2016 Designing For Life

DESIGNING
FOR LIFE
A Human Perspective
o n Te c h n o l o g y
Development
PERTTI SAARILUOMA,
JOSÉ J. CAÑAS,
JAANA LEIKAS
Designing for Life
Pertti Saariluoma • José J. Cañas • Jaana Leikas
Designing for Life

A Human Perspective on Technology
Development
Pertti Saariluoma Jaana Leikas
Cognitive Science VTT Technical Research Centre
University of Jyväskylä, Finland of Finland Ltd
Tampere, Finland
José J. Cañas
Faculty of Psychology
University of Granada
Granada, Spain
ISBN 978-1-137-53046-2 ISBN 978-1-137-53047-9 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53047-9
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016942071
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Preface
Technology is only valuable to the extent that it can enhance the quality
of life. When solving complex engineering problems, it is easy to forget
the basic reason why technologies are designed and developed. It is also
easy to forget what actually turns a technical idea into an innovation.
Although designers create technologies, only users can, in the end, decide
what becomes an innovation.
This book was written to expound on the true value of taking human
life as the starting and focus point for technology design. Given the nar-
row interpretation of the concept of ‘human’, few definite design practices
include the perspective of human life. As information and communica-
tion technologies have proliferated vastly beyond the scope of tools and
become a ubiquitous part of people’s daily lives, the need for proper design
approaches has become obvious. The traditional focus on human-centred
design approaches is increasingly considered insufficient for understand-
ing human–technology interaction (HTI), as it arises from an interest
in technology rather than an interest in humans. It has been recognized
that completely automated technologies do not exist, and designers have
accepted that there will always be a human interacting with technolo-
gies. However, ‘human’ in this sense has meant that a human being, the
user, has been the focus only as a test object for the design and launch of
a desired technology. Accordingly, the most-emphasized aspect of HTI
v
vi Preface
has been whether people find it easy to use certain products and systems,
as difficult-to-use technology is easily rejected. From this perspective,
the field of technology and innovation design can be seen more as an
engineering discipline in which, for example, psychological theories of
interaction are employed first and foremost as instruments for developing
‘usable’ technology.
There have been attempts to change this practice to make it more
human centred by introducing the term ‘human-driven design’, where
the starting point in a design should be the human being and his or her
needs, goals, and desires. The focus has been transferred from technology
and ‘quality assurance’ to a more human approach, and the significance
and emphasis of the human sciences in design has increased. Accordingly,
the practical implications of this field (and the resources channelled to it)
have been substantial.
Yet interpretations of the concept of ‘human’ have been narrow, and
perspectives on how to understand people’s needs have been limited—
and have varied depending on the purpose and the interpreter. They have
provided no concepts that would make it possible to study the real needs
of people that could be fulfilled with desirable, sustainable, and ethically
accepted technology.
Why has it been so difficult to design the human dimension of tech-
nology? We argue that this is because the most profound factor of HTI
has been left out of the discussion: people’s everyday lives. Understanding
daily life makes it possible to create a practical methodology that can
be used effectively to design the human dimension of technology, and
to convince business developers of the true value of treating the human
perspective as a cornerstone of the design. Quite simply, this means that
HTI design should be able to perceive, analyse, and design technology
through knowledge of (and for) people’s everyday lives.
Designing technology to improve the quality of human life requires
a multidisciplinary design approach. On one hand, multidisciplinary
teams can give designers with a technical background the opportunity to
better acquaint themselves with human research by working with human
researchers. On the other hand, human researchers should be more aware
of the various roles they can play in the process of designing and develop-
ing new technological solutions for people. Human researchers can be
Preface vii
provided with concepts, facts, methods, and theories that are useful in
many aspects of design.
This book is written for a wide group of professionals who may look at
design through very different types of conceptual lenses. For engineering
designers, it may strengthen their understanding of human research avail-
able for developing HTI design. For human researchers from psycholo-
gists to physiatrists, and from sociologists, anthropologists, to artists and
historians, this book should give an idea of how to apply and strengthen
their expertise in the discourses of developing human life by means of
technical design and development. As said, design thinking is a multi-
disciplinary activity that requires different roles to be filled with different
kinds of experts.
After recognizing the multidisciplinary nature of HTI design, the
question is how knowledge about humans can be incorporated into
design processes efficiently. This book introduces a new way of organizing
creative thinking about design, and discusses scientific knowledge about
the human mind as an essential element of design discourses. It reviews
different perspectives of HTI and contributes ideas of life-based design.
It systematizes traditional design discourses by showing that HTI design
thinking must always meet four fundamental design questions:
1. Functionalities and technical user interface design;

2. Fluency and ease of use;
3. Elements of experience and liking; and
4. Position of technology in human life.
As these fundamental questions are always present when designing

the human dimension of technology, it is useful to understand the logic
behind them. The questions define the basic tasks in HTI design: the
decision of the functionalities of the artefact, understanding how to best
use them, understanding the overall experience when using them, and
finally—and most importantly—the technology’s role in human life. The
latter is always present in design, either consciously or tacitly.
Finally, the book shows that it is possible to build ontological sys-
tems around these fundamental questions to rationally organize the
viii Preface
management of HTI design processes and to integrate the questions into

a unified research and design process.
We start by discussing the mutually inclusive roles of the natural sci-
ences and human research in design, and the foundations of (and relation-
ship between) scientific and design thinking. Chapter 2 introduces the
main paradigms of HTI design using different approaches, perspectives,
concepts, and methodologies. It reveals that HTI research and design is
dominated by the logic of questions, and discusses the basic questions
that provide a fundamental structure to the field. In Chap. 3 we discuss
the logic of user interface design and present the overall principles and
goals for the user interface design of any technical artefact. Chapter 4
discusses the importance of understanding the cognitive elements and
psychological and mental preconditions for using technology—that is,
the psychology of fluent use. Chapter 5 examines aspects of the dynamic
mind—in particular human emotions, motives, and personality—that
help address people’s preferences and how they feel when they use tech-
nologies. Chapter 6 introduces the reader to the conceptual model of
life-based design, which is based on segregating unified systems of action
called forms of life. Investigating the structure of actions and related facts
relevant to particular forms of life, in addition to the values that people
adhere to, constitutes the core tool of this design approach. The knowl-
edge produced comprises a template for human requirements, which
serves as a basis for design ideas and technological solutions. Chapter 7
discusses product design as a constructive process, which requires setting
up and testing hypotheses and developing logical chains of arguments to
decide which assumptions are facts and which are not. It involves creat-
ing new perspectives for searching out truths by designing more accurate
concepts, which allow new types of questions to be asked concerning the
state of affairs. Finally, the chapter introduces generic design ontology for
HTI design, and concludes by exploring the possibility of truly fitting
design solutions into people’s everyday lives and advancing the quality of
life by ethical design.
We would like to thank Jyväskylä and Granada Universities as well as
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland for being stimulating research
and innovation environments. We also wish to thank the Design United
and Department of Industrial Design at Eindhoven Technical University
Preface ix
for offering an inspiring environment for the first author during a visit
there. Without this opportunity, this book would still be unfinished. The
Finnish authors wish to thank the National Technology Agency (Tekes)
for the Theseus I-II and ITEA-2 for Easy Interactions projects, which
facilitated the start of this work. Tekes also supported the BeWell and
Life-Based Design projects, which have been important for develop-
ing the basic conceptions of the book. The work of the Spanish author
has been supported by projects SEJ2007-63850/PSIC and PSI2012-
39246 from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science, and proj-
ect ProyectoMIO! from the Spanish Ministry of Industry. We thank
PalgraveMacMillan Team, Nicola Jones, Eleanor Christie, Sharla Plant,
Greg Willliams, Ramaswamy Parvathy, and Angeline Amrita Stanley for
their invaluable help. We also thank Kelley Friel for correcting the lan-
guage. Finally, we thank Noora Hirvonen for the illustrations.
We dedicate this book to the light nights of Finnish summers and the
gentle Andalusian evenings, when the true Finnish–Spanish cooperation
took place in the heat of a Finnish sauna and in the blue hills of Granada.
Pertti Saariluoma
José J. Cañas
Jaana Leikas
Virrat, Finland
June 2015
Contents
1 Technology in Life 1
Technology in History 5
Technology Emancipates People 7
Risks of Technology 11
Towards a New Interaction Design Culture 14
Human Turn 17
References 18
2 Design Discourses 25
How Researchers and Designers Perceive HTI 26
Anatomy of Paradigms 28
Main Paradigms of HTI Design: An Overview 29
From Paradigms to Research Programmes 34
Organizing HTI 37
The Fundamental Four: The Basic Questions and Discourses 40
References 42
3 The Logic of User Interface Design 49

Functions and Events 52
Understanding the User’s Tasks 56
xi
xii Contents
Intentional and Hidden Interaction Elements 59

User Interfaces: The Means of Control 61
Dialogues and Interaction Semiotics 64
Design Patterns 67
The Conceptual Structure of ‘How to Control’ 69
References 72
4 The Psychology of Fluent Use 79

Critical Factors of ‘Being Able to Use’ 80
To Perceive and to Attend 86
To Respond and to Act 97
To Learn and to Remember 101
To Comprehend 110
To Decide and to Think 120
Cognitive Processes and Effortless Interaction 123
References 124
5 Emotions, Motives, Individuals, and Cultures

in Interaction 137
Emotions and the Mind 140
Appraisal: Cognition in Emotions 143
Emotional Aspects of HTI 145
User Motivation: Biological, Cognitive, Emotional,
and Social 148
Personality, Technology Generation, and Interaction
Dynamics 153
Cultures and Their Differences 156
The Dynamic Nature of the Human Mind 157
References 163
6 Life-Based Design 171

LBD and Forms of Life 174
Structuring a Form of Life 177
The Structure of Rule-Following Actions 179
Contents xiii
Understanding and Explaining Forms of Life: Facts

and Values 182
Technology-Supported Actions 188
Scientific Foundations 191
LBD Process 194
Technology Modifies Forms of Life 199
References 202
7 Research and Innovation 207

Similarities and Differences 209
Explanatory Design 211
Managing HTI Design Knowledge 216
Generic HTI Design Ontology 220
What Is the Technology Used for? 221
How Is the Technology Intended to Behave and to
Be Controlled? 223
How Does the Technology Fit Users’ Skills and Capabilities? 224
How Does the Technology Produce a Motivating Emotional
Experience? 226
Synthetic Design Thinking and Co-design 228
Sketches, Prototypes, Models, and Simulations 230
Fit for Life and Ethical Design 232
References 236
8 Epilogue: Designing for Life 243

References 249
Author Index 251
Subject Index 263

List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 Technology has not only changed the working methods of
housework. It has also changed women’s social position; today
women often work outside the home and men have started to
participate more in housework 9
Fig. 2.1 The basic design discourses and respective research programmes 37
Fig. 3.1 Event paths in an event tree—an example of text processing 54
Fig. 4.1 Using a technical artefact 81
Fig. 4.2 Ponzo illusion 89
Fig. 4.3 The overall structure of human memory 103
Fig. 4.4 The first sentence is easier to remember although the
sentences comprise the same letters 106
Fig. 4.5 Apperception—two persons apperceive and mentally
represent the same visual stimulus in a different way 120
Fig. 5.1 After nuclear accidents people lost their trust in this type of
technology 138
Fig. 6.1 Main components of human action 179
Fig. 6.2 Global explanatory frameworks for the form of life 184
Fig. 6.3 Generation of design ideas from a form of life 189
Fig. 6.4 The palette of human life sciences 192
Fig. 6.5 Life-based design model (Leikas et al. 2013) 195
Fig. 7.1 General explanatory framework 212
xv
List of Tables
Table 7.1 The fundamental questions of HTI design ontology

and the respective design frameworks 220
Table 7.2 The ontological questions of ‘What for?’ 221
Table 7.3 The ontological questions of ‘how to control’ 224
Table 7.4 The ontological questions of ‘being able to use’ 225
Table 7.5 The ontological questions of ‘emotional experience’ 227
xvii
1
Technology in Life
Technological advancements have changed human life throughout history

as technical inventions have emancipated people from many mundane,
necessary tasks. The development of technical artefacts has long relied on
the natural sciences and engineering. However, recent technical advance-
ments—such as ubiquitous and massively multifunctional technologies as
well as the emergence of social media—have made it necessary to approach
design from a multidisciplinary perspective and to ground design thinking
more on the understanding of human mind and human life. As the natural
sciences and human research are in many respects different practices, it is
time to discuss their mutually inclusive roles in design and to rethink the
foundations of (and relationship between) scientific and design thinking.
Information and communication technology (ICT) services have

become an increasingly central form of social activity, which is radically
changing the foundations of technology design thinking. Human–tech-
nology interaction (HTI) design no longer involves merely developing
new technical devices or artefacts for people to use. It is shifting from
creating tools to shaping what they can achieve. For example, hundreds
of thousands of apps and an unlimited number of web pages have been
developed in recent years without making any essential changes to the
technical artefacts on which the apps are used. Moreover, technical solu-
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 1
P. Saariluoma et al., Designing for Life,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53047-9_1
2 Designing for Life
tions are becoming more complex, and automatic processes have replaced
many operators. Though creating new artefacts never ceases, it is evident
that the ever-evolving human relationship with technology is becoming
more and more important.
The term ‘technical artefact’ or ‘artefact’ refers to any human-made
object, natural process, or even a modified natural phenomenon that
is used to improve human performance, satisfy some human need, or
improve the quality of life (Simon 1969). An artefact can also be a techni-
cal machine or device that has a human function (Houkes et al. 2011). It
can be a computer program, machine, device, instrument, chemical prod-
uct, or tool. It can also be something that gives subjective enjoyment to
people—a film, a TV programme, or a cigarette. It can even be a natural
phenomenon used by people, like fire or a stone tool. The main require-
ment is it helps people pursue their action goals. The term ‘technology’
typically refers to a combination of technical artefacts and their human
uses—that is, what people do with artefacts and how they are organized
around them (Davis et al. 2014; Houkes et al. 2011; Karwowski 2006;
Meier-Oeser 1998; Orlikowski 1991, 2000).
People, and the various roles they play when interacting with technol-
ogy—such as users, consumers, and operators—constitute the human
dimension of technology. HTI in its broadest sense covers all forms and
aspects of interaction between people and technical artefacts; it includes the
roles of designer, business manager, object of action, constructor, and builder.
Although issues related to computational devices dominate today’s
discussion on HTI, traditional mechanical artefacts and their uses are
also relevant for this discussion, since most technical artefacts today have
both computational and mechanical dimensions. The nature of scientific
knowledge in design thinking is changing, and designers and develop-
ers of modern technologies are required to acquire new types of skills.
For centuries, natural science and mathematics have provided the basic
concepts and theories for technology design thinking and innovation,
but they are no longer sufficient in HTI design. The interaction between
humans and new types of technologies must be holistically understood
in all its complexity.
The human dimension is an inevitable part of technology design think-
ing, since technological solutions have direct or indirect links to everyday
life. For example, modern paper machines can dry paper incredibly quickly,
thanks to the invention of the so-called extended nip, a flexible mantle
that sped up the process considerably and improved the quality of paper
(Saariluoma et al. 2006). Therefore, this invention increased the produc-
tivity of papermaking factories by tens of percentages, which improved
the quality of life for the users of the paper (e.g., newspaper readers) and
increased investors’ return of investment (ROI).
In engineering, design thinking is conceived as organizing the laws of
nature in a meaningful manner (Pahl et al. 2007). Also, understanding
the human mind and human life is necessary for people working with
technology design. However, the traditional (largely common sense and
user-need based) conceptualization of the human mind and actions is
no longer sufficient. The conceptual structure of design thinking has to
be expanded to also consider other concepts of human research (Davis
et al. 2014; Houkes et al. 2011; Karwowski 2006; Meier-Oeser 1998;
Orlikowski 1991, 2000).
The most important design solutions are based on scientific knowledge
developed in the natural sciences such as mathematics, physics, chemis-
try, and materials science. Since they are able to apply the laws of nature
and to use simulations to study different alternatives, engineers can con-
fidently predict that their design solutions will work in practice. Human
research, by contrast, is not applied as effectively as the laws of natural
science in technology design. Thus, while a design might perform well
technically, users may not be able to (or may not want to) use the artefact,
or simply have no practical use for it.
As the human dimension of technology is becoming more important
in practical design, development, and innovation, it is necessary to turn
one’s attention to human research, that is, the relevant areas of biology,
psychology, and socio-cultural research. Yet natural scientific and human
perspectives on thinking are conceptually different in many respects.
While human research is dominated by causal explanation, the natural
sciences rely on such philosophical and metascientific notions as inten-
tion or understanding (Radnitsky 1968; von Wright 1971).
There has been relatively little communication between the academic
human–computer interaction (HCI) community and industry in the
area of HTI design (Carroll 1997), and researchers in both fields have
approached interaction issues very differently. Consequently, the degree

of applying human research is not as high as it could be in modern tech-
nology design.
Engineering designers and programmers are experts in the natural sci-
ences and mathematics, while human researchers are qualified in human
biology, psychology, and socio-cultural research. Human researchers
have used different concepts and seen different problems than technical
designers, and industry professionals have felt that human researchers do
not comprehend the real goal of design thinking, which is working with
a product rather than coming up with a good theory.
Indeed, people are goal oriented rather than abstractly theoretical
when it comes to using technology (Card et al. 1983). People, more-
over, are different. Though designers have expected them to behave like
machine parts with specific functions, from registering odd things in the
environment to typing in texts, they have dimensions that should also be
factored in. People err, they change their moods and goals, they feel good
or bad, and they have their life histories, social networks, and personality.
But most of all, they have their own individual lives. Since all technolo-
gies are designed to be used in life and are justified (or not) by their sig-
nificance in human life, technology designers cannot ignore people and
their lives.
Incorporating human knowledge into technology design thinking thus
uncovers underlying conceptual structures and tacitly or explicitly guides
design thinking. Numerous paradigms have been developed to incorpo-
rate the human dimension of technology. Common examples include
usability testing, user experience evaluation, and usability goal setting
(Dumas and Redish 1999; Hassenzahl and Tractinsky 2006; Helander
and Khalid 2006; Nagamashi 2011; Nielsen 1993; Wixon and Wilson
1997). Designers have also constructed sketches, mock-ups, simulation
models, and prototypes, which they more or less systematically test with
users to find out whether they make errors or take more time than neces-
sary to perform certain tasks. However, the kind of approach that does
not fully take human research into account when creating design goals
and requirements can be seen as tacitly conservative, because it prioritizes
technical advancement over the human mind and people’s lives.
A number of different kinds of tools have been developed to sup-

port design practices, such as graphical user interface components, style
guides, standards, practices, and databanks (Cooper et al. 2007; Collison
et al. 2009; Goodwin 2011; ISO 1998a, b; Kim et al. 2011). These tools
can be effective when they are used to solve specific and restricted design
details, but when misapplied or used superficially, they overlook deeper
systematizations or understanding of how users’ minds work (Norman
2002).
From a higher conceptual level more focused on the design of HTI, the
critical step is to create and describe the conceptual foundations of new,
human research-based design thinking. This would require defining the
main interaction design and research concepts, problems, and organiza-
tion. It would also presuppose describing the design processes, the nature
of the designers’ thinking, and the logic that unifies the human research
and natural scientific design thinking in HTI design practices. This new
way of thinking should lead to a transparent and explicit understanding
of how human research can support designers’ thinking in HTI design
and innovation. From this perspective, the goal of design is not to create
new technical artefacts but to change how people live and to improve
the quality of human life. The whole history of technology justifies this
perspective, and therefore modern design thinking should concentrate on
designing life instead of just new artefacts.
Technology in History
The importance of technology in shaping everyday human life has been
understood for a long time (Basalla 1988; Bernal 1969; Marks 1988;
Pfaffenberger 1992). Many historical periods have been named after the
dominant new technologies of their time (Basalla 1988), for example, the
Stone, Bronze, and Iron Ages (Renfrew and Bahn 1991). Similarly, such
terms as the age of steam, the age of electronics, or the age of computing
are also common in characterizing the influence of specific technologies
on society (Basalla 1988; Bernal 1969; Marks 1988; Pfaffenberger 1992;
Williams, and Edge 1996).
Today, modern technologies (particularly information and com-

munication technologies) are strongly, and increasingly rapidly, influ-
encing the way we live our everyday lives (Bernal 1969; Marks 1988).
Technological development has not only meant the emergence of new
and more complex artefacts for people to use but it has also had a strong
influence on cultures and societies.
The adoption of fire and the discovery of penicillin, for example, have
significantly changed the way people live. Although the post-Homerian
period in literature and the Age of Enlightenment in philosophy are vital
for understanding human thinking, society, and life, no artistic innova-
tion has had the same economic significance or concrete effect on people’s
everyday life as technologies have. Indeed, technical progress makes pos-
sible the development of art by creating new technical products and even
new social orders (Hauser 1977). Likewise, electronic music and new
media art illustrate how modern tools for producing art, such as colour
or perspective techniques, can alter the type, markets, and content of art
in the same way that innovations changed art during the Renaissance.
One of the key innovations of the modern age has been the steamship.
It revolutionized transportation and paved the way for a new economic
era (Bernal 1969; Marks 1988). It made it possible to move people, raw
materials (e.g., coal), and merchandise from one place to another quickly
and safely, and created reliable timetables for doing so. The new transpor-
tation technology based on steam changed companies’ modes of opera-
tion and gradually altered economic life as a whole (Chandler 1992).
Time became money.
Human needs have always been the trigger and justification for
inventing, developing, and innovating new technologies. The demand
for water is a good example. When people needed water in antiq-
uity, complex technologies were developed to supply this need. The
Romans designed aqueducts that could supply water over long distances
(Chanson 2000),1 which required a large knowledge base, from math-
ematics to stone-handling practices (Carcopino 2003). In this way, the
need for water became a trigger and an explanation for the construction
1
Examples from ancient times are presented in order to illustrate that the nature of many design
problems has remained the same over time and in many cultures.
of the aqueducts, whereas technologies provided the means to solve the

problem of delivering water to the big cities. Without this technology,
it would have been impossible to develop or maintain everyday life in
Rome (Bruun 1991; Landels 2000). Water supply remained a challenge
for scientists even in the nineteenth century. The finding that contami-
nated water spread illnesses led John Snow to make many inventions
related to hygiene and clean drinking water (Cameron and Jones 1983),
which in turn stimulated population growth and social change (Bernal
1969; Galor and Weil 2000).
Thus, technological advancements have always been intimately related
to advancements in all aspects of life. Just as necessity is the mother of
invention, life is the catalyst for developing technology. Technical inven-
tions cannot be designed in a vacuum, but arise from the needs of peo-
ple’s everyday lives. The intimate connection between human life and
technical artefacts implies that the concepts used in designing technol-
ogy are gradually extended from the natural sciences to human research
(Simon 1969).
Technology Emancipates People

The central function of technology can be found in the logic of mak-
ing something possible or easier in order to improve the quality of life.
Technologies are thus not goals in themselves, but are developed to
achieve human action goals (Basalla 1988; Bernal 1969; Marks 1988).
While it is possible to develop an endless number of different tech-
nologies, innovation and development processes should be based on an
understanding of how new technologies can improve the quality of life.
Technology can, for example, help the elderly or disabled people to carry
out daily activities.
Making something happen is a form of emancipation, which means
expanding the possibilities of life. Historically, emancipation refers to
breaking free from the social conditions that enslave people (Adorno
1976; Habermas 1969, 1973; Horkheimer 1947; Stahl 2006). Life can
be restricted by many kinds of necessities, difficulties, limitations, and
non-ideal living conditions that prevent people from increasing their
happiness. Many of these restrictions are political and social, such as the
black Civil Rights or the women’s liberation movement, or improving
nutrition and sanitation. But many can be solved or improved through
technological advancements. In medicine, for instance, new ways of
treating illnesses require new kinds of technical tools, such as new medi-
cations and medical instruments.
The emancipatory role of technology has been one of the main triggers
that has led many individuals and organizations to focus their efforts on
creating technologies. Decreasing child mortality, illnesses, hunger, and
violence, for example, has been possible with the help of technologies
(Bernal 1969). While child mortality was very high 150 years ago even in
developed countries, it started to rapidly decrease at the end of the nine-
teenth century with improvements in medical understanding, hygiene,
and technology (Wolleswinkel-van den Bosch et al. 1998). Emancipation
in the context of HTI thus refers to the liberation of people by technolog-
ical means from any circumstances that diminish the quality of their lives.
The emancipating role of technology can best be seen in the way it
shapes the world around us. For example, social discourses have been lib-
erated by different kinds of information and communication technolo-
gies (Hansen et al. 2009; Lyytinen and Klein 1985; Ross and Chiasson
2011). In many respects, technologies have made social emancipation
possible (and even necessary) as they have changed people’s everyday lives.
Homes, to give just one example, have undergone a technological revolu-
tion over the last 50–60 years (Cowan 1976, 1985). They have become
‘industrialized’ in the sense that they provide people with different kinds
of technologies that take care of household tasks that were previously
performed by housewives and servants. Along with household technolo-
gies, such fundamental innovations as electric lighting, industrial food
production, medications, radio, phone, and television have all altered the
position of women in society. Thanks to technological and social develop-
ments, women today have the opportunity to educate themselves, work
outside the home and live an economically independent life (Fig. 1.1).
At the same time, the number of childbirths has dramatically decreased
(Subbarao and Raney 1993).
New ICT technology will play a similar emancipating role in human
life that the earlier forms of technologies have played in their time. While
Fig. 1.1 Technology has not only changed the working methods of house-
work. It has also changed women’s social position; today women often work
outside the home and men have started to participate more in housework
we do not know what the exact nature of this technology revolution will
be, it is essential to develop our current scientific and industrial practices
so they provide us with the proper tools for the coming changes. One
sign of change is the political use of new media, which has made possible
certain social changes—both welcome and not—which were impossible
just a few decades ago (Rheingold 2012). Another interesting initiative
is design by social media, for example, an opera composed recently by
an international community.2 It can be expected that more such cultural
and even political changes will emerge due to innovative forms of social
media and new technologies, but to make future emancipation possible,
it is essential to develop our capacity to design improvements.
As can be seen from the opera example, the emancipation enabled by
technology need not only concern issues of primary needs and necessi-
ties or large-scale issues in life. It can also include, for example, issues
related to self-fulfilment and social freedom (Eccles and Wigfield 2002;
Horkheimer 1947; Maslow 1954). For example, finding friends with
similar interests and experiences on social media: that is, emancipa-
tion from loneliness. It can also mean more flexible use of one’s time
thanks to effective tools for distance working. Technology may improve
2
See http://bit.se/3WiRR5
our relationships with other people and even increase understanding

between different cultures and nations. It may also make unjust social
forms, such as slavery, unnecessary and unfounded. Emancipation
thus means the ability to get rid of any factors that make it difficult to
improve one’s quality of life. Therefore, issues such as happiness, ethics,
and justice should not be forgotten when technology is being developed
(Bowen 2009; Jonas 1973; Stahl 2006).
As technology is social by nature, it has to be examined not only from a
technical perspective but also from ethical, juridical, and political points
of view (Bernal 1969; Bowen 2009; Leikas 2008, 2009; Stahl 2010).
However, one should not exaggerate the influence of the logic of the pos-
sible. What is possible is not real, and what is real is only one possibility.
Therefore, one cannot say that technology automatically or deterministi-
cally leads to good (Bijker 2010). It is essential to consider and design
how technologies are used, if they are used at all. A critical example is
nuclear technology: it can either be used to provide energy or to destroy
all life. Thus, the mere possibility that a technology can do something
does not in itself lead to emancipation. It is essential to return to basics
and acknowledge the importance of the social and human dimensions of
technology in design thinking.
The fact that improvements in technology lead to the possibility of
social development (and thus social emancipation) does not mean that
social emancipation will be easy. History has shown that emancipation
can be a very painful process, as in the case of the emancipation of the
American slaves in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the more we
understand about the relationship between technology and social life, the
more likely it is that we will use technical and technological advancement
to increase the quality of life.
In sum, technologies should be designed and developed with the
emancipating role of technology in mind. Technology designers should
be concerned with how the technology under development will improve
human life (and how people will be able to take advantage of its poten-
tial opportunities) as well as possible negative influence and harmful
side effects. Thus, the goal of human emancipation can best be achieved
when people’s minds and lives are sufficiently understood and taken into
account in the design process.
Risks of Technology
Yet technology can emancipate people only when it operates as expected.
However, neither human actions nor technical artefacts are free from
errors or moral problems. The use of technologies may lead to an unfore-
seeable accident or negative side effects, risks, or failures (Dekker 2006;
Perrow 1999; Reason 1990, 1997). They may even have a disastrous
influence on a society or the whole world (Beck 1992, 2008; Giddens
2000). Technologies may also entail moral risks, as they make it possible
for people to harm others. Indeed, the development of technology has
not been automatic and unproblematic; there have been many unwanted
negative consequences and risks. For example, many natural resources,
such as oil and coal, are diminishing due to the increasing need for fos-
sil fuels to run technical inventions, and accessing them has become
increasingly difficult (Aklett et al. 2010; Fantazzini et al. 2011). Another
negative consequences of the growth of technology is environmental pol-
lution; the accumulation of noble metals in the earth is becoming increas-
ingly difficult to deal with (Anderberg et al. 2000), and nuclear accidents
such as Chernobyl and Fukushima provide further examples of the risks
associated with technology (Reason 2000). The prevalence of cancer has
increased in those areas due to these accidents (Pflugbeil et al. 2011).
A social consequence of technology is the digital divide, which is
caused by the failure in technology development to sufficiently consider
democratic accessibility and the adoption of products and services (Stahl
2006, 2010). Indeed, there has been much academic discussion about the
growing digital divide (Attewell 2001; Hilbert 2011; Norris 2003), tech-
nological ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ (Howland 1998), or ‘digital natives and
digital immigrants’ (Prensky 2001). The digital divide is no longer seen
as merely an issue of access to hardware. There is now a growing concern
that the lack of design foresight is creating social exclusion (Bargh and
McKenna 2004). Now more than ever, the unequal adoption of (and
opportunities to access) ICT excludes many from benefiting from its
advantages in many fields of social life (Mancinelli 2008).
As technologies have evolved and their use has qualitatively changed,
the divide is seen as separating users from non-users, and distinguishing
between different types of users. There are now multiple divides that
relate to a variety of factors, such as living and work conditions, ethnic

background, gender, and age. Equal participation would mean that all
members of society could freely use information resources to enrich their
lives. Ideally, instead of being pushed aside and exploited, people from
different cultures, ages, genders, physical, and mental conditions (and
even educational backgrounds) could have their voices heard and their
human rights recognized (Stahl 2006, 2010).
Technologies also raise many ethical questions and risks. ICT has
introduced many useful things into people’s everyday lives, but their use
may lead to many risks with respect to information complexity, secu-
rity, crime, privacy, cyber bullying, and control, to mention just a few
(van Rooy and Bus 2010; Young and Quan-Haase 2009; Neves and de
Oliveira Pinheiro 2010). ICT applications have, for example, provoked
ethical discussion in such areas as online medical consultations and home
monitoring of older people, for example, confidentiality, data protection,
civil liability for medical malpractice, prevention of harm and informed
consent. The development of ICT can also be threatened by faith in the
omnipotence of technology. With the use of ICT technology, it is pos-
sible to instantly influence the whole world from one’s home computer.
The efficiency of computers, moreover, has overtaken many earlier pro-
duction methods. Changes in the production of goods and services have
led to changes in consuming patterns and to the creation of a technologi-
cal lifestyle. Technological cultures have thus set aside traditional values
and the role of values as legitimating entities for our actions. As a con-
sequence, a justification crisis has emerged as much of the new technol-
ogy lacks legitimating values (Beck 2008; Giddens 2000; von Wright
1981/2007).
Many technological products may have less visible or unintended side
effects. Tobacco, for example, is a technological product in the same sense
as a film or an entertaining webpage, albeit a much more problematic
one. Smoking leads to addiction and serious health risks.3 Thus, manu-
facturing and selling the product is ethically questionable, and attempts
have been made to restrict its use via warnings and legislation. Sometimes
great benefits create huge risks. Such substantial contributors to health
3
www.cdc.cov.tobacco
as improved hygiene and advanced medication and vaccination are also

major explanatory factors for uncontrolled population growth, which has
caused social problems in many places around the world. For example,
improved female education and social changes have practically stopped
overall world population growth (Lutz et al. 2001). And although the
number of cars has increased, improved cars, traffic conditions, and speed
limits have reduced the number of fatal traffic accidents. Such notions as
a risk society can characterize imminent societal risks (Beck 2008).
The notion of a risk society includes the understanding that risks are
global because modern technological societies are global (Beck 2008).
Risks arise because it is difficult to predict the consequences of techno-
logical developments such as improved communications. Modern ICT
opens up possibilities for people to act, but also contributes to the emer-
gence of different threats. For example, it creates new opportunities for
schoolchildren to proceed in their education, hobbies, and social life, but
it may also help foster a small marginal group of school bullies, and even
school killers and terrorists with dangerous technological weapons (Beck
2008). Improving the technological solutions in question or responding
to problems via proper social means can mostly be used to eliminate
problems caused by new technologies. It is hardly realistic to eliminate
technical problems by abandoning technologies. The paper industry, for
example, has produced a great deal of environmental waste for over a
century, but giving up the use of paper is hardly a viable solution. Instead,
developing closed processes that produce less waste and can effectively
reuse the waste materials is a much more rational solution (O’Brien and
O’Brien 1978). Thus, technology can also be used to solve the problems
it causes.
Technologies themselves do not cause accidents. The risks associated
with the use of new technologies are caused by human error during the
processes of design, manufacturing, or use (Perrow 1999; Reason 1990,
2000). It is therefore important to understand the logic of the emer-
gency of risks. Research must be able to uncover why some technologies
are prone to generating different kinds of risks (in addition to provid-
ing positive outputs) so that designers can find the means to eliminate
them. This kind of research requires a proper understanding of the
human dimension of technology. Technologies comprise a combination
of technical artefacts, such as programs, machines, devices or tools, as

well as their uses by human beings for a specific purpose (Meier-Oeser
1998). Therefore, technical artefacts should be designed with the human
application in mind. In this sense, designers should concentrate not only
on designing artefacts but also on designing human action. Ultimately,
designing technologies includes designing how people can (and do) live
and improve their lives.
Towards a New Interaction Design Culture

The paradoxical capability of technology design to create both oppor-
tunities and threats indicates that it is necessary to consider technology
design and development from the perspective of humans as well as tech-
nical artefacts. Thus, well-considered facts of human research should be
introduced into technology design thinking.
In today’s engineering, basic sciences such as mathematics, physics,
and chemistry provide conceptual and empirical tools that make design
possible (Adams 1992; Dym and Brown 2012). History has shown that
science is a prerequisite of modern innovations. Einstein, for example,
understood the intimate connection between matter and energy. He also
realized that it was possible to create a chain reaction when newly freed
electrons meet new nuclei. This theoretical phenomenon was later applied
by Fermi in nuclear power stations and Oppenheimer’s group in creating
the atom bomb. Here, basic natural science created tools for very com-
plicated engineering thinking and applications. In the same way, social
sciences can create important visions for political and social thinking.
The sciences have not always directly influenced technology creation.
For example, Henry Ford was a former blacksmith and clock smith who
had a sufficient degree of curiosity, creativity, and independent thinking
to create the car industry, one of the world’s most important (Ford 2009).
However, today it would be difficult to imagine a car company that does
not use scientific knowledge on materials, mechanics, and chemistry, or
marketing research and ergonomics. When the car industry was in its
infancy, the amount of research required was modest. Today, all kinds of
research expertise are required to solve design problems.
Traditionally, as in the case of the car industry, developing any tech-

nological device has involved shaping the ‘steel’ or changing mechanical
aspects of the artefact. Yet today it is possible to create new technologies
by making changes in the software. The core question has changed from
the physical structures of the technologies to how well they can be inte-
grated into people’s everyday lives. This leads to a form of design thinking
in which human concepts become central.
A good example of modern developments is social media, which has
diverse services for which Facebook-like applications have paved the way.
With the help of social media, it has been possible to create new com-
munication possibilities for all kinds of user segments without having
to make any technical changes to the artefacts. Social and other types of
new media services such as blocks, wikis, groups, or podcasts give even
users with minimal technical understanding the opportunity to create
new services and adopt new ways of using technologies to reach their
goals. Consequently, understanding people becomes more central when
designing these kinds of services.
Digital and business ecosystems are another example of new technol-
ogy design types. They are open socio-technical systems, and are often
clusters of enterprises that have networked into effective business systems
(Popp and Meyer 2010). Digital ecosystems can also involve teaching
or entertainment networks, or any self-organizing net communities that
can organize new social uses for technologies. In these ecosystems, the
contributing contents of new technologies is most important—that is,
they depend more on people and their everyday life situations than on
the technical artefact itself.
Changes in the nature and role of technical artefacts in people’s lives
also make it necessary to rethink the foundations of HTI thinking. What
is the role of human knowledge in modern interaction design? What
form should the relevant knowledge take, and how should it be used in
practical design work? What are the truly important questions, and how
should they be answered?
Only a small part of HTI design solutions can be based on knowledge
of mathematics, physics, or chemistry. It relies more heavily on different
forms of human research, from physiology to psychology and sociol-
ogy, to help understand how knowledge of the human mind and life
should be incorporated into design solutions (Card et al. 1983; Carroll

2003; Karwowski 2006; Rosson and Carroll 2002). The long research
tradition in the human and social sciences can offer concepts, methods,
and empirical theories to carry out HTI design on rational and scien-
tific grounds. The core question is how this knowledge can be effectively
used to create new technological innovations. So far, usability tests for
products and prototypes have been the most common form of applying
human research. Using this approach, design relies on common sense
guidelines and design solutions that are systematically tested and tried
out (Cooper et al. 2007; Dumas and Redish 1999; Shneiderman and
Plaisant 2005). This is good practice, but products can easily fail if human
research knowledge and concepts are limited to usability issues and are
not applied throughout the design and development process.
In HTI design, the design ideas should be based on knowledge of
the human mind in the same way that the idea of the atomic bomb was
based on the latest developments in nuclear physics. Understanding the
human dimension may lead to important, practical technological solu-
tions. It may also avoid unnecessarily expensive technological solutions.
Steve Jobs’ innovations, for example, were much more related to what
people do in life than to technical issues. The potential applications of
human research (and the ways in which it can be used in technology
design) require metascientific investigation.
One way to explain the necessity of applying the concepts of human
life to produce successful design outcomes is to open up the basic meta-
scientific difference between the logics of the causal natural sciences and
intentional human research (Bunge 1959; Radnitsky 1968; Stegmüller
1969; von Wright 1971). In causal explanations, the phenomenon that
should be explained (i.e., the explanandum) follows the phenomenon
that explains (the explanans), but in intentional or teleological explana-
tions, something that happens after the event explains the explanandum
(von Wright 1971).
The development of products or services should take into account
what people will achieve by adopting the technology and how their lives
will change. People use an excavator to remove soil when building a
house. Earth removal precedes the construction of a house, so building
a house cannot be the cause of using the excavator, though it provides an
explanation of its use. To understand human actions, one has to be able

to explain the reasons behind the deeds; these reasons are the goals of the
eventual actions.
It is thus essential to investigate all the roles that human knowledge
plays in HTI design and development. This presupposes the creation of
a new technology design culture in which knowledge of human perfor-
mance, the mind, and different forms of social life will be given a more
central role. It also presupposes a metascientific analysis of HTI design
thinking and culture. As a change is taking place already, it is time to
consider what has been achieved so far in developing the human dimen-
sion of technology design in order to accurately define the role of human
research and the modes of its implementation in HTI design.
Human Turn
The fast development of ICT, the multifunctionality of devices, and
future emerging technologies such as sensors and robots challenge us
to discuss the future scenario from the point of view of human beings.
New ICT issues, such as embeddedness and mobility and the presence of
technology in all aspects of our life, are changing our relationship to the
environment, to other people and even with ourselves.
Although technologies have always been targeted at people—that is,
to serve and improve people’s lives in some way—there has been little
systematic use of human research knowledge in designing technologies.
The main interest in design has been how to create functional technical
artefacts, which has been based on knowledge of mathematics, physics,
and chemistry as well as the systematic use of the laws of nature (Pahl
et al. 2007).
Today, as technologies have become increasingly complex, designers
have been forced to focus more and more on ensuring that users really
can use the technical artefacts. Ease of use, usefulness and ease of adop-
tion, together with trust, have been found to be important elements of
user satisfaction and acceptance (Davis 1989; Venkatesh 2000). The
increased attention to these basic design questions is not surprising, given
the countless ICT products that have been unable to interest or satisfy
potential users. Too often, products have failed due to poor design in
terms of usability, risk and error prevention, adoption, and innovation.
Throughout history, technology has been a catalyst for human social
development. To make the most of new technological inventions, design-
ers should turn their attention to how their ideas affect people’s lives.
They should acknowledge that they are not merely designing artefacts but
instead different ways for people to live their everyday lives. The gradually
increasing importance of human research in technology design became
more obvious during the Second World War, when such research areas
as ergonomics and human factors were introduced (Karwowski 2006).
With computers and computing, human research has become even more
important than with mechanical technologies. Since user interfaces have
become more complex, usage issues are now an important challenge for
designers. Today there is widespread acknowledgement that technology
should be integrated into everyday life. The gradual refocusing in design
thinking has involved a new ‘human turn’. It cannot replace classical
technical design, but it can refocus design thinking as a whole. Since
technology is to be used by people, it is essential to consider how the new
products and services should be integrated into their lives.
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2
Design Discourses
A newcomer in the human-technology interaction (HTI) field encounters a

complex variety of interest groups and design discourses. Over the years,
human interaction with artefacts has been studied from many different
approaches, perspectives, concepts, and methodologies. Yet conceptual
structuring of the field is much needed; traditional metascientific concepts
such as paradigm, research programme, and discourse can help.
Ultimately, designing is thinking. Therefore, it should be studied as

human thinking (Cross 1982, 2001, 2004; Simon 1969). In design pro-
cesses, technical or art designers pursue the creation of something new,
while thinking creates new pieces of information. These processes are
typical and unique to the human mind. Apes can use primitive ‘tools’ and
‘symbols’, but they do not have language, much less the Internet, mass
production, or a worldwide economy (Deacon 1997). All HTI design is
unified by the fact that it is a form of human thinking (Cross 1982, 2004;
Dym and Brown 2012; Simon 1969).
However, interaction design thinking is not a unified and monolithic
whole; human social thinking seldom is. Modern HTI designers have

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53047-9_2
developed a variety of different ways of thinking about (and approaches

to) HTI design. In these, such concepts as HCI, ergonomics, action
theory, and cognitive modelling often demarcate different designers
(Saariluoma and Oulasvirta 2010). Yet it is problematic that these dif-
ferent approaches use different concepts, ask different questions, and rely
on different truths. To bring clarity to the field, and find out how design
thinking is organized as a whole, one can apply the major outcomes of
modern metascientific research: paradigm, research programme, and dis-
course (Kuhn 1962; Lakatos 1970; Laudan 1977).
Human thinking is essentially about asking questions, setting problems,
and solving them (Newell and Simon 1972). However, before one can ask
a question (or answer it), one has to be able to formulate the question both
conceptually and in verbal sentences that can be communicated to other
people. Thus, it is necessary to pay attention to the concepts that research-
ers use in their different approaches to HTI design problems, including
credos, truths, goals, and focus areas. Such analysis of the foundations of
the common ways of thinking is essential for creating explicit and tacit
foundations for technological thinking (Saariluoma 1997).
How Researchers and Designers Perceive HTI

HTI design and research is dominated by different groups of research-
ers that are organized around certain common ideas. Some of them are
specialized in, for example, style guides and usability, others in user expe-
rience; some are keen on universal or inclusive design, while yet others
strive for pleasurable interaction. There are many interest groups working
on HTI issues and related topics.
Some of the topics and interest groups are so closely related that it
can be somewhat difficult to distinguish between them. For example,
differentiating between usability and user experience (Nielsen and
Norman 2014), and Kansei engineering1 (Nagamashi 2011) and user
1
This type of engineering uses semantic differential-based methods to investigate people’s prefer-
ences for various products.
experience (Hassenzahl 2011) has proven to be problematic. Further, the

basic premise of Kansei engineering is shared by ‘affective ergonomics’;
they both focus on emotional processes in HTI (Helander and Khalid
2006; Nagamashi 2011). Thus, there is considerable overlap in current
discourses.
The field of HTI therefore involves social groups of researchers and
designers aiming to achieve the same goals from different perspectives.
Creating a deeper understanding of the field requires synthesizing (or at
least acknowledging the existence of ) the various schools of interaction
design and research thinking.
Many interesting approaches influence the field of HTI. For exam-
ple, many new innovations have been made in the field of geron-
technology, which focuses on designing technologies to support the
everyday life of ageing people (Bouma et al. 2009). Likewise, funol-
ogy and entertainment computing, which focus on creating technolo-
gies such as games that bring joy to the users, has had an impact on
HTI (Monk et al. 2002; Rauterberg 2004, 2010). HCI is focused on
the interaction between humans and computers. A similar approach
is ergonomics, which focuses on the mechanical control of machines.
These two approaches are converging with the increasing prevalence
of computer technology in machines; the difference between them is
becoming irrelevant.
The different approaches examine the field of HTI from slightly dif-
ferent points of view and open up important perspectives in HTI design.
This is important in extending rational thinking in designing interaction.
While none of the approaches is insignificant, none provides an exhaus-
tive coverage of the entire field. Likewise, individuals, researchers, and
designers have different life and work experiences, and thus they bring
different intuitive assumptions to science (Saariluoma 1997) and a num-
ber of slightly different approaches to HTI, which Kuhn (1962) calls
paradigms or models of thought. Is it possible to understand the field of
HTI research and design in terms of competing paradigms? To answer
this question, one has to explore the definition and characteristics of a
paradigm in research and design.
Anatomy of Paradigms
Paradigms are based on scientific achievements that have become ideals
or models of thought for other researchers (Kuhn 1962). They are created
when a community of practitioners (including researchers and design-
ers) defines problems, concepts, credos, procedures, and even acceptable
facts within certain frameworks (Kuhn 1962: viii). Some paradigms are
extensive, such as Galileo’s experimental natural science, while some are
much narrower, such as the working memory paradigm in psychology
(Baddeley 1986). In all cases, they are approaches adopted by a number
of researchers or designers who share an ideal model of thinking and
shaping their work.
One can find fields of research and design that diversify paradigms
in all fields of learning (Kuhn 1962). One could compare a paradigm
with a line of inquiry in a detective novel. For example, when a detec-
tive focuses only on the blond lady and asks questions concerning this
particular individual, the true criminal (the middle-aged barber) may be
ignored and forgotten. Yet while the lines of inquiry are different—and
different issues become important in them—both lines might be needed
to help the detective solve the crime (Hanson 1958).
In every field of professional work, good conceptual organization is
essential for the work to be rich and productive. In art and architecture,
Scandinavian design, for example, is a different paradigm from older styles
(Alexander 1977; Koivisto 2011; Saarinen and Saarinen 1962; Whitford
and Ter-Sarkissian 1984). In technical design, touchscreen technology,
what you see is what you get (WYSIWYG), or direct manipulation define
their own spheres of thinking (Galiz 2002; Shneiderman and Plaisant
2005; Shneiderman and Maes 1997), while in programming, structural
or object-oriented programming paradigms are commonly used (Budd
1991; Dijkstra 1972).
Paradigms define the topic of research, the concepts researchers use,
and the methods that are considered suitable (Barbour 1980; Kuhn
1962). They also detail the questions that are legitimately asked, the types
of explanations sought, and the types of solutions that are seen as accept-
able (Barbour 1980; Kuhn 1962). Paradigms also define the implicit
assumptions about what the world is like that is shared by their adherents
(Kuhn 1962; Saariluoma 1997). They also entail knowledge about how
to apply the findings in practice. From a sociological point of view, para-
digms provide information about the suitable outlets for research and
the recognized congresses and events. They even contribute to creating
‘gurus’ in the field, whose opinions carry significant weight within the
paradigm.
In sum, a paradigm specifies:
• topic and concepts of research;

