Sie sind auf Seite 1von 32

[G.R. No. 138200.

February 27, 2002]

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), petitioner,


vs. ROBERTO MABALOT, respondent.

Facts: On 19 February 1996, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr., issued Memorandum Order No.
96-735 addressed to Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman Dante Lantin,
viz:

In the interest of the service, you are hereby directed to effect the transfer of regional functions of that
office to the DOTC-CAR Regional Office, pending the creation of a regular Regional Franchising and
Regulatory Office thereat, pursuant to Section 7 of Executive Order No. 202.

Organic personnel of DOTC-CAR shall perform the LTFRB functions on a concurrent capacity subject to
the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office.

On 13 March 1996, herein respondent Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, [1] against petitioner and LTFRB
Chairman Lantin, [2] praying among others that Memorandum Order No. 96-735 be declared illegal and
without effect.

29 January 1997, Secretary Lagdameo issued the assailed Department Order No. 97-1025, to wit:

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 36, dated September 23, 1987, and for purposes of economy and
more effective coordination of the DOTC functions in the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), the
DOTC-CAR Regional Office, created by virtue of Executive Order No. 220 dated July 15, 1987, is hereby
established as the Regional Office of the LTFRB and shall exercise the regional functions of the LTFRB in
the CAR subject to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office.

Respondent Mabalot principally argues that a transfer of the powers and functions of the LTFRB
Regional Office to a DOTC Regional Office or the establishment of the latter as an LTFRB Regional Office
is unconstitutional for being an undue exercise of legislative power.

Issue: to resolve the issue of validity of the subject administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary.

Whether Memorandum Order No. 96-735 and Department Order No. 97-1025 both issued by
the Secretary of the DOTC are valid and constitutional.

Held: We do not agree. Accordingly, in the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory
infirmity attending the issuance of the challenged orders, this Court upholds Memorandum Order No.
96-735 and Department Order No. 97-1025 as legal and valid administrative issuances by the DOTC
Secretary. Contrary to the opinion of the lower court, the President - through his duly constituted
political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary in the present case - may legally and validly decree the
reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional
Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant transfer and performance of public
functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.

In the instant case, the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to
the third mode - by authority of law, which could be decreed for instance, through an Executive Order
(E.O.) issued by the President or an order of an administrative agency such as the Civil Service
Commission[8] pursuant to Section 17, Book V of E.O. 292, otherwise known as The Administrative Code
of 1987. In the case before us, the DOTC Secretary issued the assailed Memorandum and Department
Orders pursuant to Sec. 1 of Administrative Order No. 36 of the President.

To us, Administrative Order No. 36 is a clear and unequivocal directive and mandate - no less than from
the Chief Executive - ordering the heads of government departments and bureaus to effect the
establishment of their respective regional offices in the CAR.

In fine, the designation and subsequent establishment of DOTC-CAR as the Regional Office of LTFRB in
the Cordillera Administrative Region and the concomitant exercise and performance of functions by the
former as the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, fall within the scope of the continuing authority of the
President to effectively reorganize the Department of Transportation and Communications.

Beyond this, it must be emphasized that the reorganization in the instant case was decreed in the
interest of the service and for purposes of economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC
functions in the Cordillera Administrative Region. In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid
provided it is pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is
for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.

[G.R. No. 145368. April 12, 2002]

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman,
respondent.

Facts: a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created.[4]
Petitioner was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9) directors.
Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.

On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its
Committee Final Report No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the Committees recommendations was
the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for
violating the rules on public bidding.

On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning
the jurisdiction of said office.

On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a resolution finding
probable cause to indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and TEODORO Q. PEA before the
Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act
No. 1594. The resolution also directed that an information for violation of the said law be filed against
Laurel and Pea. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but
dismissed the charge against Pea.

Issue: Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer
because:

A. EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER LAUREL WHICH UNDERTOOK THE FREEDOM
RING PROJECT IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES WERE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED, WAS A PRIVATE CORPORATION, NOT A GOVERNMENT-
OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION.

B. THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICE.

C. PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER AS
DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.

Held: The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section
15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and
Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and
prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as
confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited
authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770.

Having disposed of this contention, we proceed to the principal grounds upon which petitioner relies.
We first address the argument that petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was not a public officer.

The Constitution[10] describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as protectors of the people, who shall
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Among the awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the
Constitution[11] upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to [i]nvestigate any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit
of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.

Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC Chair,
namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not receive any
compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary.

Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as
[t]he most important characteristic in determining whether a position is a public office or not.

The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that
the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign
functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the
sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be
exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a
public officer.

Certainly, the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or
judicial.
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance.[17] The executive function, therefore, concerns the
implementation of the policies as set forth by law.

Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair,
is a public officer.

That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. A
salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not
conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is
annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted
merely for the public good.[23] Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an
honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary,
compensation or fees are attached.[24] But it is a public office, nonetheless.

Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an ad-hoc body make said
commission less of a public office.

The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly a position which is
merely temporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered an office. But, says Chief Justice Marshall, if
a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract,
which an individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his
station without any contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it
seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who
performs the duties from an officer.

Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss.[26] There the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission
is an office of trust as to disqualify its holder as elector of the United States President and Vice-
President.

Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is, therefore, a public
office, we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private or a public
corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioners position as Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or
omissions as CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC Chair.

A public officer, under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows:

SEC. 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, the term (b) Public officer includes elective and
appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or
exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the
preceding paragraph. [Emphasis supplied.]

It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a public officer is expressly limited to the
application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of determining the
Ombudsmans jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a public official whether or not
one receives compensation

Public Officials include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel, whether or not they
receive compensation, regardless of amount.

G.R. No. 81954 August 8, 1989

CESAR Z. DARIO, petitioner, vs. HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME and HON.
CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in their respective capacities as Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of
Finance, and Executive Secretary, respondents.

Facts: On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum,
in the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders," 12 prescribing
the procedure in personnel placement. It also provided:

1. By February 28, 1988, the employees covered by Executive Order 127 and the grace period
extended to the Bureau of Customs by the President of the Philippines on reorganization shall be: a)
Informed of their re-appointment, or b) Offered another position in the same department or agency or
c) Informed of their termination. 13

On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged with
adjudicating appeals from removals under the above Memorandum. 14 On January 26, 1988,
Commissioner Mison addressed several notices to various Customs officials

Cesar Dario is the petitioner in G.R. No. 81954

A total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs were given individual notices of
separation. A number supposedly sought reinstatement with the Reorganization Appeals Board while
others went to the Civil Service Commission. On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission
promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstatement of the 279 employees.

