Preliminary Considerations

People vs Fetalino
GR 174472, June 19, 2007
Facts: Appellant stood charged with two counts of acts of lasciviousness and three counts of rape allegedly
committed against the person of his own daughter. During trial, however, the victim became disinterested in
pursuing the case, hence, she was presented as a hostile witness. However, the testimony of the victim and
the sworn statements that she executed only details one of the alleged incident of the rape.

Issue: Can the accused be convicted of all the counts of rape?

Held: The evidence which should be considered by the court in criminal cases need not be limited to the statements
made in open court; rather, it should include all documents, affidavits or sworn statements of the witnesses,
and other supporting evidence. When a sworn statement has been formally offered as evidence, it forms an
integral part of the prosecution evidence which should not be ignored for it complements and completes the
testimony on the witness stand. A sworn statement is a written declaration of facts to which the declarant has
sworn before an officer authorized to administer oaths. This oath vests credibility and trustworthiness on the
document. The fact that a witness fails to reiterate, during trial, the contents of his sworn statement should not
affect his credibility and render the sworn statement useless and insignificant, as long as it is presented as
evidence in open court. This is not to say, however, that the sworn statement should be given more probative
value than the actual testimony. Rather, the sworn statement and the open court declarations must be
evaluated and examined together in toto so that a full and thorough determination of the merits of the case
may be achieved. Giving weight to a witness' oral testimony during the trial should not mean being oblivious
to the other pieces of available evidence such as the sworn statement. In like manner, the court cannot give
probative value to the sworn statement to the exclusion of the oral testimony. In every case, the court should
review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence presented by the parties. It must be remembered that
each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each of the other rape charges should be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, it is incumbent on the prosecution to present the quantum of proof
necessary for the conviction of an accused. In this case, we have gone over the testimony of AAA and her
sworn statement and cannot agree in the trial court's conclusion that appellant's guilt had been sufficiently
established. AAA's testimony pertaining to the second and third incidents of rape merely consists of general
statements.

Ong Chia vs Republic

GR 127240, March 27, 2000
Facts: Petitioner filed for a petition for naturalization. His petition was granted by the trial court. However, the
Republic contested his petition and appealed, alleging new pieces of evidence therefore. Petition contends the
admission by the appellate court of the additional documentary evidence presented by the Republic.

Issue: Is petitioner’s contention tenable?

Held: The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 1, sc. 4 of the Rules of Court which provides that:
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule
132, sec. 34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition
for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases
is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient
course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res
judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a
revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

People vs Valdez
GR 126126, October 30, 2000
Facts: Accused-appellants were convicted by the trial court if robbery with homicide, a special complex crime.
Accused-appellants faults the trial court for appreciating the testimony of 2 witnesses, one with an incomplete
statement in his affidavit and the other without any affidavit at all.

Issue: Is accused-appellants’ contention tenable?

Held: We are not persuaded. It is a matter of judicial experience that an affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is almost
always incomplete and often inaccurate. To be sure, a sworn statement taken ex parte is generally considered
to be inferior to a testimony given in open court as the latter is subject to the test of cross examination.

Zulueta vs CA
GR 107383, February 20, 1996
Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the
documents and papers and for damages against petitioner, of which the trial court sided with him.

Issue: Are the correspondence admissible as evidence?

Held: The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
"the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it
is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there
is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets
of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one
to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to
the other.

People vs Yatar
GR 150224, May 19, 2004
Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape. Although no direct evidence was
introduced by the prosecution, the trial court considered all the circumstancial evidence available, including
the semen recovered from the body of the victim. DNA comparison was conducted which yielded positive
result.

Issue: Is resort to DNA comparison permissible in our rule on evidence?

Held: DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. A person’s DNA is the same
in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as
the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and
vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two
individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins. DNA print or identification
technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a
wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation,
DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely
in effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the
guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors:
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,
it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was
relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they
would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such
novel procedure. Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence
 obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is
relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and
molecular biology.

People vs Sartagoda
GR
Facts:

What need not be proved

Republic vs CA
GR 119288, August 18, 1997
Facts: This case was for the registration of a parcel of land in the name of respondent. Before the scheduled hearing
on August 13, 1990, the Court received a report from the Land Registration Authority calling the Court's
attention of the decision rendered by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos on October 20, 1950 declaring this lot as
property of the Republic of the Philippines. Despite this declaration however, the petitioner nor the
government did not bar the claimant from filing her answer, possessing and occupying the lot and in fact
accepted her tax payments and issuing her tax declaration on the same. Hence, the land was registered under
the name of herein respondent.

Issue: Was it proper for the trial court to disregard the decision of another court?

Held: The rules of procedure and jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of evidentiary value, in ordinary trials, of
evidence which is not formally offered, and that adjective law is not to be taken lightly for, without it, the
enforcement of substantive law may not remain assured. The Court must add, nevertheless, that technical
rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but primarily devised and designed to help in the proper and
expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may have to be so construed
liberally as to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice. A court will take judicial notice of its own
acts and records in the same case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the
authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the
same court, and of public records on file in the same court. In addition judicial notice will be taken of the
record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or involving one of the
same parties, as well as of the record of another case between different parties in the same court. Judicial
notice will also be taken of court personnel. The remand of the case would likewise seem to be unavoidable.
The area of Lot No. 5367 claimed and awarded to the late Josefa Gacot had not been specified in the records.

People vs Kulais
GR 100901, July 16, 1998
Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted of kidnapping for ransom. One of the pieces of evidence considered by the
trial court was the testimony given by the officer who arrested herein accused-appellant in another case. The
trial court actually took judicial notice of the testimony of the arresting officer.

Issue: Was taking judicial notice of the testimony proper?

Held: True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings,
even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending
before the same judge. This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Having said that, we note, however, that even if the
court a quo did take judicial notice of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in
deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction
was based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica
Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-
examinations conducted by appellant's counsel. At best, then, the trial court's mention of Lieutenant
Feliciano's testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor
substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais.

Laureano vs CA
GR 114776, February 2, 2000
Facts: Petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case before the labor arbiter but subsequently withdrew the case and filed
it before the regular courts for allegedly breach of contract. Respondent alleged that the proper law which
should be made applicable is Singapore Law.
Issue: Is respondent’s contention proper?

Held: Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the Singapore Laws
because of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As
substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the
laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the
burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied.

LBP vs Banal
GR 143276, July 20, 2004
Facts: Respondents’ land was the subject of the CARP, hence, it was taken by the government subject to payment of
just compensation. However, respondents rejected the valuation made by petitioners, which prompted the
former to file before the RTC for the determination of just compensation. The trial court, in deciding the just
compensation, took judicial notice of the formula to determine the value of the land from another case
pending before it.

Issue: Was the act of the trial court proper?

Held: Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.
They may only do so "in the absence of objection" and "with the knowledge of the opposing party," which are
not obtaining here. Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the
Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on
the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter.

Republic Glass Corp vs Qua

GR 144413, July 30, 2004
Facts: Petitioners together with herein respondent, executed a surety agreement with Metro Bank over the loan
obtained by Ladtek, where the former are all stockholders. Petitioners and respondent, in turn, executed an
indemnity agreement whereby they pledge their shares among themselves. Ladtek defaulted on the loan, thus
Metro Bank filed a collection case. Qua filed a motion to dismiss believing that the obligation was fully paid
by herein petitioners. Petitioners, in turn foreclosed the shares of Qua and as evidence, presented Qua’s
motion to dismiss from the collection case.

Issue: Does the motion to dismiss by Qua in the collection case constitute judicial admission in the foreclosure
case?

Held: A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings filed by the parties, (b) during the trial either by
verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. The elements
of judicial admissions are absent in this case. Qua made conflicting statements in Collection Case No. 8364
and in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643, and not in the "same case" as required in Section 4 of Rule 129. To
constitute judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered. If made in
another case or in another court, the fact of such admission must be proved as in the case of any other fact,
although if made in a judicial proceeding it is entitled to greater weight.

Habagat Grill vs DMC-Urban Property

GR 155110, March 31, 2005
Facts: Respondent filed an ejectment case against petitioner over the disputed land. Petitioner presented as defense
of his possession Presidential Proclamation 20, which alleged that the said property was located inside the
Municipal Rservation, hence was not the property of the respondent. The lower court dismissed the case and
took judicial notice of the said Presidential Proclamation. However, the CA reversed the lower court’s
decision.

Issue: Did the lower court erred in taking judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation 20?

Held: “Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof
because they already know them.” Its object is to save time, labor and expense in securing and introducing
evidence on matters that are not ordinarily capable of dispute or actually bona fide disputed, and the tenor of
which can safely be assumed from the tribunal’s general knowledge or from a slight search on its part.
Indeed, municipal courts may take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the municipality in
which they sit. Such notice, however, is limited to what the law is and what it states. The location of Habagat
Grill cannot be resolved by merely taking judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 20; such location is
 precisely at the core of the dispute in this case. Moreover, considering respondent’s allegation that the
supposed lot covered by the Ordinance has been lost due to inundation by the sea, we cannot fathom how the
trial court could have known of the actual location of the metes and bounds of the subject lot. Neither may
the MTC take discretionary judicial notice under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, because the
exact boundaries of the lot covered by that law are not a matter of public knowledge capable of
unquestionable demonstration. Neither may these be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

Clarion Printing vs NLRC

GR 148372, June 27, 2005
Facts: Respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal before the labor arbiter. However, petitioner raised the defense of
retrenchment and the petitioner being under rehabilitation receivership. The labor arbiter found that
respondent was illegally dismissed and the supposed retrenchment by petitioner was not based on a valid
ground. The NLRC and CA both affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision

Issue: Was there a valid ground for retrenchment?

Held: That judicial notice can be taken of the above-said case of Nikon Industrial Corp. et al. v. PNB et al., which
has now become final and executory, there should be no doubt. Ergo, the SEC’s disapproval of the EYCO
Group of Companies’ “Petition for the Declaration of Suspension of Payment” and the order for the
liquidation and dissolution of these companies including CLARION, must be deemed to have been
unassailed. As provided in Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court: “Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A
court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of
states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws
of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions”, which Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras
interpreted as follows: A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts
established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case
between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the
same court. In addition judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another
court between the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another case
between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will also be taken of court personnel. In fine,
CLARION’s claim that at the time it terminated Miclat it was experiencing business reverses gains more light
from the SEC’s disapproval of the EYCO Group of Companies’ petition to be declared in state of suspension
of payment, filed before Miclat’s termination, and of the SEC’s consequent order for the group of companies’
dissolution and liquidation.

Rules of Admissibility

Object Evidence

People vs Rullepa
GR 131516, March 5, 2003
Facts: The prosecution failed to offer as evidence the birth certificate of the victim during trial. However, the court
took ‘judicial notice’ of the appearance of the victim in convicting the accused of rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of death.

Issue: Is the act of the court in taking ‘judicial notice’ of the appearance of the victim proper?

Held: When the trier of facts observes the appearance of a person to ascertain his or her age, he is not taking
judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is conducting an examination of the evidence, the evidence being the
appearance of the person. Such a process militates against the very concept of judicial notice, the object of
which is to do away with the presentation of evidence. This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by
the Rules of Court; on the contrary, it does. A person's appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object
evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the court, as provided in Section 1, Rule 130. As to the
weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which is again
reproduced hereunder: If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of
the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such
as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years
of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be
 below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is
alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be proved
(below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victim's age from her
appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the
victim was below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, is present. Whether the
victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable doubt exists. A mature three
and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the
victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the
mother is, by itself, insufficient.

People vs Ulzoron
GR 121979, March 2, 1998
Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted of the crime of rape by force and intimidation. He contends that the
absence of any bruises in the victim negates the use of force, which would warrant his acquittal.

Issue: Is accused-appellant’s contention tenable?

Held: The circumstances of force and intimidation attending the instant case were manifested clearly not only in the
victim's testimony but also in the physical evidence presented during the trial consisting of her torn dress and
underwear as well as the medico-legal report. Such pieces of evidence indeed are more eloquent than a
hundred witnesses. The fact of carnal knowledge is not disputed. It was positively established through the
offended party's own testimony and corroborated by that of her examining physician.

