January 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Rulings on
Political Law
Absence of motion of reconsideration; effect of. The omission
of the filing of a motion for reconsideration poses no obstacle
for the Court’s review of its ruling on the whole case since a
serious constitutional question has been raised and is one of
the underlying bases for the validity or invalidity of the
presidential action. If the President does not have any
constitutional authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman
and/or a Special Prosecutor in the first place, then any ruling
on the legal correctness of the OP’s decision on the merits will
be an empty one. In other words, since the validity of the OP’s
decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably
anchored on the final and correct ruling on the constitutional
issue, the whole case – including the constitutional issue –
remains alive for the Court’s consideration on motion for
reconsideration. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the
President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January
28, 2014.
Congress; power to determine modes of removal from office of
public officers; must be consistent with the core
constitutional principle of independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The intent of the framers of the Constitution in
providing that “all other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment” in the second sentence of Section 2, Article XI
is to prevent Congress from extending the more stringent rule
of “removal only by impeachment” to favoured public officers.
Contrary to the implied view of the minority, in no way can
this provision be regarded as blanket authority for Congress
to provide for any ground of removal it deems fit. While the
manner and cause of removal are left to congressional
determination, this must still be consistent with
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constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right to
procedural and substantive due process; the constitutional
guarantee of security of tenure; the principle of separation of
powers; and the principle of checks and balances. The
authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide
for the manner and cause of removal of all other public
officers and employees does not mean that Congress can
ignore the basic principles and precepts established by the
Constitution. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President,
etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.,
et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Constitutional bodies; concept of independence. The
independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and
by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain
characteristics – they do not owe their existence to any act of
Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself;
additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms,
the framers of the Constitution intended that these
“independent” bodies be insulated from political pressure to
the extent that the absence of “independence” would result in
the impairment of their core functions. The deliberative
considerations abundantly show that the independent
constitutional commissions have been consistently intended
by the framers to be independent from executive control or
supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar
as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on
how the “independence” granted to these bodies prevents
presidential interference. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the
President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January
28, 2014.
Gross negligence; concept of; not present when Deputy
Ombudsman reviews a case for nine days. Gross negligence
refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the
slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where
there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons may be affected. In case of public
officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is
flagrant and palpable. The Deputy Ombudsman cannot be
guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he
acted on the case forwarded to him within nine days. The
OP’s ruling that Gonzales had been grossly negligent for
taking nine days, instead of five days as required for Hearing
Officers, is totally baseless.Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of
the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito
N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232,
January 28, 2014.
Impeachment; concept of. Impeachment is the most difficult
and cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from
office. It is, by nature, a sui generis politico-legal process that
signals the need for a judicious and careful handling as
shown by the process required to initiate the proceeding; the
one-year limitation or bar for its initiation; the limited
grounds for impeachment; the defined instrumentality given
the power to try impeachment cases; and the number of votes
required for a finding of guilt. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of
the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito
N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232,
January 28, 2014.
Judicial power; issuance of protection orders is in pursuance
of the Court’s authority to settle justiciable controversies or
disputes involving rights that are enforceable and
demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of
wrongs for violations of such rights. The provision in R.A.
9262 allowing the issuance of protection orders is not an
invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to
barangay officials to issue protection orders. Section 2 of
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Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “the
Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.” Hence, the primary judge of
the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and
expediency of any law is primarily the function of the
legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the
issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority
to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights
that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of
justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.
Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge,
Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua, G.R.
No. 170701. January 22, 2014.
Just compensation; determination of just compensation is
fundamentally a judicial function. In the exercise of the
Court’s essentially judicial function of determining just
compensation, the RTC-SACs are not granted unlimited
discretion and must consider and apply the enumerated
factors in R.A. No. 6657 and the DAR formula (in AO 5-98)
that reflect these factors. These factors and formula provide
the uniform framework or structure for the computation of
the just compensation for a property subject to agrarian
reform. When acting within the parameters set by the law
itself, the RTC-SACs, however, are not strictly bound to apply
the DAR formula to its minute detail, particularly when faced
with situations that do not warrant the formula’s strict
application; they may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax
the formula’s application to fit the factual situations before
them. They must, however, clearly explain the reason for any
deviation from the factors and formula that the law and the
rules have provided.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco
Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014.
Just compensation; fair market value of the expropriated
property is determined as of the time of taking. The “time of
taking” refers to that time when the State deprived the
landowner of the use and benefit of his property, as when the
State acquires title to the property or as of the filing of the
complaint, per Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R.
No. 172551, January 15, 2014.
Justiciable question; definition of. A justiciable question is
one which is inherently susceptible of being decided on
grounds recognized by law, as where the court finds that
there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of
the powers conferred on a political branch of the government.
Our inquiry is limited to whether such statutory grant of
disciplinary authority to the President violates the
Constitution, particularly the core constitutional principle of
the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. Emilio A.
Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell
Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No.
196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Ombudsman; investigative and disciplinary powers; scope.
The Ombudsman’s broad investigative and disciplinary
powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the
Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To
support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to
insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and
influences of officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of
external reprisal by making it an “independent” office. Emilio
A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell
Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No.
196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
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Ombudsman; powers and functions. Under Section 12,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the
Ombudsman is envisioned to be the “protector of the people”
against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to
function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This
constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically
intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly
check and guard against the ills, abuses, and excesses of the
bureaucracy. As the Ombudsman is expected to be an
”activist watchman”, the Court has upheld its actions,
although not squarely falling under the broad powers granted
it by the Constitution and by R.A. No. 6770, if these actions
are reasonably in line with its official function and consistent
with the law and the Constitution. Emilio A. Gonzales III v.
Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v.
Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No.
196232, January 28, 2014.
Private lands acquired for agrarian reform; primary
jurisdiction. The Land Bank of the Philippines is primarily
charged with determining land valuation and compensation
for all private lands acquired for agrarian reform purposes.
But this determination is only preliminary. The landowner
may still take the matter of just compensation to the court for
final adjudication. Thus, we clarify and reiterate: the original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 rests
with the RTC-SAC. But, in its determination, the RTC-SAC
must take into consideration the factors laid down by law and
the pertinent DAR regulations. Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, January 15,
2014.
Public officer; discourtesy in the performance of official
duties. As a public officer and trustee for the public, it is the
ever existing responsibility of respondent sheriff to
demonstrate courtesy and civility in his official actuations
with the public. Based on the transcript of the altercation, it
is readily apparent that respondent has indeed been remiss in
the duty of observing courtesy in serving the public. He
should have exercised restraint in dealing with the
complainant, instead of allowing the quarrel to escalate into a
hostile encounter. The balm of a clean conscience should
have been sufficient to relieve any hurt or harm respondent
felt from complainant’s criticisms in the performance of his
duties. On the contrary, respondent’s demeanor tarnished the
image not only of his office but that of the judiciary as a
whole, exposing him to disciplinary measure. Atty. Virgillo P.
Alconera v. Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069, January
20, 2014.
Public officer; making untruthful statements. The charge of
making untruthful statements must fail. While the
statements mentioned in respondent’s complaint-affidavit
were not reflected in the transcript submitted by the
complainant, this actuality is not conclusive evidence that
such event did not take place. As claimed by respondent,
complainant’s clerk was only able to record a part of the
argument. We cannot then discount the probability that there
is more to the argument than what was caught on video and
there remains the possibility that what respondent narrated
and what complainant recorded both actually transpired.
Atty. Virgillo P. Alconera v. Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-
3069, January 20, 2014.
Section 8(2) of RA 6770; constitutional; the Office of the
Special Prosecutor is not constitutionally within the Office of
the Ombudsman; not entitled to the independence the Office
of the Ombudsman enjoys under the Constitution. The Court
resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of R.A. No.
6770 insofar as the Special Prosecutor is concerned. The
Court does not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
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be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and
is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys
under the Constitution. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the
President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January
28, 2014.
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770; unconstitutional; vesting of
disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy
Ombudsman; violation of the independence of the
Ombudsman. In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting
the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the
President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive
department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary
authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. Section
8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 intruded upon the constitutionally-
granted independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. By so
doing, the law directly collided not only with the
independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office
of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of
checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman
office seeks to revitalize. What is true for the Ombudsman
must equally and necessarily be true for her Deputies who act
as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their
duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her
complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as
independent as she is, if only because they are subject to
pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for
complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a
young democracy like the Philippines where graft and
corruption is still a major problem for the government. For
these reasons, Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770, providing that
the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman, should be
declared void. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President,
etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.,
et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Special Prosecutor; structural relationship with the
Ombudsman; the Special Prosecutor is by no means an
ordinary subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids
the Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her duties, which
include investigation and prosecution of officials in the
Executive Department. Congress recognized the importance
of the Special Prosecutor as a necessary adjunct of the
Ombudsman, aside from his or her deputies, by making the
Office of the Special Prosecutor and organic component of the
Office of the Ombudsman and by granting the Ombudsman
control and supervision over that office. This power of control
and supervision includes vesting the Office of the
Ombudsman with the power to assign duties to the Special
Prosecutor as he or she may deem fit. Even if the Office of the
Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the
composition of the Office of the Ombudsman, the role it
performs as an organic component of that Office militates
against a differential treatment between the Ombudsman’s
Deputies, on one hand, and the Special Prosecutor himself,
on the other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be
equally true, not only for her Deputies but, also for other
lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the
Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties. Emilio
A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell
Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No.
196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Dissension in the Court: July 2013
Posted on August 16, 2013 by Rafael L. Encarnacion • Posted
in Constitutional Law •
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In a decision penned by Justice Peralta and promulgated last
July 1, 2013, the Third Division of the Supreme Court ruled
that just compensation for property taken by the government
in 1940 should be Php0.70/sqm, its fair market value (FMV)
at the time of taking, and not Php10,000/sqm, its FMV at the
time of filing of the claim for just compensation by the
landowners in 1995, nor Php1,500/sqm, its reasonable value
as determined by the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC)
appointed by the lower court in 1999 to determine just
compensation.
Private respondents owned land in Bulacan that was taken by
the DPWH in 1940 and used for the construction of the
MacArthur Highway, without the owners’ consent and
without the necessary expropriation proceedings. In 1994,
respondents demanded payment of the FMV of the land but
petitioner DPWH District Engineer Contreras offered to pay
Php0.70/sqm per resolution of the PAC of Bulacan.
Unsatisfied with the offer, respondents demanded the return
of their property or the payment of compensation at current
FMV. As their demand remained unheeded, respondents filed
a Complaint on March 1995 for recovery of possession with
damages against petitioners DPWH Secretary and DPWH
District Engineer.
Acting on petitioners’ motion, the RTC dismissed the
complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity from suit.
On appeal, however, the CA – finding instead that the
doctrine of state immunity is not applicable because the
recovery of compensation is the only relief available to the
landowner and to deny such relief would cause injustice to
the landowner – reversed the RTC and remanded the case to
the RTC for the purpose of determining just compensation.
The RTC then referred the case to the PAC which
recommended Php1,500/sqm as the just and reasonable
compensation even as it noted that its current FMV was
Php10,000/sqm. The RTC adopted this recommendation and
rendered a decision directing the petitioners to pay
respondents that amount.
On appeal, the CA affirmed that decision with the
modification that the Php1,500/sqm amount should earn
interest of 6% per annum computed from the filing of the
action on March 1995 until full payment. Aggrieved,
petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari assailing
the CA decision.
The majority of the Third Division justices found the petition
partly meritorious and, citing several precedents with
common factual circumstances as this case, ruled that just
compensation is the value of the property at the time of
taking (which is Php0.70/sqm), and not its value at the time
of payment. The reason for this rule, as explained in Republic
v. Lara, et. al. and in a number of recent cases, is that (i) the
value of the property may be enhanced by the public purpose
for which it is taken or there may have been a natural
increase in the value due to general economic conditions from
the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, and (ii)
the owner must be compensated only for what he actually
loses since compensation must be just not only to the
property owner, but also to the public which ultimately bears
the cost of expropriation. However, noting that petitioners
clearly disregarded respondents’ proprietary rights in taking
their property without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings, the SC ordered the petitioners to pay interest at
6% per annum from the date of taking in 1940 instead of
March 1995, until full payment.
In his dissenting opinion, J. Velasco submits that, while this
Court has consistently ruled that the reckoning point for the
determination of just compensation is the time of taking, an
exception must be made in cases where no condemnation
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proceedings were instituted after a substantial period from
the time of illegal taking, since to apply the general rule in
those cases would result in inequity and prejudice.
He notes that government violated respondents’ constitutional
right to procedural due process when it deprived them of their
property without their consent and the requisite expropriation
proceedings, and unless the mandatory requirement of due
process is followed, the exercise of government powers can
become repressive. DPWH’s action in this case, done without
observing procedural due process, is illegal and invalid. As
such, the condemnation of the subject property ought to be
reversed. But since that would no longer be possible as it has
already been put to public use, the only remedy available to
respondents is the recovery of just compensation which, in
this case, should not be Php0.70/sqm as that measly amount
would be highly unjust and inequitable to respondents who
had already been deprived of their right to due process for 55
years. This dissenter believes that both the RTC and CA were
correct in granting respondents just compensation of
Php1,500/sqm as recommended by the PAC – which is just
and proper considering that it falls between Php0.70/sqm
and Php10,000/sqm, the valuation at the time of filing of the
claim for just compensation, which is already enhanced by
the public purpose and the natural appreciation in value of
the property – so government would think twice next time
before taking any unwarranted short cuts in condemning
private property.
In his separate opinion, J. Leonen proposes using the
economic concept of present value for determining just
compensation, as a happy middle ground that meets the need
for doctrinal precision urged by J. Peralta and the thirst for
substantial justice in J. Velasco’s dissenting opinion. Under
this concept, money received today is more valuable than the
same amount of money received tomorrow; that is, your
Php0.70 in 1940 can buy more in 1940 than your Php0.70 in
1995. And so taking into consideration the potential of money
to increase (or decrease) in value across time, a proper rate of
return is applied to determine, say, how much Php0.70 in
1940 – if put in the bank in 1940 and allowed to earn
interest on a compounded basis until 1995 – would be worth
in 1995. The value in 1995 of that Php0.70 1940 money
would then be paid out in 1995.
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways
and District Engineer Celesinto R. Contreras vs Spouses
Heracleo and Ramona Tecson (G.R. No. 179334); dissenting
and concurring opinion: Velasco, Jr., J.; separate opinion:
Leonen, J.
Dissension in the Court: June 2013
Posted on July 17, 2013 by Rafael L. Encarnacion • Posted in
Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law •
By a vote of seven justices, with three inhibiting, one absent,
and four dissenting, the Supreme Court – in a decision
penned by J. Perez and promulgated last June 25, 2013 –
dismissed this petition for certiorari assailing the earlier
Resolutions of public respondent COMELEC which ordered
the cancellation of petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy (CoC)
for the position of Representative of the lone district of
Marinduque.
This case stemmed from a petition to deny due course or to
cancel petitioner Reyes’s CoC filed on October 2012 by private
respondent Tan with the COMELEC alleging that Reyes
misrepresented in her CoC that (a) she is single and a
resident of Marinduque, when she is married to Rep.
Mandanas of Bauan, Batangas and a resident of that town
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(and also of Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of
Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives), and
(b) she is a Filipino citizen and not a permanent resident of
another country, when she is an American citizen and a
permanent resident of the United States.
In her answer, Reyes averred that (a) she is not legally
married to Rep. Mandanas, thus his residence cannot be
attributed to her, and (b) the evidence presented by Tan does
not support the allegation that she is a permanent resident or
citizen of the United States.
On February 8, 2013, Tan filed a Manifestation with Motion
to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence consisting of, among
others, (a) a copy of a January 2013 internet article of a Mr.
Eli Obligacion which provided a database record from the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) indicating that
Reyes is an American citizen and a holder of a US passport,
and (b) a photocopy of a Certification of Travel Records from
the BID which showed that Reyes used her US passport in
her various travels abroad.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a
Resolution granting Tan’s petition and cancelling Reyes’s
CoC. It found that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen because she
failed to qualify for repatriation under RA 9225 by taking the
required Oath of Allegiance and executing an Affidavit of
Renunciation of her American citizenship. In addition, it ruled
that Reyes did not comply with the one-year residency
requirement under the 1987 Constitution.
On April 8, 2013, Reyes filed her motion for reconsideration
claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that
she has not lost such status by simply obtaining and using a
US passport. Additionally, she averred that while she was
married to an American citizen in 1997, this only resulted in
her acquiring dual citizenship and not in her becoming a
naturalized American citizen, thus, there is no need for her to
fulfill the twin requirements under RA 9225. She also
attached to her motion an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship dated September 21, 2012 and a Voter
Certification in Boac, Marinduque dated April 17, 2012.
On May 14, 2013, the COMELEC en banc promulgated its
Resolution denying Reyes’s motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit. Chairman Brillantes, however, dissented from
the majority and held that Tan failed to offer substantial
evidence to prove that Reyes lost her Filipino citizenship,
noting that the internet article by Mr. Obligacion is hearsay,
while the purported copy of the BID certification is merely a
photocopy and not even a certified true copy of the original,
thus similarly inadmissible as evidence. Chairman Brillantes
also opined that (a) a petition to deny due course tackles
exclusively the issue of deliberate misrepresentation over a
qualification, and not the lack of qualification per se which is
the proper subject of a quo warranto proceeding, and (b) the
issues pertaining to Reyes’s residence and citizenship require
exhaustive presentation and examination of evidence that are
best addressed in a full blown quo warranto proceeding rather
than the summary proceedings in the present case.
On May 18, 2013, Reyes was proclaimed winner of the May
13, 2013 elections by the Marinduque Provincial Board of
Canvassers.
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate
of Finality declaring its May 14, 2013 Resolution final and
executory, pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
which provide that said resolutions shall become final and
executory after the lapse of five days from promulgation,
unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
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On June 7, 2013, Reyes took her oath of office before Speaker
Belmonte of the House of Representatives. On that same day,
Reyes filed this Petition for Certiorari assailing the COMELEC
Resolutions and claiming that (a) the COMELEC was ousted
of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed winner, and
(b) the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion (i)
when it took cognizance of Tan’s newly discovered evidence
without the same have been testified and offered and
admitted in evidence and without giving Reyes the
opportunity to question and present controverting evidence,
in violation of Reyes’s right to due process, (ii) when it
declared that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet
the residency requirement, and (iii) when by, enforcing RA
9225, it imposed additional qualifications to those
enumerated in the Constitution for a Member of the House of
Representatives.
Without further proceedings, the majority of the SC justices
dismissed the petition and held that:
A. The COMELEC retained jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) because
(a) Reyes has not filed a petition with the HRET, and (b) the
jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives which,
based on jurisprudence, happens only after a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office at “noon of the thirtieth day of June next following his
election.” The majority also believed that the COMELEC en
banc had already disposed of the issue of petitioner’s lack of
Filipino citizenship and residency last May 14, 2013 and so
the Board of Canvassers which proclaimed petitioner as
winner on May 18, 2013 cannot, by such act, be allowed to
render nugatory the COMELEC en banc decision, which per
COMELEC Rules of Procedure became final and executory on
May 19, 2013. To prevent the assailed Resolution from
becoming final, petitioner should have filed a petition before
the SC within the 5-day period as provided in said Rules, but
she failed to do so.
B. The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
took cognizance of the newly discovered evidence because it is
not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of
procedure in the presentation of evidence, and since the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel a
CoC are summary in nature. There was no denial of due
process because petitioner had five months from the filing of
Tan’s petition to the issuance of the COMELEC First
Division’s Resolution to adduce evidence, but she did not
avail herself of the opportunity given her.
C. A doubt was clearly cast on petitioner’s citizenship which
petitioner failed to clear. Early on, Reyes contended that it
was Tan’s burden to prove that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen.
Tan was able to substantiate his allegation by evidence
establishing that Reyes is a holder of an American passport.
The burden now shifted to Reyes to present evidence either
that she is a natural-born citizen and has not lost the same
or that she has availed of the privileges under RA 9225 but
she failed to do that, and so the conclusion is that she
remains to be an American citizen. Notably, in her motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, Reyes
admitted that she is a holder of a US passport, but she
averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus
RA 9225 does not apply to her. Still, attached to the said
motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship
which she explained was attached “if only to comply with the
rules, even as a superfluity.” Given that the Affidavit was
executed in September 2012 or even before the COMELEC
issued the assailed Resolutions raising RA 9225 compliance
as an issue, this must be taken as an admission by petitioner
that RA 9225 applies to her.
9|Page
D. As to the issue of residency, the majority agrees with the
ruling of the COMELEC First Division that petitioner cannot
be considered a resident of Marinduque because she did not
show that she had re-acquired her Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225, and so it follows that she has not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. The only proof
presented by petitioner to show that she has met the one-year
residency requirement is her claim that she served as
Provincial Administrator of the province from January 18,
2011 to July 13, 2011, but no amount of her stay in the said
locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned
her domicile of choice in the USA.
E. The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on
candidates for the House of Representatives who have
acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution that the
candidate must be a natural-born citizen and must have one-
year residency prior to the date of elections. Thus, it was
proper for the COMELEC to inquire into Reyes’s compliance
with RA 9225 to determine if she re-acquired her status as a
natural-born citizen.
All in all, the majority believed, considering that the petition
for denial and cancellation of the CoC is summary in nature,
that the COMELEC is given much discretion in the evaluation
and admission of evidence. They also cited an earlier case
where the SC held that the rule that factual findings of
administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts
except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial
evidence in support of such findings should be applied with
greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the latter
was created and explicitly made independent by the
Constitution itself and intended by its framers to be placed on
a level higher than statutory administrative organs. Citing
another case, they noted that for an act to be struck down as
having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross and, in this case,
petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that
grave abuse of discretion exists.
In his dissenting opinion, J. Brion, joined by J. Carpio, J.
Villarama, and J. Leonen, expressed his strong reservations
to the majority’s outright dismissal of this petition after an
initial review, based solely on the petition and its annexes
and its finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of COMELEC. The dissenters believed that the
majority ought to have at least required public respondent
COMELEC to comment on the petition in light of the gravity
of the issues raised, the potential effect on jurisprudence, and
“the affected personal relationships within and outside the
Court,” before any further action can be made. That this case
at least deserves further proceedings from the SC is
supported by the following considerations:
First, the issues raised by petitioner on the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC, on her right to due process and the COMELEC’s
failure to properly appreciate and evaluate the evidence
against her, and on the alleged imposition by the COMELEC
of a qualification for the position of congressman other than
those mentioned in the Constitution, among others, are all
substantial issues deserving more than the hasty dismissive
action the majority made. For example, comments should
have been solicited at least on how petitioner’s admitted
marriage affected her citizenship and on how the COMELEC
arrived at the conclusion that petitioner was a naturalized
American citizen based on submitted evidence that could only
show that petitioner was the holder of a US passport.
Second, unless the case is clearly and patently shown to be
without basis, the SC should, out of delicadeza, at least hear
and consider both sides before making a ruling that would
10 | P a g e
favor the son of a member of the SC (blogger’s note:
petitioner’s rival candidate was the son of J. Velasco).
Third, the majority’s holding that the jurisdiction of the HRET
only begins after the candidate has assumed office on June
30 is contrary to prevailing jurisprudence and the HRET
Rules (which both hold the proclamation of the winner as the
reckoning point and trigger that brings election contests
within the HRET’s exclusive jurisdiction) and is, in fact, a
major retrogressive jurisprudential development that can
emasculate the HRET. In this particular case, any election
protest or petition for quo warranto filed after June 30 or
more than fifteen (15) days from Reyes’s proclamation on May
18, 2013 shall be dismissed outright by the HRET for having
been filed out of time under the HRET Rules. In making this
kind of ruling, the SC should have at least undertaken a full-
blown proceeding.
All told, the dissenters believe that the COMELEC does not
have an airtight case based on substantial evidence on the
citizenship and residency issues, and much less a similar
case on the jurisdictional issue, to justify a very prompt
outright dismissal action from the SC. They also believe that
petitioner Reyes is not lacking in arguably meritorious
positions to support her cause, even if only to the extent of
being fully heard by the SC. If the SC is really serious in
administering justice in this case, the proper course of action
is to require the COMELEC to comment on the petition and to
decide matters from that point.
Regina Ongsiako Reyes vs Commission on Elections and
Joseph Socorro B. Tan (G.R. No. 207264); dissenting opinion:
Brion, J., Carpio, J., Villarama, J., Leonen, J.
SEC Guidelines on Compliance with Filipino-Foreign
Ownership Requirements
Posted on June 3, 2013 by Imelda A. Manguiat • Posted in
Constitutional Law •
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) issued
Memorandum Circular No. 8-2013 on May 20, 2013. The
Circular sets out the guidelines to determine compliance with
the required percentage of Filipino-foreign ownership in
corporations engaged in nationalized and partly-nationalized
activities.
Nationalized activities refer to those areas of investments
which are completely or partly reserved to Philippine
nationals pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, the Foreign
Investments Act, as amended (“FIA”), and other existing laws
such as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act.
The Circular was issued pursuant to the Supreme Court’s
directive in the case of Gamboa v. Teves, where the Court
interpreted the term “capital” in Article XII, Section 11 of the
1987 Constitution to refer “only to shares of stock entitled to
vote in the election of directors.” Under the Circular, for
purposes of determining compliance with the nationality
restrictions, the required percentage of Filipino ownership
shall be applied to both (a) the total number of outstanding
shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors,
and (b) the total number of outstanding shares of stock,
whether or not entitled to vote in the election of directors. On
the other hand, corporations covered by special laws
providing for specific citizenship requirements shall continue
to be guided by the provisions of those special laws. The
corporate secretaries of covered corporations are directed to
monitor compliance with the provisions of the Circular.
11 | P a g e
The SEC provided for a one-year grace period to enable all
corporations to comply with its new Circular, failing which,
the corporation shall be subjected to administrative sanctions
under the FIA, as amended.
SEC Memorandum Circular No. 8-2013 took effect
immediately after its publication last May 22.
(Imee Manguiat and Grace Lazaro co-authored this post.)
Dissension in the Court: April 2013
Posted on May 6, 2013 by Rafael L. Encarnacion • Posted in
Commercial Law, Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases •
The 1987 Constitution allows only one (1) member of a
bicameral Congress to sit in the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC). This, according to the Supreme Court in a majority
decision penned by J. Mendoza and promulgated last April
16, 2013, was the intention of the framers of the Constitution
who conceived of the JBC as an independent body
representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process to recommend nominees to the
President in order to rid such process of partisan political
activities, and carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution in this wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the
Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor
of law, retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
The majority cannot accede to the argument of respondents
that allowing only one representative from Congress in the
JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature,
and that the failure of the framers to make the proper textual
adjustment where there was a shift from unilateralism to
bicameralism was a plain oversight. According to the
majority, every language in the Constitution must be taken to
have been deliberately chosen and that in opting to use the
singular letter “a” to describe “representative of Congress,”
the Filipino people through the framers intended that
Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. There
could not have been any plain oversight in the wordings of
the provision since the other provisions of the 1987
Constitution were amended accordingly with the shift to a
bicameral legislative body (e.g., Sections 4, 8 and 18 of Article
VII where corresponding adjustments were made as to how a
matter would be handled and voted upon by the two Houses
of Congress), and this Court has no power to add another
member by judicial construction.
According to the majority, it is clear that the framers were not
keen on adjusting the provision on congressional
representation in the JBC because (i) it was not in the
exercise of its primary function to legislate, considering that
the JBC was created to support the executive power to
appoint and Congress, as one whole body, was merely
assigned a contributory non-legislative function, and (ii) there
was no need to recognize the dichotomy of each House and to
consider the interplay between the two Houses in their
participation in the JBC because there is no interaction
required between these two Houses in the screening and
nomination of judicial officers. Thus, in providing for the
membership of the JBC, the framers simply gave recognition
to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a
certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch
of government. And the argument that a senator cannot
12 | P a g e
represent a member of the House of Representatives in the
JBC and vice versa is misplaced because any member of
Congress is constitutionally empowered to represent the
entire Congress.
The majority went on to cite various authorities who, having
perused the records of the Constitutional Commission, are of
the view that “to allow Congress to have two representatives
with one vote each is to negate the principle of equality
among the three branches of government,” “the interpretation
of two votes for Congress would give Congress more influence
in the appointment of judges and would also increase the
number of JBC members to eight, which could lead to a
voting deadlock and is a clear violation of the seven
enumerated members in the Constitution,” and “no
parallelism can be drawn between the representative of
Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its
legislative and constituent powers under the Constitution –
while the latter justifies the separateness of the two Houses
as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made
when Congress interacts with the other two co-equal
branches of government.”
In his dissenting opinion, J. Abad, joined by J. del Castillo,
voted to grant respondents’ motion for reconsideration on the
basis that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend
to limit representation of a bicameral Congress to only one
member since the two Houses are still separate and distinct
from each other and that neither House can by itself claim to
represent the Congress. While Section 8(1), Article VIII
provides for just “a representative of the Congress,” it also
provides that such representation is “ex officio” or “by virtue
of one’s office” and there are actually two persons in Congress
– the Chairperson of the Senate Justice Committee and the
Chairperson of the House of Representatives Justice
Committee – who hold separate offices with the attached
function of sitting in the JBC. Adhering to the majority’s
literal translation of Section 8(1) would mean no
representative from Congress will qualify as “ex officio”
member of the JBC and would deny Congress the
representation the framers intended it to have. According to
this dissenter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the
Constitutional Commission, himself admitted that the
committee charged with making adjustments in the
previously passed provisions covering the JBC, failed to
consider the impact of a changed character of the Legislature
on the inclusion of “a representative of the Congress” in the
membership of the JBC.
In his separate dissenting opinion, J. Leonen agrees with J.
Abad that limiting our interpretation only from the
preposition “a” undermines the concept of a bicameral
congress implied in all other 114 places in the Constitution
that uses the word “Congress.” On the other hand, there is
no compelling reason why we should blind ourselves to the
meaning of “representative of Congress” and “ex officio” and
to limit representation of a bicameral Congress to only one.
First, the provision did not provide for a number of members
to the JBC, unlike the provisions creating many other bodies
in the Constitution, and there does not have to be an odd
number of members in the JBC since the decision made there
is not a dichotomous one, i.e., a yes or a no, where a tie-
breaker will be necessary, but rather one where the
shortlisted nominees are decided by a plurality of votes.
Second, Congress discharges its function to check and
balance the power of both the Judiciary and the Executive in
the JBC; thus, its representative has to consult with
Congress as a whole. Since neither a Senator or a Member of
the House of Representatives may represent Congress as a
whole, and since Congress does not exist separate from the
Senate and the House of Representatives, each chamber must
13 | P a g e
be represented in the JBC and must be able to instruct their
respective representatives who do not sit there just to
represent themselves – again, they are “representatives of
Congress” “ex officio.” Third, the belief that one co-equal
branch should be represented by only one representative,
while true for the Executive who has a political alter ego in
the Secretary of Justice and may be represented by that
single individual, cannot apply to Congress which may not be
represented by only one individual since it operates through
the Senate and the House of Representatives. Lastly, it is
apparent from the chronology of events relating to the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission that the
discussions perused by the authorities cited in the main
ponencia took place when the commissioners were still
contemplating a unicameral legislature and therefore any
mention of the composition of the JBC having seven members
during the dates cited was within the context that the
Commission had not yet voted and agreed upon a bicameral
legislature. It is apparent that the Constitutional Commission
was not able to amend the provisions concerning the JBC
after it had decided to propose a bicameral Congress.
This dissenter believes that discerning that there should be a
Senator and a Member of the House of Representatives sitting
in the JBC so that Congress can be fully represented ex
officio is not judicial activism, but is rather in keeping with
the constitutional project of a bicameral Congress that is
effective wherever it is represented and in tune with how our
people understand Congress as described in the Constitution
beyond a single isolated text. Thus, nothing less than having
two representatives from Congress with one full vote each
would carry out this understanding since previous
mechanisms used to carry out the consequence of the
majority’s opinion – such as allowing two representatives but
with half a vote each or alternating the seat between a
Senator and a Member of the House of Representatives – are
constitutionally abominable since in the former, either
chamber of Congress is deemed only worth fifty percent of the
wisdom of each other JBC member, while in the latter,
alternating the seat would mean not giving a seat to the
Congress at all since neither the Senator nor Member of the
House of Representatives can represent Congress as a whole.
Francisco I. Chavez vs Judicial and Bar Council, Sen. Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Rep. Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (G.R. No.
202242); dissenting opinion: Abad, J., Leonen, J.
Changing Rules on the Party List System
Posted on May 1, 2013 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV • Posted in
Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law •
Much like a swinging pendulum, the decision of the Supreme
Court on which parties compose the party list system swings
from one side to the other. Previously, the Supreme Court
limited the party list system to representatives of
marginalized and underprivileged sectors. In Atong Paglaum
v. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 203766, et al., April 2, 2013), the
latest in the series of party list cases, the pendulum now
points to the opposite side.
The New Ruling
Atong Paglaum involved 54 Petitions for Certiorari and
Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list
groups against COMELEC for disqualifying them from
participating in the May 13, 2013 party-list elections. One of
the main reasons for the disqualification was their failure to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented.
Two issues were presented:
14 | P a g e
(1) Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying the petitioners from participating
in the May 2013 elections; and
(2) Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list
system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC (ABB)
and BANAT v. COMELEC (BANAT) should be applied by the
COMELEC in the coming May 2013 elections.
The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion because it merely followed the
rulings laid down in ABB and BANAT. However, the Court
decided to abandon these rulings and adopted new
parameters for the upcoming elections; thus, it remanded the
case to COMELEC so the latter can determine the status of
the petitioners based on the following new guidelines:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list
system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and
do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system and do not
field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in partylist
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
“marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-
defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized
and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-
defined political constituencies” include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority
of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
“well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-
defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy
for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members
of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.
15 | P a g e
It is clear from the foregoing that a new rule has been set: not
all parties in the party-list system have to represent a sector
that is marginalized and underrepresented.
According to the Supreme Court, the framers of the
Constitution never intended the party-list system to be
reserved for sectoral parties. The latter were only part of the
party-list system not the entirety of it. There were two more
groups composing the system — national and regional
parties. This is evident from the phrasing of Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution, which states that:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts…and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations. (emphasis supplied)
National and regional parties are different from sectoral
parties such that the former need not organize along sectoral
lines and represent a particular sector. Hence, it is not
necessary for these parties to be representative of the
marginalized and underrepresented. In fact, Republic Act No.
7941, the enabling law of the party-list elections under the
Constitution, does not require these parties to fall under this
criterion. The Supreme Court emphasized that the phrase
‘marginalized and underrepresented’ appeared only once in
R.A. No. 7941, particularly in the Declaration of Policy. The
section provides:
The State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole,
to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards
this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free
and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
provided the simplest scheme possible.
The oft-quoted phrase neither appeared in the specific
implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 nor did it require
sectors, organizations, or parties to fall under the criterion as
well. In this regard, how then should the broad policy
declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 be harmonized with
its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the
applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The Supreme Court answered in this wise:
The phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” should
refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their
nature, economically “marginalized and
underrepresented.” These sectors are: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar
sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of
the sectoral party must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented.” The nominees of the sectoral party
either must belong to the sector, or must have a track
record of advocacy for the sector represented…
16 | P a g e
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as
sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the
youth, need not be “marginalized and underrepresented” will
allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who
lack “well-defined political constituencies” a chance to win
seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand,
limiting to the “marginalized and underrepresented” the
sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society, will give the
“marginalized and underrepresented” an opportunity to
likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where
those “marginalized and underrepresented,” both in
economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity
to send their own members to the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest
and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off
party-list representatives to masquerade as “wallowing in
poverty, destitution and infirmity,” even as they attend
sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
Based on the Court’s ratiocination, only sectoral parties for
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other sectors that by their nature are economically at the
margins of society must comply with the criterion of
representing the marginalized and underrepresented. For
national, regional, and sectoral parties of professionals, the
elderly, women and the youth, it is sufficient that they consist
of “citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or
the same governance principles and policies, regardless of
their economic status as citizens.”
Consequently, since political parties are essentially national
and regional parties, the Supreme Court categorically stated
that they may participate in the party-list elections. The rules
for their participation are found under guideline number
three.
Evolution of Party-List Cases
ABB and BANAT were the prevailing jurisprudence prior to
Atong Paglaum.
In ABB, the Supreme Court recognized that even major
political parties may join the party list elections. However, the
Supreme Court went on saying that although they may
participate, it does not mean that any political party — or
group for that matter — may do so. It is essential for these
parties to be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system, as laid down in the Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of the party-list
system is clear: “to give genuine power to the people, not only
by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so
by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves.”
Essentially, the goal is to give voice to the voiceless — to
enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented to become members of Congress.
Hence, only parties representing the marginalized and
underrepresented may join the party-list elections. The
Supreme Court stressed that the party-list system cannot be
exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented because if
the rich and overrepresented can participate, it would
desecrate the spirit of the party-list system.
17 | P a g e
In BANAT where the Supreme Court again had the
opportunity to deal with the matter, it categorically declared,
by a vote of 8-7, that major political parties are barred from
participating either directly or indirectly from the party-list
elections.
Clearly, the doctrine in Atong Paglaum is in stark contrast
with the former interpretation of the party-list system. The
Supreme Court’s reasoning in both decisions also sits at
opposite sides of the scale. In ABB and BANAT, the Supreme
Court concentrated on the spirit and purpose of the party-list
system while in Atong Paglaum, it focused on the letter of the
law and the intent of the Constitution’s framers and
Congress.
No wonder this decision has sparked intense debate and
passionate reaction from the stakeholders. These party-list
cases constitute three decisions with two exceptionally
different doctrines. Which then is correct? Should the spirit of
the law prevail over the letter? Should the party-list system be
really open to all? Should the court engage in socio-political
engineering as it did in the first two cases or should it remain
as neutral magistrates of the law, blindfolded like lady justice,
interpreting the letter of the law strictly according to its
words?
The decision in Atong Paglaum is not yet final and executory.
The case is still, if not already, subject to a motion for
reconsideration. It is still possible for the pendulum to swing
back to its former side or it may remain suspended where it is
now.
(Teng Gerochi and Tanya Baldovino co-authored this post.)
Dissension in the Court: March 2013
Posted on April 3, 2013 by Rafael L. Encarnacion • Posted in
Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law •
In a majority decision penned by J. Perlas-Bernabe and
promulgated last March 19, 2013, the Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which declared the validity of
private respondent Lucy Torres-Gomez’s substitution of
Richard Gomez as the Liberal Party’s replacement candidate
for the position of Leyte Representative.
The records clearly show that (i) Richard filed his certificate of
candidacy (CoC) misrepresenting in his CoC that he resided
in Ormoc City (in light of the Constitutional requirement that
members of the House of Representatives be residents of their
respective districts at least one year immediately preceding
the day of the election) when he in fact resided in Greenhills,
Mandaluyong City, (ii) an opposing candidate, Juntilla, filed a
petition asking the COMELEC to disqualify Richard and to
deny due course to or cancel his CoC for material
misrepresentation regarding his residence, (iii) the COMELEC
First Division granted Juntilla’s petition without any
qualification although its resolution only spoke of
disqualifying Richard without denying due course to or
canceling his CoC, (iv) only Richard moved for reconsideration
of the above resolution; Juntilla did not, (v) the COMELEC En
Banc issued a resolution denying Richard’s motion for
reconsideration and after the latter filed a Manifestation
accepting the decision to enable a substitute to take his
place, the COMELEC En Banc issued an Order declaring its
resolution final and executory, (vi) Lucy promptly filed her
CoC together with the Liberal Party endorsement as the
party’s official substitute candidate vice Richard, (vii) over
Juntilla’s opposing claim that there should be no substitution
because there is no candidate to substitute for, the
COMELEC En Banc issued a resolution allowing the
18 | P a g e
substitution on the basis that the COMELEC First Division
resolution only spoke of disqualifying Richard without
denying due course to or canceling his CoC, (viii) Juntilla filed
a motion for reconsideration of this En Banc order but,
pending resolution of his motion, local elections were
conducted and Lucy was proclaimed winner, (ix) 12 days after
Lucy’s proclamation, one of her losing opponents, petitioner
Tagolina, filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET to
oust Lucy from her congressional seat claiming, among
others, that she did not validly substitute Richard since the
latter’s CoC was void ab initio, (x) the HRET dismissed the
quo warranto petition and held that the substitution was valid
noting that the COMELEC First Division resolution only
spoke of disqualifying Richard without denying due course to
or canceling his CoC.
In reversing the HRET ruling, the Supreme Court
distinguished between a disqualification case under Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), and a petition to
deny due course to and/or cancel a CoC under Section 78. A
disqualification case is hinged on either (i) a candidate’s
possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign
country or (ii) his commission of an election offense under the
OEC, and results in the candidate still technically considered
to have been a candidate but is ordered to discontinue such
candidacy (or is disallowed from holding public office if he has
already been elected) as a sanction for committing the
election offense.
On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of a CoC proceeding is premised on a person’s
misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications
required for the elective office aspired for. Citing Miranda v
Abaya (370 Phil 642), the majority noted that the
deliberateness of the misrepresentation or one’s intent to
defraud is of little consequence in the determination of
whether one’s CoC should be deemed cancelled or not, as it is
enough that the person’s declaration of a material
qualification in the CoC be false. Pertinently, while a
disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to
have been a candidate for all intents and purposes, a person
whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled
under Section 78 is deemed not to have been a candidate at
all, as his cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio. And
considering that Section 77 of the OEC requires that there be
a candidate in order for substitution to take place, as well as
the precept that a person without a valid CoC is not
considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily follows that a
person whose CoC has been denied due course to and/or
cancelled cannot be validly substituted. It is equally
revelatory that Section 77 enumerates the instances where
substitution is permissible and noticeably, while death,
withdrawal or disqualification for any cause of an official
candidate of a registered political party are included as valid
basis for substitution, material misrepresentation cases are
not included.
In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to
run due to his failure to comply with the residency
requirement. The confusion, however, stemmed from the use
of the word “disqualified” in the Resolution of the COMELEC
First Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc
in granting the substitution of Lucy, and even further
perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto
petition. Yet, the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s
Resolution did not explicitly decree denial of due course to
and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC should not have
prevented the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the
invalidity of Lucy’s substitution since the clear basis for
Richard’s disqualification is his failure to comply with the
residency requirement under the Constitution which is a
ground for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of
19 | P a g e
a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, not for disqualification.
There is therefore no legal basis to support a finding of
disqualification under the OEC, and it cannot be mistaken
that the COMELEC First Division’s unqualified grant of
Juntilla’s petition necessarily carried with it the denial of due
course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC pursuant to
Section 78, notwithstanding the use of the term “disqualified”
in its Resolution. Hence, the COMELEC En Banc
misconstrued the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution when
it noted that Richard was only disqualified and that his CoC
was not denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the
way for the approval of Lucy’s substitution. And the HRET, in
perpetuating the COMELEC En Banc’s error although not
bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements – being the
sole judge of all contests relating the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives
– committed a grave abuse of discretion.
In his dissenting opinion, J. Leonardo-de Castro voted to
deny the quo warranto petition of Tagolino on the ground that
it was filed beyond the prescribed period of 10 days after the
proclamation of the winner under Rule 17 of the HRET Rules,
having been filed 12 days after the proclamation of Lucy
Torres-Gomez. Hence, the petition should have been
dismissed outright pursuant to Rule 21 of the said Rules.
Furthermore, the petition for quo warranto lacked factual
basis since, under Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, the grounds
for such petition are ineligibility to run for a public office or
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. The ponencia
did not find any of the qualifications of a member of the
House of Representatives absent in the case of Lucy; rather it
attributed her ineligibility to its erroneous assumption that
the CoC of Richard, whom she substituted, should have been
cancelled.
Moreover, this dissenter believes that the substantive issue
extensively discussed in the ponencia, particularly as to the
divergent effects of disqualification and denial of due course
to and/or cancellation of CoC cases vis-à-vis candidate
substitution, is inappropriate, firstly because the CoC of
Richard Gomez was not cancelled by the COMELEC, and
secondly because the decision by the COMELEC not to cancel
said CoC was proper as the COMELEC did not reach any
finding that Richard deliberately committed a the COMELEC denying due course to Richard’s CoC with the
misrepresentation, which deliberate misrepresentation is a
requisite for the cancellation of a CoC under Section 78 of the
OEC, citing Mitra v. Commission on Elections (622 SCRA 744),
contrary to the majority view that deliberateness of the
misrepresentation is of little consequence in the
determination of whether the CoC should be cancelled. Since
the COMELEC did not cancel the CoC of Richard but only
disqualified him from running in the elections, the
substitution by Lucy of Richard squarely falls within Section
77 of the OEC, which uses the broad language
“disqualification for any cause.”
In his separate dissenting opinion, J. Abad, joined by J.
Mendoza and J. Del Castillo, posits that the real issue in this
case is whether or not the HRET can review and reverse a
COMELEC decision involving a member of the House of
Representatives that had become final and executory. This
dissenter believes that neither the HRET nor this Court can
review or set aside final and executory resolutions of the
COMELEC that it rendered pursuant to its powers under the
Constitution, even if such resolutions are erroneous.
It is clear from the facts that the COMELEC First Division’s
Resolution, which merely disqualified Richard but did not
cancel or deny due course to his CoC, although it may be in
error, became final and executory for the following reasons:
first, Juntilla never filed a motion for reconsideration of that
20 | P a g e
Resolution; second, only Richard moved to reconsider and
when the COMELEC En Banc resolved to dismiss his motion,
Richard filed a manifestation accepting its dismissal,
whereupon the COMELEC En Banc declared its resolution
final and executory and consequently closed down the last
window of opportunity to review and possible reverse the
COMELEC First Division’s Resolution; third, over Juntilla’s
claim that the COMELEC First Division Resolution resulted in
effect that, without a valid CoC, he could not be substituted,
the COMELEC En Banc issued a resolution allowing the
substitution on the basis that the COMELEC First Division
resolution merely ordered Richard’s disqualification and such
resolution had become final and executory; fourth, while
Juntilla filed a motion for reconsideration of this En Banc
order, the motion remained unacted upon due to the
supervening local elections and thereafter he never insisted
that it be resolved and never elevated the matter before the
Supreme Court or the HRET and may thus be deemed to have
abandoned that motion for reconsideration.
This dissenter notes that the Supreme Court may have earlier
ruled in Guerrero v. Commission on Elections (391 Phil 344)
that, since the Constitution makes the HRET the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the House of Representatives, it has the
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of substitution involving
such members. However, this dissenter believes that
Taganito cannot invoke that ruling for three reasons:
First, the Court’s thesis in that case is that the HRET can
take over a pending matter before the COMELEC since the
latter may be considered ousted of its jurisdiction over the
same upon the winner’s assumption of office. Here, however,
the key issue of whether or not the COMELEC First Division’s
Resolution, which merely disqualified Richard but did not
cancel his CoC, is no longer a pending matter but has become
final and executory.
Second, the petitioner Guerrero in that case had the right to
raise the issue of disqualification before the HRET since he
intervened in the earlier action before the COMELEC. Here,
Tagolino never intervened in Juntilla’s actions before the
COMELEC; consequently, he has no right to ask the HRET to
resolve Juntilla’s motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC
En Banc’s order.
Third, Tagolino made a binding admission before the HRET
that the COMELEC did not in fact order the cancellation of
Richard’s CoC and is thus barred from claiming that, in
disqualifying Richard, the COMELEC’s First Division in effect
caused the cancellation of his CoC.
Silverio R. Tagolino vs House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (G.R. No. 202202);
dissenting opinions: Leonardo-de Castro, J., Abad, J.
The RH Law: The Debate Continues
Posted on February 6, 2013 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV • Posted
in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Law •
It took thirteen years, four months, and five days of heated
debates and passionate protests before the country’s first
reproductive health law was passed. Four days shy of
Christmas last year, President Aquino finally signed the 24-
page bill into law. It is now Republic Act No. 10354 or The
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012
(RH Law).
21 | P a g e
The passing of the RH Law, however, does by no means close
this chapter of Philippine history. In fact, the legal
ramifications plaguing the law are more prevalent than ever
since the provisions thereof now have force and effect. The
following discusses the significant provisions of the law and
the issues surrounding them.
Reproductive Health Services
Section 7 of the RH Law provides that health care facilities,
either public or private, are required to offer modern family
planning methods to patients:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – All accredited public
health facilities shall provide a full range of modern family
planning methods…Provided, That family planning services
shall likewise be extended by private health facilities to
paying patients with the option to grant free care and services
to indigents, except in the case of non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group…Provided, finally, That the person is not in an
emergency condition or serious case as defined in Republic
Act No. 8344. (emphasis supplied)
The law used the term “shall” to express the mandatory
nature of the provision. The Supreme Court in the case of
Tan v. Link (G.R. No. 172849, December 10, 2008) ruled that
“the term ‘shall’ is a word of command, one which has always
been or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is
generally imperative or mandatory.”
The mandatory nature of the provision is further buttressed
by Section 23 of the RH Law, which provides that it is a
prohibited act for any health care service provider to withhold
information on reproductive health. Although the law exempts
non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group from this requirement, this
exemption is nevertheless subject to the qualification that the
patient must not be an emergency condition or a serious
case. In effect, doctors cannot exempt themselves from the
RH law if the patient involved is an emergency condition.
A legal issue arising from this is whether or not it violates a
doctor’s Constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
The pro-RH argues that there is no violation because a doctor
should separate his or her religious beliefs from the exercise
of his or her profession. Moreover, exempting certain doctors
from the law based solely on their religious beliefs would
result in a violation of the non-establishment clause because
it is effectively an endorsement by the State of a religion.
As for the anti-RH, they contend that one’s religious belief
cannot be separated from one’s daily existence. Number 353
of Fr. Jose Maria Escriva’s book The Way best exemplifies
their point—that it is absurd to think that one can leave one’s
Catholicism aside upon entering a professional association
like a man leaving his hat at the door.
Sex Education
The RH Law also made reproductive health education for
adolescents aged 10 to 19 mandatory in all schools. The
pertinent provision provides:
SEC. 14. Age- and Development-Appropriate Reproductive
Health Education. – The State shall provide age- and
development-appropriate reproductive health education to
adolescents which shall be taught by adequately trained
22 | P a g e
teachers informal and nonformal educational system and
integrated in relevant subjects…
The legal issues arising from this provision are:
(1) Whether or not it is contrary to the constitutional right
and duty of parents over the “rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and development of moral character,” (Art. II, Sec.
12 of the 1987 Constitution) and;
(2) Whether or not it violates the right of spouses “to found a
family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood.” (Art. XV, Sec. 3 of the
1987 Constitution)
The pro-RH proffers the argument that no Constitutional
rights are violated because the Constitution does not award
parents absolute authority over their children and that the
State also has the constitutional obligation to promote and
protect the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social
well-being of the youth.
Arguments against the RH law, on the other hand, say that
the State has no right to intrude upon the right of parents to
rear their children according to their religious convictions.
Quoting the petition filed by the spouses Imbong questioning
the RH Law before the Supreme Court, “responsible
parenthood is embraced in [the] religious belief on life and
family and its exercise is tied to religious convictions, hence,
religious belief on parenting is to be respected, not provoked
into its violation.… This installs a ‘hands off’ paradigm upon
the State. It may not intrude into what is a natural spousal
and family right.”
Certificate of Compliance
The RH Law also introduced a new requirement for couples
intending to get married:
SEC. 15. Certificate of Compliance. – No marriage license
shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar unless the
applicants present a Certificate of Compliance…
Questions arise as to the effect of the Certificate of
Compliance on the already existing requisites of marriage. Is
it an additional formal requisite? What is the effect on the
validity of a marriage license in case no Certificate was
presented? Is the marriage void if the license was issued
without this requirement?
One view is that (1) it is not an additional formal requisite, (2)
it does not render the marriage license invalid in case of its
absence, and (3) it does not render the marriage void if the
requirement is not present.
These conclusions are based on the Latin phrase Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio, which translates to “always
presume marriage.” In the case of Alcantara v. Alcantara (G.R.
No. 167746, August 28, 2007), the Supreme Court held that
“every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity
of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this
presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled;
on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.”
It is clear, therefore, that the validity of marriage is regarded
highly by the Court. Since the law is silent as to the
repercussions of the Certificate of Compliance, any doubt
should be presumed in favor of the validity of marriage.
The constitutional questions mentioned above have already
been brought to the Supreme Court. In fact, as of this writing,
23 | P a g e
six petitions are currently resting in the Court’s dockets.
Indeed, the tussle is not over. It just moved to a different
stage. Hopefully, when the High Court renders its decision,
the debate on the RH Law’s legality would once and for all be
settled.
(Teng Gerochi and Tanya Justine R. Baldovino co-authored this
article.)
New Rules and Regulations Governing the Elections
Posted on January 14, 2013 by Imelda A. Manguiat • Posted
in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Law, Philippines -
Regulation •
The Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 9615 on 15
January 2013. This Resolution implements the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9006, more popularly known as the Fair
Election Act, for purposes of the 2013 national and local mid-
term elections.
The Fair Election Act governs the use of TV, radio and other
broadcast media, and other forms and methods of
campaigning, the use and conduct of election surveys and
exit polls, and the method of implementing the right to reply
enshrined under Section 4, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution. The law seeks to level the playing field among
national and local electoral candidates and parties,
particularly by placing limits on the amount of time a
candidate or political party may access a particular medium
for campaign purposes as well as by limiting the type and
forms of allowable election campaign materials, and
regulating public rallies, meetings and other political
activities.
While generally hewing closely to the provisions of the law,
the new regulation has met stringent opposition from media
groups as a result of a number of novel provisions. Foremost
among these is the introduction of regulations governing the
use of the internet, particularly, blogs, social networks, and
other online channels and websites. Previously unregulated,
online propaganda is now subject to limitations as to time,
pixel width, height and aspect ratio and frequency. More
particularly, under Resolution 9615, online advertisements
for each candidate are allowed a maximum of three times a
week per website during the entire campaign period. Any
exhibition or display within a 24-hour period is considered
one publication, regardless of frequency.
The new regulation also redefines the maximum thresholds
for air time and radio broadcast. Previously, limits to air and
radio transmissions were counted on a per station basis.
Under the current rules, candidates for national positions
and the party-list system are now allowed only a maximum
aggregate of 120- and 180-minutes for TV and radio
broadcasts. Candidates for local positions, on the other hand,
are only entitled to an aggregate of 60- and 90-minutes for TV
and radio, respectively. Appearance and guestings of
candidates in a newscast, documentary or report may be
excluded from the computation of these limits upon prior
approval of Comelec and proof that other candidates were
afforded equal opportunity. These particular provisions have
received the widest criticism from media practitioners as
infringements on press freedom.
The new regulations also give candidates the right to file a
claim against media practitioners which may have violated
their right to reply. The right to reply is a constitutional right
implemented by the Fair Election Act. It mandates that
candidates against whom charges have been published must
be given an equal opportunity to respond. Given the
24 | P a g e
redefinition of limits to periods of broadcast, it is uncertain
whether affording a slighted candidate the right to reply will
be counted as part of his or her aggregate maximum
broadcast times.
Lastly, and least contentious of all, the regulation encourages
environment-friendly campaigns and requires candidates to
strictly follow local ordinances proscribing the use of plastic
and other environmentally harmful materials.
The campaign period is set between 12 February 2013 to 11
May 2013 for party-list groups and candidates running for
senator and between 29 March 2013 and 11 May 2013 for
those campaigning for local positions and seats as members
of the House of Representatives. As in the 2010 elections, the
campaign period excludes Maundy Thursday, Good Friday,
the eve of Election Day and the day of elections itself.
(Imee and April Carmela B. Lacson co-authored this article.)
Making GOCCs relevant
Posted on September 14, 2012 by Ricardo Ma. P.G. Ongkiko •
Posted in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Law •
After more than a year of absence, we are back with a blog on
new laws passed by Congress. With the impeachment
proceedings of the old Chief Justice over and done with, it is
time for Congress to focus on making new laws. But, before
we write on new laws passed by Congress, it may be
worthwhile looking back at one important legislation last
year– Republic Act No. 10149 or the “GOCC Governance Act
of 2011” enacted by Congress on June 6, 2011
In recent years, there have been various reports about high-
ranking officers of government owned and controlled
corporations (GOCCs) being charged with graft for
misappropriation of government resources, dispensation of
bloated salaries, unauthorized purchase of assets, and abuse
of power.
In a move to try to address these ills, the GOCC Governance
Act of 2011 was passed to provide greater transparency,
periodic disclosure and evaluation of operations and finances,
creation of appropriate remuneration schemes, and clear
separation between the regulatory and proprietary activities of
GOCCs.
The Act actually also applies to Government Instrumentalities
with Corporate Powers/Government Corporate Entities,
which are instrumentalities or agencies of the government
that are neither corporations nor agencies integrated within
the departmental framework but are vested by law with
special functions or jurisdiction, and government financial
institutions and their subsidiaries. The Act however does not
cover the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, state universities and
colleges, cooperatives, local water districts, economic zone
authorities and research institutions (Sec. 4).
A. Creation of the GCG
The Act creates the Governance Commission for GOCCs
(GCG) within the Office of the President. The GCG, which is
composed of five members–a Chairman with the rank of
Cabinet Secretary, two members with the rank of
Undersecretary (to be appointed by the President), and the
Secretaries of the Department of Budget and Management
and the Department of Finance (as ex officio members) (Sec.
6), is tasked with the following duties:
25 | P a g e
1. GOCC Evaluation – creating performance evaluation
systems, conducting periodic examination, and identifying
GOCCs for reorganization, merger, abolition or privatization
(in consultation with the department or agency to which the
GOCC is attached), and preparing a semi-annual progress
report for submission to the President and Congress (Sec. 5
(a));
2. GOCC Streamlining – implementing the reorganization,
merger, abolition or privatization of the GOCCs (Sec. 5 (a));
3. GOCC Classification – classifying GOCCs into the following
categories: (a) Developmental/Social Corporations; (b)
Proprietary Commercial Corporations; (c) Government
Financial, Investment and Trust Institutions; (d) Corporations
with Regulatory Functions; and (e) Others (Sec. 5 (b));
4. GOCC Manual – creating an ownership and operations
manual and government corporate standards governing
GOCCs, which shall be no less rigorous than those required
by the Philippine Stock Exchange, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the
case may be, and consistent with the Medium-Term
Philippine Development Plan issued by the National Economic
and Development Authority (NEDA) (Sec. 5(c));
5. GOCC Accountability – recommending to the Board of
Directors or Trustees of the GOCCs the suspension of their
member/s who participated (by commission or omission) in
the approval of an act giving rise to a violation or non-
compliance with the GOCC manual (Sec. 5(d));
6. GOCC Nomination – identifying necessary skills and
qualifications required for Appointive Directors and
recommending to the President a shortlist of suitable and
qualified candidates for Appointive Directors (Sec.5(e));
7. GOCC Compensation – conducting studies, developing and
recommending to the President a competitive compensation
and remuneration system (i.e. the Compensation and Position
Classification System), that would attract and retain talent,
and at the same time allow the GOCCs to be financially
sound and sustainable (e.g. disallowance of retirement
benefits to directors and trustees of GOCCs) (Sec. 5(h) and 8);
and
8. GOCC Adviser and Coordinator – providing technical advice
and assistance to the government agencies to which the
GOCCs are attached in setting performance objectives and
targets, monitoring GOCCs performance vis-a-vis established
objectives and targets, and ensuring GOCCs’ operation are
aligned and consistent with the national development policies
and programs (Sec. 5 (i)).
B. Board of Directors, CEO and Officers of GOCC
To try to weed out inept political appointees, the GCG shall
now apply its Fit and Proper Rule in determining who are
qualified to become members of the Board, CEO and officers
of GOCCs, review the qualifications and disqualifications of
individuals appointed as officers, directors or elected CEO of
the GOCC and shall disqualify those found unfit (Sec. 15).
In determining whether an individual is fit and proper to hold
the position of an officer, director or CEO of the GOCCs, due
regard shall be given to one’s integrity, experience, education,
training and competence (Sec. 16).
26 | P a g e
The Act also prescribes that term of office of all Appointive
Directors shall be limited to one year, unless sooner removed
for cause. An Appointive Director may be nominated by the
GCG for reappointment by the President only if he/she
obtains a performance score of above average or higher in the
immediately preceding year of tenure based on the
performance criteria for Appointive Directors (Sec. 17).
As fiduciaries of the State, members of the Board of
Directors/Trustees and the officers of GOCCs have been given
by the Act the legal obligation and duty to always act in the
best interest of the GOCC, with utmost good faith and
exercise extraordinary diligence in all its dealings with the
property and monies of the GOCC (e.g. avoid conflicts of
interest and declare an interest they may have in any
particular matter before the Board) (Sec. 19 and 21).
Moreover, except for the per diem received for the actual
attendance in board meetings and the reimbursement for
actual and reasonable expenses, all profits and/or benefits
including, but not limited to, the share in the profits,
incentives of members of the Board or officers in excess of
what is authorized by the GCG, stock options, dividends and
other similar offers or grants from corporations where the
GOCC is a stockholder or investor, and any benefit from the
performance of members of the Board or officers of their
duties, are to be held in trust by such member of the Board
or officer for the exclusive benefit of the GOCC (Sec. 20).
Upon the determination of the Commission on Audit that
properties or monies belonging to a GOCC are in the
possession of a member of the Board or officer without
authority, or that profits are earned by the member of the
Board or officer in violation of the fiduciary duty, or the
aggregate per diems, allowances and incentives received are
in excess of the limits provided under the Act, the member of
the Board or officer shall return the same to the GOCC.
Failure to make the restitution within 30 days after written
demand is punishable with an imprisonment of one year and
a fine equivalent to twice the amount to be restituted, and in
the discretion of the court, disqualification to hold public
office (Sec. 24).
C. Full Disclosure
In the spirit of public accountability and right of the public to
receive public information, the Act likewise promotes
complete disclosure through the medium of GOCCs’ websites
that are now required to show the following information:
(a) latest annual audited financial and performance report
within 30 days from receipt of such report;
(b) audited financial statements in the immediate past five
years;
(c) quarterly, annual reports and trial balance;
(d) current corporate operating budget;
(e) complete compensation package of all the board members
and officers, including travel, representation, transportation
and any other form of expenses or allowances;
(f) local and foreign borrowings;
(g) performance scorecards and strategy maps;
(h) government subsidies and net lending;
(i) all borrowings guaranteed by the government; and
27 | P a g e
(j) such other information or report the GCG may require
(Sec. 25).
D. Creation and Acquisition of a GOCC
Maybe learning from the past misdeed of a former GOCC
officer who is reported to have acquired a thrift bank in
excess of his authority, the Act now also makes stringent
requirements for government agencies seeking to establish a
GOCC, a subsidiary or affiliate corporation, or purchase or
acquire controlling interests in another corporation.
Accordingly, they are now required to submit their proposal to
the GCG for its review and recommendation to the President
(for his/her approval). The SEC shall not register the articles
of incorporation and by-laws of a proposed GOCC or
subsidiary of affiliate, unless the application for registration is
accompanied by an endorsement from the GCG stating that
the President has approved the same (Sec. 27 and 28.).
Conclusion
The Act was well drafted and easily understandable. It seems
to cover opportunities for the abuse of GOCCs by
unscrupulous government officials. Nonetheless, the best way
to implement the thrust of the Act is to constantly remind our
President to remain steadfast in not bestowing Appointive
Director positions in GOCCs as gifts to supporters or allies of
his/her government, and for us to remain vigilant by taking
advantage of the information now readily available to us that
would indicate abuse or impropriety by those tasked with
running GOCCs.
(Ronald P. de Vera co-authored this article with Ricky
Ongkiko.)
August 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on
Political Law
Posted on September 5, 2012 by Philbert E. Varona • Posted
in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law,
Philippines - Regulation •
Here are select August 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of
the Philippines on political law:
Constitutional law
Bill of rights; due process. Due process, as a constitutional
precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-
type proceeding. It is satisfied when a person is notified of
the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or
defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. More often, this
opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the
parties submit to present their charges and defenses. But as
long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or her
interests in due course, said party is not denied due process.
… Since petitioner was given the opportunity to defend
himself from the charges against him, as in fact he submitted
a Counter-Affidavit with the PAGC, though he failed to comply
with the order for the submission of position paper, he cannot
complain of denial of due process. Dr. Fernando A. Melendres
M.D., Executive Director of the Lung Center of the Philippines
[LCP] vs. President Anti-Graft Commission, et al., G.R. No.
163859, August 15, 2012.
Bill of rights; unreasonable searches; exclusionary rule .
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a
28 | P a g e
search and seizure must be carried out through or on the
strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence
of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure
becomes “unreasonable” within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. Evidence obtained and confiscated
on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure
is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental
law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding. Margarita Ambre Y Cayuni v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 191532, August 15, 2012.
Bill of rights; warrantless arrests; flagrante delicto. Section 5[
of Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure] provides three
(3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully
effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of
a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect
was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from
custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during
the pendency of his case or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at
the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or
has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting
officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest,
two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.
In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that Ambre was
caught by the police officers in the act of using shabu and,
thus, can be lawfully arrested without a warrant. PO1 Mateo
positively identified Ambre sniffing suspected shabu from an
aluminum foil being held by Castro. Ambre, however, made
much of the fact that there was no prior valid intrusion in the
residence of Sultan. The argument is specious.
Suffice it to state that prior justification for intrusion or prior
lawful intrusion is not an element of an arrest in flagrante
delicto. Thus, even granting arguendo that the apprehending
officers had no legal right to be present in the dwelling of
Sultan, it would not render unlawful the arrest of Ambre, who
was seen sniffing shabu with Castro and Mendoza in a pot
session by the police officers. Accordingly, PO2 Masi and PO1
Mateo were not only authorized but were also duty-bound to
arrest Ambre together with Castro and Mendoza for illegal use
of methamphetamine hydrochloride in violation of Section 15,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. …
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid,
the subsequent search and seizure done on her person was
likewise lawful. After all, a legitimate warrantless arrest
necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to
validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous
weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense. Margarita Ambre Y Cayuni v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 191532, August 15, 2012.
Public officers
Public officers; three-fold responsibility. We have ruled that
dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of
an administrative proceeding against the same respondent,
nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability. It is a
basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under
a three-fold responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a
29 | P a g e
wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly,
criminally and administratively liable for the same act.
Administrative liability is thus separate and distinct from
penal and civil liability.
Moreover, the fact that the administrative case and the case
filed before the Ombudsman are based on the same subject
matter is of no moment. It is a fundamental principle of
administrative law that the administrative case may generally
proceed against a respondent independently of a criminal
action for the same act or omission and requires only a
preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt as
against proof beyond reasonable doubt of the criminal charge.
Accordingly, the dismissal of two criminal cases by the
Sandiganbayan and of several criminal complaints by the
Ombudsman did not result in the absolution of petitioner
from the administrative charges. Dr. Fernando A. Melendres
M.D., Executive Director of the Lung Center of the Philippines
[LCP] vs. President Anti-Graft Commission, et al., G.R. No.
163859, August 15, 2012.
Public officers; three-fold responsibility. Under the ”threefold
liability rule,” any act or omission of any public official or
employee can result in criminal, civil, or administrative
liability, each of which is independent of the other. Ernesto
A. Fajardo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No.
173268, August 23, 2012.
Ombudsman; power to dismiss erring public officials . As a
last ditch effort to save himself, petitioner now puts in issue
the power of the Ombudsman to order his dismissal from
service. Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman in
dismissing him from service disregarded Section 13,
subparagraph 3, Article XI of the Constitution as well as
Section 15(3) of RA No. 6770, which only vests in the
Ombudsman the power to recommend the removal of a public
official or employee. …
It is already well-settled that “the power of the Ombudsman
to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely
recommendatory but actually mandatory.” As we have
explained in Atty. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals [503 Phil. 396
(2003)], “the fact ‘[t]hat the refusal, without just cause, of any
officer to comply with [the] order of the Ombudsman to
penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for
disciplinary action [under Section 15(3) of RA No. 6770]; is a
strong indication that the Ombudsman’s ‘recommendation’ is
not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory
within the bounds of law.” Ernesto A. Fajardo vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012.
July 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions
Political Law
Posted on August 10, 2012 by Philbert E. Varona • Posted in
Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law •
Tagged Bill of Rights, eminent domain, impea, President •
Here are select July 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines on political law:
credibility through his manner and deportment while
testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules
of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses
and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in
lieu of direct court testimony. Go, et al. v. The People of the
Philippines and Highdone Company, Ltd., et al., G.R. No.
185527, July 18, 2012.
Bill of rights; right of confrontation; conditional examination
of witnesses. But for purposes of taking the deposition in
criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness
who would foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial
examination should be made before the court, or at least
before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the
clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure…
on
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness
elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case
is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his
right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge
of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness’
deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is
especially intolerable when the witness’ testimony is crucial to
the prosecution’s case against the accused…

Constitutional Law
Bill of rights; right of confrontation. The examination of
witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court.
This is true especially in criminal cases where the
Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial
and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. The
requirement is the “safest and most satisfactory method of
investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test the witness’
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply
specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold
purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the
testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow
the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses. The Court
explained in People v. Seneris [G.R. No. L- 48883, August 6,
1980] that the constitutional requirement “insures that the
witness will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring
lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to
submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in

30 | P a g e
exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables
the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess
his credibility.” Go, et al. v. The People of the Philippines and
Highdone Company, Ltd., et al., G.R. No. 185527, July 18,
2012.
Bill of rights; right to privacy. Clearly [citing Morfe v. Mutuc
(130 Phil. 415 [1968]) and Ople v. Torres (354 Phil. 948
[1998]), the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right
that must be protected from intrusion or constraint.
However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on
Banks [G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007], this Court
underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute…
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a
competing state objective, the courts are required to weigh
both notions. In these cases, although considered a
fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless
succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed
legitimate and compelling. Gamboa v. P/Ssupt. Marlou C.
Chan, et al., G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012.
Bill of rights; writ of habeas data. The writ of habeas data is
an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to
enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.
It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that
in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must
exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand,
and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Gamboa
v. P/Ssupt. Marlou C. Chan, et al., G.R. No. 193636, July 24,
2012.
31 | P a g e
Bill of rights; writ of habeas data. The notion of informational
privacy is still developing in Philippine law and
jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American
habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European tradition of
data protection, this Court can be guided by cases on the
protection of personal data decided by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v.
Sweden [26 March 1987, 9 EHRR 433], in which the ECHR
balanced the right of citizens to be free from interference in
their private affairs with the right of the state to protect its
national security…
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as
a specific component of the right to privacy, may yield to an
overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the
determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas
data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this
case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon
the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest
involved. Gamboa v. P/Ssupt. Marlou C. Chan, et al., G.R. No.
193636, July 24, 2012.
Constitutional construction; verba legis non est recedendum.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction
is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum
– from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d’ être for the rule is essentially two-fold: First,
because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained; and second, because the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer’s document but essentially that of the
people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as
an important condition for the rule of law to prevail. Chavez
v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17,
2012.
Eminent domain; determination of just compensation. We
also declared in National Power Corporation v. Purefoods
Corporation [G.R. No. 160725, September 12, 2008] that
Section 3A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended (which
provides a fixed formula in the computation of just
compensation in cases of acquisition of easements of right of
way) is not binding upon this Court. This is in keeping with
the established rule that the determination of “just
compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function. National Power Corporation vs. Sps. Florimon V.
Lleto, et al., G.R. Nos. 169957 & 171558, July 11, 2012.
Executive power; emergency or calling-out powers of
President. [I]t has already been established that there is one
repository of executive powers, and that is the President of
the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of
the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to
the President and no one else. As emphasized by Justice
Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in [Villena v. Secretary of the
Interior, 67 Phil. 541 (1939)]: “With reference to the Executive
Department of the government, there is one purpose which is
crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of
judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single,
32 | P a g e
not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the
Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins
with the enunciation of the principle that ‘The executive
power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.’ This
means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of
the Government of the Philippines, and no other.” Corollarily,
it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to
exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23,
Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known
as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.
Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et
al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.
Executive power; civilian police force; authority of local
executives over police. Regarding the country’s police force,
Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that: “The
State shall establish and maintain one police force, which
shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be
administered and controlled by a national police commission.
The authority of local executives over the police units in their
jurisdiction shall be provided by law.” A local chief executive,
such as the provincial governor, exercises operational
supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in
day-to-day operations … In the discussions of the
Constitutional Commission regarding the above provision it is
clear that the framers never intended for local chief executives
to exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency
situations. This is without prejudice to their authority over
police units in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and their
prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day
situations, as contemplated by the Constitutional
Commission. But as a civilian agency of the government, the
police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and
is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of
executive control. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov.
Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.
Executive power; emergency or calling-out powers of local
executives. Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1,
subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 [of the Local Government
Code], as the said provision expressly refers to calamities and
disasters, whether man-made or natural. The governor, as
local chief executive of the province, is certainly empowered to
enact and implement emergency measures during these
occurrences. But the kidnapping incident in the case at bar
cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster.
Respondents cannot find any legal mooring under this
provision to justify their actions. Paragraph 2, subparagraph
(vi) of the same provision is equally inapplicable for two
reasons. First, the Armed Forces of the Philippines does not
fall under the category of a “national law enforcement
agency,” to which the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) and its departments belong. Its mandate is to
uphold the sovereignty of the Philippines, support the
Constitution, and defend the Republic against all enemies,
foreign and domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of
the national territory. Second, there was no evidence or even
an allegation on record that the local police forces were
inadequate to cope with the situation or apprehend the
violators. If they were inadequate, the recourse of the
provincial governor was to ask the assistance of the Secretary
of Interior and Local Government, or such other authorized
officials, for the assistance of national law enforcement
agencies. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M.
Tan etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.
Executive power; power of reorganization. Section 31 of
Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the
continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency…
33 | P a g e
In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora [G.R. Nos.
142801-802, July 10, 2001], the Court affirmed that the
President’s authority to carry out a reorganization in any
branch or agency of the executive department is an express
grant by the legislature by virtue of E.O. 292, thus: “But of
course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to
reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch
does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very
source of the power – that which constitutes an express grant
of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No.
292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987),
‘the President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office
and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency,
shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President.’ For
this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President.”
Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, et al., G.R. No.
196425, July 24, 2012.
Executive power; power of reorganization; rationale. And in
Domingo v. Zamora [G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003], the
Court gave the rationale behind the President’s continuing
authority in this wise: “The law grants the President this
power in recognition of the recurring need of every President
to reorganize his office ‘to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency.’ The Office of the President is the nerve center of
the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the
Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry
out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the
President is the command post of the President.” Pichay, Jr.
v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, et al., G.R. No.
196425. July 24, 2012.
Executive power; power of reorganization; nature. Generally,
this authority to implement organizational changes is limited
to transferring either an office or a function from the Office of
the President to another Department or Agency, and the other
way around. Only Section 31(1) [of the Administrative Code]
gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the
internal structure of the Office of the President Proper by
allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition,
consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less drastic
move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to
another. Again, in Domingo v. Zamora, the Court noted:
“However, the President’s power to reorganize the Office of the
President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be
distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the
President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the
President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring
functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President’s power to
reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper
but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely
transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the
President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.”
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions
under Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and
(3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees’
tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the
validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive
actions undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed
under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12,
it was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners
who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I,
respectively, and was placed directly “under the Office of the
President.” On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the
functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office
34 | P a g e
within the Office of the President Proper. Since both of these
offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the
reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring
its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1)
of E.O. 292. Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division, et al., G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012.
Eminent domain; what constitutes “taking.” The NPC, relying
on [Section 3A of Republic Act No. 6395], argues that the CA
erred when it ordered the payment of just compensation for
the properties in question, given that most of the properties
were subject only to an aerial easement of right of way, with
the NPC requiring the use of the area above the subject lands
for its transmission lines. We have already established in a
number of cases the flaw behind the NPC’s argument. At the
heart of this argument is the mistaken assumption that what
are involved are mere liens on the property in the form of
aerial easements. While it may be true that the transmission
lines merely pass over the affected properties, the easement
imposes the additional limitation that the landowners are
prohibited from constructing any improvements or planting
any trees that exceed three (3) meters within the aerial right
of way area. This prohibition clearly interferes with the
landowners’ right to possess and enjoy their properties…
Apart from interfering with the attributes of ownership, we
have articulated in our observation in National Power Corp. v.
Sps. Gutierrez [271 Phil. 1 (1991)]that these transmission
lines, because of the high-tension current that passes
through them, pose a danger to the lives and limbs of those in
the surrounding areas, and, thus, serve to limit the activities
that can be done on these lands. National Power Corporation
vs. Sps. Florimon V. Lleto, et al., G.R. Nos. 169957 & 171558,
July 11, 2012.
Impeachment; nature of. Impeachment, described as “the
most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy,” was
foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or
highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger
that “the decision will be regulated more by the comparative
strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of
innocence or guilt.” Given their concededly political
character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment
cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective
functioning of the separate branches while preserving the
structure of checks and balance in our government.
Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including those
traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are
proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse
or arbitrariness.
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a
public official for serious crimes or misconduct as provided in
the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of
power, impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted
in the United States (US) through the influence of English
common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.
Our own Constitution’s provisions on impeachment were
adopted from the US Constitution… Corona v. Senate of the
Philippines sitting as an Impeachment Court, et al., G.R. No.
200242, July 17, 2012.
Impeachment; power of judicial review. In the first
impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. [G.R. No. 160261, November 10,
2003], we ruled that the power of judicial review in this
jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable
issues in impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in
35 | P a g e
Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice
[G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011], the Court resolved the
question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two
impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman
which was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and
of the one year bar provision …
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded
with the conviction of petitioner by more than the required
majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately
accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his
office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the
process of screening applicants and nominees, and the
President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new
Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among
those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by
supervening events and his own acts. Corona v. Senate of the
Philippines sitting as an Impeachment Court, et al., G.R. No.
200242, July 17, 2012.
Judicial and Bar Council; composition. As petitioner
correctly posits, the use of the singular letter “a” preceding
“representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no
room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the
members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that
is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the
JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the
Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 202242,
July 17, 2012.
Judicial and Bar Council; composition. Applying the
foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the
word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the
Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular
allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the
House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in
either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to
sit in the JBC. The foregoing declaration is but sensible,
since, as pointed out by an esteemed former member of the
Court and consultant of the JBC in his memorandum, “from
the enumeration of the membership of the JBC, it is patent
that each category of members pertained to a single
individual only.” Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al.,
G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
Judicial and Bar Council; composition. More than the
reasoning provided in the above discussed rules of
constitutional construction, the Court finds the above thesis
as the paramount justification of the Court’s conclusion that
“Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be
considered as one body. It is evident that the definition of
“Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function
in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each
house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-
legislative powers such as, inter alia, the power of
appropriation, the declaration of an existence of a state of
war, canvassing of electoral returns for the President and
Vice-President, and impeachment. In the exercise of these
powers, the Constitution employs precise language in laying
down the roles which a particular house plays, regardless of
whether the two houses consummate an official act by voting
jointly or separately. An inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. Verily,
each house is constitutionally granted with powers and
functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration
to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in
36 | P a g e
consonance with the principle of checks and balances, to the
other branches of government.
This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC
representation because no liaison between the two houses
exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required
between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the
term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. A fortiori, a pretext of oversight cannot prevail
over the more pragmatic scheme which the Constitution laid
with firmness, that is, that the JBC has a seat for a single
representative of Congress, as one of the co-equal branches of
government. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R.
No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
Public officers
Public officers; authority of city vice-mayor to enter into
contracts. Under [Section 456 of the Local Government
Code], there is no inherent authority on the part of the city
vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local
government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor.
Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts
on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by the
ordinance granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically
authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for
consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given
under the law to the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No.
15-2003 cannot be construed as a “continuing authority” for
any person who enters the Office of the Vice-Mayor to enter
into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts. Arnold D. Vicencio
v. Hon. Reynaldo A. Villar, et al., G.R. No. 182069, July 3,
2012.
Public officers; compensation and allowances. The issuance
of Resolution No. 464 by the NHA was without legal basis. At
the time of its issuance in 1982, Section 3 of P.D. 1597 had
already expressly repealed all decrees, executive orders, and
issuances that authorized the grant of allowances to groups
of officials or employees despite the inconsistency of those
allowances with the position classification or rates indicated
in the National Compensation and Position Classification
Plan.
Petitioners’ contention that P.D. 1597 only repealed Section 4
of P.D. 985, but not Section 2 thereof, is without basis. While
Section 2 of P.D. 1597 only mentions Section 4 of P.D. 985,
Section 3 of P.D. 1597 specifically refers to all inconsistent
laws or issuances.
Thereafter, or in 1989, R.A. 6758 further reinforced this
policy by expressly decreeing that all allowances not
specifically mentioned therein, or as may be determined by
the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized
salary rates prescribed.
Under Section 12 of R.A. 6758, all kinds of allowances are
integrated in the standardized salary rates. Below are the
exceptions: 1. Representation and transportation allowance
(RATA); 2. Clothing and laundry allowance; 3. Subsistence
allowance of marine officers and crew on board government
vessels; 4. Subsistence allowance of hospital personnel; 5.
Hazard pay; 6. Allowances of foreign service personnel
stationed abroad; and 7. Such other additional compensation
not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the
DBM.
Only those additional compensation benefits being received
by incumbents as of 1 July 1989, which were not integrated
37 | P a g e
into the standardized salary rates, shall continue to be
authorized.
In this case, the incentive allowances granted under
Resolution No.464 are clearly not among those enumerated
under R.A. 6758. Neither has there been any allegation that
the allowances were specifically determined by the DBM to be
an exception to the standardized salary rates. Hence, such
allowances can no longer be granted after the effectivity of
R.A. 6758. Abellanosa, et al. v. Commission on Audit and
National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 185806, July 24, 2012.
Public officers; validity of per diems paid to ex-officio
members of PEZA. PEZA’s insistence that there is legal basis
in its grant of per diems to the ex officio members of its Board
does not hold water. The constitutional prohibition explained
in [Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos.
83896 & 83815, February 22, 1991] still stands and this
Court finds no reason to revisit the doctrine laid down therein
as said interpretation, to this Court’s mind, is in consonance
with what our Constitution provides … In Civil Liberties
Union, this Court clarified the prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution and emphasized that a public
official holding an ex officio position as provided by law has
no right to receive additional compensation for the ex officio
position. This Court ruled: “It bears repeating though that in
order that such additional duties or functions may not
transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions
must be required by the primary functions of the official
concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity
as provided by law, without receiving any additional
compensation therefor. The ex-officio position being actually
and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it
follows that the official concerned has no right to receive
additional compensation for his services in the said position.
The reason is that these services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.
It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance
attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio
member thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation
performing the primary function of his principal office in
defining policy in monetary and banking matters, which come
under the jurisdiction of his department. For such
attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an
honorarium or an allowance, or some other such
euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such
additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.”
Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Commission on Audit
and Reynaldo A. Villar, Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R.
No. 189767, July 3, 2012.
Public officers; liability of public officer executing contract
without authority. Section 103 of P.D. 1445 declares that
expenditures of government funds or uses of government
property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal
liability of the official or employee found to be directly
responsible therefor. The public official’s personal liability
arises only if the expenditure of government funds was made
in violation of law. In this case, petitioner’s act of entering
into a contract on behalf of the local government unit without
the requisite authority therefor was in violation of the Local
Government Code. While petitioner may have relied on the
opinion of the City Legal Officer, such reliance only serves to
buttress his good faith. It does not, however, exculpate him
from his personal liability under P.D. 1445. Arnold D.
Vicencio v. Hon. Reynaldo A. Villar, et al., G.R. No. 182069,
July 3, 2012.
Public officers; suspension order. While the suspension of a
public officer under [Section 13 or Republic Act No. 3019] is
38 | P a g e
mandatory, the suspension requires a prior hearing to
determine “the validity of the information” filed against him,
“taking into account the serious and far reaching
consequences of a suspension of an elective public official
even before his conviction.” The accused public official’s right
to challenge the validity of the information before a
suspension order may be issued includes the right to
challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading to
the filing of an information against him, and (ii) propriety of
his prosecution on the ground that the acts charged do not
constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on
bribery of the Revised Penal Code. Miguel v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 172035, July 4, 2012.
Public officers; suspension order. The purpose of the law in
requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the
validity of the information so that the trial court can have a
basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the
trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and
dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that
impairs its validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to
the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash.
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the
accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings
against him, [Luciano v. Mariano (148-B Phil. 178
[1971])]likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists
in regulating its conduct. With the purpose of a pre-
suspension hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing
alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension
order. Miguel v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035, July 4,
2012.
No estoppel against Government. In Baybay Water District v.
Commission on Audit [425 Phil. 326 [2002]), this Court stated
that public officers’ erroneous application and enforcement of
the law do not estop the government from making a
subsequent correction of those errors. Where there is an
express provision of law prohibiting the grant of certain
benefits, the law must be enforced even if it prejudices certain
parties on account of an error committed by public officials in
granting the benefit. Practice, without more – no matter how
long continued – cannot give rise to any vested right if it is
contrary to law. Abellanosa, et al. v. Commission on Audit
and National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 185806, July 24,
2012.
Local government
Local autonomy; devolution; reservation in favor of national
government. While [Section 17 of the Local Government
Code] charges the LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them
from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic
services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions,
paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical
exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects,
facilities, programs and services, thus: “(c) Notwithstanding
the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and
services funded by the National Government under the
annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws,
pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially
funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this
Section, except in those cases where the local government
unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing
agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services.”
The essence of this express reservation of power by the
national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over
39 | P a g e
a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations
act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services
within the jurisdiction of the LGU…
Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government
powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services
cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs
against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded
from taking a direct hand in the formulation and
implementation of national development programs especially
where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs
concerned. Pimentel, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R.
No. 195770, July 17, 2012.
Other laws
Agrarian reform; procedure for acquisition. The procedure for
acquisition of private lands under Section 16 (e) of the CARL
is that upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon deposit with an accessible bank designated
by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds, the
DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and request
the proper Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, the DAR shall
proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified
beneficiaries… Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm
Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, et al., G.R. No. 192999,
July 18, 2012.
Agrarian reform; control and possession of agricultural land.
We, however, agree that petitioner must now turn over
possession of the 109-hectare land. The matter has already
been settled in Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated, etc. v.
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al. [G.R. No. 171101,
April 24, 2012], when we ruled that the Constitution and the
CARL intended the farmers, individually or collectively, to
have control over agricultural lands, otherwise all rhetoric
about agrarian reform will be for naught. We stressed that
under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 2 of the CARL, the agrarian reform program is
founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers who
are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till.
The policy on agrarian reform is that control over the
agricultural land must always be in the hands of the
farmers. Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers
Multi-Purpose Cooperative, et al., G.R. No. 192999, July 18,
2012.
Government-owned and -controlled corporations; definition.
From [Sections 2(10) and 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions
of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No.
292)], it is clear that a GOCC must be “organized as a stock
or non-stock corporation” while an instrumentality is vested
by law with corporate powers. Likewise, when the law makes
a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the
instrumentality remains part of the National Government
machinery although not integrated with the department
framework.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality
corporate powers, the instrumentality does not necessarily
become a corporation. Unless the government
instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, it remains a government instrumentality
exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers.
Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate
powers but they do not become stock or non-stock
corporations, which is a necessary condition before an agency
40 | P a g e
or instrumentality is deemed a GOCC. Examples are the
Mactan International Airport Authority, the Philippine Ports
Authority, the University of the Philippines, and Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas. All these government instrumentalities
exercise corporate powers but they are not organized as stock
or non-stock corporations as required by Section 2(13) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. These
government instrumentalities are sometimes loosely called
government corporate entities. They are not, however,
GOCCs in the strict sense as understood under the
Administrative Code, which is the governing law defining the
legal relationship and status of government entities. Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Philippine Reclamation
Authority (PRA) vs. City of Parañaque, G.R. No. 191109, July
18, 2012.
Government-owned and -controlled corporations; definition.
In the case at bench, PRA is not a GOCC because it is neither
a stock nor a non-stock corporation. It cannot be considered
as a stock corporation because although it has a capital stock
divided into no par value shares as provided in Section 74 of
P.D. No. 1084, it is not authorized to distribute dividends,
surplus allotments or profits to stockholders. There is no
provision whatsoever in P.D. No. 1084 or in any of the
subsequent executive issuances pertaining to PRA,
particularly, E.O. No. 525, E.O. No. 6546 and EO No. 7987
that authorizes PRA to distribute dividends, surplus
allotments or profits to its stockholders.
PRA cannot be considered a non-stock corporation either
because it does not have members. A non-stock corporation
must have members. Moreover, it was not organized for any
of the purposes mentioned in Section 88 of the Corporation
Code. Specifically, it was created to manage all government
reclamation projects. Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) vs. City of
Parañaque, G.R. No. 191109, July 18, 2012.
Government-owned and -controlled corporations;
Constitutional requirements. Furthermore, there is another
reason why the PRA cannot be classified as a GOCC. Section
16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
“Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law,
provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special
charters in the interest of the common good and subject to
the test of economic viability.”
The fundamental provision above authorizes Congress to
create GOCCs through special charters on two conditions: 1)
the GOCC must be established for the common good; and 2)
the GOCC must meet the test of economic viability. In this
case, PRA may have passed the first condition of common
good but failed the second one – economic viability.
Undoubtedly, the purpose behind the creation of PRA was
not for economic or commercial activities. Neither was it
created to compete in the market place considering that there
were no other competing reclamation companies being
operated by the private sector. As mentioned earlier, PRA
was created essentially to perform a public service
considering that it was primarily responsible for a
coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation,
administration and operation of lands belonging to the
government with the object of maximizing their utilization and
hastening their development consistent with the public
interest. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) vs. City of Parañaque,
G.R. No. 191109, July 18, 2012.
41 | P a g e
Government-owned and -controlled corporations; definition.
This Court is convinced that PRA is not a GOCC either under
Section 2(3) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code or under Section 16, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. The facts, the evidence on record and
jurisprudence on the issue support the position that PRA was
not organized either as a stock or a non-stock corporation.
Neither was it created by Congress to operate commercially
and compete in the private market. Instead, PRA is a
government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and
performing an essential public service pursuant to Section
2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative
Code. Being an incorporated government instrumentality, it
is exempt from payment of real property tax. Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Philippine Reclamation
Authority (PRA) vs. City of Parañaque, G.R. No. 191109, July
18, 2012.
Government contracts; public bidding requirement. Public
bidding, as a method of government procurement, is governed
by the principles of transparency, competitiveness, simplicity,
and accountability. By its very nature and characteristic, a
competitive public bidding aims to protect the public interest
by giving the public the best possible advantages thru open
competition and in order to avoid or preclude suspicion of
favoritism and anomalies in the execution of public
contracts. Except only in cases in which alternative methods
of procurement are allowed, all government procurement
shall be done by competitive bidding. In the case of Agan, Jr.
v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co, Inc. [G.R. Nos.
