—>constituency and semio-narratives?????

<—
Main argument[Form is entailed in structure, inherited in positional values of
substance (self-)organization.]
Morphogenesis[imsonar, 12/07/2019 10:04:03] of meaning (translator’s introduction)

The central issue dealt with in this research is that of structure. More,
particularly with the investigation of assigning a physical and dynamical basis to
structure that could potentially be applied to new media based abstract artwork.
The classical problem with structure has always been a concern for researchers
throughout all the structuralism tradition to reconcile its formal essence with its
phenomenological manifestation or in other words its discrete ‘form’ with its
continuous ‘matter’. The classical formalist perspectives of structuralism, are
missing the point that there are no abstract categories in nature; categories are
primarily mental products resulting from a process of discretely dividing up the
natural entities. There natural entities do not exist as such as discrete entities
but form part of a continuous substratum. And classical structuralism seems to
neglect this critical aspect.
The use of dynamical models which are able to explain qualitative discontinuities
can emerge from the organization of the continuum, in such a way that it can be
categorized and discretized. They have been used in linguistics and phonology (two
critical areas of structuralism) from researchers such as Petitot, and this
research picks up from these dynamical approaches in order to extent their
catastrophist models for applications concerning new media artworks. One of
Petitot’s initial approaches towards a dynamical structuralism, involved the
catastrophization of qualitative and privative oppositions (which form the basis of
Jacobson’s phonological feature analysis), and explain them in terms of
catastrophes of conflict and bifurcations respectively.
The syntactic character of structure presents and even more interesting picture.
Chomsky’s axioms did go beyond previous approaches concerning the content vs.
syntax relationship, or item versus arrangement, but the apparent autonomy of its
approach masks the rootedness of syntax to natural languages and in the structures
of action and perception. His formalism seems to ignore the partial analogy between
the structure of language and the structure of the experienced external world. The
infinite generativity of sentences, is instead an auto-limitation imposed by the
patterns of action in the external world and perceptual activities by the language-
user. It was Rene Thom, the predecessor of dynamical catastrophe theoretical models
in linguistic studies, which insisted on the need for explaining these auto-
limitation of the generative capacity itself.
To accomplish this a grammatical analysis should turn to some of the non-formalist
(and rather realist and semanticist) perspectives on case-structures. Ideas that
are relevant concernt the actantial perspective of Lucien Tesniere and the localist
theory adopted by Hjelmslev, Anderson and Fillmore. In their approaches they
understood sentence meaning, not as the resultant of a combinatronics of word
meanings, but as something configurationally available in a gestalt-like manner.
Tesniere talked about the theatrical imagery of sentence structure and its meaning
He composed the meaning holistically with the verb conveying the action part of the
sentence, and the actants playing the role of participants in the action. Similar
direction was taken from Hjlemslev. He concludes that case is not a logical
category, but only a structural one. He identified the case as a category that
signifies spatial relations between two objects, and he defines these relation
along three ‘dimensions’, namely, Directions (Distancing and Nearing),
Subjectivity-Objectivity and Coherence.
Following their approaches Thom introduced the application of Catastrophe Theory in
order to define the genesis of the grammatical (case) structures from the actantial
dynamics (as derived from Tesniere), on a spatial substratum. He used as a founding
principle for the deduction of grammatical cases, the set of seven elementary
catastrophes functions, and derived eighteen archetypal morphologies in the form of
actantial graphs, showing the correspondence between the topological graphs and the
case structures. His topogico-dynamical analysis of syntax-semantics relationship
involves a synthesis of the actantial syntax, the case grammars and the idea of
morphogenesis. Thom’s theoretical contribution to the structuralist movement was
the retainment of an essential continuity between the physical and the
phenomenological mode of existence, alloowing the deduction of qualitatively
differentiated case-structures from a physical substratum.Therefore provides a
principle of identifying and categorizing the finite set of core grammatical (case)
structures which in the natural world appear as infinitely varied occurrences of
physical or physically-based actions.
Jean Petitot has been a strong advocate (along with others) of the dynamical
approaches in linguistics (as found in the works of Per Aage Brandt, Leonard Talmy,
Ronald Langacker and George Lackoff), but his work main merit has been the
establishment of Catastrophe Theory as a viable dynamical approach (the
“morphodynamical approach”), in contrast to the various formalist approaches.
Embracing the morphodynamical approach, which is based on sophisticated
mathematical topology, one can better handle the inherently dynamical and
structural character of the core grammar of natural languages, as opposed to the
logico-algebraic formalization fashionable during the fifties and the sixties.
I will focus intensely on Petitot’s work in regards to the analysis of the semio-
narrative structures and his attempts to theoretically develop the inherent
topological potential of the semiotic square by applying CT to it. Throughout this
research I am using the provided schematization of Greimas’ structures of
elementary signification and a catastrophist interpretation of the latter’s
actantial model of narrative structure. I am supporting Petitot’s suggestions that
the relations associated with the qualitative and privative opposition of the
semiotic square can be schematized by means of the catastrophe of Conflict of
minimal complexity and that of Bifurcation of minimal complexity respectively.
Shifting the paradigm towards this direction I investigate the topological
potential of the square, and avoid logico-combinatory approaches which are not
suitable explaining the emergence of the structure from a physical substratum. The
main merit of this approach to narrative semiotics, is the schematization of the
‘undefinables’ of the square, and its modeling as a ‘procession’ of elementary
catastrophes. Ultimately at a more complex level, the entire canonical narrative
schema as proposed by Levi-Strauss can be understood in terms of two coupled
qualitative oppositions, represented by a ‘double cusp’, and this is the main
methodology followed in this research.
The ‘conversion’ that gives rise to the Gremasian actantial model from syntactic
operations on the content values is seen in terms of the actantial graphs
associated with Thom’s elementary catastrophes and archetypal morphologies, which
are indeed actantial schemas deeply rooted in the behavioral structures of living
beings (Petitot,2004). In a more detailed manner in this research I am describing
how morphology can be reduced to a system of qualitative discontinuities emerging
from an underlying substrate (be it physical, geometrical, or even ‘semantic’), and
indicate dynamical mechanisms which are able to generate, in a structurally stable
way, these discontinuities at local and global levels.
This paradigm is not a new apporach, but rather follows developments during the
seventies and the early eighties in physics. It follows the mathematical analysis
of the singularities and discontinuities which emerge at the macro level from
underlying micro-physical mechanisms, and can be found as caustics in optics, phase
transitions, symmetry breaking and critical phenomena, dissipative structures and
many others. The main concern of these models is to explain how the observable
morphologies which dominate the phenomenological experienced world, can emerge from
the underlying physics, and attempt to bridge the gap between physical objectivity
and phenomenology. The morphodynamical approach can be viewed as a pure
mathematical approach leading to qualitative physics. It shows that the
informational relevant and salient features of macro-physical processes are
constituted by their singularities, qualitative discontinuities and their critical
behavior.
The application of these models to cognitive processes such as perception, action
and language, constitutes differential geometry as a replacement for formal logic.
This research introduces morphodynamical concepts concerning structure and its
signification into new media artwork creation.

