G.R. No.

89823 June 19, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUTROPIO TIOZON y ACID, accused-appellant.
Facts:
On February 24, 1989, 11 o'clock in the evening, while Rosalina Magat vda. de Bolima and her
husband were sleeping inside their house in Kalookan City, they were awakened by the loud knocks
on their door; Her husband opened the door and they saw that the person who was knocking was
their "Pareng Troping", accused herein; her husband invited the accused, who appeared to be very
drunk, to come inside their house; once inside their house, accused sat down and the two (accused
and victim) exchanged pleasantries; she even saw the accused showing a gun to her husband and the
latter even toyed with it; she got irritated by her husband's playing with the gun, so she took a few
steps away from the two, however, when she looked back to the place where her husband and the
accused was, she found out that the two had already left; five minutes later and/or after she had
heard two successive gunshots, she heard accused knocking at their door and at the same time
informing her that he accidentally shoot (sic) her husband, "Mare, mare, nabaril ko si Pare, hindi ko
sinasadya" she got scared by the appearance of the accused who was full of bloodstains so she
pushed him away from her; she immediately went to her sister-in-law Marilyn Bolima and both of
them proceeded to the house of the accused; thereat, they saw the victim lying with his face up; she
took her husband's pulse and when she still felt some warmth on his body, she sought help that her
husband be brought to the hospital; accused extended his help by helping them in carrying the victim
towards the main road, however, after a few steps, he changed his mind and put down the victim;
accused reasoned out that the victim was already dead; she pushed the accused and even without
the latter's help, they were able to reach the main road; afterwhich, some of her neighbors arrived
bringing with them lights; thereafter, Kalookan policemen arrived and so she caused the arrest of the
accused; she spent about P100,000.00 in connection with burial and wake of her husband.
The day after, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening and upon instruction of Pfc. Alilam he together
with some Kalookan policemen accompanied the accused in retrieving the firearm whom the accused
threw at the grassy area particularly at the back of the latter's house; aside from the firearm they
also recovered two (2) spent bullets and three live ammunitions.
Trial Court held the accused guilty of violation of P.D. 1866 and Murder qualified by treachery.
Issue:
Whether or not the statement made by the accused-appellant to the wife of the victim immediately
after the shooting incident that he accidentally shot the victim is covered by the rule on res gestae.
Held:
No. This is a misapplication of the rule in the instant case. Statements as part of the res gestae are
among the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The rule is that a witness "can testify only to those facts
which he knows of or his own knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perceptions.
Accordingly, a testimony of a witness as to what he heard other persons say about the facts in
dispute cannot be admitted because it is hearsay evidence. There are, however, exceptions to this
rule. One of them is statements as part of the res gestae under Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The exceptions assume that the testimony offered is in fact hearsay; but it is to be
admitted in evidence. Under the aforesaid Section 36, statements may be deemed as part of the res
gestae if they are made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior
or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof. Statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue and giving it a legal significance may also be received as part of the
res gestae.
In the instant case, however, the questioned testimony of the wife of the victim is not hearsay. She
testified on what the accused-appellant told her, not what any other party, who cannot be cross-
examined, told her. The accused-appellant's statement was an "oral confession", not a part of res
gestae, which he can easily deny if it were not true, which he did in this case.
Moreover, even assuming that the testimony of the wife of the victim on the alleged statement of
the accused-appellant is hearsay, the latter is barred from questioning its admission due to his failure
to object thereto at the time the testimony was given. The transcript of the stenographic notes of the
testimony of Rosalina Magat vda. de Bolima, wife of the victim, clearly shows the absence of an
objection.
Ruling:
The trial court duly established and constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellant, and no other else, shot and killed the victim.
Based on the testimonies of Rosalina Magat vda. de Bolima, wife of the victim; Pat. Orlando Valencia
of the Kalookan Police Force, NBI Ballistician Ernie Magtibay. Despite, failure to evidence or
substantiate illegal possession and treachery. There being no proof that accused-appellant had no
license to possess the firearm in question, he could not be convicted for illegal possession of a
firearm. And no witness could have seen how the deceased was shot was presented to prove
treachery.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the subject decision of the trial court, and as
Modified, FINDING the accused-appellant EUTROPIO TIOZON Y ACID guilty beyond all reasonable
doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE. SENTENCED to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from EIGHT YEARS AND ONE DAY of prision mayor, as Minimum, to FOURTEEN YEARS, EIGHT
MONTHS AND ONE DAY of reclusion temporal as Maximum, with the accessory penalties.
G.R. No. L-13288 June 30, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOSE NARANJA, Defendant-Appellant.
Facts:
In the afternoon of December 28, 1956 at night, in barrio Caraol-Malimpin, municipality of Dasol,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines, while Maria Diaz was pounding rice in her yard, the accused
arrived and was thereupon told by her to stop coming to her house because her husband (the
deceased) knew that she and the accused had been carrying on illicit relations; that the accused had
asked her to leave her husband and, as she refused, he indicated that he would seek means to
separate her from her husband; that before leaving in that afternoon of December 28, 1956, the
accused told her to wait for him in the evening; that, when she required about this purpose, the
accused answered that he would kill his compadre (the deceased) who was then harvesting palay in
the farm; that in the evening of December 28, 1956, as the dogs were barking, her husband went out
of the house and proceeded to the place where there was stocks of palay; that, becoming impatient
for her husband's return, she went to the kitchen where she saw the accused at the stairs; that the
accused confessed to her that he had killed her husband whose dead body she ought to take and
bury; that cautioning her not to tip anyone, the accused informed that her husband lay dead at the
creek east of the house; that she awakened her mother and children and told them about the
occurrence; that, upon advice of her mother, she requested her neighbors, Santiago Balderas and
one surname Baraan, to help her bring her husband's body to the house.
Trial court convicted the accused of murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, with
intent to kill and armed with a blunt instrument, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack, and beat to death one MAMERTO SIGNEY, alias Berto, with the use of the
said blunt instrument.
Issue:
Whether or not confession of the accused to Maria Diaz is strong evidence falling under the res
gestae rule.
Held:
Yes. Maria Diaz made reference to what the accused intended to do with the deceased; and the
implementation of his evil design is borne out by the actual and physical facts of the case. The
testimony of Santiago Balderas to the effect that, when Maria Diaz came to his house for help, she
told him that her husband was dead and could be found at a certain place, amply proves the fact of
the crime as confessed by the accused. The presence of the bluish black spot at the nape of the
deceased, Mamerto Signey, and the opinion of Dr. Valera that a blow delivered right on the medulla
oblongata could have caused instantaneous death, confirm the admission of the accused to Maria
Diaz.
Ruling:
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed with costs against the accused. So ordered.
G.R. No. 136303 July 18, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTHONY MELCHOR PALMONES, ANTHONY BALTAZAR PALMONES, accused-appellants.
Facts:
In the evening of April 27, 1997, SP02 Asim Mamansal and Alicia Villamor and her two helpers went
home to Alicias house in Magsaysay when the former was shot. Alex Siago, a barangay kagawad,
testified that he was one of the first persons to go to the victim after the latter was shot. Patricio
Fuertes and Samuel Angelio then brought the victim to the hospital where the victim conversed with
Sonny Boy Redovan, nephew of the victim; Dr. Hazel Mark Aguayo, the surgeon; Police Inspector
Alexander Camilon-Tagum; Mila Arimao Mamansal, the wife of the victim, Asmyra Mamansal,
daughter of the victim.
Sonny Boy Redovan, Police Inspector Alexander Camilon-Tagum alleged that SP02 Asim Mamansal
(deceased) revealed hhis assailants to them before his death.
Trial court convicted the accused of murder qualified by treachery.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged dying declaration of Asim Mamansal as an exception to the hearsay rule
as part of res gestae.
Held:
No. Neither may the alleged statements attributed to the victim be admissible as part of the res
gestae. Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of
a crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction
or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.58
In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is
critical.1âwphi1 The following factors have generally been considered in determining whether
statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously: (1) the time
that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2)
the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the
statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the
statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself.59
Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the statements attributed to the victim, we
rule that these statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae. When Mamansal allegedly uttered
the statements attributed to him, an appreciable amount of time had already elapsed from the time
that he was shot as the victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m. but he only uttered the statements
attributed to him about 30 minutes to an hour later. Moreover, he allegedly made these statements
not at the scene of the crime but at the hospital where he was brought for treatment. Likewise, the
trip from the scene of the crime to the hospital constituted an intervening event that could have
afforded the victim opportunity for deliberation. These circumstances, taken together, indubitably
show that the statements allegedly uttered by Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity in order for
these to be admitted as part of the res gestae.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment dated 8 May 1998 of Branch 17 of the Regional
Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Anthony
Melchor Palmones and Anthony Baltazar Palmones are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless they are being held for some other legal grounds.
G.R. No. 119005 December 2, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO RAQUEL and AMADO PONCE, accused.
SABAS RAQUEL and VALERIANO RAQUEL, accused-appellants.
Facts:
At midnight of July 4, 1986, the spouses Juliet and Agapito Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in
need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise,
heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him.
Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband's lifeless (sic) while a man
took her husband's gun and left hurriedly.
She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other
men ran away.
George Jovillano responded to Juliet's plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The police
came and found one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the
victim's house. He was identified as Amado Ponce.
Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police station.
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were
the perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in their residence. However, the police
failed to find them there since appellants fled immediately after the shooting incident.
Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions.
Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress,
however, and before he could give his testimony, accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail.
Trail court convicted the accused-appellants of robbery with homicide sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs.
Not satisfied therewith, herein appellants filed a notice of appeal wherein they manifested that they
were appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals. 7 The lower court ordered the transmittal of the
records of the case to the Court of Appeals. 8 In view of the penalty imposed, the Court of Appeals
properly forwarded the same to the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the identification of herein appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the
extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime
falls under the exception of the hearsay rule and therefore be admitted as evidence against the
appellants.
Held:
No. The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against
the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-
examine his co-accused on the latter's extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are
hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of
appellants, in the case at bar.
Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused which
implicates his co-accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between extrajudicial and judicial
confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the
confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal.
Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are
inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may
be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel. 21 These rights, both
constitutional and statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.
While admittedly the alibi of appellants may be assailable, the evidence of the prosecution is
probatively low in substance and evidentiarily barred in part. The prosecution cannot use the
weakness of the defense to enhance its case; it must rely on the strength of its own evidence. In fact,
alibi need not be inquired into where the prosecution's evidence is weak.
Prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the perpetrators of,
much less the participation of herein appellants in, the crime charged.
The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband.
Even the corroborating witness, George Jovillano, who was drinking nearby when the three assailants
passed about 5 meters away, made no mention or identification on who shot Agapito Gambalan.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and accused-appellants
Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de
oficio.
G.R. No. 110290 January 25, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, WILFREDO "SONNY QUIAÑO, MANUEL "JUN" ABENOJA, JR., and
FREDDIE "BOY" CARTEL, accused.
JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.
Facts:
At past 7:30 p.m. of 6 September 1986 in Baguio City, Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, a dentist, together with
his son, Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa Francisco; his daughter, Dominic; and Danny
Ancheta, a family friend, were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the doctor's residence at
Trancoville at 21-D Malvar Street, Baguio City, from his driving the car. While they were cruising
along Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church, a man came out from the right side of a car
parked about two meters to the church. The man approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle
through its window, and fired at the passengers. The Brasilia swerved and hit a fence. The gunman
immediately returned to the parked car which then sped away.
Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dominic was bale to get out of the Brasilia to run to
the Alabanza store where she telephoned her mother and told her what had happened. Later, she
and her mother brought her father and Anthony to the hospital. Danny Ancheta went home and was
then brought to the Notre Dame Hospital for treatment. Anna Theresa Francisco was brought to the
funeral parlor. The police later arrived at the crime scene and conducted an investigation. they
recovered some empty shells of an armalite rifle.
On 30 January 1987, accused Wilfredo "Sonny" Quiaño, an alleged former military agent or "asset"
who had been picked up in La Union by the police authorities, confessed during the investigation
conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman in the fatal
shooting of Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco. He implicated Manuel "Jun" Abenoja, Jr.,
allegedly a fellow military agent and the "bagman" who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee,
Freddie "Boy" Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the investigation,
Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, a representative of the Integrated bar of
the Philippines (IBP). Ms. Christie Napeñas, a stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
investigation. Thereafter, she transcribed the notes and the transcription became the sworn
statement of Wilfredo Quiaño which he signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to
before City Fiscal Balajadia.
In the morning of 10 February 1987, "Jimmy," who turned out to be appellant Jaime Agustin, was
picked up in Sto. Tomas, Pangasinan, by military personnel (without a warrant) and brought to
Baguio city. At 4:00 p.m. of that date, he was taken to the office of City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia where
he was investigated in connection with the crime. Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom assisted the appellant
during the investigation. Ms. Christie Napeñas took down stenographic notes of the proceedings
during the investigation. The stenographic notes consisted of 22 pages (Exhibit "B"), each of which
was signed afterwards by the appellant and Atty. Cajucom. Ms. Napeñas subsequently transcribed
these notes which the prosecution marked as Exhibit "C." The appellant narrated therein his
knowledge of the shooting of Dr. Bayquen and revealed the identities of his cohorts in the crime. In a
confrontation two days later, he identified Quiaño as "Sony," the triggerman.
The appellant, who is a farmer and whose highest educational attainment was grad four, impugned
the validity of his extrajudicial statement which he finally did out of fear caused by the arresting
officers prior to him being brought to the station which he alleged in detail. Then he was brought to
the Office of the City Fiscal of Baguio City.
In five separate informations filed on 22 May 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3,
Baguio City, the accused were charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R, with
frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 4649-R, and with attempted murder in Criminal Cases Nos.
4650-R and 4651-R. The crimes were allegedly committed on 6 September 1986 in Baguio City and
resulted in the deaths of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco and the wounding of
Anthony Bayquen, Dominic Bayquen, and Danny Ancheta.
The informations in the murder cases charged that the accused acted in conspiracy and the presence
of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the ordinary aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and price.
Only the appellant and Wilfredo Quiaño were arrested. However, before Quiaño could be arraigned,
he escaped on 12 July 1987 while under the custody of the Philippine Constabulary/PNP Regional
Command I at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet.2 The cases, which were consolidated and jointly
tried, proceeded only against the appellant.
Trial court then concluded that "[t]here was conspiracy and the accused was a direct participant in
the crime," and that while he tried to minimize his culpability, his "extrajudicial confession" shows
that "he was in on the plan," and even "expected to be paid, to be rewarded monetarily"; and that he
"decided to give a statement only when he was not given the money." Since the proof of corpus
delicti required in Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court was established by the prosecution's
evidence, it found his conviction for murder inevitable.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged extrajudicial confession is admissible as evidence against the accused-
appellant, "Jimmy".
Held:
No. After a careful study of the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R and a painstaking
evaluation of the evidence, we find this appeal to be impressed with merit. Indeed, the extrajudicial
admission — not extrajudicial confession — of the appellant, which is the only evidence of the
prosecution linking him to the commission of the crime charged, is wholly inadmissible because it
was taken in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. We also see in these cases a
blatant disregard of the appellant's right under Section 2 of Article III when he was unlawfully
arrested.
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the
crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent
to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words,
and admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or
circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish
the ultimate fact of guilt.
Nevertheless, when what is involved is the issue of admissibly in evidence under Section 12, Article III
of the Constitution, the distinction is irrelevant because Paragraph 3 thereof expressly refers to both
confession and admission.
Considering that the appellant is familiar only with Ilocano, the Court has serious doubts about his
ability to understand Atty. Cajucom's explanation of his constitutional rights since Atty. Cajucom did
so in English and Tagalog. He also was not explicitly told of his right to have a competent and
independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had in mind any such counsel and, if so,
whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could not, whether he would agree to be
assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not categorically informed that he could waive his
rights to remain silent and to counsel and that this waiver must be in writing and in the presence of
his counsel.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, branch 3, Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 4647-R and Criminal Case No. 4648-R, and
ACQUITTING appellant JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN. His immediate release from confinement is hereby
ORDERED unless for some other lawful cause his continued detention is warranted.