155001, 155547 & 155661, May 5, 2003], the Court held:
“Competition must be legitimate, fair and honest. In the field
of government contract law, competition requires, not only
bidding upon a common standard, a common basis, upon the
same thing, the same subject matter, the same undertaking,
but also that it be legitimate, fair and honest; and not
designed to injure of defraud the government.” It has been
held that the three principles in bidding are the offer to the
public, opportunity for competition, and a basis for the exact
comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter which
excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive
character of the system and thwarts the purpose of its
adoption. Philippine Sports Commission, et al. v. Dear John
Services, Inc., G.R. No. 183260, July 4, 2012.
Government contracts; public bidding requirement; approved
budget of contract must be disclosed. Under the law, the
PSC-BAC is mandated to disclose not only the description of
the items to be procured, and the eligibility requirements,
among others, but also the approved budget of the project.
Competitive bidding is an essential element of a public
bidding. Thus, it should be conducted fairly and openly with
full and free opportunity for competition among bidders. It
has been held in a long line of cases that a contract granted
without the competitive bidding required by law is void and
the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it …
Consequently, the provision in the “Instruction to Bidders”
stating that no award of the contract shall be made to a
bidder whose bid price is lower than the allowable
government estimate (AGE) or AAE is not valid. The rule on
the matter is clear. The PSC-BAC is obliged to observe and
enforce the same in the procurement of goods and services for
the project. The law on public bidding is not an empty
formality. A strict adherence to the principles, rules and
regulations on public bidding must be sustained if only to
preserve the integrity and the faith of the general public on
the procedure. Philippine Sports Commission, et al. v. Dear
John Services, Inc., G.R. No. 183260, July 4, 2012.
February 2012 Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law
42 | P a g e
Posted on March 14, 2012 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV • Posted
in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law •
Tagged agrarian reform, citizenship, COMELEC, Commission
on Audit, declaratory relief, double jeopardy, due process,
eminent domain, equal protection, immunity from suit,
plebiscite, President, treaty •
Here are selected February 2012 rulings of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines on political law.
Constitutional Law
Autonomous Region; plebiscite requirement. Section 18,
Article X of the Constitution provides that “the creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose.” The Supreme Court
interpreted this to mean that only amendments to, or
revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the
creation of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects
specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress
must provide for in the Organic Act– require ratification
through a plebiscite. While it agrees with the petitioners’
underlying premise that sovereignty ultimately resides with
the people, it disagrees that this legal reality necessitates
compliance with the plebiscite requirement
for all amendments to RA No. 9054. For if we were to go by
the petitioners’ interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution that all amendments to the Organic Act have to
undergo the plebiscite requirement before becoming effective,
this would lead to impractical and illogical results –
hampering the ARMM’s progress by impeding Congress from
enacting laws that timely address problems as they arise in
the region, as well as weighing down the ARMM government
with the costs that unavoidably follow the holding of a
plebiscite. Also, Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 10153 cannot be seen as
changing the basic structure of the ARMM regional
government. On the contrary, this provision clearly preserves
the basic structure of the ARMM regional government when it
recognizes the offices of the ARMM regional government and
directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these offices
to “perform the functions pertaining to the said offices.” Datu
Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et
al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep.
Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin
Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et
al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et
al./Luis “Barok” Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28,
2012.
Citizenship; proceeding for declaration of Philippine
citizenship. There is no specific statutory or procedural rule
which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration
of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The
special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an
action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil
registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which
is not the relief prayed for by the respondent. The Republic of
the Philippines v. Nora Fe Sagun, G.R. No. 187567, February
15, 2012.
COMELEC; authority to hold special elections.
The Constitution merely empowers the COMELEC to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election. Although the legislature, under the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881),
has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to
another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and
circumstances provided for in the law. Specifically, this power
falls within the narrow confines of Sections 5 and 6, which
43 | P a g e
address instances when elections have already been
scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be
suspended because
of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such as
violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous
circumstances. In contrast, the ARMM elections
were postponed by law, in furtherance of the constitutional
mandate of synchronization of national and local elections.
Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances
contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881. More
important, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the
next ARMM elections and COMELEC has no authority to set a
different election date. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs.
Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto
Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The
Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B.
Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis “Barok”
Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
Commission on Audit; authority to determine if price is
excessive; power to conduct post-audit. The COA, under the
Constitution, is empowered to examine and audit the use of
funds by an agency of the national government on a post-
audit basis. For this purpose, the Constitution has provided
that the COA “shall have exclusive authority, subject to the
limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of
government funds and properties.” Candelario Verzosa Jr. v.
Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February
7, 2012.
Commission on Audit; Memorandum No. 07-012; relevance of
brand of an equipment as basis for what is reasonable. The
COA, under the Constitution, is empowered to examine and
audit the use of funds by an agency of the national
government on a post-audit basis. For this purpose, the
Constitution has provided that the COA “shall have exclusive
authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define
the scope of its audit and examination, establish the
techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including
those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.”
As such, CDA’s decisions regarding procurement of
equipment for its own use, including computers and its
accessories, is subject to the COA’s auditing rules and
regulations for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive and extravagant
expenditures. Necessarily, CDA’s preferences regarding
brand of its equipment have to conform to the criteria set by
the COA rules on what is reasonable price for the items
purchased. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and
COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.
Commission on Audit; Memorandum No. 97-012 (guidelines
on evidence to support audit findings of over-pricing).
3.1 When the price/prices of a transaction under audit is
found beyond the allowable ten percent (10%) above the
prices indicated in reference price lists referred to in pa[r].2.1
as market price indicators, the auditor shall secure additional
evidence to firm-up the initial audit finding to a reliable
degree of certainty. 3.2 To firm-up the findings to a reliable
degree of certainty, initial findings of over-pricing based on
market price indicators mentioned in pa[r]. 2.1 above have to
be supported with canvass sheets and/or price quotations
indicating: a) the identities/names of the suppliers or sellers;
44 | P a g e
b) the availability of stock sufficient in quantity to meet the
requirements of the procuring agency; c) the specifications
of the items which should match those involved in the finding
of over-pricing; and d) the purchase/contract terms and
conditions which should be the same as those of the
questioned transaction. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo
Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.
Commission on Audit; Memorandum No. 97-012; no
retroactive effect. In Arriola v. COA, this Court ruled that the
disallowance made by the COA was not sufficiently supported
by evidence, as it was based on undocumented claims. The
documents that were used as basis of the COA Decision were
not shown to petitioners therein despite their repeated
demands to see them; they were denied access to the actual
canvass sheets or price quotations from accredited
suppliers. Absent due process and evidence to support COA’s
disallowance, COA’s ruling on petitioners’ liability has no
basis. We categorically ruled in Nava v. Palattao that
neither Arriola nor the COA Memorandum No. 97-012 can be
given any retroactive effect. Thus, although Arriolawas
already promulgated at the time, it is not correct to say that
the COA in this case violated the afore-quoted guidelines
which have not yet been issued at the time the audit was
conducted in 1993. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo
Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.
Commission on Audit; pre-audit. On 26 October 1982, the
COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-
audit of government financial transactions, albeit with certain
exceptions. With the normalization of the political system and
the stabilization of government operations, the COA saw it fit
to issue Circular No. 89-299, which again lifted the pre-audit
of government transactions of national government agencies
(NGAs) and government-owned or -controlled corporations
(GOCCs). Petitioner claims that the constitutional duty of
COA includes the duty to conduct pre-audit. The Supreme
Court found that there is nothing in section 2 of Article IX-D
of the 1987 Constitution that requires the COA to conduct a
pre-audit of all government transactions and for all
government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit
requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which
provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain
government or private entities with state subsidy or equity
and only when the internal control system of an audited
entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt
measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to
correct the deficiencies. Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is
not a mandatory duty that the Supreme Court may compel
the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with
the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the
exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination. When the language of the law is clear and
explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application.
Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by
the Court. Gualberto J. Dela Llana v. The Chairperson,
Commission on Audit, the Executive Secretary and the National
Treasurer, G.R. No. 180989, February 7, 2012.
Constitutionality; locus standi. Pres. Aquino, on September 8,
2010, issued EO 7 ordering (1) a moratorium on the increases
in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except
salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC
and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the
President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses
and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees
until December 31, 2010. The petitioner claims that as a
PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of
EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Locus standi or
legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
45 | P a g e
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.” This requirement of standing relates to the
constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual
cases or controversies. The Supreme Court was not convinced
that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal
stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because
his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere
expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases
in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized
as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no
vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence
of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail
EO 7. Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the
petitioner’s claim that he is instituting the present petition as
a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in
ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government
are legally and validly issued. This supposed interest has
been branded by the Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils.
(IBP) v. Hon. Zamora, “as too general an interest which is
shared by other groups and [by] the whole citizenry.” Thus,
the Court ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of
its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing
in that case. Jelbert B. Galicto vs. H.E. President Benigno
Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No. 193978, February 28,
2012.
DAR Administrative Order No. 01; 2003 Rules Governing
Issuance of Notice of Coverage and Acquisition of Agricultural
Lands under RA No. 6657; procedure; commencement.
Commencement by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO) – After determining that a landholding is coverable
under the CARP, and upon accomplishment of the Pre-Ocular
Inspection Report, the MARO shall prepare the NO (CARP
Form No. 5-1). Corolarilly, Administrative Order No. 01,
Series of 1998, which outlines the steps in the acquisition of
lands, details that in the 3rd step, the Department of Agrarian
Reform Municipal Office (DARMO) should conduct a
“preliminary ocular inspection to determine initially whether
or not the property maybe covered under the CARP,” which
findings will be contained in CARP Form No. 3.a, or the
Preliminary Ocular Inspection Report. Gonzalo Puyat & Sons,
Inc. vs. Ruben Alcaide (deceased), substituted by Gloria
Alcaide representative of the Farmer-Beneficiaries, G.R. No.
167952, February 1, 2012.
Declaratory relief. Under the Rules of Court, petitions
for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to question
judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the
issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a
mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an
incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief
under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to assail the validity
of EO 7. Jelbert B. Galicto vs. H.E. President Benigno Simeon
C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012.
Double jeopardy. The rule against double jeopardy cannot be
properly invoked in a Rule 65 petition, predicated on two (2)
exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of acquittal
rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the court; and
where the prosecution had been deprived of due process. The
rule against double jeopardy does not apply in these
instances because a Rule 65 petition does not involve a review
of facts and law on the merits in the manner done in an
appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not
examine and assess the evidence of the parties nor weigh the
46 | P a g e
probative value of the evidence. It does not include an inquiry
on the correctness of the evaluation of the evidence. A review
under Rule 65 only asks the question of whether there has
been a validly rendered decision, not the question of whether
the decision is legally correct. In other words, the focus of the
review is to determine whether the judgment is per se void on
jurisdictional grounds. Arnold James M. Ysidoro vs. Hon.
Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, et al, G.R. No. 171513,
February 6, 2012.
Double jeopardy; exceptions. The rule on double jeopardy is
one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates
that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case
is terminated – either by acquittal or conviction or in any
other manner without the consent of the accused – the
accused cannot again be charged with the same or an
identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of
reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the civil law
maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England
and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence. It found
expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the
United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the
fundamental rights of the citizen, viz: The rule on double
jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the
judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the
penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule
41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on
pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. The
requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a)
there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a
competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and
(d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case
against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the defendant’s express consent. A verdict of
acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the
merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put
the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-
acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it
prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an
instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a
multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the
additional purpose of precluding the State, following an
acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the
hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the
State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again
in the hope of securing a greater penalty. An acquitted
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal. This prohibition,
however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower
court’s acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower
penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions:
(1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of
due process; (2) where there is a finding of mistrial; or (3)
where there has been a grave abuse of discretion. Artemio
Villareal vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines
vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al./Fidelito Dizon vs.
People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa vs. Manuel Lorenzo
Escalona II, et al. G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No.
155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 & G.R. No. 178080, February 1,
2012.
Due process; deprivation of the State’s right to due process.
The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in
court; in criminal proceedings, the public prosecutor acts for
and represents the State, and carries the burden of diligently
pursuing the criminal prosecution in a manner consistent
with public interest. The State’s right to be heard in court
rests to a large extent on whether the public prosecutor
properly undertook his duties in pursuing the criminal action
for the punishment of the guilty. The prosecutor’s role in the
administration of justice is to lay before the court, fairly and
47 | P a g e
fully, every fact and circumstance known to him or her to
exist, without regard to whether such fact tends to establish
the guilt or innocence of the accused and without regard to
any personal conviction or presumption on what the judge
may or is disposed to do. The prosecutor owes the State, the
court and the accused the duty to lay before the court the
pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and
meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up
gaps and loopholes in his evidence to the end that the court’s
mind may not be tortured by doubts; that the innocent may
not suffer; and that the guilty may not escape unpunished. In
the conduct of the criminal proceedings, the prosecutor has
ample discretionary power to control the conduct of the
presentation of the prosecution evidence, part of which is the
option to choose what evidence to present or who to call as
witness. In this case, the State was not denied due process in
the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. There was no
indication that the special prosecutor deliberately and
willfully failed to present available evidence or that other
evidence could be secured. People of the Philippines, v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), et al., G.R. No. 153304-05,
February 7, 2012.
Elections; synchronization of ARMM elections with local
elections. The Court was unanimous in holding that the
Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and
local elections. While the Constitution does not expressly
instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local
elections, the intention can be inferred from Sections 1, 2 and
5 of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution. The framers of the Constitution could not have
expressed their objective more clearly – there was to be a
single election in 1992 for all elective officials – from the
President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the
framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten
the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective,
highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate.
That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization
cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are
not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization.
It is to be considered that the ARMM, as we now know it, had
not yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution
was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that
a constitution is not intended to provide merely for the
exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations
for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate
sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of
what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only
the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite
future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution
remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a
constitution must be construed as a dynamic process
intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive
and not static. Article X of the Constitution, entitled “Local
Government,” clearly shows the intention of the Constitution
to classify autonomous regions, such as the ARMM, as local
governments. The inclusion of autonomous regions in the
enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the
heading “Local Government” indicates quite clearly the
constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one
of the forms of local governments. That the Constitution
mentions only the “national government” and the “local
governments,” and does not make a distinction between the
“local government” and the “regional government,” is
particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous
regions not as separate forms of government, but as political
units which, while having more powers and attributes than
other local government units, still remain under the category
of local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified
as local governments, it follows that elections held in
48 | P a g e
autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.
Datu Michael Abas Kida, et. al v. Senate of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
Eminent domain; just compensation. When the State
exercises its inherent power of eminent domain, the
Constitution imposes the corresponding obligation to
compensate the landowner for the expropriated
property. When the State exercises the power of eminent
domain in the implementation of its agrarian reform program,
the constitutional provision which governs is Section 4,
Article XIII of the Constitution. Notably, this provision also
imposes upon the State the obligation of paying the
landowner compensation for the land taken, even if it is for
the government’s agrarian reform purposes. That the
compensation mentioned here pertains to the fair and full
price of the taken property is evident from
the exchange between the members of the Constitutional
Commission during the discussion on the government’s
agrarian reform program. Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Honeycomb Farms Corporation, G.R. No. 169903, February 29,
2012.
Equal protection clause. The equal protection clause means
that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place in like circumstances. Thus, the
guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not violated if
there is a reasonable classification. For a classification to be
reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it
is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies
equally to all members of the same class. Unfortunately, CMO
27-2003 does not meet these requirements. It was not seen
how the quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where
it is discharged, or which country it came from. Commissioner
of Customs and the District Collector of the Port of Subic v.
Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579, February 1,
2012.
Executive agreement; requisites. An executive agreement is
similar to a treaty, except that the former (a) does not require
legislative concurrence; (b) is usually less formal; and (c)
deals with a narrower range of subject matters. Despite these
differences, to be considered an executive agreement, the
following three requisites provided under the Vienna
Convention must nevertheless concur: (a) the agreement
must be between states; (b) it must be written; and (c) it must
governed by international law. China National machinery &
Equipment Corp. v. Hon. Cesar Santamaria, et. al, G.R. No.
185572, February 7, 2012.
Executive Power; power to classify or reclassify lands. The
power to classify or reclassify lands is essentially an executive
prerogative, albeit local government units, thru zoning
ordinances, may, subject to certain conditions, very well effect
reclassification of land use within their respective territorial
jurisdiction. Reclassification decrees issued by the executive
department, through its appropriate agencies, carry the same
force and effect as any statute. As it were, PD 27 and
Proclamation 1637 are both presidential issuances, each
forming, by virtue of Sec. 3(2), Article XVII of the 1973
Constitution, a part of the law of the land. Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of
Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B.
Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos,
Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos.
161796;161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
Irrepealable law. The supermajority vote requirement set forth
in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is unconstitutional
for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass
49 | P a g e
irrepealable laws. The power of the legislature to make laws
includes the power to amend and repeal these laws. Where
the legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to
amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike down
such act for interfering with the plenary powers of Congress.
Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the
power to approve bills by a mere majority vote, provided there
is quorum. In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to
comply with a higher voting requirement than the
Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA
No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which the
Supreme Court sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the
act of one legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie the
hands of, future legislatures. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et
al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs.
Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito
N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The
Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B.
Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis “Barok”
Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
President; judicial courtesy. Firstly, the principle of judicial
courtesy is based on the hierarchy of courts and applies only
to lower courts in instances where, even if there is no writ of
preliminary injunction or TRO issued by a higher court, it
would be proper for a lower court to suspend its proceedings
for practical and ethical considerations. In other words, the
principle of “judicial courtesy” applies where there is a strong
probability that the issues before the higher court would be
rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation
of the proceedings in the lower court or court of origin.
Consequently, this principle cannot be applied to the
President, who represents a co-equal branch of government.
To suggest otherwise would be to disregard the principle of
separation of powers, on which our whole system of
government is founded upon. Secondly, the fact that our
previous decision was based on a slim vote of 8-7 does not,
and cannot, have the effect of making our ruling any less
effective or binding. Regardless of how close the voting is, so
long as there is concurrence of the majority of the members of
the en banc who actually took part in the deliberations of the
case, a decision garnering only 8 votes out of 15 members is
still a decision of the Supreme Court en banc and must be
respected as such. The petitioners are, therefore, not in any
position to speculate that, based on the voting, “the
probability exists that their motion for reconsideration may be
granted.” Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the
Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc.,
et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et
al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on
Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs.
Commission on Elections, et al./Luis “Barok” Biraogo, G.R. No.
196271, February 28, 2012.
President; power to appoint officer in charge. The power to
appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in
nature. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution describes in
broad strokes the extent of this power. The main distinction
between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and its
counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is the sentence
construction; while in the 1935 Constitution, the various
appointments the President can make are enumerated in a
single sentence, the 1987 Constitution enumerates the
various appointments the President is empowered to make
and divides the enumeration in two sentences. The change in
style is significant; in providing for this change, the framers of
the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to make a distinction
between the first group of presidential appointments and the
second group of presidential appointments. he first group of
presidential appointments, specified as the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the Armed Forces, and other
50 | P a g e
officers whose appointments are vested in the President by
the Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials who have
to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The
second group of officials the President can appoint are “all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint.” The second sentence acts as
the “catch-all provision” for the President’s appointment
power, in recognition of the fact that the power to appoint is
essentially executive in nature. The wide latitude given to the
President to appoint is further demonstrated by the
recognition of the President’s power to appoint officials whose
appointments are not even provided for by law. In other
words, where there are offices which have to be filled, but the
law does not provide the process for filling them, the
Constitution recognizes the power of the President to fill the
office by appointment. There is no incompatibility between
the President’s power of supervision over local governments
and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the
President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to
appoint OICs. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate
of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto
Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The
Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B.
Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis “Barok”
Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
State immunity; doctrine of state immunity. According to the
classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to
public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard
to private acts or acts jure gestionis. Since the Philippines
adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the
legal nature of the act involved – whether the entity claiming
immunity performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary,
functions. A thorough examination of the basic facts of the
case would show that CNMEG is engaged in a proprietary
activity. Piecing together the content and tenor of the
Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding
dated 14 September 2002, Amb. Wang’s letter dated 1
October 2003, and the Loan Agreement would reveal the
desire of CNMEG to construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit
of a purely commercial activity performed in the ordinary
course of its business. Even assuming arguendo that CNMEG
performs governmental functions, such claim does not
automatically vest it with immunity. It is readily apparent
that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it
contends that it performs governmental functions. Its
designation as the Primary Contractor does not automatically
grant it immunity, just as the term “implementing agency”
has no precise definition for purposes of ascertaining whether
GTZ was immune from suit. Although CNMEG claims to be a
government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence
that it has not consented to be sued under Chinese law.
Thus, following this Court’s ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be
presumed to be a government-owned and -controlled
corporation without an original charter. As a result, it has the
capacity to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the
Corporation Code. China National machinery & Equipment
Corp. v. Hon. Cesar Santamaria, et. al, G.R. No. 185572,
February 7, 2012.
State immunity; waiver by submission to arbitration. In
the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 provides for a waiver by implication of state immunity.
In the said law, the agreement to submit disputes to
arbitration in a foreign country is construed as an implicit
waiver of immunity from suit. Although there is no similar
51 | P a g e
law in the Philippines, there is reason to apply the legal
reasoning behind the waiver in this case. Under the
provisions of The Conditions of Contract which is an integral
part of the Contract Agreement,, if any dispute arises between
Northrail and CNMEG, both parties are bound to submit the
matter to the HKIAC for arbitration. In case the HKIAC makes
an arbitral award in favor of Northrail, its enforcement in
the Philippines would be subject to the Special Rules on
Alternative Dispute Resolution (Special Rules). Rule 13
thereof provides for the Recognition and Enforcement of a
Foreign Arbitral Award. Under Rules 13.2 and 13.3 of the
Special Rules, the party to arbitration wishing to have an
arbitral award recognized and enforced in the Philippines
must petition the proper regional trial court (a) where the
assets to be attached or levied upon is located; (b) where the
acts to be enjoined are being performed; (c) in the principal
place of business in the Philippines of any of the parties; (d) if
any of the parties is an individual, where any of those
individuals resides; or (e) in the National Capital Judicial
Region. From all the foregoing, it is clear that CNMEG has
agreed that it will not be afforded immunity from suit. Thus,
the courts have the competence and jurisdiction to ascertain
the validity of the Contract Agreement. China National
machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Hon. Cesar Santamaria, et.
al, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012.
Supreme Court; respect to factual findings of administrative
agencies. It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the
decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which
is constitutionally-created, not only on the basis of the
doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings
of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at
times even finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence, and the decision and order are not
tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to
grave abuse of discretion. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo
Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.
Taxpayer’s suit; standing. A taxpayer is deemed to have the
standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established
that public funds from taxation have been disbursed in
alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.
Gualberto J. Dela Llana v. The Chairperson, Commission on
Audit, the Executive Secretary and the National Treasurer,
G.R. No. 180989, February 7, 2012.
Administrative Law
Administrative Rule; due process; publication, when required.
The Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under
the Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified
according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2)
country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. The regulation
provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge,
commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending
on these factors, wheat would be classified either as food
grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade
wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.CMO 27-2003 further
provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and
Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Considering
that the regulation would affect the substantive rights of
respondent, it therefore follows that petitioners should have
applied Sections 3 and 9 of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code. When an administrative rule is merely
interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule
goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate
52 | P a g e
or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law
but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it
behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly
affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly
informed, before that new issuance is given the force and
effect of law. Because petitioners failed to follow the
requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative
Code, the assailed regulation must be struck down.
Commissioner of Customs and the District Collector of the Port
of Subic v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579,
February 1, 2012.
Void government contract; payment for services. Parties who
do not come to court with clean hands cannot be allowed to
profit from their own wrongdoing. The action (or inaction) of
the party seeking equity must be “free from fault, and he
must have done nothing to lull his adversary into repose,
thereby obstructing and preventing vigilance on the part of
the latter.” Here, even with the respondents’ supposed failure
to ascertain the validity of the contract and the authority of
the public official involved in the construction agreements,
there is no such confusion as to the matter of the contract’s
validity and the equivalent compensation. As found by the
court a quo, petitioner had assured the contractors that they
would be paid for the work that they would do, as even DPWH
Undersecretary Teodoro T. Encarnacion had told them to
“fast-track” the project. Hence, respondents cannot by any
stretch of logic, be deprived of compensation for their services
when – despite their ostensible omissions – they only heeded
the assurance of DPWH and proceeded to work on the urgent
project. DPWH v. Ronaldo Quiwa, et. al, G.R. No. 183444,
February 8, 2012.
Agrarian Reform
Agrarian Reform Law; agricultural lands. The primary
governing agrarian law with regard to agricultural lands, be
they of private or public ownership and regardless of tenurial
arrangement and crops produced, is now RA 6657. Section
3(c) of RA 6657 defines “agricultural lands” as “lands devoted
to agricultural activity as defined in the Act and not classified
as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta /
Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado
Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased)
represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado
Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 & 190456, February 8,
2012.
Agrarian Reform Law; applicability of PD 27, RA 6657, and
Proclamation 1637. From the standpoint of agrarian reform,
PD 27, being in context the earliest issuance, governed at the
start the disposition of the rice-and-corn land portions of the
Doronilla property. And true enough, the DAR began
processing land transfers through the OLT program under PD
27 and thereafter issued the corresponding CLTs. However,
when Proclamation 1637 went into effect, DAR discontinued
with the OLT processing. The tenants of Doronilla during
that time desisted from questioning the halt in the issuance
of the CLTs. It is fairly evident that DAR noted the effect of
the issuance of Proclamation 1637 on the subject land and
decided not to pursue its original operation, recognizing the
change of classification of the property from agricultural to
residential. When it took effect on June 15, 1988, RA 6657
became the prevailing agrarian reform law. This is not to say,
however, that its coming into effect necessarily impeded the
operation of PD 27, which, to repeat, covers only rice and
corn land. Far from it, for RA 6657, which identifies “rice
and corn land” under PD 27 as among the properties the DAR
shall acquire and distribute to the landless, no less provides
that PD 27 shall be of suppletory application”. Land Bank of
53 | P a g e
the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of
Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B.
Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos,
Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;
161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.
Agrarian Reform Law; certificates of title; merely an evidence
of recognition by the government; inchoate right. While the
PD 27 tenant-farmers are considered the owners by virtue of
that decree, they cannot yet exercise all the attributes
inherent in ownership, such as selling the lot, because, with
respect to the government represented by DAR and LBP, they
have in the meantime only inchoate rights in the lot––the
being “amortizing owners.” This is because they must still pay
all the amortizations over the lot to Land Bank before an EP
is issued to them. Then and only then do they acquire, in the
phraseology ofVinzons-Magana, “the vested right of absolute
ownership in the landholding.” Land Bank of the Philippines
vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian
Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran,
Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et
al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796; 161830
& 190456, February 8, 2012.
Agrarian Reform Law; private rights; just compensation. As
payment the farmer-beneficiaries who were given the 75
CLTs prior to the issuance of Proclamation 1283, as amended
by Proclamation 1637, are deemed full owners of the lots
covered by 75 CLTs vis-à-vis the real registered owner. The
farmer-beneficiaries have private rights over said lots as they
were deemed owners prior to the establishment of the LS
Townsite reservation or at least are subrogated to the rights
of the registered lot owner. Those farmer-beneficiaries who
were issued CLTs or EPs after June 21, 1974 when
Proclamation 1283, as amended, became effective do not
acquire rights over the lots they were claiming under PD 27 or
RA 6657, because the lots have already been reclassified as
residential and are beyond the compulsory coverage for
agrarian reform under RA 6657. Perforce, the said CLTs or
EPs issued after June 21, 1974 have to be annulled and
invalidated for want of legal basis, since the lots in question
are no longer subject to agrarian reform due to the
reclassification of the erstwhile Doronilla estate to non-
agricultural purposes. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate
of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs.
Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P.
Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs.
Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 &
190456, February 8, 2012.
Agricultural tenancy relationship; de jure tenant; grounds for
ejection provided by law. Respondent, as
landowner/agricultural lessor, has the burden to prove the
existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of petitioner, the
tenant/agricultural lessee. This rule proceeds from the
principle that a tenancy relationship, once established,
entitles the tenant to a security of tenure. The tenant can
only be ejected from the agricultural landholding on grounds
provided by law, in this case Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844.
SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.–
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in
the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when
his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is
shown that: (1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of
his immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding
or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into
residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful
non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural
lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition
54 | P a g e
to his rights under Sections 25 and except when the land
owned and leased by the agricultural lessor is not more than
five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance
compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advance notice
of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings
are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the
landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or
fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year
after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed
that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right
to demand possession of the land and recover damages for
any loss incurred by him because of said dispossession; (2)
The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any
of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the
provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by
fortuitous event orforce majeure; (3) The agricultural lessee
planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other
than what had been previously agreed upon; (4) The
agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as
determined under paragraph 3 of Section 29; (5) The land or
other substantial permanent improvement thereon is
substantially damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably
deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural
lessee; (6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease
rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of
the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-
five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-
payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although
the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not
thereby extinguished; or (7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee
on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of
Section 27. Juan Galope v. Cresencia Bugarin, G.R. No.
185669, February 1, 2012.
Agricultural tenancy relationship; requisites; may be
established through written or oral contract. The essential
elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is
agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to
the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation
on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the
harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee. Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844,
otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist
upon an oral agreement. Juan Galope v. Cresencia Bugarin,
G.R. No. 185669, February 1, 2012.
Jurisdiction of DAR; DARAB. The DARAB has been created
and designed to exercise the DAR’s adjudicating functions.
And just like any quasi-judicial body, DARAB derives its
jurisdiction from law, specifically RA 6657, which invested it
with adjudicatory powers over agrarian reform disputes and
matters related to the implementation of CARL. The Supreme
Court need not belabor that DARAB’s jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the Doronilla property, cannot be conferred by
the main parties, let alone the intervening farmer-
beneficiaries claiming to have “vested rights” under PD
27. As earlier discussed, the process of land reform covering
the 1,266 hectares of the Araneta estate was not completed
prior to the issuance of Proclamation 1637. So the
intervenors, with the exception of the 79 tenant-beneficiaries
who were granted CLTs, failed to acquire private rights of
ownership under PD 27 before the effective conversion of the
Doronilla property to non-agricultural uses. Hence, the
Doronilla property, being outside of CARP coverage, is also
beyond DARAB’s jurisdiction. Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform
vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P.
Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs.
55 | P a g e
Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 &
190456, February 8, 2012.
Social justice; laches. There can be little quibble about
Duran, et al. being guilty of laches. They failed and neglected
to keep track of their case with their lawyer for 14 long years.
As discussed above, Atty. Lara died even prior to the
promulgation of the DARAB Decision. Even then, they failed
to notify the DARAB and the other parties of the case
regarding the demise of Atty. Lara and even a change of
counsel. It certainly strains credulity to think that literally no
one, among those constituting the petitioning-intervenors,
had the characteristic good sense of following up the case
with their legal counsel. Only now, 14 years after, did some
think of fighting for the right they slept on. Thus, as to them,
the CA Decision is deemed final and executory based on the
principle of laches. Agrarian reform finds context in social
justice in tandem with the police power of the State. But
social justice itself is not merely granted to the marginalized
and the underprivileged. But while the concept of social
justice is intended to favor those who have less in life, it
should never be taken as a toll to justify let alone commit an
injustice. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado
Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J.
Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos
(deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of
J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 &
190456, February 8, 2012.
Public Land
Public Land Act; alienable and disposable land. Public Land
Act requires that the applicant for registration must prove (a)
that the land is alienable public land; and (b) that the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land must have been either since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land
Act. Certifications of the DENR are not sufficient to prove the
foregoing. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, 18 dated
30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the
offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988,
the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for
areas below 50 hectares. Further, it is not enough for the
PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove
that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to prove that the
land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so
because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of
the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands
as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have
attached an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s
issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
Republic of the Philippines v. Lucia Gomez, G.R. No. 189021,
February 22, 2012.
Public Land Act; confirmation of of imperfect titles. It is
explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and
occupation required to acquire an imperfect title over an
alienable and disposable public land must be “open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious” in character.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba, the Supreme Court
explained that the intent behind the use of “possession” in
56 | P a g e
conjunction with “occupation” is to emphasize the need for
actual and not just constructive or fictional possession. The
law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words
are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of
the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the
word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing
effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the
words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the
word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an
applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere
fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own property. On the
other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as to the required nature
of possession and occupation, thus, requiring a reference to
the relevant provisions of the Civil Code on prescription. And
under Article 1118 thereof, possession for purposes of
prescription must be “in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted”. It is concerned with lapse of
time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law,
namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an
owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and
adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible,
apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous
when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show
exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to
his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so
conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the
public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who
asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the
presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.
Republic of the Philippines v. East Silverlane Realty
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 186961, February 20,
2012.
Public Officers
Public officer; preventive suspension. The Sandiganbayan
preventively suspended Ysidoro for 90 days in accordance
with Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019. Clearly, by well-established
jurisprudence, the provision of Section 13, Republic Act 3019
makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend, for a
period not exceeding ninety (90) days, any public officer who
has been validly charged with a violation of Republic Act
3019, as amended or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code or any offense involving fraud upon government of
public funds or property. Arnold James M. Ysidoro vs. Hon.
Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, et al. G.R. No. 171513,
February 6, 2012.
Public officers; liability for overpricing; personal and solidary
liability; reimbursement. The Court upholds the COA’s ruling
that petitioner is personally and solidarily liable for the
overpricing in the computers purchased by CDA. The
directive for the payment of the amount of disallowance
finally determined by the COA did not change the nature of
the obligation as solidary because the demand thus made
upon petitioner did not foreclose his right as solidary debtor
to proceed against his co-debtors/obligors, in this case the
members of the PBAC charged under Notice of Disallowance
No. 93-0016-101, for their share in the total amount of
disallowance. Petitioner is therefore liable to restitute
the P881,819.00 to the Government without prejudice,
however, to his right to recover it from persons who were
solidarily liable with him. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo
Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.
57 | P a g e
Public officials; holdover. The clear wording of Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on
the period within which all elective local officials can occupy
their offices. The Supreme Court has already established that
elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus,
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the
Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the
Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from
acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the
Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-
year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No.
9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should
stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and
cannot be extended by holdover by Congress. Admittedly, the
Supreme Court has, in the past, recognized the validity of
holdover provisions in various laws. One significant difference
between the present case and these past cases is that while
these past cases all refer to elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly
provided for in the Constitution, the present case refers to
local elective officials – the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice
Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly – whose terms fall within the three-year term limit
set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Even assuming
that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had
been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA
No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available
option where no express or implied legislative intent to the
contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is
evident. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the
Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc.,
et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et
al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on
Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs.
Commission on Elections, et al./Luis “Barok” Biraogo, G.R. No.
196271, February 28, 2012.
Signing bonus; legality. There is no dispute that the grant of a
signing bonus had been previously disallowed by the express
mandate of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(President Arroyo). On July 22, 2002, this Court declared
in SSS v. COA that Social Services Commission’s authority to
fix the compensation of its employees under its charter,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1161 as amended, is subject to the
provisions of R.A. No. 6758, which provides for the
consolidation of allowances and compensation in the
prescribed standardized salary rates. While there are
exceptions provided under Sections 12 and 17 of R.A. No.
6758 in observance of the policy on non-diminution of pay,
the signing bonus is not one of the benefits contemplated.
This Court also ruled that the signing bonus is “not a truly
reasonable compensation” since conduct of peaceful collective
negotiations “should not come with a price tag”. hat MIAA’s
Board of Directors did not make a mistake and their real
intention was to reward the successful conclusion of collective
negotiations by some pecuniary means is belied by
simultaneous approval of the grant and the CNA between
SMPP and MIAA betrays their real intention. Moreover, prior
to the issuance of AOM No. JPA 03-35 declaring the subject
benefit illegal, there was no effort on the part of its Board of
Directors to rectify the alleged mistake in nomenclature. It
was only after then Corporate Auditor Manalo and Director
Nacion called MIAA’s attention as to the illegality of a signing
bonus that MIAA alleged that the subject benefit is a CNA
Incentive. Easily, such is a mere afterthought.Manila
International Airport Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R.
No. 194710, February 14, 2012.
Signing bonus; return of illegal bonus. Good faith is anchored
on an honest belief that one is legally entitled to the benefit.
58 | P a g e
In this case, the MIAA employees who had no participation in
the approval and release of the disallowed benefit accepted
the same on the assumption that Resolution No. 2003-067
was issued in the valid exercise of the power vested in the
Board of Directors under the MIAA charter. As they were not
privy as to reason and motivation of the Board of Directors,
they can properly rely on the presumption that the former
acted regularly in the performance of their official duties in
accepting the subject benefit. Furthermore, their acceptance
of the disallowed grant, in the absence of any competent proof
of bad faith on their part, will not suffice to render liable for a
refund. The same is not true as far as the Board of Directors.
Their authority under Section 8 of the MIAA charter is not
absolute as their exercise thereof is “subject to existing laws,
rules and regulations” and they cannot deny knowledge
of SSS v. COA and the various issuances of the Executive
Department prohibiting the grant of the signing bonus. In
fact, they are duty-bound to understand and know the law
that they are tasked to implement and their unexplained
failure to do so barred them from claiming that they were
acting in good faith in the performance of their duty. The
presumptions of “good faith” or “regular performance of
official duty” are disputable and may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence. Manila International Airport
Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 194710, February
14, 2012.
(Teng thanks Jiselle Compuesto for her assistance in the
preparation of this post.)
January 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on
Political Law
Posted on February 20, 2012 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV •
Posted in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases •
Here are selected January 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines on political law.
Constitutional Law
Bill of Rights; right to speedy trial versus right to speedy
disposition of cases. The right to a speedy trial is available
only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept,
while the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may
be tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies. In
this case, the appropriate right involved is the right to a
speedy disposition of cases, the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
being a civil suit. An examination of the petitioners’
arguments and the cited indicia of delay would reveal the
absence of any allegation that petitioners moved before the
Sandiganbayan for the dismissal of the case on account of
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays that attended the
proceedings. Petitioners are deemed to have waived their right
to a speedy disposition of the case. Moreover, delays, if any,
prejudiced the Republic as well. What is more, the alleged
breach of the right in question was not raised below. As a
matter of settled jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled
exception, an issue not raised before the trial court cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of
the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo
S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58
& G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
Constitutionality of PD 755, 961, 1468. This case cannot be
resolved without going into the constitutionality of P.D. Nos.
755, 961 and 1468 in particular. For petitioners predicate
their claim over the sequestered shares and necessarily their
cause on laws and martial law issuances assailed by the
respondent on constitutional grounds. This case is for the
recovery of shares grounded on the invalidity of certain
59 | P a g e
enactments, which in turn is rooted in the shares being
public in character, purchased as they were by funds raised
by the taxing and/or a mix of taxing and police powers of the
state. As may be recalled, P.D. No. 755, under the policy-
declaring provision, authorized the distribution of UCPB
shares of stock free to coconut farmers. On the other hand,
Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 authorized the PCA to utilize
portions of the CCSF to pay the financial commitment of the
farmers to acquire UCPB and to deposit portions of the CCSF
levies with UCPB interest free. The CCSF, CIDF and like levies
that Philippine Coconut Authority is authorized to collect
shall be considered as non-special or fiduciary funds to be
transferred to the general fund of the Government, meaning
they shall be deemed private funds.
In other words, the relevant provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, as
well as those of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468, could have been the
only plausible means by which close to a purported million
and a half coconut farmers could have acquired the said
shares of stock. It has, therefore, become necessary to
determine the validity of the authorizing law, which made the
stock transfer and acquisitions possible.
It is of crucial importance to determine the validity of P.D.
Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 in light of the constitutional
proscription against the use of special funds save for the
purpose it was established. Otherwise, petitioners’ claim of
legitimate private ownership over UCPB shares and indirectly
over SMC shares held by UCPB’s subsidiaries will have no leg
to stand on, P.D. No. 755 being the only law authorizing the
distribution of the SMC and UCPB shares of stock to coconut
farmers, and with the aforementioned provisions actually
stating and holding that the coco levy fund shall not be
considered as a special – not even general – fund, but shall be
owned by the farmers in their private capacities.
A. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can
only be used for public purpose. Consequently, they cannot
be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to
private individuals.
Taxes are imposed only for a public purpose. They cannot be
used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of
private persons. When a law imposes taxes or levies from the
public, with the intent to give undue benefit or advantage to
private persons, or the promotion of private enterprises, that
law cannot be said to satisfy the requirement of public
purpose. In this case, the coconut levy funds were sourced
from forced exactions decreed under P.D. Nos. 232, 276 and
582, among others, with the end-goal of developing the entire
coconut industry. To hold therefore, even by law, that the
revenues received from the imposition of the coconut levies be
used purely for private purposes to be owned by private
individuals in their private capacity and for their benefit,
would contravene the rationale behind the imposition of taxes
or levies.
The Court rejected the idea of what appears to be an indirect
– if not exactly direct – conversion of special funds into
private funds, i.e., by using special funds to purchase shares
of stocks, which in turn would be distributed for free to
private individuals. Even if these private individuals belong
to, or are a part of the coconut industry, the free distribution
of shares of stocks purchased with special public funds to
them, nevertheless cannot be justified. The fact that the
coconut levy funds were collected from persons or entities in
the coconut industry, among others, does not and cannot
entitle them to be beneficial owners of the subject funds – or
more bluntly, owners thereof in their private capacity. The
said private individuals cannot own the UCPB shares of
stocks so purchased using the said special funds of the
government.
60 | P a g e
B. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special
purpose and the balance thereof should revert to the general
fund. Consequently, their subsequent reclassification as a
private fund to be owned by private individuals in their
private capacities under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are
unconstitutional.
Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the 1987 Constitution, restating a
general principle on taxation, enjoins the disbursement of a
special fund in accordance with the special purpose for which
it was collected, the balance, if there be any, after the purpose
has been fulfilled or is no longer forthcoming, to be
transferred to the general funds of the government,
As couched, P.D. No. 276 created and exacted the CCSF “to
advance the government’s avowed policy of protecting the
coconut industry.” The CCSF was originally set up as a
special fund to support consumer purchases of coconut
products. The protection of the entire coconut industry and
the consuming public provides the rationale for the creation
of the coconut levy fund. P.D. No. 276 intended the fund
created and set up therein not especially for the coconut
farmers but for the entire coconut industry, albeit the
improvement of the industry would doubtless redound to the
benefit of the farmers. Upon the foregoing perspective, the
following provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 insofar
as they declared, as the case may be, that: “[the coconut levy]
fund and the disbursements thereof [shall be] authorized for
the benefit of the coconut farmers and shall be owned by
them in their private capacities;” or the coconut levy fund
shall not be construed by any law to be a special and/or
fiduciary fund, and do not therefore form part of the general
fund of the national government later on; or the UCPB shares
acquired using the coconut levy fund shall be distributed to
the coconut farmers for free, violated the special public
purpose for which the CCSF was established.
Not only were the challenged presidential issuances
unconstitutional for decreeing the distribution of the shares
of stock for free to the coconut farmers and, therefore,
negating the public purpose declared by P.D. No. 276, i.e., to
stabilize the price of edible oil and to protect the coconut
industry. They likewise reclassified, nay treated, the coconut
levy fund as private fund to be disbursed and/or invested for
the benefit of private individuals in their private capacities,
contrary to the original purpose for which the fund was
created. To compound the situation, the offending provisions
effectively removed the coconut levy fund away from the cavil
of public funds which normally can be paid out only pursuant
to an appropriation made by law. The conversion of public
funds into private assets was illegally allowed, in fact
mandated, by these provisions. Clearly therefore, the
pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are
unconstitutional for violating Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the
Constitution. In this context, the distribution by PCA of the
UCPB shares purchased by means of the coconut levy fund –
a special fund of the government – to the coconut farmers, is
therefore void.
C. Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is an invalid delegation of
legislative power.
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative
power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient
standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard
must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce
the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which
it is to be implemented.
61 | P a g e
In this case, the requisite standards or criteria are absent in
P.D. No. 755. This decree authorizes PCA to distribute to
coconut farmers, for free, the shares of stocks of UCPB and to
pay from the CCSF levy the financial commitments of the
coconut farmers under the Agreement for the acquisition of
such bank. Yet, the decree does not even state who are to be
considered as coconut farmers. Would, say, one who plants a
single coconut tree be already considered a coconut farmer
and, therefore, entitled to own UCPB shares? If so, how many
shares shall be given to him? The definition of a coconut
farmer and the basis as to the number of shares a farmer is
entitled to receive for free are important variables to be
determined by law and cannot be left to the discretion of the
implementing agency.
Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate any clear
condition as to how the disposition of the UCPB shares or
their conversion into private ownership will redound to the
advancement of the national policy declared under it. P.D. No.
755 seeks to “accelerate the growth and development of the
coconut industry and achieve a vertical integration thereof so
that coconut farmers will become participants in, and
beneficiaries of, such growth and development.” The said law
gratuitously gave away public funds to private individuals,
and converted them exclusively into private property without
any restriction as to its use that would reflect the avowed
national policy or public purpose. Conversely, the private
individuals to whom the UCPB shares were transferred are
free to dispose of them by sale or any other mode from the
moment of their acquisition. P.D. No. 755 did not provide for
any guideline, standard, condition or restriction by which the
said shares shall be distributed to the coconut farmers that
would ensure that the same will be undertaken to accelerate
the growth and development of the coconut industry
pursuant to its national policy. Thus, P.D. No. 755, insofar as
it grants PCA a veritable carte blanche to distribute to
coconut farmers UCPB shares at the level it may determine,
as well as the full disposition of such shares to private
individuals in their private capacity without any conditions or
restrictions that would advance the law’s national policy or
public purpose, present a case of undue delegation of
legislative power.
D. Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 and Article III, Section
5 of P.D. No. 1468 violate Article IX (D) (2) of the 1987
Constitution.
Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 takes away the coconut
levy funds from the coffer of the public funds. It privatized
revenues derived from the coco levy. The same provision is
carried over in Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1468. These
provisions violate Article IX (D), Section 2(1) of the
Constitution, which states in pertinent part that the
Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and
duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to
the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining
to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities.
The Constitution, by express provision, vests the COA with
the responsibility for state audit. As an independent supreme
state auditor, its audit jurisdiction cannot be undermined by
any law. Indeed, under Article IX (D), Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution, “[n]o law shall be passed exempting any entity
of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or
any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit.” Following the mandate of the COA
and the parameters set forth by the foregoing provisions, it is
clear that it has jurisdiction over the coconut levy funds,
being special public funds. Conversely, the COA has the
power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all
62 | P a g e
accounts pertaining to the coconut levy funds and,
consequently, to the UCPB shares purchased using the said
funds. However, declaring the said funds as partaking the
nature of private funds, ergo subject to private appropriation,
removes them from the coffer of the public funds of the
government, and consequently renders them impervious to
the COA audit jurisdiction. Clearly, the pertinent provisions
of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 divest the COA of its
constitutionally-mandated function and undermine its
constitutional independence.
The assailed purchase of UCPB shares of stocks using the
coconut levy funds is an example of an investment of public
funds. The conversion of these special public funds into
private funds by allowing private individuals to own them in
their private capacities is something else. It effectively
deprives the COA of its constitutionally-invested power to
audit and settle such accounts. The conversion of the said
shares purchased using special public funds into pure and
exclusive private ownership has taken, or will completely take
away the said funds from the boundaries with which the COA
has jurisdiction. Obviously, the COA is without audit
jurisdiction over the receipt or disbursement of private
property. Accordingly, Article III, Section 5 of both P.D. Nos.
961 and 1468 must be struck down for being
unconstitutional. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation,
Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto
E. Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of
the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193,
January 24, 2012.
Decisions; statement of fact and law. Complainant alleges
that respondent members of the CA’s Sixth Division violated
Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution by not
specifically stating the facts and the law on which the denial
of the petition for review was based. He insists that the
decision promulgated by the CA’s Sixth Division had no legal
foundation and did not even address the five issues presented
in the petition for review. Section 14 provides that “[n]o
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration
of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or
denied without starting the legal basis therefor.” The Court
held that the complaint was unfounded. The essential
purpose of the constitutional provision is to require that a
judicial decision be clear on why a party has prevailed under
the law as applied to the facts as proved; the provision
nowhere demands that a point-by-point consideration and
resolution of the issues raised by the parties are necessary.
Re: Verified complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of
the Board/CEO etc. against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., et al.,
A.M. No. 11-184-CA-J, January 31, 2012.
Due process; right to be heard. Petitioner COCOFED’s right to
be heard had not been violated by the mere issuance of
partial summary judgments before they can adduce their
evidence. As it were, petitioners COCOFED et al. were able to
present documentary evidence in conjunction with its “Class
Action Omnibus Motion” dated February 23, 2001 where they
appended around 400 documents including affidavits of
alleged farmers. These petitioners manifested that said
documents comprise their evidence to prove the farmers’
ownership of the UCPB shares, which were distributed in
accordance with valid and existing laws. COCOFED et al.
even filed their own Motion for Separate Summary Judgment,
an event reflective of their admission that there are no more
factual issues left to be determined at the level of the
Sandiganbayan. This act of filing a motion for summary
judgment is a judicial admission against COCOFED under
Section 26, Rule 130 which declares that the “act, declaration
or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
63 | P a g e
evidence against him.” Viewed in this light, the Court rejected
petitioners’ allegations about being deprived the right to
adduce evidence. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation,
Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto
E. Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of
the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193,
January 24, 2012.
Eminent domain; just compensation. In expropriation
proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the
owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning
of the word “compensation” and to convey thereby the idea
that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The constitutional
limitation of “just compensation” is considered to be a sum
equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly
defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or
the fair value of the property; as between one who receives
and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual
taking by the government. In this case, the Court affirmed the
appellate court’s ruling that the commissioners properly
determined the just compensation to be awarded to the
landowners whose properties were expropriated by petitioner.
The records show that the trial court dutifully followed the
procedure under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
when it formed a committee that was tasked to determine the
just compensation for the expropriated properties. The first
set of committee members made an ocular inspection of the
properties, subject of the expropriation. They also determined
the exact areas affected, as well as the kinds and the number
of improvements on the properties. When the members were
unable to agree on the valuation of the land and the
improvements thereon, the trial court selected another batch
of disinterested members to carry out the task of determining
the value of the land and the improvements. The members of
the new committee even made a second ocular inspection of
the expropriated areas. They also obtained data from the BIR
to determine the zonal valuation of the expropriated
properties, interviewed the adjacent property owners, and
considered other factors such as distance from the highway
and the nearby town center. Further, the committee members
also considered Provincial Ordinance No. 173, which was
promulgated by the Province of Cotabato on 15 June 1999,
and which provides the value of the properties and the
improvements for taxation purposes. The committee members
based their recommendations on reliable data and considered
various factors that affected the value of the land and the
improvements.
The Court also upheld the CA ruling, which deleted the
inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the payment for
just compensation. There is no legal basis to separate the
value of the excavated soil from that of the expropriated
properties. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the
soil has no value separate from that of the expropriated land.
Just compensation ordinarily refers to the value of the land to
compensate for what the owner actually loses. Such value
could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking.
Republic of the Philippines, rep. by the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) vs.Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc., et al.,
G.R. No. 185124, January 25, 2012.
Ombudsman; due process. Petitioners were not denied due
process of law when the investigating lawyer proceeded to
resolve the case based on the affidavits and other evidence on
record. Section 5(b)(1), Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17,
provides that the hearing officer may issue an order directing
the parties to file, within ten days from receipt of the order,
64 | P a g e
their respective verified position papers on the basis of which,
along with the attachments thereto, the hearing officer may
consider the case submitted for decision. It is only when the
hearing officer determines that, based on the evidence, there
is a need to conduct clarificatory hearings or formal
investigations under Section 5(b)(2) and Section 5(b)(3) that
such further proceedings will be conducted. But the
determination of the necessity for further proceedings rests
on the sound discretion of the hearing officer. As the
petitioners have failed to show any cogent reason why the
hearing officer’s determination should be overturned, the
determination will not be disturbed by this Court. The Court
likewise find no merit in petitioners’ contention that the new
procedures under A.O. No. 17, which took effect while the
case was already undergoing trial before the hearing officer,
should not have been applied. The rule in this jurisdiction is
that one does not have a vested right in procedural rules.
While the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as when the
statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides
that pending actions are not subject to its operation, or where
to apply it would impair vested rights, petitioners failed to
show that application of A.O. No. 17 to their case would
cause injustice to them. Here, the Office of the Ombudsman
afforded petitioners every opportunity to defend themselves
by allowing them to submit counter-affidavits, position
papers, memoranda and other evidence in their defense.
Since petitioners have been afforded the right to be heard and
to defend themselves, they cannot rightfully complain that
they were denied due process of law. Due process, as a
constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations
require a trial-type proceeding. It is satisfied when a person is
notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the
filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. More
often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings
that the parties submit to present their charges and defenses.
But as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his
or her interests in due course, said party is not denied due
process. Gemma P. Cabalit vs. COA-Region VII/Filadelfo S.
Apit vs. COA, Legal and adjuciation, Region VII/Leonardo G.
Olaivar, etc. vs. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc., et al., G.R. Nos.
180326/180341/180342, January 17, 2012.
Ombudsman; power to impose penalties. In the exercise of his
duties, the Ombudsman is given full administrative
disciplinary authority. His power is not limited merely to
receiving, processing complaints, or recommending penalties.
He is to conduct investigations, hold hearings, summon
witnesses and require production of evidence and place
respondents under preventive suspension. This includes the
power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, or censure of a public officer or employee. The
provisions of R.A. No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest
intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the
Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These
provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative
adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive
complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in
accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses
and require the production of documents, place under
preventive suspension public officers and employees pending
an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable
on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the
evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty. Thus, it
is settled that the Office of the Ombudsman can directly
impose administrative sanctions. Gemma P. Cabalit vs. COA-
Region VII/Filadelfo S. Apit vs. COA, Legal and adjuciation,
Region VII/Leonardo G. Olaivar, etc. vs. Hon. Primo C. Miro,
etc., et al., G.R. Nos. 180326/180341/180342, January 17,
2012.
65 | P a g e
Public funds/assets. The coconut levy funds are special
public funds. Consequently, any property purchased by
means of the coconut levy funds should likewise be treated as
public funds or public property, subject to burdens and
restrictions attached by law to such property. In this case, the
6 CIIF Oil Mills were acquired by UCPB using coconut levy
funds. On the other hand, the 14 CIIF holding companies are
wholly owned subsidiaries of the CIIF Oil Mills. These
companies were acquired using or whose capitalization comes
from the coconut levy funds. However, as in the case of
UCPB, UCPB itself distributed a part of its investments in the
CIIF Oil Mills to coconut farmers, and retained a part thereof
as administrator. The portions distributed to the supposed
coconut farmers followed the procedure outlined in PCA
Resolution No. 033-78. And as the administrator of the CIIF
holding companies, UCPB authorized the acquisition of the
SMC shares. In fact, these companies were formed or
organized solely for the purpose of holding the SMC shares.
As found by the Sandiganbayan, the 14 CIIF holding
companies used borrowed funds from UCPB to acquire the
SMC shares in the aggregate amount of P1.656 Billion. Since
the CIIF companies and the CIIF block of SMC shares were
acquired using coconut levy funds – funds that have been
established to be public in character – it goes without saying
that these acquired corporations and assets ought to be
regarded and treated as government assets. Being
government properties, they are accordingly owned by the
Government, for the coconut industry pursuant to currently
existing laws. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
(COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E.
Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January
24, 2012.
Election Law
Supreme Court; review of decision of a COMELEC division.
Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order
or ruling of the COMELEC, it limits such power to a final
decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not
extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to
review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final
resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Thus, the
Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for
certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division
of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The
proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC
First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if
the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his
special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along
with the other errors committed by the Division upon the
merits.
One exception to the above rule is that the Court may take
cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review
an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC
on the ground of the issuance being made without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
does not appear to be specifically provided under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the
COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not
authorized to act, or the members of the Division
unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of
necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court
because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in
which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order
can be reviewed. Douglas R. Cagas vs. the Commission on
Elections & Claude P. Bautista, G.R. No. 194139. January 24,
2012.
66 | P a g e
Public Officers
Public employee; grave misconduct. Grave misconduct
consists in a government official’s deliberate violation of a rule
of law or standard of behavior. It is regarded as grave when
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rules are present. In
particular, corruption as an element of grave misconduct
consists in the official’s unlawful and wrongful use of his
station or reputation to procure some benefit for himself or
for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.
Rigging by a public official of bidding in the organization
where he belongs is a form of corruption. As a public officer,
private respondent had the duty to protect the process of
public bidding in his organization. A ruling that would
absolve private respondent of any liability for rigging the bids
in the government office where he works on the pretext that
he was not a member of the bids and awards committee
would encourage public officers who are not members of bids
committees to make an industry of rigging bids, using their
offices and official reputations. National Power Corporation vs.
Civil Service Commission & Rodrigo A. Tanfelix, G.R. No.
152093. January 24, 2012.
Public officers; reassignment; detail versus reassignment. The
issue here is whether or not respondent’s reassignment
constitutes constructive dismissal entitling her to
reinstatement and back wages. The Court ruled in the
affirmative. While a temporary transfer or assignment of
personnel is permissible even without the employee’s prior
consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary
step toward his removal, or a scheme to lure him away from
his permanent position, or when it is designed to indirectly
terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer
would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the
tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service. Section
6, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of
1998, defines constructive dismissal as a situation when an
employee quits his work because of the agency head’s
unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning actuations which
render continued work impossible. Hence, the employee is
deemed to have been illegally dismissed. This may occur
although there is no diminution or reduction of salary of the
employee. It may be a transfer from one position of dignity to
a more servile or menial job. Reassignments involving a
reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employee’s
security of tenure, which is assured by the Constitution, the
Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Civil Service
Rules and Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only
employees removed without cause, but also cases of
unconsented transfers and reassignments, which are
tantamount to illegal/constructive removal.
The Court distinguished between a detail and reassignment.
A detail, as defined and governed by Executive Order 292,
Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6), is the
movement of an employee from one agency to another without
the issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed only for
a limited period in the case of employees occupying
professional, technical and scientific positions. If the
employee believes that there is no justification for the detail,
he may appeal his case to the Civil Service Commission.
Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be
executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission. On
the other hand, a reassignment, as defined and governed by
E.O. 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26
(7), means that an employee is reassigned from one
organizational unit to another in the same agency, provided
that such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank,
status or salaries. The principal distinctions between a detail
and reassignment lie in the place where the employee is to be
moved and in its effectiveness pending appeal with the CSC.
67 | P a g e
A detail requires a movement from one agency to another
while a reassignment requires a movement within the same
agency. Moreover, pending appeal with the CSC, an order to
detail is immediately executory, whereas a reassignment
order does not become immediately effective.
Having ruled that respondent was constructively dismissed,
the next question is whether she is entitled to reinstatement
and back wages. The Court held that she is entitled to
reinstatement but not to full back wages and benefits. An
illegally dismissed civil service employee is entitled to back
salaries but limited only to a maximum period of five years,
and not full back salaries from his illegal dismissal up to his
reinstatement. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Civil Service Commission vs. Minerva M.P. Pacheco, G.R. No.
178021, January 31, 2012.
Public officers; reorganization; termination of employment.
The issue here is whether the NEA Board had the power to
terminate all of NEA’s employees in connection with a
reorganization of the agency. Under Rule 33, Section 3(b)(ii) of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the EPIRA Law,
all NEA employees shall be considered legally terminated with
the implementation of a reorganization program pursuant to
a law enacted by Congress or pursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5) of PD
269 through which the reorganization was carried out.
Petitioners argue that the power granted unto the NEA Board
to organize or reorganize does not include the power to
terminate employees but only to reduce NEA’s manpower
complement. The Court disagreed and affirmed the
termination of the employees. Reorganization involves the
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It
could result in the loss of one’s position through removal or
abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for the
purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more
efficient to be valid, it must pass the test of good faith;
otherwise, it is void ab initio. Evidently, the termination of all
the employees of NEA was within the NEA Board’s powers
and may not successfully be impugned absent proof of bad
faith. United Claimant Association of NEA (Unican) etc., et al.
vs. National Electrification Administration (NEA), et al., G.R.
No. 187107, January 31, 2012.
Public officers; temporary and coterminous employees. No
officer or employee in the Civil Service can be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law. However, this
admits of exceptions, as it is likewise settled that the right to
security of tenure is not available to those employees whose
appointments are temporary and coterminous in nature.
Here, petitioner’s appointment was temporary as he did not
have the required career executive service eligibility. An
appointee without such eligibility cannot hold the position in
a permanent capacity. A temporary appointee can be removed
even without cause and at a moment’s notice. As to those
with eligibilities, their right to security of tenure pertain to
their rank but not to the position to which they were
appointed. Petitioner never alleged that, at any time during
which he held the position in question, he had acquired the
requisite eligibility. Petitioner’s temporary appointment was
also coterminous, or one that is co-existent with the tenure of
the appointing authority or at the latter’s pleasure. As such,
his replacement was not a removal but rather an expiration of
term and no prior notice, due hearing or cause were
necessary to effect the same. The acceptance of a temporary
appointment divests an appointee of the right to security of
tenure against removal without cause. One who holds a
temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his
employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the
appointing authority, there being no need to show that the
termination is for cause. Samuel B. Ong vs. Office of the
President, et al., G.R. No. 184219. January 30, 2012.
68 | P a g e
July 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on
Political Law
Posted on August 19, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV • Posted
in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law •
Tagged agrarian reform, due process, public officers •
Here are selected July 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of
the Philippines on political law.
Constitutional Law
Court proceedings; denial of due process. The SC here ruled
that the Energy Regulatory Commission did not deprive
petitioners of their right to be heard. Where opportunity to be
heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is
granted, there is no denial of due process. In this case, prior
to the issuance of the assailed ERC Decision approving
Meralco’s application for rate increase, petitioners were given
several opportunities to attend the hearings and to present all
their pleadings and evidence. Petitioners voluntarily failed to
appear in most of those hearings. Although the ERC erred in
prematurely issuing its Decision (as the same was issued
prior to the lapse of the period for petitioners to file their
comment on the application), its subsequent act of ordering
petitioners to file their comments on another party’s motion
for reconsideration cured this defect. Even though petitioners
never filed their own motion for reconsideration, the fact that
they were still given notice of the other motion and the
opportunity to file their comments renders immaterial ERC’s
failure to admit their comment on the rate application.
National Association of Electricity Consumers of reforms, Inc.
[Nasecore], et al. vs. Energy Regulator Commission (ERC), et
al., G.R. No. 190795. July 6, 2011.
Value added tax on toll fees; non-impairment clause.
Petitioners argue that since VAT was never factored into the
formula for computing toll fees under the Toll Operation
Agreements, its imposition would violate the non-impairment
of contract clause of the constitution. The SC held that
Petitioner Timbol has no personality to invoke the non-
impairment clause on behalf of private investors in the
tollway projects. She will neither be prejudiced nor affected
by the alleged diminution in return of investments that may
result from the VAT imposition. She has no interest in the
profits to be earned under the TOAs. The interest in and right
to recover investments belongs solely to the private tollway
investors. Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F. Timbol vs. The
Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 193007. July 19, 2011.
Administrative Law
Public official; effect of resignation on filing of administrative
complaint. The Ombudsman can no longer institute an
administrative case against Andutan because the latter was
not a public servant at the time the case was filed. It is
irrelevant, according to the Ombudsman, that Andutan had
already resigned prior to the filing of the administrative case
since the operative fact that determines its jurisdiction is the
commission of an offense while in the public service. The SC
observed that indeed it has held in the past that a public
official’s resignation does not render moot an administrative
case that was filed prior to the official’s resignation. However,
the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the
present case. In the past cases, the Court found that the
public officials – subject of the administrative cases –
resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case already
filed or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. Here, neither
situation obtains. First, Andutan’s resignation was neither his
choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second,
69 | P a g e
Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while
the administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999,
exactly one year and two months after his resignation. What
is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign
more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the
administrative case against him. If the SC agreed with the
interpretation of the Ombudsman, any official – even if he has
been separated from the service for a long time – may still be
subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad
infinitum. Likewise, if the act committed by the public official
is indeed inimical to the interests of the State, other legal
mechanisms are available to redress the same. Office of the
Ombudsman vs. Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr., G.R. No. 164679.
July 27, 2011.
Public officials; prohibited positions. Respondent in this case
was charged with violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act
6713 for solicitation or acceptance of gifts by reason of public
office. The CA found that RA 6713 was repealed by RA 6938;
thus, respondent was not liable. The SC found the contrary.
There was no repeal. The ban on Cooperative Development
Authority (CDA) officials holding a position in a cooperative
provided in RA 6938 should be taken as a prohibition in
addition to those provided in RA 6713 and specifically
applicable to CDA officials and employees. True, RA 6938
allows CDA officials and employees to become members of
cooperatives and enjoy the privileges and benefits attendant
to membership. However, RA 6938 should not be taken as
creating in favor of CDA officials and employees an exemption
from the coverage of Section 7(d), RA 6713 considering that
the benefits and privileges attendant to membership in a
cooperative are not confined solely to availing of loans and not
all cooperatives are established for the sole purpose of
providing credit facilities to their members. Petra C. Martinez,
In her capacity as General Manager of Claveria Agri-based
Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. vs. Filomena L.
villanueva/Office of the Ombudsman vs. Filomena L.
Villanueva, G.R. No. 169196/G.R. No. 169198, July 6, 2011.
Public officials; misconduct. The prohibition in Section 7(d)
of RA 6713 is malum prohibitum. It is the commission of that
act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect
thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has
been violated. Therefore, it is immaterial whether respondent
has fully paid her loans since the law prohibits the mere act
of soliciting a loan under the circumstances provided in
Section 7(d) of RA 6713. Neither is undue influence on
respondent’s part required to be proven as held by the CA.
Whether respondent used her position or authority as a CDA
official is of no consequence in the determination of her
administrative liability. And considering that respondent
admitted having taken two loans from CABMPCI, which is a
cooperative whose operations are directly regulated by
respondent’s office, respondent was correctly meted the
penalty of suspension by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
for violation of Section 7(d). Petra C. Martinez, In her capacity
as General Manager of Claveria Agri-based Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. vs. Filomena L. villanueva/Office of the
Ombudsman vs. Filomena L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169196/G.R.
No. 169198, July 6, 2011.
Agrarian Reform
Agrarian reform; distribution of shares to farmers. In this
case, Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement, Inc. (FARM)
argues that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional as it
permits stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land
transfer; in fine, there is stock certificate ownership of the
farmers or farmworkers instead of them owning the land, as
envisaged in the Constitution. For FARM, this modality of
distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being
inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform
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ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution. The Supreme
Court denied FARM’s contention of unconstitutionality. First,
there was a failure on the part of FARM and its members to
raise the question of constitutionality at the first opportunity.
It took them 27 years before they raised the same before the
SC and after they have already received some benefits from
its implementation. Second, the issue of constitutionality is
not the lis mota of this case, the lis mota being the alleged
non-compliance by Hacienda Luisita, Inc. with the conditions
of the Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) to support a plea for its
revocation. And before the Supreme Court, the lis mota is
whether or not the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
acted in grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of
the SDP for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP,
as couched and implemented, offends certain constitutional
and statutory provisions. The SC held that any of these key
issues may be resolved without going into the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Finally, there
appears to be no breach of the fundamental law. The wording
of the Section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution is
unequivocal––the farmers and regular farmworkers have a
right to own directly or collectively the lands they till.
Accordingly, the basic law allows two modes of land
distribution—direct and indirect ownership. Direct transfer
to individual farmers is the most commonly used method by
DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through collective
ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative to direct
ownership of agricultural land by individual farmers.
Therefore, Section 4 expressly authorizes collective ownership
by farmers. No language can be found in the 1987
Constitution that disqualifies or prohibits corporations or
cooperatives of farmers from being the legal entity through
which collective ownership can be exercised. Hacienda
Luisita, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council,
G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011.
(Teng thanks Charmaine Haw for her assistance in preparing
this post.)
Vacancy in the Senate
Posted on August 5, 2011 by Philbert E. Varona • Posted in
Constitutional Law •
On 14 July 2007, the Commission on Elections declared
Juan Miguel Zubiri the 12 th elected senatorial candidate in
the 2007 elections, narrowly prevailing over rival candidate
Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel by a margin of 19,292 votes. The
other day, on 3 August 2011 (more than four years after his
proclamation), Mr. Zubiri resigned from the Senate amidst
renewed allegations of cheating during the 2007 polls.
Questions on the validity of the 2007 electoral results had
resurfaced in the wake of disclosures made last month by
Zaldy Ampatuan (former Governor of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao, who is currently facing charges relating
to the massacre of 58 persons in late 2009, during
preparations for the 2010 national election). According to Mr.
Ampatuan, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered
the rigging of the 2007 senatorial elections. Mr. Ampatuan
claims that the former President ordered his father, then-
Maguindanao Governor Andal Ampatuan Sr., to transfer all
votes cast for senatorial candidates Panfilo Lacson, Alan Peter
Cayetano and Benigno Aquino III (who was subsequently
elected President in 2010) to the candidates belonging to
then-President Arroyo’s senatorial slate (which included Mr.
Zubiri). These allegations were corroborated several days
later when former Maguindanao Election Supervisor Lintang
Bedol reappeared after four years in hiding. According to Mr.
Bedol, he was instructed by the senior Ampatuan to rig the
2007 elections in favor of administration candidates.
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Unfortunately for Mr. Pimentel, however, Mr. Zubiri’s
resignation will not automatically elevate Mr. Pimentel to the
Senate. Unless the official results of the 2007 senatorial
elections are reviewed and overturned, Mr. Pimentel will
continue to be viewed as having received the 13 th most votes
in those elections and therefore, not entitled to a Senate seat.
How are Senate vacancies filled? Under Article VI, Section 9
of the 1987 Constitution, in the case of a vacancy in the
Senate, a special election may be called to fill the vacancy “in
the manner prescribed by law,” provided that the Senator
thus elected will serve only for the unexpired term. This is
operationalized by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 (1991),
which provides:
… In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate …
at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the
[Commission on Elections] shall call and hold a special
election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor
longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the
vacancy. However … the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the succeeding regular election.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In other words, under the law, the special election to fill the
Senate vacancy caused by Mr. Zubiri’s resignation may only
be held simultaneously with the succeeding regular elections,
which, in this case, are the 2013 elections. Holding a special
election sometime between now and the next regular election
is not allowed. It also goes without saying that Mr. Pimentel
will only occupy the vacancy if he in fact wins such a special
election in 2013.[1]
It appears, however, Mr. Pimentel will not need to wait until
the 2013 elections. Shortly after Mr. Zubiri was proclaimed
Senator in 2007, Mr. Pimentel filed an election protest with
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). Although the SET has
reportedly made an initial determination that Mr. Pimentel
actually won the 12th senatorial seat by a margin of
approximately 257,000 votes, the SET had delayed rendering
a formal decision in light of the pendency of a separate
counter-protest filed by Mr. Zubiri, in which Mr. Zubiri
claimed that he was also the victim of cheating in the 2007
elections. Mr. Zubiri reportedly withdrew his counter-protest
yesterday, on 4 August. If Mr. Zubiri had not withdrawn his
counter-protest, the resolution thereof would have taken at
least another year. Now, there do not appear to be any
remaining obstacles to the SET’s proceeding to resolve Mr.
Pimentel’s election protest.
Philbert wishes to thank Benjoe Panahon for helping prepare
this post.
[1] In recent memory, there appear to have been four other
instances where a vacancy occurred in the Senate mid-term:
(a) in 1998, when Senator Macapagal-Arroyo was elected
Vice-President; (b) in 2004, when similarly, Senator Noli de
Castro was elected Vice-President; (c) in 2007, when Senator
Alfredo Lim was elected Mayor of the City of Manila; and (d)
last year, in 2010, when Senator Aquino won the presidential
elections.
Dissension in the Court: June 2011
Posted on July 14, 2011 by Jose Ma. G. Hofileña • Posted in
Civil Law, Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases •
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The following relates to select decisions promulgated by the
High Court in June 2011 where at least one Justice felt
compelled to express his dissent from the decision penned by
the ponente.
1. Informed Consent (Villarama vs. Carpio)
In essential issue in the case of Dr. Rubi Li vs. the Spouses
Reynaldo and Lina Soliman was whether or not Dr. Li, a
medical oncologist, should be held liable for damages on
account of medical malpractice. According to the majority
decision penned by Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., the
answer is no. According to the dissenter, Justice Antonio T.
Carpio, the answer is yes.
Sometime in July 1993, Angelica Soliman, the 11-year old
daughter of Reynaldo and Lina Soliman, was diagnosed with
a highly malignant form of bone cancer that usually afflicts
teenage children. This condition required Angelica’s leg to be
amputated. To eliminate any remaining cancer cells,
minimize the chances of recurrence and prevent the disease
from spreading to other parts of Angelica’s body,
chemotherapy was suggested and eventually, Angelica was
referred Dr. Li.
In August of 1993, Angelica was administered the first cycle
of the chemotherapy regimen. However, 11 days later,
Angelica passed away.
The Soliman spouses filed an action for damages against Dr.
Li, claiming, among other things, that Dr. Li had assured
them that Angelica would recover in view of 95% chance of
healing with chemotherapy. And that wwhen they had
inquired about side effect, they claim that Dr. Li mentioned
only slight vomiting, hair loss and weakness. Angelica had,
however, suffered far greater side effects from the
chemotherapy and accordingly, the Solimans claimed that
they would not have given their consent to chemotherapy had
petitioner not falsely assured them of its side effects.
Dr. Li, on the other hand, asserted that she did not give
Angelica’s parents any assurance that chemotherapy will cure
Angelica’s cancer. During their several consultation sessions,
Dr. Li stated that she explained the following side effects of
chemotherapy treatment to respondents: (1) falling hair; (2)
nausea and vomiting; (3) loss of appetite; (4) low count of
white blood cells [WBC], red blood cells [RBC] and platelets;
(5) possible sterility due to the effects on Angelica’s ovary; (6)
damage to the heart and kidneys; and (7) darkening of the
skin especially when exposed to sunlight.
In his reasoning, Justice Villarama traced back the English
common law origins of the doctrine of informed consent in
medical malpractice or medical negligence cases and
concluded that “[t]here are four essential elements a plaintiff
must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of
informed consent: ‘(1) the physician had a duty to disclose
material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately
disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of
the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she
otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was
injured by the proposed treatment.’
Based on the evidence on record, the ponente held that there
was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the
chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of
Angelica’s parents. Surely, Justice VIllarama wrote, the
Soliman spouses could not have been unaware in the course
of initial treatment and amputation of Angelica’s lower
extremity, that her immune system was already weak on
account of the malignant tumor in her knee.
73 | P a g e
He added, that “[w]hen petitioner informed the respondents
beforehand of the side effects of chemotherapy which includes
lowered counts of white and red blood cells, decrease in blood
platelets, possible kidney or heart damage and skin
darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the part of the
doctor that the respondents understood very well that the
severity of these side effects will not be the same for all
patients undergoing the procedure. In other words, by the
nature of the disease itself, each patient’s reaction to the
chemical agents even with pre-treatment laboratory tests
cannot be precisely determined by the physician. That death
can possibly result from complications of the treatment or the
underlying cancer itself, immediately or sometime after the
administration of chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that cannot
be ruled out, as with most other major medical procedures,
but such conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the
general side effects of chemotherapy already disclosed.”
On the other hand, form Justice Carpio’s dissenting point of
view, analogous cases in the United States essentially
reiterate the four requisites cited by Justice Villarama that
must be proven in cases involving the doctrine of informed
consent.
Moreover, the dissenter averred, that “under a patient
standard of materiality, a doctor is obligated to disclose that
information which a reasonable patient would deem material
in deciding whether to proceed with a proposed treatment.
Stated differently, what should be disclosed depends on what
a reasonable person, in the same or similar situation as the
patient, would deem material in deciding whether to proceed
with the proposed treatment.”
Justice Carpio held significant the testimony of Dr. Li that
while she disclosed some material risks, she has impliedly
admitted that she failed to disclose many of the other
associated risks and side effects of chemotherapy, including
the most material — infection, sepsis and death.
Clearly, infection, sepsis and death are material risks and side
effects of chemotherapy. To any reasonable person, the risk of
death is one of the most important, if not the most important,
consideration in deciding whether to undergo a proposed
treatment. Thus, Dr. Li should have disclosed to Reynaldo and
Lina that there was a chance that their 11-year old daughter
could die as a result of chemotherapy as, in fact, she did after
only 13 days of treatment.
Accordingly, Justice Carpio held the view that Dr. Li should
be liable for medical negligence.
(Dr. Rubi Li vs. Spouses Reynaldo and Lina Soliman as
parents/heirs of deceased Angelica Soliman, June 7, 2011,
G.R. No. 165279. See dissenting opinion here.)
(author’s note: While this author appreciates, as an academic
matter, the historical developments of, and continued
discussions on, the doctrine of informed consent in medical
malpractice cases, he wonders whether all the nice theories
actually do work in such a tragic moment as deciding whether
or not to permit a specific form of treatment in the face of the
malignantly deteriorating physical condition of a loved one?
Despite the legal niceties about what a physician should or
need not disclose and explain, this author can foresee that his
own mental state in such a situation would likely be in such a
state of disquiet as to almost certainly taint any decision he
may make, informed or not.)
2. When Own Means Control (Carpio vs. Velasco)
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In Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Margarito B. Teves
et al, petitioners questioned the sale by the Republic of the
Philippines to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. of roughly
forty-six percent (46%) of the shares of Philippine
Telecommunication Investment Corporation (PTIC), on the
ground that such sale caused the foreign ownership in
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. Inc. (PLDT), engaged
in the business of telecommunications as a public utility, to
exceed the constitutionally-allowed limits for foreign
ownership in a public utility, as set out in Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution:
SECTION 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations
or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization
be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except
under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good
so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in
public utilities by the general public. The participation of
foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility
enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its
capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such
corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines.
The petitioners posited that “capital” under the foregoing
constitutional provision refers only to the public utility’s
common shares “because such shares are entitled to vote and
it is through voting that control over a corporation is
exercised.” Petitioners pointed out that, considering that
PLDT’s preferred shares have no voting rights, only the
common shares “can vote and elect members of the board of
directors.”
Citing the intent of the framers of the Constitution, as well as
the Foreign Investments Act, the Supreme Court en banc,
speaking through Justice Antonio T. Carpio, ruled that “[t]he
term ‘capital’ in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors,” which, in PLDT’s case, is limited to common
shares. The Court’s test does not lie in the classification of
shares per se but the right to vote in the election of directors
which should, therefore, include preferred shares if such
shares are also entitled to vote in the election of directors.
With the concurrence of ten of the justices, the Court en banc
partly granted the petition and in its dispositive portion,
directed the Securities and Exchange Commission to apply
their definition of the term “capital” in determining the extent
of allowable foreign ownership in respondent PLDT, and if
there is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions under the
law.
In the dissent penned by Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., he
countered by stating that the intent of the framers of the
Constitution was not to limit the application of the word
“capital” to voting or common shares alone. In support
thereof, the dissenter noted that the Records of the
Constitutional Commission reveal that even though the UP
Law Center proposed the phrase “voting stock or controlling
interest,” the framers of the Constitution did not adopt this
but instead used the word “capital,”
To the eyes of Justice Velasco, the intent of the Constitution
is very clear under the doctrine of Cassus Omissus Pro
75 | P a g e
Omisso Habendus Est––a person, object or thing omitted
must have been omitted intentionally. Contrary to the
majority, Justice Velasco maintained that the framers of the
Constitution decided to use the word “capital” in all
provisions that talk about foreign participation and
intentionally left out the phrase “voting stocks” or
“controlling interest”.
Moreover, Justice Velasco noted that stockholders, whether
holding voting or non-voting stocks, have all the rights,
powers and privileges of ownership over their stocks and that
this necessarily includes the right to vote because such is
inherent in and incidental to the ownership of corporate
stocks, and as such is a property right. In fact, the
dissenting opinion pointed out that even non-voting stocks
are entitled to be voted on for fundamental and major
corporate changes as set out in Section 6 of the Corporation
Code. Thus, the fact that only holders of common shares can
elect a corporation’s board of directors does not mean that
only such holders exercise control over the corporation.
As far as Justice Velasco sees it, “applying the ponencia’s
definition of the word “capital” will give rise to a greater
anomaly because it will result in the foreigner’s obtaining
beneficial ownership over the corporation, which is contrary
to the provisions of the Constitution.” On the other hand,
“interpreting “capital” to include both voting and non-voting
shares will result in giving both legal and beneficial
ownership of the corporation to the Filipinos.”
(Wilson P. Gamboa vs. Finance Secretary Margarito B. Teves,
et al.; Pablito V. Sanidad, et al., Petitioners-in-intervention,
June 28, 2011, G.R. No. 176579. See dissenting opinion here.)
(author’s note: This author recalls that in his beginning years,
when he was tasked to sift through the bound volumes of the
records of the Constitutional Commission, he seemed to
develop this curious ability to find support from the debates on
either view to a given issue. Thus, it may not necessarily be
surprising to this author that both the main decision and the
dissent are able to each find records of debates that support
their respective, if contrasting, opinions. What to do then?
There is always the very words used by the Constitution itself.
This author tends to think that there is a difference in the
meaning of the words “own” and “control.” Otherwise, the
Constitution need not keep repeating the term “government
owned OR controlled corporation”—it could just say,
“government-owned corporation”. Oh, by the way, the author
wishes to disclose that (i) his law firm includes PLDT as a
client, and (b) his phone and DSL line at home is from PLDT.)
June 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on
Political Law
Posted on July 8, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV • Posted in
Constitutional Law • Tagged Commission on Audit, due
process, freedom of the press, local government, Ombudsman
• jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. Boy Scouts of the
Here are selected June 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of
the Philippines on political law.
Constitutional Law
Commission on Audit; jurisdiction over Boy Scouts. The
issue was whether or not the Boy Scouts of the Philippines
(“BSP”) fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Audit. The BSP contends that it is not a government-owned
or controlled corporation; neither is it an instrumentality,
76 | P a g e
agency, or subdivision of the government. The Supreme
Court, however, held that not all corporations, which are not
government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be
considered private corporations as there exists another
distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which
are otherwise known as “public corporations.” These
corporations are treated by law as agencies or
instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to
the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to
a different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests
or constitutional policies and objectives and their
administrative relationship to the government or any of its
departments or offices. As presently constituted, the BSP is a
public corporation created by law for a public purpose,
attached to the Department of Education Culture and Sports
pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of 1987.
It is not a private corporation which is required to be owned
or controlled by the government and be economically viable to
justify its existence under a special law. The economic
viability test would only apply if the corporation is engaged in
some economic activity or business function for the
government, which is not the case for BSP. Therefore, being a
public corporation, the funds of the BSP fall under the
Philippines vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 177131. June 7,
2011.
Local governments; principle of local autonomy. The claim of
petitioners in this case that the subject proclamation and
administrative orders violate the principle of local autonomy
is anchored on the allegation that, through them, the
President authorized the DILG Secretary to take over the
operations of the ARMM and assume direct governmental
powers over the region. The Supreme Court held that in the
first place, the DILG Secretary did not take over control of the
powers of the ARMM. The SC observed that after law
enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into
custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre,
the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong,
assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to
the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA
9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then
Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-
Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG
Secretary did not take over the administration or operations
of the ARMM. Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon.
Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R. No. 190259. June 7, 2011.
Presidential Electoral Tribunal; constitutionality. This case
involved a motion for reconsideration, reiterating the
contention that the constitution of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court denied the
motion and explained that judicial power granted to the
Supreme Court by the Constitution is plenary. And under
the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional
jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-
presidential elections contests includes the means necessary
to carry it into effect. As to the claim of petitioner that the
PET exercises quasi-judicial power and, thus, its members
violate the proscription in Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court held that, contrary to
petitioner’s claim, the resolution of electoral contests are
judicial in nature. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618. June 7, 2011.
Presidential powers; declaration of a state of emergency.
Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised
her powers when she declared a state of emergency in the
provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City
of Cotabato. The President’s call on the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power
77 | P a g e
vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. While it is true that the Court may inquire into
the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above
power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the
matter. It is clearly to the President that the Constitution
entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the
armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence.
Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by
grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the
President’s judgment. Here, petitioners failed to show that
the declaration of a state of emergency as well as the
President’s exercise of the “calling out” power had no factual
basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the
ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that
the take over of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had
no basis too. Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo
Puno, et al., G.R. No. 190259. June 7, 2011.
Presidential powers; calling-out power. Petitioners contend
that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers
when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel
in the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the
City of Cotabato. The Supreme Court held that such
deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers
as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution. The President did not proclaim a national
emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted
by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary
powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need
a congressional authority to exercise the same. But, apart
from the fact that there was no such take over to begin with,
the SC held the imminence of violence and anarchy at the
time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to
ignore and as a result, the President had to act to prevent
further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned.
Progress reports also indicated that there was movement in
these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men
sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the people’s
fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take
preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control
the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed
groups that continuously threatened the peace and security
in the affected places. Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon.
Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R. No. 190259. June 7, 2011.
Right to fair trial v. freedom of the press. On the possible
influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court
judges, the Court found that prejudicial publicity insofar as it
undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the “totality of
circumstances” test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and
Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial
is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is
not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial,
and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of
possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual
prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair
trial. Re: Petition for radio and television coverage of the
multiple murder cases against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy
Ampatuan, et al., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-6-
SC/A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. June 14, 2011.
Local Government Code
Local government; power to classify lands. Petitioners in this
case contend that the subject property is outside the coverage
of the agrarian reform program in view of the enactment of
City Ordinance No. 1313 by the City of Iligan reclassifying the
area into a residential/commercial land. Unconvinced, the
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DARAB, in its Decision, noted that the record is bereft of any
evidence that the city ordinance has been approved by the
HLURB, thereby allegedly casting doubt on the validity of the
reclassification over the subject property. The Supreme Court
agreed with petitioners that the property is outside the
coverage of the agrarian reform program. Ordinance No.
1313 was enacted in 1975. Significantly, there was still no
HLURB to speak of during that time. It was the Task Force on
Human Settlements, the earliest predecessor of HLURB,
which was in existence at that time. The Task Force was not
empowered to review and approve zoning ordinances and
regulations. As a matter of fact, it was only on August 9,
1978, with the issuance of Letter of Instructions No. 729, that
local governments were required to submit their existing land
use plans, zoning ordinances, enforcement systems and
procedures to the Ministry of Human Settlements for review
and ratification. Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 169913. June 8, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative cases; due process. Petitioners contend that
DAR failed to notify them that it is putting the subject
property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program;
hence, their right to due process of law was violated. The SC
agreed. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a
property under the agrarian reform program cannot be
underrated, as non-compliance with it violates the essential
requirements of administrative due process of law. If the
illegality in the issuance of the CLTs is patent, the Court
must immediately take action and declare the issuance as
null and void. Accordingly, there being no question that the
CLTs in the instant case were “improperly issued, for which
reason, their cancellation is warranted.” The same holds true
with respect to the EPs and certificates of title issued by
virtue of the void CLTs, as there can be no valid transfer of
title should the CLTs on which they were grounded are void.
Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines, et
al., G.R. No. 169913. June 8, 2011.
Administrative cases; execution of Ombudsman decisions.
Petitioners in this case raise the issue of whether
administrative decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
imposing the penalties of dismissal and one-year suspension
from office are immediately executory pending appeal. The
Supreme Court held that it is immediately executory pending
appeal. This is the rule provided for under Section 7, Rule III
of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
amended by Administrative Order No. 17, dated September
15, 2003, which provides among others: “An appeal shall not
stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is
suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal,
he shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal. A decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a
matter of course…” Under this provision, a respondent who is
found administratively liable by the Office of the Ombudsman
and is slapped with a penalty of suspension of more than one
month from service has the right to file an appeal with the CA
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. But although a respondent is given the right to
appeal, the act of filing an appeal does not stay the execution
of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman. Marcelo G.
Ganaden, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos.
170500 & 170510-11. June 1, 2011.
(Teng thanks Charmaine Haw for her assistance in preparing
this post.)
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(This post will be updated when the remaining June 201o
cases are published.)
May 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on
Political Law
Posted on June 23, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV • Posted in
Constitutional Law • Tagged agrarian reform, appeal, Civil
Service Commission, due process, exhaustion of
administrative remedies, judicial review, security of tenure •
Here are selected May 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of
the Philippines on political law.
Constitutional Law
Declaration of unconstitutionality; doctrine of operative fact.
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The
doctrine of operative fact is an exception this rule. It applies
as a matter of equity and fair play, and nullifies the effects of
an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a
statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an
operative fact and may have consequences that cannot always
be ignored. It applies when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid law. The doctrine cannot be
applied to this case, as to hold otherwise would be iniquitous
to petitioner who was illegally dismissed from employment
and would allow his employer to profit from a violation of an
unconstitutional provision of law. Claudio S. Yap v.
Thenamaris Ship’s Management and Intermare Maritime
Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. 179532. May 30, 2011.
Judicial review; review of executive policy. Petitioner here
seeks judicial review of a question of Executive policy, which
the Court ruled is outside its jurisdiction. Despite the
definition of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, the determination of where, as between two
possible routes, to construct a road extension is not within
the province of courts. Such determination belongs
exclusively to the Executive branch. Barangay Captain Beda
Torrecampo v. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System, et al., G.R. No. 188296. May 30, 2011.
Administrative Law; Public Officers
Administrative cases; due process. Petitioners argue that
they were denied due process because their order of dismissal
was not accompanied by any justification from the Board of
Directors of Philippine Estates Authority, which merely relied
on the findings of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission.
The Court dismissed this argument on the basis that
petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard in the
course of PAGC’s investigation. The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s
side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of, and to submit any evidence a party may have
in support of his defense. The demands of due process are
sufficiently met when the parties are given the opportunity to
be heard before judgment is rendered. Petitioners here
actively participated in the proceedings before PAGC where
they were afforded the opportunity to explain their actions
through their memoranda. The essence of due process is the
right to be heard and this evidently was afforded to them.
Theron V. Lacson v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al./Jaime
R. Millan and Bernardo T. Viray v. The Hon. Executive
Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 165399 & 165475/G.R. No. 165404
& 165489. May 30, 2011.
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Administrative proceedings; due process. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of
due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be
heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend
his interests in due course, he was not denied due process.
Petitioner here was adequately apprised of the charges filed
against him and he submitted his answer to the complaint
while the case was still under a pre-charge
investigation. When the Office of the Legal Service conducted
a summary hearing on the complaint, petitioner was again
duly notified of the proceedings and was given an opportunity
to explain his side. He was not denied due process. Rimando
A. Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No.
180141. May 31, 2011.
Administrative proceedings; length of service as an alternative
circumstance. Length of service as a factor in determining
the imposable penalty in administrative cases is not always a
mitigating circumstance. It is an alternative circumstance,
which can mitigate or possibly even aggravate the penalty,
depending on the circumstances of the case. Where the
government employee concerned took advantage of his long
years of service and position in public office, length of service
may not be considered in lowering the penalty. The Court will
take this circumstance against the public officer or employee
in administrative cases involving serious offenses, even if it
was the first time said public officer or employee was
administratively charged. Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil
Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141. May 31, 2011.
Appeal; doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The Supreme Court denied this petition for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Petitioner here went to the Court of
Appeals to appeal the orders of Laguna Lake Development
Authority. Petitioner cites deprivation of due process and
lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as grounds
which exempted it from complying with the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Supreme Court
agreed with the CA that such appeal was premature since the
law provides for an appeal from decisions or orders of the
LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President, a
remedy which should have first been exhausted before
invoking judicial intervention. Petitioner’s contrary
arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary
would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the
LLDA’s findings is at best speculative and presumptuous.
Universal Robina Corp. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority,
G.R. No. 191427. May 30, 2011.
Civil service; security of tenure. Career service officers enjoy
security of tenure as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution
and the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, which
provides that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall
be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by
law and after due process. The tenurial protection accorded
to a civil servant is a guaranty of both procedural and
substantive due process. Procedural due process requires
that the dismissal, when warranted, be effected only after
notice and hearing. Substantive due process requires, among
others, that the dismissal be for legal cause, which must
relate to and effect the administration of the office of which
the concerned employee is a member and must be restricted
to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the
rights and interests of the public. Nevertheless, the right to
security of tenure is not tantamount to immunity from
dismissal. Petitioners cannot seek absolute protection from
this constitutional provision. As long as their dismissal was
for a legal cause and the requirements of due process were
81 | P a g e
met, the law will not prevent their removal from office.
Theron V. Lacson v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al./Jaime
R. Millan and Bernardo T. Viray v. The Hon. Executive
Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 165399 & 165475/G.R. No. 165404
& 165489. May 30, 2011.
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service;
requirements; examples. The acts of respondent constitute
the administrative offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, which need not be related to, or
connected with, the public officer’s official functions. As long
as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity
of his public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted
on the erring public officer or employee. Under the Civil
Service law and rules, there is no concrete description of what
specific acts constitute the grave offense of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. However, the
Court has considered the following acts or omissions, inter
alia, as Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service:
misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of office;
failure to report back to work without prior notice; failure to
safe keep public records and property; making false entries in
public documents; falsification of court orders; a judge’s act
of brandishing a gun and threatening the complainants
during a traffic altercation; and a court interpreter’s
participation in the execution of a document conveying
complainant’s property which resulted in a quarrel in the
latter’s family. Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141. May 31, 2011.
Government owned and controlled corporation; requisites.
The Court here ruled that Philippine Centennial Expo ’98
Corporation is a private corporation. It was not created by a
special law but was incorporated under the Corporation Code
and was registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation. Although the Bases Conversion Development
Authority owned almost all of the shares of Expocorp at the
time of the latter’s incorporation, the Board of Directors of
Expocorp allowed a private corporation to buy its shares
constituting 55.16% of its outstanding capital stock two
months after incorporation. With the BCDA as a minority
stockholder, Expocorp cannot be characterized as a
government-owned or controlled corporation. A government-
owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the
government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a
majority of its capital stock must be owned by the
government. Since Expocorp is not a GOCC, its officers and
employees are private individuals who are outside the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. People of the Philippines v.
Luis J. Morales, G.R. No. 166355. May 30, 2011.
Misconduct; relation to the official performance of duties. To
constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct
relation to, and must be connected with, the performance of
official duties. The duties of respondent here as a member of
the GSIS Fund Management Accounting Department do not
involve the modification of IP addresses, the offense he
committed. The act was considered unauthorized, precisely
because dealing with the GSIS network’s IP addresses is
strictly reserved for personnel of the Information Technology
Services Group, who are expectedly knowledgeable in this
field. Government Service Insurance System, et al. v. Arwin T.
Mayordomo, G.R. No. 191218. May 31, 2011.
Procedural due process; right to cross-examine. While the
right to cross-examine is a vital element of procedural due
process, the right does not require an actual cross
examination but merely an opportunity to exercise this right
if desired by the party entitled to it. In this case, while
National Police Commission Memorandum Circular No. 96-
010 provides that the sworn statements of witnesses shall
82 | P a g e
take the place of oral testimony but shall be subject to cross-
examination, petitioner missed this opportunity precisely
because he did not appear at the deadline for the filing of his
supplemental answer or counter-affidavit, and accordingly
the hearing officer considered the case submitted for
decision. And even with the grant of his subsequent motion
to be furnished with a copy of the complaint and its annexes,
he still failed to file a supplemental answer or counter-
affidavit and instead filed a motion to dismiss. Rimando A.
Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No.
180141. May 31, 2011.
Agrarian Law
Tenancy relation; elements. RA 1199, the Agricultural
Tenancy Act of the Philippines, defines a tenant as a person
who, himself and with the aid available from within his
immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to,
or possessed by, another, with the latter’s consent for
purposes of production, sharing the produce with the
landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying the
landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in
money or both, under a leasehold tenancy system. For a
tenancy relationship to exist, the following essential elements
must be shown: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant;
and (6) there is sharing of the harvests between the parties.
The presence of all of these elements must be proved by
substantial evidence. Estate of Pasto Samson v. Mercedes &
Ruberto Susano/Julian Chan v. Mercedes and Ruberto
Susano, G.R. No. 179024/G.R. No. 179086. May 30, 2011.
(Teng thanks Charmaine Haw for her assistance in preparing
this post.)
May 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Labor
Law and Procedure
Posted on June 21, 2011 by Leslie C. Dy • Posted in
Constitutional Law, Labor Law • Tagged appeal, due process,
equal protection, illegal dismissal, resignation •
Here are selected May 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of
the Philippines on labor law and procedure:
Section 10, Republic Act No. 8042; unconstitutional.
Petitioner Yap was employed as an electrician for
respondent’s vessel under a 12-month contract. He was found
to be illegally terminated with nine months remaining on his
contract term. The Court of Appeals (CA) awarded petitioner
salaries for three months as provided under Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042. On certiorari, the Supreme Court
reversed the CA and declared that petitioner was entitled to
his salaries for the full unexpired portion of his contract. The
Court has previously declared in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime
Services, Inc. (2009) that the clause “or for three months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” provided
in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is
unconstitutional for being violative of the rights of Overseas
Filipino Workers (OFWs) to equal protection of the laws. The
subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the
computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees
who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the
claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more
in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or
local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause
singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a
peculiar disadvantage. Moreover, the subject clause does not
state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; hence,
the same violates not just petitioner’s right to equal
protection, but also his right to substantive due process
83 | P a g e
under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Claudio S.
Yap vs. Thenamaris Ship’s Management and Intermare
Maritime Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011
Doctrine of Operative Fact; applied as a matter of equity and
fair play. Petitioner Yap was employed on respondent’s vessel
under a 12-month contract. Upon finding that he was illegally
terminated, the Court of Appeals (CA) awarded petitioner
salaries for three months as provided under Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042). While the case was pending
in the Supreme Court, Section 10 of RA 8042 was declared
unconstitutional. In deciding to award petitioner his salaries
for the entire unexpired portion of his contract, the Supreme
Court rejected the application of the operative fact doctrine.
As an exception to the general rule, the doctrine applies only
as a matter of equity and fair play. It recognizes that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The doctrine
is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will
impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the
invalid law. This case should not be included in the
aforementioned exception. After all, it was not the fault of
petitioner that he lost his job due to an act of illegal dismissal
committed by respondents. To rule otherwise would be
iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect,
send a wrong signal that principals/employers and
recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security
of tenure which an employment contract embodies and
actually profit from such violation based on an
unconstitutional provision of law. Claudio S. Yap vs.
Thenamaris Ship’s Management and Intermare Maritime
Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011.
Migrant workers; computation of salary award. Petitioner Yap
was employed as an electrician for respondent’s vessel under
a 12-month contract. He was found to be illegally terminated
with nine months remaining on his contract term, and was
declared to be entitled to his salaries for the balance of his
contract. Respondents claim that the tanker allowance should
be excluded from the definition of the term “salary.” The
Supreme Court, after examining the relevant clauses of the
contract, rejected respondent’s claim. The word salaries in
Section 10 (5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For
seafarers, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996,
provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in
which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of
overtime, leave pay and other bonuses. A close perusal of the
contract reveals that the tanker allowance of US$130.00 was
not categorized as a bonus but was rather encapsulated in
the basic salary clause, hence, forming part of the basic
salary of petitioner. If respondents intended it differently, the
contract per se should have indicated that said allowance
does not form part of the basic salary or, simply, the contract
should have separated it from the basic salary clause.
Claudio S. Yap vs. Thenamaris Ship’s Management and
Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. G.R. No. 179532, May 30,
2011.
Termination for Just Cause; separation pay by way of
financial assistance. Petitioner Juliet Apacible was employed
as Assistant Area Sales Manager for respondent’s Cebu
operations. She was informed that she would be transferred
to the Pasig office on account of the ongoing reorganization.
Petitioner’s repeated refusal to comply with the transfer order
was treated by respondent as insubordination and grounds
for her dismissal. The Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court
of Appeals all found that petitioner was justly dismissed from
employment. The NLRC awarded separation pay as financial
assistance, however, noting that petitioner’s obstinacy was
upon the advice of her counsel and, therefore, there was a
modicum of good faith on her part. On appeal, the Court of
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Appeals (CA) deleted the award of separation pay. The
Supreme Court upheld the CA and declared that the award of
financial assistance shall not be given to validly terminated
employees, whose offenses are iniquitous or reflective of some
depravity in their moral character. When the employee
commits an act of dishonesty, depravity, or iniquity, the grant
of financial assistance is misplaced compassion. In this case,
petitioner’s adamant refusal to transfer, coupled with her
failure to heed the order for her to return the company vehicle
assigned to her and, more importantly, allowing her counsel
to write letters couched in harsh language to her superiors
unquestionably show that she was guilty of insubordination,
hence, not entitled to the award of separation pay. Juliet G.
Apacible vs. Multimed Industries, et al., G.R. No. 178903, May
30, 2011.
Appeal; posting of Appeal Bond; Government’s exemption
from the same. Respondents are supervisory and rank and
file employees of the DXWG-Iligan City radio station which is
owned by petitioner Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC). Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
unfair labor practice, and reimbursement of unpaid Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) benefits against petitioner. The
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioner BBC to
pay the money claims. On appeal to the NLRC, petitioner BBC
averred that since it is wholly owned by the Republic of the
Philippines, it need not post an appeal bond. The NLRC
dismissed the appeal of BBC for non-perfection. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the NLRC. The Supreme Court, in
sustaining the CA, held that as a general rule, the
government and all the attached agencies with no legal
personality distinct from the former are exempt from posting
appeal bonds. The rationale is to protect the presumptive
judgment creditor against the insolvency of the presumptive
judgment debtor. When the State litigates, it is not required
to put up an appeal bond because it is presumed to be always
solvent. This exemption, however, does not, as a general rule,
apply to government-owned and controlled corporations
(GOCCs) for the reason that the latter has a personality
distinct from its shareholders. In this case, BBC, though
owned by the government, is a corporation with a personality
distinct from the Republic or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, and therefore do not partake in the latter’s
exemption from the posting of appeal bonds. Banahaw
Broadcasting Corporation vs. Cayetano PACANa III, et al, G.R.
No. 171673, May 30, 2011.
Appeal; posting of appeal bond within the 10-day period is
mandatory and jurisdictional. Respondents filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and reimbursement
of unpaid Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) benefits
against petitioner. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in
favor of respondents and ordered petitioner BBC to pay the
money claims. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC, and without
posting the appeal bond, filed a Motion for the Re-
computation of the Monetary Award in order that the appeal
bond may be reduced. The NLRC denied the motion and
dismissed the appeal of BBC for non-perfection. The Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court both sustained the dismissal
by the NLRC. The Motion for the Re-computation of the
Monetary Award filed by BBC was tantamount to a motion for
extension to perfect the appeal, which is prohibited by the
rules. The payment of the appeal bond within the period
provided by law is an indispensable and jurisdictional
requisite and not a mere technicality of law or procedure.
Hence, the failure on the part of BBC to perfect the appeal
had the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory.
Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation vs. Cayetano PACANa III,
et al, G.R. No. 171673, May 30, 2011.
Voluntary Resignation; financial assistance may be awarded
on equity considerations. Petitioner filed a complaint for
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illegal dismissal against respondent. Finding instead that
petitioner had voluntarily resigned, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint against respondent, but ordered the
latter to pay P18,000.00 by way of financial assistance. On
appeal, the NLRC found petitioner to be illegally dismissed.
The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the findings of the LA but
deleted the award of financial assistance, ruling that the
same may not be awarded in cases of voluntary resignation.
The Supreme Court, in upholding the award of financial
assistance, stated that while the rule is that financial
assistance is allowed only in instances where the employee is
validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or
those reflecting on his moral character, there are instances
when financial assistance may be allowed as a measure of
social justice and as an equitable concession. In this case,
petitioner, who has served respondent for more than eight
years without committing any infraction, may be granted
such financial assistance on equity considerations. Rodolfo
Luna vs. Allado Construction Company, Inc. and/or Ramon
Allado, G.R. No. 175251, May 30, 2011.
National Labor Relations Commission; authority to review is
limited to issues specifically brought before it on appeal.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
respondent. Finding that petitioner had voluntarily resigned,
the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint against
respondent, but ordered the latter to pay P18,000.00 by way
of financial assistance. Respondents interposed an appeal
with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), purely
for the purpose of questioning the validity of the grant of
financial assistance made by the Labor Arbiter. Instead, the
NLRC ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed and was
entitled to separation pay. The Court of Appeals (CA) held
that it was grave abuse of discretion for the NLRC to rule on
the issue of illegal dismissal when the only issue raised to it
on appeal was the propriety of the award of financial
assistance. The Supreme Court sustained the view of the CA,
reasoning that Section 4(d), Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC expressly provides that, on appeal,
the NLRC shall limit itself only to the specific issues that were
elevated for review. In the case at bar, the NLRC evidently
went against its own rules of procedure when it passed upon
the issue of illegal dismissal although this question was not
raised by respondents in their appeal. Rodolfo Luna vs. Allado
Construction Company, Inc. and/or Ramon Allado, G.R. No.
175251, May 30, 2011.
(Note: as of the date of this post, the Supreme Court website
has not yet published the May 2011 cases except for May 30
and May 31 cases. This post will be updated after the other
May 2011 cases become available.)
(Leslie thanks Katrina Chua for assisting in the preparation of
this post.)
April 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on
Political Law
Posted on May 18, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV • Posted in
Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law •
Here are selected April 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of
the Philippines on political law.
Constitutional Law
Cityhood Laws; Equal protection. The petitioners in this case
reiterate their position that the Cityhood Laws violate Section
6 and Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, the Equal
Protection Clause, and the right of local governments to a just
share in the national taxes. This was denied by the Supreme
86 | P a g e
Court. Congress clearly intended that the local government
units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the
coverage of R.A. No. 9009 (the Cityhood Law). The House of
Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, entitled
Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in
Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage
of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on
Joint Resolution No. 29. Even so, the House of
Representatives readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded
Joint Resolution No. 1 to the Senate for approval. Again, the
Senate failed to approve Joint Resolution No. 1. Thereafter,
the conversion bills of the respondents were individually filed
in the House of Representatives, and were all unanimously
and favorably voted upon by the Members of the House of
Representatives. The bills, when forwarded to the Senate,
were likewise unanimously approved by the Senate. The acts
of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption
clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but
the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to
exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage
of R.A. No. 9009. Thereby, R.A. No. 9009, and, by necessity,
the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the
express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses.
League of Cities of the Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et
al./League of Cities of the Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC,
et al./League of Cities of the Philippines etc., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No.
178056. April 12, 2011.
Cityhood Laws; Just share in national taxes. The share of
local government units is a matter of percentage under
Section 285 of the Local Government Code (LGC), not a
specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%,
determined on the basis of population (50%), land area (25%),
and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the
number of existing cities, such that when the number of cities
increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for
cities. However, the Supreme Court noted that the allocation
by the National Government is not a constant, and can either
increase or decrease. With every newly converted city
becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the
percentage of internal revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of
each city will decrease, although the actual amount received
may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is
a necessary consequence of Section 285 and Section 286 of
the LGC. In this case, since the conversion by the Cityhood
Laws is not violative of the Constitution and the LGC, the
respondents are thus also entitled to their just share in the
IRA allocation for cities. League of Cities of the Philippines
etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the
Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of
the Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No.
176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056. April 12, 2011.
Expenditure of Public Funds; Requirements. The
Administrative Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering
into contracts involving the expenditure of public funds
unless two prior requirements are satisfied. First, there must
be an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure required
in the contract. Second, there must be attached to the
contract a certification by the proper accounting official and
auditor that funds have been appropriated by law and such
funds are available. Failure to comply with any of these two
requirements renders the contract void. The clear purpose of
these requirements is to insure that government contracts are
never signed unless supported by the corresponding
appropriation law and fund availability. The Supreme Court
found that the three contracts between Philippine National
Railways (PNR) and Kanlaon do not comply with the
requirement of a certification of appropriation and fund
availability. Even if a certification of appropriation is not
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applicable to PNR if the funds used are internally generated,
still a certificate of fund availability is required. Thus, the
three contracts between PNR and Kanlaon were found to be
void for violation of Sections 46, 47, and 48, Chapter 8,
Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987,
as well as Sections 85, 86, and 87 of the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines. Philippine National
Railways v. Kanlaon Construction Enterprises, Co., Inc., G.R.
No. 182967. April 6, 2011.
Locus Standi. For a party to have locus standi, one must
allege “such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.” Because constitutional cases are often public
actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other
persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this
interest in the constitutional question raised. It cannot be
denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in
the event their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment is
denied and their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and
to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution is denied with finality. Indeed, according to the
Supreme Court, they have sufficiently shown that they have a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that if the
Resolution ordering finality be not reconsidered, their election
to their respective positions during the May 10, 2010 polls
and its concomitant effects would all be nullified and be put
to naught. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. Vs. Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050. April 12, 2011.
Moot and academic Principle; Exception. The “moot and
academic” principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1)
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised
requires formation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. Vs.
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No.
180050. April 12, 2011.
Administrative Law
Government Employee; Dishonesty; Misconduct. Dishonesty
is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a
matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the
performance of his duty. On the other hand, misconduct is a
transgression of some established or definite rule of action, is
a forbidden act, is a dereliction of duty, is willful in character,
and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.
More particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public
officer. The term, however, does not necessarily imply
corruption or criminal intent. In this case, petitioner’s acts
were found by the Supreme Court as clearly reflecting his
dishonesty and grave misconduct. He allowed the Spouses
Abuan to use his position as SSS Senior Member Services
Representative to make their “clients” believe that he could
give them undue advantage – over others without the same
connection – by processing their SSS claims faster. Likewise,
his acts, according to the SC, imply malevolent intent, and
not merely error in judgment. He was aware of what the
Spouses Abuan were doing and was complicit in the same. At
the very least, according to the Supreme Court, he failed to
stop the illegal trade, and that constitutes willful disregard of
the laws and rules. Jerome Japson v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 189479. April 12, 2011.
Agrarian Law
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Agrarian Reform; Right to just compensation. Apart from the
requirement that compensation for expropriated land must be
fair and reasonable, compensation, to be “just,” must also be
made without delay. In simpler terms, for the government’s
payment to be considered just compensation, the landowner
must receive it in full without delay. In the present case, it is
undisputed that the government took the petitioners’ lands
on December 9, 1996; the petitioners only received full
payment of the just compensation due on May 9, 2008. This
circumstance, by itself, was found by the Supreme Court as
already confirming the unconscionable delay in the payment
of just compensation. APO Fruits Corporation and Hijo
Plantation, Inc. v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No.
164195. April 5, 2011.
Local Government Code
Local Government; Requisites for creation of province. The
central policy considerations in the creation of local
government units are economic viability, efficient
administration, and capability to deliver basic services to
their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the Local
Government Code, i.e., income, population and land area, are
all designed to accomplish these results. Without doubt, the
primordial criterion in the creation of local government units,
particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the
clear intent of the framers of the LGC. However, there is an
exemption provided in the Local Government Code in terms of
the land area requirement. When the local government unit to
be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt
from the land area requirement as expressly provided in
Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC, if the local
government unit to be created is a municipality or a
component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province
under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated
under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Supreme Court found
no reason why this exemption should not apply also to
provinces. In fact, the Supreme Court observed that
considering the physical configuration of the Philippine
archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group
of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created
province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore,
logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was
expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450
(for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently
omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the
exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-
IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional
oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true
legislative intent. The Court thus upheld the validity of Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. Vs. Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050. April 12,
2011.
(Teng thanks Charmaine Rose K. Haw for her help in preparing
this post.)
March 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on
Political Law
Posted on April 26, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV • Posted in
Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law •
Here are selected March 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines on political law.
Constitutional Law
COMELEC; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held in this case that
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despite recourse to it, it cannot rule on the issue of
citizenship of petitioner Gonzalez. Subsequent events showed
that Gonzalez had not only been duly proclaimed, he had also
taken his oath of office and assumed office as Member of the
House of Representatives. Once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member
of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to the candidate’s election and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
Fernando V. Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R.
No. 192856, March 8, 2011.
Equal Protection. The main issue in this case is whether or
not PAGCOR is still exempt from corporate income tax and
VAT with the enactment of R.A. No. 9337. The Supreme Court
held that under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1977, petitioner is no longer exempt from corporate
income tax as it has been effectively omitted from the list of
GOCCs that are exempt from it. The burden of proof rests
upon the party claiming exemption to prove that it is, in fact,
covered by the exemption so claimed. In this case, PAGCOR
failed to prove that it is still exempt from the payment of
corporate income tax, considering that Section 1 of R.A. No.
9337 amended Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1997 by omitting PAGCOR from the
exemption. PAGCOR cannot find support in the equal
protection clause of the Constitution, as the legislative
records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting dated October
27, 1997, of the Committee on Ways and Means, show that
PAGCOR’s exemption from payment of corporate income tax,
as provided in Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424, or the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997, was not made pursuant to a
valid classification based on substantial distinctions and the
other requirements of a reasonable classification by
legislative bodies, so that the law may operate only on some,
and not all, without violating the equal protection clause. The
legislative records show that the basis of the grant of
exemption to PAGCOR from corporate income tax was
PAGCOR’s own request to be exempted. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011.
Impeachment; Initiation. The Supreme Court reiterated its
previous ruling that the term “initiate” as used in Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial
action on said complaint. The initial action of the House of
Representatives on the complaint is the referral of the same to
the Committee on Justice. Ma. Merceditas C. Gutierrez v. The
House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No.
193459, March 8, 2011.
Impeachment; Promulgation of Rules. When the Constitution
uses the word “promulgate,” it does not necessarily mean to
publish in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. Promulgation, as used in Section 3(8), Article XI
of the Constitution, suitably takes the meaning of “to make
known” as it should be generally understood. Ma. Merceditas
C. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, March 8, 2011.
Non-impairment Clause. Petitioner PAGCOR, in this case,
states that the private parties/investors transacting with it
considered the tax exemptions, which inure to their benefit,
as the main consideration and inducement for their decision
to transact/invest with it. Petitioner argues that the
withdrawal of its exemption from corporate income tax by
R.A. No. 9337 has the effect of changing the main
consideration and inducement for the transactions of private
parties with it; thus, the amendatory provision is violative of
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. The SC held
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that a franchise partakes of the nature of a grant which is
beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution. Under Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution, PAGCOR’s franchise is subject to amendment,
alteration or repeal by Congress such as the amendment
under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9377. Hence, the provision in
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of R.A.
No. 8424 by withdrawing the exemption of PAGCOR from
corporate income tax, which may affect any benefits to
PAGCOR’s transactions with private parties, is not violative of
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011.
Senate Ethics Committee; Due Process. This case refers to the
ethics complaint filed against Sen. Manny Villar on the
alleged double insertion of Php200 million for the C-5 Road
Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act.
Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics
Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative
of Senator Villar’s right to due process. The SC did not agree.
The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own
rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this
Court. The only limitation to the power of Congress to
promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum, voting,
and publication when required. As long as these requirements
are complied with, according to the SC, the Court will not
interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules.
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the
Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile,
G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
Senate Ethics Committee; Equal Protection. Petitioners allege
that the Senate Committee of the Whole was constituted
solely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction over the
complaint against Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege
that the act was discriminatory and removed Senator Villar’s
recourse against any adverse report of the Ethics Committee
to the Senate as a body. The SC did not agree with this. The
Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that “all matters
relating to the conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity,
integrity and reputation of the Senate and its Members shall
be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee
on Ethics and Privileges.” However, in this case, the refusal of
the Minority to name its members to the Ethics Committee
stalled the investigation. In short, while ordinarily an
investigation about one of its members’ alleged irregular or
unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics
Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing
the investigation when they refused to nominate their
members to the Ethics Committee. Even Senator Villar called
the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he
would answer the accusations against him on the floor and
not before the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances,
the referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole
was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics
Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the
Senate. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of
the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile,
G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
Senate; Publication of Rules. Petitioners assail the non-
publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole. Respondent counters that publication is not necessary
because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted
the Rules of the Ethics Committee which had been published
in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. Respondent alleges
that there is only one set of Rules that governs both the
Ethics Committee and the Senate Committee of the Whole.
The SC held that the Constitution does not require
publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since
rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their
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members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules
need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide
for their publication before the rules can take effect. In this
particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before
the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not
required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the
Rules expressly mandate their publication. To comply with
due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own
internal rules if the rights of its own members are affected.
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the
Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile,
G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
Senate; Quorum and Voting. If the Senate is constituted as a
Committee of the Whole, a majority of the Senate is required
to constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to Section
16(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Otherwise, there will be a
circumvention of this express provision of the Constitution on
quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole require modification to comply with
requirements of quorum and voting which the Senate must
have overlooked in this case. In any event, in case of conflict
between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole and
the Constitution, the latter will of course prevail. . Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole
represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No.
187714, March 8, 2011.
Unlawful Expenditure for being Excessive; Factors. Price is
considered “excessive” if it is more than the 10% allowable
price variance between the price paid for the item bought and
the price of the same item per canvass of the auditor. In
determining whether or not the price is excessive, the
following factors may be considered: (a) supply and demand
forces in the market; (b) government price quotations; (c)
warranty of products or special features; (d) brand of
products. In this case, the issue was whether the computer
units bought by Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)
from Tetra were overpriced. The records showed that while
the respondents found nothing wrong per se with the criteria
adopted by the CDA in the overall evaluation of the bids, the
technical aspect was seriously questioned. The final technical
evaluation report was apparently manipulated to favor Tetra,
which offered a Korean-made brand as against Microcircuits
which offered a US-made brand said to be more durable, at a
lower price. The SC concluded that the price per item of the
PC units, laptop and UPS were overpriced by almost 50%.
This comparison was based on the initial purchase of 23 PC
units with the bid price by Tetra of Php1,269,630.00 (23 PC
units, 1 unit 386 Tower and 1 unit 386 Notebook) under
Disbursement Voucher No. 01-92-12-2399. There was an
additional (repeat) purchase of 21 PC units for
Php929,649.00 (same price per item of Php44,269.00) and
one unit UPS for Php86,000.00. The total contract price
obtained by Tetra was Php2,285,279.00, of which COA
disallowed the amount of Php881,819.00 representing the
overprice per the auditor’s findings. Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr.
v. Guillermo N. Carague, et al., G.R. No. 157838, March 8,
2011.
Unlawful Expenditure; Liability of Public Officers. The SC
held the petitioner liable personally and solidarily for the
disallowed amount of Php881,819.00. The doctrine of
separate personality of a corporation finds no application
because the Cooperative Development Authority is not a
private entity but a government agency created by virtue of
Republic Act No. 6939 in compliance with the provisions of
Section 15, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover,
respondents satisfactorily established that petitioner acted in
bad faith when he prevailed upon the Development Academy
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of the Philippines-Technical Evaluation Committee (DAP-TEC)
to modify the initial result of the technical evaluation of the
computers by imposing an irrelevant grading system that was
intended to favor one of the bidders, after the bids had been
opened. Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. v. Guillermo N. Carague, et
al., G.R. No. 157838, March 8, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative Proceeding; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction.
This case refers to the ethics complaint filed against Sen.
Manny Villar on the alleged double insertion of Php200
million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008
General Appropriations Act. Respondent avers that primary
recourse of petitioners should have been to the Senate and
that the Supreme Court must uphold the separation of
powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the
government. The SC held that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented
here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary,
the issues here are purely legal questions which are within
the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not for an
administrative agency or the Senate to resolve. Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole
represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No.
187714, March 8, 2011.
Agrarian Law
Agrarian Reform; Qualifications of Beneficiary. DAR
Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1990, enumerated the
qualifications of a beneficiary: (1) Landless; (2) Filipino
citizen; (3) Actual occupant/tiller who is at least 15 years of
age or head of the family at the time of filing application; and
(4) Has the willingness, ability and aptitude to cultivate and
make the land productive. The SC found that petitioner
Lebrudo does not qualify as a beneficiary because of (1) and
(3). First, Lebrudo is not landless. According to the records,
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Amelia Sangalang issued a
certification dated 28 February 1996 attesting that Lebrudo
was awarded by the DAR with a home lot consisting of an
area of 236 square meters situated at Japtinchay Estate, Bo.
Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite. Next, Lebrudo is not the actual
occupant or tiller of the lot at the time of the filing of the
application. Loyola and her family were the actual occupants
of the lot at the time Loyola applied to be a beneficiary under
the CARP. Julian S. Lebrudo and Reynaldo L. Lebrudo v.
Remedios Loyola, G.R. No. 181370, March 9, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; Role of Land Bank of the Philippines. In this
case, the issue was whether the Land Bank of the Philippines
has the personality to file a petition for determination of just
compensation before the Special Agrarian Court. The SC held
that LBP did. The LBP is an agency created primarily to
provide financial support in all phases of agrarian reform
pursuant to Section 74 of RA 3844 or the Agricultural Reform
Code and Section 64 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. In the previous case of Heirs of
Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
the SC held that LBP is not merely a nominal party in the
determination of just compensation, but an indispensable
participant in such proceedings. It is primarily responsible for
the valuation and determination of compensation for all
private lands. It has the discretion to approve or reject the
land valuation and just compensation for a private
agricultural land placed under the CARP. In case the LBP
disagrees with the valuation of land and determination of just
compensation by a party, the DAR, or even the courts, the
LBP not only has the right, but the duty, to challenge the
same, by appeal to the Court of Appeals or to this Court, if
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appropriate. Davao Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 181566 & 181570. March 9, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; Sale or Conveyance of Land. It is clear from
Section 27 of RA 6657 that lands awarded to beneficiaries
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
may not be sold, transferred or conveyed for a period of 10
years. The law enumerated four exceptions: (1) through
hereditary succession; (2) to the government; (3) to the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP); or (4) to other qualified
beneficiaries. In short, during the prohibitory 10-year period,
any sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights is void,
except as allowed by law, in order to prevent a circumvention
of agrarian reform laws. In this case, petitioner Lebrudo
insists that he is entitled to one-half portion of the lot
awarded to Loyola under the CARP as payment for
shouldering all the expenses for the transfer of the title of the
lot from respondent Loyola’s mother, Cristina Hugo, to
Loyola’s name. Lebrudo used the two Sinumpaang Salaysay
executed by Loyola alloting to him the one-half portion of the
lot as basis for his claim. In other words, waiver of rights and
interests over landholdings awarded by the government is
invalid for being violative of agrarian reform laws. Julian S.
Lebrudo and Reynaldo L. Lebrudo v. Remedios Loyola, G.R.
No. 181370, March 9, 2011.
Election Law
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Disqualification of
Candidate; Period for Filing Petition. Petitioner Fernando V.
Gonzalez and private respondent Reno G. Lim both filed
certificates of candidacy for the position of Representative of
the 3rd congressional district of the Province of Albay in the
May 10, 2010 elections. On March 30, 2010, a Petition for
Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) was filed by Stephen Bichara [SPA No. 10-074 (DC)] on
the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish national, being the
legitimate child of a Spanish father and a Filipino mother,
and that he failed to elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority in accordance with the provisions
of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625. The SC explained the
difference between Cancellation under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Disqualification under Section
68 of the OEC. A petition to cancel a candidate’s COC may be
filed under Section 78 of the OEC exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as
required by law is false. On the other hand, a petition for
disqualification of a candidate may also be filed pursuant to
Section 68 for committing prohibited acts referred to in said
section. As to the ground of false representation in the COC
under Section 78, the Court in a previous case elaborated
that the misrepresentation must be material, i.e.
misrepresentation regarding age, residence and citizenship or
non-possession of natural-born Filipino status. In this case,
the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) based on the allegation
that Gonzalez was not a natural-born Filipino which was filed
before the elections is in the nature of a petition filed under
Section 78. The recitals in the petition in said case, however,
state that it was filed pursuant to Section 4 (b) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696 and Section 68 of the OEC to disqualify
a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some
grounds for disqualification. The COMELEC treated the
petition as one filed both for disqualification and cancellation
of COC, with the effect that Section 68, in relation to Section
3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, is applicable
insofar as determining the period for filing the petition. This
Rule provides the prescriptive period of filing to be not later
than the date of proclamation. On the other hand, the
procedure for filing a petition for cancellation of COC is
covered by Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
which provides as the prescriptive period to be within five (5)
days following the last day for the filing of certificate of
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candidacy. Section 4(B) of Resolution No. 8696 represents
another attempt to modify by a mere procedural rule the
statutory period for filing a petition to cancel COC on the
ground of false representation therein regarding a candidate’s
qualifications. Section 4(B) of Resolution No. 8696 would
supplant the prescribed period of filing of petition under
Section 78 with that provided in Section 68 even if the latter
provision does not at all cover the false representation
regarding age, residence and citizenship which may be raised
in a petition under Section 78. If the purpose behind this rule
promulgated by the COMELEC – allowing a petition to cancel
COC based on the candidate’s non-compliance with
constitutional and statutory requirements for elective office,
such as citizenship, to be filed even beyond the period
provided in Section 78 – was simply to remedy a perceived
“procedural gap” though not expressly stated in Resolution
No. 8696, the Court, in a previous case, had already rejected
such justification. Fernando V. Gonzalez v. Commission on
Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011.
(Teng thanks Charmaine Rose K. Haw for her help in the
preparation of this post. This post will be updated to include
additional March 2011 cases.)
Dissension in the Court: March 2011
Posted on April 12, 2011 by Jose Ma. G. Hofileña • Posted in
Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law •
The following is a summary of a recent decision promulgated
by the High Court in March 2011 where one Justice felt
compelled to express her dissent from the decision penned by
the ponente.
1. An Uncooperative Audit (Villarama vs. Sereno)
The case of Verzosa vs. Carague involves the Cooperative
Development Authority (CDA) and an uncooperative
Commission of Audit (COA).
Sometime almost twenty years ago, the CDA conducted a
public bidding for the supply to the CDA of computer
equipment and peripherals. The three entities that took part
were Tetra Corporation-Trigem Computers (Tetra),
Microcircuits Co. (Microcircuits), and Columbia Computers
(Columbia).
Following the bidding, the evaluation (which also included a
technical evaluation made by the Development Academy of
the Philippines (DAP) at the request of the CDA) and the
ensuing approval given by Candelario L. Versoza, Jr. as the
CDA’s Executive Director, in December 1992, Tetra was
awarded the supply contract for the total amount of
P2,285,279.00, which was eventually paid by the CDA to
Tetra.
Months after the purchase, the COA Resident Auditor
assigned to the CDA sought the assistance of the Technical
Services Office (TSO) of the COA to determine the
reasonableness of the prices of the purchased computers.
The TSO found that the purchased computers were
overpriced/excessive by a total of P881,819.00. Among other
things, the TSO noted that: (1) no volume discount was given
by the supplier, considering the number of units sold; (2) as
early as 1992, there were so much supply of computers in the
market so that the prices of computers were relatively low
already; and (3) when the CDA first offered to buy computers,
of the three qualified bidders, Microcircuits offered the lowest
bid price while Tetra offered the highest bid. The Resident
Auditor thus issued a Notice of Disallowance in November
1993, for the amount of P881,819.
95 | P a g e
The CDA sought a reconsideration and provided its basis as
to why, on the whole, the purchase from Tetra was justified.
Unconvinced, the COA issued its decision affirming the
disallowance thereby upholding the comparison process
undertaken by the Resident Auditor and the TSO. The CoA
held that CDA should not have awarded the contract to Tetra
but to the other competing bidder, whose bid is more
advantageous to the government. In addition, the COA held
Verzosa personally and solidarily liable for the disallowed
amount of P881,819 on account of his having acted in bad
faith.
The CDA therefore petitioned the High Court to reverse the
COA’s rulings.
The Supreme Court, in the main decision penned by Justice
Martin S. VIllarama, Jr., ruled in favor of the COA.
The ponente noted at the outset that acting on its
constitutional mandate to “promulgate accounting and
auditing rules, and regulations including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or
uses of government funds and properties,” the COA
promulgated certain amended rules which included
provisions relating to excessive expenditures which shall be
determined by place and origin of goods, volume or quantity
of purchase, service warranties, quality, special features of
units purchased and the like. Under those rules, price is
considered “excessive” if it is more than the 10% allowable
price variance between the price paid for the item bought and
the price of the same item per canvass of the auditor. And in
determining whether or not the price is excessive, several
stated factors may be considered by the COA.
Accordingly, in this case, the issue that had to be resolved
was whether the computer units bought by the CDA from
Tetra were overpriced.
The majority observed that the records showed that while the
COA found nothing wrong per se with the criteria adopted by
the CDA in the overall evaluation of the bids, the conduct of
the technical aspect was seriously doubtful. In particular, the
final technical evaluation report was apparently manipulated
to favor Tetra, which offered a Korean-made brand as against
Microcircuits which offered a US-made brand said to be more
durable, at a lower price.
Although the DAP, in a letter, confirmed to the CDA that
based on their evaluation in compliance with the “grading
system” specified by CDA, the units of Tetra were best suited
to the needs of CDA. However, Justice Villarama took note
that upon investigation, it was discovered that there was an
earlier report from the DAP which actually stated a contrary
finding but that a representative from CDA gave further
instructions to the DAP regarding “penalty points” that
should be applied for deviation in hardware specifications,
thus resulting in the affirmative letter mentioned earlier that
gave Tetra the highest ranking.
The main decision therefore held that it was clear that “the
conduct of public bidding in this case was not made
objectively with the end in view of purchasing quality
equipment at the least cost to the government. The price
difference far exceeded the 10% allowable variance in the unit
bought and the same item’s price…”.
The Court affirmed that “the findings of quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the COA, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are
96 | P a g e
generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality
if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. It is
only upon a clear showing that the COA acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that this Court will
set aside its decisions or final orders. We find no such
arbitrariness or grave abuse on the part of the COA when it
disallowed in audit the amount representing the overprice in
the payment by CDA for the purchased computer units and
peripherals, its findings are well-supported by the evidence on
record.”
As for Verzosa’s personal liability, Justice Villarama affirmed
that the COA had sufficiently established his bad faith when
he prevailed upon the DAP to modify the initial results of their
technical evaluation and accordingly, Section 103 of
Presidential Decree No. 1445 (Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines) which states:
SECTION 103. General liability for unlawful expenditures. —
Expenditures of government funds or uses of government
property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal
liability of the official or employee found to be directly
responsible therefor.
should apply.
The sole dissent was supplied by the newest associate justice
of the Supreme Court, Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno.
Justice Sereno raised five reasons why the COA’s ruling
against the CDA should be overturned.
“First, the Commission on Audit (COA) cannot violate the same
rules it imposes on all public offices regarding the manner of
conducting canvasses.”
The dissenter observed that the COA had taken issues with
the manner by which the DAP conducted its technical
evaluation, finding deficiencies in the manner by which the
competing bidders and their respective products were
compared. However, Justice Sereno cites the COA for having
itself conducted a questionable methodology in comparing
products and prices, including among others, that the COA’s
own evaluation was based only on alleged undocumented
telephone price canvass by a COA auditor.
“Second, the COA auditor, who admitted that she is not a
computer technology expert, cannot substitute her own
discretion for that of the CDA by denying the CDA’s right to
prefer the … the required specifications for the computers CDA
intended to purchase for its own use …”
“Third, the amount of disallowance has no basis in fact, is
grossly disproportionate to the total purchase price, and is in
the nature of punitive damages.”
“Fourth, this Court relies on the allegation that there were
instances of manipulation during the bidding process.
However, the records show that this allegation was belatedly
raised by respondents.”
Justice Sereno pointed out that this issue was not raised
before the COA and therefore, the petitioner was not afforded
due process to rebut these allegations while the case was still
pending with the COA.
97 | P a g e
“Fifth, there is no legal basis to make the CDA Executive
Director personally liable for the return of the disallowance.”
The dissenter took the view that Verzosa’s act of signing the
purchase documents was only ministerial, as the Pre-
qualification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) and the
Board of Administrators (BOA) acted on them.
According to Justice Sereno, “[t]here is a clear, bright line
that the [COA] must not cross. The powers that the 1987
Constitution granted it are only to “define the scope of its
audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods
required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance or irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of
government funds and properties.” This does not include the
substitution of preference of government agencies. Nor does
this allow COA to trample on the due process rights of
government auditees.”
She added that the decision to hold Versoza personally liable
engendered the following detrimental consequences:
(i) the bidding process is rendered inutile if we hold that
government agencies should always award purchase
contracts in favor of the lowest bidder; or even worse, that
they should simply purchase equipment from the suppliers
offering the lowest prices, regardless of brand or quality.
(ii) the discretionary power of government agencies to
determine criteria and the features of equipment or supplies
becomes irrelevant; because the COA’s preference in
determining the criteria and the features or characteristics of
the equipment or supplies is held as superior to that of any
other government agency.
(Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. vs. Guillermo N. Caraque, et al.
March 8, 2011, G.R. No. 157838. See dissenting opinion here.)
(author’s note: to the mind of this author, a degree of leeway
should be given to government agencies to determine the
precise specifications of equipment they need as they would
likely be more competent to know these matters. Having said
that, even if the CDA in fact knows more about what it wants
and needs, if the CDA indeed manipulated the process to
prefer one bidder over the rest, then the COA did its job and
should be upheld. Hmm… how would Heidi Mendoza have
decided?)
February 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on
Political Law
Posted on March 22, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV • Posted
in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law •
Tagged agrarian reform, Civil Service Commission, due
process, eminent domain, equal protection, judicial review,
local government •
Here are selected February 2011 rulings of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines on political law.
Constitutional Law
Administrative cases; right to be presumed innocent. The trial
court was correct in declaring that respondents had the right
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. This means that
an employee who has a pending administrative case filed
against him is given the benefit of the doubt and is
98 | P a g e
considered innocent until the contrary is proven. In this case,
respondents were placed under preventive suspension for 90
days from 23 May 2002 to 21 August 2002. After serving the
period of their preventive suspension and without the
administrative case being finally resolved, respondents should
have been reinstated and entitled to the grant of step
increment. The Board of Trustees of the Government Service
Insurance System, et al. v. Albert M. Velasco, et al. G.R. No.
170463, February 2, 2011.
Equal Protection; valid classification. Petitioners argue that
there is no substantial distinction between municipalities
with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and
municipalities that did not have pending bills, such that the
mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality from
another for the purpose of the income requirement. The SC
held that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was
merely to stop the “mad rush of municipalities wanting to be
converted into cities” and the apprehension that before long
the country will be a country of cities and without
municipalities. It found that the imposition of the P100
million average annual income requirement for the creation of
component cities was arbitrarily made as there was no
evidence or empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support
the choice of this amount. The imposition of a very high
income requirement of P100 million, increased from P20
million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for
municipalities to become component cities. The SC also found
that substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of
respondent municipalities to become component cities of their
respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood
Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating
economic growth and development in the provincial regions,
which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the
pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and
their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. League
of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of
Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of
Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No.
176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, February 15,
2011.
Expropriation; abandonment of public purpose. In this case,
the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA)
and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots
subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-
1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the
government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug
Airport. In fact, the Lahug Airport had been closed and
abandoned. Also, in this case, it was preponderantly
established by evidence that the National Airport Corporation,
MCIAA’s predecessor, through its team of negotiators, had
given assurance to the affected landowners that they would
be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event
they are no longer used for airport purposes. The SC held
that the government acquires only such rights in expropriated
parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title
over the properties. This means that in the event the
particular public use for which a parcel of land is
expropriated is abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to
recover or repurchase it as a matter of right, unless such
recovery or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly
deducible from the condemnation judgment. The SC held that
the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 enjoined MCIAA, as a
condition of approving expropriation, to allow recovery or
repurchase upon abandonment of the Lahug airport project.
In effect, the government merely held the properties
condemned in trust until the proposed public use or purpose
for which the lots were condemned was actually
consummated by the government. Since the government
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failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the
transfer of the property, then the lot owners can demand the
reconveyance of their old properties after the payment of the
condemnation price. A condemnor should commit to use the
property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for
the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to
return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so
desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it
expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process,
dishonor the judgment of expropriation. Anunciacion Vda. De
Ouano, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu
International Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in his
personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Olympia E.
Esteves, et al. and Aletha Suico Magat in her personal capacity
and as Attorney-in-Fact of Philip M. Suico, et al. G.R. Nos.
168770 & 168812, February 9, 2011.
Expropriation; reconveyance of expropriated property. In
accordance with Art. 1187 of the Civil Code on mutual
compensation, MCIAA may keep whatever income or fruits it
may have obtained from the parcels of land expropriated. In
turn, the landowners need not require the accounting of
interests earned by the amounts they received as just
compensation. Following Art. 1189 of the Civil Code providing
that if the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the
improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor, the
landowners do not have to settle the appreciation of the
values of their respective lots as part of the reconveyance
process, since the value increase is merely the natural effect
of nature and time. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v.
Republic of the Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu International
Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in his personal capacity
and as Attorney-in-Fact of Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and
Aletha Suico Magat in her personal capacity and as Attorney-
in-Fact of Philip M. Suico, et al. G.R. Nos. 168770 &
168812, February 9, 2011.
Impeachment; narration of facts. Petitioner urged the Court
to look into the narration of facts constituting the offenses
vis-à-vis her submissions disclaiming the allegations in the
complaints. The SC denied this as that would require the
Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question, which the Constitution has left to the
sound discretion of the legislature. Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
Impeachment; publication requirement. Petitioner contended
that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment
Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after
public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the
complaints. She likewise tacked her contention on Section
3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that
“Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” While
“promulgation” would seem synonymous to “publication,”
there is a statutory difference in their usage. Promulgation
must thus be used in the context in which it is generally
understood, that is, to make known. What is generally spoken
shall be generally understood. Between the restricted sense
and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail
unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to
be used. Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict
“promulgation” to “publication,” the former should be
understood to have been used in its general sense. It is
within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to
promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way
that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to
promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the
100 | P a g e
clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for the
Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how
to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed
a specific method of promulgation. The SC observed that it is
in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the
dictates of the Constitution. Had the Constitution intended to
have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated
so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of
procedure in legislative inquiries. Even assuming that
publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the
proceedings taken prior to the effectiveness of the
Impeachment Rules, which faithfully comply with the relevant
self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Ma. Merceditas
N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
Impeachment; One-Year Bar Rule. Article XI, Section 3,
paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: “No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.” Petitioner reckoned
the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first
impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four
days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15 th
Congress. She posited that within one year from July 22,
2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted
and referred to public respondent. Contrary to petitioner’s
claim, the SC found that the previous case of Francisco v.
House of Representatives was applicable to this case. There
the SC held that the term “initiate” means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it. It refers to the filing of
the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking
initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by
the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to
the Committee on Justice. With a simultaneous referral of
multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchstick
light the candle at the same time. According to the SC, what
is important is that there should only be one candle that is
kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning,
subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.
Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15,
2011.
Impeachment; sufficiency of form and substance. Petitioner
claimed that Congress failed to ascertain the sufficiency of
form and substance of the complaints on the basis of the
standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment
Rules. The SC found this claim to be untenable. The
determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an
impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express
constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of
Representatives which committed such determinative
function to public respondent. Contrary to petitioner’s
position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for
comprehensible standards in determining the sufficiency of
form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in
echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that
there must be a “verified complaint or resolution,” and that
the substance requirement is met if there is “a recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the committee.” Notatu dignum is the fact that
it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of
sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment
complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not
explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI
of the Constitution basically merely requires a “hearing.”
Prudential considerations behooved the Supreme Court to
respect the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively
carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any
contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines. Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives
101 | P a g e
Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15,
2011.
Internal Revenue Allotment; just share. Congress, who holds
the power of the purse, in enacting the Cityhood Laws, only
sought the well-being of respondent municipalities, having
seen their respective capacities to become component cities of
their provinces, temporarily stunted by the enactment of R.A.
No. 9009. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert
into component cities, Congress desired only to uphold the
very purpose of the LGC, i.e., to make the local government
units “enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the
attainment of national goals,” which is the very mandate of
the Constitution. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No.
178056, February 15, 2011.
International Agreements; limitations on sovereignty. The RP,
by entering into the Agreement, does thereby abdicate its
sovereignty, abdication being done by its waiving or
abandoning its right to seek recourse through the Rome
Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing
international crimes in the country. As it were, the Agreement
is but a form of affirmance and confirmation of the
Philippines’ national criminal jurisdiction. National criminal
jurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility and
within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal
offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to
the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide
to try “persons” of the US, as the term is understood in the
Agreement, under our national criminal justice system; or it
may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring
citizens or over US “persons” committing high crimes in the
country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of
the ICC over them. In the same breath, the US must extend
the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to “persons”
of the RP committing high crimes within US territorial
jurisdiction. By their nature, treaties and international
agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise
encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some
aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of
their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. The
usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may
be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal
undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same
privileges or immunities to the other. Bayan Muna, as
represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in
his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No.
159618, February 1, 2011.
International Agreements; treaties and executive agreements.
Under international law, there is no difference between
treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding
effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.
However, a treaty has greater “dignity” than an executive
agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond
doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the
President, the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike
an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior
statutory enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the
Non-Surrender Agreement between the Philippines and the US
is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a
treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by the Senate.
Petitioner relies on the case, Commissioner of Customs v.
Eastern Sea Trading, in which the Court stated: international
agreements involving political issues or changes of national
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policy and those involving international arrangements of a
permanent character usually take the form of treaties; while
those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well
established national policies and traditions and those
involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature
take the form of executive agreements. According to
petitioner, the subject of the Agreement does not fall under
any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in the
Eastern Sea Trading case that may be covered by an
executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations,
most-favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and
copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and
settlement of claims. The Supreme Court held, however, that
the categorization of subject matters that may be covered
by international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea
Trading is not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules
on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty
or an executive agreement as an instrument of international
relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form
of agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to craft an
international agreement in the form they so wish to further
their respective interests. The matter of form takes a back
seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the
enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the
parties in either international agreement each labor under the
pacta sunt servanda principle. Bayan Muna, as represented
by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity
as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618, February 1,
2011.
Judicial Review; expanded certiorari jurisdiction. Respondents
raised the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition. They argued that public respondent (the
Congress) was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two
impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act
that is discretionary in nature, and that its function is
inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation. The
case of Francisco v. House of Representatives characterizes
the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded
certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court reflects, includes
the power to “determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.” The SC found it well-within its power to
determine whether Congress committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of
its functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or
excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective
measures from the Court. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The
House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No.
193459, February 15, 2011.
Judicial Review; ripeness. An aspect of the “case-or-
controversy” requirement is the requisite of ripeness. The
question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the
direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged
conduct. In the present petition, the SC found no doubt that
questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous
referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a
mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present
constitutional vagaries which call for immediate
interpretation. The unusual act of simultaneously referring to
public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a
novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner was,
therefore, found not to have acted prematurely when she took
the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one
impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an
impeachable officer within a period of one year. Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives
103 | P a g e
Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15,
2011.
Legal Standing; requirements. When suing as a citizen, the
interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a
statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid,
but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement,
and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest. In this case, as citizens,
petitioners’ interest in the subject matter of the petition is
direct and personal. At the very least, their assertions
questioning the Non-Surrender Agreement between the
Philippines and the US are made of a public right, i.e., to
ascertain that the Agreement did not go against established
national policies, practices, and obligations bearing on the
State’s obligation to the community of nations. Bayan Muna,
as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo,
in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No.
159618, February 1, 2011.
Stare Decisis; nature. The principle of stare decisis enjoins
adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by
the Supreme Court in its final decisions. It is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the
same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and
stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in
Article 8 of the Civil Code. The previous case of Lubrica and
the present case involve two different issues. The relief prayed
for in the previous case of Lubrica is that the amount for
deposit in favor of the landowner be determined on the basis
of the time of payment and not of the time of taking. But in
the present case, the prayer of the LBP is for the deposit of
the valuation of the Land Bank of the Philippines and
Department of Agrarian Reform and not that of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator. The principle of stare decisis,
therefore, does not apply. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon.
Ernesto P. Pagayatan, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 46, San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Josefina S. Lubrica, in her
capacity as Assignee of Federico Suntay, et al., G.R. No.
177190, February 23, 2011.
Sovereign Immunity; expropriation. The doctrine of sovereign
immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid
claim for compensation arising from the taking without just
compensation and without the proper expropriation
proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property.
The SC cited the previous case of De los Santos v.
Intermediate Appellate Court where it ruled that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for perpetrating
any injustice on a citizen. In exercising the right of eminent
domain, the State exercised its jus imperii, as distinguished
from its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet, even in that
area, where private property had been taken in expropriation
without just compensation being paid, the defense of
immunity from suit could not be set up by the State against
an action for payment by the owners. Air Transportation Office
v. Spouses David and Elisea Ramos, G.R. No.
159402, February 23, 2011.
Sovereign Immunity; sovereign function and proprietary
function. The immunity from suit is based on the political
truism that the State, as a sovereign, can do no wrong.
Practical considerations dictate the establishment of
immunity from suit in favor of the State. Otherwise, and the
State is suable at the instance of every other individual,
government service may be severely obstructed and public
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safety endangered because of the number of suits that the
State has to defend against. An unincorporated government
agency without any separate juridical personality of its own
enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an
inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for
damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need
to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency
performing governmental function and one performing
proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been
upheld in favor of the former because its function is
governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been
upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in
pursuit of a necessary function of government but was
essentially a business. In this case, the juridical character of
the Air Transportation Office (“ATO”) as an agency of the
Government was not performing a purely governmental or
sovereign function, but was instead involved in the
management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an
activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in
its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the
State’s immunity from suit. Air Transportation Office v.
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February
23, 2011.
Supreme Court; modification of doctrines and principles. The
doctrine of immutability of decisions applies only to final and
executory decisions. Since the present cases may involve a
modification or reversal of a Court-ordained doctrine or
principle, the judgment rendered by the Special Third
Division may be considered unconstitutional, hence, it can
never become final. A decision rendered by a Division of the
SC in violation of the constitutional provision, that only the
SC En Banc may modify or reverse a SC doctrine and
principle, would be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore,
invalid. Any entry of judgment may thus be said to be
“inefficacious” since the decision is void for being
unconstitutional. That a judgment must become final at some
definite point at the risk of occasional error cannot be
appreciated in a case that embroils not only a general
allegation of “occasional error” but also a serious accusation
of a violation of the Constitution, viz., that doctrines or
principles of law were modified or reversed by the Court’s
Special Third Division August 4, 2009 Resolution. David Lu v.
Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al./Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al. v. David
Lu/John Lu Ym, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals of Ceby
City, et al. G.R. No. 153690/G.R. No. 157381/G.R. No.
170889. February 15, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative Proceedings; findings of fact of quasi-judicial
agencies. Petitioners argue that the Commission on Audit
(COA) committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in declaring the prepayment stipulation in the
contract between Land Bank and Remad Livestock
Corporation (REMAD) proscribed by the State Audit Code of
the Philippines. The Supreme Court did not give merit to
petitioner’s argument. It emphasized that the COA Auditor
noted that “nowhere in the documents reviewed disclosed
about prepayment scheme with REMAD.” It is well settled that
findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA,
are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court,
if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their
expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction. If
the prepayment scheme was in fact authorized, petitioners
should have produced the document to prove such fact as
alleged by them in the present petition. However, the
Supreme Court was at a loss as to whether the prepayment
scheme was authorized as its review of “Annex I,” the
document to which petitioners base their authority to make
advance payments, does not contain such a stipulation or
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provision. In addition, the Supreme Court noted that much
reliance was made by petitioners on their allegation that the
terms of the Credit Facility Proposal allowed for prepayments
or advancement of the payments prior to the delivery of the
cattle by the supplier REMAD. It appears, however, that a
CFP, even if admittedly a pro forma contract and emanating
from the Land Bank main office, is merely a facility proposal
and not the contract of loan between Land Bank and the
cooperatives. It is in the loan contract that the parties
embody the terms and conditions of a transaction. If there is
any agreement to release the loan in advance to REMAD as a
form of prepayment scheme, such a stipulation should exist
in the loan contract. There is, nevertheless, no proof of such
stipulation as petitioners had failed to attach the CFPs or the
loan contracts relating to the present petition. Based on the
foregoing, the COA was not faulted for finding that petitioners
facilitated the commission of the irregular transaction. Ruben
Reyna, et al. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 167219,
February 8, 2011.
Agrarian Law
Agrarian Reform; exclusion and exemption from coverage. The
deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a
clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted
to livestock, swine and poultry-raising from the coverage of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Petitioner’s
admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for its
own livestock is fatal to its cause. The SC, in this case,
accorded respect to the CA’s observation that the assailed
MARO reports and the Investigating Team’s Report do not
actually contradict one another, finding that the 43 cows,
while owned by petitioner, were actually pastured outside the
subject property. Milestone Farms, Inc. v. Office of the
President, G.R. No. 182332, February 23, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; just compensation. The issue in this case is
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that RA
6657, rather than P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, is the law that
should apply in the determination of just compensation for
the subject agricultural land. The LBP and the DAR argue
that P.D. No. 27, as reaffirmed by E.O. No. 228, should be
applied in determining the just compensation for the subject
property of the case. They contend that P.D. No. 27 and E.O.
No. 228 prescribe the formula in determining the just
compensation of rice and corn lands tenanted as of October
21, 1972. As the subject property was tenanted and devoted
to rice production in 1972, the just value should be fixed at
the prevailing rate at that time, when the emancipation of the
tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil was declared in
P.D. No. 27. As to R.A. No. 6657, both the LBP and the DAR
insist that it applies only to ricelands and cornlands not
tenanted as of October 21, 1972. According to them, the
government’s OLT program on tenanted privately-owned rice
and corn lands pursuant to P.D. No. 27 continues separately
and distinctly from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) acquisition and distribution program under
R.A. No. 6657. The SC held that RA 6657 is the applicable
law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect.
This is so since the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 are also
applicable to the agrarian reform process of lands placed
under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, which has
not been completed upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. It
would certainly be inequitable to determine just
compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and
EO 228 considering the DAR’s failure to determine the just
compensation for a considerable length of time. Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Magin V. Ferrer, et al./Department of
Agrarian Reform, represented by Secretary Nasser C.
Pangandaman v. Antonio V. Ferrer and Ramon V. Ferrer. G.R.
No. 172230, February 2, 2011.
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Agrarian Reform; initial valuation and just compensation. It is
the initial valuation made by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) and the Land Bank of the Philippines that must
be released to the landowner in order for DAR to take
possession of the property. Otherwise stated, Sec. 16 of RA
6657 does not authorize the release of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator’s determination of just compensation for
the land which has not yet become final and executory. Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan,
Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro; and Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as Assignee
of Federico Suntay, et al., G.R. No. 177190, February 23,
2011.
Civil Service Law
Regulations; Civil Service. Not all rules and regulations
adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the
UP Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent
character are to be filed. Resolution No. 372 was about the
new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 was about the
authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution
No. 197 was about the GSIS merit selection and promotion
plan. Clearly, the assailed resolutions pertained only to
internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of the GSIS.
There was no need for the publication or filing of these
resolutions with the UP Law Center. The Board of Trustees of
the Government Service Insurance System, et al. v. Albert M.
Velasco, et al. G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011.
Local Government Code
Cityhood; criteria for conversion. The cases involved here
were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition
filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of
Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009,
constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the
municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood LGC itself. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC,
Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et
(COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.
subject laws. In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, February
SC En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and struck 15, 2011.
down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating
Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.
Then, in another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the SC
En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the Cityhood Laws as
constitutional. Thereafter, on August 24, 2010, the Court En
Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, reinstated the
November 18, 2008 Decision. The SC held that the Cityhood
laws were constitutional. Based on the deliberations by
Congress on R.A. No. 9009, Congress intended that those
with pending cityhood bills during the 11 th Congress would
not be covered by the new and higher income requirement of
P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. Notwithstanding
that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the
pending cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section
450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried
on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were
enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual
Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to
exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A.
No. 9009. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC,
et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et
al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.
G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, February
15, 2011.

Legislative power; amendment. R.A. No. 9009 amended the

LGC. But the SC also held that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws
amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found
therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the

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