Macarrubo vs Macarrubo
AC 6148, February 27, 2004
Facts: Complainant filed a disbarment case against respondent grounded on immorality. Complainant alleged that
she was the 2nd wife of respondent and that the latter abandoned her and their 2 children. Respondent, by way
of defense, alleged that the marriage between him and complainant were already annulled prior to the filing
of the disbarment case and that his marriage to her was a ‘shotgun marriage’

Issue: Is respondent guilty of immorality?

Held: The saying that photographs do not lie could not be any truer in those submitted in evidence by complainant,
which show a typical happy family with respondent essaying out his role as a husband to complainant and a
father to their two kids. Respondent cannot thus take refuge in the earlier mentioned finding in the decision of
Tuguegarao City trial court in the annulment case he filed against complainant. The decision, rendered in
default of complainant, cannot serve as res judicata on the final resolution of the present case. A disbarment
case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the Court
into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an
administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its
course, then the judgment of annulment of respondent's marriage does not also exonerate him from a
wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence - in
disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches. It is not easy to believe
that a lawyer like respondent could easily be cowered to enter into any marriage. One incident of a "shotgun
marriage" is believable, but two such in succession would tax one's credulity. And then, there is a third
marriage to Josephine T. Constantino which is again the subject of another annulment case. It would not
come as a surprise if in that pending case he would again put blame on his third wife in order to send the
marriage to oblivion.

Documentary Evidence

De Vera vs Aguilar
GR 83377, February 9, 1993
Facts: Petitioners filed a case for the recovery a parcel of land situated in Meycauayan, Bulacan. As proof of their
claim, petitioner presented a photocopy of the alleged deed of sale executed between respondents and
petitioner. Though petitioners proved the existence and due execution of the document, through the notary
public before whom said document was acknowledged, they only accounted for the loss of 1 of the 4 original
copies, which was in their possession.

Issue: Was the loss sufficiently proved?

Held: Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to
the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the
instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents although this order
may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for
the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the
circumstances of the particular case. A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it merely ruled on
the existence and due execution of the alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959. It failed to look into the
facts and circumstances surrounding the loss or destruction of the original copies of the alleged deed of sale.
After the due execution of the document has been established, it must next be proved that said document has
been lost or destroyed. The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The
loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by any one who had made, in the judgment
of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character
are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who
has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.
However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using copies. For, since all the
duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the
writing itself can be regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable. In the case at
bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who notarized the document testified that the alleged deed of
sale has about four or five original copies. Hence, all originals must be accounted for before secondary
evidence can be given of any one. This, petitioners failed to do. Records show that petitioners merely
accounted for three out of four or five original copies.

CitiBank Mastercard vs Teodoro

GR 150905, September 23, 2003
Facts: Petitioner instituted a collection case against respondent for the outstanding balance for the use of the latter’s
credit card. During trial, petitioner presented sales invoices, receipts and vouchers evidencing the purchases
made by respondent, but all were mere photocopies. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner but was
overturned by the CA because of insufficiency of evidence.

Issue: Are the photocopies of the sales invoices and vouchers admissible?

Held: The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged obligation. Photocopies
thereof are mere secondary evidence. As such, they are inadmissible because petitioner, as the offeror, failed
to prove any of the exceptions provided under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as well as the
conditions of their admissibility. Because of the inadmissibility of the photocopies in the absence of the
originals, respondent's obligation was not established. Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the
existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its
nonproduction in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability
of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and
contents. At the sound discretion of the court, this order may be changed if necessary. In the present case, the
existence of the original sales invoices was established by the photocopies and the testimony of Hernandez.
Petitioner, however, failed to prove that the originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after
reasonable diligence and good faith in searching for them. Indeed, the loss of the originals and reasonable
diligence in the search for them were conditions that were not met, because the sales invoices might have
been found by Equitable. Hernandez, testifying that he had requested the originals from Equitable, failed to
show that he had subsequently followed up the request. Finally, when more than one original copy exists, it
must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary
evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other originals.

Sison vs People
GR 108280-83, November 16, 1995
Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of murder for the death of Salcedo. The crime
occurred after the Edsa Revolution where Marcos loyalist staged a massive demonstration in Luneta. The
victim was mauled by the accused-appellants allegedly for wearing a yellow shirt and being a loyalist of the
then president Aquino. Some of the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution were pictures taken
during the said mauling published on several newspapers, all of which were objected to by appellants
allegedly for lack of proper identification.

Issue: Are the photographs admissible?

Held: The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The
value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its
admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer,
however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the
photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the
testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it
subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by
any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. This court notes that when the
prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants objected to their admissibility for lack
of proper identification. However, when the accused presented their evidence, the same photographs were
presented to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in
the mauling of the victim. The photographs were adopted by appellants as part of the defense exhibits. At
subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the
witness stand. No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at
the third hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility. The objection of Atty. Lazaro to
the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the person who took the same was not
presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their
alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the
photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los
Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat.

Garvida vs Sales
GR 124893, April 18, 1997
Facts: A petition for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy was filed by respondent against petitioner before the
COMELEC. But said petition was filed through facsimile.

Issue: Is the filing proper?

Held: In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the petition were filed
with the COMELEC. Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the basis of the petition
transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail. A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the
transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area
at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The
current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the
receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The
receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a
facsimile. Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best,
an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on
its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his
counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. The uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading should
have restrained the COMELEC en banc from acting on the petition and issuing the questioned order. The
COMELEC en banc should have waited until it received the petition filed by registered mail.

Cuevas vs Munoz
GR 140520, December 18, 2000
Facts: Respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the CA assailing the order of
arrest issued against him by the RTC, following the request for the provisional arrest by the government of
Hong Kong against respondent for several violations of the laws of Hong Kong. The CA nullified the order of
arrest issued by the RTC for not being authenticated, all being merely facsimile copies.

Issue: Is the CA correct in nullifying the order of arrest by the RTC?

Held: The language of the Section 20(b) of P.D. No. 1069 is clear. (either through the diplomatic channels or direct
by post or telegraph) There is no requirement for the authentication of a request for provisional arrest and its
accompanying documents. The process of preparing a formal request for extradition and its accompanying
documents, and transmitting them through diplomatic channels, is not only time-consuming but also leakage-
prone. There is naturally a great likelihood of flight by criminals who get an intimation of the pending request
for their extradition. To solve this problem, speedier initial steps in the form of treaty stipulations for
provisional arrest were formulated. Thus, it is an accepted practice for the requesting state to rush its request
in the form of a telex or diplomatic cable, the practically of the use of which in conceded. even our own
 Extradition Law (P.D. No. 1069) allows the transmission of a request for provisional arrest via telegraph. In
the advent of modern technology, the telegraph or cable have been conveniently replaced by the facsimile
machine. Therefore, the transmission by the Hong Kong DOJ of the request for respondent’s provisional
arrest and the accompanying documents, namely, a copy of the warrant of arrest against respondent, a
summary of the facts of the case against him, particulars of his birth and address, a statement of the intention
to request his provisional arrest and the reason therefore, by fax machine, more than serves this purpose of
expediency.

Heirs of Sabanpan vs Comorposa

GR 152807, August 12, 2003
Facts: Petitioner instituted an ejectment case against respondents. Respondents, in their answer, attached the order
issued by the DENR declaring that the land they were occupying were still alienable and has not yet been
awarded to any person. However, the signature of the CENR officer was by way of facsimile. The MTC ruled
in favor of petitioner but the RTC and CA reversed the MTC’s decision.

Issue: Was the certification by the CENR officer admissible?

Held: Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they are
not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic. The
Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer
Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one
mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means
but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions. If the Certification were a sham as
petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he
would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter was
under the former's direct control and supervision.

Ortanes vs CA
GR 107372, January 23, 1997
Facts: Respondents sold 2 parcels of land to petitioners, evidenced by a deed of absolute sale. However, when
petitioners demanded the title of the 2 lands, respondents refused to deliver said titles and insist that certain
conditions be met before said titles are delivered. Thus, petitioner instituted an action for specific
performance. Unfortunately, the RTC admitted the oral testimony regarding said conditions and dismissed the
case. The CA affirmed the RTC

Issue: Is parole evidence admissible?

Held: The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private respondents' oral testimony on the alleged
conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on
human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously
unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. Thus, under the general rule in
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in
this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted
other than the contents thereof. Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the
truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties.
Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As
a contract, it is the law between the parties. Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a
contract, "it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake." No such
fraud or mistake exists in this case. . Lastly, record shows that private respondents did not expressly plead that
the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did not reflect the intention of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller
(private respondents). Such issue must be, "squarely presented." Private respondents merely alleged that the
sale was subject to four (4) conditions which they tried to prove during trial by parol evidence. Obviously,
this cannot be done, because they did not plead any of the exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule.

Lapu-lapu Foundation vs CA
GR 126006, January 29, 2004
Facts: Petitioner contracted several loans with Allied Bank. Under the said contract, both petitioners solidarily bind
themselves to pay said indebtedness. However, petitioners failed to pay hence respondent instituted a
collection case against petitioners. Tan, petitioner herein, contends that he contracted the loan in his personal
capacity and that the bank made him sign documents to which he has no knowledge of its contents. In
addition, he also insist that he and the bank had oral arrangements regarding the loan.
Issue: Is petitioners’ contention tenable?

Held: In contrast, as found by the CA, the promissory notes clearly showed upon their faces that they are the
obligation of the petitioner Foundation, as contracted by petitioner Tan in his official and personal capacity.
Moreover, the application for credit accommodation, the signature cards of the two accounts in the name of
petitioner Foundation, as well as New Current Account Record, all accompanying the promissory notes, were
signed by petitioner Tan for and in the name of the petitioner Foundation. These documentary evidence
unequivocally and categorically establish that the loans were solidarily contracted by the petitioner
Foundation and petitioner Tan. As a corollary, the parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject
petitioner Tan’s claim regarding the purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on
the payment of the obligation. Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that when
the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement. Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is
generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. While parol evidence is
admissible to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has
been fraud or mistake. No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this case.

Borillo vs CA
GR
Facts:

Cruz vs CA
GR
Facts:

Testimonial Evidence
People vs Golimlim
GR 145225, April 2, 2005
Facts: Accused was convicted of the crime of rape. The victim, being mentally retarded, testified as to the
circumstances of the incident. Accused contends that the victim should have been disqualified because of her
mental retardation.

Issue: Is the victim qualified to testify?

Held: A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental
condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no
matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can
still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to. It can not then be gainsaid that
a mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If his or
her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court.

People vs Castaneda
GR L-46306, February 27, 1979
Facts: Accused was charged of the crime of falsification of public documents, which was initiated by his wife.
When the prosecution called his wife to the witness stand to testify, the accused objected by reason of marital
disqualification, which was granted by the trial court.

Issue: Is the wife disqualified from testifying?

Held: The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the
accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife consented to
the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not. It
must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in
the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said
husband Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense
charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint with
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one
spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents of the
 instant case. When an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs the Conjugal Relation, it comes
within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other. With more reason must the exception apply to the
instant case where the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the
falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act complained of had the
effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-
wife underscore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have
become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may
be disturbed.

Bordalba vs CA
GR 112443, January 25, 2002
Facts: Respondents brought an action for nullification and cancellation of the free patent awarded to petitioners.
Respondents anchored their claim on the 1947 deed of extra-judicial partition which petitioner’s mother
executed with respondent’s predecessors and even made as basis by petitioner’s mother in her free patent
application. Respondents then testified as to the matters contained in the 1947 deed, which the petitioner
vehemently objected.

Issue: Is the witness disqualified?

Held: As to the alleged violation of the dead man’s statute, suffice it to state that said rule finds no application in the
present case. The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact
coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or
communication made by the deceased to the witness. Since the claim of private respondents and the
testimony of their witnesses in the present case are based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned
testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.

Razon vs CA
GR 74306, March 16, 1992
Facts: The Estate of Chuidian, through Vicente Chuidian, the administrator, brought a case for the recovery of
shares of stocks from herein petitioner. Petitioner testified as to his dealings and arrangements with the late
Chuidian. However, the CA disregarded his testimony, claiming that it falls within the prohibition of the
‘dead man statute’.

Issue: Is petitioner’s testimony within the prohibition of the ‘dead man statute’?

Held: In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant (petitioner herein) to
the affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of
the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of
stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay
the same which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan
Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear,
therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed
against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. Furthermore, the
records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true
nature of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-
examination by the private respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony is within the
prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived
the rule.

Sunga-Chan vs Chua
GR 143340, August 15, 2001
Facts: Respondent filed for the winding up and recovery of his shares in the partnership that was created by him and
the deceased spouse of petitioner. Petitioner included a counter-claim in their answer to the complaint.
Respondent presented as witness Josephine who was formerly co-manager of the partnership. Petitioners
contend that the witness should have been disqualified from testifying by reason of the ‘survivorship rule’.

Issue: Does Josephine’s testimony fall within the ‘dead man statute’ prohibition?

Held: The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by
death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of
 giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. But before this rule can be
successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that: 1. The witness is a
party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a case in prosecuted; 2. The action is against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind; 3. The
subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against person
of unsound mind; 4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind." Two reasons forestall the application of the
"Dead Man's Statute" to this case. First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents in
their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively
removed this case from the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute". Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the
executor or administrator or representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein
respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim. Moreover,
as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of facts
occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or
representatives of the deceased. Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's
Statute" for the simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted."

People vs Sandiganbayan
GR 115439-41, July 16, 1997
Facts: Respondent Sansaet was the counsel for Paredes. Both of them were charged of 3 counts of falsification of
public documents. However, the former recanted and moved for his discharged in exchange for his testimony.
The latter objected the motion and invoked the lawyer-client privilege. The Sandiganbayan refused to
discharge Sansaet.

Issue: Is the lawyer-client privilege available?

Held: The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts thereof and actuations of both
respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule. A distinction must be made between confidential
communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed, by
the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included
within the confidences which his attorney is bound to respect. It is true that by now, insofar as the
falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in
the past. But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the
date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime
committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In other words, if the
client seeks his lawyer's advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given
the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by
the attorney without the client's consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with
regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he
seeks the lawyer's advice. . It is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his
client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an
unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.

Lim vs CA
GR
Facts:

Almonte vs Vasquez
GR 95367, May 23, 2995
Facts: Petitioner was the Commissioner of EIIB. He received a subpoena duces tecum from the Ombudsman in
relation to an investigation being conducted by the latter of illegal disbursement of fund of the EIIB.
Petitioner contends that the revelation of the documents relating personal services funds were confidential
and will greatly prejudice the operations, personnel and agents of the agency.

Issue: Are the documents confidential?

Held: Where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic or other national
security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality of his conversations, courts have
declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege of the President against a subpoena considered
essential to the enforcement of criminal laws. In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic
secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's
 function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities
affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar
salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the
circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military
matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other
considerations. Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, this
decision would only justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction. However, as
concession to the nature of the functions of the EIIB and just to be sure no information of a confidential
character is disclosed, the examination of records in this case should be made in strict confidence by the
Ombudsman himself.

Admissions

Ching vs CA
GR 110844, April 27, 2000
Facts: On 04 February 1992, petitioner was charged before the RTC of Makati with four counts of Estafa in relation
to PD 115 (trust receipts). On 05 March 1992, petitioner, together with Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc.,
filed a case before the RTC of Manila for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages alleging that
the trust receipts were executed and intended as collateral or security. Petitioner then moved for the
suspension of the criminal case by reason of a prejudicial question which was denied by the trial court and by
the CA on his petition for certiorari. After promulgation of the CA’s decision, petitioner filed an amended
complaint in the civil case alleging that the transaction was one of pure loan without any trust receipts.

Issue: May both the amended complaint and the superseded complaint be considered as admission?

Held: Under the Rules, pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their status as pleadings
and cease to be judicial admissions. While they may nonetheless be utilized against the pleader as
extrajudicial admissions, they must, in order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence. If not
offered in evidence, the admission contained therein will not be considered. Consequently, the original
complaint, having been amended, lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no
proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, required its
formal offer. In virtue thereof, the amended complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as
abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms
part of the record. Nonetheless, we must stress that the actuations of petitioner demands stern rebuke from
this Court. Certainly, this Court is not unwary of the tactics employed by the petitioner specifically in filing
the amended complaint only after the promulgation of the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals. It bears
noting that a lapse of almost eighteen months (from March 1992 to September 1993), from the filing of the
original complaint to the filing of the amended complaint, is too lengthy a time sufficient to enkindle
suspicion and enflame doubts as to the true intentions of petitioner regarding the early disposition of the
pending cases. In addition, by filing the amended complaint, in effect, altered the theory of his case.
Likewise, the allegations embodied in the amended complaint are inconsistent with that of the original
complaint inasmuch as in the latter, petitioner alleged that the trust receipts were intended as mere collateral
or security, the principal transaction being one of pure loan. Yet, in the amended complaint, petitioner argued
that the said trust receipts were executed as additional or side documents, the transaction being strictly one of
pure loan without any trust receipt arrangement. Obviously these allegations are in discord in relation to each
other and therefore cannot stand in harmony.

People vs Gaudia
GR 146111, February 23, 2004
Facts: The accused-appellant was charged with the rape of Remelyn Loyola, a minor. Accused-appellant questions
the fact that his parents’ offer of compromise should not be taken against him

Issue: Is appellant’s contention tenable?

Held: Appellant’s charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the appellant to Amalia,
and by the appellant himself to Amalia’s husband should not have been taken against him by the trial court,
even if sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise allegedly made by appellant to
Amalia Loyola’s husband is hearsay evidence, and of no probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as
to the alleged offer, and she was not a party to the conversation which allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy
Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or perception.
The offer of compromise allegedly made by the appellant’s parents to Amalia may have been the subject of
testimony of Amalia. However, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the
 actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor
was it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They
cannot be considered as evidence against appellant but we reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse
the conviction of the appellant.

Doldol vs People
GR 164481, September 20, 2005
Facts: An audit of the cash and cash account of Conrado C. Doldol, the Municipal Treasurer of Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan was conducted by the State auditors. The audit covered the General Fund, Special Education
Fund and Trust Fund in his custody for the period of November 30, 1994 to June 8, 1995. Doldol and the
Municipal Accountant were present during the audit. The State Auditors discovered that Doldol had a
shortage of P801,933.26. They also noted that on June 5, 1995, he made cash withdrawals from the
municipality’s deposit account with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) amounting to P360,000.59. In a
Letter dated July 5, 1995, the State Auditors demanded the immediate refund of the said amount, and for
Doldol to submit within 72 hours a written explanation on the said shortage. Doldol failed to respond and
was, thereafter, relieved of his duties. On July 20, 1995, he was directed to transfer the account to Assistant
Municipal Treasurer Loida Cancino. Doldol wrote the Provincial Treasurer requesting that a re-audit be
conducted on his cash and cash account, taking exception to the findings of the State Auditors. Instead of
pursuing his request for a re-audit, Doldol opted to refund the missing funds. On September 15, 1995, he
remitted P200,000.00 to the Acting Municipal Treasurer for which he was issued Official Receipt No.
436756. Doldol promised to pay the balance of his shortage thereafter but he reneged on his promise.
Petitioner was then charge with malversation of public funds and thereafter was convicted.

Issue: Can his actuations be taken against him?

Held: Moreover, the petitioner wrote the Provincial Auditor and offered to refund the missing funds as follows:
P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995, P200,000.00 on or before October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on
November 30, 1995. He was able to pay only P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995, and failed to remit the
balance of his shortage. Such partial restitution of the petitioners of the cash shortage is an implied admission
of misappropriation of the missing funds. Said payment is of no moment and could not have legally brought
acquittal for the appellant. On the contrary, as guided by Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, We
hold that said payment, particularly when taken in conjunction with appellant’s commitment to gradually pay
the remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of compromise which must be treated as an implied
admission of appellant’s guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing funds to his personal use.

People vs Cui
GR 121982, September 10, 1999
Facts: In the evening of December 5, 1990, some 10 armed robbers raided the compound of Johnny and Rose Lim
on Edison Street, Lahug, Cebu City. The robbers carted away cash and jewelries worth P20,000.00. They also
blindfolded and forcibly abducted 17 year-old Stephanie, the youngest daughter of the Lims and demanded a
ransom of P1,000,000.00 for her release. Johnny Lim turned over to Toto Garcia the ransom amount in the
afternoon of the next day at an arranged meeting place. Stephanie, in turn, was released to her father. The Lim
family reported the matter to authorities and the latter conducted investigations and learned that the former’s
guard Basingan also hailed from the same municipality as where the robbers also hailed. Basingan's
interrogation broke the case wide open which led to the arrest of all the accused including appellants. All of
them were charged, including Basingan, of kidnapping for ranson. Basingan escaped from confinement after
he was arraigned. All the accused were convicted based on Basingan’s allegations.

Issue: Can Basingan’s statements be considered as evidenced against appellant?

Held: There is no question that Basingan escaped and never testified in court to affirm his accusation against the
Cuis, Obeso and Sarte. Thus, the trial court committed reversible error in admitting and giving weight to the
sworn statements of Basingan. In the same vein, the testimony of Sgt. Ouano confirming the content of
Basingan's sworn statements is not proof of its truth and by itself cannot justify the conviction of appellants.
Both the extrajudicial sworn statement of Basingan and the testimony of Sgt. Ouano are clear hearsay.
Undeniably, they are hearsay for any oral or documentary evidence is hearsay by nature if its probative value
is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses but on the knowledge of some other person who was
never presented on the witness stand. The extra-judicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused
may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the
opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the extra-judicial statements, it is elementary that the same
are hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants,
in the case at bar. For this admission of a co-conspirator to be appreciated, the following requisites must be
 satisfied: a. that the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; b. that the
admission relates to the common objects; and c. that it has been made while the declarant was engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy. The general rule is that extra-judicial declarations of a co-conspirator made
before the formation of the conspiracy or after the accomplishment of its object are inadmissible in evidence
as against the other co-conspirators, on the ground that the accused in a criminal case has the constitutional
right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to cross-examine them. In the case at bar, the
alleged conspiracy among the accused was not priorly established by independent evidence. Nor was it was
shown that the extra-judicial statements of Basingan were made while they were engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy. In truth, the statements were made after the conspiracy has ended and after the consummation of
the crime. They were not acts or declarations made during the conspiracy's existence. Since the extra-judicial
admissions were made after the supposed conspiracy, they are binding only upon the confessant and are not
admissible against his co-accused; as against the latter, the confession is hearsay. In fine, the extra-judicial
statements of Basingan cannot be used against the Cuis, Obese and Sarte without doing violence against their
constitutional right to confront Basingan and to cross-examine him.

People vs Garcia
GR 145505, March 14, 2003
Facts: Sometime in 1998, Wilfredo was ordered by the Dagupan City Chief of Police to act as security guard-driver
of Assistant City Engineer Ismael dela Cruz of Dagupan City. Wilfredo was told by the chief of police that
Engr. dela Cruz had been receiving death threats from the Garcia family in Barangay Pugaro. Engr. dela Cruz
likewise told Wilfredo that he had received death threats from Jaime and and his brother Ricardo and their
nephew Christopher because of a family feud. On February 24, 1999, while Wilfredo was driving Engineer
dela Cruz, hey were shot by the accused on an intersection as a result of which, Engineer dela Cruz died. On
May 4, 1999, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court charging Ricardo Garcia, Christopher
Garcia and Andrew Tomelden with murder. Only Ricardo was arrested and posted a defense of alibi. Ricardo
was convicted by the trial court. He points out that Wilfredo’s testimony should not have been given credence
for having inconsistent statements

Issue: Is appellant’s contention tenable?

Held: Errorless testimony cannot be expected from Wilfredo as he recounted the details of a harrowing and life-
threatening experience. Witnesses, including policemen, are not expected to recall every single minute detail
of a startling occurrence, such as the number of times the assailant fired his gun, with perfect or total recall
taking into account the treachery of human memory and the lapse of time from the time of the shooting and
his testimony. On the contrary, such minor lapses tend to justify rather than debilitate the credibility of
Wilfredo because they show that he was not coached or his answers contrived. That Wilfredo did not state in
his affidavit at the hospital that Engr. dela Cruz was also shot on his forearm is of de minimis. It bears
stressing that Wilfredo gave his affidavit in the hospital shortly after he was shot. He was still in daze when
PO1 Dacpano interrogated him. And case law has it that a Sinumpaang Salaysay or a sworn statement is
merely a short narrative subscribed to by the complainant in question and answer form. Thus, it is only to be
expected that it is not as exhaustive as one's testimony in open court. The contradictions, if any, may be
explained by the fact that an affidavit can not possibly disclose the details in their entirety, and may
inaccurately describe, without deponent detecting it, some of the occurrences narrated. Being taken ex-parte,
an affidavit is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and
sometimes from the want of suggestions and inquiries. It has thus been held that affidavits are generally
subordinated in importance to open court declarations because the former are often executed when an affiant's
mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford her a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident
which has transpired. Further, affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the declarant has in mind
because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs them after the
same have been read to her.

Confessions

Ladiana vs People
GR 144293, December 4, 2002
Facts: Petitioner was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of homicide for the death of Francisco San Juan. One of the
bases of the Sandiganbayan for his conviction was the counter-affidavit that petitioner executed in the
absence of counsel during the preliminary investigation admitting that he shot the deceased in self-defense.

Issue: Is the counter-affidavit admissible? Is it a confession?

Held: It is well-settled that the foregoing legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to
extra-judicial confessions or admissions obtained during custodial investigations. Indeed, the rights
enumerated in the constitutional provision "exist only in custodial interrogations, or in-custody interrogation
of accused persons." Custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. In
the present case, petitioner admits that the questioned statements were made during the preliminary
investigation, not during the custodial investigation. However, he argues that the right to competent and
independent counsel also applies during preliminary investigations. We disagree. A preliminary investigation
is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial. Evidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be
considered as being under custodial investigation. There is no question that even in the absence of counsel,
the admissions made by petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are not violative of his constitutional rights. It is
clear from the undisputed facts that it was not exacted by the police while he was under custody or
interrogation. Hence, the constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation as embodied in Article
III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, are not at issue in this case. We do not, however, agree with the
Sandiganbayan’s characterization of petitioner’s Counter-Affidavit as an extrajudicial confession. It is only
an admission. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a
statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense with which one is charged. Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the accused admitting the
commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is an admission,
not a confession.

People vs Flores
GR 71980, March 18, 1991
Facts: The 4 accused was convicted by the RTC of Pangasinan of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
The trial court based its decision on the testimony of Flores, one of the accused, that the 4 of them conspired
and killed the victim, Mercedes Dulay. Flores executed an extrajudicial confession prior to the institution of
the criminal case and declared in open court during trial of his confession, as a result of which, the
prosecution utilized his testimony against his other co-accused.

Issue: May Flores’ confession be appreciated against his co-accused?

Held: A distinction, however, should be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives
the other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant while in the latter, his confession is
thrown wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal. The general rule that the confession of an accused may
be given in evidence against him but that it is not competent evidence against his co-accused, admits of
exceptions. Thus, this Court has held that where several accused are tried together for the same complaint, the
testimony lawfully given by one during the trial implicating the others is competent evidence against the
latter. The extrajudicial admission or confession of a co-conspirator out of court is different from the
testimony given by a co-accused during trial. The first is admissible against the declarant alone, but the
second is perfectly admissible against his co-accused who had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. In this case, the extrajudicial confession of Flores is inadmissible because he was not assisted by
counsel. Moreover, his extrajudicial confession may not even be accorded probative value in view of his
admission of the crime in open court. That being the case, only his judicial confession should be weighed and
considered. It should be remembered that the rule that the statement of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy is not admissible in evidence unless the conspiracy is first shown by other independent evidence,
applies only to an admission in an extrajudicial confession or declaration. It does not apply to a testimony
given directly in court where the defendants have the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Provided it
is sincere in itself, given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner, and full of details which by their
nature could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought, the testimony of a co-conspirator, even if
uncorroborated, is sufficient.

People vs Sayaboc
GR 147201, January 15, 2004
Facts: On 17 April 1995, an information was filed charging Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso, Marlon
Buenviaje, and Miguel Buenviaje with murder. Sayaboc was the gunman who shot Galam at the latter’s club.
During custodial investigation, Sayaboc was advised of his constitutional rights. Then Sayaboc asked the
police officers to get a lawyer. Half an hour later, the police officers brought Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the
PAO, who then conferred with Sayaboc for a while, after which the police officers continued the
investigation, during which Atty. Cornejo remained silent the entire time. However, the police officers would
stop questioning Sayaboc whenever Atty. Cornejo would leave to go to the comfort room. That night Sayaboc
 executed an extrajudicial confession in Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed to killing Joseph Galam at the
behest of Marlon Buenviaje for the sum of P100,000. He likewise implicated Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio
Escorpiso. The confession was also signed by Atty. Cornejo and attested to by one Fiscal Melvin Tiongson.

Issue: May the extrajudicial confession be admitted?

Held: Sayaboc’s extrajudicial confession cannot be used in evidence in this case. Jurisprudence provides that
extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition for this presumption, however, is that
the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding an accused’s rights during
custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially when the extrajudicial confession has
been denounced. The rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated
would succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is inherent in custodial
investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been given voluntarily since the
confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the failure to properly
inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and
inadmissible. Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession contains the passing
of information of the kind held to be in violation of the right to be informed under Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution. The stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are
later repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police investigators either automatically
type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their
handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an impression of
voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and
unconstrained giving up of a right is missing. The right to be informed requires "the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle." It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make
of these rights. More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade
IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police officers for two
days previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense. Likewise, Sayaboc was not afforded his
constitutional right to a competent counsel. While we are unable to rule on the unsubstantiated claim that
Atty. Cornejo was partial to the police, still, the facts show through the testimonies of Sayaboc and
prosecution witness SPO4 Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo remained silent throughout the duration of the
custodial investigation. The right to a competent and independent counsel means that the counsel should
satisfy himself, during the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect understands the import and
consequences of answering the questions propounded The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial
investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a
meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as
to be useless, voluntariness is impaired. This is not to say that a counsel should try to prevent an accused
from making a confession. Indeed, as an officer of the court, it is an attorney’s duty to, first and foremost,
seek the truth. However, counsel should be able, throughout the investigation, to explain the nature of the
questions by conferring with his client and halting the investigation should the need arise. The duty of a
lawyer includes ensuring that the suspect under custodial investigation is aware that the right of an accused to
remain silent may be invoked at any time. The purpose of the stringent requirements of the law is to protect
all persons, especially the innocent and the weak, against possible indiscriminate use of the powers of the
government. Any deviation cannot be tolerated, and any fruit of such deviation shall be excluded from
evidence.

People vs Ulit
GR 131799-801, February 23, 2004
Facts: Appellant Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy was convicted by th RTC of Makati of 2 counts of qualified rape and 2
counts of acts of lasciviousness. The prosecution offered as evidence the extrajudicial confession by the
accused before the barangay. However, after the prosecution had rested its case, appellant’s counsel
manifested to the court that the appellant was changing his plea in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387
from "not guilty" to "guilty." He also manifested that he would no longer adduce any evidence in his defense
in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-386 and 97-388 because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes charged therein. The trial court suspended the proceedings and gave the
appellant 45 minutes to confer with his counsel. When trial resumed, the appellant reiterated his earlier
manifestation. When told by the court that he could be sentenced to death for the rape charges, the appellant
stood pat on his decision to plead guilty in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387, and to no longer present
any evidence in his defense in the other two cases. The appellant was re-arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-
385 and 97-387 with the assistance of the same counsel and entered his plea of guilty to the charges.

Issue: Can the extrajudicial confession be admitted? Was appellant’s confession open court sufficient to convict
 him?

Held: Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his statement to the barangay
chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence against him because he was not
under arrest nor under custodial investigation when he gave his statement. The exclusionary rule is premised
on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing
police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is
forcefully apparent. As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted
by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the
NBI and such other police agencies in our government." The barangay chairman is not deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Under
these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that the appellant’s statement before the barangay
chairman is inadmissible. AS to appellant’s open court confession, undoubtedly, the appellant was charged
with a capital offense. When the appellant informed the trial court of his decision to change his plea of "not
guilty" to "guilty," it behooved the trial court to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea as mandated by Section 6, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The following are the duties of the trial court under the rule: 1. The court must conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension [by the accused] of the consequences of his
plea; 2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and
precise degree of his culpability; and 3. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence in his
behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. The raison d’etre for the rule is that the courts must proceed with
extreme care where the imposable penalty is death, considering that the execution of such sentence is
irrevocable. However, where the trial court receives, independently of his plea of guilty, evidence to
determine whether the accused committed the crimes charged and the precise degree of his criminal
culpability therefor, he may still be convicted if there is ample proof on record, not contingent on the plea of
guilty, on which to predicate conviction.

Conduct and Character

People vs Santos
GR 100225-26, May 11, 1993
Facts: Appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crimes of frustrated murder and murder. He points out on
appeal that one of the pieces of evidence considered by the trial court should have not been admitted,
particularly the affidavit of Guerrero concerning another crime from that of which he is presently charged.

Issue: Is the affidavit admissible?

Held: Appellant Santos now complains that the affidavit of Ronaldo Guerrero was hearsay evidence, considering
that the prosecution did not present Ronaldo Guerrero as a witness during the trial. We consider that the trial
court did not commit reversible error in admitting the Guerrero affidavit for the limited purpose for proving
knowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that appellant knew that the particular corner of two (2)
particular streets in Manila was a good place to ambush a vehicle and its passengers. Appellant also had
waived the hearsay character of this evidence by failure seasonably to object to the admission of the affidavit;
it is too late in that day to raise the hearsay rule in the appellant's memorandum after prosecution and defense
had presented their respective cases and had made their respective offers of evidence.

People vs Nardo
GR 133888, March 1, 2000
Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape, for raping his 14-year old daughter.
One of the defenses that appellant utilized was that her daughter was an incorrigible liar and as such, the
accusation made by his daughter against him was a total falsity. However, the trial court disregarded such fact
and convicted him. In fact, as additional pieces of evidence, he presented several letters made by his daughter
to him while he was in prison and during the pendency of his appeal, which implies his daughter’s recantation
of the crime he is charged with.

Issue: Did the trial court properly exclude such evidence?

Held: During the trial, the defense endeavored to portray Lorielyn as an incorrigible liar. Occasions were cited
wherein Lorielyn supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her parents' permission to leave the house.
However, Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that: "Evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme,
 habit, custom or usage, and the like." While lying may constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods
committed by Lorielyn, assuming them for the moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not
as serious as charging one's own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions.

Republic vs Heirs of Alejaga

GR 146030, December 3, 2002
Facts: Felipe Alejaga, Sr. was able to register a parcel of foreshore land under his name located in Roxas City,
Capiz. It appears, however, that the land in question was inspected by the land inspector on a date prior to the
submission of his application for registration. Hence, the petitioner contested the registration and prays for
the reversion of the said land back to the public domain. One of the pieces of evidence presented was the
report of the investigating office which contained a statement that the ‘land inspector assigned to inspect the
said land did not inspect the said land’.

Issue: Is the report admissible?

Held: Cartagena’s statement on Recio’s alleged admission may be considered as "independently relevant." A
witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person -- the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good or bad
faith -- and the former’s statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without violating the
hearsay rule. Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross-examination, the
Investigation Report he had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his testimony.
Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are not
hearsay. On the other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio may be considered as
independently relevant. The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations
communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity,
they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in
itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact. Since
Cartagena’s testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had conducted, his testimony was not
hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.

Hearsay Evidence Rule

People vs Montanez
GR 148257, March 17, 2004
Facts: The victim Perlito told Edmundo after the former was shot from behind that he was on the verge of death.
When Edmundo asked Perlito who shot him, the latter declared that it was the appellant. Perlito mentioned
the appellant’s name 3 times. Accused contends that he should be acquitted in light of the surrender of Daniel
Sumaylo and the latter declaring that the latter was the one who shot the victim.

Issue: Is accused-appellant’s contention tenable despite the dying declaration of the victim?

Held: Perlito’s statement that it was the appellant who shot him was a dying declaration. The statement is highly
reliable, having been made in extremity when the declarant is at the point of death and when any hope of
survival is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and when the mind is induced by the most
powerful considerations to speak the truth. Even if the declarant did not make a statement that he was at the
brink of death, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death superseded shortly afterwards
may be considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full realization
that he was in a dying condition.

People vs Bernal
GR 113685, June 19, 1997
Facts: Accused was convicted of the crime of kidnapping. It was alleged that the accused, together with 2 men,
abducted Openda while the latter was drinking. The accused contended that it was not him who actually
kidnapped the victim and that what happened was a legal arrest. In addition, he contended that the testimony
of one of the witnesses regarding the victim’s declaration that the latter had an affair with the accused wife
should have been disregarded.

Issue: Is accused-appellant’s contention tenable?

Held: Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with
enough circumstantial evidence of facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the
malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction. Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding
his illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the
 Revised Rules on Evidence. A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to
wit: "(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the
declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to
his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be
true."

Tison vs CA
GR 121027, July 31, 1997
Facts: Petitioner commenced an action for reconveyance against respondents for a parcel of land. Petitioner offered
as evidence her lone testimony as to her filiation with respondents’ predecessor-in-interest. The trial court
dismissed the case declaring that petitioner failed to prove her filiation.

Issue: Is petitioner’s testimony admissible?

Held: The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or
sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a
declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to
testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such
relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante
litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the
declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon. There is a distinction must be made as to when the
relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said
declarant, and when it must be supported by evidence aliunde. The general rule is that where the party
claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant
himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved
by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement
that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is
sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations
to the property of some other member of the family. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the
declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is
her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that
there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is rendered competent by
virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in
the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent.

Jison vs CA
GR 124853, February 24, 1998
Facts: Respondent filed a case for recognition as an illegitimate child by petitioner. Respondent presented some
documents such as various letters from the relatives of petitioner attesting as to her filiation.

Issue: Are these admissible as evidence of pedigree?

Held: It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first underscored
clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question may not be admitted as
the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the section containing the second underscored phrase.
What must then be ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as private documents, fall within the scope of the
clause "and the like" as qualified by the preceding phrase "entries in family bibles or other family books or
charts, engravings on rights and family portraits," We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the
second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are
commonly known as "family possessions," or those articles which represent, in effect, a family's joint
statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been described as objects "openly exhibited
and well known to the family," or those "which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family
tradition." Other examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a family's reputation or
tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones, monuments or coffin plates.

People vs Mendoza
GR 115809, January 23, 1998
Facts: Accused was convicted of robbery with homicide. The incident was witnessed by Wycoco, a tricycle driver,
and Jose, who apprehended the accused while the latter was stabbing the victim. When Jose tied the hand of
the accused, the former asked why he did it and the accused answered that it was of necessity.
Issue: Is the confession admissible?

Held: It may be that Wycoco's knowledge is limited to the stabbing of the victim. However, when taken in relation
to the other evidence of the prosecution, Wycoco's testimony shows that the violence resulting in homicide
was committed in the course of a robbery. The key piece of evidence clearly showing robbery in this instance
comes from the accused-appellant himself. He was asked by Louie Jose, "Why did you say it is a hold-up?"
In response accused-appellant spontaneously answered, "I am getting despondent because I do not have
money to buy milk for my child." The test of admissibility for evidence as a part of the res gestae is stated
with congency by justice Ricardo J. Francisco thus: whether the act, declaration or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event which it characterizes as to be regarded as
a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony. Tested by this standard, the extra-judicial admission of accused-appellant was clearly
part of the res gestae and therefore correctly admitted by the trial court as evidence against the accused-
appellant.

People vs Villarama
GR 139211, February 12, 2003
Facts: Accused was convicted of rape. Appellant asserts that the testimonies of the victim’s parents were hearsay
since they did not witness the actual rape and were only relating the rape as allegedly told to them by
Elizabeth, the victim who was only 4 years old.

Issue: Are the parent’s testimonies admissible?

Held: To be admissible as part of res gestae, a statement must be spontaneous, made during a startling occurrence
or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, and must relate to the circumstance of such occurrence. In the
case at bar, there is no doubt that the victim was subjected to a startling occurrence when she pointed to
appellant as her assailant. It is evident from the records that the statement was spontaneous because the time
gap from the sexual assault to the time the victim recounted her harrowing experience in the hands of
appellant was very short. Obviously, there was neither capability nor opportunity for the 4-year-old victim to
fabricate her statement. This exception is based on the belief that such Statements are trustworthy because
made instinctively, while the declarant’s mental powers for deliberation are controlled and stilled by the
shocking influence of a startling occurrence, so that all his utterances at the time are the reflex products of
immediate sensual impressions, unaided by retrospective mental action. Said natural and spontaneous
utterances are perceived to be more convincing than the testimony of the same person on the witness stand.

People vs Palmones
GR 136303, July 18, 2000
Facts: Petitioners were convicted of the crime of murder. Their conviction was anchored upon the declarations made
by the victim while he was admitted in the hospital for the gunshot wounds he sustained. Petitioners contend
that the statements should have been disregarded by the trial court for they were hearsay.

Issue: Are the statements and declarations of the victim admissible?

Held: In cases where an alleged dying declaration is sought to be admitted, it must be proven that that the
declaration was made “under a consciousness of impending death” which means simply that the declarant is
fully aware that he is dying or going to die from his wounds or injuries soon or imminently, or shall have a
complete conviction that death is at hand, or there must be “a settled hopeless expectation.” In the instant
case, it was not established by the prosecution that the statements of the declarant concerning the cause and
surrounding circumstances of his death were made under the consciousness of impending death. From the
time the victim was brought to the hospital at 10:30 p.m. until his operation at 12:00 midnight, he was still
able to talk intelligently with at least 4 other persons on various matters. The fact that his vital signs were
strong and that he still had strength to converse with these 4 witnesses belie the conclusion that the victim
was under the consciousness of death by reason of the gravity of his wounds. Neither may the alleged
statements attributed to the victim be admissible as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to those
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or immediately after the commission of a crime, when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and
there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. In order to admit
statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical. The following factors
have generally been considered in determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res
gestae have been made spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or
 transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of
the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the
occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself.
Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the statements attributed to the victim, we rule that these
statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae. When Mamansal allegedly uttered the statements
attributed to him, an appreciable amount of time had already elapsed from the time that he was shot as the
victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m. but he only uttered the statements attributed to him about 30 minutes to
an hour later. Moreover, he allegedly made these statements not at the scene of the crime but at the hospital
where he was brought for treatment. Likewise, the trip from the scene of the crime to the hospital constituted
an intervening event that could have afforded the victim opportunity for deliberation. These circumstances,
taken together, indubitably show that the statements allegedly uttered by Mamansal lack the requisite
spontaneity in order for these to be admitted as part of the res gestae.

People vs Lobrigas
GR 147649, December 17, 2002
Facts: Petitioner was convicted of the crime of murder. The petitioner contends that the testimonies of the victim’s
employer and daughter regarding the statements made by the victim that he was 1 of the assailants should
have been disregarded by the trial court for being hearsay. The statements made by the victim as to the
employer were made right after the incident while as to that of the daughter was made a day after.

Issue: Are the victim’s statements admissible?

Held: A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. All these requisites concur
in the case at bar. The principal act, the mauling of the victim, was a startling occurrence. The declarations
were made shortly after the mauling incident while the victim was still under the exciting influence of the
startling occurrence, without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating accused-appellant. The
declaration concerns the circumstances surrounding the mauling of Felix Taylaran. However, the declaration
made by the victim to his daughter does not satisfy the second requirement of spontaneity because they were
made a day after the incident and the exciting influence of the startling occurrence was no longer present.
Nevertheless, we hold that Rosa Solarte’s testimony on what her father told her constitutes independent
relevant statements distinct from hearsay, and are thus admissible not as to the veracity thereof, but as proof
of the fact that they had been uttered. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact
that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule
does not apply, hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement
is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact.

PAL vs Ramos
GR 92740, March 23, 1992
Facts: Respondents filed a complaint for breach of contract against petitioners. Respondents claim that they
complied with the conditions prescribed in their tickets (check-in 1-hour before flight). However, petitioners
failed to check the in and transport them so they were constrained to ride the bus and suffered damages. As
support of their defense, petitioner presented the manifest and entries made during the check-in period on the
scheduled flight of the respondents and contend that the latter arrived late (less than 30 minutes before flight).
The trial court ruled in favor of respondents

Issue: Are the entries admissible?

Held: The passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264, exh. "5," (which showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go
and the private respondents) were entries made in the regular course of business which the private
respondents failed to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their testimonies.
Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing or document made contemporaneously with a
transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is
ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness
as to such facts based upon memory and recollection. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as
against a written document that speaks a uniform language. The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as
statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the main transaction as to form a part
of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are admissible as a part of the res gestae.
Lao vs Standard Insurance
GR 140023, August 14, 2003
Facts: Petitioner filed a case for breach of contract against respondent for the refusal of the latter to pay insurance
claims of the former. Respondent claimed that petitioner violated the ‘authorized driver’ clause of the policy
as the driver of the truck when the accident figured was not qualified as indicated in the latter’s driver’s
license. Petitioner contends that it was another driver, who was qualified, who drove the said truck.
Respondent, on the other hand, presented the police blotter which indicated the unqualified driver as the one
who drove the truck.

Issue: Is the police blotter admissible?

Held: The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court. Under the said rule, the
following are the requisites for its admissibility: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another
person, specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; (c) that the public
officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by
him personally or through official information. We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that the
police blotter was properly admitted as they form part of official records. Entries in police records made by a
police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact
therein stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence.
Although police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the
absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. In this case, the entries in the police blotter
reflected the information subject of the controversy. Stated therein was the fact that Leonardo Anit was
driving the insured truck with plate number FCG-538. This is unlike People v. Mejia, where we said that
“entries in the police blotters should not be given undue significance or probative value,” since the Court
there found that “the entries in question are sadly wanting in material particulars”. Furthermore, in this case
the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence. The person who made the entries was
likewise presented in court; he identified and certified as correct the entries he made on the blotter. The
information was supplied to the entrant by the investigating officer who did not protest about any inaccuracy
when the blotter was presented to him. No explanation was likewise given by the investigating officer for the
alleged interchange of names.

MERALCO vs Quisumbing
GR
Facts:

People vs Ortiz-Miyako
GR 115338-39, September 16, 1997
Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted by the trial court of illegal recruitment in large scale. Only 1 of her 3
victims appeared to testify. However, the trial court adopted the decision of another court convicting the
appellant of estafa, which also involved the same parties. The trial court alleged that both cases were one and
the same.

Issue: Was the adoption of the trial court of the facts from another case proper?

Held: The accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of confrontation. Such right has two purposes: first, to
secure the opportunity of cross-examination; and, second, to allow the judge to observe the deportment and
appearance of the witness while testifying. This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is
sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in
which event his previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to
the hearsay rule. The previous testimony is made admissible because it makes the administration of justice
orderly and expeditious. Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated in the
decision of the Parañaque trial court does not fall under the exception to the right of confrontation as the
exception contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in
previous proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions or judgments. A previous
decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously
convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent
case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said previous decision is
hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation
of the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him

Opinion Rule
People vs Abriol
GR 123137, October 17, 2001
Facts: Accused was convicted of the crime of murder. During trial, he contested the qualifications of the expert
witness particularly that of Caser, for allegedly being ignorant of the ballistic equipments used, not being well
versed in ballistics and for not being able to identify the caliber of the bullet.

Issue: Is the expert witness qualified?

Held: An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject matter of the inquiry
relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to express an opinion."
There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge that a witness must possess in
order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the following factors be present: (1) training and education;
(2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case; and (3) presentation of authorities or standards
upon which his opinion is based. The question of whether a witness is properly qualified to give an expert
opinion on ballistics rests with the discretion of the trial court. We agree with the trial court that P/Inspector
Caser qualifies as a ballistics expert. He is a licensed criminologist, trained at the Ballistics Command and
Laboratory Center in Fort Bonifacio, in the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, and in the National
Bureau of Investigation. He had previously testified as an expert witness in at least twenty-seven (27) murder
and homicide cases all over the country. An expert witness need not present comparative microphotographs
of test bullets and cartridges to support his findings. Examination under a comparison microscope showing
that the test bullet and the evidence bullet both came from the same gun is sufficient. Moreover, the
ballistician conclusively found similar characteristic markings in the evidence, test cartridges and slugs.

Bautista vs CA
GR 158015, August 11, 2004
Facts: Respondent filed a case for the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale entered into by petitioner and
respondent’s predecessor-in-interest. Respondent presented an expert witness who testified those he
signatures contained in the deed were forged. Petitioner, on the other hand, presented one of the witnesses to
the execution of the deed of sale. The trial court dismissed the case but the CA reversed the decision.

Issue: Whether the findings of an expert witness is conclusive?

Held: A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts. Although such
testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the
signatures under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting expert. The authenticity of
signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics
or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a
handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a
judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue. In the case at bar, the presumption
of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting
of the testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal
knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best.
Carmelita Marcelino, the witness to the Deed of Absolute Sale, confirmed the genuineness, authenticity and
due execution thereof. Having been physically present to see the decedent Cesar Morelos and petitioner
Laura Bautista affix their signatures on the document; the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of
petitioners.

People vs Duranan
GR 134074-75, January 16, 2001
Facts: Accused was convicted of raping a mentally retarded woman. Accused contends that there were no findings
that the victim was insane or otherwise retarded because no expert witness was presented. Only the mother of
the victim testified as to the sanity of the victim.

Issue: Is expert testimony necessary to ascertain the mental capacity of the witness?

Held: Rule 130, sec. 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: Opinion of Ordinary witnesses: The opinion of
a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in evidence regarding: a. the identify of a person
about whom he has adequate knowledge; b. a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and; c. the
mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. The mother of an offended party in case of
rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was
born, what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter. It is
 competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person,
provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the
person in question. Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he
bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: "A non-expert
witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based upon conversations or
dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his
mental condition, with the witness' own knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such
conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion.

Character Evidence

People vs Deopita
GR
Facts:

Burden of Proofs and Presumptions

Ibaan Rural Bank vs CA

GR 123817, December 17, 1999
Facts: Spouses Reyes were the owners of 3 lots located in Lipa City. On March 21, 1976, the spouses mortgaged
these lots to petitioner. On June 11, 1976, with the knowledge and consent of the petitioner, the spouses as
sellers, and spouses Tarnate, private respondents, as buyers, entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage of the lots in question. Private respondents failed to pay the loan and the bank extra-
judicially foreclosed on the mortgaged lots. The Provincial Sheriff conducted a public auction of the lots and
awarded the lots to the bank, the sole bidder. On December 13, 1978, the Provincial Sheriff issued a
Certificate of Sale which was registered on October 16, 1979. The certificate stated that the redemption
period expires 2 years from the registration of the sale. No notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure was given to
the private respondents. On September 23, 1981, private respondents offered to redeem the foreclosed lots
and tendered the redemption amount of P77,737.45. However, petitioner Bank refused the redemption on the
ground that it had consolidated its titles over the lots. The Provincial Sheriff also denied the redemption on
the ground that private respondents did not appear on the title to be the owners of the lots.

Issue: Was the Bank’s refusal proper?

Held: When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its contents. For two years, it did not
object to the two-year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it could be said that petitioner
consented to the two-year redemption period specially since it had time to object and did not. When
circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence
can be construed as consent. By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to believe that
they had two years within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two years, petitioner is estopped
from asserting that the period for redemption was only one year and that the period had already lapsed.
Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he
ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to
exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is
permitted to deny the existence of such facts. The one year period of redemption provided in Act No. 3135 is
only directory and can be extended by agreement of the parties.

Alcaraz vs Tangga-an
GR 128568, April 9, 2003
Facts: Petitioners entered into a contract of lease over the residential building of the lot, as clearly stated in their
contract of lease. However, petitioners were in arrears and despite repeated demands by the respondents, the
former failed to make good to pay the rent, which constrained the latter to file an ejection case. Petitioners
contends that since there was a change in the ownership of the lot, the ease contract had in effect lapse and
that they are bound to pay to the new owners of the lot, by virtue of the principle that accessory ollows the
principal.

Issue: Are petitioner’s contention tenable?

Held: Both parties knew that their contract pertained only to the lease of the house, without including the land. The
contract states: "1. That the lessor is the owner of a building of mixed materials situated at Premier St.,
Mabolo, Hipodromo, Cebu City." At the time of the perfection of the contract, the petitioner spouses, as
 lessees, were aware that the NHA, and not Virginia, the lessor, owned the land on which the rented house
stood yet they signed the same, obliged themselves to comply with the terms thereof for five years and
performed their obligations as lessees for two years. Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a
conclusive presumption that: Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive
presumptions: (a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it; After recognizing the
validity of the lease contract for two years, the petitioner spouses are barred from alleging the automatic
cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondents lost ownership of the house after Virgilio
acquired title over the lot.

People vs Padrigone
GR 137664, May 9, 2002
Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape. Accused-appellant contends that the
evidence against him were insufficient to convict him, especially the non-presentation by the prosecution of
the victim in court.

Issue: Is accused-appellant’s contention tenable?

Held: Besides, the non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as suppression of
evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that "evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced" does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the
suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an
exercise of a privilege. Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the
opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense
failed to call her to the witness stand. Second, Rowena was certified to be suffering from "Acute Psychotic
Depressive Condition" and thus "cannot stand judicial proceedings yet." The non-presentation, therefore, of
Rowena was not willful. Third, in any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact
witnessed the violation committed on her sister.

Metro Bank vs CA
GR 122899, June 8, 2000
Facts: Saddled with debts and business reverses, Mr. Chia offered his real property located in Diliman, Quezon City,
for sale to private respondent with assumption of the mortgage indebtedness in favor of petitioner secured by
the subject property. Pending negotiations for the proposed sale, Atty. Bernardo Atienza, acting in behalf of
respondent, went to the METROBANK branch in Quiapo, Manila sometime in the last week of August 1980
to inquire on Mr. Chia's remaining balance on the real estate mortgage. METROBANK obliged with a
statement of account of Mr. Chia amounting to about P115,000.00 as of August, 1980. The deed of sale and
the memorandum of agreement between Mr. Chia and respondent were eventually executed and signed on 04
September 1980 in the office of Atty. Atienza and on 16 September 1980, Atty. Atienza went to
METROBANK Quiapo Branch and paid P116,416.71, for which METROBANK issued an official receipt
acknowledging payment. This notwithstanding, petitioner refused to release the real estate mortgage on the
subject property despite repeated requests from Atty. Atienza, thus prompting respondent to file an action for
specific performance against petitioner. The trial court decided in favor of respondent but was reversed ob
appeal to the CA. However,, the CA, upon motion for reconsideration by respondent, set the case for oral
argument in order for petitioner to present the current mortgage debt of Mr. Chia. Unfortunately, petitioner
failed to appear. Thus, the CA reversed its previous decision and decided in favor of respondent.

Issue: What was the effect of petitioner’s failure to appear during the oral arguments before the CA?

Held: Aside from being estopped, just as decisive is petitioner’s failure to bring before respondent Court of Appeals
the current statement evidencing what it claims as "other unliquidated past due loans" at the scheduled
hearing of 8 March 1995. It was a golden opportunity, so to speak, lost for petitioner METROBANK to
defend its non-release of the real estate mortgage. It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to
prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence
which from its very nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he
refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced would operate to his
prejudice, and support the case of his adversary. No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in
his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken
as conclusive that the fact does not exist. The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within
his own control, and refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most unfavorable construction
upon his silence, and infers that a disclosure would have shown the fact to be as claimed by the opposing
 party. Verily, petitioner's omission to present its evidence only created an adverse inference against its cause.
Therefore, it cannot now be heard to complain since respondent Court extended a reasonable opportunity to
petitioner that it did not avail.

People vs Ong
GR 137348, June 21, 2004
Facts: Accused-appellants were arrested during a buy-bust operation somewhere in New Manila, Quezon City.
During trial, however, only the sole testimony of the arresting officer, SPO1 Gonzales, was presented by the
prosecution and the confidential informant was not presented. It was proved during examination of Gonzales
that it was the CI who posed as the poseur-buyer and he was merely the delivery guy.

Issue: Can the presumption of regularity of official duty apply in buy-bust operations?

Held: A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means of
arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed by police officers as an effective
way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to
commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the
offense. Its opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein the police or its agent lures the accused into
committing the offense in order to prosecute him. Instigation is deemed contrary to public policy and
considered an absolutory cause. To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper
procedures were undertaken in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure
that the details of the operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent
evidence. For, the courts could not merely rely on but must apply with studied restraint the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents. This presumption should not by
itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally protected rights of the individual. It
is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law
through lawless enforcement. Courts should not allow themselves to be used as instruments of abuse and
injustice lest innocent persons are made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. In People
v. Doria, we stressed the "objective" test in buy-bust operations. We ruled that in such operations, the
prosecution must present a complete picture detailing the transaction, which "must start from the initial
contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. We
emphasized that the manner by which the initial contact was made, the offer to purchase the drug, the
payment of the 'buy-bust' money, and the delivery of the illegal drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by
courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense." In the case at bar,
the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The confidential informant who had
sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how it was perfected was not presented as
a witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the same.
On this score, SPO1 Gonzales’ testimony is hearsay and possesses no probative value unless it can be shown
that the same falls within the exception to the hearsay rule. To impart probative value to these hearsay
statements and convict the appellant solely on this basis would be to render nugatory his constitutional right
to confront the witness against him, in this case the informant, and to examine him for his truthfulness. As the
prosecution failed to prove all the material details of the buy-bust operation, its claim that there was a valid
entrapment of the appellants must fail.

People vs Gallego
GR
Facts:

People vs Edualino
GR 119072, April 11, 1997
Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted by the RTC of Palawan of the crime of rape. One of the alleged errors that
accused-appellant assigns against the trial court was its failure to appreciate his allegation that the alleged
imputation against him of the crime of rape was a concoction that the victim made in order to save the latter’s
marriage.

Issue: Is the accused-appellant’s contention tenable?

Held: The Court cannot believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in an attempt to
conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage. We fail to understand how a false rape
story can save a marriage under the circumstances averred by accused-appellant.
Presentation of Evidence

People vs Fabre
GR 146697, July 23, 2002
Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted by the RTC of Agusan del Sur of raping his own daughter. One of the
assignments of error pointed by accused-appellant was that the trial court failed to appreciate his testimony of
alibi despite the failure of the prosecution to cross examine him and present rebuttal evidence.

Issue: Is accuse-appellant’s contention tenable?

Held: The alibi of appellant itself would not appear to be deserving of serious consideration. His account that at the
time of the alleged rape he was working at a coconut plantation, just about one kilometer away from the place
of the crime, hardly would amount to much. Nor would the testimony of Adela Fabre, his wife, merit any
better regard. At first, she testified that on the day of the rape incident, she had left their house at four o'clock
in the afternoon. Later, however, she changed her story by saying that she had left the house in the morning
and returned only at ten o'clock that same morning, staying home the whole day thereafter. In any event, in
order that alibi might prosper, it would not be enough for an accused to prove that he was somewhere else
when the crime was committed; he would have to demonstrate likewise that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Clearly,
in the instant case, it was not at all impossible nor even improbable for appellant to have been at the crime
scene.

People vs Guamos
GR 109662, February 21, 1995
Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape. During direct examination of the
victim, Michelle Dolorical, 8 years old, she failed to answer most of the questions posted by the defense
counsel. Nonetheless, the court admitted her testimony despite the objection of the defense counsel.

Issue: Does failure of the victim to answer questions during cross-examination have any effect on her testimony?

Held: It is, of course, the right of every party to cross-examine a witness "with sufficient fullness and freedom to
test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important
facts bearing upon the issue." It is also the duty of the witness to answer questions put to him or her, subject
to certain exceptions. In the instant case, defense counsel did not ask the Court to enforce his right and to
compel the witness (Michelle) to perform her duty. As noted earlier, the trial judge had instructed defense
counsel to simplify his questions. Defense counsel, for his part, neither complained about this directive nor
complied with it. It is also noteworthy that defense counsel did not object to the testimony on direct
examination of Michelle Dolorical after it became apparent that Michelle did not or could not answer the
long and meandering questions of defense counsel. When the prosecution made its offer of evidence, defense
counsel contended that the testimony on direct examination of Michelle Dolorical should not have been
admitted and prayed for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The trial court granted the defense
counsel leave to do so and, at the same time, admitted the prosecution's offer of evidence. Defense counsel,
however, did not file a demurrer to evidence. Accordingly, in its order of 25 February 1992, the trial court
ordered the defense to present its evidence, noting that no demurrer had been filed though leave to do so had
been sought and granted. The accused did not question this order of the trial court and commenced instead to
present its own evidence. In the total circumstances of this case, we consider that accused Guamos had
waived his right to object to the admissibility of Michelle Dolorical's testimony on direct examination upon
the ground that she had not answered all of the questioned posed to her on cross-examination. The trial court
believed that that failure had not affected the credibility of Michelle Dolorical's direct testimony. We find no
sufficient reason for overturning this finding of the trial court.

People vs Perez
GR 142556, February 5, 2003
Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted of the crime of rape of a 6 year old girl, Mayia Ponseca. During direct
examination of the victim, the latter was asked by the prosection leading questions, which the accused-
appellant now questions. He contends that before the victim has identified him, the prosecution, by way of
leading questions, in effect, was the one who identified him.

Issue: Is accused-appellants contention tenable?

Held: As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the witness is a
child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or suggestion.
 Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips. In the case at bar, the trial court
was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently young and unlettered, making the
recall of events difficult, if not uncertain. The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in
exercising control over the questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the
ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental
level of the child, (3) to protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of
time. Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child are allowed if the same will further the
interests of justice. The Court has repeatedly stated that it is highly inconceivable for a child of tender age,
inexperienced in the ways of the world, to fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination
of her private part, subject herself to public trial, and tarnish her family’s honor and reputation, unless she
was motivated by a strong desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her.

People vs Castillano
GR 139412, April 2, 2003
Facts: Accused-appellants were convicted of murder by the RTC of Camarines Sur. One of the appellants’
assignments of errors was the inconsistent statements made by the wife of the victim during the preliminary
examination, the police blotter and during trial.

Issue: Will such inconsistencies in the witness’ statements change the outcome of the case?

Held: Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence
consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner must
lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being
cross-examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent inconsistency
between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were made. This Court held in
People v. Escosura that the statements of a witness prior to her present testimony cannot serve as basis for
impeaching her credibility unless her attention was directed to the inconsistencies or discrepancies and she
was given an opportunity to explain said inconsistencies. It was incumbent upon the attorney when cross-
examining said witness to direct his attention to the discrepancy and to ask him if he did not make such and
such statement before the fiscal or if he did not there make a statement different from that delivered in court.
If the witness admits the making of such contradictory statement, the accused has the benefit of the
admission, while the witness has the opportunity to explain the discrepancy, if he can. On the other hand, if
the witness denies making any such contradictory statement, the accused has the right to prove that the
witness did make such statement; and if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce the document,
secondary evidence of the contents thereof would be admissible. This process of cross-examining a witness
upon the point of prior contradictory statements is called in the practice of the American courts "laying a
predicate" for the introduction of contradictory statements. It is almost universally accepted that unless a
ground is thus laid upon cross-examination, evidence of contradictory statements are not admissible to
impeach a witness; though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in the discretion of the court. In this
case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her
sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any discrepancies between her present
testimony and her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement. The appellants did
not even mark and offer in evidence the said transcript and sworn statement for the specific purpose of
impeaching her credibility and her present testimony. Unless so marked and offered in evidence and accepted
by the trial court, said transcript and sworn statement cannot be considered by the court.

People vs Plasencia
GR 90198, November 7, 1995
Facts: During the direct and cross examination of the lone witness, Francisca Espina, she wrote the dates of the
incidents of the crime on her palm. When asked by the prosecution for explanation, she reasoned that she
wanted to be accurate about the dates of the incidents of the crime and that she was having a headache before
and during the testimony.

Issue: Is the use of memory aids by the witness allowable during her examination?

Held: The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Section 16, Rule
132, of the Rules of Court states: When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be allowed to
refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the
time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his
memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing or record
must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the
 witness upon it and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing or record,
though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record
correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution. Allowing a
witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the exercise of that
discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that she merely wanted to be accurate on
dates and like details.

Canque vs CA
GR 96202, April 13, 1999
Facts: Petitioner entered into 2 contracts with Socor Construction for the restoration of several infrastructures in
Cebu City. However, when respondent sent a bill to petitioner for the balance of petitioner’s account, the
latter refused payment. thus respondent was constrained to file a collection case. One of the pieces of
evidence presented was he respondent’s VP regarding the business entry that she made notwithstanding that
she cannot remember said entry. Petitioner contends that such business entry should not have been admitted
as it does not fall among the exceptions to the hearsay rule, particularly sec. 37, Rule 130.

Issue: Is petitioner’s contention tenable?

Held: Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself constitute evidence. Under Rule 132,
sec. 10, the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does not constitute evidence, and may
not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of
refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has
been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as
corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written statement
prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because he supports his open-court declaration with
written statements of the same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless the
proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down. What is more, even where this requirement has
been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if
only because it is not very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when
the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such evidence. As the entries in
question were not made based on personal knowledge, they could only corroborate Dolores Aday's testimony
that she made the entries as she received the bills.

Dy vs CA
GR 97929, December 17, 1991
Facts: Petitioner was the intervenor in a case for specific performance which was originally between private
respondents. Petitioner is claiming that he is the owner of the 2 lots in issue evidenced by 2 receipt between
his father and a certain Dona Agripina. Respondents, on the other hand, derives their titoe from Eusebio
Lopez, under which name the land in question was registered.

Issue: Are the 2 receipts evidencing purchase by petitioner’s predecessor duly proven?

Held: The two receipts allegedly issued by the subdivision are private documents. In proving their due execution
and genuineness, it is not sufficient that the witness state in a general manner that the person whose signature
appears thereon was the one who executed the document. The testimony of an eye witness authenticating a
private document must be positive, categorically stating that the document was actually witnessed by the
person whose name is subscribed thereto. The Court notes that in the case at bar, the details surrounding
execution of the petitioner's documentary evidence were only narrated.

Heirs of Lacsa vs CA
GR 79597-98, May 20, 1991
Facts: Petitioners filed a case for the recovery of a parcel of land against respondents, contending that they acquired
said land through succession from the late Demtria Lacsa. Respondents, on the other hand, traced their title
by virtue of 2 old documents written in Spanish without however proving its due execution and authenticity.
The trial court and the CA ruled in favor of respondents and admitted the 2 documents under the ancient
document rule.

Issue: Is it necessary to prove the execution and authenticity of the 2 documents?

Held: Under the "ancient document rule," for a private ancient document to be exempt from proof of due execution
and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than 30 years old; it is also necessary that the following
requirements are fulfilled; (1) that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
 genuine; and (2) that it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion. These documents are,
therefore, more than 30 years old. Both copies of the aforementioned documents were certified as exact
copies of the original on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, by the Deputy Register of
Deeds. There is a further certification with regard to the Pampango translation of the document of
extrajudicial partition which was issued by the Archives division, Bureau of Records Management of the
Department of General Services. Documents which affect real property, in order that they may bind third
parties, must be recorded with the appropriate Register of Deeds. The documents in question, being certified
as copies of originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, can be said to be found in the proper
custody. Clearly, therefore, the first 2 requirements of the "ancient document rule" were met. As to the last
requirement that the document must on its face appear to be genuine, petitioners did not present any
conclusive evidence to support their allegation of falsification of the said documents. They merely alluded to
the fact that the lack of signatures on the first 2 pages could have easily led to their substitution. We cannot
uphold this surmise absent any proof whatsoever. As held in one case, a contract apparently honest and lawful
on its face must be treated as such and one who assails the genuineness of such contract must present
conclusive evidence of falsification. Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document rule" that a
document must be unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion refers to the extrinsic quality
of the document itself. The lack of signatures on the first pages, therefore, absent any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion cannot be held to detract from the fact that the documents in question, which were
certified as copied of the originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are genuine and free from
any blemish or circumstances of suspicion.

People vs Canonigo
GR 133649, August 4, 2000
Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted of the crime of rape. During trial, accused-appellant alleged that he was a
minor under 18 years old. However, the accused-appellant has no record of his birth in the civil registry due
to the failure of his natural mother to register the same. Instead, he presented a baptismal certificate before
the trial court which contained material dates that would in turn make him a minor. The baptismal certificate,
however, was not offered during the formal offer because the father of the accused-appellant refused to part
with it.

Issue: What is the status of the baptismal certificate?

Held: As earlier discussed, the birth certificate of the accused-appellant, although marked as an exhibit, was never
formally offered in evidence inasmuch as when the defense was about to formally offer its exhibits, the
defense counsel manifested to the trial court that accused-appellant’s father took hold of the said certificate
and has since refused to return it. Consequently, the said documentary exhibit may not be taken cognizance of
pursuant to Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides that the court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the baptismal certificate
which reflected accused-appellant’s date of birth has not been formally offered in evidence, the court may
take note of the said date of birth as reflected in the baptismal certificate. Not only was it the subject of the
testimony of accused-appellant’s own witness, Ms. Macaria Estacio, but during the course of the trial,
repeated references have been made by the counsel for accused-appellant to the latter’s date of birth as
appearing in the said baptismal certificate. The absence of any formal presentation of certain exhibits does
not render their consideration thereof a reversible error, if repeated references thereto in the course of trial by
counsel for accused and of the court convincingly show that the documents were part of prosecution’s
evidence. Prescinding from the foregoing, it is with more reason that we could take cognizance of the
accused-appellant’s date of birth as appearing in the baptismal certificate inasmuch as repeated references
thereto have been made in the course of trial by the counsel for the accused-appellant and by the court, which
fact convincingly show that the said document was part of the evidence of the defense. The fact that the
defense did not bother to formally offer in evidence the said document although it was given ample time to do
so, only bolsters the presumption that the presentation of that document was suppressed by the defense
because it contained a fact or declaration that was adverse to the accused-appellant.

Ong vs CA
GR 117103, January 21, 1999
Facts: Petitioners sued respondents for damages and breach of contract of carriage after respondents’ buses figured
in an accident. During trial, all the parties moved for the submission of the case for decision. However, the
petitioner failed to make a formal offer of evidence, especially the police report that indicate that Philtranco
was at fault. The trial court made Philtranco liable based on culpa aquiliana but on appeal, made Inland liable
instead based on culpa contractual.
Issue: Can the trial court ruled against Philtranco despite the failure of petitioner to formally offer in court the police
report?

Held: Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, provides that “the court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered." A formal offer is necessary, since judges are required to base their findings of fact and
their judgment solely and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow parties to
attach any document to their pleadings and then expect the court to consider it as evidence, even without
formal offer and admission, may draw unwarranted consequences. Opposing parties will be deprived of their
chance to examine the document and to object to its admissibility. On the other hand, the appellate court will
have difficulty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized the court below. Identification of
documentary evidence must be distinguished from its formal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in the
course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit. The second is done only
when the party rests its case and not before. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked
as an exhibit does not mean it will be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the party. The party may
decide to offer it if it believes this will advance the cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. A
document or an article is valueless unless it is formally offered in evidence, and the opposing counsel is given
an opportunity to object to it and to cross-examine any witness called to present or identify it. Evidence not
formally offered before the trial court cannot be considered on appeal, for to consider them at such stage will
deny the other parties their right to rebut them.

Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

People vs Suarez
GR 153573-76, April 15, 2005
Facts: Accused was convicted by the trial court of rape. He contends that the testimony of the victim was incredible
and full of inconsistencies, which in effect should merit his acquittal

Issue: Is accused-appellants contention tenable?

Held: It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a
degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The prosecution
sufficiently established that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the 14-year-old complainant against
her will and consent. Plainly, she was raped. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict
one of any criminal charge, but moral certainty is required nonetheless. In dubilis reus est absolvendus. All
doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused.

People vs Bulan
GR 143404, June 8, 2005
Facts: Accused was convicted by the trial court as an accomplice in the crime of murder. His conviction was
anchored on the lone testimony of the eye-witness, Perlita Mariano, the victim’s sister. The accused contend
that her testimony was inconsistent and that since she was the only witness, he should have been acquitted.
On appeal, the CA modified the trial court’s decision and convicted the accused as principal.

Issue: Can a lone witness be sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

Held: The prosecution is burdened to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the testimony
of a lone witness, if found positive and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a conviction
especially when the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity. While the number of witnesses may
be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessarily with
the greatest number. Conviction of the accused may still be had on the basis of the credible and positive
testimony of a single witness. It must be stressed that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but it must also be credible in itself, such that common experience and
observation of mankind lead to the inference its probability under the circumstances. On the other hand,
inconsistencies as to minor details and peripheral or collateral matters do not affect the credibility of
witnesses or the probative weight of their testimonies. Such minor inconsistencies may even serve to
strengthen their credibility as they negate any suspicion that their testimonies are fabricated or rehearsed.
Even the most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and make confused and inconsistent statements. The
testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof
or isolated passages therein. It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to
some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts, as there is hardly a witness who can perfectly
remember the details of a crime. Human memory is not as unerring as a photograph. Thus, corroborative
 evidence in order to be credible need not coincide on all aspects. In this case, the prosecution relied on the
collective testimonies of Perlita Mariano, who claimed to have seen Estemson stab Alberto; the prosecution
also anchored its case on the testimony of Dr. Lareza and his medico-legal report. The Court declares that
Perlita’s testimony, the medico-legal certificate and the expert testimony of Dr. Lareza would have been
enough to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

DECS vs del Rosario

GR 146586, January 26, 2005
Facts: Respondents instituted a case for recovery of possession of land against herein petitioner where a primary
school under the latter was erected. Petitioner claimed that the land where the school was erected was
donated to it by the respondents’ father, Isaias. Petitioner presented 3 witnesses to prove the due execution
and contents of the deed of donation allegedly executed between petitioner and Isaias since the said deed
were lost by the register of deeds when it transferred its office. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner
but was reversed by the CA which held that the petitioner failed to prove the existence, due execution, loss,
and content of the deed of donation.

Issue: Are the testimonies of the 3 witnesses sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the case?

Held: Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence other than the original document itself.
A party may introduce secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument not only when the original
is lost or destroyed, but also when it cannot be produced in court, provided there is no bad faith on the part of
the offeror. However, a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before
he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory
explanation for non-production of the original instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence,
execution, loss, contents, although the court in its discretion may change this order if necessary. However,
Ricardo Nicolas admitted during cross-examination that he did not read and did not have personal knowledge
of the contents of the document that Isaias and the mayor supposedly signed. In the same vein, Vidal De
Jesus’ testimony does not help to establish the deed of donation’s existence, execution and contents. He
testified that he never saw the deed of donation. DECS did not introduce in evidence the municipal council
Resolution accepting the donation. There is also no proof that the donee communicated in writing its
acceptance to the donor aside from the circumstance that DECS constructed the school during Isaias’ lifetime
without objection on his part. There is absolutely no showing that these steps were noted in both instruments.
DECS allegedly made a search in the municipal building and in the DECS Division Office in Bulacan. The
copies of the deed of donation furnished these offices were purportedly "lost" when these offices transferred
to new locations. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, Judge Natividad who claimed to
have notarized the deed of donation failed to account for other copies of the deed, which the law strictly
enjoins him to record, and furnish to other designated government offices. In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. "Preponderance of evidence" means
that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. In other words,
preponderance of evidence means the greater weight of the evidence - or evidence that outweighs the
evidence of the adverse party. This Court is not satisfied that the evidence on the side of the party carrying the
burden of proof is of preponderating weight.

Cervantes vs Cardeno
AM P-05-2021, June 30, 2005
Facts: Respondent was a utility worker before the sala of petitioner judge of MTC, Cabuyao, Laguna. Respondent
committed grave misconduct in the office and interference with the performance of the functions of the acting
clerk of court. Allegedly, the incident arose from the snatching of the application form of Hermano by
respondent from the Alcantara, the acting clerk of court; uttering insulting and sarcastic words towards
Alcantara; and starting an altercation with Hermano. Petitioner recommended for the immediate dismissal
from service of respondent to the OCA. The OCA ruled that respondent be fined by P1,000 only and sterly
warned.

Issue: Does the investigation conducted by petitioner sufficient to warrant the penalty against respondent?

Held: Without an iota of doubt, the acts of respondent in uttering those words with the Acting Clerk of Court and
hitting Hermano with a tape dispenser within the court premises, and during working hours at that, exhibit
discourtesy and disrespect not only towards co-workers but to the court as well. It is also clear that it was
respondent who provoked the fracas that ensued between him and Hermano. Such behavior is contrary to the
ethical conduct demanded by A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC, otherwise known as “Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel.” Time and again, we have stressed that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice are circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. The
 employees’ action at all times must be characterized by propriety and decorum and must be above suspicion.
Mere substantial evidence suffices in administrative cases.

Reyes vs Mangino
AM MTJ-05-1575, January 31, 2005
Facts: Complainant instituted the instant administrative case against respondent, an MTC judge. The former alleged
that they had an ‘agreement’ by virtue of which, the latter would acquit the former in consideration of ‘little
representation’. However, respondent convicted complainant despite the fact that the latter gave the former a
total of P60,000 (P20,000 initially given in Manila Hotel on Sept. 18, 1997). Upon investigation of the
Executive Judge, respondent submitted copies of 2 marriage certificates dated Sept. 18, 1997 as alibi.
However, upon inquiry of the executive judge, it was found that the dates contained in the certificates were
false. The executive judge recommended for the dismissal of the case.

Issue: Is dismissal proper?

Held: It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts
complained of rests on the complainant. Boyboy v. Yabut, Jr ., a case involving a lawyer accused of blackmail
and extortion who was exonerated of the charges against him for lack of evidence, is instructive on this point.
The Court ruled therein that it is enough for the respondent to deny complicity in the alleged blackmail or
extortion, without more, for he is not under obligation to prove his negative averment, much less disprove
what has not been proven by the complainant. Thus, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of
proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the
respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. Indeed, considering that an accusation of
bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove, the complainant must present panoply of evidence in
support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent Judge connotes
misconduct so grave that, if proven, it would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required
should be more than substantial. The Rules of Court requires that if a judge should be disciplined for grave
misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct
knowledge. The judiciary to which the respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could
be faulted, competent evidence should be presented, since the charge is penal in character. Thus, the ground
for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the
charge on which removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, or incompetence. The
general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.

Benares vs Pancho
GR 151827, April 29, 2005
Facts: Respondents were sugar farm workers which instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the labor arbiter.
However, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint because the cause for illegal dismissal was vaguely
alleged therefrom. On appeal to the NLRC, the decision was reversed and ordered complainant to pay
backwages, COLA, ERA, and other relief, despite stating in the decision that there are ‘gray areas’
surrounding the case. Upon elevation to the CA by petitioner, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari.
Petitioner contends that since there were gray areas surrounding the case, the NLRC should have remanded
the same back to the labor arbiters.

Issue: Is petitioner’s contention tenable?

Held: Petitioner perhaps wittingly omitted mention that the NLRC “opted to appreciate the merits of the instant
case based on available documents/pleadings.” That the NLRC chose not to remand the case to the labor
arbiter for clarificatory proceedings and instead decided the case on the basis of the evidence then available to
it is a judgment call this Court shall not interfere with in the absence of any showing that the NLRC abused
its discretion in so doing. It is well to note at this point that in quasi-judicial proceedings, the quantum of
evidence required to support the findings of the NLRC is only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

PAL vs CA
GR 159556, May 26, 2005
Facts: Respondent de Leon was an employee of petitioner. Upon complaint of a customer who cannot refund his
ticket, petitioner conducted an investigation over the irregularities of operations in its Iloilo branch. Upon
audit, petitioner found that several employees were in conspiracy in defrauding the company of revenues
wherein several tickets of passengers were refunded when in fact the said passengers boarded the flight.
Among the employees found by the petitioner to have been involved was herein respondent. After they have
been afforded due process by petitioner, they were dismissed, respondents instituted a case for illegal
 dismissal. The labor arbiter, which was affirmed in toto by the NLRC, found that there was more than
substantial evidence presented as proof that respondents were in conspiracy thus dismissed the case.
However, the CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC.

Issue: Was the evidence presented by petitioner sufficient to substantiate its position?

Held: It is well entrenched that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies are generally accorded great respect and even finality by the courts. Substantial
evidence, which is the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact in cases before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies, is that level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds that the findings and
conclusions of the Labor Arbiter with respect to the validity of the dismissal of respondent De Leon and his
companions, which the NLRC affirmed in toto, are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the CA
committed reversible error in setting aside these findings and conclusions of the labor officials. The Court
observes that the petitioner has presented ample evidence showing respondent De Leon’s involvement in the
anomalous transactions of refunding used or flown tickets. His involvement has been shown particularly in
the instances of fraudulent refund of tickets of the passehgers. Even in criminal law, where the quantum of
evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It may
be deduced from the mode, method and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the
acts of the accused themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiments, then a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to
concert is proved. These truisms find more application in administrative proceedings where, as earlier
intimated, the quantum of evidence required is substantive evidence, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Lagon vs CA
GR 119107, March 18, 2005
Facts: On June 1982, petitioner purchase 2 parcels land located in Sultan Kudarat from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi
through an intestate court. However, respondent filed a complaint for damages based on interference of
contracts against petitioner for interfering in the lease contract between respondent and the late owner the
said land. In support of his claim, respondent presented a duly notarized contract of lease, whcuh the
petitioner denies having knowledge thereto.

Issue: Did petitioner sufficiently disprove the said contract of lease?

Held: While the contract appeared as duly notarized, the notarization thereof, however, only proved its due
execution and delivery but not the veracity of its contents. Nonetheless, after undergoing the rigid scrutiny of
petitioner's counsel and after the trial court declared it to be valid and subsisting, the notarized copy of the
lease contract presented in court appeared to be incontestable proof that private respondent and the late Bai
Tonina Sepi actually renewed their lease contract. Settled is the rule that until overcome by clear, strong and
convincing evidence, a notarized document continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to
its execution and delivery. However, petitioner cannot be made liable for he has no knowledge of the said
contract of lease and did not act in bad faith. This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without
injury. "Injury" is the legal invasion of a legal right while "damage" is the hurt, loss or harm which results
from the injury.

Domingo vs Domingo
GR 150897, April 11, 2005
Facts: Petitioner instituted a case for declaration of nullity of a deed of absolute sale over the house and lot in
Project 4, Quezon City. Petitioner contends that the signature of his father in the said deed was forged, as
supported by the findings of the PC-INP. On the other hand, respondents presented witnesses as to the
handwriting of their father and expert testimony of the NBI. The trial court dismissed the case for lack of
evidence on the part of petitioner, which was also affirmed by the CA

Issue: Did petitioner sufficiently prove that the signature contained in the deed was forged?

Held: The passage of time and a person’s increase in age may have decisive influence in his handwriting
characteristics. Thus, in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standards of
comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. As correctly found by the
appellate court, the examination conducted by the PC-INP Crime Laboratory did not conform to the
foregoing standard. Recall that in the case, the signatures analyzed by the police experts were on documents
executed several years apart. A signature affixed in 1958 or in 1962 may involve characteristics different
from those borne by a signature affixed in 1970. Hence, neither the trial court nor the appellate court may be
faulted for refusing to place any weight whatsoever on the PC-INP questioned document report. We likewise
sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals concerning the testimonies of Clerma Domingo, Leonora, and
Jose to the effect that they saw Bruno affixing his signature to the questioned deed. They were unrebutted.
Genuineness of a handwriting may be proven, under Rule 132, Section 22, by anyone who actually saw the
person write or affix his signature on a document. Petitioner has shown no reason why the ruling made by the
trial court on the credibility of the respondent’s witnesses below should be disturbed by us. Findings by the
trial court as to the credibility of witnesses are accorded the greatest respect, and even finality by appellate
courts, since the former is in a better position to observe their demeanor as well as their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial. Finally, the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in the present case is a
notarized document. Being a public document, it is prima facie evidence of the facts therein expressed. It has
the presumption of regularity in its favor and to contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing, and
more than merely preponderant. Petitioner has failed to show that such contradictory evidence exists in this
case.