Case Summary
“Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall
Muller vs. Muller (2006)
G.R. No. 149615 | 2006-08-29
Subject: Aliens are disqualified from acquiring lands; No
implied trust was created in favor of respondent; Respondent
not entitled to reimbursement;
Facts:
Elena Buenaventura Muller (petitioner) and Helmut Muller
(respondent) were married in Hamburg, Germany on
September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany but
decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in
1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in
Germany from his parents which he sold and used the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal
at the cost of P528,000 and the construction of a house
amounting to P2.3 Million. The Antipolo property was
registered in the name of petitioner (TCT No. 219438)
Due to respondent's alleged womanizing, drinking, and
maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. Respondent
filed a petition for separation of properties before the RTC of
Quezon City.
The RTC rendered a decision which terminated the regime of
absolute community of property between the couple and
decreed the separation of properties between them. With
regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was
acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent, however,
respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was
purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution which provides that "save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
The Court of Appeals modified the RTC decision and
considered petitioner's ownership over the property as 'in
trust' for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of
Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which
prohibits respondent from acquiring the same.
Hence, the instant petition for review. The issue for resolution
is whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the
funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property.
Held:
Aliens are disqualified from acquiring lands
1. Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.”
2. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also
disqualified from acquiring private lands, The primary purpose
of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the
national patrimony.
No implied trust was created in favor of respondent
3. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust
was created and resulted by operation of law in view of
petitioner's marriage to respondent. Save for the exception
provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent's
disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is
absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides,
where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute
and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in
favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise
would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Respondent not entitled to reimbursement
4. Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition
and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He
declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name
of petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at
subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property
cannot be sustained.
5. Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law
but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been
held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit
that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy,
cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity must do equity,
and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed
in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have
equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court
of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable,
unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the
controversy in issue. Thus, respondent cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that
he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
constitutional prohibition.
6. The distinction made between transfer of ownership as
opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on
respondent's part. To allow reimbursement would in effect
permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is
not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law.
DONATO REYES YAP and MELITONA MARAVILLAS,
petitioners, vs. HON. EZEKIEL S. GRAGEDA, as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Albay and JOSE A. RICO,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-31606 | 1983-03-28
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
We are asked in this petition to review the amended decision
of the respondent court which declared as absolutely null and