On July 15, 1988, Commissioner Mison, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a motion for
reconsideration Acting on the motion, the Civil Service Commission, on September 20, 1988, denied
reconsideration.

Issue: w/o he is a public officer (?)

Held: There is no question that the administration may validly carry out a government reorganization —
insofar as these cases are concerned, the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs — by mandate not
only of the Provisional Constitution, supra, but also of the various Executive Orders decreed by the Chief
Executive in her capacity as sole lawmaking authority under the 1986-1987 revolutionary government. It
should also be noted that under the present Constitution, there is a recognition, albeit implied, that a
government reorganization may be legitimately undertaken, subject to certain conditions.
We find that the questions raised in Commissioner Mison's petition (in G.R. 85310) are, indeed, proper
for certiorari, if by "jurisdictional questions" we mean questions having to do with "an indifferent
disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, or omission to weigh pertinent considerations, a decision
arrived at without rational deliberation, 34 as distinguished from questions that require "digging into
the merits and unearthing errors of judgment 35 which is the office, on the other hand, of review under
Rule 45 of the said Rules. What cannot be denied is the fact that the act of the Civil Service Commission
of reinstating hundreds of Customs employees Commissioner Mison had separated, has implications not
only on the entire reorganization process decreed no less than by the Provisional Constitution, but on
the Philippine bureaucracy in general; these implications are of such a magnitude that it cannot be said
that — assuming that the Civil Service Commission erred — the Commission committed a plain "error of
judgment" that Aratuc says cannot be corrected by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or any special
civil action. We reaffirm the teaching of Aratuc — as regards recourse to this Court with respect to
rulings of the Civil Service Commission — which is that judgments of the Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court through certiorari alone, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Accordingly, we accept Commissioner Mison petition (G.R. No. 85310) which clearly charges the Civil
Service Commission with grave abuse of discretion, a proper subject of certiorari, although it may not
have so stated in explicit terms.

The petitioner in G.R. No. 81954, Cesar Dario was one of the Deputy Commissioners of the Bureau of
Customs until his relief on orders of Commissioner Mison on January 26, 1988. In essence, he questions
the legality of his dismiss, which he alleges was upon the authority of Section 59 of Executive Order No.
127.

the petitioner in G.R. No. 81967, was a Deputy Commissioner at the Bureau until his separation directed
by Commissioner Mison. And like Dario he claims that under the 1987 Constitution, he has acquired
security of tenure and that he cannot be said to be covered by Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127,
having been appointed on April 22, 1986 — during the effectivity of the Provisional Constitution. He
adds that under Executive Order No. 39, "ENLARGING THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,"52 the Commissioner of Customs has the power "[t]o appoint all Bureau
personnel, except those appointed by the President," 53 and that his position, which is that of a
Presidential appointee, is beyond the control of Commissioner Mison for purposes of reorganization.

The Case for Commissioner Mison

The contention of petitioner that Executive Order No. 127 is violative of the provision of the 1987
Constitution guaranteeing career civil service employees security of tenure overlooks the provisions of
Section 16, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which explicitly authorize the removal of career civil
service employees "not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3
dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution." By virtue of
said provision, the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may
continue even after the ratification of the Constitution, and career civil service employees may be
separated from the service without cause as a result of such reorganization.55

For this reason, Mison posits, claims of violation of security of tenure are allegedly no defense. He
further states that the deadline prescribed by the Provisional Constitution (February 25, 1987) has been
superseded by the 1987 Constitution, specifically, the transitory provisions thereof, 56 which allows a
reorganization thereafter (after February 25, 1987) as this very Court has so declared in Jose v. Arroyo.
Mison submits that contrary to the employees' argument, Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 is
applicable (in particular, to Dario and Feria in the sense that retention in the Bureau, under the
Executive Order, depends on either retention of the position in the new staffing pattern or
reappointment of the incumbent, and since the dismissed employees had not been reappointed, they
had been considered legally separated. Moreover, Mison proffers that under Section 59 incumbents are
considered on holdover status, "which means that all those positions were considered vacant."

The Position of Commissioner Mison

Commissioner's twin petitions are direct challenges to three rulings of the Civil Service Commission: (1)
the Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, reinstating the 265 customs employees above-stated.

The court’s rulings

The Court finds that after February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the Customs hierarchy —
except for the change of personnel — has occurred, which would have justified (an things being equal)
the contested dismisses. The contention that the staffing pattern at the Bureau (which would have
furnished a justification for a personnel movement) is the same s pattern prescribed by Section 34 of
Executive Order No. 127 already prevailing when Commissioner Mison took over the Customs helm, has
not been successfully contradicted. There is no showing that legitimate structural changes have been
made — or a reorganization actually undertaken, for that matter — at the Bureau since Commissioner
Mison assumed office, which would have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees. There can
therefore be no actual reorganization to speak of, in the sense, say, of reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions, but a
revamp of personnel pure and simple.

The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel but
replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988. This betrays a clear intent to "pack" the Bureau of
Customs. He did so, furthermore, in defiance of the President's directive to halt further layoffs as a
consequence of reorganization. Finally, he was aware that layoffs should observe the procedure laid
down by Executive Order No. 17.

THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS IS ORDERED TO REINSTATE THE EMPLOYEES SEPARATED AS A


RESULT OF HIS NOTICES DATED JANUARY 26, 1988.

THE EMPLOYEES WHOM COMMISSIONER MISON MAY HAVE APPOINTED AS REPLACEMENTS ARE
ORDERED TO VACATE THEIR POSTS SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF WHATEVER BENEFITS THAT MAY BE
PROVIDED BY LAW.

[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.

[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared the
rightful governor of Sorsogon.
Facts: Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive
elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien
citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation.

This case is a petition to annul the ff Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which are
also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:

1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running
for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of the
Philippines";

3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the
proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.

The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the
above-mentioned resolutions on the ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
is reproduced herein under:

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively
on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election."

The Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered "within the
period allowed by law. Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the
petition for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a
jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.

Issues: Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given
retroactive effect? If so, from when?

Held: The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation

The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for
elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus: "Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective
local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect. (b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his
country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States a naturalization he insists was
made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in
conscience embrace and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic
space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to
his people.

Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the
electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000
in 1995.

Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 the very day the term of office of governor
(and other elective officials) began he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such
office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time,
he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted
again in 1995. Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance
earlier in the afternoon of June 30, 1995, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he
unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such
oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer
ineligible.

With the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified
procedure of repatriation. Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo
deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality
should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.

There is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of
the date of his application. Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a
registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated
i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise
deemed validated as of said date.

"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath
of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995.
Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."

We rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective
official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has
been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having
been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue
thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial
or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative
intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and
political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given
retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was
stateless, he having given ' up his U. S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital
requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have
been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August
17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as
well.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY


MONTEJO, respondents.