Morphogenesis of Meaning: Introduction

The better part of this thesis is devoted to the study of application of CT

modeling and epistemological issues deriving from it. The main focus is given to
structural linguistics and semio-narrative structures, and is carried out in two
levels. From a modeling perspective I demonstrate how dynamical syntax and
topological thinking (introduced by Rene Thom is linguistics), allows to approach
and pry main difficulties concerning the explication of form and structure, as
encountered in structuralism. From the epistemological point of view, I examine the
type of schematization one can achieve using geometric notion on concepts and
propose a geometrization of meaning for abstract artwork. A more generic attainment
in this venture is the constitution of the structural domain and structure, a
constitution which according to Petitot “[…] is not strictly of a physical order,
to the extent it uses mathematics to reconstruct empirical phenomena, it is of
physical type.” (Petitot, 2004).
Studying classical (and early modern) structural conceptions, no matter the
discipline, one can sense that the formal rationale is short on its mathematization
in favor of formalization. I draw concepts from different domains of interest where
structuralism thrived and apply these concepts to the narrative inquiries of this
research. My main focus targets,
In the area of biological organization, the understanding on how the function of
the parts in relation to the whole is determined in terms of their pertinent
positions. Given the existence of biological structure, it is dependent on their
reciprocally determined position, which is the result of dynamic processes defining
their positional values, —what is called the principle of connection.
In the domain of perceptual organization, the inquiry is very similar concerning
the Gestalt structures.
In phonology the analogy is found at the equivalence classes of the abstract
discrete phonemes with allophones. Once more these classes are formed under the
principle of connection, obtained from the categorization of audio-acoustic
substrata, and the positional values are determined within phonetic paradigms.
In syntax, primitive structures are constituted of reciprocally determined
actantial places. Their positional values in this case is coming from semantic
connections and not formal.
Finally in narrative semiotics, Greimas theoretical investigations, employ both
phonological and actantial models in order to explain semantic and syntactic
organizations respectively. The key idea here is finding linkages between them. The
investigation lies in the conversion of the semantic paradigms into actantial
interaction, what is called in structuralism projecting the paradigmatic axis onto
the syntagmatic one.

In all of these areas, each approach relies heavily upon the formalizations
ascribed to the connections of the equivalence classes, thus on the mathematization
of the concept of positional value. This type of schematization can legitimately
establish the notion of structure and its inner workings. This is equivalent with
finding an appropriate geometry of position that can explicate the organization,
stability, elementary structures, and the constraints imposed on their
combinatronics.
Petitot has argued intensively that classical structuralism was forced to discard
the dynamical organicity and nature of structures (Petitot, 2004),[This ideas where
first printed on 1985 in the french edition of this publication, which was
traslated to English on 2004.] in order to establish abstract relations between
terms. This is exactly the difference between the process of mathematization and
formalization.
It is the fundamental conflict between the formal treatment of structure and their
‘mathematical physics’. The former is associated with formal logic of terms and
relations, while the latter refers to a dynamic topology of positions and
connections.
The first attempt on mathematical theories that take account of the dynamical
nature of structure and form and a topological language to describe them is
Catastrophe Theory.
Following the path along structuralism’s evolution through different domains
(structural biology, Gestalt theory, phenomenology and philosophy), I touch upon
some of the critical issues regarding the investigation of form and structure, in
order to trace the roots of the ideas that inspired this research project.
I challenge the general notion of structure as a symbolic construct and treat it as
a natural phenomenon. Not ignoring its symbolic nature, treated by formal logic, I
enrich these formalizations, and their algorithm in order to investigate their
diversity. In that sense a physics of meaning, as Petitot describes it (Petitot,
2004), is founded upon a mathematical schematization of categories of
structuralism. The naturalization of meaning and its structural descriptions
transcends the gap between its symbolic substance and its existential experience.

Chapter I

In this chapter I will strategically touch upon some significant aspects of

structuralism that led to what today came to be identified as dynamical
structuralism, a project endowned with the goal to inquiry the conditions for the
mathematization of structures. Gilles Deleuze following Levi-Strauss’, claims that
the foundations of structuralism are topological and not logical.

Understanding structure:

Structure is a concept of diverse content depending on the domain under

consideration. The fact that in some domains the concept of structure can be
supported by some sort of materiality, makes the ontological status of structure
non problematic. In physico-chemical systems the concept of structure can also be
equally derived from the interactions between its constituents, again the
ontological character of status remains non problematic.
Contrary to the above cases, the concept of structure seems less attainable given
the absence of materiality as found in domains such as perception, which makes the
form of organization to be abstract and not reducible to its interactive
components. The experiential trait of structure as concept in cases like that,
loses its objectivity. Mathematization of its categorial content is a strategy in
order to constitute the objectivity of structure.
Though the main trend of structuralism strifes to reduce structure to formal
dependence relations which connect parts to a whole, as far as structure is the
ideal form of a substance and not rooted to experience, it is not a sensible
phenomenon (Petitot,2004). To avoid this conflict was necessary for structuralists
to constitute it as an object of experience, which is what the cognitive tradition
in structuralism aims for. Classical structuralism regarded structure as a purely
theoretical phenomenon. Through its formal reductions the intent remained
restricted to satisfying axioms and conditions, and these symbolic transformations
ignored the dynamical character of the non trivial parts the symbols represented.
To avoid the same pitfall, dynamical structuralism proposes mathematization to deal
with the fact that form emerges from the organizational character of the substrata
that is implemented in. Dynamical structuralism chose not to neglect the
constituency and organization of the subsymbolic level — where symbols emerge from.
Krzysztof Pomian observed that in every structural approach the observed initial
object is replaced by pairs of objects with different ontological statuses,
“[…]parole and langue (Saussure), allophones and phonemes (jakobson, Trubetzkoi),
substance and form (Hjelmslev), systems of kinship and elementary structures of
kinship (Levi-Strauss), performance and competence (Chomsky), empirical
morphologies and their underlying dynamics(Thom), etc. Each of the first terms of
these pairs (which one might call ‘realizations’) are accessible to sensory
experience, or to observation, and their reality consists in this. Each of the
second terms, the structures…cannot by definition be perceived or observed; we
grant them a reality on the basis of a demonstration, more or less rigorous
depending upon the case. The relations between realization and structures are
variable, but it is always the latter which render the former stable and
intelligible. As a result, structures are defined as the sets of rational and
interdependent relations, whose reality is demonstrated, whose descriptions is
provided by theory, and which are realized by a visible or observable object whose
stability and intelligibility are conditioned by them.” (Pomian, 1981: 758)
That renders structures an ambiguous object of study.Since as an eidos is not
detachable from the substance that is realized, it is unclear whether we have to
consider it as given or posited trait of its underlying substance . One tends to
chose between the first ontological stance towards the subject of study or the
second epistemological. Till recently the dominant trend tended not to engage
extensively with the ontological conception, since the second suggested a more
methodological approach to an operational conception of structure as artefact.
The ontological views on structure, though initially could seem problematic in
their descriptive nature can become — through schematization of its categorical
content, a source of algorithms for reconstructing phenomena, or at least some
classes of them.
If one was to trace the path that led to cognitive linguistics —a venture
fundamental to cognitive narratology and modern theories of narrative, would find
the following landmarks,
The precursor of dynamical structuralism, inspired by developmental biology,
expressed through the work of D’Arcy Thompson leading to Waddington’s concept of
morphogenetic field, chreod and epigenetic landscape. The focus in these cases
being the problem of morphogenesis.
The phenomenological and gestaltist strucuralism
Saussure’s linguistic structuralism, the fundamental paradigm found in social
sciences with Jacobson in the field of phonology, Levi-Strauss in anthropology,
Tesniere in linguistics, Hjemslev and Greimas in semiotics. This structuralism was
expressed from two movements:
Jacobson’s phenomenological approach, strongly attached to dynamical structuralism
and Gestalt theory
The formalistic methodological approach, as found in Hjelmslev, Levi-Strauss,
Chomsky and Greimas, where structures are idealized to satisfy axioms
Piaget’s epigenetic and cognitive structuralism
The ‘catastrophist’ structuralism of Rene Thom, which impressively manages to
synthesize objects of study successfully considering both morphogenesis and
structure. It could be considered the first satisfying step towards theorizing
structure as an object of study.

To compliment the picture of this quest of explicating form and structure, the
following syllogisms need to be accounted for,
Experimental methods that give us access to structures and their analysis. Since
they are non material and idealistic constructs observations cannot be made
directly. For Levi-Strauss the first method of analysis deals with transformation
of structures by variational procedures. In this way a structure could be identify
itself with a set of global rules that systemically could describe it, and this
fact can create relations between localities and a global system of description.
Relation between structure and function, stemming out of biological, physiological
research.
Relation between function and teleology, since in order to analyze structure we
need to somehow project it to infinity (as in Fourier transformations for
instance), and transcend its finality.
Formalization of structures, and consider ways that account for the dynamically,
self-organized, self-regulated emergent properties of form, and the critical form-
substance relationship.
Levels of organization, on of the most important inquiries on structure is how the
different levels of organization correlate.

Main Trends in structuralism: brief overview

Starting with Kant’s intuitions on biological organization—essentially self-

organization, I will briefly recount some important perspectives regarding the
phenomena of organization of substance.
First observations date back to Kant and his arguments on the purposiveness in
nature, led to the impossibility of objectively apprehending natural purposes,
natures teleology. Briefly some of his arguments sum up to the following.
Given an a priori structure of possible experience, we cannot recognize any
objective finality in nature.
Empirically one can admit to a means in organized living beings, there exists in
nature ‘natural ends’. Kant identifies these ‘ends’ in morphogenesis, regulations,
reproduction, and adaptation (external finality).
Though the progress of physics could account for a mechanistically explication of
the above processes, would not account for the eventuality of form, since is a
trait of natural ends. It could only be understood reflectively via the idea of
finality of form.
Internal finality is not just organization, but self-organization, manifestation of
reciprocal determination between the parts and the whole. The structure is not just
the structure of a mechanism, but that of a systematic unity of the form and
interconnecting parts. Therefore exists a formative force which can’t be
objectified.
Reductionist and holistic views are not a real antinomy, but a conflict between
maxims that open to a natural dialectic concerning paths for gaining knowledge and
comprehension of phenomena. The idea of finality though not objective is as
necessary for the human faculty, according to Kant, as if it were an objective
principle[Petitot’s translation (morphogenesis of meaning)].
The possibility that a regulative idea can have the same value as a categorical
concept,comes from the finite nature of our understanding.

The impossibility of a physical explanation of the phenomena such as morphogenesis,

(self-)organization, regulation is still to be solved. We are some way from
understanding how stable and self-regulated structures can emerge from a physico-
chemical substratum. The reason for this according to Petitot is not factual but
theoretical, “What we lack are concepts not facts” (Petitot, 2004:29), stating that
only recently have we been able to account on how material media can spontaneously
self-organize, either temporally (oscillating chemical reactions) or spatio-
temporally.

Structuralism in Biology

The structuralist paradigm in biology is a dynamical perspective and appeared along

with the idea of morphogenesis. The concept of structure and form in this case is
inseparable. It has been closely related with the Aristotelian concept of
entelechia, the complete realization of a potential form or rather the conditions
which render that potential actualized.
Starting with the principle of spatial connection between parts and the whole,
proceeding with Goethe’s observations and meditations on plant morphogenesis. He
sought not so much to understand the physico-chemical mechanisms underlying the
formation of organisms, but rather to discover the principle by which an organism
appears as such. He came to the conclusion that the distinction between an organism
and a machine is that external appearances in the case of an organism, are governed
by an internal principle producing the spatial (external) connections between
parts. He gradually recognized an ideal principle— a schema that could share
infinite concrete variations. His syllogisms recognized it as the spatio-temporal
unfolding of an internal organizing force[Wolfgan Von Goethe, 2009, Mit Press, the
Metamoprhosis of Plants, english translation.], and recognized in this entelechic
principle the main regulation for the formation of natural ends.
Goethe’s speculative approach to the problem of the aporia of form[See Thom on the
subject (state bibliography)], has been considered epistemological. It was retained
in contemporary trends of dynamical structuralism, and has been found to be in line
with Waddington’s ideas, of morphogenetic fields,
canalisation[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canalisation_(genetics)
Canalisation is a measure of the ability of a population to produce the same
phenotype regardless of variability of its environment or genotype. It is a form of
evolutionary robustness. The term was coined in 1942 by C. H. Waddington to capture
the fact that "developmental reactions, as they occur in organisms submitted to
natural selection...are adjusted so as to bring about one definite end-result
regardless of minor variations in conditions during the course of the reaction".[1]
He used this word rather than robustness to take into account that biological
systems are not robust in quite the same way as, for example, engineered systems.
Biological robustness or canalisation comes about when developmental pathways are
shaped by evolution. Waddington introduced the concept of the epigenetic landscape,
in which the state of an organism rolls "downhill" during development. In this
metaphor, a canalised trait is illustrated as a valley (which he called a creode)
enclosed by high ridges, safely guiding the phenotype to its "fate". Waddington
claimed that canals form in the epigenetic landscape during evolution, and that
this heuristic is useful for understanding the unique qualities of biological
robustness.[2]] and chreods.

According to these the main characteristics of structural organizations are,

Dynamical genesis, self-regulation and structural stability
Equipotentiality, the concept of a reciprocal determination of places (positional
values), included in structures, which constitutes structure as something more than
a mere system of interaction of components.
Equifinality[The principle that in open systems a give end state can be reached by
many potential means] and homeorhesis (homogenous rhesis, steady flow), recognizing
development is structurally stable as a process, and its final state is largely
determined by the initial one.
Closure of elementary structures, and the existence of constraints constituting
some sort of ‘laws’ of form.
Generativity of forms and the production of complex structures from a closed set of
elementary ones.

The neo-Darwinian points of view on the contrary, do not recognize the existence of
laws of form regulating evolution, reducing it to a mere matter of genetics and
ignoring their epigenetics[From the generic meaning, and the associated adjective
epigenetic, British embryologist C. H. Waddington coined the term epigenetics in
1942 as pertaining to epigenesis, in parallel to Valentin Haecker's 'phenogenetics'
(Phänogenetik).[11] Epigenesis in the context of the biology of that period
referred to the differentiation of cells from their initial totipotent state during
embryonic development.[12]
When Waddington coined the term, the physical nature of genes and their role in
heredity was not known. He used it instead as a conceptual model of how genetic
components might interact with their surroundings to produce a phenotype; he used
the phrase "epigenetic landscape" as a metaphor for biological development.
Waddington held that cell fates were established during development in a process he
called canalisation much as a marble rolls down to the point of lowest local
elevation.[13]Waddington suggested visualising increasing irreversibility of cell
type differentiation as ridges rising between the valleys where the marbles
(analogous to cells) are travelling.[14]
In recent times, Waddington's notion of the epigenetic landscape has been
rigorously formalized in the context of the systems dynamics state approach to the
study of cell-fate.[15][16] Cell-fate determination is predicted to exhibit certain
dynamics, such as attractor-convergence (the attractor can be an equilibrium point,
limit cycle or strange attractor) or oscillatory.].Structuralism in biology
considered the above concepts as categories governing morphological phenomenology.
The main problem now is to find a way to assign them an objective value.

Gestalt theory and phenomenology

Same issues, problems and criticisms appeared also in psychology.Paul Guillaume in

his introduction to Gestalt theory, declared that “…the terms of shape, structure
and organization pertain not only to the language of biology (that, forms) but also
to psychology (that is, thought or ideas)…” (Circlot[“A dictionary of symbols” (in
my downloads)], 1962:291). He observed that “…shapes correspond, in our perception
and thought, to comparable forms in the nervous processes…” (ibid). What is
circular shares equivalency to both the circle and to the cyclic, the square to
things quaternary and also with the number four, and seems that form takes its
place as the “…intermediary between spirit and matter…” (ibid). Circlot continues
broadening the argument claiming that regular shapes indicate regulated, well
ordered sentiments, whereas irregular ones suggest unregulated sentiments, oval
shapes exhibit relations with biomorphic things, cube with constructional and
artificial, simple shapes with what can be considered straightforward ; complex
ones to what is complicated. He found this to apply to rhythms, structures, and any
kind of composition.
Similar principles equate symmetry to static states and equilibrium, and dynamism
with assymetry, absolute regularity and absolute irregularity with chaos—both
expressions of the undifferentiated[According to Circlot differentiation is brought
about by ritual, meaning the organization of regularized irregularity.]. He
supports of morphological analyses been applied to the symbolic, using as an
example the phenomenon of growth, and signifying in symbolic terms a regular force
of diffusion, the existence of an origin and a uniform pattern of resistance.
So the gestaltic monism of Guillaume begins with a criticism on the atomistic views
of sensations, since sensation cannot exist without some sort of perceptual
organization. Hence perceptions cannot be reduced to systems of atomic sensations.
This would require a real transformation of the state of consciousness since “…
neither the terms or the relations have an atomistic sensorial reality…” (Petitot,
2004:34). This is the reason for the necessity of conceiving them as complexions
i.e. as structures. They do not possess the status of independent parts detachable
from the whole, and differ from systems of components of interaction in the sense
of morphological organization and internal articulations. They are the results from
a formative activity and acquire their positional values from the very existence of
connections.
Gestaltists theorized these structures “…dynamically as natural biophysical
phenomena.” (ibid), supporting the applicability of general principles of dynamics
and transcending their physical applications. It is in this regard that Petitot
traces the roots of modern structuralism at the meeting point of biological
naturalism, phenomenology and Gestalt theory (ibid).
Many issues on the debate on parts/whole relations can be considered conceptually
resolved since Brentano (Smith[Parts and Moments Studies in Logic and Formal
Ontology, in my downloads], 1982), nevertheless many others still remain
unresolved. Apart from the problem of an objective validity of classifications, the
issue still remains for the states of affairs[The descriptive relation between
language and the external world], the issue of organization, and that of dependent
moments[I.e. moments some of which require the existence of others.] (ibid). For
example let us consider the edge of a material thing or the total surface by which
it is circumscribed as a spatial Gestalt. These cannot be considered as independent
pieces, since we cannot exclude either from a thing so it falls into two
independent parts. Nevertheless the circumscribing surface cannot be considered an
internal quality of the thing even though is definitely an important aspect of its
definition.[Not sure about that, maybe needs to be removed] This last issue of
dependent moments, namely the relations of dependence between moment and the whole,
has been investigated rigorously by Husserl[See Smith, 1982.]. He approaches it
either as ontological issue, or as a problem of psychology, and in doing so he
presupposes that, “…relations of dependence are not only psycho-linguistic bur also
‘a priori’ valid for every field of objects, and therefore possess an objective
content.” (Petitot, 2004).

The states of affairs, the relationship of language and reality

Concerning the descriptive relation between language and the external world,
Petitot claims (ibid) that in order to understand it is necessary to introduce a
third term, one that is neither of a physical or linguistic type, the states of
affairs.
One way to view states of affairs is assigning them the role of truth-maker, the
quality that makes a true statement true. Nevertheless it might be more productive
to try to explain how states of affairs can emerge as an objective structure, — a
phenomenological invariant as Petitot puts it—, whose reality is neither physical
nor symbolic. In that way is possible for one to explain how the structural aspects
of reality constrain and determine linguistic structures (Petitot, 2004:37).
Petitot continues claiming that Thom’s Catastrophe theory is the first synthesis
between phenomenology and physical objectivity, and a significant step in
understanding the manner in which the structure of a state of affairs can emerge
from objective reality, summing it up by stating that “…the thought of a meaning of
a proposition must be rooted in the phenomenological structuration of reality…”
(ibid).

Structuralism in phonology

Saussurean contributions in linguistic structuralism mainly involve the basic

concept of paradigm and reciprocal determination. Saussure defined a paradigm not
as a system of relations between predefined terms with autonomous existence, but
with positional values defined by dependence relations to the other categorical
terms. This is a fundamental structuralist view. Thus Saussure identifies language
as a form and not as substance.
Roman Jacobson used Saussure’s paradigm as a fundamental concept in his phonology.
While phonemes are considered mental abstract representations of speech sound— a
psychological reality of a functional nature—, allophones are the different
phonetic realizations of a phoneme, substantial units of an auditory-acoustic
nature. While a change in allophones does not produce a change in meaning, a change
in phonemes could. The critical theoretical problem then is understanding the link
between the organization of the substance of expression and the articulation of the
form of expression, or in other words how phonological categorizations emerge as
structures from the phonetic substrata.
The problem becomes a question of how the form of expression — an abstract system—,
realized in the substance of expression —speech act—, determines categorical
discrimination and phonological perception. In other words how phonological form
emerges from the organization of the auditory-acoustic substance.
The answer to this can be found in the nature of the structure of phonological
perception, which is categorical . This implies the following,
Identification discretizes the continuous space of acoustic cues, dividing it into
stable perceptual phonological sub-domains
In each sub-domain there is no intracategorial discrimination.

This second feature is what makes phonetic perception as categorical,

distinguishing it from continuous perception where discrimination is independent of
categorization.[I am going to return at this point later on]
This paradigm of how audio-acoustic phonetic substrata (organization of the
substance) are linked to the abstract relational nature of the phonological
subcategories (the organization of the form). The reason for the encoded in the
continuous auditory-acoustic flow phonemes being categorical, for Petitot, is a
consequence of the perceptual process itself. (Petitot, 2004:43)
Actantial structures and case-grammars
In syntax, one of the first advocates of the structuralist tradition is Lucien
Tesniere, for whom a sentence is a system of disembodied connections, which exist
only in the mind.[Tesniere, 1959 from Petitot:2004 p.43] He schematized the
structural relations by means of graphs which he called ‘stemmas’, a visual
manifestation of abstract dependence relations.
These structural connections for Tesniere define functions— roles—, assigned to
words in the expression of thought. Contrary to the development in
transformational-generative grammar, Tesniere’s descriptions emphasized the self-
regulated organizations— similar to biological organisms—, of these structures and
their dynamical nature. Based on the notion of verbal valence — a concept in
linguistics derived from chemistry—, his conception descibe an actantial scenic.
The concept of actantial structures describe a notion of syntax found in Fillmore’s
case grammars, and in more recent developments with Talmy’s, Lakoff’s and
Langacker’s cognitive grammars.
In order to deal with the difficulties of the semantic interpretation of deep
syntactic relations[The existence of a finite set of deep case-universals being
also functional categories:Agent, Dative, Instrumental. Locative, Objective and
Beneficiary.],— which select the semantic (actantial) roles—, Fillmore proposes the
idea of a case-frame serving as an intermediary between the descriptions of
phenomena and the underlying syntactic representations. Several semantic fields can
be the substrata of a single abstract schema of actantial relations, and he calls
these semantic fields ‘scenes’. Each ‘scene’ is organized by a finite number of
specific conceptual constructions which Fillmore argues are activated in our mind
as prototypical scenes, as we produce and understand linguistic expressions. In
other words when an expression is brought to perspective it activates the global
background upon which is profiled (Petitot:2004, 46).
There are issues however in case grammars mainly concerning,
How can actantial schemas emerge from the phenomenological organization of reality
into state of affairs, as self-regulated structures and syntactic Gestalts.
How these schemas allow for a description of case meanings in terms of positional
values.
In order to solve the above considerations it is necessary to resort to the
localist hypothesis, assuming structural connections between spatio-temporal
actants serve as a model for syntactic schemas. This hypothesis has been thoroughly
confirmed by Thom in his interpretation of case universals in terms of elementary
catastrophes.

Semio-narrative structures

Actantial relations are not only found at the sentence level but also at the
narrative level. This was demonstrated in Propp’s structural analysis of the
folktales. At the surface level of manifestations folktales exhibit relations
between plots involving actors that are situated spatio-temporally, defined by
thematic roles, interacting through conflicts, gifts, separations, unions, passions
etc. Certain deep structures can be identified which A.J. Greimas called semio-
narrative structures. The nature of semio-narrative structures makes them
anthropological structures of the mind.
Semio-narrative grammar is mainly concerned with the relationship between syntax
and semantics, to put it in structuralist terms, with the projection of the
paradigmatic axis onto the syntagmatic one. Propp identified invariant, stable,
universal actantial structures governed by a syntax which syntagmatizes a paradigm
consisting of typical members (Sender/Receiver, Subject/Object of value,
Subject/Anti-subject, Helper/Opponent). These members primarily represent the
actions of the characters in a folktale. They are a set of actions, canonically
ordered and appearing in a rule based environment, like in the process of
morphogenesis.
Taking up from Propp’s observations, Levi-Strauss introduced in the theory of deep
semio-narrative structures the concept of categorization, namely the idea that
tales share a level of deep semantic categorization expressing values which belong
to unconscious codes, then projected on the syntagmatic dimension. These deep
semantics represent ideals that give meaning to experience and life (Life/Death,
Man/Woman, Infinite/Finite etc.). Their surface lexical figures are called
‘sememes’ while their deep semantic counterparts ‘semes’. They are physical drives
that their meaning can only be grasped via its conversion into actantial
structures. More particularly,
They are anthropological universals of the imaginary order.
They appear as action, only when invested in objects of value, motivating the
actions of the subjects.
They become part of the subjects only through experiences and actions.
Actantial syntax converts them into narrative doing which determines
anthropological function.

Concerning semio-narrative grammars three important issues emerge,

Given its actantial nature what constitutes an elementary narrative structure?
What is the meaning of semantic categorization (does it bear similarities with the
categorization as found in phonology)?
What is the nature of the projection of the paradigmatic onto the syntagmatic axis?

Regarding deep semantics, Greimas proposed the semiotic square. It can be

considered as an elementary morphology of meaning, the function of which is to
formally define the morphologies which constitute the categorial form of content.
It is regarded as a universal schema for the articulation of meaning, describing
the minimum conditions for its apprehension. It develops as the unfolding of a
semic category—prior to any sememic investment—, connecting two contrary semes in a
relation of junction (conjuction/disjunction exposited in a reciprocal
presupposition).
Translating the semiotic square as a logical form of an elementary Boolean logic,it
appears completely trivial. Regarding it as a self-regulated, organic system of
dependence relations defining positional values, changes its potential radically.
The properties constituting it are relations of contrariness and contradiction.
These are not of logical type, but rather the equivalents of qualitative and
privative[The binary privative opposition is formed by a contrastive pair of
members in which one member is characterized by the presence of a certain
differential feature (“marked”, “strong”, “positive” member +) while the other
member is characterized by the absence of this feature (“unmarked”, “weak”,
“negative” member -).] oppositions as appear in Jacobson’s phonology.[Note on
qualitative and privative oppositions] It so happens that the formal essence of the
semiotic square is primarily topological and not logical, since both the notions of
presupposition, and opposition based on junction are topological and not logical in
nature. Its explication relies more on a dynamical topology of places and
connections, than a static logic of terms and relations.
Greimasian theory regards elementary actantial relations as the syntagmatization of
paradigmatic structures, constituting the narrative syntax through narrative
programmes. The purpose of narrative programmes thus is to realize a conjuction
between a subject and an object of value. These relationships can be characterized
in terms of a contract (Sender/Receiver reciprocal presupposition), modal
competence and performance (Subject/Object) and performance (Subject/Anti-Subject).
The main problem is the conversion of deep semantic into actantial syntax, i.e. the
projection of deep semantics onto narrative programmes.
Reconstituting the paradigmatic axis with discrete units (categorization) by
reciprocal determination and not by any abstract system of equivalence classes
offers a new perspective on paradigms. The central theoretical issue in this case
is to find an adequate concept of space and to geometrize its categorizations.
Quite early meditations on this problem were given by Gilles Deleuze and his
proposal for a schematism of structure.

Deleuze and the seven principles of structuralism

In his article “How do we recognize structuralism?” (Deleuze,1973), presented the
seven principles of structuralism, the first intuitions concerning the dynamical
nature of structure from a philosophical stand point.
In order to explicate his views I will invite the reader to think of a known
trivial every day object i.e. a chair. This creates a different image of that
object for each reader, though all are of the same type. Presented with different
representations of that object, for instance a photo of it, a painting of I,t and a
linguistic description of it, still the answer as to what this object’s true
identity is remains unanswered. Though all of these descriptions are valid
description of the object none of them contain more than a representation of it.
Deleuze’s answer to this problem of structure came with his syllogisms of the seven
principles of structuralism,

The symbolic realm, according to Deleuze structuralism was able to recognize a

third regime, a new domain one that is not the real nor the imaginary. The symbolic
realm is the domain where the immense number of relationship between these two
exist. One can place the anthropocentric view of experience in the symbolic realm
since it is the human mind that delineates these relationship between what is and
what we know about it —the plane of reality and the plane of ideas. This space in
between (the symbolic) is the place of structures, that compose the positions the
relations
The principle of locality or position, which is a complex combinatronics between
the real and imaginary. A structure of interrelated positions of roles which
constantly redefine each other. The first to notice the locality principle of the
symbolic real was Levi-Strauss, who claimed that the elements of structure “…have
neither extrinsic designation, nor intrinsic signification…Then what’s left?…the
have nothing other than a sense [meaning, direction] a sense which is necessarily
and uniquely positional” (ibid)
The principle of difference, which implies a pattern, a discrepancy and a border
between the two. The border (which is not apparently noticeable), is the relation
between two differentiated objects, what makes them what they are in relation to
each other, through the process of reciprocal determination. The elements of the
symbolic realm share differential relationships between them, and a such these
differentials are characterized by their singularities
Since structures are neither real or imaginary are intermediary allowing the two
domains to interact. In his description of their ontological status of structures
Deleuze said that they are “…real without being actual, ideal without being
abstract…”. Once again picking up from Levi-Strauss, Deleuze explains “… To discern
the structure of a domain is to determine an entire virtuality of coexistence which
pre-exists the beings, objects and works of this domain…” (ibid). If one wants to
grasp the concept, could think about the object of money for instance. A piece of
paper that has no objective value but the one that is assigned to it by the
structure that inhibits it itself, while at the same time the whole economic
structure itself depends on this symbolic object.
The fifth principle is serial, which refers to the possibility of different system
of differences, the possibility of different structures, to interact, contain and
reflect each other. The symbolic elements are serially ordered in series which
always refer homologically to another series. In that sense we are allowed to
identify an object’s objectiveness on another object. For instance different
actualizations of chairs do not stop us from identifying the ‘chairness’ of the
different actualizations. This faculty is so prominent to the point that we even
recognize ‘chairness’ on other objects that are not even of the same category.
Structure traces those elements that makes us understand object as similar or
different and provide a link between an object and its linguistic description
The sixth principle, the principle of empty position/place, or as Deleuze calls it
the empty square, which is what allows structures to be dynamic. Describes the
recognition of a paradoxical element in the structural domain which all the other
elements determine their relative positions in relation to their absolute
displacement with that object. An institutionally stabilized structure in which all
positions are stable occupied is called a code. What makes a structure dynamic are
empty positions allowing the elements to change positional values and relations.
The dynamic nature of form requires the necessity of empty positions that
constantly relocate and circulates.
The seventh principle concerns agency and the subject, the empty place in
structures allows for a constant reorganization of them. As he describes it “The
subject is precisely the agency [instance] which follows the empty place…” (ibid)

Deleuze’s observations according to Petitot (Petitot, 2004:63), tend towards a

positional schematism of the category of relation and assert the necessity for a
deduction to a logic of meaning from a primarily topological conception. As he
describes it “…the symbolic order is to semantic substance what morphogenesis is to
matter.” (Petitot, 2004:63)
Admitting true to Deleuze’s principles structuralism requires a general
mathematical theory of morphologies and morphogenesis. The first effective proposal
in this direction is considered to be Catastrophe Theory of Rene Thom.

Principles of Catastrophe Theory

One of the first questions Rene Thom posed was whether it is possible to find a
synthesis between the dynamical structuralism describing phenomena of morphogenesis
and the phonological (semiolinguistic) structuralism describing the form of
semiotic systems. In order for one to achieve that,according to Petitot
(Petitot:2004), one has to,
Reduce every structure (paradigmatic categorization, actantial interaction,
morphogenetic differentiation etc.) to a morphology defined on a relevant
substratum space.
To reduce every morphology to a system of qualitative discontinuities on this
substratum space.

Then the observed morphologies could be described as combinations or concatenations

of a finite number of structurally stable and recurrent sub-morphologies, similar
to Waddington’s morphogenetic fields or chreods. The first elaboration would deal
with the local dynamics that generates those chreods, and a second one would define
the global dynamics that describe the stable associations between chreods and the
phenomena of order and hierarchy.