Remedial Law

in REMEDIAL LAW
Prepared by: Dean Reynaldo U. Agranzamendez
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS IN REMEDIAL LAW
JULY 16, 2013
By:
REYNALDO U. AGRANZAMENDEZ
Dean, COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS (formerly
BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION), Baguio City
Reviewer, Remedial Law
CIVIL PROCEDURE
1. May an appeal be taken from an order denying a motion for reconsideration?
Mendiola v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 159746, July 18, 2012, teaches:
An order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order dismissing a complaint is a final

order, not an interlocutory order, as it puts an end to the particular matter resolved (which is the
dismissal of the complaint), or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for
the trial court to do other than to execute the order. Hence, an order denying a motion for
reconsideration of an order dismissing a complaint is appealable.
But an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is not appealable.
2. Whose duty is it to have the case set for pretrial? If the case has not been set for pretrial
for a long period of time, may the case be dismissed for failure to prosecute?
Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that it is the duty of the plaintiff,
after the last pleading has been served and filed, to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for
pretrial.
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, which took effect on August 16, 2004, provides, however, that: “Within
five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be
set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch
Clerk of Court shall issue a notice of pretrial.”
In Eloisa Merchandising, Inc. et al. v. Banco de Oro Universal Bank et al., G.R. No. 192716, June
13, 2012, the Supreme Court said: “While under the present Rules, it is now the duty of the clerk of
court to set the case for pre-trial if the plaintiff fails to do so within the prescribed period, this does not
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I press toward the mark for the
prize of the high calling of God in
Christ Jesus. - Philippians 3:14
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relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently.” (RUA is of the opinion that where
the clerk of court fails to set the case for pretrial, and the plaintiff likewise fails, within a reasonable
time, to move that his case be set for pretrial, the court may dismiss the case for failure to prosecute.)
3. May an amendment substantially alter the cause of action or defense?
Yes. Whether made as a matter of right or with leave of court, an amendment may now
substantially alter the cause of action or defense as stated in Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. (Lisam Enterprises, Inc. et al. v. Banco de Oro Unibank et al., G.R. No. 143264, April 23, 2012)
In Lisam Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme Court explained: “The courts should be liberal in allowing
amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies
between the parties are presented, their rights determined, and the case decided on the merits without
unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where
the amendment was made before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time
allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.
4. May an action for quieting of title (which is a special civil action governed by Rule 63) and
for declaration of nullity of title (which is an ordinary civil action) be dismissed on ground of improper
joinder of causes of action?
No. While Section 5, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that joinder shall not
include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules, Section 6 of the same Rule provides that
misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action
may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately.
(Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Fernando, Pampanga v. Soriano et al., G.R. No. 153829, Aug. 17,
2011)
In Ada, et al. v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435, Aug. 13, 2012, the Supreme Court said that a cause of
action for partition and a cause of action for rescission cannot be joined in a single complaint because
partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69, while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil
action. But if these two causes of action are joined in one complaint, and the misjoined cause of action
is not severed, the court may render judgment on all these causes of action.
The aforecited case of Ada, et al. v. Baylon has reiterated the rule that misjoinder of causes of
action is not a ground for dismissal. The Supreme Court went on to explain that courts have the power,
acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to order the severance of the misjoined
cause of action to be proceeded with separately. However, if there is no objection to the improper
joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the
simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously joined causes of action. The High Tribunal, however,
emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case has jurisdiction over all the
causes of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined cause of action has to be severed from
the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any adjudication rendered by the court with respect to
the same would be a nullity.
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5. The complaint for the recovery of possession of real property did not allege the assessed
value thereof. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction, but the trial
court denied the motion to dismiss. Is the trial court correct in denying the motion to dismiss?
No, the trial court is not correct.
A complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the
interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. Where the plaintiff fails to
allege in his complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the trial court seriously errs in
denying a motion to dismiss. (Quinagoran v. CA, G.R. No. 155179, Aug. 24, 2007)
6. If a complaint involving an intracorporate controversy is filed with the regional trial court
(which has not been designated as a special commercial court), may it transfer the case to the regional
trial court designated as a special commercial court?
No.
In Calleja, et al. v. Panday, et al., G.R. No. 168696, Feb. 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 680, the RTC Branch
58, San Jose, Camarines Norte, upon noticing that it did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case, issued an Order transferring the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The issue
brought to the Supreme Court was: WHETHER A BRANCH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH HAS
NO JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE A CASE HAS AUTHORITY TO REMAND THE SAME TO ANOTHER
CO-EQUAL COURT IN ORDER TO CURE THE DEFECTS ON VENUE AND JURISDICTION. The Supreme Court
resolved the issue in this wise:
“Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction

over respondents’ petition for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the
petition, the case was clearly one involving an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court
should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned
administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special
Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously
cognizable by the SEC.
Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power
to order the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The
only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for
lack of jurisdiction. In HLC Construction and Development Corp. v. Emily Homes
Subdivision Homeowners’ Association, the Court held that the trial court, having no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, should dismiss the same so the
issues therein could be expeditiously heard and resolved by the tribunal which was
clothed with jurisdiction.”
The same issue was presented to the Supreme Court in Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-II Builders,
Inc., et al., G.R. No. 192649, March 9, 2011, 645 SCRA 219. The Supreme Court summarized the
proceedings had in the court below, as follows:
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“The record shows that R-II Builders’ original complaint dated 23 August
2005 was initially docketed as Civil Case No. 05-113407 before Branch 24 of the
Manila, a designated Special Commercial Court. With HGC’s filing of a motion for a
preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses asserted in its answer and R-II
Builders’ filing of its Amended and Supplemental Complaint dated 31 July 2007, said
court issued an order dated 2 January 2008 ordering the re-raffle of the case upon
the finding that the same is not an intra-corporate dispute.
Relying on its ruling in Calleja, the Supreme Court resolved the issue in these words:
“We find that, having squarely raised the matter in its Rule 65 petition for
certiorari and prohibition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 111153, HGC correctly faults
the CA for not finding that Branch 24 of the Manila RTC had no authority to order the
transfer of the case to respondent RTC. Being outside the jurisdiction of Special
Commercial Courts, the rule is settled that cases which are civil in nature, like the
one commenced by R-II Builders, should be threshed out in a regular court. With its
acknowledged lack of jurisdiction over the case, Branch 24 of the Manila RTC should
have ordered the dismissal of the complaint, since a court without subject matter
jurisdiction cannot transfer the case to another court. Instead, it should have simply
ordered the dismissal of the complaint, considering that the affirmative defenses for
which HGC sought hearing included its lack of jurisdiction over the case.
Calleja v. Panday, while on facts the other way around, i.e., a branch of the
RTC exercising jurisdiction over a subject matter within the Special Commercial
Court’s authority, dealt squarely with the issue:
Whether a branch of the Regional Trial Court which has no jurisdiction to try
and decide a case has authority to remand the same to another co-equal Court in
order to cure the defects on venue and jurisdiction.
Calleja ruled on the issue, thus:
Such being the case, RTC Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power
to order the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The
only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for
lack of jurisdiction.”
7. On what date is an amended complaint deemed filed?
The rule expressed in Sec. 5, Rule 1 is that a civil action is commenced by the filing of the original
complaint in court. But as held in Dionisio v. Linsangan, G.R. No. 178159, March 2, 2011, an amended
complaint that changes the plaintiff’s cause of action is technically a new complaint. Consequently, the
action is deemed filed on the date of the filing of such amended complaint, not on the date of the filing
of the original complaint. Thus, the statute of limitation resumes its run until it is arrested by the filing
of the amended complaint. However, an amendment which does not alter the cause of action but
merely supplements or amplifies the facts previously alleged, does not affect the reckoning date of filing
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based on the original complaint. The cause of action, unchanged, is not barred by the statute of
limitations that expired after the filing of the original complaint.
8. The certification on non-forum shopping may be signed on behalf of a corporation by an

officer specifically authorized by means of a board resolution. As stated in Asean Pacific Planners, et
al. v. City of Urdaneta, et al., G.R. No. 162525, Sept. 23, 2008, only individuals vested with authority
by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping on behalf of the
corporation. Are there officers who may sign such certification without need of board resolution?
Yes. These officers are: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors; (2) the President of a
corporation; (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager; (4) Personnel Officer; and (5)
Employment Specialist in a labor case. (Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 151413, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 10, 17-19).
9. In dela Cruz v. Andres, G.R. No. 161864, April 27, 2007, the Supreme Court explained that
a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an equitable
remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate
remedy. It may be availed of only after a judgment, final order, or other proceeding was taken
against petitioner in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Is petition
for relief from judgment available as a remedy in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court?
No. A petition for relief from judgment is not available as a remedy in the Court of Appeals or
in the Supreme Court. Although Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
party in any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, Rule 56, which enumerates the cases
originally cognizable by the Supreme Court, does not include it. The phrase “any court” in Rule 38
refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court. There is no provision in
the Rules of Court making the petition for relief applicable in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme
Court. (Pucson Jr. v. MRM Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 182718, Sept. 26, 2008).
10. It was held in Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte. Ltd. V. Dakila Trading Corp., G.R. No. 172242,
Aug. 14, 2007 that extraterritorial service of summons upon a non-resident defendant who is not in
the Philippines applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not if an action is in
personam. What about if the defendant is a resident defendant but his whereabouts are unknown,
may summons be served upon him by publication where the action is in personam, as when the
complaint is one for collection of a sum of money?
Yes. Section 14, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: “In any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may
order.” The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to
the kind of action to which the rule was applicable. The present rule, however, states that it applies in
any action, and the phrase “in any action” means just that – any action, whether in personam, in rem, or
quasi in rem. (Santos Jr. v. PNOC Exploration Corp., G.R. No. 170943, Sept. 23, 2008)
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11. What are the requisites for valid substitution of public officer who has sued or has been
sued in his official capacity? What is the effect of failure to make the substitution?
Requisites for valid substitution of public officer who has sued or has been sued in his official
capacity are:
(1) satisfactory proof by any party that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining
the action;
(2) the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the acts of his
predecessor;
(3) the substitution must be effected within 30 days after the successor assumes office or within
the time granted by the court; and,
(4) reasonable notice of the application for the substitution shall be given to the other party or
officer affected and accorded an opportunity to be heard.
Failure to make the substitution pursuant to Sec. 17, Rule 3 is a ground for the dismissal of the
action. (Rodriguez, et al. v. Jardin, G.R. No. 141834, July 30, 2007)
12. May a party file a petition for habeas corpus despite the pendency of a petition for
certiorari that questions the validity of the order granting bail, which order is precisely the very basis
of the petition for habeas corpus?
No. Where a party files a petition for habeas corpus despite the pendency of a petition for
certiorari that questions the validity of the order granting bail, which order is precisely the very basis of
the petition for habeas corpus, he is guilty of forum shopping. (Pulido v. Abu, G.R. No. 170924, July 4,
2007)
13. Mistakes of attorneys generally bind their clients. Errors of the defense counsel in the
conduct of the trial is neither an error of law nor an irregularity upon which a motion for new trial
may be presented. Are there exceptions?
Yes, and these exceptions are the following: (1) the counsel’s mistake is so great and serious
that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2) the counsel is guilty of gross negligence
resulting in the client’s deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. In these two
instances, the client is not bound by his counsel’s mistakes, and a new trial may be conducted. (Ceniza-
Manantan v. People, G.R. No. 156248, Aug. 22, 2007)
14. What is the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment?
Conclusiveness of Judgment, which is also known as “preclusion of issues” or “collateral