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995.

On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification"5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy.

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry
"seven" months to "since childhood” but this was not accepted for the deadline for the filing of the
same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995.

Petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the
result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since
childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained
Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1,
13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009
meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995;
and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the
validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing
certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement.

In the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential
deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be
elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, especially those
intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects
the filer.

In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not
Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not
Tacloban.

In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where
she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered
voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of
Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions
if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of
candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro
Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of
San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters
that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that
she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This
debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative
District of Leyte since childhood.

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to
run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte.

Issue: I. the issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period
of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the
question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.

Held: Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20
this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which,
whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the
twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.

Residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

This Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the
intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions
have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election
law, it actually means only "domicile".

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a
temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition
that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In
doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of
the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881).
Petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew
up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of
the country for various reasons.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is
gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her
domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought
his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate: 1. an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond
with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue.

In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of
persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a
domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of
relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her
own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes
into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If
the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with
him in order that they may "live together."

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was
obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of residence
fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among
which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr.
Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as
the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her
domicile of origin.

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this
point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion
supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

[G.R. No. 130872. March 25, 1999]


FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts: FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, father and son, were convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of thirteen (13) counts of estafa through falsification of public documents.[1] They now
seek a review of their conviction as they insist on their innocence.

Sometime in November 1985 Red was appointed by then President Ferdinand Marcos as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. Imee Marcos-Manotoc, then
the National Chairperson of the organization, sent a telegram to Red confirming his appointment and
advising him further that copies of his appointment papers would be sent to him in due time through
the KB Regional Office.[3] Red received the telegram on 2 January 1986 and showed it immediately to
Mayor Francisco M. Lecaroz.

On 7 January 1986, armed with the telegram and intent on assuming the position of sectoral
representative of the KBs to the SB, Red attended the meeting of the Sanggunian upon the invitation of
one of its members, Kagawad Rogato Lumawig. In that meeting, Mayor Francisco M. Lecaroz informed
Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council until his appointment had been cleared
by the Governor of Marinduque. Nonetheless, the telegram was included in the agenda as one of the
subjects discussed in the meeting.

Meanwhile, Mayor Lecaroz prepared and approved on different dates the payment to Lenlie Lecaroz of
twenty-six (26) sets of payrolls for the twenty-six (26) quincenas covering the period 16 January 1986 to
30 January 1987. Lenlie Lecaroz signed the payroll for 1-15 January 1986 and then authorized someone
else to sign all the other payrolls for the succeeding quincenas and claim the corresponding salaries in
his behalf.

On 25 October 1989, or three (3) years and nine (9) months from the date he received his appointment
papers from President Marcos, Red was finally able to secure from the Aquino Administration a
confirmation of his appointment as KB Sectoral Representative to the Sanggunian Bayan of Santa Cruz.

Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against Mayor
Francisco Lecaroz and Lenlie Lecaroz arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the
position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) Informations for estafa through falsification of public documents against
petitioners, and one (1) Information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, against Mayor Lecaroz alone.

On 7 October 1994 the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the two (2) accused guilty on all
counts of estafa through falsification of public documents.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that since Red was elected president of the KB and took his oath of office
sometime in 1985 before then Assemblywoman Carmencita O. Reyes his assumption of the KB
presidency upon the expiration of the term of accused Lenlie Lecaroz was valid.

Clearly, falsification of public documents has been committed by accused MAYOR LECAROZ.

Likewise from these acts of falsification, his son, accused LENLIE LECAROZ, was able to draw salaries
from the municipality to which he was not entitled for services he had admittedly not rendered. This
constitutes Estafa x x x x the deceit being the falsification made, and the prejudice being that caused to
the municipality of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque for having paid salaries to LENLIE LECAROZ who was not
entitled thereto.

There is no justifiable reason why accused MAYOR LECAROZ should have reinstated his son LENLIE in the
municipal payrolls from January 16, 1986 to January 31, 1987, yet he did so.

The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral representative to the SB since he did
not present an authenticated copy of his appointment papers; neither did he take a valid oath of office.
Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue as member of the SB although in a
holdover capacity since his term had already expired. The Sandiganbayan however rejected this
postulate declaring that the holdover provision under Sec. 1 quoted above pertains only to positions in
the KB, clearly implying that since no similar provision is found in Sec. 7 of B.P. Blg. 51, there can be no
holdover with respect to positions in the SB.

We disagree with the Sandiganbayan. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies
that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term.[6] It is usually
provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that
term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office
does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to
assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even
though it be beyond the term fixed by law.

The Sandiganbayan maintained that by taking his oath of office before Assemblywoman Reyes in 1985
Red validly assumed the presidency of the KB upon the expiration of the term of Lenlie Lecaroz. It should
be noted however that under the provisions of the Administrative Code then in force, specifically Sec.
21, Art. VI thereof, members of the then Batasang Pambansa were not authorized to administer oaths. It
was only after the approval of RA No. 6733[14] on 25 July 1989 and its subsequent publication in a
newspaper of general circulation that members of both Houses of Congress were vested for the first
time with the general authority to administer oaths. Clearly, under this circumstance, the oath of office
taken by Jowil Red before a member of the Batasang Pambansa who had no authority to administer
oaths, was invalid and amounted to no oath at all.

There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting

The third element requiring that the narration of facts be absolutely false is not even adequately
satisfied as the belief of Mayor Francisco Lecaroz that Lenlie Lecaroz was a holdover member of the
Sanggunian was not entirely bereft of basis, anchored as it was on the universally accepted doctrine of
holdover. La mera inexactitude no es bastante para integrar este delito.[33] If the statements are not
altogether false, there being some colorable truth in them, the crime of falsification is deemed not to
have been committed.

Finally, contrary to the finding of the Sandiganbayan, we hold that conspiracy was not proved in this
case. The court a quo used as indication of conspiracy the fact that the accused Mayor certified the
payrolls authorizing payment of compensation to his son Lenlie Lecaroz and that as a consequence
thereof the latter collected his salaries. These are not legally acceptable indicia, for they are the very
same acts alleged in the Informations as constituting the crime of estafa through falsification. They
cannot qualify as proof of complicity or unity of criminal intent. Conspiracy must be established
separately from the crime itself and must meet the same degree of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable
doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together
however, the evidence must reasonably be strong enough to show community of criminal design.[34]

Perhaps subliminally aware of the paucity of evidence to support it, and if only to buttress its finding of
conspiracy, the Sandiganbayan stressed that the two accused are father and son. Granting that this is
not even ad hominem, we are unaware of any presumption in law that a conspiracy exists simply
because the conspirators are father and son or related by blood.