• intuitive assumptions concerning the topic of research;
• legitimate questions;
• structure of questions and nature of legitimate answers;
• suitable methods and instrumentations; and
• social organization of the research.
Paradigms outline the ways in which research is conducted in a field of

science or design. They help researchers generate ideas, but they do not—
and should not—define the absolute limits of what can (or should) be
studied (Feyerabend 1975). Researchers should not slavishly follow all the
assumptions of a certain paradigm, as many concepts are seen differently
by the researchers and, depending on the particular studies that have been
conducted, the importance of the competing concepts and methods may
vary. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it would be impossible to out-
line an anatomy of a paradigm and use it to compare different paradigms.
Finally, paradigms are not eternal. They are created at a point in time, live
in a particular time, and disappear when they are rejected or replaced by a
more intelligent way of investigating the problem (Kuhn 1962). The cur-
rent HTI approaches include elements of a paradigm, which is a useful way
to consider and define what it means to follow a particular approach.
Main Paradigms of HTI Design: An Overview

In order to define the paradigmatic structure of HTI research, some of
its major paradigms should be outlined. This section discusses the most
important HTI paradigms in more or less historical order in order to pro-
vide an overview of how HTI research and design are conducted today.
HTI issues have been traditionally discussed in technical concepts,

which mean that researchers and developers focus on existing documen-
tation or a variety of technical standards for measuring and controlling
machines and devices (Schmidt and Lee 2011; ISO 1998). Here, the
main goal has been to create technical paradigms that facilitate ratio-
nal interaction between technology and people. A good example of an
interaction paradigm that enables developers to build more effective
interaction processes is the development of programming. Game devel-
opers, for instance, used to build their games from scratch. Today there
are numerous game engines available, which allow them to focus more on
the content and artistic designs (Lewis and Jacobson 2002).
Many HTI issues have their origins in technical problems. For exam-
ple, the problem of friction on the surface of a road is a central safety
issue, which concerns both the tyre industry and road designers. It is
a problem with great value in making good HTI, but human research
plays a minor role in this discussion. Another example of indirect HTI
intervention is the technical ontologies of information systems. Internal
ontological structures of information systems—for example, concerning
traffic, construction, or healthcare services—are often based on function-
alities of the system that have to be considered from a technical point
of view. These, in turn, are directly linked with human users and usage
situations (Niezen 2012).
Human factors and ergonomics form two original, practically identi-
cal paradigms, in which human research concepts are vital. Karwowski
(2006) dates the beginning of ergonomics to the mid-nineteenth century,
but it could easily be placed in Ancient Greece or even earlier. The origi-
nal field of research of human factors and ergonomics was the interaction
between people and machines and the factors that affect that interaction
(Bridger 2009). The research was greatly boosted by the Second World
War (Wickens and Holands 2000). The focus has been on fostering effec-
tive performance and eliminating harmful effects. The key problems in
this paradigm have been physiological and cognitive, but recently such
broader issues as affective, organizational, and cross-cultural interaction
have also become fashionable (Aykin et al. 2006; Helander and Khalid
2006).
A closely related paradigm to human factors and ergonomics is HCI,

which began much later (Dix et al. 1993; Preece et al. 1994, 2004),
which has long focused on behavioural goals and user tasks in work set-
tings. HCI can be thought of as a sub-area of ergonomics, but many of
the problems of ergonomics and HCI are quite different and the two
fields should be seen as different paradigms. For example, not all physical
objects have a computational dimension: people interact with buildings,
walls, roads, tableware, and saucepans, for example, and although these
items might have been designed with the help of computer software, they
do not include a direct interaction with a computer.
It can be argued that the beginnings of the field of HCI can be traced
to a Gaithersburg conference on human factors in computing in 1982,
early user modelling (Card et al. 1983; Cockton 1987), or the publica-
tion of Weinberg’s (1971) book The Psychology of Computer Programming
which was intended to provide tools to address the so-called software
crises, that is, the fact that computers offered more possibilities than the
programmers of the time could utilize. These two events show how the
HCI paradigm grew independently of human factors and ergonomics as
computers and their use had gained significant practical value.
The main question of HCI is how people and computers influence
each other (Dix et al. 1993). It is built around three major concepts:
people, computers, and interaction, each of which must be interpreted
flexibly. Computers, for example, can be embedded inside numerous
solutions; interaction can be direct or indirect, text based, graphical, or
ubiquitous; and people can be analysed using many different conceptual
systems such as limited capacity, culture, or learning.
Methodologically, HCI has been dominated by two important
approaches: design and evaluation (Coursaris and Bontis 2012; Dix et al.
1993; Preece et al. 1994). Design methods such as paper and rapid pro-
totyping, task analysis, contextual inquiry, and scenario-based design
have been used to create new interaction processes. Evaluation methods
such as heuristic evaluation, experimentation, cognitive and pluralistic
walkthroughs, and field trials should ensure that the real interfaces will
operate as smoothly as possible (Markopoulos and Bekker 2003; Nielsen
1993).
The HCI research paradigm has generated a number of important

truths that have provided a structure for the field. For example, cognitive
complexity theory (Anderson et al. 1984; Dix et al. 1993; Kieras and
Meyer 1997; Newell and Simon 1972) is based on the limited capacity of
the human mind, which was originally found by Miller (1956) in mem-
ory and Broadbent (1958) in attention. In a nutshell, the theory asserts
that the more complex an interface or task is, the slower and more error
prone is human performance. Practically all fields of interaction research,
such as ergonomics, human factors, or HCI, recognize the meaning of
limited capacity as well as the explanatory role of complexity (Covan
2000; Gopher and Donchin 1986; Di Stasi et al. 2013). Prominent HCI
researchers include Norman, Card, and Moran. Its best-known confer-
ences are the ACM SIGCHI, HCI International, and Interact, and its key
journals are Human-Computer Interaction, ACM interactions, Interacting
with Computers, and the International Journal of Human-Computer
Studies.
The role of emotions in design thinking and design research has
been recognized for centuries. In the early 1960s, Japanese researchers
developed Kansei engineering in order to design affective components
(Nagamashi 2011). Likewise, user experience (UX) research, which has
gained ground with the growth of interactive products and services,
focuses on the subjective, situated, and positive aspects of technology
use. It was initially developed by Norman et al. (1995), but many active
researchers have since contributed to it (Hassenzahl and Tractinsky 2006;
Norman 2004; Preece et al. 2004; McCarthy and Wright 2004). These
researchers have emphasized the importance of human experience in
defining design goals. Thus, the basic goal of the UX research paradigm
is to design for pleasure: that is, to create positive and pleasant (even aes-
thetic) interaction conditions in which users feel good.
The basic concept of UX is experience (especially emotional experi-
ence). Naturally, technology is also central, but the research concentrates
on the uses of technology, such as services, social interaction, and gam-
ing (Forlizzi and Battarbee 2004; Väänänen-Vainio-Mattila et al. 2009;
McCarthy and Wright 2004). UX also reaches beyond the concept of
‘computer’, as all products and services involve a psychological experience
(Saariluoma and Jokinen 2014).
Other paradigms have similar goals to Kansei engineering and

UX. They also emphasize such issues as pleasure, hedonic values, flow,
competence, and frustration (Saariluoma and Jokinen 2014; Seligman
and Csikszentmihalyi 2000). Typical examples of such paradigms are
empathic design, funology, entertainment computing, and emotional
user psychology (Mattelmäki and Batterbee 2002; Monk et al. 2002,
Rauterberg 2010; Saariluoma and Jokinen 2014). One might argue that
Kansei engineering and UX research, as well as emphatic design, could
be considered different variants of affective ergonomics. Kansei, how-
ever, has a well-defined methodology based on semantic differentials,
while UX researchers use a somewhat broad methodological approach
(Nagamashi 2011), and the communities that support the two approaches
are different.
Some design approaches seek the users’ perspective in the early phases
of product or service design in order to design for quality of life. Typical
examples of these are such value-oriented design paradigms as computer
ethics, value-sensitive design, and worth-centred development, which
consider values from different perspectives. The former two are interested
in ethical values and especially information (computer) ethics, which
deals with ethical problems that are created, transformed, or exacerbated
by ICT (Bowen 2009; Cockton 2004), whereas the latter is interested in
technology’s role in value creation in general (Cockton 2004). Related
paradigms include empathic design, inclusive design, and even geron-
technology. The focus of ethical paradigms is not only on immediate
interaction with artefacts but also on much broader issues of the social,
ethical, and environmental impacts of technology as well as responsible
research and innovation (Stahl 2006, 2010; van Schomberg 2013).
The relationship of technology to some aspects of life is also considered
in socio-technical research, activity theory, cross-cultural ergonomics,
and different variations of task analysis (Annett 2000, 2004; Kaptelinin
1996; Kuutti 1996; Vygotsky 1980). In these paradigms, researchers
mainly consider implicitly issues, which define why people use technolo-
gies at all (Abras et al. 2004; Annett 2000, 2004; Annett and Duncan
1967; Card et al. 1983; Karwowski 2006; Kuutti 1996; Mao et al. 2005;
Marti and Bannon 2009; Nardi 1996; Norman and Draper 1986; Stahl
2006, 2010). They inspect the role of technology in society (particularly
the social role) and how its use should be integrated with what people do.
The instrumentation and methods of these paradigms are close to those
typical to the social sciences.
This brief overview of the main approaches in the field of HTI today
illustrates that it is dominated by a set of more or less well-organized
paradigms. Of these, the paradigms related to HCI are much more orga-
nized than the others illustrated in this chapter. Of course, the notion of
paradigms cannot be considered here in a narrow sense or as a theoretical
paradigm only. The paradigms illustrate how the work in the field should
be done, and how researchers and designers are organized around the
paradigms into more or less rigid groups. Below, other factors that can
help structure the field are examined.
From Paradigms to Research Programmes

Traditionally, new paradigms have been developed when important
empirical results cannot be adequately explained by the current paradigm
(Kuhn 1962). Experiments challenge the concepts of the earlier thinking
and test new theories against old ones. For example, Eddington’s experi-
ments showed the superiority of relativity theory compared to Newton’s
thinking.
It is slightly problematic to use the notion of paradigm in the context of
HTI and human research (Saariluoma 1997). In the traditional Kuhnian
sense, it must be possible to empirically refute a paradigm, and Popper’s
(1959) and Kuhn’s (1962) criterion for scientific work was falsification.
However, this criterion makes no sense in the case of HTI approaches.
There are no experiments that could prove that, for example, emotional
usability should be replaced by some other way of thinking. Emotional
usability is a research area rather than a testable theory; therefore, it is
not a paradigm in the traditional Kuhnian (Kuhn 1962) sense. Thus, the
present generation of apparently new paradigms in the field of HTI is
different from what Popper (1959) and Kuhn (1962) described, as HTI
paradigms are not created by an inability to explain new empirical results
(cf. Saariluoma 1997). Instead, they result from conceptual changes and
innovations (Saariluoma 1997), thus they are differentiated and unified

by their conceptual base rather than empirical refutations.
The conceptual renewal of technical discourse does not mean that
empirical testing is pointless. One can use empirical testing to refute
many interaction solutions and theoretical ideas generated within a spe-
cific approach. For example, improved screen resolution has made it pos-
sible to use a much greater variety of fonts than what was possible in the
1980s, and therefore one could say that the old ways of presenting text
information have been refuted. These developments have opened new
avenues of research and design; they have not refuted the importance of
usability and testing.
There are numerous HTI schools of thought (Carroll 2003; see also
Leikas 2009, for an overview), but how do they relate to each other?
Some HTI paradigms are conceptually closer to each other than to other
paradigms and thus form clusters. For example, ergonomics and human
factors belong to the same cluster, but are distant from other paradigms,
such as ethical design.
The first cluster is technical paradigms; they are based on technical
concepts, which can be typical for WEB design, graphical user inter-
faces (GUI), or just mechanical machine control. Paradigms in this
cluster provide tools for designing artefacts with functionalities and con-
trols that make it possible for people to use technology effectively. For
example, technical interaction design tools such as visual C#, UML, ER,
and various game engines are widely applied in technical HTI design
and research (Booch et al. 1999; Elmasri and Navathe 2011; Lewis and
Jacobson 2002). In mechanical engineering, different approaches to
control design are equally common. Technical discourses usually do not
discuss how people can best use technical artefacts, how they like to use
them, or what they use them for; these concepts are left to the designers’
intuition within this cluster of paradigms.
The second cluster of paradigms relates to how people can best use
technical artefacts. There are numerous approaches to designing controls
and other interaction elements in order to make using the artefacts easy,
fast, learnable, memorable, and safe, for example (Nielsen 1993). These
approaches involve using human research knowledge such as psychology,
medicine, and physiology.
Human factors, ergonomics, usability, HCI, and user psychology are

examples of paradigms and fields of learning in this cluster; they help solve
issues of ‘goodness’ in HTI design. They are conceptually close to each
other as they all prioritize human performance and strive to make it easy to
interact with technologies (Carroll 2003; Karwowski 2006; Nielsen 1993).
The third cluster of paradigms relies on emotion-, motivation- and
personality-based ways of interaction thinking: making people like the
technologies. Thus, UX research, affective ergonomics, emotional design,
emotional user psychology, and Kansei engineering are unified in their
attempts to advance understanding of the emotional basis of interaction
(Ciavola et al. 2010; Hassenzahl and Tractinsky 2006; Desmet et al. 2001;
Helander and Khalid 2006; Kuniavsky 2003; Leonard and Rayport 1997;
Nagamashi 2011; Norman 2004; Rauterberg 2006, 2010). Paradigms such
as designing for pleasure, funology, and entertainment computing belong
to this cluster (Jordan 2000; Monk et al. 2002). Emotional user psychology
is also important here (Saariluoma 2005; Saariluoma and Jokinen 2014).
Many interaction terms such as human- and user-centred design,
affective engineering, activity theory, and task analyses also apply to
this third cluster of paradigms (Abras et al. 2004; Annett 2000, 2004;
Annett and Duncan 1967; Card et al. 1983; Karwowski 2006; Kuutti
1996; Mao et al. 2005; Marti and Bannon 2009; Nardi 1996; Norman
and Draper 1986; Saariluoma and Oulasvirta 2010; Stahl 2006, 2010).
Ethical design, value-sensitive design, worth-centred development, inclu-
sive design, and design for all can be found in the HTI design literature
(Bouma et al. 2009; Charness 2009; Czaja and Nair 2006; Leikas 2009).
Much socio-technical research also belongs to this cluster (Trist 1978).
All these approaches focus on what people use technologies for.
Metascientist Imre Lakatos (1970) noticed that conceptually similar
research projects are often grouped together into research programmes.
HTI research as a whole can be seen as a collection of paradigms that
is organized around different research programmes (Fig. 2.1). Some
paradigms are attached to several programmes—for example, affective
or cultural ergonomics. Although ergonomics is basically the study of
human performance, it also considers important emotional and social
themes. Thus, the scope of ergonomics has expanded into the area of
other research programmes as they have also been seen as important. In

the same way, UX expands on the issues relevant in usability (Nielsen and
Norman 2014).
Organizing HTI
Resolution and composition is a renaissance method of thought (Hobbes
1651/1965) that refers to a process in which a topic is cut into pieces and
then put together again. In modern terms, one could call it reverse engi-
neering (Chikofsky and Cross 1990). The benefit of reverse engineering
is that it helps the engineers understand how a machine or device oper-
Fig. 2.1 The basic design discourses and respective research programmes
ates, including its components (and their relationships with each other)
and their functions. Similarly, categorizing the field of HTI thinking into
research programmes and further dividing them into different research
questions leads to important insights about how designers’ minds work.
Path-breakers in the field of design research have identified practical
problems and found ways to solve them. Other designers have shared and
modified their problems in their own research, which has led to a set of
research projects with more or less similar goals. The field keeps evolving,
as new pieces of information are collected in practical empirical research
every day.
However, new solutions do not totally revolutionize the problem
structure. For instance, the development of touchscreen technology
shook up both usability and interaction styles in mobile technology, but
designers still had to figure out how to efficiently input knowledge and
present feedback, and continue making easy-to-use devices. The techni-
cal solutions had changed, but the challenges and problems for designers
remained the same.
Stone Age tools were not only practical, they also had additional
design features for pleasure and aesthetic reasons. Likewise, in the ancient
world as well as today jewels were considered objects of pleasure as well
as socially significant symbols. Thus, the issues of organizing life and cre-
ating a positive user experience were already tacitly or explicitly in the
minds of ancient designers. They asked the important design questions
about artefacts concerning ‘liking’ and social organization, and made the
extra effort to solve them. Today these questions remain, although the
answers (in term of people’s preferences) have changed.
The observation that the fundamental design questions stay the same
although the answers vary suggests that it may be possible to structure
the field of HTI according to how the basic questions underlying the
research programmes are related to each other. Indeed, one could imag-
ine that these fundamental questions form a large web underlying the
designers’ thinking.
The questions also have another important property: they are task nec-
essary (Saariluoma 1984). This means that people have to solve the prob-
lems either consciously or tacitly, but they cannot avoid solving them
(Saariluoma 1997). All smartphone designers have to answer numerous
questions concerning the attributes of the final product: the form, size,
and placement of the touchscreen and the appearance and functions of
the icons must all be designed.
Yet is the design of a mobile phone essentially so different from Stone
Age designs? In designing a stone axe, people of the time had to consider
materials and forms, such as fixing the components together safely. A
broken axe was less useful than the original when battling with wolves.
Hence, the basic problems of current designs have already been addressed
in designing technical artefacts from the start. Of course, there are also
a huge number of differences, but the basic issue remains the same: the
outcome depends on the questions as much as on the answers.
It is vital to understand that HTI research and design is dominated by
the logic of questions, and that basic questions provide a fundamental
structure to the field. Questions and answers guide the design and devel-
opment irrespective of the prevailing design research programmes. HTI
introduces a complex set of problems, as the major research programmes
differ in what they consider to be the field’s most fundamental questions.
However, the basic questions of HTI research are complementary. Each
of the research programmes adds something essential to the field and thus
opens up a new perspective on the problems of HTI.
The idea of using a stable set of questions and their relationships to
structure the field of HTI follows what is known about human think-
ing. The standard psychological definition of thinking is illustrative with
respect to this point. As Newell and Simon (1972) put it: ‘Thinking is a
process which arises when a person has a goal but does not know how to
reach it.’ Questions, naturally, define these goals, which, together with
answering the questions, form the natural structure of human thinking.
Yet the questions are normally not very explicit in design thinking,
perhaps because for designers, it may be faster to find design solutions
than to address the design questions that should be answered. This kind
of tacit structure is common in human knowledge. Grammar, for exam-
ple, illustrates how people use language and structure sentences, though
non-linguists rarely have a clear idea about the structures they follow in
building sentences to express their ideas (Chomsky 1957).
The problem of tacit knowledge has historical roots. To understand the
hidden structures of our thought, we should explicate tacit knowledge
(Saariluoma 1997). It should be possible to define the tacit dimension

of the flow of information, conceptualize it, name it, and incorporate it
into the social discourse. Thus, like grammarians, people should be able
to give explicit form to the knowledge behind their deeds and thoughts.
Structuring design knowledge by explicating the tacit questions is like
a process of writing grammar to support the designers’ thinking. The
questions express how the designers should pursue better HTI designs.
Knowing what the basic problems in a field are, and how they are related
to each other, makes it easier to solve the problems. To reach this ultimate
goal, it is essential to study the paradigms related to the fundamental
problems in order to examine the questions that define the field today.
The Fundamental Four: The Basic Questions

and Discourses
The field of HTI research and design has numerous more or less anar-
chistic paradigms that can be categorized into four major research pro-
grammes. These programmes, in turn, are currently determined by four
fundamental issues:
• functionalities and technical user interface design;

• fluency and ease of use;
• elements of experience and liking; and
• the position of technology in human actions.
The research and design activity related to these questions can be seen
as organized into four discourses, which search for solutions to meet the
problems that emerge in practical design and related scientific research.
The basic questions can be investigated and answered on the grounds of
different types of scientific knowledge. The contents of this book mainly
rely on human research (psychology, physiology, action therapy, and soci-
ology), as knowledge of the preconditions and laws of the human mind
and actions provides a firm grounding for HTI design. The answers to
technical interaction issues, however, mostly rely on machine engineer-
ing, programming, and information systems knowledge. The three other

fundamental questions (usability, UX, technology in life) can also be
examined from the point of view of such applied and human-oriented
research traditions as marketing research or economics. Finally, it is
also possible to find solutions from important outcomes of innovation
research for organizing development processes in industry.
All researchers and designers usually take a position with respect to
which research programmes define the key issues in HTI design. Research
programmes serve as a basis of social and design discourses (Behrent 2013;
Ross and Chiasson 2011; Sikka 2011). The word ‘discourse’ has been
actively used among continental philosophers to refer to special ways
of thinking and respective special languages (Foucault 1972; Habermas
1973, 1981), which can be about such cultural and political issues as
equality of people, freedom, human rights, or power. Design thinking—
one of the most important engines for the advancement of human life and
society—can also be seen as a discourse with numerous important sub-
discourses. The term discourse is particularly illuminating in this context,
because design is a social construction process in which numerous people
take part in different design discourses and processes. Social media, for
instance, entails a variety of blogs, design forums, and discussion groups
in which researchers and designers discuss different ideas. Many different
kinds of people (and many different kinds of design paradigms) partici-
pate in the process of finding unified solutions. Design is a constructive
process in the sense that at the beginning, no one knows exactly what the
final solution will look like. Understanding of the relevant issues increases
during the process. Thus, the outcome is a result of a common thought
and communication process (i.e., a design discourse).
In order to gain a deeper understanding of research programmes and
their respective design discourses, it is essential to study thought ele-
ments, which keep discourses and research programmes together. Each
of the four research programmes has its characteristic key questions that
researchers and designers must answer. These can, again, be examined
with the help of metascience.
The origins of the concept of problem-oriented thinking in investi-
gating scientific thinking can be found in the work of acknowledged
metascientist Larry Laudan (1977). He argued that true advancement in
science is achieved by improving its capacity to solve problems. Thus, set-

ting and solving problems forms the core of scientific activity. Therefore,
to define the structure of HTI paradigms, it is useful to study the basic
questions of earlier research programmes.
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3
The Logic of User Interface Design
Technical artefacts exist so that people can use them to make something
happen. Their capacity to do so depends on the functions and functional-
ities of the technology, which requires users. Technologies thus have to give
users the ability to control them, and the designer’s role is to create the
actions and work processes for which the artefacts are intended. This basic
HTI pursuit is called user interface design. It applies technical interaction
concepts to solve design problems. This chapter presents the overall princi-
ples and goals for the user interface design of any technical artefact.
Technical artefacts are physical systems that only follow the laws of
physics; they are not able to set sense-making goals for their operation.
Only people can. All possible goals (end states) are equally ‘valuable’ for
artefacts. Therefore from the point of view of the laws of physics, it is
irrelevant whether an aeroplane lands successfully or crashes. Yet from a
human point of view, a successful landing is desirable and a crash is a catas-
trophe. Sensible behaviours of any technical artefacts are thus a sub-set of
all their possible behaviour alternatives. Since artefacts as physical systems
cannot distinguish between successful and non-successful behaviours, it is
essential that people control them.

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53047-9_3
It is essential to differentiate between human intentions (the goals

people pursue) and the expected goal state of a machine. The latter is the
state of an artefact that makes it possible to support human goal-driving
or intentional actions. For example, people use computers to make trans-
actions in banks. Transferring money to pay an invoice is an intentional
human action, and its goal is to pay the invoice. However, the ability to
transfer money from one’s own bank account to that of the invoicing
company requires using the bank’s software system.
The two actions—making the transaction and using the bank’s soft-
ware—are not identical, as they have different goals. Transferring money
is the goal of human action, and being able to carry out the operations
required by the software is another action, namely the aim to reach the
goal state of the technical artefact. There are thus two different, albeit
intertwined, questions: first, what are human actions, and second, how
should technical artefacts be controlled to realize them.
The user interface is the necessary part of a technical artefact (e.g., a
computer or mechanical device) that people use to control its behaviour.
Its main function is to connect a human being and the behaviour of
the artefact. The problem of how user interfaces are controlled is task
necessary.
Technical artefacts need information to direct their behaviour towards
a sense-making outcome. Users feed in information in order to control
the behaviour of the artefacts. In this respect, scissors have the same con-
ceptual structure as computers. They have a handle and finger holes as
input modes, blades for operating the target, and a pivot point with a
screw for ‘internally’ controlling the operations. When using scissors,
people control how the cutting proceeds, and at the same time use input
modes to create the desired outcome.1 Thus information input by people
is used to direct the process of technical artefacts towards the expected
goal states.
Technical artefacts have an unlimited number of possible states, some of
which are expected goal states. They are the result of a number of technical
1
To be exact, scissors are analogous machines that can have an infinite number of possible input
and output states. However, they only reach a finite number of possible states before they are
destroyed.
processes. A ship transporting goods from one continent to another is in its

expected goal state when it has reached the harbour to unload its cargo.
However, the goal is reachable only through the process of sailing off-
shore. The process and the goal form a unified whole, which is expressed
in the final goal state. Using technology requires defining what users are
expected to do during the process. The first step in solving how-to prob-
lems is to define the goal and the respective goal-directed processes—the
respective tasks and sub-tasks in using technology.
Designers investigate people’s action goals in order to create good tech-
nologies. They define the role and function of an artefact and adjust its
operations to human actions, which are organized into sub-actions that
seek to achieve a goal or intention: the user need. The function of tech-
nology is to help people pursue their action goals. Thus the structure of
the action or task defines what kind of technical artefacts can support the
action.
A concrete and familiar example of user need and the respective user
interface is the case of a lift. In a block of flats, the elevator user’s action goal
and intention is to get to another floor. Using the staircase can achieve this
goal, but this is a slow and difficult option, especially if one is headed to
the top floor. A lift is a suitable technical solution to support movement
between the floors. Moving between floors is thus a human action, which
has a goal and a respective user need. The action itself entails a number
of sub-actions such as moving to the lift and entering it. Controlling the
behaviour of the lift, or simply using it, is one of the sub-actions of mov-
ing with it to another floor.
Technical artefacts have technical properties that enable people to reach
their goals. Lifts, for example, have technical components and capacities,
such as power machines and control and safety systems, to move certain
weights from one level to another. They also have user interfaces, which
allow users to control their behaviour. Technology design discourse as a
whole is a combination of these two aspects of the design process. This
chapter focuses on user interfaces.
The first question in HTI design concerns how the behaviour (function-
alities) of a technical artefact can be controlled. How should the artefact be
manoeuvred so that it can reach its expected state or carry out the expected
processes? During a human action, an expected state can refer to a process
that makes it possible for the user to reach her goal. In this sense, the
expected state of a sailing boat can be as much about sailing on the sea as
reaching a destination.
How to control the behaviour of a technical artefact is a fundamental
problem in HTI design. No technical artefact can exist without provid-
ing its users the methods to use it. Despite its apparent simplicity, the
problem of how to control (a technical artefact) has its notable dimen-
sions. First, the behaviour of the artefact must be logically linked to the
human action in question. In the case of the lift, the technical capacity
to move from one floor to another is the artefact behaviour that makes
it possible to support people’s movement in a block of flats. Second, it is
essential to link the behaviour of the artefact to users’ actions via a user
interface. In the case of a lift, this often refers to the set of control but-
tons referring to which floor the lift should stop on. However, the latter
presupposes design knowledge of how people use the artefact.
Functions and Events
Task analysis, the schematic structure it gives to tasks and the actions
of using a technology form the basis of technology design. The role of a
technical artefact in human actions is normally called its function, and its
respective capacities are known as functionalities (Gero 1990; Gero and
Kannengiesser 2004; Ulrich and Eppinger 2011). One could say that
functionalities detail the uses of the artefact. As a property of a technical
artefact or system, they form the first step in defining technical interac-
tion (Chandrasekaran 1990; Gero 1990; Gero and Kannengiesser 2014).
They express the performance capacities of the designed artefact (Gero
1990). In the case of a window, for example, the notion of functionality
refers to such properties as providing daylight, making ventilation pos-
sible, preventing heating loss, and eliminating noise.
The concept of function in HTI discourse explains what technology
can offer to people. Sometimes researchers also use the notion of affor-
dance, the origins of which can be found in Gibson’s (1979) psychology
of perception (Gaver 1991). Functionality defines the effects that operat-
ing an artefact can have on the environment. The goodness or purpose-
fulness of an artefact is also often expressed in terms of its functionality.

For example, if a window does not insulate well against frost, it has poor
functionality.
The concept of functionality is important in designing different sub-
systems. For example, in a graphic user interface (GUI), many elements
such as menus and dialogue boxes have the function that they can be used
to select possible courses of action (Cooper et al. 2007; Griggs 1995).
For example, in a mobile phone, the icon of a camera indicates that one
can switch the phone to camera mode and take photographs. Similarly,
the icon of a compass indicates opening a navigation service. Thus, the
main screen may have numerous icons and menus that all have their
own functionalities and open up different ways of operating with a given
technology.
Functionalities in design discourse define the design requirements—
what an artefact should be able to do. An interaction design requirement
is a goal asset in the design process. Requirements express what a new
product should be like and what kinds of needs it is supposed to meet. If
the ability to take photographs with a tablet is a user need, it becomes a
requirement for designers and a functionality of the product.
On a basic how-to-control level, functionalities define the goals for
immediate interaction when using a given technology. The user inputs a
command by, for example, pushing a button on a device, or feed-specific
information into the system, which in turn steers the behaviour of the
artefact. The act of controlling an artefact can be called an event or a
control event in a physical or information system (Datye 2012; Memon
et al. 2001; Myers et al. 2000). An event is a significant change in the
state of an artefact towards the expected goal state. Event-driven thinking
is mostly used in software research and in designing mechanical artefacts,
but it can also be used, for example, in service business.
An event thus involves an individual human act of controlling the state
and behaviour of an artefact, for example by pressing a start button in
an engine or turning a control knob. In technical discourse, events and
event handlers are often discussed; these are programs that transform a
technical artefact into an expected goal state (Memon et al. 2001). Every
piece of information that a user provides a technical artefact with is an
event. The concept of an event could also refer to opening up a dialogue
box, entering information, resizing a window, or moving it with a mouse.

In other cases, the physical interaction of an event could be pressing a
lever or turning a steering wheel. In brief, an event or interaction event
represents the moment when a user has an effect on the system.
An event has two main components: a triggering action and a respec-
tive response in a device or system. The former gives the user the ability to
choose the next expected state of the artefact. The latter is a process that
moves the artefact or system from a given initial state to the expected goal
state. Thus, using a technology means controlling event flows from the
initial state of a technical artefact to an expected goal state (Memon et al.
2001). The user’s role is to choose between possible courses of action.
A series of events forms control histories, which event handlers coor-
dinate. The operation of artefacts proceeds from one state to another,
and eventually reaches the final goal state. One can also call this kind of
sequence of interlinked events as event flows, event histories, or event paths
(Fig. 3.1). The structure of these interaction processes forms event trees,
which illustrate alternative paths for reaching different goal states of the
technical artefact. In technical design, all events and the flows needed for
the behaviour of the artefact are designed, analysed, and tested in prac-
tice to prove the logic of events (Memon et al. 2001; Yuan et al. 2011).
On web pages, the event tree can be called a site map (Lin et al. 2000;
Newman and Landay 2000). Site maps are organized lists of web pages
Fig. 3.1 Event paths in an event tree—an example of text processing

that are linked together in a single site. They aid navigation and make it
possible for users and search engines to find pages with related content.
An event flow is a sense-making concept in designing user interfaces
and respective processes of technical artefacts. In order to slow down the
speed of a car, the driver has to choose a lower gear. Doing this requires
pressing the clutch to shift into another gear. This kind of common
control operation is similar to interacting with GUIs. Events must be
defined so that the user can control the technical artefact in a sense-
making manner.
Functionalities, requirements, events, and event flows are intimately
related to technical concepts. They define the potential processes of a
technical artefact and how users can control machine processes or choose
between alternative event paths, so that the artefact can do what it is sup-
posed to do. Their design is based on technical theory languages. The crit-
ical design question is to define the best structure for event flows from an
initial state to a goal state in realizing a particular function (Rauterberg
1996; Ulich et al. 1991).
Event flows can be presented as graphs. In these graphs, nodes repre-
sent the input actions of the user and arrows the transformation of the
technical artefact from one state to another. On this level the interaction
process can be understood as a state-action graph; such graphs have often
been used to describe human mental representations (Newell and Simon
1972). This is an equally valid conceptualization for both mechanical and
information systems. Thus, riding a bike can be presented as a graph of
turning left and right and using hand or pedal brakes. These actions are
analogical—that is, they are not really discrete states but can be approxi-
mated by finite state graphs just as, for example, voices can be digitalized.
In information systems, finite state structures are natural.
From the user’s point of view, information systems and other compu-
tational technologies are finite by nature. Moreover, the nodes in an event
tree entail two types of information, indicating the two modes that users
have. First, users give control and steering information to the system by
‘telling’ the system what the next goal is (mostly by using dialogue boxes
or menus). Second, this type of information is relevant for actual tasks.
For example, editing a text presupposes writing the text and using the dif-
ferent control facilities of a text-editing program. No interaction process
can be defined without investigating the concepts of functionalities and

event flows. Even when designing a simple tool such as a saw, these notions
are necessary. One function of a saw is to cut down trees. Taking a saw
in hand to carry this out entails an event flow. However, necessary con-
cepts are not necessarily sufficient concepts. To make sense of what the right
functionalities and events would be, it is essential to consider the nature
of the intended tasks and their related user requirements. Here, task and
work analyses can illustrate the functions and goals of events in event trees
(Annett 2000; Crandall et al. 2006; Rasmussen et al. 1994; Stanton 2006;
Vicente 1999).
Understanding the User’s Tasks

The first step towards defining how technology should perform is to
define precisely how a new technical artefact should function in relation
to specific human actions (i.e., what the users do and how they use the
given artefact to reach their goals). This process can be carried out using a
task analysis (Annett 2004; Annett and Duncan 1967). Designers use task
analyses to define the goals and structures of the users’ actions and sub-
actions in order to develop a technology concept and define the functions
of the technical artefact. This information is needed to construct sense-
making technical solutions.
Using (operating) a technical artefact is one element of the whole action
or task. For example, a radiographer has to carry out certain actions when
taking an X-ray, including positioning the instrument, taking the X-ray,
downloading and examining it on a computer, and interpreting it. Thus
using the instrument forms one part of the whole operation.
The task analysis process was created by Taylor (1911) to make work
processes more rational. Since the early 1970s it has attracted increasing
attention in technology design, and numerous sophisticated variations of
the process have been developed; it has also been used in larger settings for
work analyses (Annett 2000, 2004; Annett and Duncan 2000; Diaper 2004;
Hollnagel 2006; Rasmussen et al. 1994; Stanton 2006; Vicente 1999).2
2
We do not discuss here the differences between task and work analysis, though the difference is
essential in the context of work processes. This section focuses on technical interaction, not on the
way work groups are organized.
Task analysis is a suitable procedure for examining HTI issues in all

fields of technology. Lately, the method has received considerable atten-
tion in the area of designing human–computer interaction (HCI) and
information systems (Card et al. 1983; Karwowski 2006; Nielsen 1993;
Nickerson and Landauer 1997; Rosson and Carroll 2002; Woods and
Roth 1988). It is also still widely used in traditional mechanical engineer-
ing (Czaja and Nair 2006; Sanders and McCormick 1993). The usage of
cars, trains, and cranes, as well as white goods and domestic appliances
can be examined equally well with the help of task analysis.
The main goal of task analysis is to rationally stipulate the task (the
action in question) and define how a particular technical artefact will be
controlled. The ultimate goal is to design how people and technical arte-
facts can be coordinated in action. Reaching this goal requires defining
the following in advance: the series of actions users have at their disposal,
the goals of the actions, and the components or sub-actions typical of
this action. For example, when developing patient monitoring systems
it is important to define what a target group—for example, medical staff
in an operating room—does, and what kind of sub-actions they consider
relevant during an operation in order to be able to understand the roles
of the supporting technology. Similarly, by understanding how a team of
nurses and doctors operates in primary health care it would be possible
to outline roles for supporting information systems in a primary care
clinic and to get the best output from both the people and the technology
(Hysong et al. 2011).
Task analysis breaks the higher-level main task into rational sub-tasks
(Annett 2004; Annett and Duncan 1967) using empirical information
collected by, for example, observation, interviews, focus groups, and
various co-design activities (Kjeldskov and Paay 2012; Markopoulos and
Bekker 2003; Morgan 1996; Smith 2003). This information can be used
to design improvements for actions in general as well as particular work
processes (Annett 2000; Hollnagel 2006; Rasmussen et al. 1994; Stanton
2006; Vicente 1999). This process generates a hierarchical representation
of what people do and what kind of actions they perform in a certain con-
text to achieve a particular goal (Annett 2004; Annett and Duncan 1967).
A familiar example of investigating an elementary interaction process
is typing: the process of writing a text is the high-level (main) action.
It can be divided into different sub-actions that are executed when typing
a sentence—such as insert, replace text, save, delete, shift line, and access
text from a file (Annett 2000; Card et al. 1983; Hollnagel 2006). These
sub-actions can be analysed in terms of the keystrokes used (e.g., push-
ing a line feed or using the delete button). In this way it is possible to
model the process of typing down to the keystroke level, or even down
to the level of the typists’ muscle control. This method can be used to
represent the hierarchical actions and sub-actions in any human task,
from typing to steering a ship (Annett 2004). Yet task analysis can also be
used to conceptualize tasks in many other kinds of conceptual systems,
such as scenarios (Go and Carroll 2004) or computational models (Card
et al. 1983; Kieras 1997). Although their perspectives may be different,
all these models of task analysis work to describe tasks as combinations
of units. They differ in their characterization of the elements and the way
they are unified.
When defining the structure of human actions for a specific task,
it is equally important to consider people’s goals and the purposes of
their actions. Human actions are always intentional and goal directed
(Brentano 1874/1955; Dennett 1991; Husserl 1901–1902; Searle 1992).
People have reasons for what they do, which are usually explained by the
goals they wish to reach (von Wright 1971; Taylor 1964). People do not
use TV remote controls to play with or control technology. Instead, they
use them to access news or movies on TV. Each action has its goal, for
example watching a movie, and this action generates sub-actions to reach
this goal, in this case pushing the buttons of a remote control.
Task analysis explicates tasks as a function of sub-tasks: the main action
is realized to reach the goal of the main task. However, reaching a goal
presupposes carrying out all the necessary sub-tasks and sub-actions. The
goals of the sub-tasks are defined by their purpose in helping to achieve
the main task. In this sense, sub-tasks and their related actions become
meaningful only as a part of the main task. If a father wants to buy a book
as a present for his child, he may get in a car and drive to a bookshop, buy
a book and drive back home. The purpose of buying a book may be to
make his child happy or to encourage his mental development. Going to
a bookshop requires taking a car. Buying a book presupposes paying for
it and, quite likely, using a credit card. Thus the sub-tasks and sub-actions
are ways to reach the goal of the main task, and their purpose is defined
as part of the main task.
The core of task analyses is to illustrate the hierarchical action and
sub-action sequences or histories in a detailed task hierarchy. It requires
defining the functions of the actions in using the artefact, and their
mutual relations and sub-actions as a whole, as this knowledge is needed
to outline requirements and solutions for technologies supporting the
actions. The functional structure of a task thus provides designers with
information about design requirements, which can be used to explain
why individual design solutions make sense and what their optimal form
should be.
A proper task analysis helps designers decide which kinds of technical
solutions and user requirements are needed to accomplish the chosen
task: that is, the kind of functional roles the technology could have and
the kind of opportunities the user should be given to control the opera-
tion of the artefact. The performance capabilities needed for technology
depend on the nature of the task and the human intentions in carrying it
out. Task analysis provides this information about what the new technol-
ogy is supposed to do.
Intentional and Hidden Interaction Elements

Modern HTI can be constructed in two different ways: intentional or
tacit. Often the interaction is supposed to be explicit and conscious. In
this type of interaction, users need to understand the behaviour of an arte-
fact and how their intentional involvement affects this behaviour. Users’
control of actions and the operations of the machine must be clearly
linked to each other and understood by the users. Users must be given
all the necessary information and all the means to control the process in
all possible scenarios. This kind of interaction can be called intentional,
as it is based on the conscious intentions of the users. Users know what
they would like to achieve—what the goal is—and how they should use
technical artefacts to do so.
Direct manipulation schemes provide a good example of intentional
interaction (Shneiderman 1983; Shneiderman and Maes 1997). In direct
manipulation, users are given every means to directly influence the way
technical artefacts operate, and to be aware of how operations precede.
Users are allowed to use visible or directly sensible objects that are directly
linked to the operations of the artefacts. When direct manipulation is
allowed, computer users can, for example, drag and drop items or change
their sizes at will. Today many technologies have internal and tacit user-
interaction solutions, which are used to help control the behaviour of a
technical artefact. Cars, for example, may have numerous tacit control
systems of which users are barely aware. These systems operate ubiqui-
tously in the background and make driving easier, although the driver
has no direct contact with them (or a need to know what is happening
in the system).
Also in some devices that resemble a bike, such as balance electric
scooters, it is possible to automate a balance-keeping function with a
smart computer program. This kind of automation represents a com-
mon interaction design technique. For example, when a smartphone is
picked up, the device adapts the display so the user can easily read the
information on the screen. Repositioning the phone thus indirectly acti-
vates automatic operations that present the content on the display in
an optimal manner. This type of machine operation, which directs the
machine towards an anticipated and optimal state, can be called internal
or machine interaction operations.
Another example of tacit functions is related to navigation on a screen.
Main menus usually provide limited information and hide the rest until
selected by the user. The users must thus have an idea about what is hid-
den and what kind of information can be expected behind the selections.
In the design, it is important to perceive the correct order for this kind of
invisible information.
Different kinds of memory support systems, such as balloon tips, can
help users navigate such menus. However, current user interface solu-
tions often do not provide particularly efficient solutions due to techni-
cal limitations. Limits on the space for GUI or the size of touchscreens,
for example, makes it necessary to hide certain functionalities and com-
mands from the primary display. Therefore finding the commands must
be so intuitive, and the information concerning them so purposeful, that
people can reach their task goals using the given controls. This is possible
only when user tasks, and the structure of particular actions by means of
tasks analyses, are intuitively perceived.
Arguably, the most important form of tacit interaction today is ubiq-
uitous computing (Weiser 1993). In such variants as pervasive comput-
ing or computing everywhere, the traditional command- or GUI-based
interfaces are replaced by interfaces that automatically register the behav-
iour of the user and respond accordingly. This kind of interaction can
support human actions without the active involvement of users.
Ubiquitous computing is an important paradigm in HTI, as it enables
people to use technologies without special training or skills. These tech-
nologies aid people in their actions unnoticed and make the users’ goals
easier to reach. Ubiquitous computing can be used, for instance, in
gerontechnology to monitor the health of older people or to adapt the
living environment according to changes in human behaviour in order
to prevent accidents (Bouma et al. 2009; Charness 2009; Czaja and Nair
2006; Leikas 2009).
Intentional and tacit interaction always presupposes the analysis of
tasks. Most of the current application programs have numerous tacit ele-
ments, though their overall use is intentional. The crucial questions in
design are associated with dividing tasks between intentional and tacit
processes, as well as recognizing the relevant characteristics of human fac-
tors that can be used to launch tacit technical processes.
User Interfaces: The Means of Control

User interfaces are systems of signs that have the same structure as event
trees. They also have tacit and intentional components, and they are con-
nected to the actions people carry out when they use the interfaces and
technologies in question. User interfaces are always created by synthesiz-
ing different types of man-machine discourses.
The core of an interface concerns selecting expected tasks for a given
technology. Before people can benefit from any technology, it must be
used; thus the technical artefact must have a user interface. Standard lifts,
for example, have buttons to push to access different floors. Users select
the preferred floor and push the corresponding button on an elevator
interface. Developing a lift—or any technical artefact—without a means

of controlling it would not make sense.
The design of a user interface and the associated controls of the artefact’s
behaviour form two of the basic problems in HTI design. Ultimately,
user interfaces give people the ability to control technical artefacts. This is
based on the interaction between control equipment and human actions
in different types of practical situations, and requires an understanding
of the expected behaviour and states of the artefact in relation to different
types of human actions.
The nature of human actions justifies the use of a certain technical
artefact. The control systems must be based on knowledge of the connec-
tions between the actions and how the technical artefact is supposed to
respond to them. Finally, designing a user interface relies on the ways in
which the artefact or system is used in an action. Task analyses offer one
perspective on interaction. They explain how different action goals and
sub-actions and their functional goals are reached by using technical arte-
facts. Event flows and event trees describe how users can control technical
artefacts from one state to another. Controlling the artefact or system is
dependent on the control tools and instruments that are used to reach
certain goals. These tools as a whole form the user interface, which com-
prises the required control equipment and different interaction modes.
In event trees, the role of the user interface is decisive when users make
decisions about the future course of actions. Technical artefacts are unable
to set goals for an action or choose between different possible goals. Only
human users or designers can decide what the relevant goals are, and user
interfaces can provide them with different opportunities to make choices.
Providing the scope to set goals is the main function of the user interface,
as this enables users to control the technology.
One can sometimes see solutions in which users are required to inter-
act with a technical process in a way that leaves them no real choices. For
example, their task may be to make the artefact move from one state to
another to generate the next step in an event path. An example of such
a bad design is the extensive use of unnecessary message boxes (Cooper
et al. 2007). While in some cases confirmations of user actions provided
by message boxes make sense, they are simply meaningless and irritating
if they are used only to confirm the physical processes of the device. In
a good design, a user’s actions should only be needed to select between

different critical goal states for an artefact.
Rational selections presuppose valid information about the given situ-
ation. In order to succeed in their tasks, users need meaningful feedback
about the internal and external states of the technical artefact. Feedback
instruments provide users with the information they need to make deci-
sions regarding the control of a technical artefact.
Concrete human actions in using a technical artefact can be carried
out by using input/output (I/O) components (Cooper et al. 2007; Griggs
1995; Henry 1998). These devices are used to control the behaviour of
an artefact. They are composed of many kinds of objects, devices, and
tools that allow users to regulate the behaviour of technologies and acti-
vate relevant I/O operations (Greenstein and Arnaut 1988; McKay 1999;
Salvendy 2006). They must be connected to instruments that indicate the
currently prevailing states and contextual factors of the technical artefact
so the user can control its behaviour in a sense-making and logical manner.
These types of control can be divided into two main classes. First,
there are instruments that are used to input information into the system.
Keyboards, pointing devices, and touchscreens are typical examples of
such instruments in modern computer-based technologies, but one can
also base input information, for example, on movement recognition, ther-
mal energy, biometric characteristics, haptic signals, pressure and voice,
and even feed the information remotely with the help of another device,
such as a smartphone (Cooper et al. 2007; McKay 1999). Traditional
machine controls—such as steering wheels, gears, levers, push buttons,
and foot pedals—are also equally important devices for controlling cer-
tain artefacts. Indeed, there are many ways to enter information into a
device in order to control it and reach the expected goal state.
The second class of controls comprises instruments used for output
purposes—such as displays, meters, pop ups, warning signals, heads up
displays (HUDs), and vibrations—to deliver information about the state
of the device or system and its related context, such as weather conditions
or noise. Such controls provide information required to assess important
control dimensions.
There are typical input and output components for GUI (Cooper et al.
2007; McKay 1999), some of which are designed to input information
into the artefact (such as text boxes or forms), and some that have been
developed to directly control the behaviour of the programs. Typical
examples of the latter include dialogue boxes, gizmos (or controls), scroll-
bars, radio buttons, menus, and toolbars (Cooper et al. 2007; McKay
1999). The main advantages of such standardized interface components
are the positive transfer effects created by the consistency of user inter-
faces and the ease of learning how to operate new interfaces (Helfenstein
and Saariluoma 2006; Singley and Anderson 1987). Another benefit can
be found in programming interfaces: standardized parts allow the wide
reuse of codes and make visual programming easier.
Thus user interfaces can be based on different technological solutions,
which can be used to classify them into different types. Some user inter-
faces are mechanical (such as a steering wheel, a gear, or a keyboard),
while others are based on commands as in computer languages and still
others are graphical such as modern web pages. Some interfaces are based
on such ubiquitous interaction solutions as the direct registration of a
human body and its neural states (Weiser 1993).
These kinds of interface categories are useful but not absolute, because
graphical interfaces can have mechanical features, and mechanical inter-
faces may have electromechanical and graphical features. For instance,
touchscreen interfaces have mechanical aspects (the user presses a sur-
face), and power steering systems are hydraulic and electronically real-
ized, whereas steering wheels are mostly mechanical devices. Hence, from
the users’ point of view, the discussion of the technical classification of
user interfaces is of limited importance when constructing theoretical
concepts for user interface design.
Dialogues and Interaction Semiotics