estoppel”, means that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any
future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.
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15. A complaint asserting a common cause of action was filed against several defendants.
Some of these defendants filed an answer, but the others did not. On motion of the plaintiff, the
defendants who did not file an answer were declared in default. Is it correct for the trial court to first
hear the case ex parte as against the defaulted defendants and render a default judgment against
them, then proceed to hear the case as to the non-defaulted defendants?
No. In the problem presented, the trial court shall try the case against all the defendants upon
the answer thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented. It is not within the authority
of the trial court to divide the case by first hearing it ex parte as against the defaulted defendants and
rendering a judgment by default against them, then proceed to hear the case as to the non-defaulted
defendants. (Heirs of Mamerto Manguiat, et al. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 150768, Aug. 20, 2008, and its
companion case
16. State the modes of service of summons upon foreign juridical entity (like a foreign
corporation).
The Supreme Court has adopted the use of electronic means to serve summons on foreign
juridical entities who are being sued in the Philippines but has no resident agent or not registered to do
business in the country. Thus, as amendment to Section 12, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
A.M. No. 11-3-6 New Rule on Service of Summons on Foreign Juridical Entities provides:
“SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. — When the defendant is a foreign private
juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident
agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the
government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the
Philippines.
If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the Philippines or has no resident agent,
service may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines through any of the following means:
a) By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country
with the assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs;
b) By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where

the defendant may be
found and by serving a copy of the summons and the court order by-registered mail at
the last known address
of the defendant;
c) By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof of

service; or
d) By such other means as the court may in its discretion direct.”
As a result of such amendment, summons can now be served on the foreign private juridical entity
through the afore-quoted means, provided leave of court is first obtained.
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Although the Supreme Court did not specify the other forms of electronic means, it is submitted
that the use of e-mail is sufficient as long as it can be proven in court that the defendant has received
the summon.
17. If the last day for filing of a pleading (or motion) falls on a Saturday, when may the pleading
(or motion) be filed?
In Leynes v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 154462, Jan. 19, 2011, the ten-day period for Spouses Leynes
(defendants in the case for forcible entry before the MTC) to file their Answer expired on May 20, 2000
(a Saturday). They filed their answer on May 22, 2000. The MTC declared Spouses Leynes in default and
rendered its Judgment on May 29, 2000, because, according to the MTC, they had only up to May 20,
2000 to file their Answer, and although May 20, 2000 was a Saturday, the court was open and court
personnel were present at that time to receive cases and motions filed with the court. Held: The MTC
should not have rendered an ex-parte judgment against them. Section 1, Rule 22 states: “In computing
any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable
statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be
excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on
a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the
next working day.” Thus, Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded from the counting of the
period only when the last day of the period falls on such days. SC Adm. Circular No. 2-99, which took
effect on February 1, 1999, requires certain trial court judges and employees to be present on Saturdays
“primarily to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters.” An answer cannot be considered as
among such urgent matters.
18. What are the sanctions that the court may impose upon a party who fails to attend the
mediation proceedings notwithstanding due notice to him?
In Linda M. Chan Kent v. Spouses Alvaro E. Micarez and Paz Micarez, et al., G.R. No. 185758,
March 9, 2011, the RTC dismissed the civil case because of the failure of plaintiff’s duly authorized
representative and her counsel to attend the mediation proceedings. The Supreme Court, however,
found the dismissal too severe a sanction because the records of the case is devoid of evidence of willful
or flagrant disregard of the rules on mediation proceedings. A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA dated Oct. 16,
2001 (Second Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Mediation Proceedings) regards mediation
as part of pretrial, and the parties must personally attend the proceedings. The non-appearance of a
party may be excused only when the representative, who appears in his behalf, is duly authorized to
enter into amicable settlement or to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution. The sanctions
that the court may impose upon a party who fails to attend the proceedings are censure, reprimand,
contempt, and even dismissal of the action in relation to Sec. 5, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure. Unless the conduct of the party is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as to
justify dismissal of the action, the court should consider lesser sanctions.
19. May pretrial be conducted although no notices of pretrial were sent to the parties?
No. In PNB v. Perez, G.R. No. 187640, June 15, 2011, it was held that the absence of notice of
pretrial renders the pretrial, if one is held, void, and all the subsequent proceedings, including the
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judgment, are also void. The absence of notice of pretrial constitutes a violation of a person’s
constitutional right to due process.
(RUA: A notice of pretrial should notify the parties of the date, time, and place of the pretrial
and should require the parties to file their respective pretrial briefs and served copies thereof on the
adverse party in such a manner as shall ensure receipt thereof at least three days before the date of the
pretrial. A notice that does not state the date, time, and place of pretrial and does not require the
submission of pretrial briefs as stated above is not a valid notice of pretrial.)
20. If a party, whether the defendant or plaintiff, fails to seasonably file his pretrial brief, may
the court nonetheless conduct pretrial?
No. Rule 18 mandatorily requires the parties to seasonably file their pretrial briefs. Plaintiff’s
failure to do so shall be cause for the dismissal of the action. On the other hand, defendant’s failure to
do so shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render
judgment based thereon. The court cannot hold pretrial without the parties filing their pretrial briefs.
(Vera v. Rigor, et al., G.R. No. 147377, Aug. 10, 2007)
21. Is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 the proper remedy to nullify an
executive order issued by the Office of the President?
No. In Galicto v. Pres. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino et al., G.R. No. 193978, Feb. 28, 2012, it was
held that a petition for certiorari and prohibition is available as a remedy to question judicial and quasi-
judicial acts. Since the issuance of an executive order is not judicial or quasi-judicial, a petition for
certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy. The correct remedy to assail the validity of an
executive order is a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to
be filed with the Regional Trial Court.
Also, in Yusay v. CA, G.R. No. 156684, April 6, 2011, it was held that certiorari will not lie against
the Sangguniang Panglunsod because it is not part of the judiciary settling an actual controversy
involving legally demandable and enforceable rights when it adopted Resolution No. 552, but a
legislative and policy-making body.
22. What are the modes of appeal?
The modes of appeal are specified in:
a) Rule 40 (ordinary appeal from MTC to RTC);
b) Rule 41 (ordinary appeal from RTC to CA);
c) Rule 42 (petition for review from RTC to CA);
d) Rule 43 (petition for review from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA);
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e) Rule 45 (petition for review on certiorari from CA, Sandiganbayan, CTA, or RTC to the SC).
As explained in Latorre v. Latorre, G.R. No. 183926, March 29, 2010, the first mode of appeal,
governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact,
of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with
the Supreme Court only on questions of law
Further explained:
In appeal from RTC to CA governed by Rule 41, the questions that may be raised are questions
of fact or mixed questions of fact and law.
In appeal from RTC to CA under Rule 42, the questions that may be raised are questions of fact,
of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
In appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA under Rule 43, the questions to be raised are
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
In appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45, the questions that may be raised are pure
questions of law only, subject to some exceptions. Take note, however, that in writ of kalikasan cases,
habeas data cases, amparo cases, appeal to the Supreme Court is by petition for review on certiorari
where the petitioner may raise questions of law, questions of fact, or mixed questions of fact and law.
But in Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 190660, April 11, 2011, it was held that
decisions and final orders of RTCs sitting as special agrarian courts are appealable to the Court of
Appeals by petition for review under Rule 42, not through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. Under Sec.
60. R.A. No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law), special agrarian courts, which are regional trial
courts designated by the SC as special agrarian courts, have original and exclusive jurisdiction over: (a)
all petitions for determination of just compensation to landowners; and (b) the prosecution of all
criminal offenses under RA No. 6657.
And, under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC, all decisions and final orders of RTC acting as special
commercial courts in corporate rehabilitation and intra-corporate controversies under R.A. No. 8799 are
appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43. (BPI Family Savings
Bank, Inc. v. Pryce Gases, Inc. et al., G.R. No. 188365, June 29, 2011)
23. Suppose the appellant appeals from the judgment of the RTC to the CA under Rule 41 by
filing a notice of appeal with the RTC, but his appeal raises pure questions of law, may the CA take
cognizance of the appeal?
No.
In Heirs Of Nicolas S. Cabigas, etc. v. Limbaco, et al., G.R. No. 175291, July 27, 2011, it was held
that where a litigant files an ordinary appeal with the CA that raises only questions of law, Section 2,
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Rule 50 of the Rules of Court expressly mandates that the CA should dismiss the appeal outright as the
appeal is not reviewable by that court. When there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of
whether or not the conclusion drawn from these facts is correct is a question of law. When the
petitioners assailed the summary judgment, they were in fact questioning the conclusions drawn by the
RTC from the undisputed facts, and raising a question of law.
In Cabigas, University of Cebu Banilad (UCB), AWG, Petrosa, the defendants in the case below,
filed a motion for summary judgment, admitting as true the allegations in the complaint, but claiming
that the plaintiffs had no legal right to the property in question. The RTC Cebu City granted the motion
and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs appealed to the CA by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC.
UCB et al. filed a motion to dismiss appeal, claiming that plaintiffs raised only questions of law in their
appeal; thus, they should have filed an appeal by certiorari with the SC, and not an ordinary appeal with
the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal, ruling that plaintiffs (now petitioners) should have filed a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The SC affirmed the CA’s ruling.
St. Mary of the Woods School, Inc. et al. v. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City et al., G.R.
No.s 174290, 176116, Jan. 20, 2009 teaches that in a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause
of action, there cannot be any question of fact or “doubt or difference as to the truth of falsehood of
facts” simply because there are no findings of fact in the first place. What the trial court merely does is
to apply the law to the facts as alleged in the complaint, assuming such allegations to be true. If follows
then that any appeal therefrom could only raise questions of law or “doubt or controversy as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts.” Therefore, a decision dismissing a complaint based on failure to
state a cause of action necessarily precludes a review of the same decision on questions of fact. One is
the legal and logical opposite of the other.
Thus, if from the judgment or final order of the Regional Trial Court, the appellant raises only
questions of law, the appeal should be a direct appeal to the Supreme Court through a petition for
review on certiorari. (Sps. Dadizon v. CA, et al. G.R. No. 159116, Sept. 30, 2009).
24. If an appeal is taken to the wrong court, may this erroneous appeal be transferred to the
correct appellate court?
No. Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: “An appeal erroneously taken
to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed
outright.”
There is no longer any justification for allowing transfer of erroneous appeals from one court to
the other, much less for tolerating continued ignorance of the law on appeals. (Sps. Dadizon v. CA, et
al., G.R. No. 159116, Sept. 30, 2009).
Where the accused is a public officer occupying a position lower than Salary Grade 27, and he
commits an offense in relation to his office, jurisdiction over the offense shall be vested in the RTC or
MTC pursuant to their respective jurisdictions. In Quileste v. People, G.R. No. 180334, Feb. 18, 2009, the
accused was a low-ranking government employee who was charged with malversation. After he was
convicted by the RTC, he appealed to the CA. HELD: Accused filed his appeal in the wrong court. The
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Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions, or orders
of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction.
In Balaba v. People, G.R. No. 169519, July 17, 2009, the accused, a low-ranking government
employee, was also charged with malversation. He was convicted by the RTC. In his notice of appeal, he
specified the CA as the court to which he was taking his appeal. The Supreme Court reiterated its
pronouncement in Melencion v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 150684, June 12, 2008 that an “error in
designating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the correction in designating the
proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal.” If the correction is not
made within the said 15-day period, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure will apply. It states: “An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be
transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.”
In Estarija v. People, et al., G.R. No. 173990, Oct. 27, 2009, the accused, a public officer
occupying a position lower than Salary Grade 27, was charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. He was convicted by the RTC and was meted a straight penalty of seven years.
The CA, to which Estarija brought his appeal, affirmed the judgment of the RTC but modified the
sentence to six years and one month to nine years of imprisonment. HELD: The CA erred in entertaining
the appeal. Although the penalty imposed by the RTC is erroneous as it did not apply the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the decision of the RTC has long become final and cannot be modified anymore.
Take note, however, of the case of Filomena Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 188630, Feb. 23,
2011. Filomena was the assistant regional director of the Cooperative Development Authority, a
position lower than Salary Grade 27. She was charged before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court with
violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
The trial court found her guilty and imposed upon her the penalty of five years of imprisonment and
disqualification to hold office. She appealed to the RTC which affirmed the MCTC decision. She then
filed a petition for review before the CA, but the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that it is the
Sandiganbayan that has exclusive jurisdiction over the petition. She filed a petition for review on
certiorari with the SC. The SC ruled: There is no question that Filomena took the wrong procedure. She
should have appealed the RTC decision to the Sandiganbayan. Under R.A. 8249, the Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of regional trial courts whether in the
exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction. While the SC said that the CA
was correct in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, yet because of the peculiar circumstances of
the case, Filomena should be given a chance to bring her case to the Sandiganbayan. (These peculiar
circumstances were: (a) the administrative case against Filomena was eventually decided by the CA in
her favor; (b) Filomena was shown to have paid the loan which became the subject of the criminal case;
(c) there was no sufficient showing that Filomena exerted undue influence in obtaining the loan; (d) the
civil case against Filomena’s husband, which was intertwined with the criminal case filed against her,
was decided in favor of her husband. Thus, the SC resolved to suspend the rules to give Filomena a
chance to seek relief from the Sandiganbayan by filing a petition for review within ten days from receipt
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of the SC’s decision. The SC, however, said that it does not countenance the inexcusable negligence
committed by Filomena’s former counsel.
25. What is the remedy against an order dismissing a complaint in a civil action?
Appeal is the remedy against an order dismissing a complaint in a civil action. As held in Heirs of
Teofilo and Eliza Reterta v. Mores et al., G.R. No. 159941, Aug. 17, 2011: “For one, the order that the
petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order granting the respondents' motion to
dismiss, not the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The fact that the order granting the motion to
dismiss was a final order for thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial
court to do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy.”
But in Palma v. Galvez, et al., G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010, it was held that where there are
several defendants, one of whom files a motion to dismiss which was granted by the court, plaintiff’s
remedy against such order of dismissal is certiorari under Rule 65 because, as stated in Section 1(f),
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, no appeal may be taken from a “judgment or final order for
or against one or more of several parties x x x while the main case is pending, unless the court allows
an appeal therefrom.” Since there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the special civil action for certiorari is proper.
26. If an interlocutory order of the MTC is assailed in a petition for certiorari filed under Rule
65 with the RTC on the ground that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion, but the RTC dismissed
the petition, what is the remedy against the order of the RTC dismissing the petition?
The remedy is an ordinary appeal to the CA by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC pursuant to
Sec. 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The petition for certiorari filed with the RTC is an original action,
the dismissal of which is a final order that completely disposed of the petition. (Galzote v. Briones and
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164682, Sept. 14, 2011)
27. To what court is the decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator appealable?
The decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for review under Rule 43 because a voluntary arbitrator performs quasi-judicial functions.
(Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt v. Voluntary Arbitrator Buenaventura C. Magsalin et al., G.R.
No. 164939, June 6, 2011)
28. Gonzalo Go Jr. was appointed in 1980 as hearing officer of the Board of Transportation
(BOT) with a salary rate of P16,860 per annum. In 1987, EO No. 202 was issued creating, within the
DOTC, the LTFRB to replace the BOT. In 1990, the DOTC Secretary extended a promotional
appointment to Go as Chief Hearing Officer with a salary rate of P151,800 per annum. The Civil
Service Commission approved this permanent appointment. LTFRB Administrative Division Chief
Cynthia Angulo stated that the promotion was to the position of Attorney VI, Salary Grade 26.
However, the DBM in its letter of March 13, 1991 stated that Go’s position should only be allocated
the rank of Attorney V, Salary Grade 25. Go wrote the DBM to question his summary demotion or
downgrading of his salary grade from SG26 to SG25. The DBM Secretary denied Go’s protest. Go
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sought reconsideration, but it was denied. Go then appealed to the Office of the President, but the
Office of the President dismissed Go’s appeal. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by
the Office of the President. Go interposed before the Court of Appeals a petition for review under
Rule 43. Did Go take the proper remedy?
No. The proper remedy available to Go is to question the DBM’s denial of his protest before the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) which has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving personnel actions,
and not before the OP. In turn, the resolution of the CSC may be elevated to the CA under Rule 43 and,
finally, before the Supreme Court. Consequently, Go availed himself of the wrong remedy when he went
directly to the CA under Rule 43 without repairing first to the CSC. (Go v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 172027, July
29, 2010)
29. May an appeal under Rule 45 and a special civil action under Rule 65 be incorporated in a
single petition?
No.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Mangotara, etc., et al., G.R. No. 170375, July 7, 2010, the
Supreme Court explained: It is apparent in the case at bar that the Republic availed itself of the wrong
mode of appeal by filing Consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 and for Certiorari under Rule
65, when these are two separate remedies that are mutually exclusive and neither alternative nor
successive. Nevertheless, the Court shall treat the Consolidated Petitions as a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 and the allegations therein as errors of judgment. As the records show, the
Petition was filed on time under Rules 45. Before the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
under Rule 45, the Republic filed with the Court a motion for extension of time to file its petition. The
Court, in a Resolution dated January 23, 2006, granted the Republic a 30-day extension, which was to
expire on December 29, 2005. The Republic was able to file its Petition on the last day of the extension
period. In Ligon v. Court of Appeals where the petitioner described her petition as "an appeal under
Rule 45 and at the same time as a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,"
this Court, in frowning over what it described as a "chimera," reiterated that the remedies of appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative nor successive.
30. Is failure to pay the appellate court docket and other lawful fees a ground for the
dismissal of the appeal?
Yes. In D.M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. v. City of Parañaque, et al., G.R. No. 170728, Aug.
31, 2011, the Supreme Court has explained that the payment of appellate court docket fees is not a
mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement, without which the decision or final
order appealed from becomes final and executory as if no appeal was filed. Under Sec. 1, Rule 50 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees is a ground
for the dismissal of the appeal. While there are circumstances, like fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, that may justify the relaxation of the rules on payment of docket fees, extremely
heavy workload or excusable inadvertence of appellant’s counsel is not among them.
31. In what instances is record on appeal necessary?
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As provided for in Sec. 2, Rule 41, record on appeal is necessary only in special proceedings and
other cases of multiple or separate appeals. (Rovira v. Heirs of Jose C. Deleste, etc., G.R. No. 160825,
March 26, 2010).
Where record on appeal is required, the period for perfecting an appeal is 30 days from notice
of the judgment or final order appealed from or notice of the order denying motion for reconsideration
or motion for new trial.
An order appointing an administrator of a deceased person’s estate is a final determination of

the rights of the parties in connection with the administration, management and settlement of the
decedent’s estate; hence, it is a final order and thus appealable. In special proceedings, such as
appointment of an administrator, record on appeal is required and is to be filed, along with the notice of
appeal, within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. (Zayco, et al. v. Hinlo
Jr., G.R. No. 170243, April 16, 2008).
Republic of the Philippines v. Nishina, G.R. No. 186053, Nov. 15, 2010 teaches that although
Section 2, Rule 41 requires a record on appeal in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals, in proceedings involving cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the
civil registry, record on appeal is not necessary.
Rovira v. Heirs of Jose C. Deleste, etc., G.R. No. 160825, March 26, 2010, holds that a trial court’s
ruling on the matter of attorney’s fees initiated through a motion in the same case of recovery of
ownership and possession of land, may be appealed by a mere notice of appeal. Since the suit for
recovery of ownership and possession is not one where multiple appeals are taken, a record on appeal is
not necessary.
Record on Appeal is not required in contempt proceedings. (Flaviano B. Cortes v. Judge Felino
Bangalan, etc., G.R. No. MTJ-97, Jan. 19, 2000).
32. Are judgments rendered by the Family Courts (or RTCs in places where there is no Family
Courts) in summary proceedings under Art. 238 of the Family Code appealable?
No. Judgments rendered in summary proceedings under Art. 238 of the Family Code are
immediately final and executory as provided for in Art. 247 thereof; hence, they are not appealable. The
remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari to question grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed with the Court of Appeals in
accordance with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Even if the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court in certain
cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. (Republic of the
Philippines v. Tango, G.R. No. 161062, July 31, 2009)
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33. What is the remedy of a party who is aggrieved by the resolution issued by the
City/Provincial Prosecutor in a preliminary investigation?
His remedy is to appeal to the Secretary of Justice. If the Secretary of Justice dismisses his
appeal, he must file a motion for reconsideration. If his motion for reconsideration is denied by the
Secretary of Justice, he may now file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals.
(Filadams Pharma, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 132422, March 30, 2004).
Take note also that the resolution of the DOJ in offenses where the penalty imposable is
reclusion perpetua to death is appealable administratively to the Office of the President, and the
decision of the OP may be appealed to the CA pursuant to Rule 43. (de Ocampo v. Sec. of Justice, G.R.
No. 147932, Jan. 25, 2006; See also: Heirs of the Late Nestor Tria v. Epifania Obias, G.R. No. 175887,
Nov. 24, 2010; Angeles v. Gaite, et al., G.R. No. 176596, March 23, 2011)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
1. In a criminal case, the prosecution filed a motion to take the testimony of its witness by
oral deposition in Laos, Cambodia, citing as its reason that this witness, himself the private
complainant, was sick and of advanced age. The trial court granted the motion. Is the trial court
correct?
No, the trial court is not correct. The applicable rule is Sec. 15, Rule 119 that reads:
“When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or
infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with
no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the
court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or
in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on
him, shall be conducted in the same manner as examination at the trial. …”
While the condition of the private complainant as being sick and of advanced age falls within the
provision of the Section 15, the same rule provides that he should be conditionally examined before the
court where the case is pending. Nowhere in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the
Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not. To take the deposition of a prosecution witness
elsewhere other than before the court where the case is pending would not only deprive the accused of
his right to attend the proceedings, but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the
prosecution witness’s deportment. It would also violate the right of the accused to meet the witnesses
face to face.
(RUA: For conditional examination of a defense witness before trial in a criminal case, please
read Secs. 12 and 13 of Rule 119. Note that the conditional examination of a witness for the accused
may be taken before a judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so designated
by the judge in the order, or if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior
court to be designated therein.)
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It is different in civil cases. Rules 23 to 28 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure allow the taking
of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge,
notary public, or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or
before any Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in
a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the
other party. (See: Harry L. Go et al. v. People et al., G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012)
2. In what instances may habeas corpus be resorted to as post-conviction remedy?
The writ of habeas corpus may be resorted to as post-conviction remedy in any of the following
exceptional circumstances:
a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a

person;
b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
c) the imposed penalty is excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.
Under the Rule on DNA Evidence, habeas corpus may also be resorted to as post-conviction
remedy where the result of the DNA examination is favorable to the accused.
Thus, the writ of habeas corpus was held available where an accused was deprived of his right
against self-incrimination. (cited in de Villa v. The Director, New Bilibid Prisons, G.R. No. 158802, Nov.
17, 2004).
But habeas corpus is not available as post-conviction remedy where the appeal is still pending.
(People v. Maquilan, G.R. No. 126170, Aug. 27, 1998)
3. What is the rule regarding Post-Conviction DNA Testing?
The rule on post-conviction DNA testing is expressed in A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, Effective Oct. 15,
2007, as follows:
“Sec. 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. – Post-conviction DNA testing may be available,

without need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final
and executory judgment provided that (a) a biological sample exists, (b) such sample is
relevant to the case, and (c) the testing would probably result in the reversal or
modification of the judgment of conviction.” (Rule on DNA Evidence, A.M. No. 06-11-5-
SC, Effective Oct. 15, 2007)
“Sec. 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing – Remedy if the Results Are Favorable to the
Convict. – The convict or the prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to
the convict. In case the court, after due hearing, finds the petition to be meritorious, if
shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict,
unless continued detention is justified for a lawful cause.
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A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court,
or with any member of said courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the
petition to the court of origin and issue the appropriate orders.”
4. As a general rule, courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final,
to enjoin or restrain criminal prosecution. What are the exceptions?
The exceptions are:
1) When the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of
the accused;
2) When it is necessary for the orderly administration of justrice or to avoid oppression or

multiplicity of actions;
3) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
4) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
5) When the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7) When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8) When it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9) When the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied. (Borlongan Jr. v. Pena, et al. G.R. No. 143591, Nov. 23, 2007)
5. C and L, who were charged as co-conspirators, were convicted of violation of R.A. No. 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) in a judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan, imposing upon
each of them the penalty of imprisonment from six years and one month to twelve years and one
month. They filed separate appeals to the Supreme Court by filing their respective petitions for
review on certiorari. L’s appeal was dismissed on technicality. During the pendency of the appeal, C
died.
a) Should C’s appeal be dismissed on the ground that his death has rendered his appeal moot
and academic as his death has already extinguished his criminal liability?
No. C’s appeal should not be dismissed. The two petitions are so intertwined that the
absolution of C is ultimately determinative of the absolution of L. The exoneration of C will necessarily
signify the injustice of carrying out the penalty imposed on L. Thus, the SC, in this instance, has to
ascertain the merits of C’s appeal to prevent a developing miscarriage of justice against L.
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Courts must still decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, in the following instances: (1)
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; (3) when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; (4) the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
In the problem presented, the exceptional character of the appeal of C and L in relation to each
other, as well as the higher interest of justice, requires that the Court determine the merits of C’s
petition and not dismiss it outright on the ground of mootness.
b) Does the reversal of the decision of the Sandiganbayan as against C benefit L whose appeal
was dismissed on technicality?
Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: “An appeal taken
by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.” The phrase “did not appeal”
applies also to a co-accused who withdrew his appeal, failed to file an appellant’s brief, or filed a notice
of appeal with the trial court but eventually withdrew the same. The Supreme Court has at various
times applied the foregoing provision without regard to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a co-
accused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him. Thus, the foregoing provision should be applied
to L whose appeal was dismissed on technicality. (Constantino v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No.
140656, Sept. 13, 2007; Lindong v. People, et al., G.R. No. 154482, Sept. 13, 2007.)
6. The accused, who claims that he was illegally arrested, refused to enter a plea when
arraigned; whereupon, the court entered a plea of not guilty for him. May he still question the
validity of his arrest?
Yes. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of his arrest after
arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during the trial, without
previously invoking his objections thereto. (Borlongan Jr. v. Pena, et al. G.R. No. 143591, Nov. 23, 2007).
Thus, the accused may still question the legality his arrest, etc. where, at the arraignment, it is the court
that entered the plea of not guilty for him.
7. Frank, who was 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, was charged
with murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Crediting the accused with the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the RTC rendered judgment sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment of 12 years and one day to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal. The trial
court, however, suspended Frank’s sentence and ordered his commitment to the Regional
Rehabilitation Center for Youth, he being a juvenile in conflict with law. Is the trial court correct in
suspending Frank’s sentence?
Art. 192 of PD No. 603 provides that the benefits of the law on suspension of sentence shall not
apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or to
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one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one who is convicted
of an offense by the Military Tribunals.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC also provides that the benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a
juvenile in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to one who is
convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the
time of promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or over.
It is clear, therefore, that a person who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, life
imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of a suspended
sentence. The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty
therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty imposed,
but the imposable penalty which determines the disqualification of a juvenile.
Thus, where the youthful offender is charged with an offense punishable by death, life
imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua, he is not entitled to the benefit of suspended sentence although
the penalty actually imposed by the court is, say, reclusion temporal.
R.A. No. 9344, which took effect on May 20, 2006, did not change the foregoing ruling. Section
38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides the following: “Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.”
R.A. No. 9344 merely amended Art. 192 of P.D. 603 in that the suspension of sentence shall be
enjoyed by the juvenile even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other disqualifications in Art. 192 of P.D. 603 and in Sec. 32 of A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344. Hence, juveniles who have been
convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death
are disqualified from having their sentence suspended.
Take note, however, that in People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, Sept. 10, 2009, 599 SCRA 20, cited
in People v. Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011, it was held that although
suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already 18 years of
age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the suspension
of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond
the age of 21 can no longer avail himself of the provisions of Secs. 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to suspension
of his sentence because this has already become moot and academic.
8. May the offended party in estafa and violation of BP 22 arising from the single act of
issuing a bouncing check intervene through a private prosecutor in both criminal cases?
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Yes. Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two
distinct criminal offenses: estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The Rules of Court allow the
offended party to intervene through a private prosecutor in each of these two penal proceedings.
However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act of issuing a bouncing check in
either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the other criminal action. While the
law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, it authorizes recovery in only one. In
short, while two crimes arise form a single set of facts, only one civil liability attaches to it. (Rodriquez v.
Ponferrada, et al., G.R. Nos. 155531-34, July 29, 2005)
9. After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused files a demurrer to evidence. In
resolving the demurrer to evidence, should the trial court likewise decide the civil aspect of the case
and determine the civil liability of the accused?
The answer should be qualified as follows:
a) If the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court:
If the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived his
right to present evidence. In this situation, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil
aspect, unless the offended party has waived the civil action, or has reserved his right to institute it
separately, or has instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action.
In case of conviction, the trial court should state in its judgment the civil liability or damages to
be recovered by the offended party from the accused.
In case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable where: (a) the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; or (c) the
civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted.
But if the accused is acquitted and there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, then the civil action based
on the delict is deemed extinguished.
b) If the demurrer to evidence is filed with leave of court:
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence because the evidence presented by the
prosecution is sufficient, the accused may present evidence regarding both the criminal and civil aspect
of the case.
If the court grants the demurrer to evidence because the evidence so far presented by the
prosecution is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence
is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. Thus, if the court grants the demurrer,
proceedings on the civil aspect of the case shall proceed, except if the trial court finds that the act or
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omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, G.R.
No. 165496, Feb. 12, 2007)
10.a. The trial court granted the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused. May the
prosecution appeal from the order granting demurrer to evidence?
No. An order granting the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused is an adjudication of the
case on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. An appeal from said order would violate the right of
the accused against double jeopardy. This is based on the finality-of-acquittal rule – which means that
verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable.
b) If appeal is not a remedy against an order granting demurrer to evidence, what then is the
remedy?
The remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure upon a
clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely
reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. In Sanvicente v.
People, 441 Phil. 139 (2002), the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the CA which reversed the
acquittal of the accused upon a demurrer to evidence, holding that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in preventing the prosecution from establishing the due execution and authenticity
of a certain letter marked as Exh. “LL” which positively identified the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime charged.
To put it another way, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate
the right of the accused against double jeopardy. To this rule, there are exceptions as follows: (1) when
the prosecution is denied due process, as in the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-72670,
Sept. 12, 1986, where the Supreme Court declared the sham trial a mock trial, and the predetermined
judgment of acquittal was held unlawful and void ab initio; (2) when the trial court commits grave abuse
of discretion in granting the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused.
Thus, double jeopardy will not attach when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity
to present its case or where the trial was a sham. (People v. Laguio Jr., G.R. No. 128587, March 16,
2007)
In People v. Sandiganbayan and Barcenas, G.R. No. 174504, March 21, 2011, it was held that
although the grant of demurrer is not subject to appeal it is still reviewable through certiorari under
Rule 65.
The Supreme Court ruled, in Ysidoro v. Hon. Leonardo-de Castro et al., G.R. No. 171513, Feb. 6,
2012, that the rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65 petition, predicated
on two exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion
by the court; and where the prosecution had been deprived of due process. The rule against double
jeopardy does not apply in these instances because a Rule 65 petition does not involve review of facts
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and law on the merits in the manner done in an appeal. A review under Rule 65 only asks the question
of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not the question of whether the judgment is
legally correct. In the other words, the focus of the review is to determine whether the judgment is per
se void on jurisdictional grounds. (RUA: A petition purportedly brought under Rule 65 should be
dismissed if it does not raise any jurisdictional ground, as when, for example, it seeks to have the
evidence reviewed by the higher court.)
11. Jayson was involved in a vehicular collision where Nestor, the driver of the other vehicle,
died. Evangeline, Nestor’s wife, sustained only minor injuries, although their vehicle was heavily
damaged. Jayson was charged with two offenses before the MeTC of Pasig City, namely: (1) Criminal
Case No. 82367, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries; and (2) Criminal Case No.
82366, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. Jayson pleaded guilty
to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted the penalty of public censure. Invoking his
conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367, he moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366
on the ground of double jeopardy, but the trial court denied Jayson’s motion. Is the trial court correct
in refusing the quashal of the information?
No, the trial court is not correct. In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro et al., G.R. No. 172716, Nov. 17,
2010, the Supreme Court, held that double jeopardy has already set in. Citing the opinion of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in the earlier case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383, March 29, 1968, it said: “… as the
careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.”
12. If the trial court convicted the accused of frustrated homicide, but on appeal the appellate
court found him guilty of attempted homicide as the accused had insisted all along, may he apply for
probation?
Yes, as held by the Supreme Court (En Banc) in Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, Dec. 13,
2011.
Arnel Colinares was charged before the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur, with frustrated
homicide. Convicted of frustrated homicide, he was meted the penalty of from 2 years and 4 months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum. He appealed to
the CA, but the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. He then went to the SC on petition for review on
certiorari. The SC found him guilty of attempted homicide only as the injury he had inflicted on the
victim was not fatal. The SC sentenced him to suffer the penalty of 4 months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum. Is Colinares entitled to
probation? Yes. The SC held: In appealing his case, Colinares raised the issue of correctness of the
penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction for attempted
homicide only, which crime calls for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, he sought from the
beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for probation.
In a real sense, the SC’s finding that Colinares was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of
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attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty.
13. May a judgment be promulgated in a criminal case even in the absence of the counsel for
the accused?
Yes. The presence of counsel for the accused is not indispensable for promulgation. (Icdang v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185960, Jan. 25, 2012)
14. Is the “fresh period rule” laid down by the Supreme Court in Neypes, et al. v. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 141524, Sept. 14, 2005, applicable in criminal cases?
Yes. In Yu v. Samson-Tatad, et al., G.R. No. 170979, Feb. 9, 2011, the SC ruled that its
pronouncement of a “fresh period” to appeal in Neypes, et al. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 141524, Sept. 14,
2005, should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Neypes is also applicable in special proceedings where record on appeal is required. (Zayco, et
al. v. Hinlo Jr., G.R. No. 170243, April 16, 2008)
EVIDENCE
1. What are the guidelines that will serve as jurisprudential benchmark in appreciating age of
the victim either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:
The guidelines as formulated in People v. Pruna, 439 Phil. 440 (2002), and reiterated in People v.
Padigos, G.R. No. 181202, Dec. 5, 2012, are:
a) the best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy
of the certificate of live birth of such party;
b) in the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age;
c) if the certificate of liver birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed
or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such
as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
1) if the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be

proved is that she is less than 7 years old;

proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
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proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
d) in the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
e) it is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure
of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
f) the trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
2. Is a police report admissible in evidence even if the police investigator who prepared it was
not presented as a witness in court?
Yes. A police report is considered an entry in official records; hence, it is admissible as an

exception to the hearsay rule. Section 44, Rule 130 provides: “Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.”
The requisites for the admissibility of entries in official records are:
a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to
do so;
b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his or her duties or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her
stated, which must have been acquired by the public officer or other person personally or through
official information.
Thus, the presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an exception to the hearsay
rule even if the police investigator who prepared it was not presented in court, as long as the above
requisites could be adequately proved. (Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Ablerto et al., G.R. No. 194320,
Feb. 1, 2012)
3. Is plaintiff’s evidence the only basis in resolving a demurrer to evidence?
No. Sec. 1, Rule 33 provides, in part: “After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. x x x” The “facts” referred to in Section 8 should include all the
means sanctioned by the Rules of Court in ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings. These include
judicial admissions, matters of judicial notice, stipulations made during the pre-trial and trial,
admissions, and presumptions, the only exclusion being the defendant’s evidence. (Casent Realty
Development Corp. v. Philbanking Corp., G.R. No. 150731, Sept. 14, 2007)
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4. Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the “court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.” Why is a formal offer of evidence necessary?
A formal offer of evidence is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of
facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. (Heirs of
Pedro Pasag, etc., et al. v. 55483, April 27, 2007)
5. What is the principle of adoptive admission?
By adoptive admission, a third person’s statement becomes the admission of the party
embracing or espousing it. Adoptive Admission occurs when a party:
(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another;
(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another;
(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further
points which he or she has heard the other make; or
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another. (Republic of the Philippines v. Kenrick
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149576, Aug. 8, 2006)
6. In paternity cases, is it necessary that there be a prima facie showing of paternity before
the court may issue an order for DNA testing?
Yes. Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011 holds that a prima facie showing is necessary
before a court can issue a DNA testing order. During the hearing on the motion for DNA testing in
paternity cases, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.
7. In cases involving paternity, if the results of DNA examination show that the value of
probability of paternity (VPP) is 99.9% or higher, are the results already conclusive evidence of
paternity?
No.
Section 9(c) of the Rule on DNA Evidence states the rule as follows:
a) DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be conclusive
proof of non-paternity;
b) If the value of the Probability of Paternity is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA
testing shall be considered as corroborative evidence;
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c) If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a

disputable presumption of paternity.
8. What is the Doctrine of Presumed Identity Approach?
The Doctrine of Presumed Identity Approach, also known as the Doctrine of Processual
Presumption, holds that in the absence of proof, the foreign law will be presumed to be the same as the
law of the jurisdiction hearing the case. This doctrine comes into play where a foreign law is not
pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, in which event the presumption is that the foreign law is the
same as our law on the matter. (ATCI Overseas Corp. et al. v. Echin, G.R. No. 178551, Oct. 11, 2010)
9. On parental and filial privilege, Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, provides: “No
person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other
direct ascendants.” Does this apply to stepdaughters or those not connected by common ancestry?
No. In Lee v. CA, 625 SCRA 66, July 13, 2010, it was pointed out that Sec. 25 was taken from Art.
315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Court
extended the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative filed against
parents and other direct ascendants or children and other direct descendants. The privilege applies only
to “direct” ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by common ancestry. Since a
stepdaughter has no common ancestry with her stepmother, one can be compelled to testify against the
other.
Take note, however, that under Art. 215 of the Family Code, a descendant may be compelled in
a criminal case to testify against his ascendant when such testimony is indispensable in: (a) a crime
committed against the descendant; (b) a crime committed by one parent against the other.
10. What is the purpose for establishing a chain of custody?
The purpose of establishing a chain of custody is to guaranty the integrity of the physical
evidence and to prevent the introduction of evidence which is not authentic. Since it is called chain,
there must be links to the chain. The links are the people who handled or had custody of the object. As
long as one of the “chains” testifies and his testimony negates the possibility of tampering and that the
integrity of the evidence is preserved, his testimony alone is adequate to prove the chain of custody.
Chain of Custody in Drug Cases under Sec. 21, par. 1, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165: The apprehending
team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, further, that noncompliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.
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11. What are the guidelines to be used by courts in assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence?
In People v. Vallejo, 382 SCRA 192 [2002], which involves a rape-slay of a 9-year old girl, the
court admitted in evidence the DNA samples of the victim which were found on the bloodstained
garments of the accused. In this case, the Supreme Court adopted the following guidelines to be used
by courts in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence:
a) how the samples were collected;

b) how they were handled;
c) the possibility of contamination of the samples;
d) the procedure followed in analyzing the samples;
e) whether the proper standards and procedure were followed in conducting the tests; and
f) the qualification of the analyst who conducted the test.
In People v. Yatar, 428 SCRA 504 [2004], the SC affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape
with homicide when the test showed that a match existed between the DNA profile of the semen found
in the victim and the DNA profile of the blood sample given by the accused. Yatar upheld the
constitutionality of compulsory DNA and rejected the contention that compulsory DNA testing violates
the right of the accused against self-incrimination.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
1. Where may the estate of a deceased person be settled?
The estate of the a deceased person may be settled –
a) in the province or city where he resided at the time of his death, if he was a resident of the
Philippines.
Note that under Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the estate of a deceased person shall be
settled in the Regional Trial Court of the “province in which he resides at the time of his death.” As held
in Garcia Fule v. CA, G.R. Nos. L-40502 & L-42670, Nov. 29,1976 [74 SCRA 189], the term “resides”
connotes “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” In other words,
“resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. (See also:
San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. No. 133743 and G.R. No. 134029, Feb. 6, 2007)
b) in the province where he had estate, if he was not a resident of the Philippines.
2. What are the two exceptions to the requirement that the estate of a decedent be judicially
administered through an administrator or executor?
The two exceptions are:
a) if there is extrajudicial settlement among the heirs; and
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b) in summary settlement of estate of small value.
3. What are the requisites of a valid extrajudicial settlement?
The following are the requisites:
a) the decedent died intestate;
b) there is no outstanding debts of the estate at the time of settlement;
c) the heirs are all of legal age; or if minors and incapacitated, they are represented by their
judicial guardians or representatives;
d) the settlement is made in a public instrument;
e) the fact of extrajudicial settlement is published in a newspaper of general circulation once a

week for three consecutive weeks.
(Note that if the case is proper for extrajudicial settlement, an heir cannot insist on instituting
administration proceedings which would be superfluous and unnecessary. If the heirs cannot agree on
the manner of partition, they may institute an action for partition.)
If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit
filed in the office of the register of deeds.
4. What is the Statute of Non-Claims?
The Statute of Non-Claims is the period for the filing of claims against the estate, which period
shall not be more than 12 months nor less than 6 months after the date of the first publication of the
notice to the creditors.
Note that immediately after granting letters testamentary or of administration, the court shall
issue a notice requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent to file them in the office
of the clerk of said court.
The following are barred forever if not filed within the time specified in the notice to the
creditors:
a) all claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether
the same be due, not due, or contingent;
b) all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent;
c) judgment for money against the decedent.
But though barred forever, the aforesaid claims may nonetheless be set forth as counterclaims
in any action that the executor/administrator may bring against the claimant.
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5. How may a claim be filed, and where?
A claim may be filed with the clerk of court, serving a copy thereof on the
executor/administrator. Within 15 days from service thereof, the executor/administrator shall file his
answer, admitting or denying the claim specifically and setting forth the substance of the matters which
are relied upon to support his admission or denial. He shall serve a copy of his answer on the claimant.
Any claim admitted entirely by the executor/administrator shall be immediately submitted by

the clerk to the court who may approve the same without hearing, although the court, in its discretion
may notify all known heirs, legatees, or devisees. If any heir, legatee, or devisee opposes the claim, the
court may allow him 15 days to file his answer.
Contested claim shall be set for trial, with notice to both parties. The court may refer the claim
to a commissioner. The judgment of the court approving or disapproving the claim is appealable. Note
that the appeal should be by notice of appeal and record on appeal.
6. So it is said that the creditor’s claim is barred forever if not filed within the time specified in
the notice. But, does the creditor who fails to file his claim within the time specified in the notice still
have a remedy?
Yes. His remedy is to file a motion for leave to file his claim. He may file this motion at any time
during the administration proceedings provided no order of distribution has yet been entered. The
court may grant the creditor one-month period from notice of order granting his motion to file his claim.
7. What are the remedies of a creditor holding a claim secured by a mortgage?
a) he may waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the deceased
debtor-mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
b) he may foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim;
c) he may rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred
by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency. (Sec. 7, Rule 86; Maglague v. Planters
Development Bank, G.R. No. 109472, May 18, 1999.)
8. May a probate court issue a writ of execution?
No. A probate court may not issue a writ of execution because its orders usually refer to the
adjudication of claims against the estate which the executor or administrator may satisfy without the
need of writ of execution.
But by way of exceptions, the probate court may issue a writ of execution in the following
instances:
a) to satisfy the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs, who have taken possession
of decedent’s estate, for debts and expenses of the estate;
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b) to enforce payment of expenses of partition;
c) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate proceedings.
9. When may distribution of the estate be made?
It may only be made after all debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to
the widow, and estate taxes have been paid.
It may also be made before payment of such obligations, provided the distributees or any of
them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligation within
such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
10. AA, BB, CC, and DD are the heirs of XX who died on July 16, 2003. XX had three other
children by his paramour. His illegitimate children are: MM, NN, and OO. AA filed a petition for his
appointment as administrator of the estate of XX. During the pendency of the petition for issuance of
letters of administration, AA, BB, CC, and DD discovered that MM, NN, and OO had executed an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of XX involving a property located in Dagupan City. AA, BB, CC,
and DD filed a complaint against MM, NN, and OO for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement
and for the recovery of the Dagupan property. Defendants MM, NN, and OO filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that plaintiffs AA, BB, CC, and DD are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the
Estate of XX in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings. Question: May the heirs (AA,
BB, CC, and DD) bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an
administrator?
Yes. During the pendency of the administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal
personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of
Article 777 of the New Civil Code that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the
suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of
advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3 and Section 2,
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. The legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of
the decedent under administration pending the appointment of an administrator has long been
recognized. The heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait
further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and
the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the
decedent are violated or dissipated.
In fact, even if an administrator is already appointed, the heirs may still institute the proper
action for the recovery of a property of the estate in the following instances: (1) if the executor or
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administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have
participated in the act complained of and he is made a party defendant.
Thus, if the question is: What are the exceptions to the rule that the heirs have no legal standing
to sue for the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of the administration
proceedings? Then the answer is as follows: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to
bring suit; (2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he is
made a party defendant; and (3) when no administrator has yet been appointed. (Rioferio, et al. v. CA,
et al., G.R. No. 129008, Jan. 13, 2004).
11. Betty was appointed administratrix of the estate of deceased Jose. She submitted an
inventory to the court of the real and personal properties of the deceased. AMC, one of the creditors
of the deceased, filed a claim against the estate. Thereafter, AMC noticed that the shares of stocks of
the deceased with Ayala were not included in the inventory. AMC then filed a motion to require Betty
to explain the non-inclusion of these shares of stocks. Betty explained that these shares of stocks had
already been transferred to other persons prior to the death of Jose. AMC filed a motion for the
examination of the supposed transferees. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that it was
merely a fishing expedition. Is the trial court correct?
Persons, or third persons, to whom the decedent’s assets had been conveyed may be cited to
appear in court and examined under oath as to how they came into possession of the decedent’s assets.
If they refuse to appear, the court may punish them for contempt.
The trial court has the inherent duty to see to it that the inventory lists all the properties, rights
and credits which the law requires the administrator to include in his inventory. In compliance with this
duty, the court has also the inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the
deceased should be included by the administrator in the inventory. An heir or person interested in the
properties of a deceased may call the court’s attention that certain properties, rights and credits are left
out from the inventory. In such a case, it is likewise the court’s duty to hear the observations of such
party. The court has the power to determine if such observations deserve attention and if such
properties belong prima facie to the estate. However, in such proceedings the trial court has no
authority to decide whether the properties, real or personal, belong to the estate or to the persons
examined. If after such examination there is good reason to believe that the person is keeping
properties belonging to the estate, then the administrator should file an ordinary action in court to
recover the same. A separate action is necessary for determination of ownership and recovery of
possession. (Betty T. Chua, et al. v. Absolute Management Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 144881, Oct. 16,
2003)
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MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS:
Practice Test on Remedial Law: Choose the correct answer by shading the letter in the parenthesis.
1. A civil action is commenced:
(a) by the filing of the original complaint in court;

(b) by serving the summons upon the defendant;
(c) by setting the case for pretrial;
(d) by setting the case for trial.
2. It is an action against all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the
right sought to be established:
(a) accion publiciana;

(b) action in rem;
(c) action in personam;
(d) action quasi in rem.
3. If a sole proprietorship files a complaint in court, the defendant may move to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that:
(a) the complaint states no cause of action;

(b) the plaintiff has no legal personality to sue;
(c) the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(d) the plaintiff is not the real party in interest.
4. A misjoined cause of action may be severed and proceeded with separately:
(a) upon motion of the defendant;

(b) upon motion of the plaintiff;
(c) upon motion of both the plaintiff and the defendant;
(d) upon motion of a party or on the initiative of the court.
5. A transferee pendente lite of a property under litigation is:
(a) an indispensable party;

(b) a necessary party;
(c) neither an indispensable party nor a necessary party;
(d) a proper party.
6. Where the husband files an action to recover a property which he claims to be part of his
exclusive property, his wife should be joined as co-plaintiff because:
(a) she is an indispensable party;
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(b) she is a necessary party;

(c) she is a pro-forma party;
(d) she is a proper party.
7. The rule is joinder of parties is permissive. But it is compulsory when the party to be joined
is:
(a) an indispensable party;
(b) a necessary party;
(c) a proper party;
(d) a pro-forma party.
8. In petition for change of name shall be filed in:
(a) the RTC of the province or city where petitioner has been a bona fide resident for at least
three years prior to the date of the filing of the petition;
(b) the RTC of the province or city where petitioner has been a bona fide resident for at least
one year prior to the date of the filing of the petition;
(c) the RTC of the province or city where petitioner has been a bona fide resident for at least
six months prior to the date of the filing of the petition;
(d) the RTC of the province or city where the civil registry is located.
9. Where the venue is improperly laid, the defendant may raise the question of improper
venue:
(a) only in a motion to dismiss;

(b) only by pleading it as an affirmative defense in his answer;
(c) either in a motion to dismiss or in his answer;
(d) only as an assignment of error in his appeal.
10. One of these is not a pleading:
(a) a counterclaim;
(b) a cross-claim;
(c) a reply;
(d) a bill of particulars.
11. One of these is not required to be verified:
(a) an action for recovery of possession of a real property;

(b) a petition for change of name;
(c) a petition for guardianship of a minor;
(d) a complaint for expropriation.
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12. A pleading may not allege a provision of law, except if the pleading is:
(a) a complaint;
(b) an answer;
(c) a reply;
(d) a motion to dismiss.
13. A defendant declared in default may appeal from:
(a) the order declaring him in default;

(b) the order denying his motion to set aside order of default;
(c) the judgment rendered against him in default;
(d) the order denying his motion for new trial.
14. A defendant declared in default:
(a) cannot take part at the trial and is not entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings;
(b) can take part at the trial, although he is not entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings;
(c) cannot take part at the trial, but is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings;
(d) can take part at the trial and is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings.
15. An amended pleading:
(a) supersedes the pleading that it amends;

(b) supplements the pleading that it amends;
(c) becomes part of the pleading that it amends;
(d) is superseded by the pleading that it amends.
16. Answer to a permissive counterclaim must be filed:
(a) within 15 days from service of summons;

(b) within 10 days from service of summons;
(c) within 15 days from service of the answer containing the counterclaim;
(d) within 10 days from service of the answer containing the counterclaim.
17. Where the whereabouts of the defendant are unknown, summons upon him may be served:
(a) by substituted service;

(b) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient;
(c) by publication, if the action is an action in rem or quasi in rem;
(d) by publication, in any action.
18. If the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service of summons may be effected on
the:M
(a) Solicitor General;

(b) Ombudsman;
(c) Executive Secretary;
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(d) President.
19. Deposition pending action is also known as:
(a) deposition de bene esse;

(b) deposition in perpetuan memoriam;
(c) deposition upon oral examination;
(d) deposition upon written interrogatories.
20. An instrument sent in the name and by the authority of a judge or court to another,
requesting the latter to cause to be examined, upon interrogatories filed in a cause pending before the
former, a witness who is within the jurisdiction of the judge or court to whom such letters are addressed
is called:
(a) commission;
(b) written interrogatories;
(c) request for admission;
(d) letters rogatory.
21. It may be filed by the defendant after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence:
(a) demurrer to evidence;

(b) motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence;
(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings;
(d) motion for summary judgment.
22. Plaintiff may move for judgment on the pleadings:
(a) before defendant files his answer;

(b) after defendant has filed his answer;
(c) after plaintiff has rested his case;
(d) after defendant has been declared in default.
23. If a new trial is granted, the original judgment or final order is:
(a) stayed;
(b) vacated;
(c) nullified;
(d) executed.
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24. If an appeal is dismissed for having been filed out of time, but the appellant can show that
he was prevented from perfecting his appeal on time by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, his remedy is:
(a) file a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his appeal
(b) file a petition for relief;
(c) file a petition for certiorari;
(d) file a petition for mandamus.
25. A judgment that has become final may be enforced by motion:
(a) within five years from entry of judgment;

(b) within ten years from entry of judgment;
(c) after five years but within ten years from entry of judgment;
(d) within five years from rendition of judgment.
26. A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the:
(a) filing of the notice of appeal and record on appeal in due time;
(b) filing of the notice of appeal in due time;
(c) filing of the record on appeal in due time;
(d) approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
27. Appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court rendered by it in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction should be brought to the Court of Appeals:
(a) by notice of appeal;

(b) by petition for review on certiorari;
(c) by petition for review under Rule 42;
(d) by petition for review under Rule 43.
28. If the appeal is brought to the Court of Appeals by notice of appeal filed with the Regional
Trial Court, the appellant may withdraw his appeal:
(a) as a matter of right, after appellee’s brief has been filed;

(b) as a matter of right, before the filing of appellee’s brief;
(c) in the discretion of the court, before the filing of appellee’s brief;
(d) in the discretion of the court, before the filing of appellant’s brief.
29. The plaintiff or any proper party may apply for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment at the commencement of the action or at any time:
(a) after entry of judgment;

(b) before entry of judgment;
(c) after finality of judgment;
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(d) before finality of judgment.
30. The prior or contemporaneous rule shall not apply where the action is:
(a) an action in rem or quasi in rem;

(b) an action in personam;
(c) a real action;
(d) a personal action.
31. The lifetime of a temporary restraining order, if issued by the RTC or MTC, is:
(a) 20 days from service thereof on the party sought to be enjoined;

(b) 20 days from its issuance;
(c) 20 days from service thereof on the applicant;
(d) 30 days from service thereof on the party sought to be enjoined.
32. An application for the issuance of a writ of replevin should be filed:
(a) at the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment;
(b) at the commence of the action;
(c) at the commencement of the action or at any time before pretrial;
(d) at the commencement of the action or any time before defendant files his answer.
33. A writ of replevin, whether issued by the RTC or the MTC, is enforceable:
(a) only within its territorial jurisdiction;