Petitioners FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ are ACQUITTED of all the thirteen (13) counts
of estafa through falsification of public documents (Crim. Cases Nos. 13904-13916).

A.M. No. P-88-269 December 29, 1995

OSCAR ABETO, complainant, vs. MANUEL GARCESA, Stenographic Reporter, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 45, Bacolod City, respondent.

The complainant charges the respondent with having misrepresented himself as a full-fledged lawyer
and having acted as one of the authorized representatives of the complainant and his co-complainants
in labor cases filed with Regional Arbitration Branch VI of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) of Bacolod City despite the fact that he is a court employee.

Then Deputy Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro referred the complaint to the respondent through
the Presiding Judge of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City and required him to
comment thereon.

In his Comment/Explanation, the respondent admits having assisted the complainants in the
aforementioned labor cases; denies having misrepresented himself as a lawyer; and explained the
nature of the assistance he had given to the complainants. According to him, when he first met
complainant Abeto in December 1986, he frankly informed the latter that he is only a court employee
and that he is only assisting or helping Mr. Arturo Ronquillo, for at that time no lawyer dared to assist
the complainants in filing their cases. He manifests, however, that "in the event that his good motives
and intentions in helping the poor and downtrodden workers/employees of BISCOM Central would be
considered not in consonance with Memorandum Circular No. 17 dated September 4, 1986 issued by
the Executive Department and is prohibited by Administrative Circular No. 5 issued by the Supreme
Court, Manila, then [he] will readily and obediently submit to the sound discretion of the Honorable
Supreme Court."

On 13 October 1995, Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño submitted a Memorandum, duly
approved by the Court Administrator, wherein she made the following findings and conclusion:

It is worth mentioning here Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules which provides that:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or
be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of
those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage, in
outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency
to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided,
finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee,
which do not involve any real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in
any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of
the enterprise or become an officer or member of the board of directors.

Moreover in Administrative Circular No. 5 dated 4 October 1988 the Court expressed the view that

The entire time of Judiciary officials and employees must be devoted to government service to insure
efficient and speedy administration of justice considering the express prohibition in the Rules of Court
and the nature of their work which requires them to serve with the highest degree of efficiency and
responsibility, in order to maintain public confidence in the Judiciary.

We believe that the stenographer Garcesa merits at the very least a reprimand for engaging in a limited
law practice.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that the penalty of REPRIMAND be


imposed on Manuel Garcesa, Stenographer Reporter, RTC, Branch 45, Bacolod City for failure to heed
the above quoted Civil Service rule and the Supreme Court Administrative Circular which prohibits
government employees from engaging in any private business, vocation, or profession without
permission from the Court.

He could not, however, be liable for unauthorized practice of law, since there is no convincing evidence
that he misrepresented himself as a lawyer. Moreover, his appearance was in his capacity as one of the
representatives of the complainants in the labor cases and not as a lawyer. Under Section 6, Rule IV of
the Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC in force at that time, a non-lawyer may appear before the
NLRC or any Labor Arbiter if he represents himself as a party to the case, represents an organization or
its members, or is a duly accredited member of a free legal aid staff of the Department of Labor and
Employment or of any other legal aid office accredited by the Department of Justice or the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.

The provisions of Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Executive Department are not applicable to
officials or employees of the courts considering the express prohibition in the Rules of Court and the
nature of their work which requires them to serve with the highest degree of efficiency and
responsibility, in order to maintain public confidence in the Judiciary.

ACCORDINGLY, all officials and employees of the Judiciary are hereby enjoined from being
commissioned as insurance agents or from engaging in any such related activities, and, to immediately
desist therefrom if presently engaged thereat.

This prohibition is directed against "moonlighting," which amounts to malfeasance in office. Respondent
MANUEL GARCESA is hereby REPRIMANDED and warned that the commission of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

[G.R. No. 135805. April 29, 1999]

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY, respondent.


Fatcs: On November 29, 1995, George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter,
Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a complaint against Pedro O.
Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism.

Accordingly, the Civil Service Commission conducted a formal investigation, and, on January 28, 1997,
the Civil Service Commission promulgated its resolution finding no substantial evidence to support the
charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Civil Service Commission found
respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his
two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under
his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts
and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.

On July 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision
of the Civil Service Commission, ruling that respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons Rito
and Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of nepotism. The Court further held that it is the person who
recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act.

Issue: The basic issue raised is the scope of the ban on nepotism.

Held: We agree with the Civil Service Commission that respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy was guilty of
nepotism and correctly meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. The word relative and
members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of
affinity.

Mr. Daclag's authority to recommend the appointment of first level positions such as watchmen,
security guards, drivers, utility workers, and casuals and emergency laborers for short durations of three
to six months was recommended by respondent Dacoycoy and approved by DECS Regional Director
Eladio C. Dioko, with the provision that such positions shall be under Mr. Daclags immediate supervision.
On July 1, 1992, Atty. Victorino B. Tirol II, Director III, DECS Regional Office VIII, Palo, Leyte, appointed
Rito Dacoycoy driver of the school. On January 3, 1993, Mr. Daclag also appointed Ped Dacoycoy casual
utility worker. However, it was respondent Dacoycoy who certified that funds are available for the
proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy and even rated his performance as very satisfactory. On the
other hand, his son Ped stated in his position description form that his father was his next higher
supervisor.

He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees under his immediate
supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondents two sons and placed them
under respondent’s immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both
positions are career positions.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court REVIVES and AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated
January 28, 1998 and September 30, 1998, dismissing respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy from the service.

G.R. No. L-26785 May 23, 1991

DEOGRACIAS A. REGIS, JR., petitioner, vs.

SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., VICENTE PACIFICO, CITY OF CEBU, CITY COUNCIL OF CEBU, CITY TREASURER
AND CITY AUDITOR, respondents.
Fatcs: On January 8, 1958, petitioner was appointed by then Cebu City Mayor, Ramon Duterte, as driver,
Motorized Division of the Cebu Police Department, with a yearly compensation of P1, 440.00.

On January 8, 1960, petitioner was issued another appointment as "driver" of the Cebu Police
Department, at an increased yearly compensation at P1,560.00.

On December 21, 1961, petitioner was issued another appointment by then Cebu City Mayor Carlos J.
Cuizon as "Driver, Civilian Employee" of the Cebu Police Department at the increased yearly
compensation of P1,920.00.

On November 7, 1963, petitioner was extended an appointment as "driver (Radio Patrol) Civilian
Employee" of the Cebu Police Department at the increased yearly compensation of P2,040.00.

On April 14, 1964, petitioner was removed from his position in the Cebu Police Department without
prior investigation or hearing.