The HTI process entails many forms of interaction. Only completely
automated systems can be operated by turning the system on using a
single command, after which the system takes care of everything else.
Yet, even these systems ultimately depend on the initial human action
(Minsky 1967). User interfaces that can be operated via a single com-
mand are the ideal form of interaction, but unfortunately this is increas-
ingly rare in modern information technology.
Technical artefacts and goods have become increasingly complex.
People are required to operate using many kinds of input modes and
hierarchies when performing a task, and users have to control event flows
in different states of operation. These tasks are usually carried out in the
form of a dialogue or a game between the user and the artefact. Designers
must create sense-making dialogues to enable the artefact’s effective use
(Cooper et al. 2007; Moran 1981).
In constructing dialogues, it is essential to provide users with as much
relevant knowledge as possible to help them choose between different
actions. This presupposes goal-relevant decisions during the dialogue.
Designers use task analysis to understand what people intend to achieve
during different sub-tasks in order to define how the given technology
should respond to users’ actions and what kind of feedback should be
developed in the user interface for different inputs.
User interfaces are sign systems. They may provide information about
many different types of issues, and users are expected to comprehend the
delivered messages. The sub-set of semiotics, the study of signs, which
relates to user interfaces and other HTI and communication issues, is
called semiotic engineering (de Souza 1993, 2005; Rousi 2012). In the
following, we examine the overall principles of semiotics and semiotic
systems of user interfaces.
The roots of semiotics (Eco 1976) can be found in the classic works of
Peirce (1931–1958) and de Saussure (1916). The key problem of semiot-
ics is using a sign to stand for something else, such as opening a web page
(i.e., a path in an event tree). Signs have the capacity to evoke mental
representations of references in the human mind. They can be words or
linguistic signs; they can be formal signs such as mathematical symbols,
or commands in computer languages. They can also be natural phenom-
ena such as smoke, which signifies fire, or fever, which signifies illnesses
(Eco 1976). They also provide us with a valuable conceptual tool for
investigating and designing interfaces.
Semiosis is the process by which people give meanings to signs. The
context of giving meanings can be called semiosphere or a language game
(Lotman 2005; Wittgenstein 1953). These concepts refer to how the
meanings of signs are defined in a particular discourse—such as a user

interface system—which provides valuable tools for interface designers.
All user interfaces must have their own system of signs, though within
a single interface paradigm the same symbol or sign may have different
meanings.
An example of applying semiotic concepts to analyse the communica-
tion between technical artefacts and users is Peirce’s triadic analysis of sign
types (Peirce 1931–1958). Peirce divided signs into three types: icons,
indexes, and symbols; this differentiation is useful in interface semiotics.
Icons are pictures that resemble a reference, whereas indexes include a
direct connection to the reference. Thus, many natural phenomena can
serve as alarms, such as smoke to warn of fire or mercury to indicate high
or low temperature. Similarly, a picture can represent a person as an icon.
Finally, symbols stand for their references. Thus words can have a sym-
bolic value in interfaces.
It is important to create logical and coherent semiospheres in interface
design, which the user can effectively use to control technical artefacts.
Overall principles of semiotics are needed for interaction languages (de
Souza 2005), as well as knowledge of their operation in the mind. Ogden
and Richards (1923) argue that in human thoughts, signs have their own
references, which refer to referents (external objects, events, or ideas). For
example, the word ‘dog’ refers to the idea of a dog in the human mind,
and this idea refers to an actual dog. Signs thus acquire their meanings
via an act of the human mind. Accordingly, technical signs can be con-
structed in the context of the human mind and its laws, which requires
empirical psychological justification of the meaning of signs.
Research on mental processes that give meaning to technical signs
(e.g., signs in technical artefacts) can be called technological psycho-
semiotics (Saariluoma and Rousi 2015). This paradigm investigates how
people give meaning to technical signs such as icons, controls, or meters
by using psychological and socio-cultural research methods, concepts,
and theories. It analyses signs in technical artefacts to provide designers
with objective knowledge of the relevant semiotic systems.
Design Patterns
Many existing components are used in current technology development.
Game programming, for example, relies on previous programs and their
components. In most game development the story and the design of the
figures are more demanding than the actual programming work, which
employs several standard user interface components, technology stan-
dards, and styles (Cooper et al. 2007; McKay 1999). Standardized design
solution patterns are also commonly used in the physical interaction
designs that are typical of mechanical technologies (Alexander 1977).
Standardized solution patterns also make it easier for users to learn and
accept new systems.
Mechanical interfaces have standard input and output components
(Dieter and Schmidt 2009). Some of them are used to control the spa-
tial position of moving objects (such as a steering wheel or a rudder),
while others (such as an accelerator or brake pedal) are used to control
the speed of a process. It is also essential to have information about
the internal and external states of a given artefact in order to use the
technology. This information cannot always be detected by the human
senses. The temperature of combustion processes, for example, is not
definable by human senses. Similarly, it is impossible to be aware of the
thousands of indicators that ensure the proper paper-making processes
in a modern paper machine. Only with the help of adequate user inter-
face components is it possible for users to supervise the processes of
machines.
Many standard control components have been developed in mechani-
cal engineering in recent decades. Such items as hand wheels, knobs,
levers, joysticks, rocker switches, pedals, push buttons, and sensor keys
have been used for a long time in technical interaction solutions as input
controls for machines. Their design parameters are well known and their
usage has frequently been tested.
Likewise, there are also numerous more or less standardized output
instruments, such as speedometers, thermometers, and artificial horizons.
Modern paper machines, for example, can have over 4000 sensors regis-
tering different aspects of this complex process. Successfully integrating
these sensors (and the feedback they give controllers) is crucial for keep-
ing these complex systems effectively operable.
Standardized interaction components can also be found in the area of
HCI (Cooper et al. 2007; Griggs 1995; Goodwin 2011). Event handlers
can steer computational processes on the basis of information that users
have directly or indirectly input into the computer. Such standard ele-
ments as text and dialogue boxes, radio and option buttons, toolbars,
icons, pop ups, drop-down menus, or scrollbars are everyday compo-
nents used to build standard GUIs (Cooper et al. 2007; Griggs 1995;
McKay 1999). Feedback is mostly given on a screen, but it can also be
auditory or printed. The main function of feedback is to provide users
with information to help control the process or support the task.
In the design, it is necessary to anticipate the usage situation and the
related requirements in order to develop the best possible means for the
interaction. Depending on the situation, the solution can involve any-
thing from hand and foot controls and visual and auditory displays to
designing suitable illumination conditions and organizing the space for
effective use of the given input tools (Sanders and McCormick 1993). To
approach the questions of user interface design systematically, the ICT
design community has developed a set of recommendations, guidelines,
technology standards, and de facto standards for user interfaces (Cooper
et al. 2007; McKay 1999). These mainly discuss interface components
that have been widely applied in user interface design.
Usability standards and style guidelines also support reusing design
ideas. Standards are intended as norms to help designers unify the tech-
nical culture; they are often worldwide requirements that designers fol-
low globally. The content of standardization of HTI issues has improved
along with the recent ISO-9241 standards, which include more specific
information about ergonomics, safety and interaction issues than earlier
versions (ISO 1998a, b). There are also laws and directives that regulate
the technical aspects of interaction. These are mostly technical details
about health risks, such as the influence of magnetic fields on pacemakers.
Though the above-mentioned guidelines and directives provide sup-
port information for constructing technical HTI processes, designers
must decide between alternative ways of creating interaction solutions (or
develop their own variations). This leaves room for many style standards
for web pages, for example. Style sheets have standardized many proper-
ties of web pages, for example typical interaction components such as
fonts, boxes, lists, and positioning have been given their own require-
ment recommendations (Collison et al. 2009; w3schools 2013). There
are also a huge number of templates and other ready-to-modify solution
models for solving concrete design problems.
Standardized solution models simplify the design of technical solu-
tions and interfaces. Programmers and mechanical designers can use the
same solutions again, which saves considerable time and facilitates a more
unified and easy-to-learn design culture. However, in most cases standard
solutions and best practices offer only a framework within which one can
work, rather than a final solution. In the design, it is essential to under-
stand why given standard solutions and standards make sense, as well as
why they are not optimal in some situations.
The Conceptual Structure of ‘How to Control’

In summary, the first level of HTI design is technical, and is based on
traditional technical engineering concepts (Eder and Hosnedl 2008; Pahl
et al. 2007; Ulrich and Eppinger 2011). Here, the main problem is to
create a technical artefact that can carry out a given task defined by a user
need. For example, a drill is designed to make a hole in a certain material.
In order to get technical artefacts to do what they should to support users
in their actions, it is essential to provide users with the means to control
them. This aspect of functionality design is called technical user interface
construction.
Based on knowledge of people’s intentions and goals, it is possible to
define the necessary functionalities of the technology (Pahl et al. 2007;
Ulrich and Eppinger 2011). Designing functionalities plays a central role
in all engineering design, as every part of a system has its own function
in the whole (Boyle et al. 2013; Dym and Brown 2012; Gero 1990; Goel
et al. 2009; Hirtz et al. 2002). In HTI design, functionality defines how a
technology can improve a particular human action (i.e., what people can
do with the given technical artefact). Doctors, for example, need knowl-
edge about their patients in order to make diagnoses or safeguard their
living environments. By using correctly designed information systems,

medical staff can acquire a more general view of their patients’ medical
histories than can be provided in a patient interview (Barach and Small
2000; Blumenthal 2010).
The ‘how to control’ problem has a special conceptual structure. So
far, we have discussed its main components, but a more holistic picture
of the process provides a useful context. The overall structure of human
interaction with technical artefacts is similar from one device to another,
since the overall structure of all artefacts that are controlled by people
is basically the same (Minsky 1967; Turing 1936–1937). The how-to-
control discourse opens up four important sub-discourses. First, one has to
understand users’ tasks when a new technology is being used. Second, it
is necessary to comprehend the functions of the technology in perform-
ing the task in question. Third, it is essential to understand the context
of using the technology. Fourth, one has to construct the behaviour of
the artefact and how users can control it. Each of these questions must be
discussed before proceeding further in HTI design.
When the goals of a technical artefact (and the processes for reaching
those goals) are determined, the next step is to define what users must do
to reach the goals. Technical artefacts have a finite set of input channels,
which in turn have a finite set of possible states. Analogical control devices
such as steering wheels can be ‘digitalized’ and interpreted as finite state
machines because their principal infinity does not have practical meaning
as they can be digitalized similarly to digital music.
A technical artefact has also a finite set of output channels, which in turn
have a finite set of possible states for each channel (Minsky 1967; Turing
1936–1937). Using technology is based on the users’ operations, which
control the behaviour of the artefact and the systems feedback. To sum-
marize, the overall conceptual structure of the process of using any tech-
nical artefact is as follows: After defining the overall goal of the user, one
must define the goals for (and the functionalities of ) using the technical
artefact or system to carry out the user’s specific tasks and sub-tasks. This
can be expressed by defining the expected goal states of the given tech-
nology and the respective technical processes from its initial or prevailing
state to the final goal state. It is also necessary to define the input channels
that enable people to control the behaviour of the artefact so it can reach
its goal state. Finally, it is essential to define the technical and natural
feedback systems that allow users to follow the artefact’s behaviour.
All artefacts have this type of conceptual structure. It defines the fun-
damental questions associated with the problems of how-to-control tech-
nologies, which must be solved in any HTI design project.
The main concepts and design problems of how-to-control are:
• The main aim of the action (the user’s goal) must be defined.
• The technology’s effect on the environment (natural, mental, informa-
tion, or socio-cultural) must be determined.
• The user’s tasks and sub-tasks must be defined.
• The technical artefact or system is transformed from its current initial
state to its expected goal state to achieve the effect.
• Users employ tasks when using a technology and each task has multi-
ple sub-tasks.
• All tasks and sub-tasks have a purpose in human action when using the
technical artefact or system.
• Each technical artefact or system has input channels with different
operational states.
• Each element of user input affects the behaviour of the technical arte-
fact or system.
• Each technical artefact or system has a number of output channels
with multiple output states that give the user feedback information
about the prevailing state of the artefact.
• Natural observation (following how the artefact behaves) serves as an
output channel.
• The combination of input and output channels constitutes the human–
artefact interface.
• A user interface must be implemented to direct the actions of the
artefact.
Before defining the contents and functions of information chan-

nels, it is essential to assemble a complete representation of the control
of technology, which requires considering the kinds of operations and
technical goals the artefact is supposed to achieve in support of overall
human goals, and the contexts in which it will be used. I/O component
standards and style guides are valuable and necessary in technical design.
However, they are not sufficient for understanding and designing HTI
processes. Before using them, it is essential to consider which standards
and guidelines are justifiable (and why) by proceeding from technical
discourse to psychological and sociological discourse and examining con-
cepts of human research in the field of technology design. Technological
standards and design solutions must be justified by their positive effects
on human physical and biological environments, mentality, and society.
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4
The Psychology of Fluent Use
In a perfect world, it would always be possible to operate technology

effortlessly and to reach the desired goal. However, in the real world many
factors may make technologies difficult to use or even hinder people from
using technical artefacts. Most of these factors pertain to usability (i.e.,
technology’s ability to fit users’ capabilities) and thus concern technological
solutions from the point of view of human beings as users of technology.
Therefore, designing technical artefacts that are easy to use requires under-
standing the psychological and mental preconditions for using technology.
People have a variety of different functionalities in their smartphones

and laptops that they never use although they would need them in their
life (Kämäräinen and Saariluoma 2007; Shneiderman 2011). There might
be attractive applications and services that users could benefit from, but
they do not know what they are or how to use them. They cannot access
the devices or systems in the intended way, and do not know how to navi-
gate or input information. They may also have special requirements for
accessing technology due to physical restrictions, or quite simply a lack of
training (Blackmon et al. 2005; Dillon et al. 1990). Failing to use technol-
ogy in an adequate manner can even lead to risky interaction situations,
examples of which can be found in traffic and industrial accidents (Lamble

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53047-9_4
et al. 1999; Laursen et al. 2008). In principle, people should be able to use
all the facilities and functionalities that technologies offer, but in practice
this is not always the case. This is one of the main reasons that products
fail to find markets (Norman 1999; Shneiderman 2011). Designing rel-
evant and attractive functionalities for technologies is important, but it is
even more necessary to ensure that people can really use them.
User interface solutions are meant to provide people with a realis-
tic possibility of reaching their goals (Card et al. 1983; Nielsen 1993;
Rosson and Carroll 2002; Shneiderman, and Plaisant 2005; Wickens and
Holands 2000), regardless of users’ capacity limitations (Baddeley 2007,
2012; Broadbent 1958; Covan 2000; Miller 1956), comprehension
problems (Kitajima and Polson 1995), or lack of skills (Green and Petre
1996; Navarro-Prieto and Canas 2001; Visser and Hoc 1990). Therefore,
we focus the design discourse now on the issues how to make technolo-
gies easier for people to use (Card et al. 1983; Olson and Olson 2003;
Rosson and Carroll 2002).
The ability to use technology depends on mental processes (Karwowski
2006). The issues of ‘to be able to’ and ‘ease of use’ are typical problems
of usability, accessibility, ergonomics, and human factors (Bridger 2009;
Karwowski 2006; Kivimäki and Lindström 2006; Rosson and Carroll
2002; Nielsen 1993). In addition to these research domains, which are
based mainly on natural scientific laws, understanding the characteristics
of the human mind is essential when designing non-functional human
requirements for technical artefacts.
The next question is thus how to apply the knowledge of psychol-
ogy and other related human sciences in designing HTI solutions. This
knowledge is often analytical, in the sense that it is composed of detailed
pieces of information from different domains of human sciences. This
information, along with many different sub-problems, forms a holistic
approach to the human dimension of technology.
Critical Factors of ‘Being Able to Use’

The core questions of ‘being able to use’ in HTI can be found mostly in the
area of psychology (Card et al. 1983), in particular user psychology (Moran
1981; Saariluoma 2005; Saariluoma and Oulasvirta 2010), supported by
other human sciences, such as sociology and brain physiology (Cockton

2004; Parasuraman and Rizzo 2006; Pinch and Bijker 1984; Sassen 2002).
User psychology, a branch of psychological thinking, examines the prob-
lems of using technology in light of psychological concepts, knowledge,
theories, and methods. It is thus comprised of both scientific knowledge
and the practical problems of using technology.
A common way of applying psychological knowledge is to articulate
typical questions related to HTI and to associate the respective psycho-
logical research with each critical problem. Defining general user interac-
tion problems can do this. Figure 4.1 (cf. Card et al. 1983) illustrates a
human user interacting with a technical artefact.
Ultimately, all artefacts have identical basic interaction properties and
a conceptual structure to the extent that, after receiving input informa-
tion from the user, the artefact interacts with the environment and gives
feedback to the user. This logic follows the concept of a Turing (1936–
1937) machine (Minsky 1967). By analysing the crucial psychological
Fig. 4.1 Using a technical artefact

sub-tasks in this process, it is possible to define the basic design questions

of any technology.
In this way, it would be possible to apply psychological knowledge on
a general level in considering the issue of ‘being able to use’, and to ask
what kinds of psychological factors may best support the interaction and
what kind of psychological limitations of the human mind may make it
difficult (or even impossible) to interact with technologies.
A common-sense analysis of the interaction situation generates a num-
ber of psychologically motivated sub-tasks that the user must be able to
carry out. First, the user must be aware of the present stage of the task
and its future course. He or she must also be able to detect the informa-
tion given by the artefact about its internal and external states. These
perceptual discrimination problems, which are discussed in the psychology
of perception and attention (Covan 1999, 2000; Pashler 1998; Styles
1997), must be solved to give the user the relevant information that is
needed to operate the artefact (Proctor and Proctor 2006).
The second fundamental task for the user is how to control the behav-
iour of the artefact by communicating information about the user’s goals
to the artefact. Today, controlling technical artefacts is mainly a physi-
cal task, which requires motor actions. These actions can be carried out,
for example, by hand, feet, or body movements, or by looking, speak-
ing, or using the vibrations of the larynx. The user’s motor actions—
and the optimal conditions for carrying these actions out—comprise a
central psychological and usability problem in design, as psychomotor
behaviour and perceptual discrimination are intimately connected in a
perceptual-motor loop, which forms an essential part of human cogni-
tion (Jeannerod 2007). This loop is important in ubiquitous computing,
as well as in pervasive or ambient computing (Weiser 1993).
Using artefacts requires the user to perform an organized series of tasks
and store large chunks of relevant information in his or her immediate
memory to be able to carry out the tasks. In addition to the immediate
perceptual and motor cycles, the user has to be able to keep active repre-
sentations of more complex tasks in his or her mind. The working memory
and remembering thus form the next problem of usability design. The
relevant psychological concepts are short- and long-term working memo-
ries, as these two systems keep task-relevant information active in the
human mind (Baddeley 2007, 2012; Chase and Ericsson 1981; Covan
1999, 2000; Ericsson 2006; Gopher and Donchin 1986).
Some alternatives to the Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) model have been
suggested in literature. Alternative views have been presented by Baddeley
(2007). His model is called episodic long-term memory. Another alter-
ative has been suggested by Gobet (2000). Nevertheless, all models imply
that large active mental representations must be partly deposited in more
permanent storage than the easily inferable working memory. This stor-
age component is better known in terms of what Ericsson and Kintsch
(1995) describe as long-term working memory (LTWM). From a design
point of view, the important thing is that training makes it possible for
people to activate sizable mental representations and store them in mem-
ory for longer periods of time and in larger amounts than predicted from
the traditional working memory models. Thus, LTWM explains why
some actively used materials are beyond standard interference. One can
use this storage to analyse and explain phenomena such as interruptions,
remembering computer program code, and learning to use computers
(Ericsson and Kintsch 1995; Oulasvirta and Saariluoma 2004, 2006).
Using technical artefacts does not only involve perceiving and respond-
ing to the operation of the artefact. Users are also required to learn which
responses are relevant in which situations. This can be called the prob-
lem of perceptual-motor learning (or in a wider sense, the problem of
learning to use technologies). The use of most technical artefacts requires
some learning, and sometimes a learning process can be very complicated
and demanding, for example, programmers must study for years to reach
the required skill level (Anderson et al. 1984; Mayer 1997; Robins et al.
2003).
Acquiring expertise in using advanced technologies often takes a long
time, and even experts must keep in mind the issues they have learned
(Mayer 1997). This brings about the next interaction task, which can
be called long-term remembering; the psychological ability that is respon-
sible for it can be called long-term memory. It is a vital concept in learn-
ing. Everything that has been learned is kept in the long-term memory
(Baddeley 2007, 2012; Brady et al. 2009).
Additional tasks must be studied before one can draw a road map of
the psychological sub-tasks associated with using a technical artefact.
The next task is to organize communication so that it is comprehensible.

The user has to understand the communication between herself and the
technical artefact. At best, this is intuitive or self-evident, and the com-
munication is organized in a way that it is easily comprehensible. Thus,
the psychological problem of comprehension is important in HTI (Brooks
1980; Kintsch and van Dijk 1978; Pennington 1987; Salmeron et al.
2005).
Comprehension, however, is not sufficient to help the user complete
the task. He or she must also be able to decide between different alterna-
tive actions. Therefore, decision making is another important task for the
user (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Kahnemann 2011). The more
complex the technology, the more essential this task is. It can even be
critical in the usage of complex technologies, such as power stations or
financial investment software, where the user has to be able to make up
his or her mind concerning different courses of actions (Lehto and Nah
2006), and where the quality of decisions may entail, for example, secu-
rity and economic risks.
The psychology of decision making is essential in investigating the
decision aspects of HTI (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Kahnemann
2011; Simon 1955). The tasks that people are expected to execute using
today’s sophisticated technologies are increasingly complex and presup-
pose complex problem-solving skills. Situation awareness entails problem
solving that relies on consciousness of the present situation (Endsley
1995, 2006; Endsley and Jones 2011). In a risk society—a consequence
of the increasing complexity of technologies (Beck 1992, 2008)—critical
situations, such as nuclear accidents, require human capability to take
technical decisions rapidly and accurately in order to minimize harm to
people. Investigating the nature of complex problem solving (and thereby
the role of psychological interaction design) has become more important
in the field of HTI (Anderson 1983, 1993; Funke 2012).
Interaction with technologies is not only a cognitive issue; it has emo-
tional, motivational, and personal aspects as well (Hassenzahl 2011;
Norman 2004). Factors such as emotional processes, motivation, and per-
sonality are present in the interaction and must be included in user psycho-
logical research and HTI design processes. These issues will be discussed
in the following chapter. However, it is not only tasks that differ from
each other. Users of technology are also different. They may have differ-
ent societal, occupational, educational, and generational backgrounds,
as well as different experiences as technology users (Bouma et al. 2009;
Charness 2009; Czaja and Nair 2006; Leikas 2009). They may be experi-
enced or novices (Mayer 1997). In each case, it is essential to understand
what kinds of characteristics are shared by users of a specific technical
artefact. This knowledge is required when designing technologies for spe-
cific groups of people. The psychology of individual differences and per-
sonality provides information and methodologies for solving these kinds
of questions (Cronbach 1984; Kline 2013).
Finally, people belong to—and co-operate in—groups of different
sizes. These groups may be pairs, families, small work teams or organi-
zations, and even nations and cultures. Social media (services allowing
people to exchange text, speech, pictures, videos, and information over
the Internet) is currently in a decisive position to create different groups.
Irrespective of whether the group is organized around culture, work, or
social pleasure, there are always common norms that are accepted and
followed (Brown 2000).
Social interaction with the help of technology can involve either
one-dimensional communication (interaction between the human
and the machine) or two-dimensional human–human interaction (the
communication is transferred from one person to another in turn).
Communication can be seen as a multidimensional interaction when
several people interact with each other at the same time—for example,
social media applications that enable a group of persons to share each
other’s contexts, locations, and contextual content. Many solutions for
multi-user questions and group behaviour can be found in social and
organizational as well as cross-cultural psychology (Brown 2000).
A seemingly simple situation can include several major psychological
aspects, for example:
• psychology of attention and perception (target discrimination);

• psychology of motor movement and movement science (handling
artefact);
• working memory and LTWM (controlling ongoing interaction);
• skills acquisition and long-term memory (expertise in using);
• communication and comprehension (conveying information to

machine and people);
• decision making (choosing between alternatives); and
• situation awareness and complex problem solving (being aware of
what really happens).
The above-presented design and research tasks all require solid knowl-
edge of the human mind and its operations in order to improve the user’s
capacity to effectively use technical systems. Good design solutions,
which are in harmony with the principles of the human mind, form pre-
conditions for the effective use of technologies. Obtaining a more con-
crete view of the nature of these design challenges calls the attention for
systematic consideration of different aspects of psychological knowledge
bases. This chapter focuses on cognitive issues.
To Perceive and to Attend
When using a technical artefact, it is necessary to receive information
concerning different states of the technology and the context in which it
is used. If the user is unable to acquire all the relevant information con-
cerning its usage, an artefact will be impossible to control. For example,
when loading a container onto a ship, a crane driver working on a rainy
night may not see a workmate in a dark jacket and hit him with the crane.
This kind of work accident can be a consequence of poor visibility and
difficulty in discriminating relevant information.
Discrimination has two important stages: (1) discriminate between
objects in general and (2) discriminate the relevant targets from among
all the available objects. In the crane example, the challenge for the crane
driver is to first notice everything that happens in the loading area, and
second to discern the walking person from among other possible objects.
In psychological terms, relevant information about the state of an arte-
fact and the task to be completed is acquired via perceptual information
processes (Goldstein 2010; Rock 1983). The information is most often
visual but can be auditory, tactile, somatic sensory, or even olfactory
(Goldstein 2010; Proctor and Proctor 2006). The main requirement is
that the user is able to find the right information at the right time and in
the right location, and to use it to control the technical artefact or system.
However, the user may have to perform several sub-tasks before being able
to accurately discriminate the crucial information. For example, he or she
has to be able to detect the target and its colour, discriminate between the
target and its background, locate the target in three-dimensional space,
and register its movements.
The first psychological precondition for acquiring information is
thus how to find relevant information in I/O components and action
contexts. The psychology of sensory and visual discrimination provides
much of the key information about human performance related to these
types of issues (Bruce and Tsotsos 2009; Duncan and Humphreys 1989;
Neisser 1967, 1976). For example, if the sound of the given task is too
similar to the background noise, the threshold of discrimination becomes
too high and may lead to dangerous situations (Goldstein 2010; Proctor
and Proctor 2006).
The first level of user psychological issues is information encoding by
a human’s sensory systems. People need to see where I/O components
and contextual items are, how they are located, and how they differ from
other equivalent components. These processes are essential in monitor-
ing and controlling how technology works. One cannot interact with a
technical artefact without a sensory connection to the technology and its
relevant environment. However, this very basic task entails a large num-
ber of important scientific questions.
Before users can operate any I/O component in an interface, they have
to be able to obtain information about the component, such as an icon
on a computer display or a button in a car interface. However, perception
in the scientific sense is much more complicated than simply experienc-
ing the target I/O element. There is a wide gap between intuitive experi-
ence and scientific understanding.
In order to perceive an object, one must be able to generally discrimi-
nate it from other objects. First, there must be a physical target. This is
called the absolute discrimination threshold (Goldstein 2010). Second, the
target has to be discriminated from the background noise: the relative dis-
crimination threshold (Goldstein 2010; Hecht 1924). These two aspects
are present in every interaction event.
Humans perceive the environment, which is present in physical

energy states. In practice, this means that individuals discriminate the
information that is above the sensory thresholds and against the back-
ground (Proctor and Proctor 2006). If a factory hall has too little light,
it makes it difficult for employees to discriminate the relevant I/O and
other objects, and insufficient light may even cause industrial accidents.
The absolute discrimination threshold is equally important in all senses.
The human ear, for example, can discriminate sounds only between 20
and 20,000 Hz (Bregman 1994; Goldstein 2010). Similarly, all other
sensory systems have their absolute limits, which constitute an important
element of designing HTI processes.
For example, it is often difficult to see information clearly on mobile
phone and tablet screens in strong sunlight. Discrimination thresholds
change depending on the type of display, and also when the environ-
mental light changes. Kindle e-books and iPads, for example, differ in
how light affects discrimination. If we can discriminate only the target,
the difference is called the ‘just noticeable’ difference. Interestingly, the
discrimination threshold follows Weber’s law, which means that the per-
centage of the magnitude change is constant over the changes of a stimu-
lus. However, from a practical point of view, sensory thresholds are limit
values, and thus can seldom be a design goal in themselves. They express
minimal conditions for performance; it is almost always better to design
solutions that clearly surpass minimal thresholds.
Properly designed lighting and contrast improve perceptivity.
Backlights, efficient working lights, and proper highlighting can improve
performance, and should thus be considered when designing working
and living environments (Proctor and Proctor 2006). The safety and reli-
ability of human performance, for example, often depends on how well
illumination is designed. It is also well known that improved illumina-
tion in an office increases production (Barnaby 1980), and helps people
with low vision cope better with many everyday affairs.
When illumination and other issues related to the discrimination
threshold have been solved, the next issue to consider is object percep-
tion. In HTI processes, it is vital to correctly locate objects in space. One
should also consider environmental objects as controls or displays. This
requires the correct perception of objects, as well as their movements
and depth; it can be called the problem of three dimensionality (Bruce and
Green 1992) and it has two main variants. First, it is essential that users
can see the location of objects in their physical surroundings in real space.
Second, if using a computer screen, the user must be able to perceive a
three-dimensional presentation of the object on the screen.
There are also contextual factors to be considered. The perceiving per-
son can move quickly or be placed above the surface of the earth. Pilots,
for example, must be able to correctly locate the take-off and landing
zone as well as the height of the plane (Gibson 1950, 1979). Similarly,
crane operators must be able to move containers into the correct places
in the narrow cargo hold of a ship. This is possible only if they can see
the objects and their movements in space. The question concerns the
ability to place objects in a spatial arrangement as well as the movement
of the perceiving person, because the perceiver’s movements continuously
change the retinal picture and affect the way a person perceives the envi-
ronment. Three dimensionality and object perception thus form a com-
plex set of problems for the psychology of perception (Bruce and Green
1992; Rock 1983).
The three dimensionality of a perceptual space is partly constructed
on the grounds of asymmetry between retinal pictures, and partly due to
distance cues (i.e., the properties of the environment, which the human
mind can use to infer the distances between different objects). A typi-
cal example of this is gradient, which means that the surface has similar
structures that give smaller and smaller retinal images (Fig. 4.2).
Fig. 4.2 Ponzo illusion

In this figure, the target circles are of equal size, but the upper circle
seems to be larger. The gradient of the railway track suggests that the
upper circle is further away, and as the retinal size of the targets is the
same, it suggests that the upper circle must be larger (Bruce and Green
1992; Goldstein 2010).
This type of visual illusion can be used to construct three-dimensional
spaces on two-dimensional surfaces, such as displays or paintings. Three
dimensionality is also often an important problem in constructing games
or other three-dimensional virtual realities. The psychology of depth and
movement perception is vital in solving these design issues (Bruce and
Green 1992).
The perception of movements is also based on perceptual cues. The
edges of objects, for example, for a time cover a background that causes
the image of a moving object (Ullman 1996). As mentioned above, an
additional element in the perception of movement comes from the move-
ments of the observer (Gibson 1950, 1979). Constructed movements are
often important in improving displays. For example, when constructing
virtual reality, it is often important to create body movements to avoid
contradictory sensory information between the eyes and body. Without
logical coordination between different sensory modalities, it is impossible
to create, for example, a genuine flight simulator.
Perceptual processes in interaction include colours as well as three-
dimensional moving objects (Goldstein 2010; Mollon 1982). Colours
can be used for several purposes in organizing HTI processes, for exam-
ple, to discriminate items, camouflage certain objects, or improve emo-
tional usability. In HTI, colours are important in discriminating critical
information. Warning signals and alarm buttons are typically discrimi-
nated by colour, and it is also important in many semiotic presentations
(Tufte 1990, 1997), for example, red is the symbol for the highest tem-
perature and blue for the lowest. Colours are also important in creating
emotional dimensions for texts and other products (Desmet et al. 2001;
Liu et al. 2003).
Thus, colour perception is an additional issue in encoding I/O com-
ponents. While a normal human can distinguish between over a million
different colours (Boyton 1988; Mollon 1982), not all people can discrim-
inate colour information. Colour blindness can be genetic or acquired,
and is much more common in men than women. There are also ethnic
differences so that Eskimos have more names for the types of snows than
Southern nations.
It is possible to find similar types of problems in other modalities, as
discussed above about vision. Sensory information is not only visual, it
may also be auditory, tactile, or vestibular (Bregman 1994; Goldstein
2010). Senses connect people with the immediate environment and pro-
vide information about the current state of their body in space or infor-
mation about its current internal states.
The problem of discriminating relevant information cannot be solved
by using concepts derived from perceptual information processes. The
question of relevant information does not concern only the experience
of perceptual space, it also requires discriminating the relevant piece of
information from all other available information. However, to effectively
use technology it is essential to discriminate important action-relevant
information from the less important background. This process has
its own principles that are studied in the psychology of human atten-
tion (Broadbent 1958; Covan 1999, 2000; Egeth and Yantis 1997;
Kahnemann 1973; Pashler 1998; Styles 1997).
In emergency situations, as in the Three Mile Island nuclear accident
or in industrial process breakdowns, it is often critical to extract critical
information quickly so that users can respond swiftly to the demands of
the situation. This may be an alarm light, a vibration, or a sound. The
psychological laws of human attention help solve the design issues of
discriminating between relevant and irrelevant information (Broadbent
1958, 1975; Kahnemann 1973; Chun et al. 2011; Pashler et al. 2001;
Styles 1997). This can also be called the difference between figure and
ground.
Thus, perception offers two interpretations of the same retinal image.
On the one hand a duck is visible, and on the other hand a rabbit. When
the duck is seen, the rabbit disappears, and vice versa. These kinds of
ambiguous pictures illustrate how perception and attention are selective
and distinguish between the foreground and the background (Luckiesh
1965; Styles 1997).
Perception is selective in the sense that it is often necessary to find a
crucial piece of information in the environment. For example, to go out
of a room, one must find the door and its handle in order to grasp it
and push the door open. All these actions presuppose selective percep-
tion, and the ability to differentiate the background from the foreground.
Often, background information can be distracting, for example, using a
mobile phone while driving (Nasar et al. 2008).
The automotive industry is developing HUD indicators, which would
project safety information onto an image of the road. The driver could
see, for example, an indicator of a danger in his line of vision on the image
of the road. The problem with these displays is that the driver can pay
attention either to this indicator or to the road; this continuous adjust-
ment of focus may cause an accident if the display is not well designed.
Several experimental settings have been used to investigate human
attention. Visual search and cocktail party effects are perhaps the most
significant ones (Broadbent 1958; Egeth and Yantis 1997; Kahnemann
1973; Neisser 1963, 1967; Pashler 1998; Treisman and Gelade 1980). In
visual search tasks, target objects such as letters or numbers are searched
for amongst other objects. They together form the figure ‘x’ whilst the rest
of the letters or numbers serve as the background. In this task, people are
asked to report as quickly as possible whether they can perceive an ‘x’ on
the display. When a large number of displays are presented, it is possible
to measure the average time that it takes for subjects in different condi-
tions and contexts to find the target (Sanders and Donk 1996).
Discriminating targets from their background is important in human–
technology design, because targets often entail vital information; thus, a
failure to discriminate them may lead to misinterpreting situations. In
radar, for example, it is absolutely vital to discriminate between an enemy
aircraft and background noise. For this reason, many radars have software
to make discrimination easier.
It is also well known in the theory of human attention that colours
make discrimination easier when there are not too many of them
(Treisman and Gelade 1980). The ability to effortlessly and quickly dis-
criminate is called the ‘pop-up’ phenomenon, which is characterized by
discriminative cues that are easy to pick up and thus helpful in discrimi-
nating target information. Similarly, forest workers and hunters must be
discriminated so that other hunters do not accidentally shoot them. The
pop-up phenomenon works well in this case too:
The visibility of the surface material of forest workers clothing was com-
pared in situations with different lighting. These studies discovered that
phosphorized yellow was the easiest to perceive for peripheral vision.
Although white formed the strongest contrast, yellow was the easiest to
discern against the background formed by the green forest (Isler et al.
1997).
Discrimination of the target is associated with a large set of problems,

and it is one of the most fundamental tasks that users must carry out
when using technology. For example, when driving a car, the driver has
to detect information about the control system and signs and symbols on
the windscreens of the car, other cars driving in the opposite or same lane,
traffic signs, pedestrians, crossroads, buildings, trees, and lakes. In nearly
all situations of normal use, the user has to discriminate objects from the
background. Discrimination can also be used in reverse by hiding some-
thing in the background. For example, hiding the on/off button on many
computers used to be important in preventing unauthorized usage, but
this is seldom necessary.
Attention is not only a visual phenomenon. For example, people in
a noisy restaurant can hear numerous auditory messages, but they can
still discriminate between relevant and irrelevant messages to follow the
discussion they are most interested in (Broadbent 1958; Neisser 1967;
Pashler 1998; Styles 1997).
Evacuation planning includes the design of audible alarms that must
be heard against a background of noise. Therefore, alarm designers
know that they should adjust the frequency of alarms to a level that is
clearly different from that of the background noise (Häkkinen 2010).
Manipulation of volume is not desirable because the human auditory
system is more capable of discriminating frequency than intensity, and
the auditory attention benefits from differences in frequency.
It is also important to remember that the object of attention varies.
An individual’s gaze is targeted at the most significant items for current
action, and it lingers the longest on essential information. For this reason,
eye movements have become an important method of studying target
perception (Baccino and Manunta 2005; Henderson and Hollingworth
1999; Josephson and Holmes 2002; Mackworth and Morandi 1967;
Yarbus 1967). For example, the design of panels in industrial process or

aviation control rooms must follow this principle. The most relevant and
important displays must be located within the attentional focus of the
operator (Norman 2002). Consequently, when designing a user interface,
the factors that direct attention must be taken into account.
Both follow-up of the object of attention and eye movements have an
important role in usability research. For example, Josephson and Holmes
(2002) studied the scan paths that people’s eyes follow when they read
information on web pages, and Howarth (1999) investigated how the eye
adapts to the distance from a stimulus created in virtual reality, and found
that adaptation was different in virtual reality than in real-life situations.
Unintentional direction of attention can be considered the basic form
of directing attention (Chun et al. 2011; Eimer et al. 1996; Styles 1997).
It is a fundamental mechanism for reacting to sudden changes, such as
a threat, in a person’s environment (Eimer et al. 1996; van der Heijden
1992, 1996). A rapid shift in unintentional attention is also called ori-
entation. It signifies a comprehensive reaction, such as an attack or an
escape. These kinds of reactions also include, for instance, a sudden
increase in adrenaline secretion and nervous reactions (Eimer et al. 1996;
Posner 1980). When people direct their attention to an object based on
their prior intention, this is called self-controlled or voluntary attention
(Chun et al. 2011; Eimer et al. 1996; Styles 1997) because this type of a
shift in attention originates from the human’s own will and need.
The laws of target discrimination in orientation have been used to
improve the efficiency of the message. For example, pop-up icons, which
interrupt the continuous state of working, call for human attention by
causing an orientation reaction (Posner 1980). Yet since this also breaks
the normal course of the main action (Shneiderman and Plaisant 2005),
many people use pop-up blockers. On the other hand, there are many
situations, such as when a program crashes, when it is vital that the mes-
sage is well discriminated even during severe stress.
When people repeat the same perceptual-motor task in the same cir-
cumstances, they start to improve their performance. It becomes faster,
less error prone, unconscious, and independent of will until finally it
requires few cognitive resources (Neumann 1984; Schneider et al. 1984).
This learning process is called automatization (James 1890; Schneider
et al. 1984), which has received major attention. Automatization is very

important when learning to use technologies. Automatic processing can
be explained in terms of feature discrimination. People learn the systems
of discriminative cues, which enable them to process information faster.
They need not put any effort into discriminating a target object, as their
information-processing system easily picks up the decisive information.
For several reasons, it is good that human performance is automa-
tized in many HTI processes. It makes performance fast, error-free, not
capacity demanding and therefore protected against such sudden factors
as panic (Neumann 1984). The only problem is that in an unexpected
situation, automatization may cause people to make serious errors, as
they cannot adapt effectively enough to the changing demands of the
advanced technologies.
People can have different roles related to controlling artefacts. For
example, they monitor the performance of artefacts in many different
ways. Normally, people are continuously monitoring the performance of
the artefacts. They seek information and respond to it immediately, such
as when driving a car on a curvy road; they are ‘in the loop’. However, the
more control that is transferred to the artefacts, the less involved people
are in the performance of the technology. Good examples of this are pro-
vided by autonomous systems. In a problem situation, the interaction
process with complex technology becomes increasingly demanding. This
phenomenon is called being ‘out of the loop’ (Endsley and Jones 2011).
An additional problem linked to attention in interaction processes is
the amount of time that people are able to efficiently and reliably observe
the same target. Many professions require constant vigilance. People may
work to observe, for instance, radar or a monitor for a long time, without
any deviant behaviour being shown on the display. This kind of continu-
ous observation task may eventually weaken one’s attention or lower the
level of vigilance, which can be hazardous in many critical surveillance
tasks. These are common challenges in interaction design, for example,
in the process industry (Koelega 1996). Especially in fields in which even
small breaks (not to mention longer delays in manufacturing processes)
become very expensive or risky in some way, the work tasks should be
properly designed and examined at intervals. It is quite typical that emer-
gency processes, for instance, have not been tested for years, and then do
not work properly when they are suddenly needed.
If the level of attention lapses due to lower levels of vigilance, the per-
formance level decreases. When this happens, the probability of failure
rises and the number of errors increases. Although these effects are to some
extent individual, problems related to vigilance can be taken into account
in technology design (Koelega 1996). For example, tasks that require con-
tinuous attention should not last long, and should be divided into periods
with breaks. Vigilance begins to weaken after half an hour of continuous
attention and a continuous work performance of two hours can be too
demanding. People should also be trained efficiently in order to minimize
the number of processes one has to keep in mind at the same time.
Fatigue of night shift workers is a typical vigilance-related problem.
Bonnefond et al. (2001) conducted a one-year study of workers who
were allowed to sleep for an hour during a night shift and found that this
arrangement improved vigilance. This research suggests that this type of
arrangement is useful where the work task requires a person’s full atten-
tion, and if it is possible to arrange a sleeping break at the work place.
The study itself is a good example of usability design analysing vigilance.
Another important concept of perceptual psychology is called affor-
dance (Gibson 1979), which refers to how a visual object is perceived
from the point of view of action. For example, a glass is perceived dif-
ferently when taking it from a cupboard, filling it, and drinking from
it as opposed to throwing it at a referee in a football match (Gibson
1979; Gielo-Perczak and Karwowski 2003; Rasmussen 1983). Gibson
(1979) and colleagues note that affordance also entails information about
the state of the object that is related to what people do. Because of this
close relationship between affordance and action, it is possible to think of
affordances as attention phenomena.
If there are several alternative courses for actions, affordance allows
individuals to attend to objects from the correct point of view (Gibson
1979). Thus, their eyes, hands, limbs, and body anticipate the next
moment of the action depending on its affordance. When a person takes
up a pen to sign a document, he or she does this in a different way than if
they throw it away, and when they drink from a teacup it is not the same
action as washing the cup. The phenomenon of affordance requires not
taking perception as an absolute but rather linking it to the nature of a

current action. This concept has been introduced into HCI research to
develop its ecological relevance (Forrester and Reason 1990).
The first sub-task in interaction design for usability, discriminating rel-
evant information, has a large number of links with the basic psychology
of perception and attention. While knowledge of human perception and
attention can be used to define and solve important interaction prob-
lems, the main problem is to analyse the technological interaction tasks
effectively and to consider the coherence between them and the tradition
of attentional psychology.
To Respond and to Act
Senses have a significant role in collecting information about different
states of technology. Some kinds of tools (e.g., hands or feet) are needed
in order to respond to this information and to control the technical arte-
fact. Human psychomotor action plays a central role in using technology.
Action itself is a hierarchical process with several different levels (moving
a finger, moving an arm), but the control level consists of the thoughts
about what a person is doing and why. Each of these levels makes it pos-
sible to understand some aspects of the action in question.
Within a specific context, the ultimate action goal serves as a person’s
highest level of action and as a trigger in using technologies. A ship is
built to transport cargo and to ferry passengers from one port to another.
Having this particular everyday action (moving a ship to a new port) as
the ultimate action goal explains why people use ships in general. In addi-
tion to this overall task, each individual act needed in steering the ship
has its own goal and intentional content (Jeannerod 2007). This thinking
is supported by Searle (1993), who distinguishes between prior inten-
tions and intentions in action (Jeannerod 2007) and effectively illustrates
the distinction between action in the life of users and action in using a
technical artefact or system. This chapter mainly focuses on the action in
using a technology.
Human psychomotor movements are present in every human action
and have a necessary role in interacting with technologies (Bridger 2009;
Karwowski 2006). For example, in addition to the movements of hands,

feet, and eyes, speech is produced by the activity of the psychomotor sys-
tem associated with the larynx and the lungs (Rayner 1998).
Perception has a direct connection to motor functions (Olson and
Olson 2003; Schmidt 1975; Schmidt and Lee 2011). It automatically
monitors the environment whilst the person is, for example, walking.
The connection of perception and attention to motor functions is termed
perceptual-motor cycle or sensory-motor integrations (Fotowat and Gabbiani
2011; Schmidt 1975). This system has been equally important to Stone
Age hunters and modern office workers. With the help of perceptual
information processing, it is possible to perceive the surrounding envi-
ronment and respond to it with the operations of the psychomotor sys-
tem. Without perception our motor functions would be helpless, and
without a motor system our perception would be senseless.
An important property of the human psychomotor system is its hier-
archical character. People use different types of motor movement patterns
that are partly linked; thus, each higher-level action depends on differ-
ent lower-level motor patterns (Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Kawato et al.
1987). Lower-level patterns include, for example, posture, instinctive
reflexes, and intentional motor functions such as stretching or pinching.
These functions support a large variety of higher-level actions of complex
motor patterns from walking and typing to gymnastics and dancing.
Technical environments often include restrictions that force people to
work in an unergonomic manner in terms of motor functions. Using a
mouse, for example, can cause elbow and shoulder problems in the long
run (Murata et al. 2003). Ergonomics is thus needed in work environ-
ments in order to develop ideal posture models and ways of working
with new technologies (Bridger 2009). Posture as a zero movement is an
idealized concept here, as it is present in all complex movements and the
realization of motor tasks depends on the success of the posture adopted.
The most fundamental motor function is a reflex (Pavlov 1927). For
example, when someone puts his or her hand on a hot surface, the hand
is withdrawn quickly and automatically without any conscious control of
the motor function. The information from the finger goes to the spinal
cord and from there to the muscles responsible for withdrawing. The
information goes more slowly to the higher levels as the hand is already
moving away. Very close to this type of reflex are many learnt automatic
responses that operate unconsciously. Typing or driving a car, for exam-
ple, are built on unconscious low-level motor patterns of fingers and
hands (Card et al. 1983; Rumelhart and Norman 1982; Salthouse 1986).
Instinctive and automatic motor functions are important, as they are
used in situations that require rapid reactions. Such functions are vital
since they help avoid danger. Even today, one of their main purposes
is to help humans react to immediate changes in their environment. In
earlier days, these kinds of self-protection mechanisms were important in
fighting off external attacks, but today they are helpful, for example, in
avoiding traffic accidents.
The second type of motor function is formed by a large set of simple
intentional motor functions. When a hand reaches out towards a control
device, the individual is intentionally leading it towards a goal. Whereas
automatic motor functions are subconscious and unintentional, inten-
tional motor functions—although based on evolutionarily developed
patterns—essentially rely on higher cognitive processes. Various standard
functions such as walking, reaching, or grasping are examples of these
action patterns in humans, and therefore they also hold a central position
in usability design. People employ these functions when they use tech-
nologies such as a mouse or keyboard (Lewis et al. 1997).
Input modes for user interfaces are becoming increasingly advanced
with the development of ubiquitous, ambient, and pervasive technol-
ogy. For example, many modern artefacts from TVs to museum guides
are already based on gesture recognition. In addition to recognizing the
intentional motor functions of users, a great deal of effort is being put
into developing smart environments, which respond automatically to the
behaviour of the user. That is to say, to the unintentional motor functions
of the user.
Finally, complex schematic motor functions also need to be consid-
ered (Schmidt 1975; Schmidt and Lee 2011). In addition to simple and
basically automatic procedures, human beings also execute complex and
learnt series of motor functions. Such series can be recalled from memory
and applied in an adjustable manner depending on the current situation.
In technology usage, to control complex machines generally requires
motor actions of the highest level, and it usually takes a long time to
learn them. Handicraft provides a good example of complicated motor

patterns. For example, the actions of a goldsmith or watchmaker require
dexterity and hand–eye coordination.
High precision and dexterity are fundamental prerequisites of the
work. In fact, surprisingly little is known about controlling precision and
dexterity, although this subject is constantly under discussion, for exam-
ple, in the expanding area of robotics research. It is difficult to develop
and program robots to perform human-like motor functions with adapt-
ability, accuracy, and versatility, and the unconscious nature of motion
control further complicates the issue. In addition to robotics, different
kinds of simulators have found their way into the research and devel-
opment of technology and human psychomotor action. In surgery, for
example, where human motor functions are a necessary complement to
a high level of cognitive expertise, simulators have become increasingly
popular training tools. They make it possible to practice risky operations
without putting patients in danger.
Elementary motor patterns can be either automatic or intentional.
They form basic elements of studying the nature of complex series of
motor functions (Schmidt and Lee 2011). Such patterns include, for
example, grasping a drinking glass, lifting weights, and shaking hands.
Variations of these patterns are unconsciously repeated (Desmurget et al.
1999; Schmidt and Lee 2011). Indeed, all complex motor functions are
variations and combinations of elementary motor patterns.
Basic motor patterns may change to some extent as a result of learn-
ing. The actions of a professional cricket batsman provide an interesting
example. In this game, the ball is bowled to a batsman, who has approxi-
mately half a second to adjust his strike to the movement of the ball.
Land and McLeod (2000) studied the eye movements of cricket players
at different levels using an eye-movement camera. They discovered varia-
tions in the ability to follow the movement of the ball between players
at different levels. Every player directed his eyes in the same way to the
initial trajectory and ground contact point of the ball, but the speed of
following the ball with one’s eyes clearly distinguished players at different
levels. Years of practice had made the eye movements of the more experi-
enced players quicker and more appropriate than those with less experi-
ence. Similarly, it is possible to train dexterity and other motor functions

required in the usage of different technical artefacts.
Motor patterns are holistic in nature to the extent that a change in
one motor function creates a change in the whole motor pattern. In this
sense, user interface paradigms should be developed following the holis-
tic patterns of users, or at least they should not require severe changes in
natural motor patterns. For example, when operating smartphones whilst
walking, users are forced to acquire new types of motor patterns, that is,
to watch the behaviour of the artefact instead of observing the surround-
ing environment. This change in natural motor patterns increases the
risk of tripping or falling. Therefore, it is vital to analyse in detail the pos-
sible changes in motor patterns and postures in the usage of a developed
artefact.
As a whole, human psychomotor action highlights a large set of practi-
cal problems that have to be considered when designing HTI processes
and user interfaces. These problems are mostly investigated in the area
of ergonomics and human factors research (Bridger 2009; Karwowski
2006), but understanding the basic principles is essential in any design
target. Human psychomotor action forms an important conceptual basis
for user interface design. Its characteristics determine the structure and
properties of the input devices and controls of technology.
To Learn and to Remember
The technologies that human beings have created are far beyond the
capacity of any other animals. People’s ability to create and construct is
mainly a result of the human capacity to keep large associative structures
in the memory and, consequently, to learn large systems of knowledge
such as languages. Memory and learning are central factors in understand-
ing HTI; without them, people would be unable to create technologies
to serve them. These two processes are always present when people use
technologies, from learning user guides to highly educated professional
use of technologies. Computer programmers, for example, must keep in
mind aspects of programs such as reserved words, function names, typical
algorithms, the way they are used to construct well-formed expressions,
and the structure of the program they are working with at that moment.
They have to remember large amounts of symbolic information to be
able to carry out programming tasks. In order to understand this kind of
complex activity, it is essential to understand how people have learnt to
program—especially how their memory (which makes the learning pos-
sible) operates.
The importance of memory and learning has been long understood in
the field of interaction. Memorability and learnability are acknowledged
usability design criteria, and one goal of usability testing has been to
illustrate deficits in these areas (Nielsen 1993). One way to do this is to
measure values in remembering and learning compared to other interac-
tion processes. A completely different and more challenging task is to
find out what kind of changes should be made to really improve users’
abilities to remember relevant and required information. The improve-
ments presuppose understanding the underlying memory processes and
how they can be influenced. For this reason, usability design and research
should be intimately connected with the user psychology of the human
memory (Saariluoma and Oulasvirta 2010).
Memory is as basic a cognitive process as perception and attention.
It is needed in motor functions, and it forms the basis of human skills.
The basic memory processes, as seen in memory research, form com-
plex networks of questions that relate to how people encode, store,
and retrieve information in their minds and what kinds of properties
the many important memory systems have (Baddeley 1990, 2007). The
importance of memory has been understood within the usability com-
munity from the very beginning (Nielsen 1993). The present usability
discourse only addresses the concepts of memory on a relatively basic
level, and detailed analysis of the connections between HTI and memory
processes is still in a relatively early state. There is much work to be done
to illustrate what aspects of the human memory are important, and in
what ways, when developing HTI solutions.
An example of such research is the connection between pictorial
recognition memory and GUIs. The superiority of GUIs compared to
symbolic interfaces has had an enormous impact on interaction studies.
Not only smartphones are touchscreens; many other instruments have
been redesigned. For example, dentists today use touchscreens to con-
trol their instruments. The breakthrough of two revolutionary technolo-

gies—GUIs and touchscreen technologies—has been based on the use of
pictorial recognition memory (Shepard 1967), which is a more effective
form of learning than text-based solutions.
Psychologists have known for at least 30 years that human pictorial
memory and the capacity to learn to recognize pictures is much better
than the human capacity to remember and recognize symbolic strings
(Standing 1973; Standing et al. 1970). Using pictorial information as the
basic interaction model makes it much easier for users to interact with
technology compared to symbolic interaction paradigms. Therefore, it is
difficult to understand why this fact was overlooked for so long: many
usability tests illustrated the importance of pictorial information long
before the development of touchscreens (Ramsay and Nielsen 2000).
One of the most prominent questions in the research on human
memory has concerned different types of memory. Human memory is
divided into several types of storage; the most important in this context
are working memory, LTWM, and long-term memory. These systems
have different roles and explain different interaction-relevant phenomena
in human information processing, which is responsible for controlling
human actions. To understand the importance of these explanatory phe-
nomena of memory, it is essential to consider each of them separately
and to clarify their role in HTI processes. The overall structure of human
memory is presented in Fig. 4.3.
Fig. 4.3 The overall structure of human memory

Intuitively, people tend to think that remembering concerns only

past experiences. Memory researchers, however, argue that remembering
also includes keeping specific information active. Smooth human per-
formance presupposes the ability to anticipate the demands of the tasks
that follow. In order to prepare for these tasks, the human information-
processing (working memory) system must keep information in the mem-
ory in an active state (Baddeley 1986, 1990, 2007, 2012; Ericsson 2006;
Ericsson and Kintsch 1995). The systems of preparation can be seen in
subconsciously activated associative networks detected in priming tasks
(Anderson 1976, 1983, 1993). Scientific experiments have demonstrated
that activating one piece of information, such as seeing the word ‘nurse’,
leads to the activation of related information, such as the word ‘doctor’,
but not to the activation of unrelated information, such as ‘butter’. This
very systematic phenomenon illustrates the human mind’s capability to
better prepare for the emergence of related than unrelated issues.
The system of memories is practical, as it enables people to distinguish
between task-related and relevant information during interaction pro-
cesses. For example, different kinds of warning systems can improve users’
performance in critical situations (Häkkinen 2010), but they may make
users neglect design mistakes. Also, a programmer who must take care
of thousands of lines of code whilst focusing on writing a single object
can use his working memory to keep the immediately needed informa-
tion about the object active. At the same time, he keeps the program as
a whole in LTWM, and the rest of the knowledge in long-term memory
(McKeithen et al. 1981).
Research has shown that working memory stores are modular, and
that there are at least three independent sub-systems (Baddeley 1986,
2007, 2012; Logie 1995): central executive, visuospatial, and articula-
tory stores. All these memory stores explain many phenomena related to
human actions, and are therefore fundamental for user psychology. They
were discovered by studying how simultaneous tasks disturb memory. If a
human subject tries to perform two visual or auditory tasks simultaneously,
performance will usually deteriorate, whereas performing one visual and
one auditory task simultaneously will not necessarily weaken the paral-
lel performance (Baddeley 1986, 2007, 2012; Logie 1995). In practice,
these systems are in intimate collaboration, but depending on the proper-
ties of a particular sub-task, they may have a different value in solving the
particular problem.
Miller (1956) discovered one of the main properties of the working
memory when he examined people’s performance in various tasks that
required memory, such as multidimensional evaluations. Based on his
analysis of the test results, Miller discovered that human immediate
memory is very limited in capacity. Many others after him discovered the
same thing, and the number of empirical observations began to increase.
Based on these results, a division between working memory and long-
term memory was established (e.g., Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968; Miller
1956). It is now known that working memory is temporary in nature, and
the information it contains easily decays when new information enters.
The storage capacity of the working memory has been estimated using
various methods (Broadbent 1975; Covan 1999, 2000; Crowder 1976;
Gregg 1986; Miller 1956). These estimates have concluded that the
scope of the working memory is around four to seven separate units.
This capacity is so small that it causes problems in all tasks that load the
working memory with unrelated and new symbolic information as well
as new systems of symbols; it also makes learning cognitive skills very
time consuming (Newell and Rosebloom 1981). Thus, programming is a
good example of the necessity of processing complex symbols (Anderson
1993; McKeithen et al. 1981).
Event sequences in controlling technologies often require accurate
memory for relatively long chains of performance. Even such a sim-
ple task as adjusting the time on an electronic clock may require long
sequences of keystrokes. Learning them may be time consuming, because
the system does not necessarily provide intuitive and logical support for
comprehending what should be the next sub-task to reach the expected
goal state of the artefact.
In scientific experiments, the capacity of the short-term working
memory has proved to be rather small. This creates a new dilemma: how
is it possible for a creature with this little capacity to manage large and
complex devices such as aeroplanes and rockets? The answer is in people’s
ability to code individual bits into larger entities: chunks and memory
units (Fig. 4.4). Working memory limits the number of units, but not
their size. An individual letter, word, or sentence can all comprise a nearly
Fig. 4.4 The first sentence is easier to remember although the sentences
comprise the same letters
equal load for the human memory, although they are unequal in the
sense that a sentence contains numerous letters (Baddeley 1990; Crowder
1976).
Human cognition can circumvent the limits of the working memory
(Miller 1956). Programmers, for example, can keep in mind long pieces
of code by organizing it into sense-making wholes. They can perceive in
the program text familiar ‘chunks’ such as loops, structures, search algo-
rithms, and sorting methods. They also have an idea of the structure of
the whole piece of code they are working with, and can thus effectively
utilize chunking mechanisms. Structure and object-oriented program-
ming paradigms particularly help support information encoding during
programming.
The limited capacity of the human working memory is an essential
component in analysing and explaining cognitive workload (Wickens
and Holands 2000). Researchers have used a series of several equivalent
tests to prove that humans store extensive information networks in their
memory. According to the type of stored information, these chunks can
be called motor, visual, or other schemas, scripts, or semantic networks
(Markman 1999). Different elements of these memory structures become
associated with each other and form vast networks, which can operate as
chunks.
Since chunking may be based on semantic associations between items,
it is easier to remember words that can be naturally categorized (Bower
1970; Bower et al. 1969), for example, into categories such as WEAPONS
(rifle, sword, dagger, pike) and FRUITS (apple, pear, orange, etc.) than
those that are totally unrelated to each other. Moreover, items’ visual and
spatial properties may also enable chunking. Thus, unrelated words that
can be chunked into bizarre images may aid remembering. For example,
words like hat, whale, cigarette, spectacles, and an overcoat can be more
easily recalled when imagined as a bespectacled whale smoking a cigarette

and wearing a hat and an overcoat. Likewise, when working with spread-
sheets, people may find it easier to form implicit images (Saariluoma
and Sajaniemi 1989, 1994), and icons can be grouped semantically and
spatially.
Although working memory limitations can cause problems in any
HTI task, it is often possible to support users’ performance by external
memory cues—that is, by visual information indicating the state of the
user action. ‘Breadcrumbs’ are typical examples of navigation tools that
have been developed to help to keep relevant information active in the
minds of users.
Human working memory performance is weakened considerably in
secondary tasks, when two actions are performed at the same time. Even
tasks that are independent of modality, such as the production of random
numbers, may decrease the performance level. This has been thought
to disturb the division of tasks between the stores of working memory
(Baddeley 1986, 2007, 2012). The visual sub-system is harmed by visual
secondary tasks and the auditory system by auditory tasks. A typical
example of a visual dual task is in-vehicle information systems such as
navigators. A driver’s main task is to control the car, but he or she also
needs information about the route; he or she will be at risk if they take
their focal vision away from the road to look at the navigator.
There is yet another type of memory store that has been found. Many
experiments have shown that experts can overcome the limited capac-
ity of the working memory by retaining information relevant to their
domain of specialization while undertaking secondary tasks (Ericsson
and Kintsch 1995). While counting backwards from a three-digit num-
ber will considerably disturb remembering trigrams (sequences of three
letters such as BBC or MEP), it is of little consequence to skilled chess
players who are used to storing chess positions in their memory (Charness
1976; Saariluoma 1995). Similar results have been obtained in studies on
experts’ memories in various fields (Saariluoma 1995), which indicate
that skill-related information lies in a store that is deeper than the work-
ing memory: LTWM (Ericsson and Kintsch 1995). Blindfold chess play-
ers can, for example, learn in an hour the locations of thousands of pieces
in numerous games (Saariluoma 1997). This capacity is based on pre-

learned patterns of pieces that operate as chunks in the working memory.
LTWM stores large amounts of information in a more permanent state
than the actual working memory in order to protect details required by
the active task at hand from incidental distractions. For instance, experi-
enced taxi drivers can store even the longest route maps in this memory
(Kalakoski and Saariluoma 2001). Likewise, although programmers see
only a few lines of code at a time, programs can contain thousands of
lines and have several layers (McKeithen et al. 1981). Most programming
paradigms, such as structured or object-oriented programming, entail
ways to facilitate associative structures and command program codes.
From the machine’s point of view, the choice of the programming para-
digm is irrelevant. Using corresponding structures that are efficient and
conducive to memory is also advisable when developing other interaction
environments.
LTWM is a good storage for any domain-specific information, as it
protects information during interruptions and makes it possible to keep
in mind new information even though it was not the object of attention.
This is called episodic indexing. It is a typical instance of an intriguing phe-
nomenon related to long-term memory theory. It is relevant, for instance,
in research on interruptions when using technologies (Oulasvirta and
Saariluoma 2004, 2006). A person who is making coffee can be disturbed
by a telephone call. After the call, she should return to making the coffee,
but people with memory disorders do not remember to do so.
Memory is a necessary precondition for learning (Bower 1981).
Learning enables people to accumulate their experiences and, as a conse-
quence, change their behaviour and act more appropriately in new situ-
ations. Everything in a person’s memory must be somehow learned; no
one knows inherently how technical artefacts work. New information is
stored in the long-term memory, thus learning increases the amount of
information stored there.
Modern theories of cognitive learning (e.g., Anderson 1993) con-
sider that the learning cycle begins with the presentation of information,
usually in a verbal form, which describes how to perform a task. This
information is stored in a declarative way with the help of training, and
it becomes procedural knowledge. Analyses of these observations indicate
that users do not intensively try to learn a whole system, but instead
only learn the most urgent work-related information. After learning this
information, they start an exploratory process of trial and error. This type
of learning has been called ‘exploratory’ and has become one of the most
investigated in cognitive ergonomics (Bridger 2009).
A feature that differentiates exploratory learning from other types of
learning is that in exploratory learning, the trainee performs a search pro-
cess that does not occur in other types of learning. When students learn
physics, they are provided with examples that explain the concepts to be
learned. When they learn through exploration, they look at the possible
interface objects (menus, icons, etc.) that may be related to the task they
want to perform. The search is performed with a task in mind in most
cases, although it is common to find users who explore the interface with
no particular goal in order to find out what they should do. In any case,
the most important aspect to consider if a designer wants to facilitate the
search (and therefore encourage exploratory learning) is to design the
interface so that objects on the screen can be easily related to the task he
or she wants to learn to do.
The most common learning strategy is a search strategy called ‘track-
ing tags’, which involves the user searching the user interface and trying
to find a word, phrase, icon, or any other element that is connected with
the task he wants to perform. For example, if a user of a word processor
wants to know how to type text in bold, he would search on the screen
for the word ‘bold’. If this is not found, he would try other words, such
as ‘source’, ‘format’, and so forth. Novice users typically try to search for
common words that have a meaning in different contexts but not neces-
sarily in word processor usage. Those who are more proficient in using a
word processor can guess that to select a bold font, one should look for
‘Format font’.
Users can also rely on such general strategies to solve search problems,
and open a menu and fully explore it before opening another menu
(Rieman et al. 1996). However, the aspect that has been highlighted by
scanning learning is that the search is performed based on the semantic
similarity between the task the user wants to perform and the label on the
user interface. Soto (1999) has shown that the time needed to learn to
perform a task on a new interface depends on the semantic relationship
between the task and the label. The semantic relationship was measured
empirically using the Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) (Landauer and
Dumais 1997).
Another important learning phenomenon in the context of HTI is
transfer (Helfenstein and Saariluoma 2006). The transfer of learning
occurs when learning a task facilitates the learning of another, similar
task. Two views have been proposed to explain the effect of transfer.
According to the first, originally proposed by Thorndike and Woodworth
(1901), transfer involves similar or identical elements in the two learning
situations. The second view is known as transfer through principles. It
was originally proposed by Judd (1902), who suggested that transfer does
not occur when there are common elements in the learning situations,
but when principles or rules learned in one situation may be applied to a
new situation (Singley and Anderson 1987). In this light, style guidelines
are important because they keep the interaction culture sufficiently simi-
lar and the design solutions somewhat consistent, which makes it much
easier for users to learn and use different applications.
To Comprehend
HTI is ultimately communication by nature. It is based on an activity in
which the user feeds signs to the artefact, to which the artefact responds
in an adequate way. In information technology, the meaning of signs is
obvious, as the artefacts are all symbol-processing machines. While this
is also the case with traditional electromechanical machines, these sys-
tems of communicative signs are different, as the information exchange
is based on natural signs. In what follows, this central role of signs in
HTI will be examined through semiotic concepts. The way to organize
I/O actions is to develop reasonable communication models and lan-
guages for information exchange between people and artefacts. Systems
of signs—and the respective distinctions between the expected machine
operations—make it possible for people to use and control technologies,
but without understanding the general principles of semiotic systems and
semiosis, it is hard to design human–artefact communication.
Semiotic codes, such as natural language, are systems of arbitrary sym-

bols connected to underlying concepts or references. One could also say
that they are thoughts. Via thoughts, signs are linked with actual referents
(Ogden and Richards 1923; Lyons 1977). Thus, the word ‘dog’ is con-
nected to the concept of dog (the reference) one has in mind, and finally
to the actual dog (the referent). The meaning of the word depends on
the way one thinks about the referent. An atom today, for example, is
not perceived in the way it was in Dalton’s or Democritus’ time. One
branch of semiotics, called engineering semiotics, is designed to clarify
the code systems used in HTI (de Souza 2005); in general, understanding
the foundations of semiotic systems presupposes an analysis of the mind.
People use symbol systems to communicate with each other in dif-
ferent ways. Such symbols evoke conceptual representations in peoples’
minds. These symbolic systems—and in a wider sense, any semiotic sys-
tem (i.e., the possibility of using signs)—also enable people to commu-
nicate with machines. In order to analyse how people really use technical
signs during interaction, one can apply technological psycho-semiotic
thinking (Saariluoma and Rousi 2015).
As technology has become more complex, people have learned to use
and construct complex semiotic systems to communicate with machines
and devices. The difference between human-to-human and human-
to-machine communication is that machines lack the mental systems
to interpret symbols. Symbols used by people evoke deterministic and
causal processes, but technical artefacts are unable to interpret and use
symbols in a similar, flexible, redundant, and creative manner (Chandler
2007; Eco 1976; Lyons 1977). This is why human–machine commu-
nication is said to be mechanistic. It does share many properties typical
of human-to-human communication, which in turn makes it easier for
people to use machines.
A common solution to human–machine communication is based on
artificial pseudo-languages such as LISP. This kind of communication
is intentional and direct. The basic idea in constructing such artificial
languages is that they make it easier for people to remember how to
operate complex machines compared to only using the signs of zero and
one (Barnard and Grudin 1988; Moran 1981). The words of technical
pseudo-languages provide memory cues and support, and allow a huge

set of possible instructions for technical artefacts given by people.
However, command languages are not entirely unproblematic. Their
commands may have misleading contents, or they may be difficult to dis-
criminate. For example, error diagnostics and supervisory languages must
be made consistent and semantically rational to allow the fast and intui-
tive use of complex machines. When designing command languages, it is
necessary to understand how the contents of the information are encoded
in the minds of the users. The language is meant to deliver users’ com-
mands to machines as well as information about the state of the machine
to users. For example, it is possible to use eye-movement detectors to pick
up which part of a screen the user is looking at, and to use this informa-
tion as a pointing device. In this way eyes can, like a cursor, indicate the
location of the user’s intention on the screen.
Part of human communication is non-verbal in nature. Human
paralanguage (such as body language) is a constantly used non-verbal
communication system in human-to-human communication. Thus,
when reading other people’s emotions, faces play a constant and impor-
tant role in the human mind. Similar processes are under development in
modern computing; in ubiquitous computing, no direct verbal guidance
is needed. Instead, machines deduce from human behaviour what the
users would like to do, and users understand intuitively what they should
do to reach their goals.
Sometimes, communication between people and artefacts is so ele-
mentary that it is difficult to notice that these cases are also considered
human–machine communication processes. Many common-life tools
are intuitive. They are easy to use and easy to learn to use. However, as
Norman (2002) has illustrated, there are also many tools that are totally
incomprehensible. Even a door handle that needs to be lifted instead of
pushed down can cause substantial difficulties for users who are used to
the standard usage. Intuition is thus very much a matter of tradition and
culture. Non-intuitive tools are non-communicative, as they more or less
turn the ‘meanings’ of ‘words’ upside down.
A common example of non-verbal communication is provided by
GUIs, which do not require any specific knowledge from users. These
pictorial metaphors and simple interaction models, as in the case of
smartphones, follow interaction patterns that are already familiar to

users. They can thus effectively exploit users’ existing knowledge of the
general characteristics of GUIs. The solutions have been obvious and,
for example, the root-knot-based navigation solution is ingeniously used
in mobile phones, for example. People can reach their goals using obvi-
ous metaphorical information without the need to inspect thick user
manuals.
Icon-, Windows- and menu-based interfaces thus provide examples of
ways to develop implicit communication between machines and users.
The selection of the icon contents and their organization mean that inter-
action situations and their requirements are obvious for users. Using bin-
oculars as the emblem for search is a good example. The effective use of
transfer, as in many Windows systems, spreads information from one
situation to another so that learning one way of doing things essentially
improves the interpretation of other interaction events.
Visualization is also an important form of communication that is
possible thanks to modern technologies. Analysis and understanding of
visual programming languages and statistical visualization, virtual real-
ity, and animation are examples of the scope and power of visualization
(Brown et al. 1995). Information visualization enables designers to make
complex issues more concrete (Larkin et al. 1980; Tufte 1990, 1997).
Moreover, virtual reality-based techniques make it possible to communi-
cate real-life experiences of such complex issues as architectural objects.
Visualization often serves to make symbolically visible the type of
characteristics that are normally not perceivable—for example, the tem-
perature of different parts of an engine (red for hot and blue for cold).
Similarly, crisis areas on maps are often depicted in red and peaceful areas
in blue. However, since visualization includes its own system of symbols
and meanings, the cultural relativity of symbols should be considered
when developing visualizations. Thus, visualization is a means of promot-
ing apperception and is not, therefore, connected only to perception.
Organizing human–machine communication combines semiotic
and psychological research—that is, technological psycho-semiot-
ics (Saariluoma and Rousi 2015). This field introduces a large set of
questions, as it is essential to have psychological grounds for semiotic
phenomena. Such issues as distinguishing signs or their cultural contents
are typically multidisciplinary issues, which presuppose an understand-

ing of the underlying psychology. Especially relevant is the psychology of
comprehension. Three fundamental aspects of the psychology of com-
prehension are examined below: the concepts of mental representations,
mental models, and metal contents.
In command languages, navigation, and other interaction situations,
not all the required information to construct a mental representation is vis-
ible (Markman 1999; Newell and Simon 1972). When the information
contents of mental representations or mental contents in using technical
artefacts are considered, there are numerous mental content elements that
have no sensory or retinal correlates. When users navigate in a menu
system they represent their goal, but these goals are not present as such
on the screen that they see. Similarly, programmers usually see a tiny part
of the whole program code, but their knowledge of other pieces of code
(which may not even have been written yet) influences what they do.
Contents such as ‘possible’, ‘infinite’, and ‘eternal’ also have no sensory
equivalence (Saariluoma 1995).
Imagine that a designer is developing software for a bank. She knows
that the user interface must include a set of user interface components
used in banking tasks. It is not important whether these components are
then represented by icons or menus, or in some other way, but an impor-
tant issue remains: how the hierarchical spatial organization of the user
interface will reflect the mental representations of the user. Therefore, the
designer will need to analyse the representational structure of the compo-
nents involved in the task. Although the designer could formally analyse
the tasks that the users perform—and thereafter establish the semantic
relationships between different user interface components—it is also pos-
sible to use a simple and effective procedure that involves applying indi-
rect techniques of knowledge elicitation.
Information on the nature of mental representations of the user inter-
face components related to banking in users’ minds can be obtained
with statistical methods such as pathfinder and latent semantic analysis
(Landauer 2007). This procedure generates a network in which the con-
cepts are the nodes, and the links represent the relationships between
them. If there is a link between two concepts, the designer could interpret
that in the user’s memory there is a relationship between them. In this
example, the central concept in the network of banking is ‘clients’. This

can be interpreted as meaning when people think of a banking task, the
first component that should be available is the customer database (names,
ID numbers, account numbers, etc.) and after this, the operation that the
user wants to perform.
Comprehension during interaction largely depends on how users
mentally represent the signs and situations. Good usage presupposes hav-
ing relevant mental models of the artefact (Gentner and Stevens 1983).
Interacting with a system relays knowledge of its structure, functioning,
codes, and the meanings of individual signs. This knowledge is called
the mental model in the field of design artefacts, and its assessment and
measurement are considered crucial for designing a system with which a
person can interact effectively (Johnson-Laird 1983, 2008). Mental mod-
els are thus representations of the world that human beings have in their
minds (Cañas et al. 2001; Johnson-Laird 1983, 2008).
The term ‘mental model’ has been used in research on interaction
with physical systems. A person creates a representation in their working
memory by combining the knowledge stored in the long-term memory
with information extracted from the characteristics of the task (Gentner
and Stevens 1983). In such cases, the information stored in the long-term
memory relevant to HTI is related to the knowledge of the structure and
operation of the device.
Mental models to study the interaction with artefacts can be viewed
from various perspectives. For example, a good mental model is consid-
ered important in the acquisition of skills for manual control systems.
Recently, interest has expanded to include monitoring tasks of automati-
cally controlled systems in which the skills that come into play are detec-
tion, diagnosis, and fault compensation (Rasmussen and Rouse 1981).
In the study areas of manual control and monitoring, mental models are
used to perform calculations on the expected control performance when
interacting with a system.
It has often been demonstrated that when individuals interact with
a computer, they acquire knowledge about its structure and function-
ing. Research has shown, for example, that acquiring an adequate mental
model of the computer makes learning a programming language easier
(Moran 1981; Navarro-Prieto and Canas 2001).
Thus, comprehension is possible because of relevant mental contents

about the situation, the task, and the artefact. When people interact with
an artefact, they create a dynamic representation that combines external
information extracted through perceptual systems and knowledge in the
human memory. This representation is used to simulate the artefact struc-
ture and functioning to enable reasoning processes (Cañas et al. 2001).
Comprehension is based on a good mental model of the technical arte-
fact. However, it does not make sense to speak about the ‘goodness of
a mental model’ before its information contents are known and its rel-
evance concerning the artefact and task can be defined. Thinking is based
on mental representations, and mental contents refer to their informa-
tion contents. Thus, it is essential to discuss mental contents in mental
models and their relation to human thinking.
The highest levels of cognitive processes are constructed by thinking
and related processes. They also form the highest level of mental processes
involved in HTI. Traditionally, thinking in psychology refers to such pro-
cesses as categorization, inference, decision making, and problem solving
(Newell and Simon 1972). In addition, it is essential to pay attention
to representation construction, which underlies all types of thought
processes (Saariluoma 2003). Much of the work in cognitive psychol-
ogy that addresses lower cognitive processes has made a tacit assumption
that cognitive capacity explains human performance (Broadbent 1958;
Covan 2000; Miller 1956). However, the concept of cognitive capacity
has limited explanatory power. When considering such issues as the cor-
rectness or relevance of information, content-based thinking can seldom
be applied. The limited capacity of human information processing can
entail any information. It can be correct or incorrect, as well as relevant
or irrelevant. For this reason, the problems of relevance and correctness
cannot be analysed in terms of capacity. Instead, new theoretical concepts
are needed that are based on the notion of mental contents.
Mental contents—the content of the information in the human
mind—are representations of the information that people use to
guide their actions. They form their own type of scientific information
(Saariluoma 2003) and open up theoretical and practical questions that
are different from the perspectives discussed above. These questions are
most relevant when higher cognitive processes such as apperception,
consciousness, and thinking are considered (Newell and Simon 1972;

Markman 1999; Saariluoma 1990, 1997, 2001). In HTI research, this
means that mental contents must be examined when investigating inter-
action processes in which language, consciousness, and thinking play an
essential role.
The world is depicted in people’s minds. One can sit down on a chair
if he or she has an image (i.e., a mental representation) of this chair in
mind. This representation tells the individual’s muscles when to contract
and extend in order to maintain a correct sitting position. When sit-
ting down, the individual is not very clearly aware of the strength of her
muscles or the speed of the movement, but the information required for
motion control (as well as all other activities) is stored in her memory. If a
person does not have the information required for an action in his mind,
he would not be able to perform the action in question. If the informa-
tion were different in content, the action would be different as well.
The information in individuals’ minds concerning the world, actions,
goals, movements, beliefs, and other people is all entailed in human men-
tal representations, which always have specific and definable information
content that refers to something or tells about something. Psychological
research that explains human behaviour based on the content of men-
tal representations is called the psychology of mental content. This type of
psychology strives to analyse the information content of human mental
representations, and based on this information, to analyse and predict
human behaviour (Saariluoma 1990, 2001, 2003).
Mental contents are important in the user psychology of thinking.
Users piece together knowledge of their environment and the usage envi-
ronment with the help of information contents in their memory (e.g.,
Nerb and Spada 2001). They control devices based on their own knowl-
edge, which is represented as the content of their mental representations.
If users lack the required information, they may use a device incorrectly
or deficiently. For example, smartphone users may miss out on an essen-
tial service if they are unaware of it or do not know how to activate it
(Kämäräinen and Saariluoma 2007). They lack the required mental con-
tents to be able to use the given services.
Interaction designers should be aware of the beliefs, assumptions,
wishes, ideas, needs, cultural engagements, and thoughts that underlie
users’ perceptions of the designed product. They should try to under-

stand how users will most likely represent the product and the situation
in question in their minds. Using question formulation of content-based
psychology (Saariluoma 2003) and paying attention to the problems of
first-time users can help identify this information.
To investigate the mind, it is necessary to elaborate on the idea of
mental contents and to coin some additional theoretical concepts. The
first thing to examine is perception. From a content-based point of view,
perception cannot be understood as the sole process of constructing men-
tal representations. Along with perception, many non-perceivable con-
tent elements also exist in mental representations. Leibniz (1704/1981)
and Kant (1781/1976) were the first to notice this substantial concep-
tual problem over 200 years ago. Following their critical tradition, how
mental representations are constructed with the help of non-perceivable
content elements (i.e., apperception) will be examined next (Saariluoma
1990, 1992, 2003).
When using technical artefacts based on information technology, it is
not always possible to see all the essential user interface components at
a glance. Users have, for example, to navigate in menu systems, which
hide the task goals under different menu bars, and imagine the hidden
elements behind the actions of the menus. Drivers also have hidden ele-
ments when they operate a car. They have to be able to imagine—to
represent in their mind—many issues that are not yet visible in the per-
ceivable environment. For example, they seldom see their final destina-
tion at the start of the journey. They read traffic signs and follow the
navigator’s instructions and, on the basis of the given information, form
mental representations of the destination.
Drivers use perceivable information elements, such as important
buildings, traffic signs, and other landmarks, to form a representation
of the situation. This representation of elements in time and space is
the basis of situation awareness (Endsley 2006: Endsley and Jones 2011;
Klein 2000), which is based on understanding the functional connection
between the perceptual signs and the non-perceivable elements of mental
representations (Saariluoma 1995). It thus includes the basic default that
it is not possible to perceive all the contents of representational elements
that effect thinking, and that not all fundamental elements that affect
thinking are perceivable. Mental representations and analyses of situa-

tions have non-spatial and non-perceptual references, for example, such
concepts as ‘possible’, ‘friction’, or ‘eternity’.
The contents of mental representations are thus independent of the
perceptual environment (Saariluoma 1990, 1995, 1997, 2001). It is
possible to imagine electrons or think about foreign trade, for example,
but it is not possible to directly perceive them. A person can perceive
an individual computer or a human being but not the computer or the
human in general. Accordingly, the supposition that representations are
composed only through perception or attention should be abandoned.
Instead, the concept of apperception can be used to explain the construc-
tion of representations in modern psychology (Saariluoma 1990, 1992,
1995, 2001, 2003; Saariluoma and Kalakoski 1997, 1998).
The basic mental function of apperception is constructing mental rep-
resentations (Kant 1781/1976; Saariluoma 1990, 1992, 1995, 2001).
Apperception selects and unifies information contents in the human
mind as a coherent representation, thus forming interpretations of mean-
ing for the physical world. It integrates conceptual information in the
memory and sensory information, introduced by perceptual processes,
into a representation that directs activity (Saariluoma 1990, 1995,
2001). Significant philosophers, such as Leibniz (1704/1981) and Kant
(1781/1976), developed the concept of apperception. In psychology, par-
ticularly Wundt (1880) and Stout (1896) and later Saariluoma (1990,
1992, 1995, 2001) have used this concept. Consequently, an exten-
sive amount of analytical work underlies the concept of apperception
(Fig. 4.5).
Apperception unifies the memory representations with task- and
situation-specific information contents. For example, medical doctors
can understand the meaning of perceptual elements called symptoms
and measurement values, as they can give these meaning in their mental
representations. Yet non-medical observers can see perceptual elements
but are unable to understand their medical significance. Thus, the same
perceptual representations can have very different consequences; apper-
ceptive processes give meaning to the perceptual elements.
Analysing mental contents provides an important perspective on
human action and thinking (Saariluoma 2003), and is thus a key concept
Fig. 4.5 Apperception—two persons apperceive and mentally represent the

same visual stimulus in a different way
in investigating HTI. It helps understand what kind of knowledge would

be important and beneficial, and what kind of knowledge would be false
and incorrect in designing easy-to-use user interfaces. Its task is also to
expose implicit mental contents to explicit research.
To Decide and to Think
Psychologists consider and investigate thought processes that emerge in
situations that have typical structures. For example, situations in which
thinking produces two or more alternative courses of action are called
decision situations, and the respective mental processes decision processes
(Kahnemann 2011; Tversky and Kahnemann 1974, 1986). Likewise,
problem-solving situations are those in which people have a goal, but do
not know how to reach it by immediately available means (Newell and
Simon 1972).
Decision making is straightforward in structure: one has to choose
between two or more alternative courses of action. This activity is impor-
tant in HTI, especially because machines cannot set goals. They are
processes, by nature, with no independent goals. Artefacts are unable to
know what is relevant. Designers and users are thus responsible for the
human decision-making element: to organize the action of the techni-
cal artefacts and systems so that their behaviour makes sense from the
human point of view (Kahnemann 2011).
In order to select goals and choose between different courses of usage
action—that is to say, to make decisions—users have to collect and inte-
grate information from different sources into a holistic representation of
the situation. Decisions can be made alone or with other people, and they
can be unified or conflict driven (Lehto and Nah 2006). In any case, the
user has to make preferences among the possible alternatives.
On a formal level, decisions are supposed to be rational, which ide-
ally means that the preferences attributed to the alternatives are per-
fect. In practice this is rare, as people tend to make the wrong decisions
(Kahnemann 2011; Tversky and Kahnemann 1974). For a number of
psychological reasons, they may overestimate the benefit they expect
to receive from the chosen alternative. The challenge for designers is to
ensure that people’s mental representations are correct and that they have
realistic expectations. This means that users’ situation awareness should
include adequate contents, which requires providing them with the nec-
essary information, in the right form.
A tragic example of decision making is provided by an aeroplane acci-
dent in Madrid in 2008. The maintenance personnel of Spanair decided
to disconnect a computer system that was about to crash. This system
was supposed to be connected to a warning system that alerts the pilots
of problems. During take-off the warning system was switched off, and
the pilots were not aware that the flaps and slats were not well configured.
As a consequence, they made a wrong decision when piloting the aircraft
because they did not have all the relevant and necessary information.
Though decision making is an essential form of human thinking, when
technical artefacts are used even more complex forms of thinking are
needed. Problem solving is most important (Newell and Simon 1972).
Complex problem solving is essential in designing technologies, but it
also has a role in using technologies. In many professions, technology use
includes complex tasks that require decision making, and carrying them
out incorrectly may lead to serious problems.
Human beings are capable of constructing very large mental represen-

tations, for example, of cities, hospitals, banking systems, and aeroplanes.
In all these cases, a large number of different content elements are com-
bined to form a whole. Reaching goals in the numerous problem-solving
and decision processes of the design of these entities presupposes good
coordination. For example, a jumbo jet includes some 7 million different
parts, and the human thought process enables its construction.
Human mental representations can be seen as large knowledge struc-
tures with contents that form coherent and consistent entities. In the
same way that narrative analysis separates different parts of a story into
independent wholes, the user interface designer must be able to distin-
guish between the essential content features of mental representations for
scrutiny.
The analysis of human mental representations and their contents is not
a mechanical process. Systems of mental contents are largely unknown
even to the object of observation. They contain a multitude of subcon-
scious layers, which usability research seeks to understand. For instance,
response to interview questions cannot be taken at face value; one also
has to be able to read the features of representations that crop up between
the lines. Thus, basing usability analysis on personal experiences is mis-
guiding. Examining these may be inspiring, but they prove rather little
about the issue as a whole. The subconscious can normally be reached
through the point of view of an external ‘third-person’ perspective.
In order to understand representation, its individual content elements
should be detached from the whole and described, just as micro-organisms
separated from other microscopic mass are pictured in bacteria research.
The limits of objects deemed essential should be accurately defined and
delineated; afterwards, it is possible to draw conclusions about their
meaning. One perspective on how the contents of mental representations
control humans when interacting with technology can be seen by looking
at the similarities and dissimilarities in the contents of representations.
The ability to solve problems is also needed in unpredictable contex-
tual conditions. Technologies can behave in ways that are impossible to
predict, and users may be forced to solve important problems in order
to make the right decisions when using technologies. The Fukushima
nuclear power plant was built by the sea in order to access the large
amount of water needed to cool the reactors. However, the designers

did not envision the possibility that a tsunami and an earthquake would
hit the nuclear power plant. This is an example of how designers should
‘design for resilience’: to be prepared for the unexpected. Understanding
the nature of human problem solving is the basis for designing any
HTI. Designing for resilience makes this demand a prerequisite.
Cognitive Processes and Effortless Interaction

In conclusion, this chapter has focused on the information required to
make it possible and easy for people to use technical artefacts. The core
of the discussion has focused on the psychology behind fluent use. The
central message is that merely generating event sequences and other
technical solutions is insufficient to design successful user interfaces;
the preconditions for smooth and unproblematic interactions must be
understood. This chapter has thus focused on analysing basic cognitive
processes when interacting with technologies. From the point of view
of interaction design, emotions, individual differences, and groups and
cultures also play an important role in successful HTI design. These will
be discussed in the forthcoming chapters.
It is essential that people are able to use new technologies. Thus, a well-
designed artefact must work appropriately and be highly usable. As has
been illustrated here, human psychological (and in particular, cognitive)
processes set different types of limits that have to be taken into account
when designing effective user interfaces.
Designing usable systems presupposes solving several levels of prob-
lems that arise from the nature of the human mind. Artefacts do not
cause them, because there are many ways of developing user interfaces
between man and machines, and it is human beings who create artefacts.
Although it is not always easy to understand the human mind and how
it functions, it should be possible to create successful user interfaces by
taking into account the characteristics of human perception, memory,
decision-making, and thinking processes.
This chapter has considered the necessity of being in perceptual and
psychomotor contact with artefacts, entailing such issues as responding
and controlling. Information about a perceptual-motor cycle provides tools

for examining these basic issues. The necessity of learning and remember-
ing raises another set of important cognitive issues concerning immediate
interaction. People have to be able to learn and remember the necessary
information in order to use technical artefacts. Designing the best condi-
tions for these processes requires applying the psychology of learning and
memory.
The next set of cognitive questions is intimately connected to human
memory. It concerns communication and comprehension. Designers create
sets of signs to be able to design sufficiently extensive variations when
using technologies. For example, programming languages provide the
means to significantly vary the behaviour of technical artefacts. Finally,
various types of thought processes, such as decision making and complex
problem solving, are relevant in HTI. It is often too easily seen that tech-
nologies are no more than simple stimulus-process artefacts that do not
require creative thinking to use. But even such a basic technology as a
chisel, for example, can be used to complete such complex tasks as creat-
ing a sculpture. The psychology of ‘being able to use’ introduces a new set
of theoretical concepts to interaction analysis, which are mostly related to
psychology, but in some cases the study of semiotics and the philosophy
of the mind can be very beneficial.
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5
Emotions, Motives, Individuals,
and Cultures in Interaction
Cognitive aspects of the human mind form the foundations of solving

usability problems. However, being able to use a technology is not the only
critical psychological question in the design of successful HTI. In addition to
understanding users’ capabilities, it is equally important to comprehend
their preferences and what they want to accomplish with the help of tech-
nologies. Knowledge of the dynamic mind—in particular human emotions,
motives, and personality—helps address such ‘liking and wanting’ concerns
in HTI design.
Though people can use a given technology, such as an app in a smart-

phone or a medical instrument, it does not yet mean they like to use it.
It may be that they simply discard it as quickly as possible and replace
it with another because they are not motivated to use it. It may also be
that the designed technology does not attract the target audience, even
though objectively they need it. People may find the technology ugly,
unfashionable or even stigmatizing, and therefore do not want to adopt
it at all. It may also be that the technology does not fit in with peoples’
values, self-image or lifestyle, and is therefore avoided. These questions of
like and want, which concern personal and group emotions and motives,
introduce a number of new design discourses (Brave and Nass 2009;

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53047-9_5
Hassenzahl 2011; Helander and Khalid 2006; Nagamashi 2011; Norman

2004). These discourses as a whole can be called dynamic user psychology
(emotions, motives, and personality), as their scientific background is in
dynamic psychology.
The influence of emotions, motives, and personality should not be
underestimated, as it can affect the choices of a large group of people,
and even of society. For example, after the Three Mile Island (1979),
Chernobyl (1986), Fosmark (2006), and Fukushima (2011) accidents,
people felt unsafe and were uncertain about nuclear energy, and partly
lost their trust in this type of technology (Fig. 5.1). People’s situational
assessments changed as the risk became visible.
Fig. 5.1 After nuclear accidents people lost their trust in this type of
technology
5 Emotions, Motives, Individuals, and Cultures in Interaction 139
The headlines in the media, and concrete actions such as limiting the
distribution of milk or the recommendation to avoid eating fish, made
the consequences of the accidents concrete in everyday life. This con-
creteness is essential in changing situational assessments and attitudes
(Kahnemann 2011; Tversky and Kahnemann 1974). In the case of
Fukushima, the concreteness of the effects was further intensified by
social media (Friedman 2011). People no longer found nuclear energy a
good solution and fought against it. This resistance, caused by changing
opinions, finally forced industry and many governments to take a more
critical position towards nuclear energy.
Questions of likes and wants are vital in understanding why people
accept and adopt new technologies. They are intimately related to emo-
tions, motives, and personality, which are the basic psychological con-
cepts that explain the issues of acceptance and adoption (Brave and Nass
2009; Hassenzahl 2011; Nagamashi 2011; Norman 2004). These aspects
of the human mind are considered under the concepts of dynamic psy-
chology to separate them from cognitive issues (Neisser 1967).
Historically, the concept of dynamic psychology or psychodynam-
ics arises from the clinical personality theories of Freud (1917/2000)
and Jung (1999). Since both of these luminaries are psychoanalysts, it
has occasionally been said that the term ‘psychodynamic’ refers to psy-
choanalysis. This usage of the word ‘dynamic’ in psychology neverthe-
less misses the fact that many other psychologists have also worked to
improve understanding of emotions, motives, and personality (Neisser
1967). The most recent paradigm of dynamic psychology is positive psy-
chology. It focuses on such issues as well-being, contentment, satisfaction,
happiness, and the flow of experience, which have proven to be impor-
tant in many contexts of user experience (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi
2000).
This chapter uses dynamic psychology to include the psychology of
emotions, motives, personality, and intercultural issues. The concept of
dynamic refers here to the ‘forces’ that control and direct human actions,
but which also give them ‘mental energy’. These make people act in a
defined way and give them the power to meet and overcome different
obstacles.
The main issues discussed in this chapter are:
• User experience and emotional usability;

• Motivation and the will to use;
• Individuals and personality; and
• Interacting groups and cultures.
From a metascientific point of view, the task of interaction research

is to find rational grounds for solving interaction design problems. This
presupposes investigation of general psychological phenomena and con-
necting this knowledge to finding and grounding solutions for techno-
logical problems. Following this line of thinking, it is possible to discuss
on a scientific level the role of the psychology of dynamic interaction
(i.e., the roles of emotions, motives, and personality in HTI).
Emotions and the Mind
Emotions form a central dimension of the human mind (Damasio 2005;
LeDoux 1998; Rolls 2000). A better understanding of emotional pro-
cesses in the analyses of HTI is essential for the development of the field.
The main aspects of human emotional behaviour can offer designers
essential information in their search for good design solutions.
Emotions form a central action control system in the human mind
and have therefore a focal role in explaining people’s behaviour (Ekman
1999; Frijda 1986, 1988, 2007; Oatley et al. 2006). Evolutionarily,
emotions constitute a relatively primitive system, and many characteris-
tics of human emotions can be found in other animals as well (Darwin
1872/1998; Panksepp 1998). Emotional processing is mainly centred in
the subcortical areas of the human brain, which form a primitive (but in
many ways the most fundamental) control system in the mind (MacLean
1990; Luria 1973; Rolls 2000).
Emotions are holistic by nature. In addition to psychological aspects
(Ekman 1999; Frijda 1986, 1988; Oatley et al. 2006; Power and Dalgleish
1997), they include important biological dimensions (Panksepp 1998;
Rolls 2000), as well as a number of important social features (Eisenberg
2000; Frijda 1986, 1988; Lazarus and Lazarus 1994; Niedenthal et al.
2006). In research it is good to consider the relevance of all aspects when

solving design problems.
In the mind, emotions are associated with a moment in time. While
people speak, for example, about general happiness, in the mind happi-
ness is always linked to a particular situation. Emotional state is the core
theoretical concept that expresses how people feel in a certain context of
emotional mental representation at a certain time. It illustrates the emo-
tional aspect of a prevailing mental representation. Emotional states are
thus aspects of mental states, and they bring with them some aspects of
the mental contents of mental representations.
Emotional states consist of a number of basic dimensions. The first is
the momentary intensity of emotions: arousal (Kahnemann 1973; Power
and Dalgleish 1997). There is a graded structure typical to all human
emotions, and the intensity or level of arousal is used to express how
emotions vary. Irritation, for example, is an emotional state that expresses
a negative feeling towards an object, person, or state of affairs (Bono and
Vey 2007; Norman 2004). Hate, violence, and rage can be seen as more
intense versions of the same emotion. The level of human performance
depends on the intensity of the prevailing emotional state (James 1890;
Kahnemann 1973). When arousal is very low, as in sleep, the human
capacity is also low. When arousal increases, the performance capacity
also increases. However, after a certain point, increasing arousal no longer
improves the level of performance, and performance starts to deteriorate.
When in a panic, for example, people seldom act in a rational manner
as their cognitive capacity has decreased. Understanding this principle,
called the Yerkes–Dodson law, and other aspects of arousal supports the
design of technical artefacts and systems that are meant to be used in crit-
ical situations or under pressure (Kahnemann 1973; Salehi et al. 2010).
This information implies that critical safety systems should be simple and
people should be extensively trained to use them.
Another dimension that concerns emotional states is the length of the
duration of an emotion. A person’s response to a certain incident may
be very short, such as a rapid reaction to a surprise (Power and Dalgleish
1997). Sometimes, in technology design, this kind of surprise-related
emotional state is called a wow effect. The duration of an emotional state
can also be long, and last from weeks to even years, as in the case of
different moods (Power and Dalgleish 1997). Finally, there are emotional
states that belong to one’s personality, which represent attitudes or features
of personality rather than affective emotional responses to the surround-
ing environment (Gross 1998; Niedenthal et al. 2006). A good example
of a long-lasting emotional tendency is temperament, which is formed in
infancy and early childhood and changes only slowly afterwards (Clark
and Watson 1999).
When focusing on emotional states in the design, one should also
investigate the actual emotional content. Emotional states can differ in
their information content. Euphoria, for example, differs from depression
in its positive nature, and sadness in its negative nature. Consequently,
technical artefacts may include different aspects of emotional content,
for example when considering the feelings aroused by the art design of a
product. In this kind of analysis, two new dimensions of human emotion
become relevant: emotional valence illustrates the negativity or positiv-
ity of the emotion, and emotional theme refers to its general contents
(Lazarus 1991; Niedenthal et al. 2006; Oatley et al. 2006; Saariluoma
and Jokinen 2014).
The concept of valence arises from a pair of opposite emotions—
one positive and one negative (Lazarus and Lazarus 1994; Niedenthal
et al. 2006; Schmitt and Mees 2000; Spinoza 1675/1955). For exam-
ple, joy is a positive emotion and sorrow its corresponding negative
counterpart. In fact, emotional valence is strongly connected to the
pleasantness or unpleasantness of the emotional state, and it deter-
mines the desirability of emotional contacts. The positivity of an
emotional contact is often seen as imperative in HTI (Jordan 2000;
Hassenzahl 2011).
People have many different types of positive and negative emotions,
and valence is not the only dimension along which the contents of emo-
tions can be analysed (Lazarus 1991; Power and Dalgleish 1997). The
concept of emotional theme—or core emotional theme—is also needed
to cover all the aspects of emotional states.
An example may clarify the difference between valence and theme. The
feeling of joy in using technologies usually embodies a sense of positive
emotions such as wellness, commitment, and positivity (Mayring 2000).
Trust is also a positive emotion that, in the context of HTI, refers to
human reliance on a given technology. Thus, these two emotions—joy
and trust—have the same positive valence but different themes. Hence,
the theme defines the accurate contents of emotional states in a more
sophisticated manner than valence (Oatley et al. 2006).
Because emotions determine the subjective meaning of a situation to
people, they are closely connected to the tendencies of human action
(Frijda 1986, 1988; Ortony et al. 1990). They indicate the personal
meaning of the target and the possible action that people might carry out
(Frijda 1986, 1988; Lazarus and Lazarus 1994). The feeling of fear, for
example, makes people flee, whereas curiosity often results in approach-
ing a target. Because these emotional characteristics are built into HTI
processes, emotions are a critical element of situational representations.
Emotional responses to things or incidents are not static by nature,
and thus do not stay the same forever. Instead, human emotional reac-
tions continue to develop during a person’s life span (Oatley et al. 2006;
Lazarus 1991; Power and Dalgleish 1997). For instance, people who
reacted hastily or aggressively in certain incidents in their youth may
behave moderately and calmly in the same situations in maturity, as their
emotional make-up has altered. This process of emotional development
is called emotional learning.
Emotional learning processes change the contents of emotions stored
in the memory—so-called emotional schemas—which people use when
they select information during perception and build memory representa-
tions (Beck 1976; Bower 1981; Williams et al. 1997). Emotional learn-
ing is common in HTI. A user who once regarded mobile services as
redundant may later become an advocate of this kind of technology after
having learned to use and understand its practical value. In this case, a
change in an emotional meaning is explained by a change in the contents
of emotional schemas that are used by apperception to construct emo-
tional states.
Appraisal: Cognition in Emotions

Emotional processes are closely linked to cognition. An emotional state
is not activated by accident; it is based on an individual’s understanding
of the current situation. If the situation is cognitively seen as risky or
threatening, the emotional states are constructed based on danger-related
emotions, such as excitement, fear, and courage. If positive relations

dominate the situation, emotional states are characterized by relaxation,
happiness, humour, and benevolence. Before the situation-related emo-
tional representation is constructed in the human mind its meaning and
the cognitive content must be clear to the individual (Frijda 2007).
The psychological process of linking a situation’s cognitive and emo-
tional representations is called appraisal.1 Appraisal is a core process in
the psychology of emotions (Frijda 1986, 1988, 2007; Moors et al. 2013;
Weiner 1985; Scherer 2005), which is often defined as the representation
of emotional significance for the experiencing person, and the associ-
ated emotional value of cognitions and actions (Frijda 1986; Oatley et al.
2006; Ortony et al. 1990). Emotions associated with technologies are
relevant in the study of HTI. When performing a similar task, one user
may feel anger for failing in the task, while another may feel guilt (Myhill
2003).
The connection of cognitions and emotions is a central issue in user
interface design. If people cannot use a technical artefact effectively they
become frustrated (Saariluoma and Jokinen 2014), and this activated
emotional state is connected to the cognitive characteristics of the given
situation. For example, forms and colours may activate cognitive repre-
sentations, which in turn engender relevant positive or negative emotions
(Norman 2004).
The outcome of appraisal is a mental representation with cognitive
and emotional dimensions. For example, human cognitive beliefs are
connected to their active emotional states. If users do not think they
can learn to use e-learning technology they become frustrated (Juutinen
and Saariluoma 2007). Thus, cognitive assessment leads to emotional
frustration.
These dimensions are not always rationally connected, as people may
emotionally represent situations in an inadequate manner and in the case
of technology usage, even misrepresent the technologies or their uses both
cognitively and emotionally. This may affect the feeling of self-efficacy,
that is, an individual’s confidence in his or her ability to successfully per-
1
Appraisal can also be seen as an apperceptive process associating emotional values with cognitions.
form a task (Bandura 1977, 1986, 1997). Mistaken beliefs of one’s own
incapacity may even lead to a self-fulfilling misconception.
Repeated failures create a negative atmosphere and lower self-efficacy,
whereas success in using technology improves self-efficacy and generates
positive feelings and pride. This makes people more willing to accept, use,
and train to use new technologies to achieve their goals (Juutinen and
Saariluoma 2007). The example illustrates how appraisal is significant
in indicating personal meanings of technologies to people, how people
differentiate their emotions, as well as what their behavioural responses
are on both the cognitive and physiological levels (Ellsworth and Scherer
2003; Moors et al. 2013). Thus, appraisal connects cognitive evaluation
with emotions and actual human actions. Individual preferences and
selections of actions are constructed based on representations made in
appraisal.
The main question in appraisal-based HTI research is to define what
kinds of cognitions activate certain kinds of emotional states. When
people interact with a user interface, human mental representation and
the respective emotional representation are created. These cognitive and
emotional representations control human actions and define whether
people like and accept a technology. Thus even a small emotionally mis-
placed detail in a user interface can easily decrease the value of the tech-
nology in people’s minds. One the whole, appraisal can also be seen as
an apperception process, as it constructs from its parts the contents of
mental representations.
Emotional Aspects of HTI

A number of paradigmatic concepts and discourses have been developed
to analyse the emotional aspects of technology usage (Hassenzahl 2011;
Helander and Khalid 2006; Nagamashi 2011; Norman 2004; Jordan
2000). Some of them discuss emotional features in products that activate
users’ emotional states, while others are interested in what takes place in
users’ minds and what the main characteristics of technology-relevant
emotional states are.
A classic example of emotion-based thinking in technology design is

Kansei engineering, which applies traditional psycho-semantic methods
to analyse emotional aspects in different technological and product con-
texts (Nagamashi 2011). There are also other paradigms such as emotional
and affective usability research (Helander and Khalid 2006; Norman
1999, 2004), user experience research (Hassenzahl 2011; Kuniavsky
2003; Norman 1999), affective design, pleasurable design (Jordan 2000),
and funology (Monk et al. 2002). All of these are relevant approaches in
investigating emotional interaction. These closely related scientific para-
digms have illustrated the importance of emotional dynamics in technol-
ogy design thinking (Helander and Khalid 2006; Kuniavsky 2003).
The relevance of emotional interaction design is a recognized chal-
lenge among designers (Brave and Nass 2009; Hassenzahl 2011; Norman
2004), the significance of which can be seen in many design outcomes
of information technology. A great deal of effort is put into designing
products with faddish and distinguishable forms and symbolic values
(Nagamashi 2011). This trend can be clearly seen in consumer products,
and even robots are designed with more and more humanized elements,
such as warm smiles and pleasant voices.
In traditional industrial design, when creating brands, designers bring
out certain product characteristics to create particular emotional states
(Stenros 2005). Scandinavian design, for example, is known for its mini-
malist, functional, and practical forms that reflect people’s relationship
with nature and the wild (Englund and Schmidt 2013). These forms can
be found in the works of such famous designers as Arne Jacobsen, Poul
Henningsen, and Alvar Aalto. The pursuit of the ideals of functionality
and practicality can be seen in the designs of information technology,
too. Many devices are meant to represent the feeling of simplicity and
effectiveness, at least from the usability point of view.
Emotional interaction does not, however, concern only the immediate
use of a product or system. Technologies should also respond to emo-
tions such as trust and confidence, which also reflect people’s attitudes
towards technology in general. People have to trust that the given tech-
nology operates as promised, and that it will not create or exacerbate any
practical or ethical problems. For example, in order to efficiently serve
citizens in society, technical applications and systems increasingly collect
private information about people (e.g., personal codes and account infor-
mation). Citizens have to be able to trust that this information is well
protected, and that no one can use maliciously. In the case of smart cards
for example, users need to be confident that the system will reliably and
correctly identify them and not permit access to any other users.
Negative trust in technology is embodied in such emotional states as
technophobia (Brosnan 2002), the dislike of technology. When confront-
ing new technology, people may feel incapable of using it. Novice and
elderly users often deem poor interaction to be the consequence of their
own inability to use a given technology. At workplaces, poor usability
may even lead to psychosomatic stress among people who feel that they
have been coerced into working with systems they cannot handle (Arnetz
and Wiholm 1997). Technophobia can disappear as a consequence of
direct (Kelley and Charness 1995) or indirect (Rogers and Fisk 2000)
positive experiences and improving skills (Ellis and Allaire 1999).
The concept of trust illustrates the connection between emotions and
cognitions. In the context of appraisal, when people trust each other or a
technology, emotions and cognitions are connected. On a cognitive level,
a person may be aware that the information security system installed on
her computer is powerful enough to prevent all virus attacks. The reasons
for believing this are based on, for example, previous experiences with
online services and information offered by computer support services and
the media. This information constitutes the knowledge base that creates
a feeling of trust. In an immediate usage situation (using a banking sys-
tem, for example), the feeling of trust is realized as determined input
actions when operating the user interface. In a broader context outside
the immediate use of the system, trust defines the overall attitude towards
banking systems, for example at the moment of purchase.
Emotions are present every minute of the day, and their influence is
widespread in HTI as well. For example, an extreme case of the influ-
ence of emotions in Internet dependency—the compulsory and exces-
sive use of the Internet in the form of computer games or social media
(Block 2008). The addiction develops as a result of the short-term plea-
sure enjoyed when playing games or surfing the net (i.e., when the device
is turned on). Internet dependency is classified as a psychiatric illness,
which requires professional intervention. In South Korea alone, it has
been assessed as one of the most serious public health issues, as it has
been claimed to be connected to, for example, childhood obesity. The
ever-increasing time spent in front of the Internet or a computer game
change eating habits, increasing the number of snacks and the amount of
unhealthy food consumed. Also, when spending many hours a day on the
Internet, young people are constantly tired and unable to concentrate in
school, as a result of which they fail their exams.
On the grounds of knowledge of the nature of people’s relevant emo-
tional states, it would be possible to generate rational design goals for
technologies, for example to assess aesthetic requirements for the product
and to look for emotionally inspiring and satisfactory ways of using tech-
nologies. Recent developments to encourage personal health monitoring
systems are a good example. The field of emotional user psychology opens
up an extensive set of design questions and challenges, of which only a
small percentage has yet been investigated.
User Motivation: Biological, Cognitive,

Emotional, and Social
In addition to emotions, dynamic psychology is concerned with human
motivation, which in psychology refers to the mental mechanism or
forces driving, maintaining and controlling human goal-directed actions
(Atkinson 1964; Cofer and Appley 1968; Franken 2002; Laming 2008)—
that is, the conative dimension of the mind (Hildgard 1980). Motivation
is thus relevant in explaining why people use technologies and in under-
standing to what extent different design solutions help motivate people
to use particular products and systems. As mentioned earlier, motivation
refers to people’s energy to pursue their goals. In the context of HTI, one
can speak about user motivation.
Examining motives provides answers to the question of why people
carry out different tasks. Motivation research focuses on people’s goals
and how energetic their pursuit of these goals is. People join e-courses to
acquire different skills, from which they could benefit later in life. In this
example, the goal state of acquiring knowledge for the future forms the
primary motivational aspect, and attending a course forms the secondary

motivational aspect.
Research on users’ motives can offer fundamental knowledge to sup-
port design decisions. One of the most important focus areas in this
context is the introduction of new technology (Dvash and Mannheim
2001; Shelton et al. 2002; Venkatesh 2000). In the HTI literature, an
outstanding example of technology introduction is the model of technol-
ogy acceptance (TAM) (Davis 1989; Venkatesh 2000). The basic idea is
that perceived usefulness and ease of use are crucial factors in explaining
how motivated people are to accept a given technology. ‘Perceived’ (or
conceived) refers to the cognitive representation of one’s ability to use a
technology.
Motivation has biological, cognitive, emotional, and social elements,
and it opens up a new independent discourse in research into the human
mind (Franken 2002). Understanding motivation is central in analysing
why a defined goal is important for a certain group of people. For exam-
ple, the motivation to use a product or system is present throughout the
action that is carried out. Thus the motive is not a cause for action; rather,
it is the action itself. Therefore, designing how to maintain motivation
is as important as designing how to spark the initial motivation to use
something. The Rubik’s cube was a global success in its time, but it—like
many other products—has lost much of its popularity since. To avoid a
loss of interest among users, the motivation to use technology should be
more rigorously examined as part of the lifespan design of products and
systems.
Human needs form the basis of human motivation. People generally
pursue the satisfaction of their needs (Maslow 1954).2 Different theo-
ries of need hierarchy, such as Maslow’s (1954) well-known model, have
been presented in the literature of ergonomics and interaction. Maslow’s
(1954) idea was that some human needs are more basic than others,
and that only after satisfying such basic, lower-level needs such as thirst,
2
It is important to understand the distinction between the two concepts: engineering interaction
books routinely entail the concept of ‘user need’, which is an intuitive concept that has only an
indirect connection to psychological needs. Thus it is important to separate ‘user need’ from human
needs. The purpose of technology is to have a function, often related to very complex systems of
human life, and therefore it should not be simplified to such overall concepts as user need.
hunger, and sex is one able to proceed to higher-level needs, such as self-
actualization. The important dimension of Maslow’s work is his concrete
introduction to the connection between needs and motives, although
modern research on motivation has illustrated that it cannot be concep-
tualized solely in terms of static need hierarchies.
The basic structure of needs and motivation has been described by
applying the concept of the depletion–repletion cycle (Toates 1986). In
this description, human physiological needs activate people towards cer-
tain goals, which enable them to satisfy their needs. The state before sat-
isfaction can be called desire, as it has a goal but not necessarily the means
to reach it. When a person finds a way to satisfy a need, the need state
is deactivated or depleted. When the need has been satisfied, the action
can be shifted to another direction. In everyday life, the mechanisms of
satisfying needs can be complicated. People may save money to use later
in life without having any clear plan about how they intend to use it, or
what kinds of needs it would satisfy.
Biological psychology and neuroscience can be illuminating in the analy-
sis of motives (Berridge 2004). Likewise, neural phenomena can offer
the possibility of objectively understanding many aspects of motiva-
tion when people use technologies, although biological concepts and
theories alone cannot explain human motivation in technology usage.
This kind of research can be carried out in the field of neuroergonomics
(Parasuraman and Rizzo 2006), which uses biopsychological techniques
to analyse needs and motives. For example, an individual’s heart rate can
be used to analyse stress during technology use (Anttonen and Surakka
2007).
Emotions also have a central role in understanding motivation, as they
inform people about needs and other motivational states. The concept
of pleasure, for example, is usually seen as a motivational goal towards a
certain state. People mostly pursue pleasurable states, and products that
help them achieve this state are considered favourable and motivating
(Hassenzahl 2011; Jordan 2000). For example, the need for water evokes
thirst, which makes people start to look for a drink. Thus the concept
of pleasure, in addition to being an important goal, is also an emotional
state. Depending on the situation, there can of course be numerous other
emotional states that explain the motives behind certain actions.
Engagement is another example of motivating emotional states (Porges

2003). In the HTI context, engagement refers to a commitment to a
product or brand. In sports, for example, engagement to certain products
is obvious (Dickey 2005). Engagement involves long-lasting motivation,
and explains why people choose some products rather than others.
An additional perspective on motivation in HTI is revealed by the
differences between motives connected to self-based emotional states.
Motivation is a combination of two types of factors influencing human
actions: extrinsic and intrinsic motives (Deci et al. 1999). Extrinsic motives
involve different external factors that influence human motivation. For
example, sports exercise can be accomplished for extrinsic reasons such
as improved fitness or better appearance. Intrinsic motives, on the other
hand, are internal to the individual. In the case of sports exercise, motives
such as enjoyment and competence can be intrinsic. In sports, intrin-
sic motives remain a more critical factor in sustained physical activity,
whereas extrinsic motives often fail to sustain exercise over time. A person
cannot always directly influence extrinsic motives. For example, employ-
ers mostly decide on salary and other organizational incentives, and
employees have little ability to influence them. The motivation to use
technologies can also be extrinsic, so that people use technical artefacts
because their employer expects them to.
Intrinsic motives are internal, and people set these motives for them-
selves. For example, the desire to express oneself is an important motivat-
ing force in the early adoption of new technologies (Kim et al. 2001).
Students, for example, are more motivated to put effort into learning to
use technology because of the challenges of the tasks, rather than because
of some course rewards. Similarly, playful and emotionally positive inter-
action with a computer may be motivating. For example, a computer
game should motivate players intrinsically if they are to be expected to
continue with it for any length of time (Venkatesh 2000).
Intrinsic motivation is a valuable asset in marketing any product. It
includes several forms, such as self-actualization and self-determination.
Maslow (1954) argued that self-actualization has a vital role in the human
control of actions (May 2009). Later, Bandura (1986) and Ryan and
Deci (2000) demonstrated that self-determination and self-efficacy can
explain how intrinsic motives are more dominant than extrinsic motives.
The former concept refers to how people assess their capacity to cope
with a task and the latter to how competence, relatedness, and autonomy
form the core of intrinsic motivation.
Self-determination is a valuable motive when introducing new tech-
nologies to people. People must have the right to decide what kind of
technology they want to use. Although this may not always be possible,
forcing consumers to use new service systems, for example, easily leads to
rejection and negative attitudes towards the service provider in question.
Without a right to decide, extrinsic motivation becomes dominant and
may weaken the likelihood of successful technology adoption (Reinders
et al. 2008).
Human motives cannot only be explained on emotional grounds, for
they also have cognitive dimensions. Perhaps the best-known link between
cognition and motivation is cognitive dissonance, which refers to a moti-
vational state dominated by conflicting cognitions. For example, people
may want to buy a new technical device, but because it is said to have
been produced unethically, they may be afraid of losing face by buying it.
Other people may have purchased a product but feel uncertain about the
wisdom of their decision (Kahnemann 2011).
Cognitive aspects of motivation can be associated with the scope that
technology can offer in improving users’ tasks. In organizations, for
example, people are willing to use new technologies if they understand
how these new tools will improve upon their earlier practices (Orlikowski
2000). Yet poor understanding of the outcome of technology use may
cause opposition. Such cognitive phenomena as intention, learning, per-
ceived self-efficacy, and usefulness are factors that explain the cognitive
aspects of motivation when using technologies (Yi and Hwang 2003).
Finally, there is a social aspect of motivation (Dunning 2004; Ryan and
Deci 2000). In fact, numerous motives in human life are social by nature.
Social dimensions of technology use can often explain why people are
motivated, or why they are less motivated when using certain technical
artefacts. These themes are focal today thanks to computer-supported
cooperative work, and especially to social media applications such as
blogs, forums, wikis, and social networks (Tapscott and Williams 2008).
Social media has important functions in the formation of mod-
ern social motives. Social motives become visible in goal setting, goal
contents, and the choices made between different goals (Franken 2002;
Karniol and Ross 1996). This is an important phenomenon, for example,
in creating brands and organizing people around them. Typical examples
are communities around Apple or Linux (Himanen 2010). On this level,
motives can be formulated as goal-related beliefs, and emotions as either
congruent or incongruent with establishing goals (Franken 2002).
Because people use technologies to support their actions, motivation
is a central field in the investigation of human–technology relations. The
motivation to use technologies (and the resulting success rate) relies to a
large extent on human self-image (Santos-Pinto and Sobel 2005). If one
does not believe in one’s competence to use a technology, the positive
learning cycle comes to a stop.
In HTI literature to date, relatively little interest has been paid to
motivation compared to discussions about such matters as usability.
However, as can be seen from the analysis above, when developing HTI
research and design, it is essential to put more effort into connecting
general knowledge about human motivation with specific and important
HTI problems.
Personality, Technology Generation,

and Interaction Dynamics
Personality is the last concept to be discussed in the context of dynamic
psychology. It has a central role in investigating HTI. The psychology
of personality studies human individuals as integrated wholes (Mischel
1993). It also focuses on the cognitive, emotional, and conative (or moti-
vational) dimensions of the mind. The psychology of personality asks
what a person is or what a person is like, and identifies similarities and
dissimilarities between individuals (Hogan et al. 2000; Mischel 1993;
Pervin and Oliver 1997). It also concentrates on stable response patterns
that individuals have in different types of situations. In modern psycho-
logical terms, this refers to the stable content of individuals’ internal
representations.
The core questions of the psychology of personality have great sig-

nificance in user psychological interaction analyses. Human personality
explains how people as a whole consider technologies. Such elements as
dispositions, attitudes, habits, appeals, beliefs, values, and aspirations, for
example, vary depending on the person—and even within an individual
over longer periods of time. Hence, answers to many questions essential
to user research can be based on the concepts and methods of the psy-
chology of personality. This kind of knowledge enables one to segment
and characterize target user groups, as well as study what kind of techni-
cal artefacts they would need and accept.
The definition of different user groups has become increasingly
important in recent interaction design. In addition to making devices
that people can use, attention is paid to the characteristics of individu-
als in the target group by analysing personality features and other dif-
ferences using factorial methods (Hogan et al. 2000; Mischel 1973). A
well-known example is the so-called Big-5 theory, which focuses on five
basic personality traits: extraversion, agreeableness (or warmth), consci-
entiousness, stability, and openness to experience (or intelligence) (see,
e.g., McCrae and Costa 1987; Wiggins 1996). In Big-5 analysis, based
on their answers to test questions, people are placed differently in this
five-dimensional space.
Knowledge of personality types can be used to target products to differ-
ent types of consumers. Users’ or consumers’ commitment to a product
may depend on different aspects of their personalities (Kim et al. 2001).
Some product features may appeal to many users because they serve as
status indicators and have symbolic value (Caprara et al. 2001; Fournier
1998). Analysis of these kinds of factors that connect the notions of per-
sonality and the user is still in its infancy, but it is self-evident that per-
sonality is a key concept in considering how people as whole accept and
use technologies.
An individual’s personality also reflects a wide range of possible mental
contexts, including attitudes and values. Attitudes are acquired tendencies
to apperceive situations in a certain way. For instance, Linux specialists
may regard their own operating system as different from that of a nor-
mal microcomputer user (Himanen 2010; Moody 2002). Values are an
important closely related concept or type of attitude that indicate what a

person considers to be good (e.g., Runes 1983).
Attitudes and values can also be seen as individual and personality
factors. They are relatively stable over a person’s lifetime. Therefore, they
have a fundamental role in how people experience reality, receive infor-
mation and make decisions (Aiken 2002), and they also hold a central
position in consumer psychology (Jacoby et al. 1998) and the closely
related field of consumer psychology.
The formative period in life, the period of adolescence and young adult-
hood, is critical in terms of attitudes towards future technology. During
this period, cognitive abilities and experiences influence each other for
further maturation. Accordingly, the understanding of how to use tech-
nology (present and future) is built on the kind of knowledge that is
typical for that cohort as a technology generation (Docampo Rama 2001;
Bouma et al. 2009). The concept of technology generations is thus built
on the idea that technology that is available in one’s formative period cre-
ates practices and mental models that will later affect how people encode
new technology. From this point of view, designers have to be aware of
the potential generation-specific ability gap between users when creating
new types of user interfaces and interaction models. Appreciating this
generational difference does not only concern the design of tangible user
interfaces but also understanding such issues as privacy and trust, for
instance, in the usage of the technology in question (Leikas et al. 2011).
Attitudes form an interesting group of phenomena in analysing
human mentality (Osborne et al. 2003). Their stability makes it pos-
sible to use them to explain many different types of phenomena in HTI
(Aiken 2002; Zimbardo and Leippe 1991), and to forecast certain forms
of human behaviour rather accurately.
Attitudes are activated automatically, and they control actions; they are
stable, but not immutable (Aiken 2002; Osborne et al. 2003; Zimbardo
and Leippe 1991). Attitude is often a system of beliefs linked to emo-
tional models that govern the selection of information, in the sense that
information that is contrary to prevailing attitudes is rejected, and infor-
mation that is positive is adopted (Aiken 2002). A special branch called
attitude psychology can help solve problems caused by users’ expecta-
tions. For example, company image is dependent on customers’ attitudes.
A negative image swiftly becomes expensive even for the most powerful
companies (Teo 2002).
Change in attitudes is one of the core questions of user psychology.
New functions in the ICT field are often adopted relatively slowly. For
example, information networks existed long before they became widely
used in the 1990s, and mobile phones were also quite slowly adopted for
everyday use. Today one of the field’s greatest challenges is interesting
users in new mobile services. These problems are not only technical; the
accompanying attitudes also set important challenges for designers.
Cultures and Their Differences

People as individuals are always surrounded by numerous groups of other
people, the largest of which can be called cultures: ways of life that are
shared by groups of people. In the contexts of cultures, people reach their
adulthood and internalize different norms and values. The mental con-
tents of a culture thus become parts of the mental contents of people
living in this culture (Matsumoto 2000). HTI design must consider that
the development of ICT is a global phenomenon that affects different
cultures in different ways.
Culture can be seen as an integrated system of customs, symbols, lan-
guages or dialects, values, and beliefs (Geertz 1973; Harris 1979). The
system can be national, organizational, religious or symbolic, or even vir-
tual. In different cultures people may differ essentially from each other;
they have their own myths and legends, and different ways of solving
social problems, for instance.
Cultures have their own institutional ways of solving production prob-
lems and defining the position of individuals (Castells 1997). They are
often seen as geographic and even national systems. However, not all cul-
tural issues are localizable. Organizations have their cultures, young and
old people have their cultures, and ethnic groups, male and female as well
as people with specific skills such as experts all have their own cultures
(Hofstede 1980). Therefore people do not belong to only one kind of
culture at a time. They belong to groups, sub-cultures (such as teens), or
organizational cultures (Hofstede 1980) and follow the values and ways
of behaving that are typical to that culture; people of the same culture
often share mental representations and underlying patterns of thought.
Characteristics that are significant in one culture are often less important
in others, which creates challenges for HTI design.
For example, cultures often have different approaches to communica-
tion and semiotics such as cultural symbols, terms, and even the meaning
of colours. Three principles are particularly useful when designing for
cultural diversity (Matsumoto 2000). First, it is important to understand
the main principles and findings of cross-cultural psychology. Second,
one has to understand other cultures and their internal logic. Finally, it is
essential to make realistic case-specific conclusions and avoid stereotypi-
cal thinking.
The notion of culture will eventually change as people become increas-
ingly networked, creating more or less global cultures (Castells 1997) in
which an endless number of people share an interest and form associ-
ated social groups. ICT has already changed cultures with its capacity
to connect people in new ways (Castells 1997). Social media has cre-
ated numerous sub-cultures and joined people globally with a similar
mindset. Geographical location, though not meaningless, is no longer
as important as it used to be (Castells 1997). Anticipating cultural and
lifestyle changes is essential when designing for the future.
The Dynamic Nature of the Human Mind

This chapter describes how the human mind always operates in a holistic
manner. Considering dynamic HTI and users’ minds, cognitive, emo-
tional, motivational, and personality phenomena are always present and
linked together. Cognitions influence emotions, while emotions influence
motives and personality sets preconditions on all of them. Personality also
connects emotions and cognitions to such wider issues as social groups
and culture. In science, it is normal to set aside other dimensions and
only concentrate on one specific issue of a larger phenomenon, but in
technology design it would be impossible to create a successful outcome
without taking into account all the above aspects of HTI.
The theoretical concept of mental representation is useful for consid-

ering cognitive and dynamic problems (Markman 1999; Newell and
Simon 1972). Mental representations always have both cognitive and
emotional aspects, both of which are central in explaining motives and
attitudes. They can have cognitive contents such as perceptions, beliefs
and thoughts, but they also have emotional dimensions, such as amiabil-
ity, anger, or envy. Finally, the contents of human mental representations
depend on one’s personal life history and other personal characteristics.
Research into the dynamic aspects of interaction offers new perspec-
tives in interaction design. In many design challenges, for example when
designing new media services, it is helpful to have knowledge about users
as personas. Dynamic processes direct and maintain people’s activities,
and can thus explain and clarify the solutions to many important design
problems (cf. Ambrose and Kulik 1999; Carlson et al. 2000; Greenberg
and Baron 2000).
The overview of dynamic interaction presented in this chapter is not
meant to be exhaustive; it is intended to introduce the versatility and
scope of the problems of dynamic interaction in order to highlight the
challenges of dynamic user psychology and manage design thinking in
product development.
User experience can be used to illustrate the HTI phenomenon in terms
of mental representations. An increasing number of literatures on differ-
ent aspects of user experience are produced (Norman 2004; Law et al.
2008), but the concept is still rather ambiguous and elusive, thus far
lacking sufficient empirical research or an exact definition (Hassenzahl
2011; Hassenzahl and Tractinsky 2006). However, experiences are con-
scious cognitive and emotional states of mind, and thus the concept of
user experience is relevant when considering the connections between
dynamic and cognitive aspects of the user’s mind during interactions.
Like mental representations, experiences also have cognitive and emo-
tional contents. Cognitive contents include perceptions, remembrances,
and thoughts. Understanding why people are motivated to use certain
technologies requires knowledge of the emotional and motivational con-
tents of their experiences.
Motives and emotions have multifaceted roles in actions (Deci et al.
1999; Franken 2002; Maslow 1954; Ryan and Deci 2000; Switzer and
Sniezek 1991). The interconnectedness of needs, emotions, and motives

is clear in various motive phenomena based on rewards and punishments
(Franken 2002). The satisfaction of needs also affects emotional states:
states with a negative valence are usually punitive, and those with a posi-
tive valence are rewarding. Naturally, rewards encourage efforts towards
a goal, while punishments discourage particular actions. For the user, the
fundamental reward is often a positive user experience. This motivates
and directs people to fulfil their needs in the context (of use) in question.
An obscure service is not encouraging, and only an external imperative
will make people use a low-quality service. Even if a user receives train-
ing to use a poor-quality service, it may in any case be quickly forgotten.
In addition to cognitive and emotional concepts, experience can also
be considered the conscious part of mental representations, which also
include unconscious elements (Allport 1980; Dienes and Scott 2005;
Ellenberg 2008; Freud 1917/2000; Marcel 1983). Because the conscious
mind is just the tip of the iceberg, understanding experience—including
user experience—also requires understanding the unconscious elements
of representations, which cannot be verbally expressed (Saariluoma and
Jokinen 2014).
Motives and emotions have multifaceted roles in actions (Deci et al.
1999; Franken 2002; Maslow 1954; Ryan and Deci 2000; Switzer and
Sniezek 1991). The interconnectedness of needs, emotions, and motives
is clear in various motive phenomena based on rewards and punishments
(Franken 2002). The satisfaction of needs also affects emotional states.
States with a negative valence are usually punitive and those with a posi-
tive valence are rewarding. Naturally, rewards encourage efforts towards
a goal while punishments discourage this. For the user, the fundamen-
tal reward is often a positive user experience. This motivates and directs
people to fulfil their needs in the context (of use) in question. An obscure
service is not encouraging and only an external imperative will make
people use a low-quality service. Even if a user receives training to use
a poor-quality service, the service may in any case be quickly forgotten.
From the user’s perspective, the interaction between the user and the
technical artefact is not only collaboration between human senses and
limbs; emotions and motives—linked to perceptions, attention, val-
ues, and memory—also play a significant role. The emotional interface
is a fundamental part of human experience, and therefore the emotional

design of usability also involves analysing the user’s cognitive experience.
Cognitions activate emotions by cognitively assessing the situation, and
emotions control cognitive processing. Consequently, the origins of the
interaction phenomena must be uncovered in each case (on emotions
and cognitions, see, for example, Beck 1976; Wells and Mathews 1994).
The cognitive mind selects which emotions will be activated (e.g., fear
or delight), and these emotions create motives for action (Lazarus and
Lazarus 1994; Power and Dalgleish 1997). As a consequence, respective
action tendencies are activated, and motivated actions are carried out.
People cognitively define the interaction situations from which they can
construct their dynamic interpretations. If the perceptions are incorrect,
the emotional responses may be inappropriate as well. However, correct
perceptions facilitate the emergence of correct emotional interpretations.
People identify the emotionally important features in the environment
through an emotional assessment process. For example, distressed test
subjects may process words that refer to anxiety more quickly than words
that are neutral (see reviews in Wells and Mathews 1994). These find-
ings imply that emotions unconsciously affect the direction of attention.
Strong emotional intensity also has a tendency to narrow the attention
(Kahnemann 1973; Wells and Mathews 1994).
Mental dynamics is based on the regular and individual emotional
models that people have learned in their lives. This emotional theme con-
trols how aggregate functions are formed. Predilection, for example, is a
social emotion in which the person gains a positive emotional experience
from the object’s happiness (Mees and Rohde-Höft 2000; Power and
Dalgleish 1997), whereas feelings of inferiority may make people place
unnecessary limitations on themselves (Adler 1929/1997; Beck 1976;
Sanders and Wills 2005).
The interaction of cognitions, emotions, and motives is based on the
fact that cognitive and dynamic schemas form entities. This connection
emerges quite clearly when examining memory processes. Memory can
be considered a network of information or a system of schemas in which
the content of the working memory is formed by the active nodes of
each situation. The nodes of the network represent both cognitive memo-
ries and the emotions connected to them (Bower 1981). Cognitive and
dynamic states are connected in active representations. They work simul-

taneously, but the individual’s general impression about the world always
depends on both cognition and emotion.
It is essential for the psychology of memory that unconscious emo-
tional and motivational schemas often control our activity (Beck 1976;
Berry and Dienes 1993). Coca-Cola provides an interesting example of
this. When competing with Pepsi in the USA, it put New Coke on the
market and withdrew the traditional Classic Coke. As a consequence,
the company lost much of its market share as consumers felt that Classic
Coke had lost its position as one of the symbols of the American way
of life (Tibballs 1999). The example reveals the influence of unspoken
emotional representations in how people encode information in their
environment. Hidden intuitions may be genuine, but they may also be
incorrect. In many cases it is impossible to know if the hidden knowledge
is correct (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1994; Saariluoma 1997).
Emotions and their respective motives ultimately define what consum-
ers consider to be good or bad. Thus, they create a direction for attitudes
and control various decisions. They also have an essential personal mean-
ing that is manifested in what things people find positive and negative,
valuable and not valuable. By learning to understand emotional processes,
one can learn to see what kinds of things create the most fundamental
representational contents for people.
Values are closely connected to cognitions, emotions, and motives.
Values can be moral, practical, or aesthetic. One can offend someone’s
values and feelings without noticing it, or take the values of others into
consideration, for example, by putting oneself mentally in the position
of another person to imagine how one would feel in a similar situation
and deal with similar incidents. Devices also have various emotional and
product values that are linked to them. From the user psychological point
of view, it is essential that the designed technology respond to the values
of its users, as the willingness to adopt technologies may depend on these
values. Therefore, human values should serve as a guideline for designing
technology and the information society in general.
Motives provide information about the goals and energy of actions
(Franken 2002). Thus, analysing motives can offer concrete information
to the analysis of why some people adopt certain technologies. To acquire
knowledge of what people expect of a product (and why they would use
it) presupposes, in addition to motives, clarifying possible dissonances.
Finally, personality research can introduce a new set of questions that
allow an inspection of the relationship between technology and indi-
viduals with different emotional, cognitive, and motivational patterns.
Understanding what kind of people with what kind of motives will be
interested in different design makes it possible to segment people and
target products to these segments. Thus, the issue of user personality inte-
grates all elements of cognitive and dynamic interaction research.
As the human mind and human action can be seen as a combination
of cognitive, emotional, and dynamic (or conative) processes (Hildgard
1980), a part of the discussion has been targeted at three main sub-fields:
emotions, motives, and personality issues. It is also vital to consider
the joint issues between the fields—that is, how cognitions influence
motives—and to assess to what extent personality is a factor in forming
cognitions, emotions, and motives.
In all user research, it is possible to begin with an analysis of cogni-
tions relevant to the usage situation, for example by using such methods
as thinking aloud, interviews, and surveys (Ericsson and Simon 1984).
Second, it is essential to investigate different emotions that are involved
in the interaction with the technology in question. If the interaction is
long, or includes complicated multistage processes, different usage situ-
ations may require separate analysis. Basic psychology provides infor-
mation about interpreting the results, in terms of what kinds of visual
features or which technical details should be altered in searching for solu-
tions that enable people to reach positive emotional states.
The research on immediate interaction situations raises questions such
as why a user interface should be experienced in a negative way, why users
have difficulties in discriminating between the target and the background
or why the user interface should be non-intuitive. It may also be that the
user interface does not address cross-cultural demands. These examples
highlight the importance of understanding the immediate dynamic inter-
action between people and artefacts. Since human mental processes are
integrated into a whole, it would be impossible to eliminate the sense of
frustration in operating a user interface without understanding its psy-
chological source. The frustration might be caused by a number of factors,
such as the location of the user interface components on the screen, a lack
of cultural knowledge, or a lack of computational skills.
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6
Life-Based Design
Technical artefacts should exist to bring added value and quality to peo-
ple’s lives. Human-Technology Interaction(HTI) design should, there-
fore, be considered in a much broader context than merely the usage of
technology. It should be based on an understanding of people’s lives and
well-grounded design methods and tools, which can investigate life and
apply this knowledge to the design work. The conceptual model of life-
based design (LBD) is based on segregating unified systems of actions
called forms of life. Investigating the structure of actions and related facts
relevant to particular forms of life, in addition to the values that people
follow, is the core tool of LBD. The knowledge produced constitutes a
template for human requirements, which serves as a basis for design ideas
and technological solutions.
The motive for using any technology must be sought by investigating
the role and influence of particular technical artefacts in people’s lives.
Regardless of whether the technology is produced for daily activities,
work, education, or leisure, the justification for technology is always—
directly or indirectly—in its capability to improve the quality of life.
Technologies are intended to help people realize their action goals in life,
and thus make life easier or richer. Depending on the case, this means that

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53047-9_6
with the help of technology, their situation in life is either improved or

maintained, which would not be possible without the given technology.
In the early stages of design, it is common to envision and design what
the technology in question should do and how it is intended to carry out
its task in practice. The early design phases should be dominated by the
question of what technology is designed for, which is implicit in any design
process. It is not possible to design a technology without at least a fair
idea of its future use, although some modern technologies such as social
media let users choose the ultimate contents of the technology (Pahl et al.
2007; Ulrich and Eppinger 2011). This ‘leave it up to the users to decide’
mentality is not, however, suitable in most cases of technology design.
The target of the design should be fully understood in order to design
purposeful technology.
The present directions of early-stage (or front-end) design can be
roughly divided into three approaches based on their focal design con-
cepts. These need-based, action-based, and user-based approaches are
applied to explicate the purpose and usage of the designed technology.
Technology need-based thinking is common in traditional engineering
(Leikas 2009; Pahl et al. 2007; Ulrich and Eppinger 2011). The idea
is that technology satisfies a human need, for example, to drill holes in
wood. The task of the design is to find the right combination of functions
and structures for the artefact to satisfy the user’s need (Pahl et al. 2007;
Ulrich and Eppinger 2011). Thus, solving interaction problems is guided
by the knowledge of user need, such as how the tool should be used.
The increasing complexity of technology has challenged designers and
design theorists to generate methods that would describe in detail the
immediate use of a technical artefact. Good examples of these action-
based approaches are activity theory, scenario-based design, contextual
design, and related ways of thinking, which begin by investigating what
people do in their work environment and with technology (Beyer and
Holtzblatt 1997; Carroll 1997; Kuutti 1996). For example, when design-
ing an information system for a company, action-based approaches anal-
yse the organizational activities and, based on the results, create technical
solutions to support company personnel in their work.
The rapid development of everyday computing has raised interest
in the properties of users and, accordingly, user-based or user-centred
approaches. In such design approaches as goal-directed design, design

with personas (Cooper et al. 2007), and human-driven design (Brand and
Schwittay 2006), users as individuals are considered the cornerstone of
the design process. Designers generate descriptions of potential end users
and their use contexts to obtain an accurate picture of how the technol-
ogy should be used and what kinds of design requirements or targets for
the particular technical artefact or service should be created.
The curt introduction of the design approaches above is meant to
highlight that the differences between them are not imperative, and that
instead the approaches overlap to some extent. What is significant is that
none of these approaches has reached a sufficient level of generality to
assimilate others. Each of them is focused on a restricted area of the inter-
action phenomenon, and they have many elements in common but also
differences. While they do not offer a holistic view of the design, together
they conceptually cover most of the known design issues.
It is possible to examine the questions of ‘what for’ from a more focused
and wider perspective than that of the immediate usage situation. Instead
of focusing on the use of the technical artefact, it is reasonable to focus
from the very beginning of the design process on designing life itself,
that is, how people can improve the quality of their life. Instead of only
paying attention to the technical artefact, one should also focus on ana-
lysing, investigating, and designing how people live. Different artefacts
are important in the sense that they enable people to carry out tasks.
However, the first goal of technology design should be to understand
what these tasks should first consider how life itself can be changed. The
second goal, then, is to create tools for that change. Life provides a solid
concept for interaction design processes that arise from the question
‘what for’?
Life in this context refers to work life, daily activities, as well as leisure
time, all of which should be considered when exploring what people need
in life in terms of and roles for future technologies. This chapter develops
the foundations for this design approach—LBD—that unites the need-,
individual-, and action-based approaches and thus provides general foun-
dations for front-end design (Leikas 2009; Saariluoma and Leikas 2010).
When life has been accepted and adopted as the basis for technol-
ogy design thinking, it is necessary to move on to construct the basic
structure of related design thinking using basic concepts, procedures, and

questions. The goal is to outline practical contents for designing for life.
Critical questions include how should life be conceptualized, what are its
design-relevant aspects, what are the scientific foundations for designing
life and how can the knowledge of these aspects be used to outline a gen-
eral HTI design framework.
LBD and Forms of Life

All scientific approaches must define their basic concepts and research
topics. Yet it is difficult to find limiting definitions to describe life in a
unified, unambiguous, and satisfactory manner in the context of tech-
nology. Even the very concept of life itself is difficult to define in this
context, as it is a phenomenon that all people intuitively know exists, and
which they experience every second.
Biology is said to be the science of life, and it has been assumed that
it defines what life is comprised of (Mayr 1998). However, human life
is only partly understandable in biological terms. Life, as it should be
understood in the context of technical artefacts, also comprises the dif-
ferent practicalities of everyday experiences as well as socio-cultural and
mental aspects.
The concept of life is a conceptual postulate such as a ‘system’ or ‘func-
tion’ (Saariluoma 1997) that can be applied in many ways depending on
the context. Like most conceptual postulates, ‘life’ is a family resemblance
concept (Wittgenstein 1953), which can be used with many different,
loosely connected meanings in different contexts (Wittgenstein 1953).
There is certainly a significant difference between, for example, such
notions as ‘the life of unicellular creatures’ and ‘social life’. Technology is
not central for unicellular creatures; there are many complex technologi-
cal systems that support people’s social lives. Thus, when designing an
artefact, it is difficult to think of life as a whole. Instead, it must be bro-
ken down into definable parts to find a proper concept for the purposes
of the design target. Design requires a concept that can be used to sepa-
rate any concrete context of human life from all other possible contexts
of life. Form of life is a concept that separates the design contexts (Leikas
2009; Leikas and Saariluoma 2008; Wittgenstein 1953).1
The main function of the concept ‘form of life’ is to define and sepa-
rate the section of life for which the new technology is designed, and to
help understand the contents of this particular area of life. Form of life
is, thus, a general concept used to abstract any system of actions in human
life under scrutiny and design. This concept has been used as a part of
sociological discourse (Giddens 1984, p. 74, 2000), but should not only
be studied from a sociological perspective. In addition to social elements,
human forms of life are determined and shaped by many biological and
psychological factors. Even though these three form the basic human life
sciences, they all have internal and combined fields of research that are
relevant for the analyses and theoretical discussions in LBD.
Form of life is thus a general conceptual abstraction, but it enables
designers to define the topic and organize their research. Such concep-
tual abstractions are a common procedure in all sciences. For example,
a chemist may be interested in the properties of molecules. Before it is
possible to proceed with the research, it is necessary to define whether the
research topic concerns hydrogen, sodium chloride, or something else.
Similarly, before a form of life can be studied, it first has to be distinct.
Whereas chemists can be interested in pentane molecules rather than
other molecules, a life-based designer may be targeting solutions at, for
example, recreational travellers as opposed to businessmen. Ultimately,
researchers in both fields have to decide and express their topics in a
similar manner.
Form of life is a highly flexible concept, yet at the same time it is also
exact. Using it, one can refer equally well to a medical doctor’s ways of
working as to the hunting habits of a little-known tribe. People’s lives, to
a great extent, are characterized by the different kinds of regularities they
1
The original German term for ‘form of life’ is ‘Lebensform’ (e.g., Wittgenstein 1953: §19). The
concept form of life originates from Wittgenstein’s (1953, 1964) late philosophy. By this term,
Wittgenstein, one of the most important philosophers of the last century, refers to any circle or
context of linguistic actions. In his original proposal, form of life was a theoretical concept and
conceptual abstraction for analysing human linguistic behaviour and use of language. It is possible
to extend the use of this concept to analyse, for example, human social life (Giddens 1990) and any
other aspects of human life (Leikas 2009; Saariluoma and Leikas 2010).
follow. For some people, these may include hunting and preparing the
catch, for others driving to work every weekday or having dinner with
friends once a month.
People can participate in an unlimited number of possible forms of
life. A form of life can be a hobby or activity, profession, family status,
or a situation. Students, weight-watchers, voluntary workers, teenagers,
golfers, criminals, policemen, bankers, designers, Finns, Spaniards, slow-
food lovers, grandmothers, and alcoholics all have different forms of life,
and they may find new forms of life or develop old ones. Thus, everyone
participates in several different forms of life, and their regularities give
meaning to people’s actions and aims.
It is important to note that form of life is not identical to the concept
of culture. Cultures explain many differences in forms of life, from, for
example, designing clothes to participating in political or religious cere-
monies, but not all characteristics of forms of life are culturally motivated.
For example, it is not a cultural but a biological phenomenon that people
age and start to experience age-related decline in physical functional abil-
ities. This change in physical abilities, however, may change people’s daily
life and consequently create new forms of life, such as utilizing rehab
services or moving to a senior home, which entail culture-dependent trig-
gers and modifiers (Leikas 2009). To give another example, a compass
in a mobile phone that indicates the direction of Mecca is based on a
cultural form of life. Similarly, toys for children playing in a sandbox
are based on a special form of life. Thus, everything that people do takes
place in a definable form of life. For this reason, the first step in LBD is
analysing the form of life (Leikas 2009; Saariluoma and Leikas 2010).
Participating in a form of life is not necessarily a voluntary choice.
Instead of choosing it, an individual may be ‘thrown’ into it. For exam-
ple, a woman born in Scandinavia might have a different conception of
family roles than a woman from Africa. The official and public, as well
as private, individual, and tacit regularities in a human life’s actions form
logical wholes that constitute forms of life.
Understanding a particular form of life helps develop technical solu-
tions for people participating in it. For example, designing for young
and sporty people is very different from designing for retired but active
seniors. Although these groups have the common denominator of ‘active
life’, their forms of life differ in many ways. A form of life is, thus, a tool
for exposing relevant differences between different life settings. It pro-
vides a precise yet elastic enough concept for an LBD process to define
its target.
Structuring a Form of Life

By defining and analysing forms of life, it is possible to understand what
kinds of entities everyday life contains. People participate in forms of life
by sharing different rules and regularities (Wittgenstein 1953). When
ice hockey fans, for example, go to the ice stadium, or get together with
other fans in a pub, watch a match on TV or read sports news, they par-
ticipate in the hockey fans’ form of life. They carry out certain actions
that are typical of this particular form of life.
The organized systems of regular actions in a form of life—in
Wittgenstein’s (1953) terms rule-following actions—are connected.
Summer cottagers perform typical actions when participating in this
form of life: they usually refuel and pack the car, stop at a grocery shop
or supermarket, drive to the cottage, unload the car at the destination,
look around that everything is all right, heat up the cottage, sweep the
courtyard, make things comfortable, and relax. This form of life involves
quite different types of rule-following actions from that of a cultural trav-
eller, for example. These facts are significant when specifying the rule-
following actions from the point of view of a specific group of people.
The notion of rule-following actions provides a focus when analysing
forms of life (Leikas 2009; Saariluoma and Leikas 2010), and the first
step in investigating any form of life is to consider what the main rule-
following actions are (Saariluoma and Leikas 2010). The school child’s
form of life can be defined by investigating what kinds of regular actions
are undertaken during a school day. Children wake up, get washed, have
breakfast, go to school, take part in schoolwork, meet classmates during
breaks, return home, and finally do their homework. These regularities
are rules that children follow by acting in a regular manner when they
participate in the school child’s form of life (Latvala 2006).
With the help of analysing forms of life and their structure of rule-
following actions, it is possible to innovate technology that would helps
people in their actions and practices. It can be said that rule-following
actions have their meaning in a form of life, and that the rule-following
actions and their goals give a meaning to technological ideas, and conse-
quently, to designing technology.
Form of life considers the activities of a group of people instead of indi-
viduals. This premise makes it possible to found the development of tech-
nology on this notion. Naturally, from an individual perspective, people
can have a certain way of life, but examining a form of life always binds
the point of view to a larger group of people. In this respect, forms of life
can be examined, for example, through certain generations with a specific
nationality and background.
When carrying out rule-following actions, people do not necessar-
ily follow the rules any more consciously than when they encode letters
when reading a text. The rules may equally well be subconscious patterns
of behaviour, such as rules of conduct and etiquette that people follow
when visiting each other. Many rules are explicit, such as tacit rules at
the work place—and some may even be formally regulated or juridically
determined, such as traffic codes—but most often they are just ways of
acting in life. It may also be that people may take different actions to
follow the same rule. One of Wittgenstein’s (1953) key remarks in using
the notion of rule-following actions is that these actions are regular but
not mechanistic. People can violate, reject, or even neglect rule-following
actions and still participate in a form of life. Soccer fans do not need to
watch every match their favourite team plays, children do not always
have homework, and one need not always visit a grocery shop on the way
to the summer cottage. It is also possible to reach these goals in different
ways. So, although they are regularly followed, rules do not have to be
absolute.
Mere discrimination of rule-following actions of a form of life does
not provide sufficient information. For early-phase design purposes, it is
essential to understand the internal structure of rule-following actions.
One has to see how actions are integrated in order to define the rela-
tionships between them, extract their similarities, and explicate the logic
behind them (Leikas 2009; Saariluoma and Leikas 2010).
The Structure of Rule-Following Actions

The next step in investigating a form of life during a design process is to
consider what kinds of actions people carry out and what kinds of inte-
grated systems of rule-following actions or deeds are included in the form
of life. The first step in doing so is to examine the structural elements of
all human actions (Parsons 1968) (Fig. 6.1).
One of the major Finnish historical novels of the last century, Under
the North Star, begins with the sentence ‘In the beginning there was the
swamp, the hoe—and Jussi’ (Linna 1959–1962). Implicitly, one realizes
that Jussi has a task: he should drain the swamp and turn it into a field of
grain and he has a tool—hoe. Upon reflection, the ontological structure
of the actions of the settlers of Jussi’s time are similar to that of today’s
schoolteachers. The latter have a task—to transmit knowledge to pupils
(cf. how to drain a swamp), they are agents (like Jussi) and they have tools
(pads, chalk, classrooms etc.). Although the contents of tasks, and the
tools and skills for accomplishing the task, are different, the structure of
actions has remained the same.
Fig. 6.1 Main components of human action

Defining the conceptual structure of human actions when using an

artefact starts by defining the goal of the action (for an alternative analysis
of actions, see, for example, Parsons 1968). Second, in every action, there
is someone who acts—in other words, the action’s agent. Third, there has
to be an artefact or tool with which the action is realized. Fourth, the
action requires a target. Finally, an action cannot be executed without a
usage environment, that is, a context, in which it is carried out. This five-
component schema of action explicates the conceptual structure of any
situation in which a technical artefact is used (Fig. 6.1).
When using technology, actions have goals, as their purpose is to alter
the existing state of affairs. This alteration may be a change in a physi-
cal state. In Jussi’s time, as on cattle farms today, it is important to fence
cattle. Digging a hole in the ground makes it possible to put up a pole
and then build a fence. The new state of affairs—a hole in the ground—is
the goal of the actions, and these actions aim to cause a change in the
existing physical environment.
It is good here to call readers’ attention to the difference between what
people do and what happens to them. If action is goal directed by nature, it
is considered as ‘doing’ rather than merely causal happening. If a human
being falls from the top of a building, this can be a consequence of stum-
bling, which means that the person originally had a different intention.
Falling is then considered an action that happened to the person. But if
the person jumps in order to commit suicide, it is an intentional action
carried out in a goal-directed manner and is thus considered doing.
An agent—that is, the acting self—refers to the human being or beings
who are carrying out actions (Searle 2001). The subject of the action
can also be called a user. Human roles in using technologies can vary.
Often people are active users and they steer the technical artefact towards
the expected goal. They can also be passive users, such as travellers on a
train or in an aeroplane. Finally, they can be objects for using technical
artefacts, such as patients at a dentist or citizen records in national infor-
mation systems. Without an agent, no action would be possible. The dif-
ferent properties of an agent, such as age, skills, profession, gender, and
intention can have a significant role in deciding what kind of technology
is required and what would be purposeful for the design of a particular
artefact (Cooper et al. 2007).
Naturally, a significant conceptual attribute of using any technology is

the technical artefact itself (Gero 1990), which have different functions,
behaviours, and structures (components, links, and operative logic).
Technical artefacts serve to achieve the action goal. Their behaviour is
predetermined, that is, it is decided what kinds of states they can reach
and what kinds of processes they follow to accomplish the expected goal
compared to a given initial state. They include attributes that describe
their behaviour, such as effectiveness, purposefulness, and ecology.
The fifth conceptual element of using technology is target. It constitutes
the elements caused by the action that need to be changed, modified, or
removed from the environment. The target is dependent on a context
of action, and a context is a precondition of the actual performance to
take place. This component of interaction comprises a large entity of
different perspectives in the usage environment. The physical context is
formed by different kinds of physical phenomena such as illumination,
temperature, noise, or wind. A heavy wind, for example, may affect the
way an aeroplane behaves, and direct sunlight may affect the visibility of
a display. Contexts can also include social, psychological, technical, and
task-based elements. A social context includes different stakeholders that
are indirectly involved in the usage of an artefact, such as work mates in
the case of office technology, family members of a patient in hospital,
virtual friends in social media, or legislation behind home care services
for elderly people.
Information forms its own context, which becomes increasingly impor-
tant in designing technology. Naturally, even Jussi in the example above
needed to understand how to dry the swamp. He had to have the know-
how to be able to dig a ditch and to place the stones properly in order to
direct the water away from the swamp. The modern world is filled with
information contents relevant for carrying out any action. The worldwide
web, big data, Internet of things, and social media surround people and
form a central part of their action environment. These kinds of informa-
tion contexts form an additional and independent element of current and
future technology.
In context design, all circumstantial effects of the context must be
taken into account. Sometimes it can be difficult to even distinguish the
difference between the target and a context. For example, technology that
is designed to change a temperature in a given environment is actually

modifying a context at the same time as it accomplishes the target of the
action.
Goal, agent, artefact, target, and context together describe the high-
est conceptual and ontological schema of any situation in which people
use technology. The properties of these concepts introduce task-necessary
questions, which must be answered either explicitly or implicitly. They
form the framework in which HTI design problems are solved.
Understanding and Explaining Forms of Life:

Facts and Values
The logic behind rule-following actions is valuable information, as it
reveals why rules make sense, what the goals of actions are and how the
actions are integrated. However, rules and regularities in actions are not
the only significant factor in understanding a form of life. Facts and values
also help explain why people follow these actions.
People’s lives can be surrounded by many factors such as age, gen-
der, marital status, health, standard of living, size of household, religion,
nationality, education, and work history. They can all be considered facts
in life and attributes of a form of life. They explain (and often even deter-
mine) the goals of rule-following actions and provide the limits—the
possibilities and restrictions—for what people can do in their life.
Facts make it possible to understand people’s everyday contexts and
the kinds of real needs that arise from these contexts. Along with facts,
one has to pay attention to the values that people follow in life in order
to create added value for people and improve their quality of life. In this
way, the design focuses on opening up possibilities and developing mean-
ingful services for people.
Examples of key questions that can be answered by examining facts and
values include: Why does it make sense to have this particular form of
life? Why have people developed it? What aim does the form of life serve?
What do people gain by participating in it? Why does it have all these
regularities? How and why are rule-following actions linked to each other?
Travelling, for example, is quite a different event for a teenager travel-
ling in Europe compared to that of a retired person on a city trip. On a
superficial level, these groups of people seem to follow the same system
of rules—the rules of travelling—but on a deeper level, the divergent
frameworks composed of facts in their life make their travelling events
quite distinct from each other.
The first group of facts in life that signifies, for example, the difference
between young and older people is the biological facts of life, which in the
case of a retired person can include a decline in physical functional abili-
ties, such as vision and hearing. This may narrow their opportunities to
travel. The second group is socio-cultural facts. In the case of older people
these may include an increased amount of free time after retirement, and
thus the freedom to travel at any time of the year. Another sociological
fact is that as people get older, the extent of their social networks—and
thus the number of potential travelling companions—usually decreases.
The older travellers in Europe usually have more money than younger
travellers, and are thus able to organize their trip in a more comfortable
manner from their own point of view. In other words, their social condi-
tions are different from those of young travellers. Young travellers often
have a minimal backpacking budget and are keen to find new friends,
perhaps even new partners. To save money, they are prepared to use sleep-
ing bags, stay in campsites and youth hostels, and eat cheap food. Many
older travellers could not, for health reasons, travel in this way.
The third group of facts is the psychological facts of life. A psychological
fact can be, for example, that older people have more experience in life
but often also stronger resistance to change than young people. Another
psychological difference between these two groups is skills or expertise
(Ericsson 2006). For example, the ICT skills of young and older people
may differ. Young people are usually technically more skilled and able
to reap more benefits from ICT technology during a trip. They may use
technology to find, for example, information about travelling conditions
and tourist attractions. They can also take advantage of online maps and
other available services, while older people may mainly focus on sending
SMS messages and talking on the phone.
The different facts in life of these two groups of people influence their
travelling styles and the form that the life of a traveller takes. As can
be seen from the above examples, facts in life consist of biological, psy-
chological, and socio-cultural aspects that influence the constitution of a
Fig. 6.2 Global explanatory frameworks for the form of life
form of life (Fig. 6.2). As already pointed out, biological facts are essen-
tial in explaining the very basic elements of a form of life. Psychological
and socio-cultural facts, in turn, arise from the corresponding elements
of people’s lives. They become visible by modifying the rule-following
actions in different forms of life accordingly.
Forms of life are comprised of the biophysical conditions of an individ-
ual as well as the customs, habits, rules, and language games of the person
in question and many other people. In this sense, people are placed in
pre-existing forms of life and have little chance of changing them. Some
of the facts in life are more or less ‘chosen’ by the individual and may
be dynamic in nature, whereas others are ‘given’—that is, inherited or
determined by living conditions—and thus constitute stable factors of
the holistic form of life. An example of such a stable factor determined by
living conditions is the lives of war-affected children. Thus, form of life
is a holistic notion that includes predetermined factors in life as well as a
complex variety of different elements in everyday life.
In addition to facts, values provide necessary information for analysing
and understanding forms of life. They explicate individual or group goals,
demands, obligations, and conceptions of beauty and goodness in life,
and direct and affect people’s behaviour, goal settings, choices, and atti-
tudes. Logically, technologies must be designed to support these actions
(things that are valuable to people).
Many elements of form of life culminate, and are reflected in, values.
Similarly, values can be shaped by different elements of a form of life. For
example, mobile technology has changed the way people look at social
relationships. Before mobile phones, social relationships were to a large
extent based on certain locations and largely depended on a person’s spe-
cific environment (Hulme and Peters 2001; Hulme and Truch 2006).
With mobile phones, however, it is not immediately obvious to the caller
where the individual is calling from. At the same time that the boundar-
ies of environments have become more fluid, privacy conceptions have
become more flexible. Along with the phone’s value conception of ‘any-
time, anyplace’, people are starting to appreciate and take for granted that
they can be available every time the phone rings. Thus, mobile technol-
ogy has changed the concept of reachability: ‘always being available’ has
become a value for most people. An exception is made by the increasing
group of people that is committed to being available because of work
demands and that now seeks for possibilities for down shifting in life.
Values are either moral or practical, and they may include personal,
social, cultural, religious, philosophical, ethical, and aesthetic dimen-
sions. For example, Catholic people in many countries carry out deco-
rated and carefully organized processions of hundreds of people during
the Holy Week at Easter. The religion-based personal and community
values of participants of this ancient tradition explain why these people
are ready and willing to spend long hours preparing for these festivities
over the years, decades, and centuries.
Values as attributes of forms of life are different from facts, in that they
represent voluntary choices of the people in question. They influence the
selection processes that people carry out between different forms of life,
and make people’s future plans visible. They also give meaning to actions
within a specific form of life. For instance, praying towards Mecca is not
meaningful for all people who pray. Instead, knowledge of the direction
of Mecca is very valuable to a devout Muslim due to his or her form of
life. Based on their values, people give different weightings to different
goals, and values can make it understandable why people act as they do.
Understanding values helps identify the kind of ‘worth’ that technol-
ogy can bring people (Cockton 2004, 2006). The added value can be
attributed to the outcome of the use of a product. Moreover, it can be seen
as incorporating human values into product development. For example,

the value of a product can be analysed in a utilitarian sense: its good-
ness depends on the happiness or benefit that it brings, and producing a
product is considered ethically correct if it brings about the ‘maximum
benefit’ for the largest group of users. Utilitarianism is often felt to be a
workable philosophy with respect to new technologies in the sense that
the best solution is the one that produces the greatest amount of happi-
ness for the greatest number of people. For example, the development of
health care and medical technology can be seen to produce a utilitarian
good (maximal value for a maximum number of people).
Through incorporating human values into product design it is possible
to enhance the desirability of products and thus increase the value of the
product from a commercial and social point of view (Stahl 2006, 2010).
Likewise, economic and business value from the point of view of product
or service providers should also be emphasized.
Values also call into question what kinds of technologies should be
designed for a form of life to improve its value climate in terms of moral
standards. A morally virtuous action without expectation of reward is a
good in itself. Altruistically, doing something beneficial for others can
be considered morally valuable. Moral designers may ask themselves
whether their work really promotes ‘the good of man’. This is an ethical
question that concerns the human consequences of one’s work (Bowen
2009). When committing themselves to this aim, designers are faced
with a substantial responsibility. Technology will ultimately change the
structures of society and the everyday lives of people in a profound way.
The kinds of expressions that society will have depend significantly on
the design approaches of information society. Ethical design means, first
of all, conscious reflection on ethical values and choices with respect to
design decisions. Second, it involves reflection on the design process and
the choices of design methodologies. Finally, ethical design must consider
the issue of what is ethical; that is, what constitutes the good of man.
Answering questions of this kind can be supported by knowledge of citi-
zens’ forms of life (Leikas 2008, 2009; Stahl 2006).
In ICT research and development, ethical design is grounded on infor-
mation (or ‘computer’) ethics, the field of academic study that examines the
actual and possible impacts of information and communication technologies
on important human values, such as life, health, psychological and physical

well-being, happiness, one’s abilities, peace, democracy, justice, and opportu-
nities. The overall goal is to advance and defend human values in light of the
possible and actual impacts of ICT (Bynum 2010; Stahl 2010).
ICT technology partly constitutes the things to which it is applied. It
shapes people’s practices, institutions, and discourses in important ways.
What health care, public administration, politics, education, science,
transport, and logistics will look like 20 years from now will in impor-
tant ways be determined by the ICT applications that are developed for
use in these domains. ICT will also shape the way individuals experience
themselves and others.
ICT has introduced many useful things into people’s everyday lives,
but along with its positive effects its usage may lead (and has led to)
many risks, for example, related to information complexity, security, and
privacy. For example, ICT applications have provoked ethical discussion
in areas such as online medical consultations and home monitoring of
older people. Ethical questions related to these issues have concerned,
for example, confidentiality, data protection, civil liability for medical
malpractice, prevention of harm, informed consent, and patient confi-
dentiality. The development of ICT can also be menaced by faith in the
omnipotence of technology. With the use of ICT technology, it is possible
to instantly influence other people’s worlds from one’s home computer.
Different viewpoints on value substantially deepen the analysis of life
needed for technology design processes. However, values cannot be sepa-
rated from the analysis of forms of life, nor should they be separated
from rule-following actions. Both facts and values associated with rule-
following actions explain the goals to which people aim and the facts that
motivate them. Based on this knowledge it is possible to derive goals for
technology concepts. It is also possible to give detailed analyses of how
the new technology should be realized.
To summarize, consider value construction related to different objects.
People are attached to certain possessions because they have constructed
values within them, for example, a childhood book or gift from a loved
one. This physical-object attachment is an important phenomenon.
Modern technology has also introduced digital-object attachment. For
example, the increasing role of online services in connecting people and
communicating via different systems and media—in addition to the

increasing capacity of digital repositories for personal content and of per-
sonal spaces in social networking systems—has created a digital world
populated by objects that people can build value with, which become
important artefacts of life. Digital objects have thus become cherished
possessions to which people feel attached. These new forms of attach-
ment to digital objects could require new technological applications. In
order to discover what kinds of applications people would need, the value
constructions of people within specific cultural settings need to be stud-
ied (Odom et al. 2013).
The next section reflects more systematically on what kinds of design
discourses are needed to transform knowledge of actions, facts, and
values into concept descriptions of new technology; that is, how to
turn this knowledge and understanding of human life into technology
requirements.
Technology-Supported Actions
The properties of the concept ‘form of life’ were analysed above, along
with its relationship to the human actions, values, and facts of life that
define people’s goals. Different forms of life are characterized by different
types of rule-following actions typical to a particular form of life. The
forms of life of older people include performing daily errands, attending
cultural events, visiting friends and relatives, taking care of their own
well-being and health, getting medical advice, spending time at a holiday
home and travelling, for example (Leikas and Saariluoma 2008). People
participate in forms of life by undertaking actions that enable them to
follow related rules.
Analysing the form of life is thus the first step in the design process.
Based on the analysis of rule-following actions and facts and values in life,
it is possible to consider the role of the designed technology in the chosen
form of life of the target group. The next question is how this informa-
tion can be used to design technical artefacts, and help people fully par-
ticipate in their chosen form of life. The idea of what a technology can be
used for provides the focal problem for design, and answering the ques-
tion ‘what for?’ thus constitutes a focal design idea. The next crucial step is
to elaborate the focal design idea and transform the acquired information
into technical interactions and concept descriptions. This process relies
on the information collected in the analysis of the form of life. Its task is
to transform the rule-following actions into technology-supported actions
(TSAs) (Leikas 2009).
As introduced earlier, rule-following actions, and the forms and rea-
sons behind them, together with information on facts and values, form
design-relevant attributes in a particular context (Fig. 6.3). After examin-
ing the design-relevant attributes, it is clear how some actions can be
supported by technology. These target actions constitute TSAs for the
particular form of life. They are actions that are realized with the help of
technical artefacts. Walking is a rule-following action, and walking with
a stick when a person is injured is a simple example of a TSA. Walking
sticks are hence technologies that support and modify the original action
of walking.
TSAs should consist of elements relevant to the generation of design
ideas. These elements are the action and its goal, the agent, the context,
and the possible technology. This categorization is characteristic of all
human actions, as explained in the previous chapter.
Fig. 6.3 Generation of design ideas from a form of life

For example, before designing a service that could provide informa-

tion for senior citizens, it is necessary to describe the senior citizens’ need
for such a service—in other words, their goals for using it. This includes
factual knowledge of the agents (older adults) as users of technology,
and their backgrounds, living environments, and rule-following actions.
Value attributes also have a central role in this discourse: to extract the
goals of the agents and select the best way to reach these goals from the
user’s point of view. After that, a description of the artefact by which the
service could be realized is needed. In addition, the targets of actions that
users are supposed to carry out using the application should be described.
Finally, information about the physical, social, and psychological context
of use is needed to describe the interaction between the artefact, agents,
and related stakeholders in TSAs. After elaborating on this information,
it would be possible to proceed with a more detailed design concept with
the task-based elements of technical contexts.
An example of how rule-following actions can be changed into TSAs
is ticket vending machines at railway stations. At many railway stations
train passengers are often forced to wait in long queues to buy their tick-
ets. This takes time, and it is irritating for passengers who are in a hurry.
From the design point of view, the passenger needs a faster procedure for
purchasing a ticket. The change can be made by analysing the passengers’
actions and the facts and values involved in buying a train ticket. Based
on this information, it should be possible to define technology that could
support faster and more convenient purchasing actions. In the case of
railways, the results of the step from rule-following actions to TSAs have
been ticket vending machines and buying tickets online. In both cases,
the traveller can avoid queues and the companies can cut costs.
In this way, rule-following actions can be transformed into TSAs. This
is a vital innovation step further in the design. There are no mechanical
means to carry out this transformation. Extracting rule-following actions
and investigating their facts and values to find problem points gives,
however, a solid basis for early phase interaction design.
Many rule-following actions do not need any technological support.
However, some technology is commonly used to improve individuals’
performance when carrying out a rule-following action. There are thus
two kinds of rule-following actions; the ones that can be supported by
technology are TSAs.
The description of TSAs takes the design process forward, as it raises

and defines sub-problems in the design. For example, if the task is to use
an e-commerce service, it is possible to use the explicated TSAs and attri-
bute information to generate sub-problems. These sub-problems would
include such questions as how to get people to trust the service, and how
to make payment for purchases easy. Such sub-problems emerge auto-
matically when TSAs are analysed. However, the analytical design process
can never be endless; at some stage the integration of the results of sub-
problems has to begin. This means that each sub-problem has to find its
place in the draft concept before it can be stated that all the problems
have been solved at the level of a satisfactory product or service concept.
The final concept is a full description of an integrated system of TSAs.
This description gives the goal of the technology design and includes
information that technology designers need to be able to construct the
product in a sense-making manner (that is, in a manner that can be easily
integrated into the flow of actions in the form of life). The criterion for
the goodness of the concept description is whether it fits the TSAs and
the form of life it is supposed to support.
Scientific Foundations
In design, one cannot speak about facts unless they are scientifically
grounded. LBD relies on human research, and uses the knowledge and
methodological bases of such human sciences and research traditions that
are directly connected to research on human life. These can be called
human life sciences (Fig. 6.4). They can have two substantial roles in the
design of technical artefacts and systems. First, the concept of human
life sciences can be used to explore design issues when searching for clar-
ity with problems and solutions. Second, it can be used to advocate one
design solution over another for a particular design purpose. The core
question is how these sciences should be organized with respect to design
tasks in order to get the best possible support for design solutions. This
calls for a holistic and multidisciplinary examination of the design prob-
lem at hand. For instance, when people get older, some social decisions,
such as retirement, affect older peoples’ social lives, and many sociological
Fig. 6.4 The palette of human life sciences
changes, such as freedom from work and increasing amounts of free time,
take place. However, getting old is not merely a social phenomenon. It
is also an essential biological phenomenon and has many psychological
aspects as well. Therefore, sociological concepts alone cannot give suffi-
cient information about what is relevant in designing modern technolo-
gies for older people. It is naturally important to be able to describe the
changes in everyday contexts when people age, but it is also necessary
to understand the multidisciplinary process of ageing and its different
effects. Many of the changes in old age are not caused by social structures,
social habits, or social communities, but can be examined, for example,
with the help of biological and psychological concepts related to the age-
ing process.
The relevant research areas of human life sciences are discussed below,
starting with biology and biological life. These terms refer to all the para-
digms of biological and related research that focus on people. Biology
introduces numerous perspectives that are important in technology
design. People have different biological preconditions for interacting with
technologies. Their environment has its biological properties, and human
bodies have their biological characteristics, which change over the course
of time. Biology has a number of related fields of research, each of which
has many potential contact points with modern HTI design. Examples of
such research areas can be found in many forms in ecology (e.g., Berkes
and Turner 2006; Young 1974), human ethology (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1989),
physiology, anatomy, and neuroscience (Corr 2006), and even in many
medicine and health care issues (Coiera 2009).
Without a biological life there would be no life at all. However, bio-
logical concepts are not sufficient for understanding all human life and
action. Modern brain research has shown that learning, for example,
modifies the brain and provides it with ‘programs’, which cannot be
understood merely in terms of biological concepts. Brains are dependent
on the properties of learning environments and their contents, and not
solely on their own properties (Saariluoma 1999). For example, if a child
is born in Germany she will learn German as a native language, and if she
is born in South America, her language will most probably be Portuguese
or Spanish.
The second dimension of human life sciences is based on the psychol-
ogy and philosophy of mind, that is, research on people as individuals
and the general laws conducting their behaviour. This not only refers to
the cognitive aspects of the mind—such as limited capacity or informa-
tion discrimination—but to all of psychology, including emotional issues
such as valence, and personality and social issues such as group behaviour
(Saariluoma and Oulasvirta 2010). Again, there are many related disci-
plines, such as education, ergonomics, and social psychology (e.g., Brown
2000; Karwowski 2006; Nolan 2003).
Sociology, cultural research, and related disciplines form their own
cluster of human life sciences (e.g., Argyle 1990; Geertz 1973; Giddens
1984, 1987), which have relevance for design. This cluster includes such
research disciplines as social and cultural anthropology, ethnography, ger-
ontology, linguistics, and semiotics, as well as many issues that are usually
associated with history, art, literature, and film research.
Sociological concepts often describe the ways people act in society,
and thus they fruitfully elaborate the role of human life in design. Social
scientific analysis can help understand how and why people participate
in different forms of life and share the rules and regularities they involve.
This kind of research provides important facts about people and their
lives, and it is evident that psychological research, for example, would
not provide a similar perspective on life. Instead, knowledge of cultural
history or national habits, for example, can be useful in this sense. Many
ethical and value questions that are necessary to consider in design also
emerge in the context of social and cultural matters (Albrechtslund 2007;
Bowen 2009; Bynum 2010; Leikas 2009; Stahl 2010). In addition, there
are many interdisciplinary fields of learning that are relevant in HTI
design, such as action theory, management, and organizational research
(Bannon and Bødker 1991; Kuutti 1996; Nardi 1996). The core chal-
lenge is to find a framework that connects the design problems with the
respective research.
All the research fields presented above have something to say about
human life (Fig. 6.4). They provide methods, concepts, paradigms, mod-
els, and theories that may prove relevant in setting, asking, and solving
design questions. Indeed, all of these disciplines can play their part in
specific types of HTI design processes. In design it is necessary to under-
stand the types of scientific knowledge that are needed to solve different
design questions. In order to do this, it is useful to provide an overview of
the typical problems concerning the target user group and the knowledge
that can be used to design solutions to these problems. After this over-
view, it is possible to identify the kinds of multidisciplinary concepts that
are needed in designing HTI for particular users.
LBD Process
LBD, like all design paradigms, is a methodological process (Leikas et al.
2013). It defines major questions in the field and helps answer them.
LBD conceptualizes human life in concepts of human life sciences and
connects this knowledge with design thinking.
Fig. 6.5 Life-based design model (Leikas et al. 2013)
The LBD model consists of four main phases to guide the designer’s
thinking during the design process: (1) form-of-life analysis, (2) concept
design and design requirements, (3) fit-for-life design, and (4) innovation
design (Fig. 6.5). Each of the phases can have numerous sub-questions,
which are presuppositions for solving the main design questions. The
four phases do not have to be sequential; they can be parallel in the itera-
tive design process.
Form-of-life analysis includes defining and analysing the particular
form of life the designers are interested in. To produce design-relevant
information about the selected form of life, regular actions—the kinds
of actions people normally follow—defining the form of life in question
have to be extracted. In addition, it is essential to define major explana-
tory facts and values of the form of life and investigate several issues, as
detailed below.
What do people need in their life, and how could life be improved with the
help of technology?
• Selection of the form of life in question;

• Analysis of rule following and regular actions;
• Analysis of other relevant characteristic actions; and
• Definition of design goals.
Extraction and examination of the design-relevant human-based problems

to define possible problematic side issues:
• Explication of design-relevant problems; and

• Analysis of the existing technology in use.
A realistic understanding of the potential users or actors and their proper-

ties, such as education, age, gender, or technology skills:
• Analysis of typical users; and

• Analysis of relevant stakeholders.
Analysis of physical, psychological, and socio-cultural conditions and social

relations activated before, after, and when using the technology:
• Analysis of typical contexts; and

• Definition of design theme.
The analytical work should generate the design theme and the human
requirements of a technical artefact. This information explains the why’s
and what for’s that should guide the entire design process. Human
requirements define how people’s life in a specific form of life should be
improved. They are based on the methods and results of human life sci-
ences, and form the basis of the next phase in the design by introducing
the design theme and the human requirements behind it. However, they
do not define the requirements for technological concepts that could be
used to address the defined design goals of the specific form of life; these
are called design (user) requirements, and they are discussed below.
Concept design and design (user) requirements is the second phase of the
LBD model, in which designers define the role of technology in achiev-
ing the defined design goals and produce a definition of TSAs in a prod-
uct or service concept. This means defining what the technology is to be
used for (the technical requirements).
An essential part of the concept design phase consists of ideation and
outlining what the supposed technological solutions could be like, as well
as reflection on (and elaboration of ) the selected solution. The outcome
of this phase is a definition of TSAs in a product or service concept. It
generates prototypes of the relevant new technology. It also explains how,
by defining the role of technology in the form of life, this technology can
be associated with people’s needs, and how technological solutions can be
implemented.
A key element of LBD is co-design with stakeholders. End users should

be seen as experts in their everyday life who can participate in explor-
ing and inventing products and services for their own forms of life.
Foundations for co-design will be further elaborated in the final chapter
of this book.
The concept design phase ends with technical design and implemen-
tation. Here the designers generate mock-ups and prototypes by using
the kinds of technologies that should be able to meet the design goals
and make it possible for the users to reach their goals in the form of life.
In this stage, the issues of user interface, usability, and user experience
become focal. These may include, for example, deciding between the use
of fixed or mobile technology, as well as special devices for realizing a par-
ticular design goal. Congruent with the ISO standards of human-centred
design, this phase entails the use of traditional human-centred design
processes, such as user interface design and usability and user experi-
ence studies as part of LBD (Leikas 2009). These would also include
such issues as emotional experience and value of technology for the user
(Odom et al. 2013).
To summarize, the main questions of the concept design phase include:
• Defining the role of technology in achieving action goals;

• Solution ideation and reflection;
• Elaborating selected solutions;
• Usability and user experience design;
• User evaluations (usability); and
• Technical design, iteration, and implementation.
The final outcome of this phase is a definition of the technological

concept and a description of how people would use it in their specific
form of life. Hence, the process explains: (1) how the proposed technol-
ogy will be part of the user’s everyday life and (2) (user) requirement
specifications for implementation.
Fit-for-life design is the third phase of LBD. It refers to examining the
benefits and meaningfulness users can get from the developed solutions
and the impact they have on the quality of life. The outcome of this anal-
ysis can lead to improvements and modifications of the product ideas.
This is the most fundamental phase of the LBD framework, as it illus-

trates the logic of enhancing the quality of life. It stresses the importance of
returning to (and reflecting on) the human requirements defined in the
first phase of the process as well as defining and removing the barriers to
implementation. Should there be any problems in fitting the outcome to
the form of life, the prototype should be refined according to the require-
ments. This is the only way to ensure that the outcome truly satisfies the
users’ needs.
Furthermore, it is essential to bear in mind the ethical and responsible
considerations regarding the design concept. Ethical evaluation of the
outcome is a natural part of this phase (Bowen 2009; Florini 2010; Stahl
2010). As ethics defines what can be considered the ‘good of man’, ethi-
cal analysis may help explore from whose perspective (and by what kinds
of choices) it could be possible to generate an increase of goodness and
develop products with a higher value in improving the quality of life.
To summarize, the essential parts of this phase are:
• Illustration of the logic to enhance the quality of life;

• Fit-for-life evaluation; and
• Ethical and responsible design.
Innovation design is the final phase of LBD. It introduces a procedure

for exporting the design outcome into general use and incorporating the
new technology into human life settings. This process entails activities
that are meant to transform the design concepts into products that are
used in everyday life. Good design is a prerequisite for ensuring that the
future product is really used by people, and therefore innovation diffu-
sion processes are a vital part of LBD.
To make something an innovation, one has to create usage cultures for
design outcomes. To ensure that people can in fact use the new technol-
ogy to realize their goals calls for well-designed guidance and training
possibilities. It may also require sophisticated educational programmes.
A proper usage culture requires skilled users, and indicates that users can
find a role for the given technology in their lives—and know how it could
improve the quality of their lives.
Innovation design consists of such sub-questions as definitions of the

infrastructure (social and technical), a marketing plan, and service and
auxiliary activity. These are methods of communicating the benefits of
using the technology. The outcome of the innovation design process is a
product that has found its users, or at least a clear plan of how this goal
can be reached. This final phase of LBD defines a procedure for exporting
the outcome into general use.
The essential parts of innovation design include:
• Creation of a usage culture;

• Definition of the infrastructure;
• Marketing plan;
• Definition of service and auxiliary activity as well as corporate respon-
sibility; and
• Illustration of the technology life cycle.
The process introduced above presents an overview of the significant

issues in any technology design process. They emphasize that technology
design is not only about techniques and artefacts; it is essentially about
designing to improve the quality of human life. The sub-questions raised
are not the only ones to emerge during a practical design process. In addi-
tion, there are case-specific questions in each design project.
Technology Modifies Forms of Life

As discussed above, technology gains its meaning in the contexts of every-
day life. People follow the rules of their adopted forms of life to reach
their goals, and the technologies they use are meaningful to the extent
that they do so. Technologies enable people to carry out tasks easier, and
they often make it possible to do things that would otherwise be impos-
sible. History shows that technology has influenced forms of life in many
different ways, both positively and negatively (Bernal 1969).
Forms of life are systems of integrated and organized actions, called
rule-following actions. Similar concepts can be found in the literature; one
could use such social scientific terms as ‘practices’, ‘traditions’, or ‘habits’
as well. The term action, expressing the intentionality of mind, is more

meaningful in the context of design, as it does not imply a longer commit-
ment to this mode of behaviour. Habits and practices presuppose a regular
role in individuals’ lives, but it is possible to participate in rule-following
actions only once. The main issue is to follow a regular action pattern.
To be able to target technology design effectively, it is necessary to
have knowledge about forms of life and how they could be improved.
This includes understanding why a particular form of life exists and why
certain actions of people are relevant. This necessitates knowledge of facts
and values associated with the form of life. It has long been known that
technological developments change human social life. Technology can
also contribute to the extinction of old (and the emergence of new) forms
of life. The domestication of animals and the invention of the plough,
steam engine, telegraph, radio, nuclear technology, computers, and
mobile technologies have all essentially changed the way people live their
everyday lives (Bernal 1969; Fichman 2000).
Technologies have made things possible for people, but people them-
selves have found respective social forms of living. The shift from an agri-
cultural to a modern industrial society did not happen smoothly and
easily. It had many social consequences, which changed people’s forms of
profoundly. In the same sense, applied artificial intelligence and decision-
making systems, information networks, and mobile technology are alter-
ing what people do, and how and when they do it (Augusto and McCullagh
2007). For example, work life has changed profoundly with the develop-
ment of information networks, and especially wireless and mobile tech-
nology. Company intranets enable distributed and global operations, and
mobile devices and the supporting infrastructure allow for new forms of
working. E-work is a normal procedure at many work places, including
mobile work, remote work, and home-based work (Harpaz 2002). Work
tasks are carried out increasingly in global network-like communities and
teams. Work can be taken with the employee anywhere, and that person
can be connected to his work from almost any place. Colleagues, cus-
tomers, partners, producers, and competitors can be found in all corners
of the global world. Accordingly, along with global networks operating
around the clock, the concept of working time has changed.
In addition to shaping behaviour and attitudes, technology affects the
way people experience themselves and others. On the basis of their forms
of life and experiences, users also modify and alter how they use technol-
ogy, and as a result may create totally new meanings for different tech-
nologies. For example, mobile technology has changed people’s attitudes
towards devices. A smartphone can be a highly personal device, perhaps
more personal than any other technical artefact. The owner of the phone
has a personal number, a personal physical device with personal contents,
and personalized tone rings. Hulme and Peters (2001) even argue that
users consider their mobile phone an extension of the self. Thus, the loss
of a mobile phone is felt not just as the loss of a device, but it is also
sensed on the level of one’s physical self. Indeed, when leaving home
without a mobile phone, many people feel that something is missing. So,
as users of technology people have come a long way from being consid-
ered extensions of machines. The artefact now, at least in the case of the
smartphone, is considered an extension of the human.
Although technology has a largely beneficial effect on forms of life,
ICT technology does have some downsides. First, the development of
ICT has led to a divided society, creating a digital divide between tech-
nological haves and have-nots. The socio-cultural reasons for not using
new technological products or services include ignorance of the services
offered; inability to use the services because of lack of knowledge, educa-
tion, and training; and reluctance to acquire and try new technologies.
For example, many commonly used types of interactions are beyond the
competence (and thus out of reach) of some groups of people. For some
people, the operation logics of new technological solutions are incompre-
hensible. Moreover, people may not be able to access (or are uninformed
about) the services offered through technology. In some cases they are
also reluctant to invest their time and effort in trying to learn to use
new solutions, especially if they have had bad experiences in using other
products or services.
To gain from the benefits of technology and lessen the risks, good
design practices are needed. LBD takes the concepts, methods, theories,
and empirical knowledge provided by human life sciences as its starting
point to serve as grounds for design and research actions as well as tools
of thought. It has created a shift in the focus of design thinking: the ques-
tion is no longer only about technical artefacts and natural sciences; it is
also about how people live their lives and how they can improve them.
Technologies—when understood as combinations of human action and
the technical artefacts or systems in use—are always designed for the

well-being of people, and are used to improve the quality of everyday life
(Leikas 2009; Saariluoma and Leikas 2010). Therefore, they only make
sense in human and social contexts. Because of this human dimension in
technology design, it is essential to rethink the nature of design, and early
design in particular, of HTI. This shift in focus emphasizes designing life
and human life sciences as the basis of technology design. The focus of
design and innovation is therefore not on artefacts, but on their capacity
to make people’s lives richer.
The sub-problems and solutions of designing ‘the good life’ are case
dependent, and can be either conflicting or complementary. Conflicting
sub-problems cannot be used in the final solution because they would
require different functional solutions in similar situations. For example,
the designer of a web page must choose a single location for the input
fields for credit card payment on the page.
The LBD process therefore requires choosing between plausible alter-
native solutions. This can be done on the grounds of information about
the design attributes. For example, one of the possible solutions may be
less usable or ethical than others, and must thus be changed or eliminated.
A challenge—but also a significant strength of—the practicality of the
LBD paradigm is the multidisciplinary nature of its applicability. The
design should be carried out in a multidisciplinary design team, in which
different designers with different expertise work together (and co-design
with) different stakeholders. These designers with different backgrounds,
perceptions, know-how, and skills should be eager to adopt different
design policies and provide a better information society. The goal of LBD
is to provide tools for this kind of thinking.
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7
Research and Innovation
Thinking is the property of the human mind. Scientists engage in constructive

thinking: they set up hypotheses and test them, and develop logical chains of
arguments to decide which assumptions are facts and which are not. They also
create new perspectives for searching out truths by designing more accurate
concepts, which allow them to ask new types of questions concerning the states
of affairs. However, product design is also a constructive thought process
Product design is also a constructive thought process. Product design

can be seen as a form of systematic thinking in which designers generate,
evaluate, and specify concepts for technological systems, artefacts, or pro-
cesses to satisfy the needs of users under specific constraints (Dym and
Brown 2012; Dym et al. 2005; Hall et al. 1961; Pahl et al. 2007; Ulrich
and Eppinger 2011). Design thinking thus has a creative character (Cross
2004; Eder and Hosnedl 2008; Schön 1983), since design involves find-
ing new solutions or creating new applications for old solutions (Cross
1982, 2001, 2004). Finally, ordinary people, by restructuring their ways
of living, turn design insights into innovations (Schumpeter 1939).
Science, design, and innovation are based on the human capacity to
create new information contents (Saariluoma et al. 2011). In the exam-

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53047-9_7
ple of the mining industry, before Savery and Newcomen, water in the
mines created problems. However, the construction of primitive steam
engines for pumping water out made the problem much more manage-
able (Derry and Williams 1960). In the beginning of the innovation pro-
cess, there was little understanding of how to solve the problem with
miners’ working conditions. Cosimo de Medici failed in his attempts to
build a suction pump to raise water from a depth of 50 ft, but with the
help of the basic research experiments by Torricelli and Guernicke on the
power of atmospheric pressure it became evident that vacuums might
have a role in pumps. Finally, the solution of creating a vacuum by steam
enabled Savery, Newcomen, and others to develop ‘miners’ friends’, that
is, water pumps (Derry and Williams 1960), which dramatically changed
the methods of working in mines. Not only designers had changed their
way of thinking; the community had also adopted new ideas, and an
innovation was born (Schumpeter 1939). This was possible with the
help of human thinking and its capacity to create new representations. A
web of basic scientific principles made it possible to create ideas, which
ended in practical devices for mines. The scientific findings made it pos-
sible to construct new design solutions and further develop them into
innovations.
Two separate forms of human thinking, design, and research, are
important in the development of new HTI products. On the one hand,
the designer’s thinking creates new products, while on the other hand
science and human research enable designers to solve design problems.
As with the natural sciences, human research can be relevant in develop-
ing practical solutions. For example, social research on different aspects
of ageing in society has an essential role in developing technological
solutions to improve the everyday life of ageing people (Sixsmith and
Gutman 2013). A critical question is how to organize human research
and human life science in order to optimally support HTI processes to
improve the quality of human life. In order to develop practical tools
for this purpose, it is essential to consider the role of human research in
innovative thought processes.
Similarities and Differences
Although the foundations of science and human research,1 on the one
hand and science and design, on the other differ, their approaches have
much in common. They have the common goal of improving the quality
of human life by means of thinking, although they pursue this goal in
different ways and thus often seem to have little to share with each other
(Carroll 1997). Human scientists may have difficulty understanding the
reasoning of industrial designers, and in the same way many industrial
designers have difficulty exploiting the results of human research. One
reason for this can be found in their different modes of thinking, that is,
their scientific stance and design stance. In order to understand how human
and social research can be effectively linked with design, it is necessary to
consider the relationships of these two stances systematically.
The difference between thinking in design and science has been
known for a long time in design science (Cross 1982; Cross et al. 1981;
Rauterberg 2006). Herbert Simon (1969) in his classic work ‘The
Sciences of the Artificial’, argues that design represents a new kind of
science. It is a science of the artificial, and this is typical of schools of
medicine, architecture, law, business, and engineering (March and Smith
1995; March and Storey 2008). Since the early 1960s, research into the
differences between science and design has been considered in different
design contexts (Eder 1998; Iivari 2007; March and Smith 1995; March
and Storey 2008; Rauterberg 2006).
Science and design both explicate and describe phenomena, use special
terminology to discuss them, like to rely on methods, and construct new
ideas and test them (March and Smith 1995; Simon 1969). Thus they
have many interaction points. The properties of research and design com-
pared here are their relationships to the nature of theory and practice, the
1
There is an annoying difference in semantic fields and meanings between the English word ‘sci-
ence’ and the respective words in other European languages, such as ‘Wissenschaft’, ‘vetenskap’,
‘ciencia’, ‘tiede’, etc. The latter refer to any form of reason applied in research. For example, such
fields of learning as ‘literature’ and ‘history’ are forms of Wissenschaft, or vetenskap. However, they
are not ‘sciences’. When discussing human research, this difference often causes difficulties.
Therefore, in this context, ‘research’ is used as an equivalent term for the European words that
describe all forms of investigative activities.
nature of concepts, implicit knowledge as well as the structure of knowl-

edge (Cross 1982; Cross et al. 1981; March and Smith 1995; Hu et al.
2010; Indulska et al. 2009; Simon 1969; Venable 2006).
It is common to think that design is practical and that science is theo-
retical. However, it is in no way self-evident in which sense science can be
seen as theoretical and design as practical thinking. For example, discus-
sion about the movements of the stars long ago demonstrated the impor-
tance of the subject for navigation. In fact, this research made it possible
to start globalization through colonialism (Bernal 1969). A more modern
example would be relativity theory, one of the most abstract theoreti-
cal constructions in science, though it has been applied to create power
plants and nuclear bombs (Bernal 1969). If Einstein were alive today, he
would be fully aware that GPS and many other innovations are based on
his theory (Bahder 2003).
The structure of knowledge in science and design differs in many ways.
Although concepts and knowledge structures are vital in both research
and design, they have different contents. While science works to under-
stand eternally true principles of reality, such as regularities in human life,
designers are more concerned with the possible future states of affairs.
Questions of science are thus epistemic, while questions of design are
praxeological, deontological, and axiological (Anscombe 1957; Boven
2009; Cockton 2006, 2013). Whereas science focuses on ‘what is’, design
focuses more on ‘what should be’ (Bunge 1959, 1967; Skolimowski 1966;
Simon 1969; Saariluoma & Oulasvirta 2010).
It makes sense, however, to also speak about truth and its degrees in
design. Design thinking has hypothetical modes. A designer presents
ideas, prototypes, models, and concept plans of a more or less hypo-
thetical character as solutions to specific problems (Chandrasekaran
1990; Gero 1990). They are not final solutions, but possible solutions
that must be tested or verified against functionality, usability, user expe-
rience, and other relevant attributes until it is possible to proceed with
the design. The crucial intersection between science and design is thus in
the designer’s urge to make something possible. To do so, designers must
ensure that the design plan is feasible. A precondition of the feasibility of
a design solution is that it does not contradict the knowledge of reality in
science and human research.
Science helps by asking the right questions and providing realistic

answers. This means that it should be possible to manage design and inno-
vation processes by combining design questions with the corresponding
research knowledge. In this way, design solutions can have scientific bases
and the management of design processes can be organized around asking
design questions and providing scientific knowledge to solve them. This
kind of design thinking is called explanatory design.
Explanatory Design
A solid ground for assessing what kinds of technological solutions are
required for a specific user-interaction design problem can be found by
applying human research in interaction design in an explanatory man-
ner. A detailed analysis of user interaction can best be exploited when it
is combined with relevant scientific knowledge. It should be possible to
explain why one solution is more suitable than another—for example,
why a specific solution would be more usable or more robust than other
competing interaction solutions.
Explaining is not uncommon in technical thinking. For example,
breakage of a car radiator in sub-zero temperatures has a simple technical
explanation: in freezing temperatures, the water in the radiator turns to
ice, and the force of this expansion is too strong for the radiator to with-
stand (Hempel 1965). Similarly in medicine, for example, the reasons
why different medical methods work are investigated, and this knowl-
edge is used to develop new types of treatments. For example, mechanical
forces caused by human bodily movements provide important knowledge
about how to treat spinal injuries (Roaf 1960).
In technical design, issues concerning the usage of technologies and
the respective design problems can be analysed on the basis of the gen-
eral laws of nature. Hence, design thinking not only involves explaining
something, it also concerns solving problems and predicting different
phenomena (Hempel 1965). If ice is the reason why a radiator breaks
down, it is necessary to ask how to prevent ice formation. This is a typi-
cal question in convergent engineering design. In this case, the problem
can be solved by lowering the freezing point by using glycol (Hempel
1965). The explanation is linked to the problem, and solving it directs

the designer towards a concrete solution. Explaining, converging, and
predicting form a chain of design thought.
There is a fundamental difference between traditional engineering and
current HTI design practices. The processes of HTI design are generally
dominated by such intuitive procedures as the free and creative generation
of ideas, visioning, and user testing. In these, explanatory practices typi-
cal to natural science have only a minor role or are even absent, although
they could have the power to place HTI design on a more solid founda-
tion (Saariluoma 2005; Saariluoma and Jokinen 2014; Saariluoma and
Oulasvirta 2010).
Explanation should be based on science and scientific principles
(Fig. 7.1). When designing for life, it is essential to search for explana-
tory solutions. The main challenge is to unify design problems, scientific
truths, and explanatory grounds in a sense-making manner.
In this general explanatory framework, a designer binds the interac-
tion problem and relevant scientific information together and generates
a solution on this basis. Each design thought sequence of this type can
be seen as a separate explanatory framework, but scientifically grounded
design processes are generally characterized by this schema. For example,
Fig. 7.1 General explanatory framework

theories of visual attention can be used to improve the visibility of icons

on a screen. In practice, this means that the device’s discriminative char-
acter systems must be improved, for example, by organizing colours on
the screen. This may require investigating which colours look good and
what kinds of icons are experienced as good. The latter problem involves
a new explanatory framework that is based on human emotions rather
than visual attention.
The core concept of the explanatory process is coherence. This means
that the explanandum (the phenomenon to be explained) and the explan-
ans (the explaining phenomenon) should be coherent. For example, the
superiority of GUIs over text-based interfaces can be explained by the
pre-eminence of the results of pictorial memory in experimental psychol-
ogy compared to memorized symbols (Standing et al. 1970). The two
phenomena are coherent and consistent. The structure of the explanatory
argumentation is similar to Hempel’s radiator illustration.
Explanatory frameworks can help designers concentrate their think-
ing on essential problems in an organized form. When a problem can
be transformed into a language that points in a scientific direction, it
is possible to enrich it with research knowledge; in this context, coher-
ence plays a significant role. It is essential that the theoretical knowledge
and generated solutions are coherent so that there are no contradictions
between the design solution and the general base of existing scientific
knowledge. For example, it has been known for a long time that discrimi-
nate features are crucial in human attention (Gibson 1979; Eimer et al.
1996; van der Heijden 1992, 1996; Schneider et al. 1984). It is evident
that discrimination is an important sub-process when people search for
information on a display. Explanatory coherence means that the design
solutions are consistent with the known principles, results, and theories
in basic science. In the case of discriminating between icons, the design
solutions have to be coherent with the main truths of visual attention.
So, general cognitive knowledge of colour can be used to place the tar-
get with a clearly discriminating colour compared to the background to
improve the efficiency of a visual search (Treisman and Gelade 1980).
The coherence between tradition and the design solution makes it pos-
sible to predict whether the solution will work, and to explain why.
Systematization of knowledge, which is the basis of explaining, is also

related to falsification (Popper 1959). This means that researchers make
predictions based on general principles and laws, against which every sci-
entific truth is continuously tested. If the outcome of the test is positive,
the given truths are considered valid. However, if the results do not sup-
port the assumptions, the theories must be reformulated (Kuhn 1962).
Testing is also essential in interaction design. However, the outcome
of testing can only tell which kinds of solutions will work and which will
not; it does not reveal what kinds of ideas would be rational to test. In
this sense, tests are essential and can lead to good ideas, but they can-
not replace an in-depth understanding of the design problem setting
and solution. Frameworks are essential for developing solution ideas and
understanding why some solutions work and others do not. They are
essential for generating solutions and eliminating suboptimal ideas.
Science and design both have theoretical and practical features. In
design thinking today, practicality can only be found by unifying sci-
ence and design. Unification is the key to understanding the function
of scientific knowledge in design thinking. It is known that science and
design have multiple connections, and that they are at their best when
the two stances are unified. However, a precise definition of the connec-
tions between the two ways of thinking requires extending the circle of
core issues.
Although design thinking is clearly oriented towards solving practi-
cal problems in human life, this does not mean that science should be
considered impractical. It simply has a different practical orientation: it
produces knowledge to be used in practical life. History has illustrated
that scientific knowledge has always been superior to intuitive thinking,
that is, superior to pseudoscience (Bunge 1967). The less it is necessary
to rely on intuitions—and the more detailed design questions that can
be asked—the better. However, it is not possible to replace all intuitive
elements in HTI with scientific solutions. There is no field of design
in which this has been done because design targets new issues, and sci-
ence does not cover all the practical issues needed in design. Some solu-
tions have to be created with the help of intuition. The following sections
examine the extent to which science can replace intuition.
Human thinking begins with problems, which emerge when people

have goals but do not know how to reach them (Duncker 1945; Newell
and Simon 1972). Defining and setting problems is as important in sci-
ence as it is in design (Bunge 1967; March and Smith 1995). Yet, the
nature of the problems is one of the main differences between science
and design. Design problems are normally expressed in terms of per-
formance requirements. The goal of design thinking is to express what
the technology being designed is supposed to accomplish, and conse-
quently, to introduce a system with the required performance. In this
way, design thinking is consistent with normal human problem solving:
it sets goals and searches for intermediate means to reach them (Simon
1969). Scientific problems, in turn, are about principles that dominate
reality, which can be physical or biological, psychological or social. The
principles may concern objects, but also ideas or, for example, social prac-
tices or economic activity. Science typically works to unveil the general
principles that control reality. Ideally, these principles are thought to be
universal and unaltered. Galileo first explained the laws of motion, which
are not expected to change over time. Similarly, the principles of the
human mind as defined by psychology are anticipated to remain valid in
the future. For example, human vision, following its own laws, constructs
the experienced three-dimensional world (Rock 1983). Consequently,
the principles can be used to solve practical problems independently of
time.
Since the main goal of science is to unveil how things are and to describe
the prevailing state of affairs (reality), scientific problems have a specific
character: they are problems of knowing. The solutions to these problems
tell us how things are (Bunge 1967). Problems are closely linked with sci-
entific tradition, and they often emerge from testing existent principles.
Design problems are very different from scientific problems. The
designer’s task is to construct artefacts, information structures, or tech-
nologies to help users reach a given goal in their life. For example, when
designing an interaction model, the main justification is not that all the
solutions are true in the scientific sense, but that the artefact helps peo-
ple reach their practical goals and satisfy their practical needs (Dieter
and Schmidt 2009; Pahl et al. 2007). This is why design problems com-
monly arise from the recognition of a need that people wish to satisfy.
For example, emotions are an important problem in science and they

also have a function in HTI design (Power and Dalgleish 1997; Norman
2004). Psychologists and sociologists work to understand the structure
and function of human emotions (Frijda 1986; Power and Dalgleish
1997). They are interested, for example, in the kinds of reactions that
emotional words might inspire in people. Designers, for their part, con-
struct emotional features in their systems to make them more appealing
and more sellable (Norman 2004).
Thus, there is a logical connection between science and design that is
built on the notion of truth. Deontological propositions can be consid-
ered to have a truth value if there is a possible world in which they are
true. Only impossible propositions are false in a deontological sense. This
rather obscure claim simply means that designed technologies can work if
they can be realized, and they can be realized if the principles upon which
they are built are true when the technology is used.
Managing HTI Design Knowledge

In HTI design, innovative thought processes are often more or less unor-
ganized. Because of hectic design cycles, interaction designers do not
necessarily have the time to apply systematic methods or use scientific
knowledge to construct interfaces (Norman 1986). Although it is com-
mon in engineering design to apply the laws of nature and other scientific
facts, this approach is unfortunately not often taken in HTI design.
If an organization wishes to exploit scientific knowledge in interaction
design processes, it is important to create systematic procedures for doing
so, for example, by defining the relationships of relevant design concepts
and questions and organizing design processes around them. The con-
cept of usability, for example, opens up a large set of questions and sub-
questions that can be both general and product specific in nature.
The notion of usability refers to the extent to which a product can be
used to achieve users’ goals effectively, efficiently and to their satisfac-
tion, and the ways the technology should be designed in order to make
it as usable as possible (Karwowski 2006; Nielsen 1993). Thus, to meet
this broad design goal and to organize usability and ergonomic design
processes in industry, it is also essential to pay attention to such issues

as interaction components, controls, and displays for feedback informa-
tion, contexts of use (Cooper et al. 2007; Galiz 2002; Griggs 1995), and
the skills and other properties of users and organizations (Orlikowski
1991, 2001). Using relevant conceptualized questions is especially criti-
cal during technology revolutions. For example, without touchscreens, it
would not have been possible to formulate design questions concerning
this technological paradigm. The way design questions are conceptual-
ized and asked is often of primary importance, but the organization and
transparency of these questions can also play a significant role in manag-
ing design processes.
Organizing knowledge is vital, as it makes it possible to reuse previ-
ous knowledge, as well as guide and manage design thinking effectively.
Knowledge management in design has been a topical issue for some time
(Gero 1990). A key concept in this discussion is ontologies,2 which are
organized sets of domain-specific concepts (Chandrasekaran et al. 1999;
Gruber 1993) that describe the most general concepts in a given field;
they are widely used in knowledge management. Ontologies can be seen
as theories of information contents (Aristotle 1984; Chandrasekaran et al.
1999; Gero 1990; Gruber 1993, 1995) and normally express the infor-
mation structure of a field (Chandrasekaran et al. 1999). They can, for
example, be used to describe an electronic device (Gruber 1993, 1995)
and have such content elements as unit, measure, and meter.
Much of ontology research is focused on formal ontologies (Leppänen
2006; Sowa 2000), which use formal operations and theoretical mod-
els. This kind of ontology has no domain-specific contents, but investi-
gates ontologies on a general level. The main idea is that the entities in
model sets can be bound to entities in the real world, and in this way the
interpretation creates their contents. This book has been concerned with
ontologies of HTI; these ontologies are domain- and content-specific
ontologies that explicate the main issues of HTI design (Saariluoma and
Leikas 2010).
2
It is important to distinguish between general and product-specific HTI design ontologies.
General design ontologies describe properties of HTI solutions that are common to all products.
Product-specific ontologies concern properties typical to individual products. Only general ontolo-
gies are discussed here.
Traditionally, ontologies have mainly been used to describe the struc-

tures of some domains as facts. For example, some products have been
described as sets of elements and relations. In such instances, ontologies
have had the role of information storage and retrieval. However, when
considering design as a dynamic thought process, it is more worthwhile
to discuss ontology as a question structure to be used to manage design
problems. Ontologies, in this sense, can be seen as tools for creative
thought rather than as information storage. Especially in HTI design,
which is influenced by many fundamental concepts and their contents,
it is logical to imagine ontologies in the form of questions and answers.
They define the information contents of the propositions, which express
the domain-specific substance of design problems. Ontologies for HTI
design can, thus, be used to generate sets of design questions describ-
ing the interaction—that is, the questions that must always be answered
when a technology and its relationship to users is designed—and to con-
duct the HTI design process accordingly.
As concepts, questions and ontologies provide a means of managing
corporate thinking and making corporate knowledge explicit. When
thought processes are explicit, it is possible to support them, to provide
correct knowledge to thinking, to foster innovations, and to move tacit
knowledge from one process to another. In this way management can
follow the progress of the design process and the content of the design
problems that have been solved so far.
From an ontological point of view, HTI design and innovation pro-
cesses are clustered around four design issues that are intertwined with
the major research programs in the field, which were introduced in Chap.
2. These (and their respective design tasks) include:
1. The position of technology in human actions—design of the role of

technology in life;
2. Functionalities and technical user interface design—design of
functionalities;
3. Fluent use or ease of use—design of usability; and
4. Experience and liking—design of dynamic interaction.
These entities are more or less independent of each other and are
based on different theoretical discourses and multiple theory languages.
Together, they cover the fundamental ontological questions of HTI

design:
1. What is the technology used for?

2. How is it intended to behave and to be controlled?
3. How does it fit the users’ skills and capabilities?
4. How does it produce a motivating emotional experience?
These principal questions discuss the interaction from the point of

view of the human user, and must always be examined when HTI
is designed, and must be explicitly or tacitly solved in order to fin-
ish the overall design process. The questions are thus task necessary.
They have numerous sub-questions characterizing individual products
or services. To proceed successfully in the interaction design process,
it is vital to consider what the sub-questions are and how they can be
explicated. The more accurate and well grounded the ontologies are,
the faster and more reliably the design processes can be managed. As
the core idea of ontology is to explicate the contents of knowledge, it
allows designers to direct routine questions to the appropriate knowl-
edge base. If the interaction information can be easily found this saves
time, which leaves more time for creative design issues. Ontologies
also enable designers to recall all details of design and benefit from
past solutions.
The following section explores these fundamental questions of HTI
design and introduces general ontologies for HTI design thinking. The
ontologies are not presented sequentially, as it is possible to start the
design from any of the main questions. In fact, using the ontologies in an
interactive manner makes it easier to proceed with design and innovation
processes. Even the parallel use of ontologies is possible and sometimes
even recommended, although it may make design management more
challenging.
Finally, there is an underlying connection between design ontolo-
gies and explanatory design. Design ontologies can be formed around
design problems and their respective scientific knowledge bases. Thus
good design ontology provides the major task-relevant questions
and the respective scientific knowledge bases. Consequently, design
ontologies generate explanatory frameworks that connect science and

design.
Generic HTI Design Ontology

As already pointed out, the highest-level ontology of HTI design defines
the fundamental questions of HTI design processes. The logic is clear:
at a minimum, the designers have to be aware of (and solve) the task-
necessary questions. Thus, the questions define a set of basic require-
ments, but at the same time they define a goal for each sub-step in
design thinking. The questions cannot define the solutions, but when
linked with knowledge of the earlier possible solutions, they can provide
the information needed to solve the problems. All design processes are
unique, even though the answers could be inherited or transferred from
one generation of products or from a certain kind of product to another.
In each case, the solutions must be integrated into a unified whole that
includes old and new ideas.
At the highest level, HTI design issues are product independent and
do not change during the interaction design process. These questions are
introduced in Table 7.1 and discussed below.
Table 7.1 The fundamental questions of HTI design ontology and the respective
design frameworks
Fundamental design
question Design task Design framework
What is the technology The role of technology in Life-based design
used for? life
How is the technology Control of the behaviour Functionality and
intended to behave and and performance of the user interface
to be controlled? technology design
How does the technology Being able to use Usability design
fit the users’ skills and
capabilities?
How does the technology Dynamic interaction User experience
produce a motivating design
emotional experience?
What Is the Technology Used for?

What is a technology intended to be used for, in the first place? Why is it
used? What is its position in people’s life? Answering these questions is a
prerequisite for successful interaction design, and calls for an understand-
ing of the life settings that the artefact is intended to support. This is pos-
sible with the help of a general notion of ‘form of life’ that can describe
any domain or context of life in relation to technology. Form of life is a
system of actions in a specific life setting with its rules and regularities,
and facts and values that explain the sense of individual deeds and prac-
tices in them.
The LBD process begins with defining a particular form of life and
ends with analysing the impact of technology on people’s quality of life
(fit-for-life analysis). A typical set of ontological questions in LBD is pre-
sented in Table 7.2. The questions represent partially iterative and over-
lapping phases of LBD (see Chap. 6).
The first ontological questions here concern a deep understanding of
the structure, functional relations, and contents of the form of life for
which the technology is to be designed. The chosen form of life—the
actors and contexts, their biological, psychological, and socio-cultural
Table 7.2 The ontological questions of ‘What for?’

Life-based design
What is the technology used for?
Design question Knowledge required
Definition of a form Human research on characteristics of actors and contexts
of life of a chosen form of life
Definition of the Analysis of people’s goals and related actions based on
system of regular research and literature on the form of life
actions
Definition of facts Analysis of biological, psychological, and socio-cultural
and values of life preconditions in a given form of life based on research
and literature
Innovation of Analysis of technology-supported actions and know-
required how of concept design methodology
technologies
Fit-for-life analysis Empirical analysis of the fit of the planned technology
in the task in question, its impact on the form of life;
and its capacity to improve the quality of life
preconditions—must be analysed, and its typical regular actions must be

defined. This analysis can be used to innovate technologies that support
people in their actions and practices. People’s goals and regular actions
give meaning to technological ideas and technology design.
Analysing facts—the different determinants of people’s lives—makes
the everyday contexts that people live in (and the needs that arise from
them) understandable. Facts have a set of psychological, biological, and
socio-cultural ontological questions of their own. From the point of view
of actors they may include, for example, questions concerning gender,
education, experience, health, economic status, and work history. From
the point of view of action they may include such questions as relevance,
structure, processes, and instruments. From the point of view of context
they may concern questions of physical, social, psychological as well as
informational contexts.
In addition to facts, different values that people follow in their form of
life are meaningful and necessary for understanding the question ‘what
for?’ One of the main reasons for not adopting and using technology
might be that it does not reflect the socio-cultural determinants (values,
lifestyles, and mentalities) of the target group. Therefore, values can reveal
how people wish to live with technology, not only how the technology can
be used. This requires understanding the cultures in which people live.
The next ontological sub-question of ‘what for?’ concerns innovation
and the role of new technology in achieving action goals—that is, how
technologies can help people. The question is analysed using knowledge
of the topical form of life. Here, meaningful rule-following actions are
transformed into TSAs. This ontological sub-question provides the logic
of how future technology will be part of users’ everyday lives, and thus
helps give new form to the old form of life.
Logically, new technological ideas must be tested against their suit-
ability for the chosen task. This activity is examined within the question
of the fit for life of the technology. Fit-for-life analysis studies whether
the new artefact or service can really be used in the given life setting,
and what kind of impact it would have on people’s quality of life. This
approach helps ensure that the design outcome has a genuine role in the
life of the target user group. The analysis should study both negative and
positive impacts—including the practicality, sustainability, and ethics of
the design solutions—to reveal the consequences of adopting the new

technology. The outcome of this analysis can be rejection of the tech-
nological idea or solution, an improvement on it, or acceptance of the
technology as part of the form of life of the target user group.
How Is the Technology Intended to Behave

and to Be Controlled?
The first task in any technical design process is to define what the tech-
nology is intended to do, that is, the behaviour and performance of the
artefact. Important questions include how the artefact will affect its envi-
ronment when it operates, how it is going to change the technical envi-
ronment, and how the user can control these issues. This helps define the
functionalities and technical user interface of the artefact.
As explained above, technical artefacts can reach their goals if they
perform correctly (Gero 1990). The performance of the artefact has to
be designed so that it can move from an initial state to its expected goal
state and have the intended effect. Steering the artefact to the goal state
presupposes a number of choices, which can only be made by the user.
Therefore, the user has to interact with the artefact. He or she has to
select between choices and launch the respective events.
The interactions processed consist of dialogues between the technical
artefact—a machine, device, or program—and the human user. Dialogues
are uniquely defined as a limited set of signs. Each sign is associated with
an event; that is, a process leading to a definite goal state. The human role
is to decide between different goal states and the commands that steer the
artefact to the desired state. Sometimes dialogues are simple: turning a
power switch on activates the electric current in a machine and makes it
possible to use it. Dialogues can also be multidimensional, such as when
controlling an aircraft. Often these dialogues can be analysed under the
concepts of data stream management.
To make the dialogues possible, proper interaction elements in a user
interface are required. These can be input elements launching event flows
or output elements indicating the states of different processes. In design
language they are called, for example, controls, meters, widgets, icons, or
Table 7.3 The ontological questions of ‘how to control’

Functionalities and technical user interface design
How is the technology intended to behave?
Relevant research and
User interface elements knowledge
Expected goal states and respective Task analysis
functionalities
Event flows: goals and sub-goals Programming and engineering
Dialogues Data stream management
Interaction elements, widgets, and controls Engineering semiotics
Interface architecture Interface design
text boxes. Their function is to let users issue commands to the artefacts
and to inform the users about the state of the artefact. Thus interaction
elements are signs in dialogues between machines and people (de Souza
2005) (Table 7.3).
How Does the Technology Fit Users’ Skills

and Capabilities?
The next fundamental question in HTI design ontology concerns the fit
of the technology with users’ ability to use it. This problem concerns the
human dimension of the user interface and opens up a new set of ques-
tions and sub-questions that can be answered with the help of human
research and underlying psychological concepts.
In order to guarantee smooth and easy interaction, user interface
architectures should explicitly organize dialogues. For example, elements
with similar functions should be associated in a sense-making manner.
The foundations of understandable user interfaces can be searched from
human research—that is, answers to such questions as why a particular
architecture is favoured over another. Accordingly, Table 7.4 divides the
fundamental question of ‘being able to use’ into a set of sub-questions
regarding smooth and easy interaction.
The overall schema of the sub-questions includes different types of user
tasks, described from the human research point of view, and the relevant
Table 7.4 The ontological questions of ‘being able to use’

Usability and human user interface design
How does the user interface fit users’ skills and capabilities?
Relevant human research and psychological
User behaviour knowledge
Perceptual information Psychology of attention and perception
processing
Human motor functioning Human functioning and psychology of motor
movement
Keeping tasks in mind Working memory and long-term working
memory
Learning and remembering Skills acquisition and long-term memory
Understanding messages Communication and comprehension, engineering
semiotics, psychology of language
Choosing between tasks Psychology of decision making
Complex and unpredicted Situation awareness and complex problem
processing of tasks solving
psychological and human research knowledge required to discuss these

design problems.
Perceptual information processing refers to how people perceive infor-
mation as relevant when interacting with user interfaces. The main sections
of human perceptual information processing, the psychology of percep-
tion and attention, are central in solving the interaction problems of mak-
ing it easy for people to perceive relevant information. Discriminating the
target information, such as a warning light or an alarm button, presup-
poses that the information is discriminable and distinguishable enough,
which involves the psychology of perception and attention.
Motor movements have a significant, yet often underestimated, role in
usability design. Most user interfaces require the usage of hands, feet,
voice, or other motor systems to control the artefact. Users have to be
able to set goals for the technology, which is mostly done by using the
human capacity to move. Understanding the principles of human func-
tioning and complex motor performances is a prerequisite for good
usability design and for developing technology that is accessible to (and
usable by) as many people and types of users as reasonably possible.
Memory creates another complex set of user behaviour problems.
Memory processes are central in design. Questions such as how to make
information easy to remember and recall, how to support remembering

information, and how to help people acquire expertise in a particular
domain form the core issues in using memory research in interaction
design. It is easy to make mistakes in this complex area. For example,
many resources were used to develop WAP—Wireless Applications
Protocol, which was impossible to realize as its use surpassed human
memory capacity. Luckily, graphical interfaces have made it possible for
people to use modern ICT networks in this sense.
Communication between people and technical systems is the next
human research issue that must be solved. The core knowledge can be
found in semiotics (de Souza 2005), which provides principles that can
be used to design semiotic systems or codes for interfaces. The psychol-
ogy of language and meaning explains why some semiotic solutions are
better than others.
The psychology and philosophy of thinking create their own discourse
within HTI. People have to decide what they want technical artefacts to
do for them. Users have to employ artefacts to solve complex problems,
and be able to repair them if they get broken. The systems should support
these activities in the optimal manner, which requires an understanding
of human thinking.
One pressing issue in the development of information societies is
demographic change. Ageing is a physiological and psychological phe-
nomenon that involves changes in cognitive capacities such as the func-
tionality of human memory, perception, dexterity of movements, and
performance of senses. These factors especially influence the usage of
ICT, and create demands for the design of displays, controls, and key-
boards. It is necessary to consider these psychological and physiological
aspects of life during the design process.
How Does the Technology Produce a

Motivating Emotional Experience?
Psychological knowledge of human emotions and motives offers a good
starting point for examining the question of emotional experience, which
comprises several sub-questions (see Table 7.5).
Table 7.5 The ontological questions of ‘emotional experience’

User experience design
How does the technology produce a motivating emotional experience?
Relevant human research and psychological
Psychological tasks knowledge
Emotional appraisal Emotion and appraisal processes
Motives What motivates people
Individual differences Psychology of personality and expertise
Interacting groups Social and cross-cultural psychology
Emotions are important, as they define the human position towards

specific issues (Frijda 1986, 1988). In design, the question is not only
about positive emotions but also about asking which emotions are rel-
evant in the particular interaction situation. One should be able to feel
angry when the cause is irritating enough and happy when experiencing
positive actions. Otherwise, the human emotional system does not oper-
ate in a rational manner. In interaction design, it is essential to consider
how people experience a situation or event that arouses their emotional
responses (Frijda 1988; Lazarus and Lazarus 1994). Designers mostly
strive to create a positive mood in their clients when interacting with the
product. To understand the emotional dimensions of human experience
it is necessary to understand human emotions and motivation, which is
closely linked with emotions. People often pursue positive mental states,
and are therefore motivated to use artefacts that help them do so. The
motives for doing something can be complex and long lasting. The mod-
ern psychology of motivation offers a sophisticated framework for analys-
ing the motives for using technologies (Franken 2002). The importance
of this sub-discourse is obvious: designers need to know why people use
some technical artefacts and ignore others.
Finally, good design also requires an understanding of groups and
cross-cultural issues. Cultural practices between different user groups
may differ, and people may even belong to different subcultures within
them. Further, cultural factors with arbitrary signs and meanings may
evolve and change. They can in many cases be related to collective values,
and may explain why people do not adopt technologies even when—
objectively—they could be valuable for them.
Synthetic Design Thinking and Co-design

So far the discussion has mainly focused on analytical design thinking
based on the ontological approach. Ontological questions define the ele-
ments of analytical design thinking required to set goals and requirements
for design and to analyse existing products in relation to a particular form
of life.
Yet synthetic design thinking is also needed to be able to proceed in
product development. It is based on the idea that products are con-
structed wholes that include human action systems, and that the develop-
ment process turns product ideas into constructed and working artefacts
by implementing different pieces of knowledge together in a meaning-
ful way. This implementation work builds on the analytical (ontological)
thinking described above, and necessitates constructive thinking. In the
constructive design phase, the role of HTI design ontologies is to again
bring forth the relevant issues of designing for life and thus focus design-
ers’ minds on developing technology to improve the quality of life. In
this sense, analytical and synthetic design thinking are intertwined into a
unified construction process that provides designers with synthetic pre-
sentations of their ideas (Gero 1990; Goldschmidt 2003; Rosson and
Carroll 2002).
Synthetic design is responsible by nature, in that it includes co-design
with end users and other stakeholders, which produces a design out-
come that is likely to satisfy the needs of the users in both a functional
and qualitative manner. To create a successful design outcome, collab-
orative design activities with stakeholders are needed across the whole
span of the design process. These should be organized in such a manner
that stakeholders’ knowledge and experience can be fully and effectively
exploited in design.
Synthetic design can be divided into different phases in which design-
ers can use several types of co-design activities and tools to support their
work (Leikas et al. 2013). Design for life begins with attempting to
improve human life in a particular situation. Following the ontological
questions of ‘what for’, it thus entails an analysis of a certain form of life:
the situation in life, the actors and contexts of that situation, and the
values that people follow. This knowledge can be gathered from the litera-
ture and, for example, interviews with different stakeholders. To under-
stand how new design elements would improve the quality of the form
of life in question, common creativity procedures such as brainstorming
or synectics are used to generate the first ideas (Nolan 2003; Long 2014).
Quite often, the source of ideas can also be found in the organization’s
existing designs, design knowledge, and design traditions. A common
example of this kind of ideation is reverse engineering, in which designers
inspect products (either their own or those of a competitor) by ‘cutting’
them into pieces to understand their logic and to find ways to improve
them. The same approach can be used in designing for life, only the
focus of the analysis is on how people use the product and how rede-
sign could help the product better serve the users’ purposes. Following
this approach, the initial idea for developing a good product does not
always have to originate from the analysis of life. It can also be technology
driven, as long as the designers have an idea that can be trusted, which
is discussed with (and accepted by) stakeholders in co-design sessions. In
this sense, when designing products, it is not important where the idea
came from, but how the designer proceeds (and where they end up): the
design must include all versatile phases of the LBD process, enabling
designers to elaborate their ideas. It would be impossible to launch a
successful product on the market without a proper understanding of its
implementation in and impact on everyday life, its tasks and function-
alities, and the harmonized interplay between the user and the artefact.
The outcome of the form-of-life analysis is brought into concept
design. In this phase, a product or service concept of a technical artefact
or service is created. The main functionalities of the artefact, and the
main models for its usage in practice, should be clarified at this stage.
Personas and scenarios have been found useful in this phase (Cooper
et al. 2007; Rosson and Carroll 2002). Personas are models of potential
or thought users that produce descriptions of possible users and their
goals and intentions. Scenarios can be seen as concrete and work-driven
explications of action contexts (Carroll 1995; Rosson and Carroll 2002).
In these two methods, the chosen paradigms generate much of the con-
ceptual structure and functional understanding of the product or service
concept.
Functional understanding of how a new product will be used leads

to a new level of qualitative consideration that searches for the best pos-
sible usability and is focused on concrete solutions of input and output
devices. Here, typical questions include where the input devices should
be placed, what they should be like and how they should be located in
relation to each other. Similar considerations with output devices are also
necessary.
Questions of usability come to the fore when the functionalities and
constructive solutions of the design target have been defined. Following
the ontological questions of ‘being able to use’, usability issues concern
such attributes of the product as how important input elements can be
discriminated, how they can be recalled, what kinds of interaction levels
make sense and how people can be offered the information they need to
make sense-making navigation decisions.
When a design concept has been developed, it can be finalized in order
to maximize its emotional usability. Concepts such as aesthetics, trust, frus-
tration, and competence are typical problems to be solved at this stage. The
goal is to create a product that people trust and like to use. The ontological
questions associated with ‘like to use’ are helpful in solving these problems.
They can provide information about what the relevant problems are and
how they have been solved in the past. They can also aid in finding effective
methods for developing and evaluating design outcomes.
As can be seen, analytical thinking can support synthetic thinking.
In synthetic and constructive thinking, ontologies provide designers and
developers with tools for thought. They make it possible to inhere such
design knowledge and models, which can be stored and used again in
other design projects. These models need not be identical to the actual
design solutions, but they may suggest ideas that can be used in the search
for final solutions.
Sketches, Prototypes, Models, and Simulations

After having the initial ideas about a possible future product, a new syn-
thetic development process begins in which designers create, co-design,
test, and revise their plans. Sketches are transformed into low-level proto-
types and then into high-level embodied prototypes and, finally, products
(Goldschmidt 2003).
With the help of co-design activities and teamwork, development takes
an iterative form. Designers may return time and again to the same basic
solutions, but every time in more concrete and advanced forms. This
kind of ‘circulus fructuosis’ or hermeneutic circle is common in human
thinking. It is a natural consequence of constructive activity. Piece by
piece, a whole gets its final form.
Sketches, mock-ups, prototypes, models, and simulations are impor-
tant in communicating ideas with end users and within the design team
(Gero 1990; Goldschmidt 2003; Rosson and Carroll 2002). They are
also vital in supporting designers’ memory in their thinking. The role of
sketches and prototypes is to present a synthetic conception. The ontol-
ogy of design thinking provides tools to analyse all aspects of the idea, to
find things that have not yet been considered and provide possible solu-
tion models for different issues.
As human information processing capacity is limited, it is good to
use different types of sketches and prototypes to support external mem-
ory. Prototypes are an excellent means of collecting design ideas, since
they allow designers to consider how different interaction elements fit
together. Different levels of presentations are used to carry out iterative
discussions of the product’s functional and qualitative aspects, and enable
developers to embody their ideas. This includes defining the forms and
role of technology in everyday life, and to the way new technologies can
be implemented: what will the particular artefact do, and how will people
use it.
Human interactive behaviour is a complex whole, and is therefore
difficult to analyse. Laboratory experiments in which only one particu-
lar aspect of interaction is analysed are insufficient to cover all relevant
problems of interaction design. An additional tool for analysing interac-
tion processes is to conduct a computer simulation to evaluate proposals
related any aspect of the design (hypotheses). The simulation is done
first by constructing a computer programme that simulates the cognitive
mechanisms responsible for behaviours. Then an environmental situation
is created that hypothesizes that the user must respond in a certain way.
If the simulated user responds as expected, there is evidence to support
a design hypothesis. These kinds of simulations are usually performed

in the context of either a general cognitive architecture or a cognitive
architecture especially developed for simulating interaction processes
(Anderson et al. 1997; Kieras and Meyer 1997). Generally, the simula-
tions are made based on an analysis of what is known about user behav-
iours and the cognitive processes involved in HTI.
Simulation models thus form a specific class of prototypes. They
enable designers to consider sequences of actions and events, and to see
how the logic of interaction processes operates and how logical it is. Thus
computer simulation, despite its costs, often provides a practical tool for
interaction designers to see how their assumptions would work, what the
problems are, and how they can be solved.
Although the final outcome of a design process may be summarized
in a couple of sentences, it may easily require hundreds of small related
inventions before it is ready. After having a basic idea of the product or
service, and some understanding of everyday life around it, a develop-
ment process normally proceeds as an iterative process with numerous
repetitions. Step by step, the product becomes more specified and closer
to the final solution (Rauterberg 2006).
Fit for Life and Ethical Design

Technology design involves the interplay between analytical and syn-
thetic processes. The previous sections provided an overview of how dif-
ferent visualizations, prototypes, models, and simulations can be used in
synthetic design processes to collect and test numerous ideas in order to
create a working technology. The next question concerns the possibility
of fitting the design solutions into people’s everyday lives. How is it pos-
sible to know that the design solutions are correct and the design ideas
valid?
A critical part of the LBD process is fit-for-life analysis. It studies in
what forms (and on what terms) technology would be welcomed and
adopted in practice. Autonomous and embedded solutions and social
media, for example, can only serve new roles in society if they have the
strength to bring added value to people’s daily lives. As already explained
in the context of form of life, understanding social and cultural settings

plays an essential role in this context. These refer to values, expectations,
and beliefs that influence the way individuals live and how they under-
stand the technology as part of it. Understanding the current practices
that people follow in everyday life is also essential, as they affect people’s
engagement with technology on a practical level and how a people and a
community can make use of technology.
The holistic nature of LBD sets requirements for the way design
hypotheses, solutions, prototypes, and models are tested during design
processes. As explained above, a form-of-life analysis focuses on inves-
tigating how the new ideas will be accepted and how they improve the
quality of life, while fit-for-life analysis focuses on the implementation
and realization of new design solutions in the context of everyday life.
Thus, as a major validation procedure, fit-for-life analysis ensures that
the design outcome fits seamlessly into the complexity of the target users’
everyday lives. This fundamental phase in LBD brings a new and essen-
tial layer to the traditional development discourse.
Standard usability and user experience designs alone cannot provide
information on how a particular technological solution can be properly
implemented in daily life. They do not focus on analysing how the future
product or service will improve practices of life or how it will fit into the
complexity of life settings. They are not interested in explaining the role
and function of technology in advancing the good life. For this reason, it
is essential to use fit-for-life analysis to explore how new technology can
be implemented so as to consider all elements of daily life.
Designing a food-delivery service might serve here as an example. This
service aims to deliver groceries to people who prefer shopping online.
User interface and usability designs naturally ensure that the service has
high usability. The user can access the virtual shop and put groceries into
a virtual basket. Fluent use of the service when ordering and paying for
the purchases is a prerequisite of good service. A positive user experience
is guaranteed with the help of an appealing and nicely designed outlook,
and a secure service that people can trust and be confident in.
But how to ensure that the service fits seamlessly into the everyday
life of the user? Fit-for-life analysis considers more than usability and
user experience, and explores how people’s everyday lives are constructed
around the future service. For example, an online grocery delivery ser-
vice may work perfectly from a technological point of view, and the user
interface may be highly usable. However, if the designers have not con-
sidered how the service will fit into the practicalities of the daily life of the
client, it will be at risk of failure. For instance:
• If the package is delivered inside a house or apartment:

– How to ensure that the person is at home at the time of the
delivery?
– What happens if the user is not at home at the time of the
delivery?
• If the package is placed at the front door:
– How to ensure that the neighbour’s dog does not find the package?
– How to ensure that the groceries do not freeze or spoil in extreme
temperatures?
Another example could be a service designed for sending greetings to

friends. It may work fine for an ordinary day, but the design should also
consider people’s forms of life and their need to send, for example, Merry
Christmas or Happy New Year greetings. If millions of people try to send
a greeting at the same time using the same system or application, the ser-
vice may become overloaded. This should be considered in the form-of-
life analysis, and the information should be brought to fit-for-life design.
These two examples reveal only a small part of fit-for-life analysis, but
give an idea of the thinking behind this procedural tool, which can be
used to test ideas and construction solutions in practice (Leikas et al.
2013). Fit-for-life analysis investigates current practices in everyday life
and uses this information to examine the design concept. The aim is to
find deficiencies in the design in terms of practicalities of life, and to sug-
gest ways to improve the applicability of the design target. In the analysis,
new concepts, sketches, prototypes, and models are critically studied to
find the best possible ways to implement the new innovation. The analy-
sis is carried out on both practical and ethical issues of the technological
application under design.
Ethical design should be a focal part of fit-for-life analysis. It should

cover the identification and assessment of the ethical aspects or impli-
cations of the particular design target. Ways of ethical conduct of new
product or service types should be examined to ensure success and gen-
eral acceptance. Here the main question pertains to the interpretation
of ‘good’. What can be considered good, from whose perspective, and
what kinds of choices generate an increase in goodness? In any event, the
interpretation of ‘good’ leads to discussions of quality of life, technology-
relevant moral rules, and people’s rights and responsibilities. Technologies
may have significant consequences for human well-being, and should
always be resolved within the design decisions (Bowen 2009). The overall
goal should be to advance and defend human values in light of the pos-
sible and actual impact of technology (Bynum 2010).
Ethical design means, first of all, conscious reflection on ethical values
and choices with respect to design decisions. Second, it entails reflection
on the design processes and the choice of design methodologies. Third,
ethical design involves what is ethically acceptable. Finally, it must con-
sider what are ethical goals—that is, what constitutes the good of man.
All these dimensions must be handled in ways that are ethically valid and
acceptable to the users and to community and society in general.
The ethical issues concerning the adoption and use of technology-
supported services are raised and solved in a social, political, and economic
context. They also arise in the context of use. How the ethical dilemmas
are solved depends on the context—that is, the attitudes and views of the
different formal and non-formal stakeholder groups involved. Therefore,
the ethical issues related to the introduction, adoption, and usage of tech-
nology should always be contextualized. The solutions developed have to
consider the specific cultural, economic, political, and legal contexts of
different societies. People as technology users are heterogeneous in many
respects, including their ambitions, education, culture, former profes-
sion, family situation, housing, health, and wealth or poverty. Designers
must make sure that the design actions will benefit the intended target
group without causing detrimental effects on themselves or others.
These issues are profoundly connected to moral values, a matter that
has rarely been considered in traditional approaches to HTI design. From
this standpoint, the essential research questions include:
• What kind of influence does the technology have on the users’ quality
of life?
• Does the technology enhance the quality of life of the users better than
any other artefact or solution?
• What needs (and whose expectations) should the technology fulfil?
• Who benefits from the technology? Would other stakeholders benefit
from it?
• What are the possible alternatives for solving the problem?
• How should the users (direct and indirect) be seen, interpreted, and
understood in the design?
• How are the users involved in the design theoretically and
empirically?
• Is the main basis for the design answering the users’ needs and
expectations?
• What are the multiplicative effects of the solution?
It is essential to discuss these questions from the point of view of tech-

nology development processes. Hence, ethical issues should be addressed
in relation to concept design, test installations, user involvement in
design and, finally, fit-for-life analysis. Ethical aspects are also important
in innovation design, in implementing the new practice in the society. If
ethics are underestimated, there is a risk of distrust and rejection.
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8
Epilogue: Designing for Life
The main criterion for HTI design is that it should not only concern
the development of a technical artefact and the design of the immediate
usage situation, but also help illustrate how technologies can advance
the quality of human life. People should be motivated to adopt and use
technology by the added value it can bring to everyday life to help them
accomplish their goals. The question of how much a technology can
improve the quality of human life defines the worth of the particular
technology.
To be able to improve the quality of the target users’ lives, the true value
of any technology should be measured with the concepts of life. Human life,
in all its complexity, should be the starting point for design. Somewhat
oversimplified concepts such as ‘user needs’ cannot adequately examine
the true essence of human life actions. In addition to asking what people
need, it is also necessary to consider how they can best use technologies,
how they can be motivated to use them and for what purposes. For exam-
ple, as numerous socio-psychological and anthropological approaches
have demonstrated, expectations, values, goals, and cultural factors influ-
ence people’s motives. Technology becomes meaningful through personal
and individual symbolic values as well as through social relationships in

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53047-9_8
a person’s everyday contexts. People follow the rules of the forms of life
that they have adopted (or have been thrown into) to reach their goals
and the technologies they use help them reach these goals. Considering
different forms of life, technology may enhance, for example, the feeling
of belonging to a certain group or to a particular geographical or virtual
space. It may also enhance people’s feelings of competence, security and
self-efficacy, and promote coping in life. Further, it can facilitate people’s
opportunities to influence decision-making processes through participa-
tion and creativity.
As discussed above, LBD thinking—which investigates the HTI
design process in concepts pertaining to research into human life—
offers the ultimate framework and grounds for designing for life, and
thus underlies all HTI design. LBD concepts should belong to the HTI
designer’s toolbox, from the front-end concept design to evaluating the
impact of designed solutions in people’s lives. The power of LBD is its
holistic nature. Designing for life cannot be based on the natural sciences
and mathematics alone. It calls for applying ‘human life sciences’ (par-
ticularly sociology, psychology, and biology of human life, supplemented
with other human life sciences) to design processes. Depending on the
research target, the corresponding sciences can be ethnography, organi-
zational research and management, philosophy of the mind, education,
ergonomics, medicine, neuroscience, or physiology and anatomy. To this
list can be added multidisciplinary areas of research such as cognitive
science, gerontechnology, occupational therapy, design science, and art
design. The key unifying argument is that the problems of HTI design
should be conceptualized (and, arguably) supported in concepts and the-
ories developed for analysing human life.
Technology-driven processes in the design of products and services
seldom truly manage to support people’s goals because they lack the
ability to holistically consider people’s lives. Therefore the resulting new
technologies may be too complex to use (Ramsay and Nielsen 2000),
or be anaesthetic, stigmatizing, or somehow ethically problematic. Or
they may simply not match the values of the users or fail to bring them
any added value. Often, technology-oriented design begins with the
creation of new technical artefacts, and only after that is it asked how
they could be used (Rosson and Carroll 2002). While there is nothing
wrong with this process, it is also possible to turn the design process
around and begin with the role of technology in improving the qual-
ity of life. Such an approach gives human researchers a better chance of
incorporating research-based understanding of human life into designing
new technology concepts at an early enough stage, provided that these
concepts are given a clear role in technology design processes. This issue
has been brought out in such human-driven and human-centred design
approaches as goal-directed design (Cooper et al. 2007), contextual
design (Beyer and Holtzblatt 1997), and scenario-based design (Rosson
and Carroll 2002), which strive to offer a truthful picture of the position
of technology in the everyday life of the target population. Such widely
accepted and brilliant conceptualizations as personas and scenarios, for
example, can be seen as suitable tools to be used in different phases of
LBD, because their contents have the power to express the true position
of a new technology in life in a realistic and truthful manner. The truth
and validity of personas and scenarios depend on how well these descrip-
tions can express different attributes of the form of life of the target popu-
lation. Superficial and illusory descriptions may lead to problems rather
than be of real use.
Many human-centred design approaches include, for example, observ-
ing individuals’ daily routines in order to understand users’ actual needs.
This is a good way to start understanding the form of life of the target
group. However, merely observing users’ needs does not make the design
process itself worth conscious (Cockton 2006). As explained earlier, val-
ues, for instance, cover much broader and personal contents than the
moral values of human welfare and justice, and include non-perceivable
values that are based on both personal and cultural concepts. Thus, when
designing for the quality of life, it is important to understand what is
holistically relevant for people and to try to adapt the design processes
to acquire this information early enough and to exploit it effectively in
the design. The design may, for example, concern biological changes and
the health of ageing people, but it should at the same time focus on cog-
nitive capacity as well as on the values and goals of this target group in
order to produce successful design solutions. Therefore, when designing
user interfaces and interaction, for example, one should not only focus
on the parameters of a screen or input devices from the viewpoint of
usability. In holistic design it is also necessary to be sensitive to biological,

psychological, and social restrictions as well as the possibilities of the
target group. This means considering, for example, such issues as self-
efficacy and a sense of people’s coherence. In addition, when looking at
design challenges on a larger scale from the point of view of LBD, it can
be understood that user interfaces are only one piece of the challenge in
interaction design. There are also many other factors to consider when
striving to use technology to improve the quality of people’s lives. These
issues arise from people’s forms of life and the role of technology within
them. For example, log information can be investigated from the point
of view of cognitive psychology and the psychology of emotions to see
why people stop using some interfaces or why they drop out of e-learning
courses. The first question here concerns the cognitive aspects of technol-
ogy use, while the latter is related to emotional aspects. For example,
dropping out of e-learning courses may be associated with different roles,
time management, and coping in life in general.
One may argue that all design is life based. When a ship is designed,
for example, it is intended to take people from one port to another, and
it thus contributes to human life. From this point of view, traditional
naval engineering design clearly connects technology with life and can
thus be seen as life based. Since all technologies are used in the context
of life in some way or another, what can LBD offer that current ICT
design practices cannot? There are two important aspects to consider.
First, the role of foundational work is to explicate implicit practices.
The situation can be seen as parallel with linguistics. When working
to abstract the structures of a language, something new that has never
existed before in that language should be brought out. In linguistics,
this paves the way for the construction of grammar—a tool that makes
the structure of language explicit. Similarly, explicating important forms
of design thinking can improve the understanding of design processes.
Although human beings have always had a place in HTI research, it
was only after the explication of human-centred design (ISO 1998a, b)
that the analysis of human interaction with technologies became more
visible. LBD is a similar explicitly defined way of designing HTI. It pro-
vides concepts and procedures to help carry out the design process in an
organized manner.
The second advantage of LBD over traditional ICT approaches con-

cerns the complex process of HTI design. The reason for explicating
intuitions in technology designers’ thinking in the area of HTI is to make
tacit practices visible. It is possible to investigate explicated design proce-
dures systematically, in order to examine their ideal form and ask how
they could best be developed. Intuitive and visionary practices, however,
cannot be rationally discussed and developed. With the help of new sci-
entific phenomena (and by understanding their behaviour), science and
research can provide designers with an opportunity to ground their solu-
tions in facts. For example, experimenting, testing, and inquiry are care-
fully developed psychological procedures (Cronbach 1984; Kline 1994)
that have made it possible to evolve knowledge on usability and hence
create efficient methods for usability design (Cooper et al. 2007; Galiz
2002; Griggs 1995; Stanton 2006).
Moreover, abstract principles of science and research per se are not yet
practicable. The results and principles of basic research are not significant
unless they are applied to a target in life and to the real world. This can be
seen in the case of X-rays. Wilhelm Röntgen discovered that it was pos-
sible for certain cathode rays to pass through flesh but not bone. Later this
knowledge was used in medicine to produce images of bones in tissues
(Bernal 1969). Thus the original scientific theoretical work, when applied
to solve a practical problem in medicine, led to the creation of an impor-
tant medical method and to technology for examining bones amid tissue.
Technology can make many things possible. The development and
usage of technologies may even generate novel ways of living that con-
tribute to the development of users’ ordinary lives. Technologies in differ-
ent forms of life may—and already have—started to gain new meanings,
and people even seem to become emotionally attached to them. In order
to make advancements, these emerging walks of (ICT) life should sup-
port the form of life that the users in question lead. Therefore, when
designing for life, it is essential to ask how a new technological culture
changes human life physiologically, mentally, socially, and ethically, and
to understand how technological changes could alter the conditions of
living for all humankind. If technologies are considered from this holistic
and responsible perspective, they have the potential to increase human
happiness and the quality of life.
This book has argued that there are four major questions that have to
be answered in all HTI design:
1. What is the technology used for?

• How can the quality of life be improved?
• What is the role of the technology in life?
2. How is the technology intended to behave and to be controlled?
• What are the functionalities of the technical artefact?
• What kinds of controls and feedback instruments should the arte-
fact provide for the users?
3. How does the technology fit users’ skills and capabilities?
• How can the use of an artefact be made possible?
• How can the technology be made easy to use?
4. How does the technology produce a positive emotional experience?
• How can people be motivated to use the technology?
• What will make people like the technology?
The questions are necessary, and they must always be solved, implicitly
or explicitly, knowingly or tacitly. It would be impossible to create an
artefact without providing it with an appearance and functionalities, and
organizing these attributes in some way. It would make even less sense to
make a technology without defining a role for it in everyday life.
These fundamental questions are always present in design; they define
the parameters of the main design discourses. Seeing the scientific and
design process as a system of discourses gives designers the freedom to
apply the research ideas that they see as important and helpful in solving
their design problems. Understanding the discursive character of the
paradigmatic structure also makes it understandable why it is possible
to have partially overlapping—and at the same time partially different—
ways of examining things. Research and design in technology devel-
opment is like all human social development activities. The next ‘final
solution’ is to unify different perspectives (Behrent 2013; Foucault 1972;
Habermas 1973, 1981, 1990; Sikka 2011).
LBD (designing for life) turns traditional technical design and

development thinking upside down—or, to be more precise, places it
on its feet. The process of design thinking should focus first on asking
how people live, how they wish to live and how the quality of their life
could be improved, and only thereafter on what kinds of technologies
can serve this goal. Most technological ideas can be explained by ‘a
human need’, but not all technical solutions can be justified in terms
of the benefits of the good life. LBD thinking, by defining the con-
tents of relevant knowledge in relation to different forms of life, meets
the human needs of a modern society and contributes to improving
the quality of life of its citizens. The first question that innovators,
designers, and developers following LBD should ask is how they can
improve the quality of human life and design a good life.
References
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Author Index
A Appley, M.H., 148

Abowd, G., 31, 32 Argyle, M., 193
Abras, C., 33, 36 Arnaut, L., 63
Adams, J.L., 14 Arnetz, B.B., 147
Adorno, T.H., 7 Atkinson, J., 148
Agogino, A.M., 207 Atkinson, R., 105
Aiken, L.R., 155 Attewell, P., 11
Aklett, K., 11 Augusto, J.C., 200
Albrechtslund, A., 194 Aykin, N., 30
Alexander, C., 28, 67
Alexander, G.E., 100
Allaire, J.C., 147 B
Allport, D.A., 159 Baccino, T., 93
Alvarez, G.A., 83 Baddeley, A., 80, 83, 106
Ambrose, M.L., 158 Baddeley, A.D., 28, 102, 104, 107
Anderberg, S., 11 Bahder, T.B., 210
Anderson, J.R., 32, 64, 83, 84, 104, Bahn, P.G., 5
105, 108, 110, 232 Bailloeuil, C., 96
Andersson, J., 83 Bainbridge, W.S., 33, 36
Angelantoni, A., 11 Bandura, A., 145, 151
Annett, J., 33, 36, 56–8 Bannon, L.J., 33, 36, 194
Anscombe, G.E.M., 210 Barach, P., 70
Antolí, A., 32 Barbaranelli, C., 154

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53047-9
252 Author Index
Barbour, I., 28 Bower, G.H., 106, 108, 143, 160

Bargh, J.A., 11 Boyton, R.M., 90
Barnaby, J., 88 Bradford, S.J., 93
Barnard, P., 111 Brady, T.F., 83
Baron, R.A., 158 Brave, S., 137, 139, 146
Bartneck, C., 210 Bregman, A.S., 88, 91
Basalla, G., 5, 7 Brewer, M.B., 152
Beale, R., 31, 32 Bridger, R.S., 30, 80, 97, 98, 101,
Beck, A., 143, 160, 161 109
Beck, U., 11–13, 84 Broadbent, D., 32, 80, 91–3, 105,
Behrent, M.C., 41, 248 116
Beitz, W., 3, 17, 69, 172, 207, 215 Bronswijk, J.E.M.H., 27, 36, 61, 85,
Bekker, M., 31, 57 155
Benjamins, V.R., 52, 210, 217 Brooks, R., 84
Benyon, D., 31, 32 Brosnan, M.J., 147
Berente, N., 8 Brown, D.C., 14, 25, 69, 207
Berkes, F., 193 Brown, J.R., 113
Bernal, J.D., 5–8, 10, 199, 200, 210, Brown, R., 85, 193
247 Bruce, N.D., 87
Berridge, K.C., 150 Bruce, V., 89, 90
Berry, D.C., 161 Bruun, C., 7
Bessant, J., 33 Bruyn, S., 11
Beyer, H., 172, 245 Budd, A., 5, 69
Bijker, W.E., 10, 81 Budd, T., 28
Bitouze, F., 96 Bunge, M., 16, 210, 214, 215
Blessing, L., 52, 69, 181, 210, 217, Bus, J., 12
223, 228, 231 Buskist, W., 158
Block, J., 147 Bynum, T., 187, 194, 235
Blumenthal, D., 70
Bødker, S., 194
Boff, K.R., 32, 83 C
Bonneau, A., 96 Cameron, D., 7
Bonnefond, A., 96 Canas, J., 80, 84, 115
Bono, J.E., 141 Cañas, J.J., 32, 80, 115, 116
Booch, G., 35 Caprara, G.V., 154
Bouma, H., 27, 36, 61, 85, 155 Carcopino, J.M., 6
Boven, W.R., 210 Card, S., 4, 16, 31–3, 36, 57, 58, 80,
Bowen, W.R., 10, 33, 186, 194, 198, 81, 99
235 Carey, T., 31–3, 36
Author Index 253
Carlson, N.R., 158 Costa, P.T., 154

Carroll, J., 16, 57, 80, 228, 229, Covan, N., 32, 80, 82, 83, 91, 105,
231, 244, 245 116
Carroll, J.M., 3, 16, 35, 36, 58, 172, Cowan, R.S., 8
209 Craik, F.I.M., 147
Castells, M., 156, 157 Crandall, B., 56
Chakrabarti, A., 52 Cronbach, L.J., 85, 247
Challenger, R., 2, 3 Cronin, D., 5, 16, 53, 62–5, 67, 68,
Chandler, A.D., 6 173, 180, 217, 229, 245, 247
Chandler, D., 111 Cross, J.H., 37
Chandrasekaran, B., 52, 210, 217 Cross, N., 25, 207, 209, 210
Chanson, H., 6 Crowder, R., 105, 106
Charness, N., 36, 61, 85, 107, 147 Csikszentmihalyi, M., 33, 139
Chase, W.G., 83 Czaja, S.J., 36, 57, 61, 85
Chen, W., 210
Chiasson, M., 8, 41
Chikofsky, E.J., 37 D
Chipman, S., 33, 36, 56–8 Dabholkar, P.A., 152
Chomsky, N., 39 Dahl, O., 28
Chun, M.M., 91, 94 Dalgleish, T., 140–2, 143, 160, 216
Clark, L.A., 142 Damasio, A., 140
Clark, M.C., 106 Davidson, R.J., 145
Claussen, A., 11 Davies, D., 94, 213
Claxton, G., 159 Davis, F.D., 17, 149
Clegg, C.W., 2, 3 Davis, M.C., 2, 3
Clore, G.L., 143, 144 de Oliveira Pinheiro, L., 12
Cockton, G., 31, 33, 81, 185, 210, de Souza, C.S., 65, 66, 111, 224,
245 226
Cofer, C.N., 148 Deacon, T., 25
Cohen, M.B., 54 Deci, E.L., 151, 152, 158, 159
Coiera, E., 193 Dekker, S., 11
Collins, A., 143, 144 Dennett, D., 58
Collins, S., 155 Dennis, S., 114
Collison, S., 5, 69 Derry, T.K., 208
Conezio, J., 103, 213 Desmet, P., 36, 90
Cooper, A., 5, 16, 53, 62–5, 67, 68, Desmurget, M., 100
173, 180, 217, 229, 245, 247 Di Stasi, L.L., 32
Cordero, M.I., 141 Diaper, D., 33, 36, 56–8
Corr, P., 193 Dickey, M.D., 151
254 Author Index
Dienes, Z., 159, 161 Eppinger, S.D., 52, 69, 172, 207
Dieter, G.E., 67, 215 Epstein, C., 100
Dijk, T.A., 84 Erdos, G., 117–19
Dijkstra, E., 28 Ericsson, K.A., 83, 104, 107, 162, 183
Dillon, A., 79 Eris, O., 207
Dix, A., 31, 32 Euler, H., 142
Docampo Rama, M., 155 Euler, H.A., 142
Donchin, E., 32, 83
Donk, M., 92
Draper, S., 216 F
Draper, S.W., 33, 36 Fajardo, I., 84
Dumais, S., 94, 110, 213 Fantazzini, D., 11
Dumais, S.T., 57, 110 Farrell, R., 32, 64, 83, 84, 104, 105,
Dumas, J.S., 4, 16 117, 232
Duncan, J., 87 Feldhusen, J., 3, 17, 69, 172, 207,
Duncker, K., 215 215
Dunning, D., 152 Feltovich, P.J., 83, 84, 95, 118, 183
Dvash, A., 149 Fernandez, J.E., 55
Dym, C.L., 14, 25, 69, 207 Feyerabend, P., 29
Fichman, R.G., 200
Findlay, J., 31, 32
E Fisk, A.D., 147
Earnshaw, R., 113 Fitzgerald, G., 8
Eccles, J., 9 Florini, L., 198
Eco, U., 65, 111 Ford, H., 14
Eder, W., 69, 207, 209 Forrester, M., 97
Edge, D., 5 Fotowat, H., 98
Egeth, H.E., 91, 92 Foucault, M., 41, 248
Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I., 193 Fournier, S., 154
Eimer, M., 94, 213 Fozard, J.L., 27, 36, 61, 85, 155
Eisenberg, N., 140 Frambach, R.T., 152
Ekman, P., 140 Franken, R., 148, 149, 153, 158,
Ellenberg, H., 159 159, 161, 227
Ellis, R.D., 147 Frey, D.D., 207
Ellsworth, P.C., 145 Friedman, S.M., 139
Elmasri, R., 35 Frijda, N.H., 140, 143, 144, 216,
Endsley, M., 84, 95, 118 227
Endsley, M.R., 84, 118 Funke, J., 84
Englund, M., 146 Furukawa, K., 98
Author Index 255
G Gross, J.J., 142

Gabbiani, F., 98 Grote, K.H., 3, 17, 69, 172, 207,
Gaissmaier, W., 84 215
Galiz, W.O., 28, 217, 247 Gruber, T.R., 217
Gallese, V., 98 Grudin, J., 111
Galor, O., 7 Gründer, K., 2, 3, 14
Ganter, B., 217 Guido, G., 154
Garland, D.J., 118 Gutman, G.M., 208
Geertz, C., 156, 193
Gelade, G., 92, 213
Gentner, D., 115 H
Gero, J., 3 Habermas, J., 7, 41, 248
Gero, J.S., 52, 69, 181, 210, 217, Hall, A.S., 207
223, 228, 231 Han, D., 154
Gibson, J.J., 52, 89, 90, 96, 213 Han, JH
Giddens, A., 11, 12, 175, 193 Hansen, H.L., 80
Gielo-Perczak, K., 96 Hansen, S., 8
Gigerenzer, G., 84 Hanson, N.R., 28
Gilhooly, K.J., 117 Harber, R.N., 103, 213
Gilmore, D., 80 Harkness, A., 153, 154
Go, K., 58 Harpaz, I., 200
Goel, A., 3 Harris, M., 156
Goel, A.K., 69 Hassenzahl, M., 4, 27, 32, 36, 84,
Goldschmidt, G., 228, 231 138, 139, 142, 145, 146, 150,
Goldsmith, H., 145 158
Goldstein, E.B., 86–8, 90, 91 Hautamäki, A., 207
Golomb, J.D., 91, 94 Hecht, P., 92
Goodstein, L.P., 56, 57 Hecht, S., 87
Goodwin, K., 5, 68 Heijden, A.H.C., 94, 213
Gopher, D., 32, 83 Heinilä, J., 228, 234, 194195
Graafmans, I., 36, 61, 85, 107, 147 Helander, H., 4, 27, 30, 36, 138,
Grafton, S.T., 100 145, 146
Green, P.R., 89, 90 Helfenstein, S., 64, 110
Green, T.R.G., 80 Hempel, C., 211, 213
Greenberg, J., 158 Henderson, J.M., 93
Greenstein, J., 63 Henry, P., 63
Gregg, V., 105 Hilbert, M., 11
Greutmann, T., 55 Hildgard, E., 148, 162
Griggs, L., 53, 63, 68, 217, 247 Himanen, P., 153, 154
256 Author Index
Hirtle, S., 104, 105, 108 Jeannerod, M., 82, 97

Hirtz, J., 69 Jenkins, J.M., 140, 142–4
Hoc, J.M., 80 Jensen, O.C., 80
Hoffman, R.R., 56 Jern, M., 113
Hofstede, G., 156 Johar, G.V., 155
Hogan, R., 153, 154 Johnson-Laird, P., 115
Holands, J.G., 30, 80, 106 Johnston, J.C., 91
Holland, S., 31 Jokinen, J.P., 32, 33, 36, 142, 144,
Hollingworth, A., 93 159, 212
Hollnagel, E., 56–8 Jonas, H., 10
Holowenko, A.R., 207 Jones, D., 84, 95, 118
Holtzblatt, K., 172, 245 Jones, I.G., 7
Höök, M., 11 Jordan, P.W., 36, 142, 145, 150
Horkheimer, M., 7, 9 Josephson, J.R., 93, 94, 217
Hosnedl, S., 69, 207 Judd, C.H., 110
Houkes, W., 2, 3 Jung, C.G., 139
Howarth, P.A., 94
Howes, A., 109
Howland, J.S., 11 K
Hu, J., 210 Kahnemann, D., 84, 91, 92, 120,
Hudson, S.E., 53 121, 139, 141, 152, 160
Hulme, M., 185, 201 Kalakoski, V., 108, 119
Humphreys, G.W., 87 Kannengiesser, U., 52
Hwang, Y., 152 Kannisto, E., 207
Kaptelinin, V., 33
Karniol, R., 153
I Karvinen, M., 3
Iivari, J., 209 Karwowski, W., 2, 3, 16, 18, 30, 33,
Isler, R., 93 36, 57, 80, 96, 98, 101, 193,
216
Kauranen, T., 79
J Kawato, M., 98
Jacko, J., 5, 151, 154 Kelley, C.L., 147
Jacobson, I., 35 Keltner, D., 140, 142–4
Jacobson, J., 30, 35 Khalid, H.M., 4, 27, 30, 36, 138,
Jacobsson, K., 11 145, 146
Jacoby, J., 155 Kieras, D.E., 32, 58, 232
James, W., 94, 141 Kim, C.K., 151, 154
Jayewardene, D.N., 2, 3 Kim, K., 5
Author Index 257
Kintsch, W., 83, 84, 104, 107 Lee, T.D., 30, 98–100
Kirk, P., 93 Lehto, M.R., 84, 121
Kitajima, M., 79, 80 Leifer, L.J., 207
Kivimäki, M., 80 Leikas, J., 10, 35, 36, 61, 85, 155,
Klein, G., 56, 118 172, 173, 175 176, 177, 186,
Klein, H.K., 8 188, 189, 194, 195, 197, 198,
Kline, P., 85, 247 202, 217, 228, 234
Koelega, H.S., 95, 96 Leippe, M.R., 155
Koestner, R., 151, 158, 159 Leonard, D., 36
Koivisto, K., 28 Leppänen, M., 217
Konkle, T., 83 Lesgold, A.M., 106
Krauth-Gruber, S., 140, 142 Lewis, J.R., 99
Kroes, P., 2, 3 Lewis, M., 30, 35
Kuhn, T., 26–8, 29, 34, 214 Lindström, K., 80
Kulik, C.T., 158 Logie, R.H., 104
Kuniavsky, M., 36, 146 Long, H., 229
Kuutti, K., 33, 36, 172, 194 Lotman, Y., 65
Lubinski, D., 153
Luckiesh, M., 91
L Luria, A., 140
Laakso, M., 79 Lutz, W., 13
Lakatos, I.M., 26, 36 Lyytinen, K., 8
Lakoff, G., 98
Lamble, D., 79
Laming, D., 148 M
Land, M.F., 100 Mackenbach, J.P., 8
Landauer, T., 57, 110, 114 Mackworth, N.H., 93
Landauer, T.K., 110 MacLean, P., 140
Landels, J.G., 7 Maes, P., 28, 59
Lardelli, M., 11 Magyar, R.L., 99
Larkin, J.H., 113 Maloney-Krichmar, D., 33
Laudan, L., 26, 42 Mancinelli, E., 11
Laughlin, H.G., 207 Mannheim, B., 149
Laursen, L.H., 80 Manunta, Y., 93
Lazarus, B.N., 140, 142, 143, 160, Mao, J., 33, 36
227 Marcel, A.J., 159
Lazarus, R.S., 142, 143, 160, 227 March, S.T., 209, 210, 215
Lebiere, C., 232 Mark Pejtersen, A., 56, 57
LeDoux, J., 140 Markman, A., 106, 114, 117, 158
258 Author Index
Markopoulos, P., 31, 57 Mollon, J.D., 90

Marks, J., 5–7 Moody, G., 154
Marti, P., 33, 36 Moors, A., 144, 145
Martin, G.N., 158 Moran, T., 32, 55, 58, 65, 80, 83,
Maslow, A.H., 9, 149, 151, 158, 99
159 Moran, T.P., 65, 115
Matessa, M., 232 Morandi, A.J., 93
Mathews, A., 143 Morgan, D.L., 57
Mathews, G., 160 Morrin, M., 155
Matsumoto, D., 156, 157 Murata, A., 98
Matsumoto, S., 98 Muzet, A., 96
May, R., 151 Myers, B., 53
Mayer, R., 83, 85 Myhill, C., 144
Mayr, E., 174
Mayring, P., 142
McAdams, D.A., 69 N
McCarthy, J., 32 Nagamashi, M., 4, 26, 27, 32, 33,
McCormick, E.J., 57, 68 36, 138, 139, 145, 146
McCrae, R.R., 154 Nah, F., 84, 121
McCullagh, P., 200 Nair, S.N., 36, 57, 61, 85
McDermott, J., 113 Nardi, B.A., 33, 36, 194
McKay, E., 63, 64, 67, 68 Nasar, J., 92
McKeithen, K., 104, 105, 108 Nass, C., 137, 139, 146
McKenna, K.Y., 11 Nattkemper, D., 94, 213
McKnight, C., 79 Naughton, J., 209, 210
McLeod, C., 143 Navarro-Prieto, R., 80, 115
McLeod, P., 100 Navathe, S., 35
Mees, U., 142, 160 Neisser, U., 87, 91, 92, 139
Meier-Oeser, S., 2, 3, 14 Nerb, J., 117
Meijers, A., 2 Neumann, O., 94, 95
Memon, A.M., 53, 54 Nevala, K., 3
Meyer, D.E., 32, 232 Neves, J., 12
Milewski, A., 30 Newell, A., 4, 16, 26, 31–3, 36, 43, 55,
Miller, G.A., 32, 80, 105, 106, 57, 58, 80, 81, 99, 105, 114,
116 116, 117, 120, 121, 158, 215
Minsky, M.L., 64, 70, 81 Niedenthal, P.M., 140, 142
Moll, C., 5, 69 Nielsen, J., 4, 26, 31, 35, 36, 57, 80,
Moll, T., 55 102, 103, 216, 244
Author Index 259
Niezen, G., 30 Pavlov, I., 98

Nolan, V., 193, 229 Pennington, N., 84
Nonaka, I., 161 Perrow, C., 11, 13
Norman, D., 26, 32, 33, 36, 84, Pervin, L.A., 153
138, 139, 141, 144, 145 146, Petre, M., 80
158, 216 Pfaffenberger, B., 5
Norman, D.A., 5, 36, 80, 94, 99, Pflugbeil, S., 11
112, 146 Pinch, T.J., 81
Norris, P., 11 Plaisant, C., 16, 28, 80, 94
Pollack, M.E., 53, 54
Polson, P.G., 80
O Poppel, F.W., 8
Oatley, K., 140, 142–4 Popper, K.R., 34, 214
Ogden, C., 66 Porges, S.W., 151
Olendrzynski, K., 11 Posner, M.I., 94
Oliva, A., 83 Potosnak, K.M., 99
Oliver, P., 153 Power, M., 140–3, 160, 216
Olson, G.M., 80, 98 Prablanc, C., 100
Olson, J.S., 80, 98 Preece, J., 31, 32
Orlikowski, W.J., 2, 3, 152, 217 Prensky, M., 11
Ortony, A., 143, 144 Prieler, S., 11
Osborne, J., 155 Printz, W., 94, 213
Oulasvirta, A., 26, 36, 80, 83, 102, Proctor, J.D., 82, 86–8
108, 193, 212 Proctor, R.W., 82, 86–8
Overbeeke, K., 36, 90
Q
P Quaet-Faslem, P., 30
Pahl, G., 3, 17, 69, 172, 207, 215 Quesada, J.F., 115, 116
Panksepp, J., 140
Parasuraman, R., 81, 150
Park, S.-B., 5, 151, 154 R
Parker, R.J., 93 Radnitsky, G., 3, 16
Parsons, T., 179, 180 Raney, L., 8
Pärttö, M., 207 Rasmussen, J., 56, 57, 96, 115
Pashler, H., 82, 91–3 Rauterberg, M., 27, 33, 36, 55, 209,
Paulitz, H., 11 232
Pausch, R., 53 Rayner, K., 98
260 Author Index
Rayport, J.F., 36 Ruthruff, E., 91

Reason, D., 97 Ryan, R.M., 151, 152, 158, 159
Reason, J., 11, 13
Reason, J.T., 11
Redish, J., 4, 16 S
Reimann, R., 5, 16, 53, 62–5, 67, Saariluoma, P., 3, 26, 27, 29, 32–6,
68, 173, 180, 217, 229, 245, 38–40, 64, 66, 79, 80, 83,
247 102, 107, 109–11, 113, 114,
Reinders, M.J., 152 116–19, 142, 144, 145, 159,
Reitman, J., 104, 105, 108 161, 173–8, 175n1, 188, 193,
Renfrew, C., 5 202, 207, 210, 212, 217
Rheingold, H., 9 Saarinen, A.B., 28
Ric, F., 140–2 Saarinen, E., 28
Richards, I., 66 Sajaniemi, J., 107
Richardson, J., 79 Salehi, B., 141
Rieman, J., 109 Salmeron, L., 84
Rizzo, M., 81, 150 Salthouse, T.A., 99
Roaf, R., 211 Salvendy, G., 63
Robins, A., 83 Sanders, A.F., 92
Rock, I., 86, 89, 215 Sanders, D.J., 160
Rogers, W.A., 147 Sanders, M.S., 57
Rogers, Y., 31, 32 Sanderson, W., 13
Rohde-Höft, C., 160 Sandi, C., 141
Rolls, E.T., 140 Santos-Pinto, L., 153
Rosebloom, P., 105 Sassen, S., 81
Ross, A., 8, 41 Sauers, R., 32, 83
Ross, M., 156 Scherbov, S., 13
Rosson, B., 16, 57, 80, 228, 229, Scherer, K.R., 144, 145
231, 244, 245 Schmidt, C., 146
Roth, E.M., 57 Schmidt, L.C., 67, 215
Rountree, J., 83 Schmidt, R.A., 98, 99
Rountree, N., 83 Schmitt, A., 142
Rouse, W.B., 115 Schmitz-Feuerhake, I., 11
Rousi, R., 66, 111, 113 Schneider, W., 94–5, 213
Rueter, H., 104, 105, 108 Schön, D.A., 207
Rugaber, S., 69 Schröger, E., 94
Rumbauch, J., 35 Schumpeter, J., 207, 208
Rumelhart, D.E., 99 Scott, R., 159
Runes, D., 155 Searle, J., 58, 97
Author Index 261
Searle, J.R., 180 Styles, E., 82, 91, 93, 94

Seligman, M.E.P., 33, 139 Subbarao, K., 8
Sharp, H., 31, 32 Summala, H., 79–80
Shelton, B.E., 149 Suzuki, R., 98
Shepard, R.N., 103 Switzer, F.S., 158–9
Shiffrin, R., 94–5, 105, 213 Szykman, S., 69
Shneiderman, B., 16, 28, 59, 79, 80,
94
Sikka, T., 41, 248 T
Simon, D., 113 Tabeau, E., 8
Simon, H., 209 Takasawa, Y., 98
Simon, H.A., 2, 7, 25, 26, 32, 39, Takeuchi, H., 161
55, 84, 113, 114, 116, 117, Tapscott, D., 152
120, 121, 158, 162, 210, 215 Tax, S., 36, 90
Simon, S., 155 Taylor, C., 58
Singley, M.K., 64, 100 Taylor, F., 56
Sixsmith, A., 208 Teo, T.S., 156
Skolimowski, H., 210 Ter-Sarkissian, C., 28
Small, S.D., 70 Thorndike, E., 110
Smith, B., 57 Tibballs, G., 161
Smith, G.F., 209, 210, 215 Toates, F.M., 150
Smith, P.W., 33, 36 Tractinsky, N., 4, 32, 36, 158
Sniezek, J.A., 159 Treisman, A., 92, 213
Snowden, S., 11 Trist, E.L., 36
Sobel, J., 153 Truch, A., 185
Söderberg, B., 11 Tsotsos, J.K., 87
Soffa, M.L., 53, 54 Tufte, E.R., 90, 113
Sowa, J.F., 217 Turk-Browne, N.B., 91, 94
Spada, H., 117 Turner, N.J., 193
Stahl, B.C., 7, 10–12, 33, 36, 186, Turner, R., 100
187, 194, 198 Turns, J., 149
Standing, L., 103, 213 Tversky, A., 120, 121, 139
Stanton, N.A., 56, 57, 247
Stenros, A., 146
Stevens, A.L., 115, 128 U
Stone, R.B., 69 Uetake, A., 98
Storey, V.C., 209 Ulich, E., 55
Stout, G., 119 Ullman, S., 90
Strohm, O., 55 Ulrich, K.T., 52, 69, 172, 207
262 Author Index
V Wiggins, J.S., 154

Väänänen-Vainio-Mattila, K., 32 Wiholm, C., 147
Väätäjä, H., 32 Williams, A.D., 152
Vainio, T., 32 Williams, J.M.G., 143
van Rooy, D., 12 Williams, R., 5
van Schomberg, R., 33 Williams, T.I., 208
Vattam, S., 69 Wills, M.F., 160
Väyrynen, S., 207 Wilson, C., 4
Venkatesh, V., 17, 149, 151 Winter-Dill, A., 96
Vermaas, P.E., 2, 3 Winzenz, D., 106
Vey, M.A., 141 Wittgenstein, L., 65, 174, 175,
Vicente, K.J., 56, 57 175n1, 177, 178
Vince, J., 113 Wixon, D., 4
Visser, W., 80 Wolleswinkel-van den Bosch, J.H., 8
von Wright, G.H., 3, 16, 58 Wood, K.L., 69
Vredenburg, K., 33, 36 Woods, D.D., 57
Vygotsky, L.S., 33 Woodworth, R., 110
Wright, P., 32
W
Wagner, T.S., 149 Y
Walker, D., 209, 210 Yantis, S., 91, 92
Watson, D., 142 Yarbus, A.L., 94
Watts, F.N., 143 Yi, M.Y., 152
Weil, D., 7 Ylikauppila, M., 155
Weinberg, G.M., 31 Young, G.L., 193
Weiser, M., 61, 64, 82 Young, R.M., 109
Wells, A., 160 Yuan, X., 54
Wener, R., 92
Whitford, F., 28
Wickens, C., 30, 80, 106 Z
Wigfield, A., 9 Zimbardo, P.G., 155
Subject Index
A attitude, 142, 146, 147, 154, 155,

action, 2, 7, 26, 50, 51, 53, 56–8, 161, 184, 200, 201, 235
62, 69, 71, 94, 96, 97, 101, automatization, 94, 95
107, 120, 140, 149, 162, 172,
173, 179–81, 189, 193, 194,
200, 222, 229 B
affective ergonomics, 27, 33, 36 biology, 3, 4, 174, 193, 244
affordance, 52, 96
agent, 179, 180, 182, 189, 190
alarms, 66, 93 C
anthropology, 193 co-design, 57, 197, 228–31
apperception, 113, 116, 119, 120, communication, 3, 8, 13, 15, 65, 66,
143 84, 85, 110–13, 124, 157, 226
appraisal, 143–5, 147 comprehension, 84, 114–16, 124
arousal, 141 concept design, 195–7, 236, 244
artefact, 2, 3, 50–6, 59, 62, 63, 67, 70, conceptual postulate, 174
71, 81, 82, 85, 86, 97, 101, 110, conscious, 59, 158, 159, 186, 235
116, 123, 144, 172, 180–2, context, 8, 34, 41, 56n2, 63, 65, 70,
190, 196, 222, 223, 229, 248 97, 103, 110, 142, 147, 149,
artificial intelligence, 200 153, 159, 174, 175n1, 181,
attention, 17, 26, 37, 56, 57, 82, 86, 182, 194, 200, 221, 222, 233,
91–7, 108, 116, 118, 154, 235, 246
159, 173, 180, 213, 225 contextual design, 172, 245

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53047-9
264 Subject Index
culture, 14–17, 68, 85, 110, 112, 156, event (event flow), 54–6, 62, 223
157, 176, 198, 199, 235, 247 expertise, 14, 83, 100, 183, 226
explain, 16, 59, 62, 83, 103, 104,
110, 139, 152, 176, 182, 187,
D 211, 227
decision making, 84, 116, 120, 121, explanandum (explanans), 16, 213
124, 200, 244
design, 3–6, 9, 13–17, 25–42,
49–72, 82, 86, 94, 96, 99, F
101, 104, 110, 123, 140, 143, fact, 10, 31, 100, 139, 142, 152,
149, 153, 156, 158, 171–202, 183, 198, 219
207–23, 225, 227, 230, 243–9 fit for life, 195, 197, 222, 232–6
design-relevant attributes, 189 form of life, 175–8, 175n1, 182,
design stance, 209 184, 185, 188, 189, 195, 200,
digital divide, 11, 201 221, 222, 228, 233, 245
direct manipulation, 28, 59, 60 functionality, 52, 53, 69, 146, 210
discrimination, 82, 86–8, 92–5, 178, fundamental questions, 38, 39, 41,
213 71, 219, 220, 248
display, 60, 68, 87, 88, 90, 92, 181, funology, 27, 33, 36, 146
213, 226
dynamic interaction, 140, 158, 162,
218 G
gerontechnology, 27, 61, 244
graphical user interfaces (GUI), 35,
E 53, 61, 63
ecosystem, 15
emancipation, 7–10
emotions, 32, 112, 137–63, 213, H
216, 226, 227, 246 hermeneutic circle, 231
engineering, 3, 14, 26n1, 35, 37, 41, human-driven, 173, 245
57, 65, 69, 111, 172, 209, human factors, 18, 30, 31, 36, 61,
211, 212, 216, 229, 246 80, 101
entertainment computing, 27, 33, 36 human life sciences, 175, 191–3,
ergonomic, 26, 27, 30, 31, 33, 36, 196, 201, 244
68, 80, 98, 101, 109, 149, human technology interaction
193, 216, 244 (HTI), 1, 5, 15, 17, 25–7,
ethics, 33, 186, 198, 222, 236 29–34, 36–41, 51, 59, 65, 69,
ethnography, 193, 244 80, 84, 90, 101, 107, 110,
evaluation, 4, 31, 105, 145, 198 123, 140, 143, 145–8, 153,
Subject Index 265
157, 182, 194, 212, 216–23, M

228, 244 memory, 28, 60, 82, 83, 101–8, 114,
human turn, 17–18 115, 119, 124, 143, 160, 213,
225, 231
mental content, 114, 116–20, 122,
I 141, 156
illusion, 89, 90 mental model, 115, 116, 155
inclusive design, 26, 33, 36 mental representation, 83, 114,
information, 12, 25, 30, 33, 38, 40, 117–19, 122, 141, 144, 158,
50, 55, 59, 60, 63, 68, 80, 82, 159, 161
86, 87, 91, 92, 102, 104, model, 83, 103, 115, 149, 195, 215,
106–8, 114, 116–19, 124, 217
141, 143, 147, 155, 161, 180, mood, 4, 142, 227
181, 184, 189, 190, 192, 202, motivation, 36, 84, 148–53, 158,
207, 215, 245 162, 227
information and communication movement, 52, 82, 89, 90, 94, 97,
technology (ICT), 1, 8, 12, 17, 98, 100, 112, 117, 211, 225,
68, 156, 183, 187, 201, 246, 226
247
innovation, 3, 6, 7, 41, 190, 195,
198, 199, 207–36 N
input/output (I/O), 63, 87, 90, 110 natural science, 3, 4, 14, 16, 28, 208,
intention, 51, 94, 112, 152, 180 212, 244
interface design, 49–72, 144, 197, navigate, 60, 114, 118
218 neuroergonomics, 150
ISO, 5, 68, 197, 246
O
K ontology, 217–20, 231
Kansei engineering, 27, 32, 33, 36,
146
P
paradigm, 27–9, 31, 34–7, 61, 66,
L 108, 139, 202, 217
learning, 28, 36, 64, 83, 95, 101, perception, 52, 82, 88–91, 93, 98,
102, 105, 108–10, 124, 143, 113, 118, 143, 225
151, 161, 193, 194, 209n1 perceptual-motor, 83, 94, 98, 124
life-based design (LBD), 171–202, 221 personality, 36, 84, 138, 139, 142,
linguistics, 194, 246 153–7, 162, 193
266 Subject Index
personas, 173, 229, 245 senses, 67, 88, 91, 97, 159, 226
pervasive computing, 61 sign, 9, 65, 66, 223
problem solving, 84, 120, 121, 123, simulation, 4, 231, 232
124, 215 situation awareness, 84, 118, 121
product, 2, 12, 33, 39, 53, 118, 146, sketch, 4, 230–2, 234
149, 151, 154, 161, 185, 186, skill, 2, 61, 83, 84, 105, 107, 115,
196, 198, 199, 207, 216, 220, 147, 148, 163, 180, 183, 202,
228–30, 235 217
prototype, 4, 196, 197, 230–4 socio-cultural research, 3, 4, 66
psychology, 4, 31, 33, 36, 79–124,
138, 139, 144, 150, 153, 155,
158, 162, 193, 215, 225, 244, T
246 task analysis, 33, 52, 56–9, 65
technology, 1–18, 27, 33, 51, 52, 56,
66–9, 72, 79, 81, 85, 97, 99,
Q 103, 111, 124, 137, 138,
quality of life, 2, 7, 10, 182, 197, 198, 145–7, 155, 171–4, 181, 190,
221, 228, 233, 245, 249 195, 215, 218, 226–7, 232,
243–5, 248
technology acceptance (TAM), 149
R technology-supported actions,
remembering, 82, 83, 102, 106, 124 188–91
requirements, 53, 55, 59, 68, 113, 148, technophobia, 147
173, 195, 196, 220, 228, 233 thinking, 1, 4, 5, 14, 18, 25, 26, 35,
research program, 26, 34–7, 39–42, 38, 41, 81, 87, 116, 117, 123,
218 124, 140, 162, 172, 174, 195,
risk, 11–14, 68, 84, 101, 138, 187, 207–10, 214, 226, 228–30,
201, 234, 236 234, 246, 249
rule-following actions, 177–82, transfer, 50, 64, 110, 113
188–90, 199, 222
U
S ubiquitous computing, 61, 82, 112
Scandinavian design, 28, 146 unconscious, 94, 99, 159, 161
scenarios, 59, 229, 245 unification, 214
science, 2, 14, 29, 42, 85, 157, 174, usability (usable), 16, 18, 26, 34, 36,
207–10, 214, 215, 244, 247 38, 68, 80, 82, 96, 99, 102,
scientific stance, 209 122, 146, 160, 197, 210, 216,
semiotics, 64–6, 111, 124, 157, 226 218, 225, 230, 233, 247
Subject Index 267
user, 4, 5, 15, 17, 26, 31, 33, 35, 36, V

49–72, 80–2, 84, 87, 94, 99, value, 30, 33, 36, 66, 105, 144, 145,
101, 107, 109, 114, 117, 122, 182, 185–7, 190, 197, 216,
138–40, 144, 147–53, 155, 232, 244
158, 159, 162, 172, 180, 194, verbal, 26, 108, 112
196, 197, 211, 223–5, 233, vigilance, 95, 96
243
user-centred, 36, 172
user experience (UX), 26, 32, 38, W
139, 158, 159, 197, 210, 233 worth-centred design, 33, 36
user need, 51, 69, 149n2, 172 what you see is what you get
(WYSIWYG), 28

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DESIGNING

Designing for Life

ISBN 978-1-137-53046-2 ISBN 978-1-137-53047-9 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016942071

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Cover illustration: © Garry Gay / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

1. Functionalities and technical user interface design;

As these fundamental questions are always present when designing

management of HTI design processes and to integrate the questions into

3 The Logic of User Interface Design 49

Intentional and Hidden Interaction Elements 59

4 The Psychology of Fluent Use 79

5 Emotions, Motives, Individuals, and Cultures

6 Life-Based Design 171

Understanding and Explaining Forms of Life: Facts

7 Research and Innovation 207

8 Epilogue: Designing for Life 243

Author Index 251

Subject Index 263

Table 7.1 The fundamental questions of HTI design ontology

Technological advancements have changed human life throughout history

Information and communication technology (ICT) services have

approached interaction issues very differently. Consequently, the degree

A number of different kinds of tools have been developed to sup-

Today, modern technologies (particularly information and com-

of the aqueducts, whereas technologies provided the means to solve the

Technology Emancipates People

our relationships with other people and even increase understanding

relate to a variety of factors, such as living and work conditions, ethnic

as improved hygiene and advanced medication and vaccination are also

of technical artefacts, such as programs, machines, devices or tools, as

Towards a New Interaction Design Culture

Traditionally, as in the case of the car industry, developing any tech-

should be incorporated into design solutions (Card et al. 1983; Carroll

explanation of its use. To understand human actions, one has to be able

Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: Towards a new modernity. London: Sage.

Dekker, S. (2006). The field guide to understanding human error. Farnham:

Nagamashi, M. (2011). Kansei/affective engineering and history of Kansei/

Rheingold, H. (2012). Smart mobs. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

A newcomer in the human-technology interaction (HTI) field encounters a

Ultimately, designing is thinking. Therefore, it should be studied as

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 25

developed a variety of different ways of thinking about (and approaches

How Researchers and Designers Perceive HTI

experience (Hassenzahl 2011) has proven to be problematic. Further, the

• topic and concepts of research;

Paradigms outline the ways in which research is conducted in a field of

Main Paradigms of HTI Design: An Overview

HTI issues have been traditionally discussed in technical concepts,

A closely related paradigm to human factors and ergonomics is HCI,

The HCI research paradigm has generated a number of important

Other paradigms have similar goals to Kansei engineering and

From Paradigms to Research Programmes

innovations (Saariluoma 1997), thus they are differentiated and unified

Human factors, ergonomics, usability, HCI, and user psychology are

other research programmes as they have also been seen as important. In

(Saariluoma 1997). It should be possible to define the tacit dimension

The Fundamental Four: The Basic Questions

• functionalities and technical user interface design;

ing, programming, and information systems knowledge. The three other

science is achieved by improving its capacity to solve problems. Thus, set-