(b) only within the province or city where such court is sitting;
(c) only within the judicial region where such court is located;
(d) anywhere in the Philippines.
34. An application for support pendent elite may be filed:
(a) at the commencement of the proper action or at any time prior the judgment or final
order;
(b) at the commencement of the proper action or at any time prior entry of judgment or final
order;
(c) at the commencement of the proper action or at any time before defendant files his
answer;
(d) at the commencement of the proper action or at any time prior start of trial.
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35. One of these may be amended or modified notwithstanding its finality:
(a) judgment in an action for support;

(b) judgment in an action for legal separation;
(c) judgment in an action for annulment of marriage;
(d) judgment in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
36. The nature of the crime charged in the complaint or information is determined by the:
(a) title thereof

(b) provisions of the law alleged to have been violated
(c) facts alleged therein
(d) designation made by prosecution
37. Section 2 of Rule 110 provides that “the complaint or information shall be x x x against all
persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved.” But, as an exception, a person who
appears to be responsible for the offense committed may be excluded from the complaint or
information if:
(a) that person is admitted into the witness protection program

(b) that person has been discharged, on motion of the prosecution, to be utilized as a state
witness
(c) there is no sufficient evidence against that person
(d) prosecuting that person is a waste of time
38. An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense and subscribed
by the:
(a) offended party

(b) prosecutor
(c) any peace officer
(d) judge
39. A complaint or information must charge only one offense. But, as an exception, it may
charge more than one offense:
(a) when the law so provides to avoid multiplicity of suits

(b) when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses
(c) when the court allows it in the exercise of its discretion
(d) when the prosecutor deems it proper to charge two or more offenses to protect the
interest of the state
40. An information that charges two or more offenses may be referred to as:
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(a) onerous information

(b) duplicitous information
(c) insufficient information
(d) vague information
41. A complaint or information may be amended in form or substance, without leave of court,
at any time:
(a) after the accused has entered his plea

(b) before the accused enters his plea
(c) after the accused has been arrested
(d) before the accused is arrested
42. After the accused has pleaded to the charge, the complaint or information may be amended
where such amendment is required by supervening fact, provided:
(a) leave of court is granted

(b) the offended party consents to the amendment
(c) the right of the accused to speedy trial is not violated
(d) the accused consents to the amendment
43. In a plea bargaining, the trial court may allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense
without the consent of the private offended party if the offended party:
(a) refuses to give his consent without justifiable cause

(b) cannot be notified of the date of the arraignment because his whereabouts are unknown
(c) fails to appear at the arraignment despite due notice to him
(d) is already dead or lives more than 100 kilometers from the place of trial
44. If, before arraignment, the prosecution wants to amend the Information from murder to
homicide, its remedy is to:
(a) file a motion for leave to amend, with notice to the offended party, and if leave is granted,
file an amended information for homicide
(b) file an amended information charging the accused with homicide
(c) withdraw the information, and file a new information for homicide
(d) file a motion to dismiss the case
45. In criminal cases venue is jurisdictional. Thus, an information for bigamy must be filed in the
Regional Trial Court of the place:
(a) where the second marriage was contracted

(b) where the first married was contracted
(c) where the parties to the second marriage have set up their conjugal dwelling
(d) where the first marriage was contracted or where the second marriage was contracted at
the election of the prosecution
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46. The offended party may reserve his right to institute a separate civil action:
(a) at any time before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence
(b) at any time before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation
(c) at any time before the prosecution rests its case
(d) at any time before the prosecution rests its case and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation
47. After the accused had pleaded guilty to the charge of reckless imprudence resulting into
homicide, the court issued an order declaring the case deemed submitted for decision notwithstanding
the motion of the offended party to be allowed to present evidence on the civil liability of the accused.
The offended party may assail the order of the court on the ground that it is error for the court not to
allow the offended party to prove the civil liability of the accused:
(a) because the civil action to recover civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed
instituted in the criminal action
(b) because the civil liability of the accused is implied from his plea of guilty
(c) because the plea of guilty already determines the civil liability of the accused
(d) because the plea of guilty applies only to the criminal aspect of the case
48. A civil action based on quasi delict may be filed by the offended party even if he does not
reserve his right to file it separately because such civil action is:
(a) a separate civil action

(b) an independent civil action
(c) a prejudicial question
(d) deemed instituted in the criminal action
49. An accused who is acquitted may still be adjudged civilly liable, except:
(a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt

(b) if the court declares in its judgment that the liability of the accused is only civil
(c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of
which he is acquitted
(d) if the civil action is based on the delict and there is a finding in the final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist
50. If a final judgment is rendered in a civil action and the judgment absolves the defendant
from civil liability, such judgment:
(a) bars the filing of a criminal action against the same defendant for the same act or omission
subject of the civil action
(b) does not bar the filing of a criminal action against the same defendant for the same act or
omission subject of the civil action
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(c) extinguishes the criminal liability of the same defendant for the same act or omission
(d) conclusively proves that the same defendant is not liable for the same act or omission
51. The existence of a prejudicial question may be invoked to:
(a) dismiss a criminal action

(b) dismiss a civil action
(c) suspend a criminal action
(d) suspend a civil action
52. Preliminary investigation is required for offenses punishable by imprisonment of:
(a) less than 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day

(b) at least 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day
(c) more than 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day
(d) not more than 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day
53. The accused may waive his right to preliminary investigation. But where the accused asserts
his right to preliminary investigation, to deny him that right amounts to a denial of due process because
the right to preliminary investigation is a:
(a) constitutional right

(b) statutory right
(c) substantive right
(d) natural right
54. Preliminary investigation may be conducted ex parte if the respondent cannot be served
with:
(a) subpoena
(b) prosecutor’s resolution
(c) writ of execution
(d) summons
55. The right to preliminary investigation may be waived by not asserting it:
(a) before arraignment and plea

(b) before pretrial
(c) in a motion to quash before trial
(d) in a motion to quash before pretrial
56. An accused validly arrested without warrant for an offense requiring preliminary
investigation and charged in court without preliminary investigation having been first conducted may
ask for a preliminary investigation:
(a) within 5 days from the time he learns of the filing of the information against him
(b) within 5 days from the time of the filing of the information against him
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(c) within 10 days from the time he learns of the filing of the information against him
(d) within 10 days from the time of the filing of the information against him
57. An information filed in court without the prior written approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the ombudsman or his deputy is:
(a) void
(b) voidable
(c) valid
(d) defective but valid
58. A warrant of arrest is valid and shall remain in force:
(a) for a period of ten days from date of its issuance

(b) for a period of 15 days from date of its issuance
(c) for a period of 30 days from date of its issuance
(d) until it is executed
59. Within ten days from the filing of the information, the judge of the Regional Trial Court shall
issue a warrant of arrest if he finds probable cause after:
(a) personally examining the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence
(b) personally evaluating the complainant and his witnesses by means of searching questions
and answers
(c) personally examining the complainant and his witnesses in writing and under oath by
means of searching questions and answers
(d) personally evaluating the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence
60. X filed a complaint with the NBI alleging that Y, who is a barangay captain, kidnapped and
detained X’s husband on June 19, 2010. The NBI directed Y to appear before it on June 26, 2010 to
answer the charge of kidnapping. When Y appeared at the NBI on June 26, 2010, he was arrested and
detained. On June 27, 2010, the NBI submitted its investigation report to the Office of the City
Prosecutor. That same day, Prosecutor Z conducted an inquest. On June 28, 2010, an Information was
filed with the RTC, charging Y with kidnapping. The inquest is not proper in this case because:
(a) only the police may conduct an inquest

(b) the NBI has already conducted its own investigation
(c) the arrest of the accused in this case was unlawful, and an inquest may only be
conducted by the prosecutor if the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant
(d) an inquest may only be conducted by the police if the accused has been lawfully
arrested without warrant
61. If a person is arrested and detained and no case has yet been filed in court against him, he
may question the legality of his arrest and detention by filing:
(a) a petition for habeas corpus

(b) a motion to quash before he enters a plea
(c) a petition for writ of amparo
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(d) a petition for habeas data
62. Bail shall be effective upon its approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain in force at all
stages of the case:
(a) until promulgation of judgment by the Regional Trial Court in a case originally filed in it
(b) until promulgation of judgment by the Regional Trial Court in a case appealed to it
(c) before promulgation of judgment by the Regional Trial Court in a case originally filed in or
appealed to it
(d) until promulgation of judgment by the Regional Trial Court in a case originally filed in or
appealed to it
63. One of the conditions of bail is that the accused shall appear before the court:
(a) at all stages of the proceedings

(b) only during trial
(c) whenever required by the court or by the Rules of Court
(d) whenever required for the purpose of perfecting his appeal
64. Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, the application for bail may be filed:
(a) only in the court of the city or municipality where he was arrested
(b) only in the court of the city or municipality where he is being held
(c) only in the court where the case is pending whether on trial or appeal
(d) only in the court where he was arraigned
65. The accused is charged with maltreatment, a light felony. At the arraignment the accused
was absent despite notice, but his counsel manifested that he had already explained to the accused the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. He then moved that a plea of not guilty be entered for
the accused. The court allowed it. This plea is:
(a) valid, because where the accused is charged with a light offense, his counsel may enter
a plea of not guilty for him
(b) valid, because the court allowed it
(c) void, because there is no showing that the accused understood the consequences of his
plea of guilty
(d) void, because the accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally
enter his plea
66. At his arraignment for homicide, the accused pleaded guilty. Upon motion, he was allowed
by the court to prove the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. But the evidence he has
presented proved complete self-defense. If the court renders a judgment of acquittal, such a judgment
is:
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(a) void, because the plea of guilty entered by the accused is a full admission of his culpability
(b) void, because the court erred in allowing him to prove the justifying circumstance of self-
defense
(c) valid, provided he told the truth in court
(d) valid, provided his plea of guilty is considered withdrawn and a plea of not guilty entered for
him
67. The discovery proceedings allowed by Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 116 are applicable only:
(a) during preliminary investigation

(b) after the filing of the information in court
(c) after pretrial
(d) after trial
68. If a complaint is filed in the municipal trial court for an offense not requiring preliminary
investigation and the judge finds probable cause, but there is no necessity of placing the accused under
immediate custody, the judge may issue to the accused:
(a) summons
(b) subpoena
(c) warrant of arrest
(d) order to answer the charge
69. Accused, with leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence. But his demurrer is denied by the
court. His remedy is:
(a) to file a motion for the inhibition of the judge

(b) to enter a plea and go to trial
(c) to present rebuttal evidence
(d) to appeal from the order denying his motion to quash
70. The requirement that agreements or admissions made by the accused shall be reduced in
writing and signed by him and his counsel applies only to those agreements or admissions made during
the:
(a) preliminary investigation

(b) arraignment
(c) pretrial
(d) trial
71. An appeal from a judgment of the Regional Trial Court rendered by it in the exercise of its
exclusive original jurisdiction where the appellant raises questions of fact is by:
(a) notice of appeal

(b) petition for review
(c) petition for review on certiorari
(d) petition for certiorari
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72. An appeal from a judgment of the Regional Trial Court rendered by it in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction where the appellant raises pure questions of law is by:
(a) notice of appeal

(b) petition for review
(c) petition for review on certiorari
(d) petition for certiorari
73. Bail may be cancelled upon application of the bondsman, but with due notice to the
prosecutor upon:
(a) proof of death of the accused

(b) acquittal of the accused
(c) dismissal of the case
(d) execution of the judgment of conviction
74. The remedy of the accused if the allegations in the Information are vague is:
(a) to file a bill of particulars before arraignment

(b) to file a motion for a bill of particulars before arraignment
(c) to file a motion for a bill of particulars after arraignment
(d) to file a bill of particulars after arraignment
75. The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information has
been filed or assigned for:
(a) preliminary investigation

(b) trial
(c) promulgation of judgment
(d) reinvestigation
76. The arraignment of the accused may be suspended when:
(a) there exists an incidental question

(b) there exists a prejudicial question
(c) the accused refuses to enter a plea
(d) the accused enters a conditional plea of guilty
77. If the court grants the motion to quash filed by the accused on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the offense, the remedy of the prosecution is to:
(a) refile the case in the court of proper jurisdiction

(b) refile the case in the court of proper venue
(c) amend the information so as to bring the offense within the jurisdiction of the court
(d) withdraw the information
78. A provisional dismissal should be with the:
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(a) express consent of the offended party

(b) express consent of the accused
(c) consent of the accused
(d) consent of both the offended party and the accused
79. If the offense is punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six years, a provisional
dismissal thereof becomes permanent:
(a) one year after issuance of the order of dismissal without the case having been revived
(b) two years after issuance of the order of dismissal without the case having been revived
(c) six months after issuance of the order of dismissal without the case having been revived
(d) one month after issuance of the order of dismissal without the case having been revived
80. If the offense is punishable by a fine of any amount, a provisional dismissal thereof becomes
permanent:
(a) one year after issuance of the order of dismissal without the case having been revived
(b) two years after issuance of the order of dismissal without the case having been revived
(c) six months after issuance of the order of dismissal without the case having been revived
(d) one month after issuance of the order of dismissal without the case having been revived
81. Among the things to be considered at the pretrial of criminal cases is:
(a) amicable settlement

(b) stipulation of facts
(c) reference of the issues to a commissioner
(d) amendment of the complaint or information
82. After having bargained for a lesser penalty, the accused pleaded guilty to the charge set
forth in the information. This plea of guilty is:
(a) valid although it is a conditional plea of guilty

(b) void because it is a conditional plea of guilty
(c) valid because the accused himself entered his plea
(d) void because the accused should always enter a plea of not guilty
83. At the hearing on the motion for the discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state
witness, his sworn statement shall be presented by the prosecution as evidence. At the trial the sworn
statement of the witness shall be inadmissible in evidence if the court:
(a) grants the motion

(b) denies the motion
(c) defers hearing on the motion
(d) fails to act on the motion
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84. The order of the court discharging an accused to be utilized as a state witness amounts to:
(a) an acquittal of the discharged accused

(b) an adjudication of the case on its merits
(c) an acquittal of all the accused
(d) dismissal of the case
85. The proceedings in a criminal case may be reopened to avoid a miscarriage of justice
(a) after finality of the judgment of conviction

(b) before finality of the judgment of conviction
(c) before rendition of judgment
(d) after the case is submitted for decision
86. The accused who files a demurrer to evidence does not waive his right to present evidence
in the event his demurrer is denied if he filed his demurrer:
(a) with prior leave of court

(b) with prior notice to the prosecution
(c) with the consent of the offended party
(d) after filing with the court a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence
87. If there are several accused, and the prosecutor has no direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense committed, the remedy of the prosecution is:
(a) to move for the dismissal of the case with the express consent of the all the accused
(b) to exclude one or some of the accused by amending the information with leave of court
and utilized the excluded accused as witnesses against the remaining accused
(c) to withdraw the information and refile it as soon as a witness becomes available
(d) to move for the discharge of one or some of the accused to be utilized as state witnesses
88. If the accused has been detained for a period equal to or more than the maximum of the
imposable penalty, he:
(a) may be released on recognizance

(b) may be released on bail
(c) should be released immediately without bail or recognizance, unless there are other valid
causes for his further detention
(d) should be released immediately if there is already a finding by the court that he is not guilty
89. If the accused fails to appear at the promulgation of judgment despite due notice to him,
the judgment:
(a) cannot be promulgated
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(b) shall be promulgated by reading it to his counsel who may be required to stand in lieu of
the accused, just like in the movies
(c) shall be promulgated by recording it in the criminal docket and furnishing the prosecution
with a copy thereof
(d) shall be promulgated by recording it in the criminal docket and furnishing the accused with
a copy thereof through his counsel or at his last known address
90. The accused was convicted of homicide in the judgment promulgated by the RTC on October
4, 2010. The judgment was promulgated in his absence because he failed to appear at the promulgation
notwithstanding due notice to him. He received a copy of the judgment through his counsel on October
5. His remedy is:
(a) he must surrender himself and file a motion for leave to avail of the remedies on or before
October 19, 2010
(b) he must file a notice of appeal on or before October 19, 2010
(c) he must surrender himself and file a motion for leave to avail of the remedies on or before
October 20, 2010
(d) he must file a motion for reconsideration on or before October 20, 2010
91. The rule that ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
or omission of another is referred to as:
(a) res inter alios acta rule

(b) res ipsa loquitor
(c) res gestae
(d) res nova
92. DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be conclusive proof of
non-paternity. But If the value of the probability of paternity is 99.9% or higher, the presumption of
paternity is:
(a) conclusive
(b) disputable
(c) quasi-conclusive
(d) semi-conclusive
93. The best evidence rule is the rule requiring the presentation of the original document itself
when the subject of inquiry is the:
(a) existence of the said document

(b) contents of said document
(c) condition of the said document
(d) value of the said document
94. The Dead Man’s Statute is applicable if the case is upon a claim or demand against the
estate of a person who is deceased:
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(a) provided he died after the suit against him is filed

(b) provided he died before the suit against him is filed, but he is already dead at the time the
testimony is given
(c) whether he died before or after the suit against him is filed
(d) whether he died before or after the suit against him is filed, provided he is already dead at
the time the testimony is give
95. The attorney-client privilege may be invoked with respect to a confidential communication
between attorney and client if such communication is made:
(a) during a professional employment

(b) during and after professional employment
(c) prior to professional employment
(d) in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment.
96. The physician-patient privilege may be invoked:
(a) in all cases where the patient is a party

(b) only in a criminal case where the patient is a party
(c) only in a civil case whether the patient is a party or not
(d) in all cases whether the patient is a party or not
97. Under the Rule on Examination of Child Witness, the court may allow leading questions:
(a) in all stages of examination of the child witness

(b) only during cross examination of the child witness
(c) only during direct examination of the child witness
(d) during both cross examination and direct examination of the child witness
98. Upon his counsel’s request, the plaintiff testified in narrative form. The defense objects to
this of manner of giving testimony. Rule on the objection.
(a) Objection sustained. Witness must testify in answer and question form
(b) Objection sustained. Witness may testify in any manner he finds convenient provided he tells
the truth
(c) Objection overruled. It is within the discretion of the judge to direct a witness to testify in
question-and-answer form, or allow him to testify in a narrative form
(d) Objection overruled. It is within the discretion of the examining counsel to direct his witness to
answer in question-and-answer form or in a narrative form.
99. The prosecution may prove the bad moral character of the accused:
(a) during presentation of its evidence in chief if it is pertinent to the moral trait involved in
the offense charged
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in REMEDIAL LAW
(b) during presentation of its evidence in chief regardless of whether or not it is pertinent to
the moral trait involved in the offense charged
(c) only in rebuttal regardless of whether or not it is pertinent to the moral trait involved in
the offense charged
(d) only in rebuttal if it is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
100. If the accused admits the killing but invokes self-defense, the evidence required of the
accused to establish this justifying circumstance is:
(a) preponderance of evidence

(b) proof beyond reasonable doubt
(c) substantial evidence
(d) clear and convincing evidence
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Answers:
1. a 35. a 69. b
2. b 36. c 70. c
3. c 37. a 71. a
4. d 38. b 72. b
5. b 39. b 73. a
6. c 40. b 74. b
7. a 41. b 75. b
8. a 42. a 76. b
9. c 43. c 77. a
10. d 44. a 78. b
11. a 45. a 79. a
12. b 46. b 80. a
13. c 47. a 81. b
14. c 48. b 82. b
15. a 49. d 83. b
16. d 50. b 84. a
17. d 51. c 85. b
18. a 52. b 86. a
19. a 53. c 87. d
20. d 54. a 88. c
21. a 55. a 89. d
22. b 56. a 90. a
23. b 57. a 91. a
24. b 58. d 92. b
25. a 59. d 93. b
26. b 60. c 94. d
27. c 61. a 95. d
28. b 62. d 96. c
29. b 63. c 97. a
30. a 64. c 98. c
31. a 65. d 99. d
32. d 66. d 100. d
33. d 67. b
34. a 68. a
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THE BARRISTERS’ CLUB OFFICERS

Chancellor: ABBYGAILE T. GONZALES
Vice Chancellor: ROMEL L. BASILAN
Secretary: JESSA ALYSSA G. REYES
Treasurer: MILDRED P. AMBROS
PRO: ROBYN B. DELA PENA
PRO: AARON JAMES E. CO
Business Manager: RUDDY ALLEN N. YEE
Business Manager: LESLIE D. RAGUINDIN
SSG Representative: ANNE LUCILLE B. RUIZ
Ex-Officio: RONA B. ESTRADA
Adviser: ATTY. ISAGANI G. CALDERON
Dean, College of Law: ATTY. REYNALDO U. AGRANZAMENDEZ
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Remedial Law

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in REMEDIAL LAW

Prepared by: Dean Reynaldo U. Agranzamendez

QUESTIONS & ANSWERS IN REMEDIAL LAW

JULY 16, 2013

Dean, COLLEGE OF LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS (formerly

BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION), Baguio City

Reviewer, Remedial Law

1. May an appeal be taken from an order denying a motion for reconsideration?

An order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order dismissing a complaint is a final

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3. May an amendment substantially alter the cause of action or defense?

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No, the trial court is not correct.

“Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction

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Calleja ruled on the issue, thus:

7. On what date is an amended complaint deemed filed?

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8. The certification on non-forum shopping may be signed on behalf of a corporation by an

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14. What is the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment?

Conclusiveness of Judgment, which is also known as “preclusion of issues” or “collateral

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b) By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where

c) By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof of

d) By such other means as the court may in its discretion direct.”

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22. What are the modes of appeal?

The modes of appeal are specified in:

a) Rule 40 (ordinary appeal from MTC to RTC);

b) Rule 41 (ordinary appeal from RTC to CA);

c) Rule 42 (petition for review from RTC to CA);

d) Rule 43 (petition for review from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA);

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27. To what court is the decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator appealable?

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31. In what instances is record on appeal necessary?

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An order appointing an administrator of a deceased person’s estate is a final determination of

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2. In what instances may habeas corpus be resorted to as post-conviction remedy?