The position of the petitioner, after his removal, was filled up by the respondent City Mayor with the
appointment of Eduardo Gabiana, a non-civil service eligible as shown in his appointment.

On August 20, 1964, after his removal, the petitioner addressed similarly worded letters to the President
of the Philippines and the Civil Service Commissioner protesting and appealing his unlawful removal and
demanding his reinstatement.

The records of the Regional Office of the Civil Service Commission in Cebu City do not show that
petitioner possesses any civil service eligibility at the time he was appointed as driver.

The last three appointments were for salary adjustments.

The appointment of the petitioner being temporary or provisional in nature, the duration of temporary
appointment should not exceed six months. (Sec. 24, Rep. Act 226.) After the expiration of said period,
petitioner could have been removed at will by the appointment power; his continuance thereafter as a
temporary employee was only an extension of grace. (Jimenez vs. General Francisco, etc., et al., supra.)

Temporary appointment is similar to one made in an acting capacity, the essence of which lies in its
temporary character and its terminability at pleasure by the appointing power. And one who bears such
an appointment cannot complain if it is terminated at a moment's notice. (Cuadra vs. Cordova, G.R. No.
L-11602, April 21, 1958; Vol. 54 O.G. Dec. 8, 1958, p. 8063.)

Petitioner further argues that his last appointment of 7 November 1963 was approved under Section
24(c) of R.A. No. 2260; therefore, it was a provisional and not a temporary appointment as erroneously
classified by the court a quo. Republic Act No. 2260 makes a distinction between provisional and
temporary appointments. The former is governed by Section 24(c) while the latter is covered by Section
24(d) thereof. He claims that his patrolman-detective eligibility is appropriate to his position considering
the nature of his office prior to his removal which authorized him to wear the uniform and badge of a
regular member of the Cebu Police Department, carry an official firearm, wear an ID as a regular
member of the city police, and to make arrests.

Paragraph (c) of Section 24 of R.A. No. 2260 while temporary appointments are covered by paragraph
(d) of said Section:
(c) Provisional appointments — A provisional appointment may be issued upon prior authorization
of the Commissioner in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules and standards
promulgated in pursuance thereto to a person who has not qualified in an appropriate examination but
who otherwise meets the requirements for appointment to a regular position in the competitive service,
whenever a vacancy occurs and the filling thereof is necessary in the interest of the service and there is
no appropriate register of eligibles at the time of appointment.

(d) Temporary appointment. — A person may receive a temporary appointment to a position


needed only for a limited period not exceeding six months, provided that a preference in filling such
position be given to persons on appropriate eligible lists.

Temporary appointment is designed to fill "a position needed only for a limited period not exceeding six
months, a provisional appointment, on the other hand, is intended for the contingency that "a vacancy
occurs and the filling thereof is necessary in the interest of the service and there is no appropriate
register of eligibles at the time of appointment."

As a matter of fact, under this provision, even if the appointee has the required civil service eligibility,
his appointment is still temporary, simply because such is the nature of the work to be done.

Although this case refers to a temporary appointment, the rule laid down equally applies to a provisional
appointment.

This matter, however, had been subsequently categorically resolved in favor of holders of provisional
appointments by R.A. No. 6040, which took effect on 4 August 1969. Section 18 thereof provides:

. . . all provisional appointments made or appointments approved by the Civil Service Commission under
Section 24(C) of Republic Act Numbered Two thousand two hundred sixty prior to the approval of this
Act shall automatically be permanent under the provisions of Section twenty-four (b) thereof as
amended by this Act, subject to the provisions of Section 16(h) of said Act as herein amended.

We therefore rule that petitioner's dismissal was illegal and that he should be reinstated.

He should also be granted back salaries.

However, the award for back salaries should not be from the date of his dismissal until reinstatement. In
similar cases, We limited the award for a period of five (5) years.

We likewise order her reinstatement, subject to the condition that she has not obtained any other
employment in Murcia municipal dentist or any position for which she is qualified by reason of civil
service eligibility and subject to the requisites of age and physical fitness. . . .

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the Decision appealed from
the ORDERING the respondent City of Cebu to (a) reinstate petitioner, subject to the condition that he
has not obtained any other employment, to his position under his appointment of 7 November 1963, or
to any position of equivalent rank, or for which he is qualified by reason of civil service eligibility and
subject to the requisites of age and physical fitness, (b) pay petitioner back salaries, at the rate last
received by him, for a period of five (5) years without qualification and deduction and with interest at
the legal rate from the date of his illegal dismissal until the same shall have been fully paid, and (c) pay
the costs.
G.R. No. 116183 October 6, 1995

SEC. RICARDO T. GLORIA, in his capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports and Chairman of
the Board of Trustees of the Philippine State College of Aeronautics (PSCA); JULIAN J. LOLENG, JR., in
his capacity as Officer-in-Charge of PSCA; and BOARD OF TRUSTEES of PSCA, petitioners, vs.

HON. SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., Presiding Judge of Branch 113, Regional Trial Court of Pasay,
Metro Manila; VIRGILIO R. RAMOS, LEONY P. SENDIN, ROSARIO V. CERILLO, ANDREA A. PESTANO,
ARTHUR V. RODRIGUEZA, LENI V. DIMAYUGA, JAIME ABON, RIZALDO O. VALLE, JOIE ARCEO, SHIRLEY
PESTANO, SERVANDO SACUEZA, JAIME C. PONEGAL, EDGARDO MERCADO, CRISTINA BULADO,
BENIGNO T. AQUINO, RODEL PESTANO, JUN JAY PARMA, NILO B. ELLO, and NELSON SACUEZA,
respondents.

Knowing fully well that, as temporary employees whose terms of office, whether by contract or by the
tenor of their appointments, had expired one year after their respective temporary appointments, that
is, on December 31, 1992, they insist on a perceived, albeit mistaken, right to reinstatement.

Questioned in effect by the petitioners is only the portion of the judgment ordering the reinstatement of
private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo to the position of "Coordinator for Extension Services".

The case for reinstatement which was filed before respondent Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. of the
Pasay City Regional Trial Court was instituted during the incumbency of the succeeding DECS Secretary,
the Hon. Armand Fabella. The judgment of the lower court, as a matter of fact, involved the Hon.
Armand Fabella as defendant. In view of the resignation of Secretary Fabella, the duty and obligation to
question the decision aforesaid of Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. devolved on the incumbent
Secretary, the Hon. Ricardo T. Gloria.

Issue: Is private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo entitled to reinstatement to the position of "Coordinator
for Extension Services"?