void the sale of a residential lot in Guinobatan, Albay to a
Chinese national and ordered its reconveyance to the vendors
thirty years after the sale inspite of the fact that the vendee
had been a naturalized Filipino citizen for fifteen years at the
time.
We grant the petition. The questioned decision and the order
amending it are reversed and set aside.
The facts are not disputed.
On April 12, 1939, Maximino Rico, for and in his own behalf
and that of the minors Maria Rico, Filomeno Rico, Prisco Rico,
and Lourdes Rico, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex 'A'
to the complaint) over Lot 339 and a portion of Lot 327 in favor
of the petitioner Donato Reyes Yap who was then a Chinese
national. Respondent Jose A. Rico is the eldest son of
Maximino Rico, one of the vendors in Annex 'A'.
Subsequently, the petitioner as vendee caused the registration
of the instrument of sale and the cancellation of Original
Certificates of Title Nos. 29332 and 29410 and the consequent
issuance in his favor of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2433
covering the two lots subject matter of the Contract of Sale.
After the lapse of nearly fifteen years from and after the
execution of the deed of absolute sale, Donato Reyes Yap was
admitted as a Filipino citizen and allowed to take his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. He was,
thereafter, issued Certificate of Naturalization No. 7, File No.
19 of the Court of First Instance of Albay.
On December 1, 1967, the petitioner ceded the major portion
of Lot No. 327 consisting of 1,078 square meters which he
acquired by purchase under the deed of sale in favor of his
engineer son, Felix Yap, who was also a Filipino citizen because
of the Filipino citizenship of his mother and the naturalization
of his father Donato Reyes Yap.
Subsequently, Lourdes Rico, aunt and co-heir of respondent
Jose A. Rico, sold the remaining portion of Lot 327 to the
petitioner who had his rights thereon duly registered under Act
496. Petitioner, Donato Reyes Yap, has been in possession of
the lots in question since 1939, openly, publicly, continuously,
and adversely in the concept of owner until the present time.
The petitioner has one surviving son by his first marriage to a
Filipino wife. He has five children by his second marriage also
to a Filipina and has a total of 23 grandchildren all of whom are
Filipino citizens.
The respondent court considered Section 5, Article XIII of the
1935 Constitution that "no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines" to be an absolute and unqualified
prohibition and, therefore, ruled that a conveyance contrary
to it would not be validated nor its void nature altered by the
subsequent naturalization of the vendee.
The dispositive portion of the amended decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Contract of Sale
embodied in the 'Escritura de Compra Venta' which is attached
to the Complaint as Annex 'A', is hereby declared null and void
ab initio and without any legal force and effect.
"The action to recover Lot 339 of the Cadastral Survey of
Guinobatan, Albay, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-2433, and Lot 327 covered by the same Transfer Certificate
of Title, is hereby granted to plaintiff, upon payment of the
consideration price of P150.00 and declaring plaintiff as the
lawful owner and entitled to the possession thereof.
"Defendant Donato Reyes Yap is hereby ordered to produce
his Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2433 to the Register of
Deeds of Albay, so as to enable said office to make the due and
proper annotations on said title as well as in the original of the
declaration of nullity as herein adjudged. Let Transfer
Certificate of Title issued to plaintiff, concerning said Lots 339
and 327 of the Cadastral Survey of Guinobatan, Albay.
"COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS."
The rulings in Vasquez v. Li Seng Giap et al. (96 Phil. 447) and
Sarosa Vda. de Bersabia v. Cuenco (113 SCRA 547) sustain the
petitioner's contentions. We stated in Sarosa Vda. de Bersabia:
"There should be no question that the sale of the land in
question in 1936 by Epifania to Ong King Po was inexistent and
void from the beginning (Art. 1409 [7], Civil Code) because it
was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of
the 1935 Constitution, which is an expression of public policy
to conserve lands for the Filipinos. Said provision reads:
"'Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural
land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations, qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain.'
"Had this been a suit between Epifania and Ong King Po, she
could have been declared entitled to the litigated land on the
basis, as claimed, of the ruling in Philippine Banking
Corporation vs. Lui She, reading:

"'. . . For another thing, and this is not only cogent but also
important. Article 1416 of the Civil Code provides as an
exception to the rule on pari delicto that when the agreement
is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the
prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the
plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover
what he has sold or delivered. . . .'

"But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is

now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned
by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen,
was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property.
There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing
petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the
hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of
this Court in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons:

"'. . . if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural

but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko
case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of
Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but
achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by
aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.'"

Only recently, we had occasion to reiterate the above rulings

in Vicente Godines v. Fong Pak Luen, et al. (G.R. No. L-36731,
January 27, 1983).

WHEREFORE, the amended judgment of the respondent court

is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
VICENTE GODINEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FONG PAK
LUEN, ET AL., defendants, TRINIDAD S. NAVATA, defendant-
appellee.
G.R. No. L-36731 | 1983-01-27
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The plaintiffs filed this case to recover a parcel of land sold by
their father, now deceased, to Fong Pak Luen, an alien, on the
ground that the sale was null and void ab initio since it violates
applicable provisions of the Constitution and the Civil Code.
The order of the Court of First Instance of Sulu dismissing the
complaint was appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter
court certified the appeal to us since only pure questions of law
were raised by the appellants.
The facts of the case were summarized by the Court of Appeals
as follows:
"On September 30, 1966, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Sulu alleging among others that they
are the heirs of Jose Godinez who was married to Martina
Alvarez Godinez sometime in 1910; that during the marriage
of their parents the said parents acquired a parcel of land lot
No. 94 of Jolo townsite with an area of 3,665 square meters as
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 179 (D - 155) in
the name of Jose Godinez; that their mother died sometime in
1938 leaving the plaintiffs as their sole surviving heirs; that on
November 27, 1941, without the knowledge of the plaintiffs,
the said Jose Godinez, for valuable consideration sold the
aforesaid parcel of land to the defendant Fong Pak Luen, a
Chinese citizen, which transaction is contrary to law and in
violation of the Civil Code because the latter being an alien
who is inhibited by law to purchase real property; that Transfer
Certificate Title No. 884 was then issued by the Register of
Deeds to the said defendant, which is null and void ab initio
since the transaction constituted a non-existent contract; that
on January 11, 1963, said defendant Fong Pak Luen executed a
power of attorney in favor of his co-defendant Kwan Pun Ming,
also an alien, who conveyed and sold the above described
parcel of land to co-defendant Trinidad S. Navata, who is aware
of and with full knowledge that Fong Pak Luen is a Chinese
citizen as well as Kwan Pun Ming, who under the law are
prohibited and disqualified to acquire real property in this
jurisdiction; that defendant Fong Pak Luen has not acquired
any title or interest in said parcel of land as the purported
contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez alone was contrary
to law and considered non-existent, so much so that the
alleged attorney-in-fact, defendant Kwan Pun Ming had not
conveyed any title or interest over said property and
defendant Navata had not acquired anything from said grantor
and as a consequence Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1322,
which was issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of the latter
is null and void ab initio; that since one-half of the said
property is conjugal property inherited by the plaintiffs from
their mother, Jose Godinez could not have legally conveyed the
entire property; that notwithstanding repeated demands on
said defendant to surrender to plaintiffs the said property she
refused and still refuses to do so to the great damage and
prejudice of the plaintiffs; and that they were constrained to
engage the services of counsel in the sum of P2,000.00. The
plaintiffs thus pray that they be adjudged as the owners of the
parcel of land in question and that Transfer Certificate of Title
RT-90 (T-884) issued in the name of defendant Fong Pak Luen
be declared null and void ab initio; and that the power of
attorney issued in the name of Kwan Pun Ming, as well as
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1322 issued in the name of
defendant Navata be likewise declared null and void, with
costs against defendants.
"On August 18, 1966, the defendant Register of Deeds filed an
answer claiming that he was not yet the register of deeds then;
that it was only the ministerial duty of his office to issue the
title in favor of the defendant Navata once he was determined
the registerability of the documents presented to his office.
"On October 20, 1966, the defendant Navata filed her answer
with the affirmative defenses and counterclaim alleging
among others that the complaint does not state a cause of
action since it appears from the allegation that the property is
registered in the name of Jose Godinez so that as has sole
property he may dispose of the same; that the cause of action
has been barred by the statute of limitations as the alleged
document of sale executed by Jose Godinez on November 27,
1941, conveyed the property to defendant Fong Pak Luen as a
result of which a title was issued to said defendant; that under
Article 1144 (1) of the Civil Code, an action based upon a
written contract must be brought within 10 years from the
time the right of action accrues; that the right of action accrued
on November 27, 1941 but the complaint was filed only on
September 30, 1966, beyond the 10-year period provided for
by law; that the torrens title in the name of defendant Navata
is indefeasible who acquired the property from defendant
Fong Pak Luen who had been in possession of the property
since 1941 and thereafter defendant Navata had possessed
the same for the last 25 years including the possession of Fong
Pak Luen; that the complaint is intended to harass the
defendant as a civic leader and respectable member of the
community as a result of which she suffered moral damages of
P100,000.00, P2,500.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00
expenses of litigation, hence, said defendant prays that the
complaint be dismissed and that her counterclaim be granted,
with costs against the plaintiffs. On November 24, 1967, the
plaintiffs filed an answer to the affirmative defenses and
counter-claim. As the defendants Fong Pak Luen and Kwan Pun
Ming are residing outside the Philippines, the trial court upon
motion issued an order of April 17, 1967, for the service of
summons on said defendants by publication. No answer has
been filed by said defendants.
"On December 2, 1967, the court issued an order as follows:

"'Both parties having agreed to the suggestion of the Court
that they submit their supplemental pleadings to support both
motion and opposition and after submittal of the same the said
motion to dismiss which is an affirmative defense alleged in
the complaint is deemed submitted. Failure of both parties or
either party to submit their supplemental pleadings on or
about December 9, the Court will resolve the case.'
"On November 29, 1968, the trial court issued an order
dismissing the complaint without pronouncement as to costs.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 31-37). A motion for reconsideration of
this order was filed by the plaintiffs on December 12, 1968,
which was denied by the trial court in an order of July 11, 1969,
(Rec. on Appeal, pp. 38, 43, 45, 47). The plaintiffs now
interpose this appeal with the following assignments of errors:
I. The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs-appellants'
complaint on the ground of prescription of action, applying Art.
1144 (1) New Civil Code on the basis of defendant Trinidad S.
Navata's affirmative defense of prescription in her answer
treated as a motion to dismiss.
II. The trial court erred in denying plaintiffs-appellants' motion
for reconsideration of the order of dismissal.
III. The trial court erred in not ordering this case to be tried on
the merits."
The appellants contend that the lower court erred in
dismissing the complaint on the ground that their cause of
action has prescribed. While the issue raised appears to be
only the applicability of the law governing prescription, the
real question before us is whether or not the heirs of a person
who sold a parcel of land to an alien in violation of a
constitutional prohibition may recover the property if it had, in
the meantime, been conveyed to a Filipino citizen qualified to
own and possess it.
The question is not a novel one. Judicial precedents indicate
fairly clearly how the question should be resolved.
There can be no dispute that the sale in 1941 by Jose Godinez
of his residential lot acquired from the Bureau of Lands as part
of the Jolo townsite to Fong Pak Luen, a Chinese citizen
residing in Hongkong, was violative of Section 5, Article XIII of
the 1935 Constitution which provided:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
The meaning of the above provision was fully discussed in
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila (79 Phil. 461) which
also detailed the evolution of the provision in the public land
laws, Act No. 2874 and Commonwealth Act No. 141. The
Krivenko ruling that "under the Constitution aliens may not
acquire private or agricultural lands, including residential
lands" is a declaration of an imperative constitutional policy.
Consequently, prescription may never be invoked to defend
that which the Constitution prohibits. However, we see no
necessity from the facts of this case to pass upon the nature of
the contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak
Luen - whether void ab initio, illegal per se, or merely
prohibited.
* It is enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned,
prescription is unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his
heirs rely on an argument based on imprescriptibility because
the land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen
against whom the constitutional prescription was never
intended to apply. The lower court erred in treating the case
as one involving simply the application of the statute of
limitations.
From the fact that prescription may not be used to defend a
contract which the Constitution prohibits, it does not
necessarily follow that the appellants may be allowed to
recover the property sold to an alien. As earlier mentioned,
Fong Pak Luen, the disqualified alien vendee later sold the
same property to Trinidad S. Navata, a Filipino citizen qualified
to acquire real property.
In Vasquez v. Li Seng Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons (96 Phil.
447), where the alien vendee later sold the property to a
Filipino corporation, this Court, in affirming a judgment
dismissing the complaint to rescind the sale of real property to
the defendant Li Seng Giap on January 22, 1940, on the ground
that the vendee was an alien and under the Constitution
incapable to own and hold title to lands, held:
"In Caoile vs. Yu Chiao, 49 Off. Gaz., 4321; Talento vs. Makiki,
49 Off. Gaz., 4331; Bautista vs. Uy 49 Off. Gaz., 4336; Rellosa
vs. Gaw Chee, 49 Off. Gaz., 4345 and Mercado vs. Go Bio, 49
Off. Gaz., 5360, the majority of this Court has ruled that in sales
of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by
virtue of the provisions of the Constitution (Section 5, Article
XIII; Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 44 Off. Gaz., 471) both the
vendor and the vendee are deemed to have committed the
constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the
courts will not afford protection to either party. (Article 1305,
old Civil Code; Article 1411, new Civil Code) From this ruling
three Justices dissented. (Mr. Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Alex.
Reyes and the writer. See Caoile vs. Yu Chiao, Talento vs.
Makiki, Bautista vs. Uy, Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee and Mercado vs.
Go Bio, supra.
"The action is not of rescission because it is not postulated
upon any of the grounds provided for in Article 1291 of the old
Civil Code and because the action of rescission involves lesion
or damage and seeks to repair it. It is an action for annulment
under Chapter VI, Title II, Book II, on nullity of contracts, based
on a defect in the contract which invalidates it independently
of such lesion or damages. (Manresa, Commentarios al Codigo
Civil Español, Vol. VIII, p. 698, 4th ed.) It is very likely that the
majority of this Court proceeded upon that theory when it
applied the in pari delicto rule referred to above.
"In the United States the rule is that in a sale of real estate to
an alien disqualified to hold title thereto the vendor divests
himself of the title to such real estate and has no recourse
against the vendee despite the latter's disability on account of
alienage to hold title to such real estate and the vendee may
hold it against the whole world except as against the State. It
is only the State that is entitled by proceedings in the nature of
office found to have a forfeiture or escheat declared against
the vendee who is incapable of holding title to the real estate
sold and conveyed to him, (Abrams vs. State, 88 Pac. 327; Craig
vs. Leslie et al., 4 Law, Ed. 460; 3 Wheat, 563, 589-590; Cross
vs. Del Valle, 1 Wall, [U.S.] 513; 17 Law. Ed., 515; Governeur vs.
Robertson, 11 Wheat, 332, 6 Law. Ed., 488.)
"However, if the State does not commence such proceedings
and in the meantime the alien becomes naturalized citizen, the
State is deemed to have waived its right to escheat the real
property and the title of the alien thereto becomes lawful and
valid as of the date of its conveyance or transfer to him.
(Osterman vs. Baldwin, 6 Wall, 116, 18 Law. ed. 730; Manuel
vs. Wulff, 152 U.S. 505, 38 Law. ed. 532; Pembroke vs.
Houston, 79, SW 470; Fioerella vs. Jones, 259 SW 782. The rule
in the United States that in a sale of real estate to an alien
disqualified to hold title thereto, the vendor divests himself of
the title to such real estate and is not permitted to sue for the
annulment of his contract, is also the rule under the Civil Code.
. . . Article 1302 of the old Civil Code provides: . . . Persons sui
juris cannot, however, avail themselves of the incapacity of
those with whom they contracted; . . .'
xxx xxx xxx
". . . (I)f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural
but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko
case, is to preserve the nation's land for future generations of
Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but
achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by
aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. The title
to the parcel of land of the vendee, a naturalized Filipino
citizen, being valid that of the domestic corporation to which
the parcel of land has been transferred, must also be valid,
96.67 per cent of its capital stock being owned by Filipinos."
Herrera v. Luy Kim Guan (1 SCRA 406) reiterated the above
ruling by declaring that where land is sold to a Chinese citizen,
who later sold it to a Filipino, the sale to the latter cannot be
impugned.
The appellants cannot find solace from Philippine Banking
Corporation v. Lui She (21 SCRA 52) which relaxed the pari
delicto doctrine to allow the heirs or successors-in-interest, in
appropriate cases, to recover that which their predecessors
sold to aliens.
Only recently, in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco (113 SCRA
547) we had occasion to pass upon a factual situation
substantially similar to the one in the instant case. We ruled:
"But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is
now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned
by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen,
was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property.
There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing
petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the
hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of
this Court in Vasquez vs. Giap & Sons: (96 Phil. 447 [1955]).
" '. . . if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural
but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko
case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of
Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but
achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by
aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.'
"While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondent's
vendor, had no rights of ownership to transmit, it is likewise
inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for
26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction or inexcusable
neglect, she should be held barred from asserting her claim to
the litigated property (Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 157 [1978]).
" 'Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which
by exercising due diligence could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it. (Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., No. L-21450, April
15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 35).' (Cited in Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA
154 [1978]).
"Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful
owner of the property."
In the light of the above considerations, we find the second
and third assignments of errors without merit. Respondent
Navata, the titled owner of the property is declared the rightful
owner.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby denied. The orders
dismissing the complaint and denying the motion for
reconsideration are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.