimentel) brought a class action suit against Philippine President Ferdinand
Marcos. Pimentel obtained a nearly $2 billion judgment and later tried to attach a brokerage account at
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. (Merrill Lynch) (plaintiff), which was owned by Arelma, S.A.
(Arelma), a company incorporated by Marcos. The Republic of the Philippines and the Philippine
Presidential Commission on Good Governance (collectively, the Republic) claimed the money in the
brokerage account belonged to the Republic under Philippine law and asked Merrill Lynch to transfer
the money to the Philippine National Banc (PNB), pending a decision by a Philippine court. Instead,
Merrill Lynch filed an interpleader lawsuit in federal court to settle all the claims in one case, naming the
Republic, Arelma, PNB, Pimentel, and others as defendants. The Republic claimed sovereign immunity
and was dismissed from the lawsuit. The Republic then moved to dismiss the interpleader action,
arguing that the case could not proceed without it because it was an indispensable party under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 19. The district court denied the motion and continued to adjudicate the
case. The Republic appealed the denial, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed and issued a stay, pending the outcome of the litigation in the Philippine court. The district
judge vacated the stay and awarded the money to Pimentel. The Republic asked the Philippine court to
declare the money forfeited, but that court has not yet ruled. The Republic, Arelma, and PNB appealed,
but the court of appeals affirmed this time, largely because the Republic, despite being a required party
under FRCP Rule 19(a), was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim. The defendants petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the right to right to equality before the courts, the right to speedy
disposition of cases and the right to adequate legal remedy.

Ruling:
As to the length of the proceedings relating to the issue of the filing fee, the Committee recalls that the
right to equality before the courts, as guaranteed by article 14, paragraph 1, entails a number of
requirements, including the condition that the procedure before the national tribunals must be
conducted expeditiously enough so as not to compromise the principle of fairness. (5) It notes that the
Regional Trial Court and Supreme Court spent eight years and three hearings considering this subsidiary
issue and that the State party has provided no reasons to explain why it took so long to consider a
matter of minor complexity. For this reason, the Committee considers that the length of time taken to
resolve this issue was unreasonable, resulting in a violation of the authors' rights under article 14,
paragraph 1, read in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant.

The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol, is of the
view that the facts before it discloses a violation of article 14, paragraph 1, read in conjunction with
article 2, paragraph 3, as it relates to the proceedings on the amount of the filing fee.
The Committee is of the view that the authors are entitled, under article 2, paragraph 3(a), of the
Covenant, to an effective remedy. The State party is under an obligation to ensure an adequate remedy
to the authors including, compensation and a prompt resolution of their case on the enforcement of the
US judgement in the State party. The State party is under an obligation to ensure that similar violations
do not occur in the future.

Lumanog and Santos vs. The Philippines

Facts:
The authors of the communication are Mr. Lenido Lumanog and Mr. Augusto Santos, Filipino nationals
who, at the time of the submission of the communication, were on death row, at New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City, the Philippines. They claim to be victims of a violation by the Philippines of articles 6,
paragraph 1; 9, paragraph 1; 14, paragraphs 1, 3 (c) and 5; and 26 of the Covenant. They are represented
by counsels, Soliman Santos and Cecilia Jimenez.

The authors and three other individuals were sentenced to death for the murder of former Colonel
Rolando Abadilla, occurred on June 1996. They have been in detention since June 1996. After their
motions for reconsideration and new trial were rejected by the RTC in January 2000, the case was
transmitted to the Supreme Court in February 2000 for automatic review (appeal) of the death penalty.
All defence and prosecution appeals briefs for the purpose of the Supreme Court review were filed by
June 2004. Soon after the last appeal brief, on 6 July 2004, the authors filed a “Consolidated Motion for
Early Decisions”. On 10 December 2004, they filed a “Motion for Early Decision”, which was responded
to by Supreme Court is resolution of January 2005. In the latter resolution, the Supreme Court
transferred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition, in conformity with
its new jurisprudence pursuant to the judgment in “Mateo”. As a result, the authors filed an “Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration of Transfer to the Court of Appeals” on 24 February 2005, stressing that the
jurisprudence in “Mateo” should not be applied automatically to each death penalty case. Furthermore,
it was argued that the Supreme Court was in a position to proceed with the review of the case. The
Supreme Court rejected the Motion March 2005 for lack of merits. A new similar and more
substantiated request to reconsider the Supreme Court’s decision was filed on June 2005, but by
Resolution of July 2005 the Supreme Court reiterated its decision to transfer the case to the Court of
Appeals, declaring that its decision was “in conformity with the Mateo decision”. The review of the case
has been pending before the Court of Appeals since January 2005. On January 2007, due to internal
organizational matters of the Court of Appeals, the criminal case concerning the authors (Cesar Fortuna
et Al.) was transferred to a newly appointed judge in the Court.

With respect to Mr. Lumanog only, it is submitted that he was denied interlocutory relief while the case
was pending before the Supreme Court. The Court denied his “Motion for New Trial and Related Relief.”
On November 2004, the Supreme Court denied another motion filed by Mr. Lumanog, who had become
a kidney transplant patient in 2003 and asked the Court to be returned to the specialist kidney hospital
where he was treated as a patient in 2002 instead of being placed in the prison’s general hospital. Mr.
Lumanog went back to his cell, on his own request, as he preferred the conditions there to those of the
prison’s hospital.

Issues:
1. Whether or not there are violations of the Covenant caused by the transfer of their case from the
Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals.
2. Whether or not the decision of the Supreme Court not to review their case and transfer it to the Court
of Appeals violates article 14, paragraph 5 of the Covenant insofar as it violates their right to have their
conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of article 14, paragraph 3(c) of the Covenant, since their case had
been pending for five years before the Supreme Court and was ready for a decision when it was
transferred to the Court of Appeals, thereby unduly delaying the hearing.
4. Whether or not there is a violation of article 6, paragraph 1 and article 9, paragraph 1, since the
alleged violations of article 14 occurred in the context of a death penalty case with prolonged detention
which had very detrimental effect on the authors, and notably for Mr. Lumanog.

Ruling:
In relation to the authors’ claim under article 14, paragraph 3 (c), it may be noted that the right of the
accused to be tried without undue delay relates not only to the time between the formal charging of the
accused and the time by which a trial should commence, but also the time until the final judgment on
appeal3. All stages whether at first instance or on appeal, must be completed “without undue delay”.
Therefore, the Committee must not limit its consideration exclusively to the part of the judicial
proceedings subsequent to the transfer of the case from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals, but
rather take into account the totality of time. With respect to the alleged violation of article 14,
paragraph 5, of the Covenant, the Committee notes that the authors’ appeal remains pending before
the Court of Appeals, a higher tribunal within the meaning of article 14, paragraph 5, which is seized of
the case so as to enable it to review all factual issues pertaining to the authors’ conviction. This part of
the communication is therefore inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. The Committee
therefore decides that the communication is admissible only insofar as it raises issues under article 6,
paragraph 1, and article 14, paragraph 3(c), of the Covenant.

In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to
provide the authors with an effective remedy, including the prompt review of their appeal before the
Court of Appeals and compensation for the undue delay. The State party is also under an obligation to
take measures to prevent similar violations in the future. By becoming a party to the Protocol, the State
party has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a
violation of the Covenant and, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to
ensure all individuals within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
Covenant and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy in case a violation has been established.
In this respect, the Committee wishes to receive from the State party, within 180 days, information
about the measures taken to give effect to the Committee’s Views. The State party is also requested to
publish the Committee’s Views.

Marcellana and Gumanoy vs. The Philippines

Facts:
Marcellana was the former Secretary General of Karapatan-Southern Tagalog (a human rights
organisation) and Mr. Eddie Gumanoy was the former chairperson of Kasama Tk (an organization of
farmers). They were leading a fact finding mission in the province of Mindoro Oriental, to enquire about
the abduction of three individuals in Gloria town allegedly committed by elements of the 204th infantry
brigade and the killing and disappearance of civilians and burning of properties by the military in the
town of Pinamalayan. The victims were travelling on the highway when their van was stopped by ten
armed men. All the belongings of the members of the fact-finding mission, including mobile phones,
documents and photos of the mission, were then seized. After the armed men tied them up, they were
taken into a vehicle (“jeepney”). The armed men were not all hooded and some of them could be
identified as being former rebels and currently associated with the military. The victims were later
dropped along the roadside in different parts of Bongagbong municipality. The dead bodies of Ms.
Marcellana and Mr. Eddie Gumanoy were found the following day. Forensic reports and the death
certificates indicate that their death was caused by gun-shot wounds.

The authors filed a complaint for kidnapping and murder before the Department of Justice (DOJ) but
dismissed the complaint on 2004 and the charges against one of the alleged perpetrators on the ground
of insufficient evidence. The authors filed a Petition for Review which was 2006. The authors filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was dismissed on 2007. The authors appealed the DOJ’s decisions
before the Office of the President of the Republic. The appeal requested that the DOJ decision be
reversed and that charges be filed against Aniano “Silver” Flores and Richard “Waway” Falla. That appeal
is still pending.

A complaint was also filed with the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines. This complaint was
later withdrawn, due to the authors’ assessment that they would not obtain justice from this body.
Complaints were also filed with the House of Representatives of the Philippines, the Senate, and under
the Comprehensive Agreement on respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, but
no action was taken. The authors add that, in spite of widespread and public opposition, one of the
principal suspected perpetrators, Col. Palparan, was later promoted to Major General by the President.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the communication is inadmissible on the ground of failure to exhaust domestic
remedies.
2. Whether or not the State party’s contention that the case is inadmissible because the subject matter
of the communication is being or was examined by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.
3. Whether or not the authors have abused their right of submission.

Ruling:
1. The authors have conceded non-exhaustion of domestic remedies but claim that remedies have been
ineffective and unreasonably prolonged. The Committee refers to its case law, to the effect that, for the
purposes of article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol, domestic remedies must both be
effective and available, and must not be unduly prolonged.
2. The Committee observes that fact-finding country visits by a Special Rapporteur do not constitute a
“procedure of international investigation or settlement” within the meaning of article 5, paragraph 2(a),
of the Optional Protocol. The Committee further recalls that the study of human rights problems in a
country by a Special Rapporteur, although it might refer to or draw on information concerning
individuals, could not be regarded as being the same matter as the examination of individual cases
within the meaning of article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol. Accordingly, the Committee
considers that the 2007 country visit by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions, does not render the communication inadmissible under article 5, paragraph 2 (a),
of the Optional Protocol.
3. The Committee rejects this view: On the contrary, it is clear that pursuant to article 1 of the Optional
Protocol “[a] State party to the Covenant that becomes a party to the […] Protocol recognizes the
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its
jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State party…”. In the absence of any valid
reason offered as to why the present communication constitutes an abuse of right of submission, the
Committee is of the view that the case is not inadmissible on this ground.
In the present case, though over five years have elapsed since the killings took place, the State party’s
authorities have not indicted, prosecuted or brought to justice anyone in connection with these events.
The Committee notes that the State party’s prosecutorial authorities have, after a preliminary
investigation, decided not to initiate criminal proceedings against one of the suspects due to lack of
sufficient evidence. The Committee has not been provided with any information, other than about
initiatives at the policy level, as to whether any investigations were carried out to ascertain the
responsibility of the other members of the armed group identified by the witnesses. Absence of
investigations to establish responsibility for the kidnapping and murder of the victims amounted to a
denial of justice. The State party must accordingly be held to be in breach of its obligation, under article
6, in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 3, properly to investigate the death of the victims and take
appropriate action against those found guilty.

By becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party has recognized the competence of the
Committee to determine whether there has been a violation of the Covenant or not and that, pursuant
to article 2 of the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant, and to provide an effective
and enforceable remedy in case a violation has been established.

Larranaga vs. The Philippines

Facts:
On 1999, the author, along with six co-defendants, was found guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention of Jacqueline Chiong by the Special Heinous Crimes Court in Cebu City and was sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. On 3 February 2004, the Supreme Court of the Philippines found the author also
guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape of Marijoy Chiong and
sentenced him to death. He was also sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the simple kidnapping and
serious illegal detention of Jacqueline Chiong.

According to the author, he travelled from Cebu City to Quezon City on 8 June 1997 to pursue a Diploma
at the Centre for culinary arts in Quezon City. On 16 July 1997, he was taking examinations during the
entire day and then went to a restaurant in the evening. He stayed with friends until the next morning.
On 17 July 1997, he took another examination before taking a plane back to Cebu City at 5pm.

The prosecution presented its first and main witness, the defendant Davidson Valiente Rusia, who was
promised immunity from prosecution if he told the truth. The author gave written consent to the
withdrawal of his counsel and requested three weeks to hire a new counsel.

The Special Heinous Crimes Court found the author guilty of the kidnapping and serious illegal detention
of Jacqueline Chiong and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It decided that there was insufficient
evidence to find him guilty of the kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape of
Marijoy Chiong.

Isues:
1. Whether or not death penalty may be imposed upon Larranaga.
2. Whether or not the principle of presumption of innocence has been violated.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (b) and (d), of the Covenant.
4. Whether or not there is a violation of Article 14, paragraph 3(c). 5. Whether or not there is a violation
of Article 7.
Ruling:
The Committee notes from the judgments that the author was convicted of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape under article 267 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that "when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped |…|, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed". Thus, the death penalty was imposed automatically by the operation of
article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that the automatic and
mandatory imposition of the death penalty constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life, in violation of
article 6, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, in circumstances where the death penalty is imposed without
any possibility of taking into account the defendant's personal circumstances or the circumstances of
the particular offence. It follows that his rights under article 6, paragraph 1, of the Covenant were
violated. At the same time, the Committee notes that the State party has adopted Republic Act No. 9346
prohibiting the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines. The Committee has noted the arguments
of the author that the reintroduction of the death penalty for "heinous crimes", as set out in Republic
Act No. 7659, constitutes a violation of article 6 of the Covenant.

The Committee concludes that the author's trial did not respect the principle of presumption of
innocence, in violation of article 14, paragraph 2. The Committee is cognizant that some States require
that a defence of alibi must be raised by the defendant, and that a certain standard of proof must be
met before the defence is cognizable. In the present case, the trial judge put a number of leading
questions to the prosecution which tend to justify the conclusion that the author was not presumed
innocent until proven guilty. Moreover, incriminating evidence against a person provided by an
accomplice charged with the same crime should, in the Committee's opinion, be treated cautiously,
particularly where the accomplice was found to lie about his previous criminal convictions, was granted
immunity from prosecution, and eventually admitted to raping one of the victims. In the present case, it
considers that, despite all the issues mentioned above having been raised by the author, neither the trial
court nor the Supreme Court addressed them appropriately.

The judge refused to grant the requests allegedly because the trial had to be terminated within sixty
days. The Committee considers that in a capital case, when counsel for the defendant requests an
adjournment because he was not given enough time to acquaint himself with the case, the court must
ensure that the defendant is given an opportunity to prepare his defence. In the instant case, both the
author's appointed and chosen counsel should have been granted an adjournment. In the
circumstances, the Committee finds a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (b) and (d), of the Covenant.

The Committee has noted the State party's explanations concerning the delay in the trial proceedings
against the author. Nevertheless, it finds that the delay was caused by the authorities and that no
substantial delay can be attributable to the author. In any case, the fact that the author appealed cannot
be held against him. Article 14, paragraph 3(c), requires that all accused shall be entitled to be tried
without undue delay, and the requirement applies equally to the right of review of conviction and
sentence guaranteed by article 14, paragraph 5.

With regard to the alleged violation of article 7, the Committee considers that to impose a death
sentence on a person after an unfair trial is to subject that person wrongfully to the fear that he will be
executed. In circumstances where there is a real possibility that the sentence will be enforced, that fear
must give rise to considerable anguish. Such anguish cannot be dissociated from the unfairness of the
proceedings underlying the sentence. Indeed, as the Committee has previously observed [FN58], the
imposition of any death sentence that cannot be saved by article 6 would automatically entail a violation
of article 7. The Committee therefore concludes that the imposition of the death sentence on the author
after the conclusion of proceedings which did not meet the requirements of article 14 of the Covenant
amounts to inhuman treatment, in violation of article 7.

Bearing in mind that, by becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party has recognized the
competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a violation of the Covenant or not
and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, that State party has undertaken to ensure all individuals
within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an
effective and enforceable remedy in case a violation has been established.