Held: the PAFCA Board of Trustees issued Resolution No. 91-026 on April 1, 1991, which declared that
"All faculty/administrative employees are also subject to the required civil service eligibilities," Thus,
herein private respondents were issued only temporary appointments because at the time of their
appointment, they lacked appropriate civil service eligibilities or otherwise failed to meet the necessary
qualification standards for their respective positions.

Private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo, specifically, was issued a one-year temporary appointment to the
position of Board Secretary II of PAFCA (now PSCA), that is, from January 1, 1992 to December 31, 1992.
This appointment went along the line enunciated by the Civil Service Commission in a letter, dated
March 25, 1992.4 The letter emphasized that temporary appointments were good and renewable only
up to 1992.

Only on December 7, 1992 did Col. Loleng inform private respondents that they shall be deemed
separated from the service upon the expiration of their temporary appointments. Had private
respondent Rosario V. Cerillo not been summarily dismissed as Board Secretary on March 24, 1992, her
temporary appointment as such was supposed to have lasted until December 31, 1992.

I
The judgment of respondent Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. which orders the reinstatement of Ms.
Rosario V. Cerillo to the position of "Coordinator for Extension Services" is patently improper because it
finds no support as to facts and the law. Respondent Cerillo, although temporarily extended an
appointment as Board Secretary II, was dismissed therefrom because of loss of confidence. This
dismissal was neither contested nor appealed from by Ms. Cerillo. There is no question, therefore, that
her dismissal as Board Secretary II could not have been the subject of the petition for mandamus and
reinstatement filed before respondent Judge. The fact is that private respondent's assignment as
"Coordinator for Extension Services" was a mere designation. Not being a permanent appointment, the
designation to the position cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement.

Furthermore, even granting that Ms. Cerillo could be validly reinstated as "Coordinator for Extension
Services", her reinstatement thereto would not be possible because the position is not provided for in
the PSCA plantilla.

At any rate, a mere "designation" does not confer upon the designee security of tenure in the position
or office which he occupies in an acting capacity only.

II

She accepted the dismissal without any ripple and when designated as Coordinator for Extension
Services, she indicated acceptance by performing the acts called for by the designation.

Please note that temporary appointments last only for a maximum of one (1) year and all personnel
appointed in a temporary capacity can be replaced any time by a civil service eligible.

The fact that private respondent Cerillo passed the requisite Civil Service Examination after the
termination of her temporary appointment is no reason to compel petitioners to reappoint her.
Acquisition of civil service eligibility is not the sole factor for reappointment. Still to be considered by the
appointing authority are: performance, degree of education, work experience, training, seniority, and,
more importantly, as in this case, whether or not the applicant enjoys the confidence and trust of the
appointing power.

We hold that reappointment to the position of Board Secretary II is an act which is discretionary on the
part of the appointing power. Consequently, it cannot be the subject of an application for a writ of
mandamus.

The challenged decision, dated January 31, 1994, insofar as it ordered the reinstatement of Ms. Rosario
V. Cerillo and the payment to the latter of back wages and attorney's fees, and the Order, dated June 29,
1994, of respondent Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. are hereby declared null and void and ordered set
aside.

G.R. No. 149036 April 2, 2002

MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,


FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-
In-Charge, Finance Services Department of the Commission on Elections, respondents.

Facts:
Issue/s: 2. Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the
ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;

3. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent
assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution;

Held:

FACTS:

On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec’s EID by then
Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent
Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim
appointment. While on such ad interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman
issued a Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested
Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department.
She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads
of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period.
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300
dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.

Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also
filed an administrative and criminal complaint16 with the Law Department17against Benipayo, alleging
that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No.
3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil
service laws, rules and regulations.

During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as
Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence
of the COMELEC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.

RULING:

We find petitioner’s argument without merit.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in
the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in
Brillantes vs. Yorac34 and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.35 The ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which
authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect
immediately.

While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent"36, this provision should be
harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the
independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim
appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad
interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect
to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution.

G.R. No. 167472 January 31, 2007

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. ENGR. ALI P. DARANGINA, Respondent.

Engr. Ali P. Darangina, respondent, was a development management officer V in the Office of Muslim
Affairs (OMA). On September 25, 2000, he was extended a temporary promotional appointment as
director III, Plans and Policy Services, in the same office. On October 11, 2000, the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), petitioner, approved this temporary appointment effective for one (1) year from the
date of its issuance unless sooner terminated.

On October 31, 2000, newly appointed OMA Executive Director Acmad Tomawis terminated the
temporary appointment of respondent on the ground that he is not a career executive service eligible.
Tomawis then appointed Alongan Sani as director III. But he is not also a career executive service
eligible. Thus, the CSC disapproved his appointment, stating that respondent could only be replaced by
an eligible.

On April 3, 2002, respondent filed a motion for partial reconsideration, praying for his reinstatement as
director III and payment of backwages up to the time he shall be reinstated.

On June 5, 2002, the CSC issued Resolution No. 02-782 denying respondent’s motion for partial
reconsideration being a second motion for reconsideration which is prohibited.

ACCORDINGLY, our Decision of February 27, 2004 is RECONSIDERED and the assailed CSC resolutions are
hereby MODIFIED in that the petitioner is reinstated to his post to finish his 12-month term with
backwages from the date of his removal until reinstatement.
Section 27, Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended,
classifying the appointment status of public officers and employees in the career service, reads:

SEC. 27. Employment Status. – Appointment in the career service shall be permanent or temporary.

(1) Permanent status. A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including appropriate eligibility
prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance
thereof.

(2) Temporary appointment. In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the
public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service
eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the
appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.

Rather, an acting or temporary appointment seeks to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official
functions by authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the selection of a permanent
appointee.

Under the Revised Qualifications Standards prescribed by the CSC, career executive service eligibility is a
necessary qualification for the position of director III in Plans and Policy Services, OMA. It is not disputed
that on September 25, 2000, when respondent was extended an appointment, he was not eligible to the
position, not being a holder of such eligibility. Hence, his appointment was properly designated as
"temporary."

The Court of Appeals ruled that such replacements are not valid as the persons who replaced
respondent are not also eligible. Also, since he was replaced without just cause, he is entitled to serve
the remaining term of his 12-month term with salaries.

Moreover, in Achacoso8 cited earlier, this Court held that when a temporary appointee is required to
relinquish his office, he is being separated precisely because his term has expired. Thus, reinstatement
will not lie in favor of respondent. Starkly put, with the expiration of his term upon his replacement,
there is no longer any remaining term to be served. Consequently, he can no longer be reinstated.

As to whether respondent is entitled to back salaries, it is not disputed that he was paid his salary during
the entire twelve-month period in spite of the fact that he served only from September 25, 2000 to
October 31, 2000, or for only one month and six days. Clearly, he was overpaid.

[G.R. No. 129616. April 17, 2002]

THE GENERAL MANAGER, PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA) and RAMON ANINO, petitioners, vs.
JULIETA MONSERATE, respondent.

Julieta Monserate, respondent, started her government service in 1977 as Bookkeeper II in the Port
Management Office, PPA, Iloilo City. Barely a year later, she was promoted to the position of Cashier II
and then as Finance Officer (SG-16) in 1980.[3]

In the early part of 1988, when the PPA underwent a reorganization, respondent applied for the
permanent position of Manager II (SG-19) of the Resource Management Division, same office.
On February 1, 1988, Maximo Dumlao, Jr., then General Manager of the PPA, appointed[5] respondent
to the position of Manager II (Resource Management Division). On even date, respondent assumed
office and discharged the functions thereof. On July 8, 1988, the CSC, through Guillermo R. Silva
(Assistant Director of the Civil Service Field Office-PPA) approved her appointment.

Meanwhile, on April 18, 1988, petitioner Ramon Anino, who ranked second to respondent per the
Comparative Data Sheet earlier quoted, filed an appeal/petition with the PPA Appeals Board, protesting
against respondents appointment. The PPA Appeals Board, in a Resolution[6] dated August 11, 1988,
sustained the protest and rendered ineffective respondents appointment based on (1) CSC MC No. 5, s.
1988, Par. 3;[7] (2) CSC MC NO. 10, s. 1986, Par. A, 1.2 and Par. B;[8] and (3) Civil Service Eligibility.
These grounds were not explained or discussed in the Resolution.

She questioned her replacement under PPA Special Order No. 479-88, claiming that the proceedings
before the PPA Appeals Board were irregular because (1) she was not notified of the hearing before it;
(2) she was not furnished a copy of the August 11, 1988 PPA Appeals Board Resolution or a copy of the
protest filed by petitioner Anino;[11] (3) she was not informed of the reasons behind her replacement;
and (4) their Port Manager (in Iloilo City), who was then an official member of the Board, was not
included in the said proceedings.

This appeal remained pending with the CSC for more than six (6) years despite respondent's requests for
early resolution. In the meantime, she assumed the position of Administrative Officer.

It is well-established rule that an appointment, although approved by this Commission, does not
become final until the protest filed against it is decided by the agency or by the Commission. Although
Monserate had already assumed the position of RMD Manager II, the appointing authority may still
withdraw the same if a protest is seasonably filed. This is covered by Section 19, Rule VI of the Omnibus
Rules implementing EO 292

Issue: the main question to be resolved is whether or not the appointee meets the qualification
standard.

II THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ALIGNING ITSELF WITH THE WELL-NIGH RULE THAT
RESPONDENT MONSERATES APPOINTMENT AS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT DIVISION MANAGER,
ALTHOUGH APPROVED BY CSC, DOES NOT BECOME FINAL UNTIL THE PROTEST FILED AGAINST HER IS
FAVORABLY DECIDED IN HER FAVOR BY THE AGENCY OR THE CSC.

Held: Petitioners vehemently aver that respondent was never demoted since demotion, being in the
nature of administrative penalty, presupposes a conviction in an administrative case. Here, respondent
was not charged of any administrative case. Rather, she was displaced from her position as an aftermath
of the PPA reorganization, authorized by law, the implementation of which having been carried out with
utmost good faith.

The petition is unmeritorious.

In the first place, the PPA reorganization in 1988 has nothing to do with respondents demotion from the
contested position of Manager II, Resource Management Office (SG-19), to the lower position of
Administrative Officer (SG-15). Antithetically, it was precisely because of the said reorganization that
respondent applied to the higher position of Division Manager II. In fact, the Comparative Data Sheet
accomplished by the PPA Reorganization Task Force itself shows that respondent ranked No. 1, while
petitioner Anino ranked No. 2, from among the six (6) contenders to the said post. Respondent was
eventually issued a permanent appointment as such Division Manager on February 1, 1988 by then PPA
General Maximo Dumlao, Jr., during which time she actually assumed office and discharged its
functions. This appointment was later approved on July 8, 1988 by the CSC, through Assistant Director
Guillermo R. Silva of the Civil Service Field Office-PPA.

Unfortunately for petitioners, this Court cannot accord validity to the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the
PPA Appeals Board which upholds the appointment of Ramon A. Anino as Resource Management
Division Manager. But how can it uphold his appointment when he was not yet appointed then? It bears
stressing that he was appointed on a much later date - October 21, 1988, or more than two (2) months
after August 11, 1998 when the PPA Appeals Board Resolution was issued. Stated differently, the PPA
Appeals Board could not uphold an appointment which was not yet existing.

These grounds are incomprehensible for lack of discussion or explanation by the Board to enable
respondent to know the reason for her demotion.

To us, the August 11, 1988 Resolution by the PPA Appeals Board was not supported by evidence. Of the
CSC MC No. 5, the petitioner had no pending administrative or criminal case at the time of her
appointment as Manager.

On eligibility, she has a Career Service Professional eligibility while the private respondent only has a
First Grade Civil Service Eligibility.

She said that the resolution of the PPA Appeals Board appears irregular, if not null and void. She was
never notified of any proceeding; she was not furnished either a copy of the resolution. What she
received instead was a Special Order dated September 29, 1988 already ordering her demotion. She was
not at all given the oppurtunity of defending herself before the Appeals Board.

From all indications, it is indubitable that substantial and procedural irregularities attended respondents
demotion from the position of Manager II, Resource Management Division, to the lower position of
Administrative Officer. Indeed, her demotion, tantamount to a revocation of her appointment as
Manager II, is a patent violation of her constitutional rights to security of tenure and due process.

In this respect, while petitioner Aninos appointment to the contested position is void, as earlier
discussed, he is nonetheless considered a de facto officer during the period of his incumbency.[24] A de
facto officer is one who is in possession of an office and who openly exercises its functions under color
of an appointment or election, even though such appointment or election may be irregular.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 20,
1997 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that petitioner Ramon A. Anino is ordered to pay
respondent Julieta Monserate backpay differentials pertaining to the period from the time he wrongfully
assumed the contested position of Manager II up to his retirement on November 30, 1997.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL –
ARROYO

G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010


FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days
after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under
Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up
the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two
declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.

The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the
Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its
occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the
Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure
its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as
stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which
the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process,
there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once
the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may
resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII,
which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement.

HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall
not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall
be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in
division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power
of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within
the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume
that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended
Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a
similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

[G.R. No. 129133. November 25, 1998]

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION BUREAU, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.
In a letter dated October 13, 1988, respondent CSC through Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas required
the Secretary of Finance to submit to the CSC all appointments in the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB).

Instead of complying with the said letter, petitioner Jose T. Almonte, as Commissioner of EIIB, wrote a
letter dated March 29, 1989, to respondent CSC, requesting for confirmation of EIIBs exemption from
CSC rules and regulations with respect to appointments and other personnel actions invoking as basis
for such exemption PD No. 1458 and LOI No. 71.

Not having received any compliance from petitioners, respondent CSC, in its Order of December 7, 1990,
directed petitioner Jose T. Almonte to immediately implement Resolution No. 89-400, with a warning
that any EIIB official who shall fail or refuse to comply with the said order shall be held liable for indirect
contempt.

In a letter, dated June 13, 1991, petitioner Almonte explained to the respondent CSC the reasons of the
EIIB for its inability to comply with Resolution No. 89-400. He invoked PD No. 1458 and LOI No. 71
exempting the EIIB from the coverage of civil service rules and regulations on appointments and other
personnel actions.

On August 22, 1991, respondent CSC issued an order, finding petitioner Almonte guilty of indirect
contempt of the Commission.

Article IX (B), Section 2 (1). - The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters.

In the light of this constitutional mandate, petitioner EIIB, being a government agency, is necessarily
embraced by the civil service. The fact that positions in the EIIB are primarily confidential did not place it
outside the domain of civil servants, since it is conceded that one holding in the Government a primarily
confidential position is in the Civil Service (Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171). That fact merely exempts
confidential positions in the EIIB from the constitutional rule that appointments in the civil service shall
be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable ... by competitive
examination [Art. IX (B), Sec. 2 (2) ]. And it is in this sense that the provisions of PD 1458, particularly
Section 5 and LOI 71 relied upon by the petitioners should be interpreted.

EIIB officials and personnel remain civil servants and as correctly argued by the Solicitor General, EIIB
officials occupying confidential positions, remain accountable to the people and are subject to the same
state policies on morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness and courtesy in the civil service. Thus, We
hold that the personnel in the EEIB are covered by the civil service.

Issue: The pivotal issue here is: whether or not the petitioner, Economic Intelligence Investigation
Bureau (EIIB), is embraced by the Civil Service.

Held: Section 2, subparagraph (1), Article IX, paragraph (B) of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter.
Petitioner EIIB is a government agency under the Department of Finance as provided by Section 17,
Chapter 4, Title II, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.[4] Therefore, EIIB is within the ambit of the
Civil Service Law.

The aforecited provisions of law provide for the exemption of petitioner EIIB only from Civil Service
Rules and Regulations relative to appointments and other personnel actions, but not from the Civil
Service Law or Civil Service Rules and Regulations relative to any other matter.

... [R]espondent CSCs act of requiring petitioner EIIB to submit to it all appointments in the Bureau, for
appropriate action, is part of its administrative function as the central personnel agency of the
government.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED; and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No.
37720 AFFIRMED, without any pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 141141 June 25, 2001

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), petitioner, vs. CARLOS P.


RILLORAZA, respondent.

G.R. No. L-3881 August 31, 1950

EDUARDO DE LOS SANTOS, petitioner, vs.

GIL R. MALLARE, LUIS P. TORRES, in his capacity as City Mayor, PANTALEON PIMENTEL, in his capacity
as City Treasurer and RAFAEL USON, in his capacity as City Auditor, respondents.

Francisco S. Reyes for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Augusto Luciano for respondents.

The real issue however is the legality of the petitioner's removal from the same office which would be
the effect of Mallare's appointment if the same be allowed to stand.

Stripped of details unessential to the solution of the case, the facts are that Eduardo de los Santos, the
petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, by the President, appointment which
was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he
qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of the position.

The petitioner rests his case on Article XII of the Constitution, section 4 of which reads: "No officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."

It is admitted in respondents' answer that the City Engineer of Baguio "belongs to the unclassified
service."

the provision of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, he (Governor-General now President)
may remove at pleasure any of the said appointive officers," is incompatible with the constitutional
inhibition that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law." The two provisions are mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable.
One in express terms permits what the other in similar terms prohibits.
The Constitution leaves it to the Congress to provide for the cause of removal, and it is suggested that
the President's pleasure is itself a cause. The phrase "for cause" in connection with the removals of
public officers has acquired a well-defined concept. "It means for reasons which the law and sound
public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes
which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers
may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause.
Moreover, the cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to
something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public."

It is contended that only officers and employees in the classified service should be brought within the
purview of Article XII of the Constitution.

Section 670 of the Revised Administrative Code already provided that "Persons in the Philippine civil
service pertain either to the classified service," and went on to say that "The classified service embraces
all not expressly declared to be in the unclassified service." Then section 671 described persons in the
unclassified service as "officers, other than the provincial treasurers and assistant directors of bureaus
or offices, appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly, and all other officers of the government whose appointments
are by law vested in the President of the Philippines alone."

The Constitution authorizes removals and only requires that they be for cause. And the occasions for
removal would be greatly diminished if the injunction of section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution —
that appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be
determined as far as practicable by competitive examination — would be adhered of meticulously in the
first place.

Separation, suspension, demotions and transfers. — The "merit system" will be ineffective if no
safeguards are placed around the separation and removal of public employees. The Committee's report
requires that removals shall be made only for "causes and in the manner provided by law. This means
that there should be bona fide reasons and action maybe taken only after the employee shall have been
given a fair hearing. This affords the public employees reasonable security of tenure.

The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical.

The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the
office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or
freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Nor is the
position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does not formulate a method of action for
the government or any its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it.

A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or training in the supreme
or superior degree, which is the sense in which "highly technical" is, we believe, employed in the
Constitution.

under section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioner must be deemed to have
accepted the conditions and limitations attached to the appointment. If the clause of section 2545
which authorized the President to remove officers of the City of Baguio at pleasure had been abrogated
when petitioner's appointment was issued, the appointee can not presumed to have abided by this
condition.

We therefore hold that the petitioner is entitled to remain in office as City Engineer of Baguio with all
the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, until he resigns or is removed for cause, and
that respondent Mallare's appointment is ineffective in so far as it may adversely affect those
emoluments, rights and privileges. Without costs.

G.R. No. 91602 February 26, 1991

HONORABLE SIMPLICIO C. GRIÑO, SIXTO P. DEMAISIP, SANTOS B. AGUADERA, MANUEL B. TRAVIÑA


and MANUEL M. CASUMPANG, petitioners, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, TEOTIMO ARANDELA,
CIRILO GELVEZON, TEODULFO DATO-ON, and NELSON GEDUSPAN, respondents.

Sixto P. Demaisip for petitioners.

Rex C. Muzones for private respondents.

Thelma A. Panganiban-Gaminde, Rogelio C. Limare and Normita M. Llamas-Villanueva for Civil Service
Commission.

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen