36. SANTILLON v.
MIRANDA 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for
14 SCRA 563
Date ​1965
Ponente: Bengzon
Digest Author: Santos
Topic in the Syllabus:
Kinds of Compulsory Heirs
Relevant Law:
Article 892. ​If only one legitimate child or
descendant of the deceased survives, the widow or
widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the
hereditary estate. In case of a legal separation, the
surviving spouse may inherit if it was the deceased
who had given cause for the same.
If there are two or more legitimate children or
descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled
to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the
legitimate children or descendants.
In both cases, the legitime of the surviving spouse
shall be taken from the portion that can be freely
disposed of by the testator. (834a)
Article 996
If a widow or widower and legitimate children or
descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the
succession the same share as that of each of the
children
Doctrine: When intestacy occurs, a surviving
spouse concurring with only one legitimate child
of the deceased is entitled to one-half of the
estate of the deceased spouse under Article 996
of the Civil Code.
Decedent:​ Pedro Santillon
Will: ​No will
Parties:
Carlo Santillon - Son of Petitioner
Perfecta Miranda - Widow of the deceased, mother
of petitioner
FACTS:
● On November 21, 1953, Pedro Santillon died
without a testament
○ Survived by his son, herein petitioner Carlo;
○ and his wife, respondent Perfecta Miranda
● In April 1961, Carlo filed a “Motion to Declare
Shares of Heirs” and to resolve the conflicting
claims of the parties with respect to their
respective rights in the estate
○ Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code,
Carlo insisted that after deducting 1/2
from the conjugal properties as the
conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining
her and 3/4 for him.
● Perfecta Miranda: claimed that besides her
conjugal half, she was entitled under Art.
996 of the New Civil Code, to another 1/2 of
the remaining half.
● In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's
inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.
● The trial court ruled in favor of Perfecta,
allowing her to inherit another ½ of the
remaining half of the estate
● Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the
article is unjust and inequitable to the extent
that it grants the widow the same share as
that of the children in intestate succession,
whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and the
only child 1/2.
● Oppositor Perfecta contends that Art. 996
should control, regardless of its alleged
inequity, being as it is, a provision on
intestate succession involving a surviving
spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as
in statutory construction, the plural word
"children" includes the singular, "child".
● From the decision of the trial court, Carlo filed
this petition
ISSUES:
Whether or not Miranda, as the widow of the
deceased, is entitled to ½ of the remaining half of
the estate
RULING:
Yes. Miranda is entitled to the ½ of the remaining
half of the estate
Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the
chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas Art.
996 comes under the chapter on Legal or
Intestate Succession.
Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro
cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to
3/4 of his father's estate. ​Art. 892 merely fixes
the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art.
888 thereof, the legitime of children intestate
succession​.
While it may indicate the intent of the law with
respect to the ideal shares that a child and a
spouse should get when they concur with each
other, it does not fix the amount of shares that
such child and spouse are entitled to when
intestacy occurs.
Because if the latter happens, the pertinent
provision on intestate succession shall apply; i. e.
Art. 996.
The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this
instance.
1 of 36
37. SOLANO vs. CA, BIENVENIDO AND EMETERIA
GARCIA
GR No. L-41971 November 29, 1983
Ponente: ​Melencio Herrera, J.
Digest Author: ​ Sumanga
Topic: ​Kinds of Compulsory heirs; Concurring;
Surviving spouse/Illegitimate children
Relevant Law: ​Article 887, NCC.; Article 854, NCC.
Doctrine: ​The preterition or omission of one, some,
or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will
or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
Parties:
Defendants:
Bienvenido Garcia & Emetria Garcia (claiming to be
illegitimate children of Dr. Meliton Solano +)
Plaintiffs:
Zonia Ana Solano (acknowledged natural child of Dr.
Meliton Solano+)
BACKGROUND OF THE STORY (PLEASE READ)
1st Wife
MELITON SOLANO, a resident of Tabaco, Albay,
married ​Pilar Riosa​. The latter died.
2nd Wife
On a world tour he met a French woman, ​Lilly
Gorand​, who became his second wife in 1928. The
union was short-lived as she left him in 1929.
3rd Partner (Garcias' Mom)
In the early part of 1930, SOLANO started having
amorous relations with ​Juana Garcia,​ out of which
affair was born Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria
Garcia. Their birth certificates and baptismal
certificates mention only the mother's name without
the father's name.
The facts establish that SOLANO during his lifetime
recognized the GARCIAS as his children by acts of
support and provisions for their education.
4th Partner (Zonia's Mom)
In 1935, SOLANO started living with ​Trinidad
Tuagnon​.
Three children were born out of this relation but
only petitioner ZONIA Ana Tuagnon, is living. In her
Birth Certificate, her status was listed as
"illegitimate".
Divorce From The French Girl
During the Japanese occupation, SOLANO obtained a
divorce from Lilly Gorand and on December 22,
1943.
SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon executed an
"Escritura de Reconocimiento de Unit Hija Natural"
acknowledging ZONIA as a "natural child" and giving
her the right to use the name SONIA Ana Solano y
Tuagnon. The document was registered with the
Local Civil Registrar on the same date.
(So indeed) ZONIA has a better right.
On January 18, 1969, SOLANO executed his ​"Ultima
Voluntad y Testamento" ​instituting ZONIA as his
universal heir to all his personal and real properties
in Camalig, Tabaco and Malinao, all in the province
of Albay, ​except​ for five parcels of land in Bantayan,
Tabaco, Albay, which were given to Trinidad
Tuagnon in usufruct.
FACTS:
● July 7, 1969 --> Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria
Garcia (GARCIAS), claiming to be illegitimate
children of Dr. Meliton SOLANO, filed an ​action
for recognition​ against him.
● In his Answer, SOLANO ​denied ​paternity.
● During the pendency of the suit, ​SOLANO died.
● Petitioner ZONIA Ana Solano was ordered
substituted​ for the DECEDENT as the ​only
surviving heir mentioned in his Last Will and
Testament ​probated prior to his death in a
Special Proceeding.
● ZONIA entered her formal appearance as a
"substitute defendant" -
○ claiming additionally that she was the ​sole
heir​ of her father, SOLANO, and
○ asking that she be allowed to assume her
duties as ​executrix​ of the probated Will
with the least interference from the
GARCIAS who were "mere pretenders to be
illegitimate children of SOLANO".
● The GARCIAS filed their reply -
○ impugning the recognition of ZONIA as an
acknowledged natural child;
○ with the prayer that she be declared
instead, like them, as an ​adulterous child ​of
the DECEDENT.
○ The GARCIAS further moved for the
impleading of the SOLANO estate in
addition to ZONIA, which was opposed by
the latter, but which the Trial Court granted
in its Order.
2 of 36
● The Trial Court specified the ​legal issues​ to be
treated in the parties' respective Memoranda
as:
1. the question of recognition of the GARCIAS;
2. the correct status of ZONIA, and
3. the hereditary share of each of them in
view of the probated Will.
Trial Court:
● Declared Bienvenido and Emeteria together
with Zonia Solano as illegitimate children of Dr.
Meliton Solano under the class of ​adulterous
children.
● The institution of Zonia Solano as sole and
universal heir of the said deceased in the will
was declared null and void;
● and the three (3) children shall share equally
the estate or one- third (1/3) each, without
prejudice to the legacy given to Trinidad
Tuagnon (Zonia’s mom) and the right of any
creditors of the estate.
CA: ​affirmed in to​to.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the
declaration of institution of sole heir from
decedent’s will – ​NO​.
RULING:
THIS CASE IS A PRETERITION CASE.
The Trial Court and the Appellate Court had
jurisdiction to conclude -
● that upon the facts, the GARCIAS and ZONIA
were in the same category as illegitimate
children;
● that ZONIA's acknowledgment as a "natural
child" in a notarial document executed by
SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon on December 22,
1943 was erroneous because:
○ at the time of her birth in 1941, SOLANO
was still married to Lilly Gorand, his divorce
having been obtained only in 1943, and,
○ therefore, did not have the legal capacity to
contract marriage at the time of ZONIA's
conception,
● that ​being compulsory heirs​, the GARCIAS were,
in fact, pretended from SOLANO's Last' Will and
Testament; and
● that as a result of said preterition, the
institution of ZONIA as sole heir by SOLANO is
null and void​ ​pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil
Code.
"The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of
the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution
of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious."
However, (contrary to the conclusions of the Courts
below, holding that the entire Will is void and
intestacy ensues,) the ​pretention of the GARCIAS
should annul the institution of ZONIA as heir ​only
insofar as the LEGITIME of the omitted heirs is
impaired.
So the Will, therefore, is valid subject to that
limitation. THE TESTATOR REALLY INTENDED TO
FAVOR ZONIA.
Court said under the law, he had a right to dispose of
by Will, so that the disposition in her favor should be
upheld as to the one-half (1/2) portion of the
property that the testator could freely dispose of.
Since the legitime of illegitimate children consists of
one half (1/2) of the hereditary estate, the GARCIAS
and ZONIA each have a right to participation therein
in the proportion of one-third (1/3) each.
ZONIA's hereditary share will, therefore, be 1/2 +
(1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of the estate, while the GARCIAS
will respectively be entitled to 1/3 of 1/2 or 1/6 of
the value of the estate.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby
modified in that the hereditary share in the estate of
the decedent of petitioner Zonia Ana T. Solano is
hereby declared to be (1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of
said estate, while that of private respondents,
Bienvenido S. Garcia and Emeteria S. Garcia, shall
each be (1/3 of 1/2) or (1/6) of the estate. The
usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon shall be
respected. The judgment is affirmed in all other
respects. No costs.
3 of 36
   REPUBLIC V. MA. IMELDA IMEE R.
38
MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND BONGBONG R.
MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, IRENE
R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG
CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, AND PANTRANCO
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO
  No. ​[171701]
GR
Date ​[February 8, 2012]
 
Ponente: ​[ SERENO, ​J.​]
Digest Author: [ARQUILLO, GERTRUDE]
Topic: [COMPULSORY SUCCESSION]
Doctrine: ​Thus, while it was not proven that
respondents conspired in accumulating ill-gotten
wealth, they may be in possession of such ill-gotten
properties or the proceeds thereof as heirs of the
Marcos couple.
● Thus, their lack of participation in any illegal act does
not remove the character of the property as
ill-gotten and, therefore, as rightfully belonging to
the State.
Decedent: [Ferdinand Marcos]
Will: ​There is a will. No text was reproduced in the
case.
Parties:
● Petitioner: Republic of the Ph
● Respondents:
FACTS:
● This is ​Petition for Review filed by Republic
assailing Resolutions​ ​issued by Sandiganbayan in
connection with the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.
● After the EDSA People Power Revolution in
1986, the first executive act of then President
Cory Aquino was to create the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
● One of the civil cases filed before the
Sandiganbayan to recover the Marcoses alleged
ill-gotten wealth was Civil Case No. 0002, now
subject of this Petition.
● On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, on behalf of the
Republic and assisted by OSG, filed a Complaint
for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution,
Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E.
Marcos
○ who was substituted by his estate upon
death; Imelda and respondents Imee, Irene,
Bongbong, Tomas Manotoc, & Gregorio
Araneta III.
● Amended Complaint impleaded other
defendants (not important)
○ Nemesio Co, Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun
Ho, Yeung Chun Fan (Marcos dummies)
○ Imelda Cojuangco, estate of Ramon
Cojuangco, and Prime Holdings
● Allegations in Complaint specific to
respondents:
● Imee, Tomas, Irene, Gregorio, and Bongbong:
actively collaborated, with Ferdinand and
Imelda among others, in unlawfully
appropriating funds and property, and
concealing the same; received property, shares
of stocks in corporations, illegal payments such
as commissions, bribes or kickbacks.
● (not important) ​Yeung Chun Kam et. al.:​ illegal
salting of foreign exchange by importing denim
fabrics from only one supplier a Hong Kong
based corporation which was also owned by
defendant Hong Kong investors, at prices much
higher than those being paid by other users of
similar materials to the damage of Republic.
● Republic’s Causes of Action:
○ Breach of Public Trust
○ Abuse of Right and Power
○ Unjust Enrichment
○ Accounting
○ Liability for Damages
● Pantranco Employees Association-PTGWO
(PEA-PTGWO), a union of Pantranco employees,
moved to intervene before the Sandiganbayan.
○ trust funds in the account of Pantranco
North Express (₱55M) belonged to
Pantranco employees, pursuant to NLRC’s
money judgment in favor of the employees
and against Pantranco.
○ PEA-PTGWO contested the allegation of
Republic that the assets of Pantranco were
ill-gotten because, otherwise, these assets
would be returned to the government and
not to the employees.
● Republic presented its evidence against
respondents.
● Respondents objected on the ground that the
documents violated the best evidence rule of
the Rules of Court, as these documents were
unauthenticated;
○ moreover, petitioner had not provided any
reason for its failure to present originals.
● Sandiganbayan Resolution: ​admitted the pieces
of evidence but evidentiary value shall be left to
the determination of the Court
● Respondents filed their respective Demurrers
to evidence.
● Sandiganbayan issued the ​Assailed Resolution:
granted all the Demurrers to Evidence except
4 of 36
 the one filed by Imelda R. Marcos.
○ Imelda categorically admitted that she and
her husband owned and lawfully acquired
the properties enumerated in the
Complaint
○ evidence presented by petitioner
constituted a ​prima facie ​case against her,
bec value of the properties was grossly
disproportionate to the Marcos spouses
income.
○ this admission and the fact that​ Imelda R.
Marcos was the ​compulsory heir​ and
administratrix​ of the Marcos estate were
the reasons why she was responsible for
accounting for the funds and properties
alleged to be ill-gotten.
○ Imee Bongbong, Irene, and Gregorio’s
involvement were never established. They
were never mentioned by any of the
witnesses presented. Neither did the
documentary evidence pinpoint any
specific involvement of the Marcos
children.
○ the evidence, were considered hearsay,
because their originals were not presented
in court, nor were they authenticated by
the persons who executed them.
○ petitioner failed to provide any valid
reason why it did not present the originals
in court.
○ These exhibits were supposed to show
○ 1.interests of Imee inIBC-13, BBC-2 and
RPN-9, all three of which she had allegedly
acquired illegally AND
○ 2. her alleged participation in dollar salting
through De Soleil Apparel.
● Republic filed its ​Motion for Partial
Reconsideration​: there was a preponderance of
evidence to show that respondents Marcos
siblings and Gregorio had connived with their
parents.
○ respondents were compulsory heirs to the
deposed President and thus obliged to
render an accounting and return the
ill-gotten wealth.
● Sandiganbayan issued the ​2nd Assailed
Resolution: ​denied Republic’s MR. Hence this
Petition.
● The Marcos siblings are being sued in 2
capacities:
● as co-conspirators in the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth; and
● as the ​compulsory heirs ​of their father,
Ferdinand E. Marcos
● Imee​ was accused of dollar salting by using
Glorious Sun to import denim fabrics from one
supplier at prices much higher than those paid
by other users of similar materials. The
Marcoses benefitted from the sequestered
media networks IBC-13, BBC-2, and RPN-9, in
which Imee had a substantial interest
● Irene​ was accused of having conspired with her
husband, Gregorio, in his being President
Marcos conduit to Pantranco, paving the way
for the Presidents ownership of the company in
violation of Art. VII, Sec 4, par 2 of the 1973
Constitution
● Petitioner contends that the documents it used
to support the above allegations against the
Marcos siblings fall under the Rules third
exception:
○ these documents are public records in
the custody of a public officer or are
recorded in a public office.
○ Since these documents were collected by
the PCGG, then, the conditions for the
exception to apply had been met.
○ Docs: Sworn Statements of financial
advisors of President Marcos; ​Affidavits
and Transcript of Stenographic Notes
(TSN) taken during the PCGG hearing held
on 8 June 1987,​ Articles of Incorporation,
etc.
ISSUES:
1. WON Republic failed to observe the best
 
evidence rule [YES] ​not important
2. WON Respondents, as compulsory heirs of
Ferdinand, should be dropped as
 
defendants [NO] ​important issue
RULING:
1. Petitioner failed to observe the best evidence
rule.
● It is petitioner’s burden to prove the
allegations in its Complaint.
● For relief to be granted, the operative act
on how and in what manner the Marcos
siblings participated in and/or benefitted
from the acts of the Marcos couple must
be clearly shown through a ​preponderance
of evidence.
● Should petitioner fail to discharge this
burden, the Court is constrained and is left
with no choice but to uphold the Demurrer
to Evidence filed by respondents.
● First, petitioner does not deny that what
should be proved are the contents of the
documents themselves. It is imperative,
therefore, to submit the original
documents that could prove petitioners
allegations.
● Thus, the photocopied documents are in
violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court, otherwise known as the ​best
evidence rule​, which mandates that the
evidence must be the original document
itself.
● The fact that these documents were
5 of 36
 collected by the PCGG in the course of its
investigations does not make them ​per se
public records referred to in the quoted
rule.
● While TSN may be considered as a public
document since it was taken in the course
of the PCGGs exercise of its mandate, it
was not attested to by the legal custodian
to be a correct copy of the original.
● This omission falls short of the
requirement of Rule 132, Secs. 24 and 25
of the Rules of Court.
2. Imee, Bongbong, and Irene, as compulsory
heirs of Ferdinand, are equally obliged to
render an accounting and return ill-gotten
wealth.
● Since the pending case before the
Sandiganbayan survives the death of
Ferdinand, it is imperative that the estate
be duly represented.
● The purpose behind this rule is the
protection of the right to due process of
every party to a litigation who may be
affected by the intervening death.
● We take judicial notice of the probate
proceedings regarding the will of
Ferdinand.
● In Republic v. Marcos II, we upheld the
grant by RTC of letters testamentary in
solidum to Ferdinand, Jr. and Imelda as
executors of the last will and testament.
● Unless the executors of the Marcos estate
or the heirs are ready to waive in favor of
the state their right to defend or protect
the estate, then they may not be dropped
as defendants in the civil case pending
before the Sandiganbayan.
● Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines
indispensable parties as those
parties-in-interest without whom there
can be no final determination of an action.
● In order to reach a final determination of
the matters concerning the estate of
Ferdinand, the present case must be
maintained against Imelda and Bongbong,
as executors of the Marcos estate
pursuant to ​Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court:
○ actions may be commenced to recover
from the estate, real or personal
property, or an interest therein, or to
enforce a lien thereon; and actions to
recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal,
may be commenced against the
executors.
● The action must likewise be maintained
against Imee and Irene on the basis of the
non-exhaustive list attached to the
Amended Complaint, which states that the
listed properties therein were owned by
Ferdinand and Imelda and their immediate
family.
● It is only during the trial of Civil Case No.
0002 before the Sandiganbayan that there
could be a determination of whether these
properties are indeed ill-gotten.
● SEE DOCTRINE
● Under the rules of succession, the heirs
instantaneously became co-owners of the
Marcos properties upon the death of the
President.
● Nothing prevents the heirs from exercising
their right to transfer or dispose of the
properties that constitute their legitimes,
even absent their declaration or absent
the partition or the distribution of the
estate.
● upon the death of a person, each of his
heirs becomes the undivided owner of the
whole estate left with respect to the part
or portion which might be adjudicated to
him, a community of ownership being thus
formed among the coowners of the estate
while it remains undivided.
● every part owner may sell, assign, or
mortgage his part in the common
property, and the effect of such
assignment or mortgage shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted him in
the partition upon the dissolution of the
community.
● In sum, the Marcos siblings are maintained
as respondents, because
(1) the action pending before the
Sandiganbayan is one that survives
death, and, therefore, the rights to
the estate must be duly protected;
(2) they allegedly control, possess
or own ill-gotten wealth, through
their direct involvement in
accumulating or acquiring such
wealth may not have been proven.
FALLO:
● Petition ​PARTIALLY​ ​GRANTED​. The assailed
Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 6 Dec
2005 is ​AFFIRMED​ with M
​ ODIFICATION​.
● Imelda, Irene, and Bongbong shall be
maintained as defendants in Civil Case No.
0002 pending before Sandiganbayan.
6 of 36
39. SAYSON v. CA
GR No. 89224-25
Date ​Jan. 23, 1992
Ponente: Cruz, J.
Digest Author: Charry

Topic in the Syllabus:

[insert text]

Relevant Law:
Art. 970.Representation is a right created by fiction
of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised
to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter
would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971.The representative is called to the
succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed
the person represented but the one who the person
represented would have succeeded.
Art. 981.Should children of the deceased and
descendants of other children who are dead, survive,
the former shall inherit in their own right, and the
latter by right of representation.

Doctrine:
While it is true that the adopted child shall be
deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same
right as the latter, these rights do not include the
right of representation.

Decedent: Eleno and Rafaela

Person/s Represented: Teodoro, Isabel
Representative/s: Doribel

Will: ​No Will

Parties:

7 of 36
FACTS:
● Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children,
namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios
and Teodoro.
● Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela
on May 15, 1976.
● Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died
on March 23, 1972.
○ His wife died nine years later, on March 26,
1981.
○ Their properties were left in the possession
of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all
surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their
children.
Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to
the share her father would have directly inherited
had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares
of her grandparents' other children.
But a different conclusion must be reached in the
case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers.
While it is true that the adopted child shall be
deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same
right as the latter, these rights do not include the
right of representation.

On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and
Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's
mother, filed a complaint for partition and
accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson.
The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to
the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful
descendants.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein
private respondents on the basis of right of
representation.
The petitioners -
● seek to annul the adoption of Delia and
Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and
Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the
time
● but also argue that Doribel herself is not the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel, but
was in fact born to one Edita Abila.
The relationship created by the adoption is between
only the adopting parents and the adopted child and
does not extend to the blood relatives of either
party.
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia
and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and
Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are
under no obligation to share the estate of their
parents with the petitioners.
The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in
holding that only Doribel has the right of
representation in the inheritance of her
grandparents' intestate estate, the other private
respondents being only the adoptive children of the
deceased Teodoro.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED ​in toto​, with costs against the petitioners.

The Court of Appeals held that only Doribel has the

right of representation in the inheritance of her
grandparents' intestate estate.

ISSUES:
WON Delia, Edmundo and Doribel have the capacity
to inherit from their alleged grandparents by right of
representation (Only Doribel)

RULING:

It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth

certificate offers only​ prima facie ​evidence of
filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.
However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter

of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and
Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her
deceased father in the distribution of the intestate
estate of her grandparents.
8 of 36
40. TUMBOKON v. LEGASPI
GR No. G.R. No. 153736
Date ​ August 12, 2010
Ponente: ​BERSAMIN, ​J.
Digest Author: Biag
Topic in the Syllabus:
Compulsory Heirs
Relevant Law:
Article 887.​ The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with
respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents
and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural
children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article
287.
Doctrine:
Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by
virtue of which the representative is raised to the
place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if she
were living or if she could have inherited.
Decedent: Alejandra Sespeñe
Will: ​NO WILL.
Parties:
FACTS:
● Under contention herein are the ownership and
possession of that parcel of land with an area of
12,480 square meters, more or less.
● The land – planted to rice, corn, and coconuts –
was originally owned by the late Alejandra
Sespeñe (Alejandra), who had had two
marriages. (see diagram)
● The ownership and possession of the parcel of
land became controversial after Spouses
Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario Sespeñe
(petitioners) asserted their right in it by virtue of
their purchase of it from Cresenciana Inog, who
had supposedly acquired it by purchase from
Victor Miralles.
● The tug-of-war over the property between the
petitioners and the respondents first led to the
commencement of a criminal case.
● The Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario
Sespeñe filed a criminal complaint for qualified
theft against respondents Apolonia and Paulina
S. Magtanum and others not parties herein,
namely: Rosendo Magtanum, Antonio
Magtanum, Ulpiano Mangilaya, charging them
with stealing coconut fruits from the land
subject of the present case.
● After trial, the CFI found the respondents and
their co-accused guilty.
● The respondents appealed but the CA affirmed
their conviction whereby the CA rejected
respondent Apolonia’s defense of ownership of
the land.
● Meanwhile, on September 21, 1972, or prior to
the CA’s rendition of its decision in the criminal
case, the petitioners commenced this suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of real
property with damages against the respondents
in the CFI.
○ Petitioners alleged they (petitioner Rosario
Sespeñe Tumbokon) purchased the land in
question from Cresenciana Inog.
Cresenciana Inog, in turn, acquired the land
by purchase from Victor Miralles, son-in-law
of decedent Alejandra, who had
represented that he inherited the land from
his mother-in-law.
● The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioners, holding that the spouses were able
to establish the purchase of the land.
● The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the RTC and dismissed the complaint.
○ The appellees trace their acquisition of the
subject lot to the admitted primal owner
Alejandra Sespeñe through her supposed
sale of it to her son-in-law Victor Miralles,
who sold this to Cresenciana Inog, and who
in turn sold it to the appellees.
○ In the process, they presented the Deed of
Absolute Sale (Exh. "B", June 19, 1957)
executed by Victor Miralles in favor of
Cresenciana Inog but wherein it is provided
in the said instrument that:
■ That this parcel of land
abovementioned ​was inherited​ from
the deceased Alejandra Sespeñe, by
the party of the First Part being the ​sole
heir of the said Alejandra Sespeñe​,
having no other brothers or sisters.
■ This claim of being the sole heir is
obviously false and erroneous for
Alejandra Sespeñe had more than one
intestate heir, and Victor Miralles as a
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 mere son-in-law could not be one of place and the degree of the person represented, and
them. acquires the rights which the latter would have if she
were living or if she could have inherited.
ISSUES:
In this case, the representative (Crisanto Miralles)
Whether or not Respondent Apolonia should
was called to the succession by law and not by the
rightfully be declared the true and lawful owners,
person represented (Ciriaca); he thus succeeded
and entitled to the possession of the parcel of land.
Alejandra, not Ciriaca.
RULING: Yes.
The foregoing undeniable facts rendered the hearsay
testimony of Nicanor Tumbokon to the effect that he
Petitioners’ claim of ownership could not be legally
had been informed that Victor Miralles had "become
and factually sustained.
automatically the heir" of Alejandra "after the death
of his wife," the wife being "the only daughter" and
First of all, the petitioners adduced no competent
he "the only son-in-law" a plain irrelevancy.
evidence to establish that Victor Miralles, the
transferor of the land to Cresenciana Inog (the
Thirdly, Victor Miralles’ supposed acquisition of the
petitioners’ immediate predecessor in interest) had
land by oral sale from Alejandra had no competent
any legal right in the first place to transfer
factual support in the records.
ownership.
For one, the oral sale was incompatible with the
He was not himself an heir of Alejandra, being only
petitioners’ anchor claim that he had acquired the
her son-in-law (as the husband of Ciriaca, one of
land by inheritance from Alejandra.
Alejandra’s two daughters).
Also, the evidence that the petitioners adduced on
Thus, the statement in the deed of absolute sale
the oral sale was insufficient and incredible,
entered into between Victor Miralles and
warranting the CA’s rejection of the oral sale under
Cresenciana Inog, to the effect that the "parcel of
the following terms:
land was inherited from the deceased Alejandra
○ This supposed sale was oral, xxx and devoid of
Sespeñe" by Victor Miralles "being the sole heir of
the standard particulars like what was the price,
the said Alejandra Sespeñe, having no other brothers
when and where was the sale made, who were
or sisters," was outrightly false.
present, or who knew of it.
○ The record is bereft too of documentary proof
Secondly, a decedent’s compulsory heirs in whose
that Victor Miralles exercised the rights and
favor the law reserves a part of the decedent’s
performed the obligations of an owner for no
estate are exclusively the persons enumerated in
tax declarations nor tax receipt has been
Article 887, Civil Code (see relevant law)
submitted or even adverted to.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are
With Victor Miralles lacking any just and legal right in
not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do
the land, except as an heir of Ciriaca, the transfer of
they exclude one another.
the land from him to Cresenciana Inog was
ineffectual.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation
must be duly proved.
As a consequence, Cresenciana Inog did not legally
acquire the land, and, in turn, did not validly transfer
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the
it to the petitioners.
three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in
the manner and to the extent established by this
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Code.
WHEREFORE​, the petition for review on certiorari is
denied, and the decision rendered on May 15, 2001
Only two forced heirs survived Alejandra upon her
by the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Costs of suit to
death, namely:
be paid by the petitioners. SO ORDERED.
○ respondent Apolonia, her daughter, and
○ Crisanto Miralles, her grandson.
■ The latter succeeded Alejandra by right of
representation because his mother, Ciriaca,
had predeceased Alejandra.

Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by

virtue of which the representative is raised to the

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41. REYES vs. DATU ○ It was discovered that she had executed 2
GR No. L-17818 wills
Date: January 25, 1967 ■ First will: Salud and Milagros Barreto
Ponente: Reyes as her heirs
Digest Author: de Vera ■ 2nd will: She revoked her first and
left all her properties in favour of
Topic in the Syllabus: Milagros alone
[insert text] ● The lower court rejected the first will
presented by Tirso Reyes, husband of Salud
Relevant Law: ○ Stating that she ain’t a daughter of the
[insert text] decedent Maria Gerardo
● The SC affirmed this ruling
Doctrine: ● Having lost the fight for a share in the estate of
[insert text] Gerardo, Reyes falls back upon the remnant of
the estate of the deceased BB, which was given
Decedent 1: Bibiano Barreto in usufruct to his widow MG.
● He instituted this action for the recovery of ½
Will: YES portion thereof.
BB left the will of a vast estate, consisting of 13 ● This action afforded Milagros the opportunity
properties covered by their respective TCTs to the ff: to
● Salud Barreto ○ Set up her right of ownership over all
● Milagros Barreto properties willed and delivered to Salud
● Legacies to: Barreto, as a spurious heir
○ 2 sisters ○ Institute that SB is not entitled to any
■ Rosa Barreto share in the estate of BB.
■ Felisa Barreto ● LC: ruled in favour of Milagros
○ Nephew and nieces ○ Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889
Usufruct for the fishpond in Bulacan is reserved for (then in force) providing as follows:
his widow, Maria Gerardo ■ "A partition in which a person was
Maria Gerardo: Administratrix believed to be an heir, without being
so, has been included, shall be null
Decedent 2: Maria Gerardo and void."
● Reyes negated saying:
Parties: ○ the fact that Salud happened not to be a
daughter of the testator does not preclude
her being one of the heirs expressly
named in his testament ; for Bibiano
Barretto was at liberty to assign the free
portion of his estate to whomsoever he
chose

ISSUES/HELD:

(1) W/N the partition from which

FACTS:
● MG, as administratrix, prepared a project of
partition
○ Signed by her in her own behalf and as
guardian to minor Milagros Barreto
○ This was approved by the CFI
● Upon CFI approval → delivery of the shares of
the heirs followed forthwith
● Salud Barreto immediately took possession of
her share and secured the cancellation of the
OCTs and had the issuance of the new titles in
her own name.
● Problem ensued when Maria Gerardo died.
Salud acquired the fishpond in
question is void ​ab initio​ and Salud
did not acquire valid title to it. ​NO.
(2) W/N Milagros’ action is barred
by the statute of limitations. ​YES.
Ratio
(1) Art. 1081 (OCC) is misapplied!
● Salud admittedly had been instituted heir in
Bibiano’s last will and testament together
with Milagros.
● Hence, the partition had between them
could not be one such had with a party who
was believed to be an heir without really

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 being one, and was not null and void under of the project of partition becomes
Art. 1081. irrelevant.
● The legal precept of Art. 1081 does not
speak of children, or descendants, but of (2) Milagros contends that as Maria could not have
heirs (without distinction between forced, ignored that Salud was not her child, the act of
voluntary or intestate ones), Maria in agreeing to the partition and distribution
○ and the fact that Salud did not was a fraud on her rights and entitles her to belief​.
happen to be a daughter of the This contention is unfounded.
testator ​does not preclude​ her ● First​, there is no evidence that when
being one of the heirs expressly Bibiano’s estate was judicially settled and
named in his testament; distributed, Salud knew that she was not
○ for Bibiano was at liberty to Bibiano’s child.
assign the free portion of his ○ Thus, if fraud was committed, it
estate to whomsoever he chose. was Maria who was solely
● While the share (½) assigned to Salud responsible; and neither Salud nor
impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud her minor children can be held
did not for that reason cease to be a liable therefor.
testamentary heir of Bibiano. ● Second​, granting there was such fraud,
○ Nor does the fact that Milagros relief therefor can be obtained within 4
was allotted in her father’s will a years from its discovery, and the record
share smaller than her legitime shows that this period had elapsed a long
invalidate the institution of Salud time ago.
as heir, since there was no
preterition or total omission of a Dispositive:
forced heir here.
● The view that the partition in question is CFI decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as it
void for being a compromise on the civil orders Tirso to reconvey to Milagros the properties
status of Salud, in violation of Art. 1814 enumerated in said decision. The same is AFFIRMED,
(OCC) is ​erroneous. insofar as it denies any right of Milagros to
○ A compromise presupposes the accounting. The action for partition of the fishpond
settlement of a controversy must be GIVEN DUE COURSE.
through mutual concessions of the
parties; and the condition of Salud
as daughter of the testator
Bibiano, while untrue, was at no
time disputed during the
settlement of the estate of
testator.
○ There can be no compromise over
issues not in dispute.
○ While a compromise over civil
status is prohibited, the law
nowhere forbids a settlement by
the parties over the share that
should correspond to a claimant to
the estate.
● At any rate, independently of the project of
partition (a mere proposal for distribution
of estate), it is the court alone that makes
the distribution of the estate and
determines the persons entitled thereto
and the parts to which each is entitled.
● It is that judicial decree of distribution,
once final, that vests title in the
distributees.
● Where a court has validly issued a decree
of distribution of the estate, and the same
has become final, the validity or invalidity

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42. AZNAR v. DUNCAN
GR No. L-24365
Date June 30, 1966
Ponente:​MAKALINTAL​, ​J
Digest Author: Dimla
Topic in the Syllabus:
Compulsory Succession
Relevant Law:
ART. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of
the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if
contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of
those set forth in this Code, shall annul the
institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the
person disinherited; but the devises and legacies and
other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to
such extent as will not impair the legitime.
Doctrine:
There is no preterition if there was distribution of
the legacy or devise.
Decedent: Edward Christensen
Will: ​ Yes. Here are the important parts:
3. I declare . . . that I have but ONE (1) child, named
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (Now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about
twenty-eight years ago, who is now residing at No.
665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. "4. I further declare that I now have no living
ascendants, and no descendants except my
above-named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY. xxx xxx xxx
"7. I give, devise, and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia,
about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has
she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from
all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos,
Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600), Philippine Currency, the
same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria
Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the
Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate
of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency
per month until the principal thereof as well as any
interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted.'
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with
domicile in the Philippines, died leaving a will
executed on March 5, 1951.
● The will was admitted to probate by the
Court of First Instance of Davao in its
decision of February 28, 1954.
● In that same decision the court declared
that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia
(hereinafter referred to as Helen Garcia)
was a natural child of the deceased.
On October 29, 1964, the Court of First Instance of
Davao issued an order approving the project of
partition submitted by the executor, dated June 30,
1964, wherein the properties of the estate were
divided equally between
● Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan (named in
the will as Maria Lucy Christensen Daney,
and hereinafter referred to as merely Lucy
Duncan), whom the testator had expressly
recognized in his will as his daughter
(natural) and
● Helen Garcia, who had been judicially
declared as such after his death.
The said order was based on the proposition that
since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will
● the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was
annulled, and
● hence the properties passed to both of
them as if the deceased had died intestate,
● saving only the legacies left in favor of
certain other persons​, which legacies have
been duly approved by the lower court and
distributed to the legatees.
Duncan appealed questioning -
● whether the estate, after deducting the
legacies, should pertain to her and to Helen
Garcia in equal shares, or
● whether her inheritance of as instituted
heir should be merely reduced to the extent
necessary to cover the legitimate of Helen
Garcia, equivalent to 1/4 of the entire
estate.
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This is due to the fact that under the will, Helen has
been preterited, and can only be given her legitime
of P3,600.
Note: Manresa defines preterition as the omission
of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at
all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by
not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him
expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the
properties.
The trial court ruled, and appellee now maintains,
that -
● there has been preterition of Helen Garcia,
a compulsory heir in the direct line,
● resulting in the annulment of the institution
of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
"ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some,
or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious."
On the other hand, appellant contends -
● that this is not a case of preterition,
● but is governed by Article 906 of the Civil
Code, which says: "Any compulsory heir to
whom the testator has left by any title less
the legitime belonging to him may demand
that the same be fully satisfied.”
Appellant also suggests that -
● considering the provisions of the will
whereby the testator expressly denied his
relationship with Helen Garcia, but left to
her a legacy nevertheless, although less
than the amount of her legitime, she was in
effect defectively disinherited within the
meaning of Article 918.
● under both Articles 906 and 918, Helen
Garcia is entitled only to her legitime, and
not to a share of the estate equal that of
Lucy Duncan as if the succession were
intestate.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there was preterition which would
annul the will and pass the property as intestate.
(Basically kung magiging intestate ba yung pag-pass
ng property, which would allow Helen to get 1/2 of
the estate, and not the given P3,600 in the will.
RULING: ​NO.
He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his
natural daughter, and limited her share to a legacy
of P3,600.00 or ¼ of the estate.
Therefore, there is no preterition if the heir is given a
legacy or devise.
The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his
death consisted of 399 shares of stocks in the
Christensen Plantation Company and a certain
amount in cash.
¼ of said estate descended to Helen Garcia as her
legitime. Since she became the owner of her share
as of the moment of the death of the decedent (Arts.
774, 777, Civil Code), she is entitled to a
corresponding portion of all the fruits or increments
thereof subsequently accruing.
The solution (from three SC Spain decisions cited by
Manresa) was that the heir ask that the legitime be
completed and not that the institution of heirs be
annulled entirely.
This solution is more in consonance with the
expressed wishes of the testator in the present case
as may be gathered very clearly from the provisions
of his will.
He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his
natural daughter, and limited her share to a legacy
of P3,600.00.
The fact that she was subsequently declared
judicially to possess such status is no reason to
assume that had the judicial declaration come during
his lifetime his subjective attitude towards here
would have undergone any change and that he
would have willed his estate equally to her and to
Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by
him.
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43. SEANGIO v REYES
GR No. 140371-72
Date ​November 27, 2006
Ponente: J. Azcuna
Digest Author: LAI
Topic in the Syllabus:
Compulsory Succession; Preterition - caution in
drawing up will
Decedent: [insert text]
Will: Issue is if disinheritance constitutes a valid will
Parties:
● Petitioners: Dy Seangio, Barbara Seangio,
Virginia Seangio
● Respondent: Reyes (rtc judge), Alfredo Seangio,
Alberto Seangio, Elisa Seangio-Santos, Victor
Seangio, Alfonso Seangio, Shirley Seangio, Betty
Seangio, James Seangio
● Pets and Resps are all children of Segundo
FACTS:
● In 1988, private respondents filed a petition
○ for the settlement of the intestate estate of
the late Segundo Seangio, and
○ praying for the appointment of private
respondent Elisa D. Seangio–Santos as
special administrator and guardian ad litem
of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
● Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all
surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that
○ Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full
command of her faculties
○ The deceased Segundo executed a general
power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving
her the power to control and supervision
over his business in the Philippines
○ Virginia is the most competent and
qualified as the administrator of the estate
of Segundo because she is a CPA
○ Segundo left a holographic will, dated
September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of
the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio,
for cause.
○ In view of the purported holographic will, in
the event the decedent is found to have left
a will, the intestate proceedings are to be
automatically suspended and replaced by
the proceedings for the probate of the will.
● Petition for probate of holographic will of
Segundo was filed by Petitioners which they
likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings
should take precedence over SP (the one filed
by resps) bec testate proceedings take
precedence and enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings
● Resps filed a MTD of the probate proceedings
filed by Pets, on the ground that the docs
purporting to be holographic will of Segundo
doesn’t contain any disposition of the estate of
deceased and doesn’t meet the qualification of
a will
○ Accdg to them, the will only shows alleged
act of disinheritance by the decedent to the
eldest son and nothing else.
○ And all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or
legatee, hence, there is preterition which
would result to intestacy.
○ Because of this, it is their contention that
while procedurally the court is called upon
to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the
will, it is not barred from =
■ delving into the intrinsic validity of the
same, and
■ ordering the dismissal of the petition
for probate when on the face of the will
it is clear that it contains no
testamentary disposition of the
property of the decedent.
RTC: Petition for probate proceedings dismissed
There is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned are
Alfredo and Virginia
ISSUES:
WON the document executed by Segundo can be
considered as a holographic will - ​YES
RULING:
Main argument of Petitioners:
● the holographic will does not contain any
institution of an heir,
● but rather, as its title clearly states,
Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, s​ imply
contains a disinheritance of a compulsory
heir.
● Thus, there is no preterition in the
decedent’s will and the holographic will on
its face is not intrinsically void
● the testator intended all his compulsory
heirs, petitioners and private respondents
alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to
inherit his estate.
● None of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line of Segundo were preterited in the
holographic will since there was no
institution of an heir
● the continuation of the proceedings in the
intestate case will work injustice to
petitioners, and will render nugatory the
disinheritance of Alfredo
SC:
15 of 36
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810
NCC, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself.
It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or
out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

Segundo’s document, although it may initially come

across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law​.
● It is written, dated and signed by the hand
of Segundo himself.
● An intent to dispose ​mortis causa c​ an be
clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument
● While it does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latter’s property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, is an act of
disposition in itself.

In other words, the disinheritance results in the

disposition of the property of the testator Segundo
in favor of those who would succeed in the absence
of Alfredo.

Holographic wills, being usually prepared by one

who is not learned in the law, should be construed
more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert,
taking into account the circumstances surrounding
the execution of the instrument and the intention of
the testator.

In this regard, the Court is convinced that the

document, even if captioned as ​Kasulatan ng
Pag-Aalis ng Mana,​ was intended by Segundo to be
his last testamentary act and was executed by him in
accordance with law in the form of a holographic
will.

Considering that the questioned document is

Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot
be dispensed with.

Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will

shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court.

Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a

person to dispose of his property may be rendered
nugatory.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
PETITION GRANTED

16 of 36
44. ACAIN v. CA
GR No. 72706
Date ​Oct. 27, 1987
Ponente: Paras, J.
Digest Author: Lim
Topic in the Syllabus:
Preterition (Art. 854) - Caution in drawing up will;
Effect of Preterition
Relevant Law:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some,
or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before
the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of representation.
Doctrine:
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s
will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, through
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited.
Decedent: Nemesio Acain
Will: ​[Yes] Written in Bisaya, with a translation in
English. The will contained provisions on burial rites,
payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain
Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the
testament. On the disposition of the testator's
property, the will provided:
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our
properties. house, lands and money which I earned
jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given
by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino,
widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C
Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother
Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money
properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here
in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given
​ onstantino,​
to me to his children, namely: Anita, C
Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose,
all surnamed Acain.
Parties:
FACTS:
● Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which,
○ Constantino and his brothers Antonio,
Flores, Jose, Anita, Concepcion, Quirina, and
Laura were instituted as heirs.
○ The will contained that shares that Nemesio
Acain may receive from his properties will
be given to Seguno Acain his sibling.
○ In case Segundo predeceases Nemesio, the
share shall go to Segundo’s children. (see
excerpt of will)
● Segundo predeceased Nemesio.
○ The children of Segundo are claiming to be
heirs.
● Constantino filed a petition for probate of the
will
● Respondents Virginia Fernandez (adopted
daughter of Nemesio) and his widow Rosa filed
a motion to dismiss on the grounds:
(1) for the petitioner has no legal capacity to
institute these proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir and
(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have
been pretirited. Said motion was denied by
the trial judge.
ISSUES:
Whether or not private respondents Virginia and
Rosa have been preterited.
NO for widow, YES for adopted child.
RULING:
For Widow:
● Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article
854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she
does not ascend or descend from the
testator, although she is a compulsory heir.
● Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory
heir, there is no preterition even if she is
omitted from the inheritance, for she is ​not
in the direct line.
17 of 36
For Adopted Child: August 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated October
● However, the same thing cannot be said of 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez,
whose legal adoption by the testator has
not been questioned by petitioner
● Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption
gives to the adopted person the same rights
and duties as if he were a legitimate child of
the adopter and makes the adopted person
a legal heir of the adopter.
● It cannot be denied that she has totally
omitted and preterited in the will of the
testator and that both adopted child and
the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime.
● Neither can it be denied that they were not
expressly disinherited.
● Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of
the legally adopted child.

Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and

annulment throws open to intestate succession the
entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no
hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o
donacion" ​(the free portion (that) would not have
disposed in virtual legacy improvement or donation)​.

The only provisions which do not result in intestacy

are the legacies and devises made in the will for they
should stand valid and respected, except insofar as
the legitimes are concerned.

The universal institution of Constantino together

with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally
abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs-without any other
testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written.

Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of

the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential
interpretation.

No legacies nor devises having been provided in the

will the whole property of the deceased has been
left by universal title to Constantino and his brothers
and sisters.

The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will

be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy
except that proper legacies and devises must be
respected.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit and the questioned decision
of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on

18 of 36
45. NUGUID VS. NUGUID
GR No. L-23445
Date: June 23, 1966
Ponente:​ ​Sanchez, J.
Digest Author: Lo
Topic in the Syllabus: ​Preterition
Relevant Law:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some,
or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.
Doctrine: PRETERITION vs. DISINHERITANCE
Preterition​ "consists in the omission in the testator's
will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited."
Disinheritance,​ in turn, "is a ​testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his
share in the ​legitime​ for a cause authorized by law. "
Decedent: ​Rosario Nuguid
Will: ​Holographic Will
Parties:
● Rosario Nuguid​ - decedent, left a
Holographic Will
● Felix Nuguid & Paz Nuguid ​- Parents of
Rosario
● Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado,
Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid
- Brothers and sisters of Rosario
Facts:
● Rosario Nuguid died on December 30, 1962,
single, without descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate.
● Surviving her were her -
○ legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz
Salonga Nuguid, and
○ six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo,
Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and
Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
● On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid
filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years
before her demise.
● Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid,
concededly the legitimate father and mother of
the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their
opposition to the probate of her will.
○ Ground therefor, ​inter alia,​ is that by the
institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as
universal heir of the deceased, oppositors
— who are compulsory heirs of the
deceased in the direct ascending line —
were illegally preterited and that in
consequence the institution is void.
○ Oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground
of absolute preterition.
Issue:​ Is there Preterition in this case?
Held:​ Yes. This is a clear case of preterition.
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate.
● But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending
line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid
and Paz Salonga Nuguid.
● And, the will completely omits both of them:
○ They thus received nothing by the
testament;
○ tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime;
○ neither were they expressly disinherited.
The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as
the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific
legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in
this posture that we say that the nullity is complete.
Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: ​The disputed order, we
observe, declares the will in question "a complete
nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely
nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering,
however, that the will before us solely provides for
the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and
nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will
is null.
Upon the view we take of this case​, the order of
November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed.
No costs allowed. So ordered.
19 of 36
46. PALACIOS v. RAMIREZ
GR No. L-27952
Date ​February 15, 1982
Ponente: Abad Santos, J.
Digest Author: Abby Martinez
Topic in the Syllabus: ​Preterition/Substitution
Relevant Law:
Simple or Vulgar substitution
Art. 859. The testator may designate one or more
persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in
case such heir or heirs should die before him, or
should not wish, or should be incapacitated to
accept the inheritance.
Fideicommissary substitution:
Art. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of
which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is
entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to
transmit to a second heir the whole or part of
inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect,
provided such substitution does not go beyond one
degree from the heir originally instituted, and
provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and
the second heir are living at time of the death of the
testator.
Doctrine:
Degree = degree of relationship;
second heir must be related by ​one generation​ from
the first heir;
second heir can only be either a child or parent of
the first heir.
Decedent: ​Jose Eugenio Ramirez
Will: ​Yes, written in Spanish
[google translate:
The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
"A. - In bare property, to Mr. Roberto and Mr. Jorge
Ramirez, both minors, residing in Manila, IF, Wright
Street, No. 1818, Malate, children of his nephew Mr.
Jose Ma. Ramirez, with vulgar substitution in favor of
their respective descendants, and, failing that, with
reciprocal vulgar substitution between both.
"The previous legacy in naked ownership of the
undivided participation of the Santa-Cruz Building,
the testator orders in favor of the named legatees, in
attention to the fact that said property was created
by the beloved father of the grantor and for being
those who continued the surname Ramirez.
"B. - And in usufruct to know: -
to. - Regarding a third party, in favor of the wife of
the testator, Da. Marcelle Ramirez, domiciled in IE
PECO, street of General Gallieni, No. 33, Seine,
France, with vulgar substitution or trustee in favor of
Da. Wanda from Wrobleski, from Palma de Mallorca,
Son Rapiña, Avenida de los Reyes 13,
b. - And as for the remaining two thirds, in favor of
the appointed Da. Wanda of Wrobleski, with vulgar
substitution and trustee, namely: -
"As for half of said two thirds, in favor of Mr. Juan
Pablo Jankowski, from Son Rapiña, Palma de
Mallorca, and as for the remaining half, in favor of
his nephew, Mr. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis
Building, Florida St. Ermita, Manila, IF
"In spite of the prior ordinance trustee substitutions,
the usufructuaries appointed jointly with the joint
owners may, at any time, sell the property object
delegated to third parties, without any intervention
of the trustee holders."]
Parties:
FACTS:
● Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in
Spain -
○ with only his widow, Marcelle (a French
woman who lives in Paris) as compulsory
heir
● His will was admitted to probate by CFI Manila
● The Ramirez executed a will bequeathing his
estate to 4 principal beneficiaries:
○ His widow Marcelle Ramirez
○ Two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge
Ramirez
○ His companion Wanda de Wrobleski
(NOTE: His “companion” (maybe mistress?)
Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain)
● Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed
administratrix of the estate.
○ She submitted a project of partition as
follows, the property of the deceased to be
divided in 2 parts:
■ One part of the estate shall go to his
widow Marcelle in satisfaction of her
legitime.
20 of 36
 ■ The other part or “free portion’ shall
go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez.
● ⅓ of the free portion is charged
with the Marcelle’s usufruct
● Remaining ⅔ with a usufruct in
favor of Wanda
Jose and Roberto opposed the project of partition
● Wanda’s substitutes, (Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace Ramirez) are ​not related to her
● the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions
are also invalid because the first heirs are not
related to the second heirs or substitutes within
the first degree
● that the grant of a usufruct over real property in
the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski,
who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of
the Philippine Constitution
CFI: ​Approved the project of partition
ISSUES:
WON the provision for vulgar and fideicommissary
substitution with respect to Wanda’s usufruct in
favor of Juan Pablo and Horacio Ramirez is valid
RULING:
As to the vulgar aspect - the substitution is VALID
It is true even though Wanda survived the testator,
because dying before the testator is not the only
case for vulgar substitution. It also includes refusal
or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in
Art. 859 of the Civil Code.
As to the fideicommissary aspect - the substitution
is VOID
The substitutes (Juan Pablo and Horace) are not
related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted.
Art 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary
substitution “provided such substitution does not go
beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted.”
There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to
transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as required
by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code.
In fact, the administratrix admits “that the testator
contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary
substitution when he permits the properties subject
of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of
the usufructuaries and the naked owners.”
One degree means one generation
The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir
must be related to and be one generation from the
first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can
only be either a child or a parent of the first heir.
These are the only relatives who are one generation
or degree from the fiduciary.
The testator cannot impose any lien, substitution,
or condition on his widow’s legitim​e
Art. 900 of the Civil Code “If the only survivor is the
widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to
one-half of the hereditary estate.​”
Since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is
entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could
impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or
substitution of any kind whatsoever
The usufruct in favor of Wanda, albeit a real right,
does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary
and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens
which is proscribed by the Constitution. (MOOT)
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose
Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as
follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and
the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple
substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of
the court a quo. No special pronouncement as to
costs.
21 of 36
47. PCIB V ESCOLIN
GR No. L-27860 & L-27896
Date ​March 29, 1974
Ponente: Barrredo, J.
Digest Author: Ollero

Topic in the Syllabus:

Preterition

Doctrine:
Substitution occurs only when another heir is
appointed in a will"so that he may enter into
inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted

Decedent/s:
Linnie Jane Hodges
Charlie Newton Hodges

Will​:

The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late

Charles Newton Hodges (C.N. Hodges) as well as that
of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges (a Texas national),
who predeceased him by about five years and a half.

In their respective wills which were executed on

different occasions, each one of them provided
mutually as follows:

"I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue

and remainder (after funeral and administration
expenses, taxes and debts) of my estate, both real
and personal, wherever situated or located, to my
beloved (spouse) to have and to hold unto (him/her)
— during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the
condition that upon the death of whoever of them
survived the other, the remainder of what he or she
would inherit from the other is "given, devised and
bequeath(ed" to the brothers and sisters of the
latter.

Note: ​Long case (138 pages excluding Separate

Opinion. Preterition is off topic but highlighted the
part which it could be applicable)

Parties:

Administrators:

Avelina Magno - ​appointed Administratrix (for

Linnie’s estate) and a Special Administratrix (for
Charles’)

PCIB​ - Much later, PCIB became the Administrator of

Charles’ estate.
22 of 36
FACTS:
● Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges
were originally from Texas, USA.
○ During their marriage, they had acquired
and accumulated considerable assets and
properties in the Philippines and in
Oklahoma and Texas in the US.
○ They both lived, worked and were
domiciled in Iloilo City for around 50 years.
● Before her death, Linnie Jane executed a will
leaving her estate, less her debts and funeral
expenses, to her husband Charles.
○ Should Charles die, the will provided that
the remainder of her estate go to her
brothers and sisters, share and share alike.
○ Should any of the brothers and sisters die
before the husband, Linnie willed that the
heirs of the said sibling be substituted in the
deceased’s sibling’s place.
● When Linnie died, Charles took the will to
probate court, and was appointed Executor,
then later, Special Administrator.
○ He moved to be allowed to continue
administering the family business, as per
Linnie Jane’s wishes, and to engage in sales,
conveyances, leases, mortgages and other
necessary transactions.
○ He also filed the necessary and appurtenant
administration/accounting records, and
income tax returns for the estate.
○ Charles named seven brothers and sisters of
Linnie Jane as her heirs (Esta, Emma,
Leonard, Aline, David, Sadie, Era and
Nimroy),
■ but the order admitting the will to
probate unfortunately omitted one of
the heirs, Roy Higdon,
■ so Charles filed a verified motion to
have Roy’s name included.
● As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns
for the estate he was administering under
American law.
○ He did file such as estate tax return on
August 8, 1958.
○ In Schedule "M" of such return, he
answered "Yes" to the question as to
whether he was contemplating "renouncing
the will".
○ On the question as to what property
interests passed to him as the surviving
spouse, he answered:
■ “None, except for purposes of
administering the Estate, paying debts,
taxes and other legal charges.
■ It is the intention of the surviving
husband of deceased to distribute the
remaining property and interests of the
deceased in their Community estate to
the devisees and legatees named in the
will when the debts, liabilities, taxes
and expenses of administration are
finally determined and paid.”
● Charles died in Iloilo in December 1962 without
having liquidated Linnie’s estate, which includes
her share in the conjugal partnership.
○ A longtime employee of the Hodges,
Avelina Magno, was appointed
Administratrix (for Linnie’s estate) and a
Special Administratrix (for Charles’).
○ Magno was appointed,
○ but later Harold Davies (representative of
Charles’ heirs in the US) was designated
Co-Special Administrator, who was then
replaced by one Joe Hodges, Charles’
nephew.
● Allegedly, a ​modus operandi​ to settle money
matters (a settlement with records the Court
never saw)—which occurred between parties.
● Much later, PCIB became the administrator of
Charles’ estate, asserting a claim to all of his
estate, including those properties/assets that
passed to him upon Linnie Jane’s death.
● Avelina naturally opposed this, as Linnie Jane’s
other heirs (the HIGDONS) would be prejudiced,
so she continued acting in her capacity as
administrator (entering into sales and other
such conveyances).
● For these acts, the PCIB dismissed her as an
employee of Charles’ estate, to which she
responded by locking up the premises being
used by PCIB as offices, which were among the
estate’s properties.
PCIB’s Claims
● Linnie Jane’s will should be governed by
Philippine Law, with respect to the order of
succession, the amount of successional rights,
and the intrinsic validity of its testamentary
provisions.
● Linnie intended Philippine laws to govern her
Will.
● Article 16, CC, provides that "the national law of
the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found", shall
prevail.
● However, the Conflict of Law of Texas, which is
the "national law" of the testatrix, Linnie Jane
Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law
(Philippine law) should govern the testamentary
dispositions and successional rights over
movables, and the law of the situs of the
property (also Philippine law as to properties
23 of 36
 located in the Philippines) as regards
immovables.
● Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as
approved and applied in the ​Christensen ​case
(1963), Philippine law should apply.
● Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or
community estate of spouses shall, upon
dissolution, be divided equally between them.
● Thus, upon Linnie’s death, ½ of the entirety of
the assets of the Hodges spouses constituting
their conjugal estate pertained automatically to
Charles, ​not by way of inheritance, but in his
own right as partner in the conjugal partnership​.
● The other one-half (1/2) portion forming part of
Linnie’s estate, cannot, under a clear and
specific provision of her Will, be enhanced or
increased by income, earnings, rents, or
emoluments accruing after her death.
● “​All rents, emoluments and income from said
estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he
is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or
desire​."
● Articles 900, 995 and 1001 provide that the
surviving spouse of a deceased leaving no
ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a
matter of right and by way of irrevocable
legitime, to at least one-half (1/2) of the estate
of the deceased, and no testamentary
disposition by the deceased can legally and
validly affect this right of the surviving spouse.
● In fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half
(1/2) portion of her estate by way of legitime.
(Article 886)
○ Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the
death of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges
was the owner of at least 3/4 or 75%
percent of all of the conjugal assets of the
spouses, 50% by way of conjugal
partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of
inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents,
emoluments and income" accruing to said
conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie
Jane Hodges' death.
○ As the sole and exclusive heir, Charles did
not need to liquidate the estate.
○ Neither was there any asset left to Linnie’s
estate at the time of Charles’ death, though
Linnie’s estate may have referred to “all of
the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate” which would go to her siblings in
the event of Charles death.
○ The provision is thus void and invalid at
least as to Philippine assets.
○ The remedy of the Higdons, then, who are
claiming dubious rights to ¼ of the conjugal
estate of the Hodges, is to file a claim
against the estate of Charles.
○ It also follows that the conveyances
executed by Avelina, claiming to be merely
in continuation of the Hodges’ businesses,
and which corresponding deeds of sale
were confirmed by the probate court, are
null and void and should be subject to
reconveyance.
Avelina’s Claims
● Linnie Jane merely gave Charles a life-estate or a
usufruct over all her estate, and gave a vested
remainder-estate or the naked title over the
same estate, to her relatives.
● After Linnie’s death, Charles, as administrator
and executor of the will, unequivocably and
clearly through oral and written declarations
and sworn public statements, renounced,
disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and
usufruct.
● Since there was no separation or segregation of
the interests of Linnie and Charles in the
combined conjugal estate, as there has been no
such separation or segregation, and because of
Charles’ repudiation, both interests have
continually earned exactly the same amount of
rents, emoluments and income.
ISSUE:
WON Linnie’s disposition in favor of her siblings
void- NO.
RULING:
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact
that it views the said disposition exclusively in the
light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code when
it is obvious that substitution occurs only when
another heir is appointed in a will "so that he may
enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally
instituted," (Article 857) and, in the present case, no
such possible default is contemplated.
The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not
substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they
are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would not or
may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of
from his inheritance;
rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted
simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to
certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as
Hodges was concerned and correspondingly
suspensive with reference to his brothers and
sisters-in-law.
It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto
Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned and
enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with
absolute dominion over them only during his
lifetime, which means that while he could
completely and absolutely dispose of any portion
thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he
was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights
24 of 36
to what might remain upon his death would cease
entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency,
inasmuch as the right of his brothers and
sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested
already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would
automatically become operative upon the
occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of
actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.
Contrary to Avelina’s view, however, it was not the
usufruct alone of Linnie’s estate, as contemplated in
Article 869, that she bequeathed to Charles during
his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although
the same was to last also during his lifetime only,
even as there was no restriction whatsoever against
his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion
thereof to anybody other than himself.
The Court saw no legal impediment to this kind of
institution, except that it cannot apply to the
legitime of Charles as the surviving spouse,
consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that
Linnie had no surviving ascendants nor descendants.
(Arts. 872, 900, and 904.)
Hodges’ acts of administration and accounting
strongly negate PCIB’s claims that he had
adjudicated to himself all of Linnie’s estate.
While he may have used language like “herein
executor (being) the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased, in accordance with the last will and
testament already probated… there is no other
person interested in the Philippines of the time and
place of examining herein account to be given
notice,” he would’ve known that doing so would
impute bad faith unto him.
Also, in his very motions, Hodges asserted the
rights of Linnie’s named heirs. He even moved to
include Roy’s name included in the probate court’s
order, lest Roy’s heirs think that they had been
omitted.
Thus, he recognized, in his own way, the separate
identity of his wife’s estate from his own share of
the conjugal partnership up to the time of his death,
more than 5 years after that of his wife.
He never considered the whole estate as a single one
belonging exclusively to himself.
The only conclusion one can gather from this is that
he could have been preparing the basis for the
eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at
least, so much thereof as he would not have been
able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her brothers
and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire,
as intimated in his tax return in the US.
And assuming that he did pay the corresponding
estate and inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the
basis of his being sole heir, such payment is not
necessarily inconsistent with his recognition of the
rights of his co-heirs.
It is obvious, though, that Charles’ procrastinating in
settling Linnie’s estate, and his sole administration of
it, commingled his and his co-heirs interests, making
it difficult to properly make an accounting of their
shares.
PCIB, then, cannot administer the properties on its
own. What would be just and proper is for both
administrators of the two estates to act conjointly
until after said estates have been segregated from
each other.
Not relevant to the topic but good to know:
WON estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than 1/4 of the
conjugal property. Case is remanded to trial court to
allow the parties to present evidence in relation to
these issues. Nevertheless, PCIB now cannot allege
that the estate is less than ¼.
- Texas law provides no legitime.
- RP Law provides that the Surviving Spouse,
being the sole heir gets 1/2 o the conjugal
property, then 1/2 goes to the estate of the
spouse. If 1/2 of the estate of the spouse
goes to the surviving spouse which is the
sole heir, then Charles gets 1/4 of the whole
conjugal property.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Remand for determination of proper application of
Art. 16, CC (renvoi), and of Charles’ alleged
renunciation of his ineritance under Linnie’s will.
Avelina remains to be the administrator of Linnie’s
estate.
The said estate consists of ¼ of the community
properties of the said spouses, as of the time of
Linnie’s death on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the
husband had already gratuitously disposed of in
favor of third persons from said date until his death,
provided,
first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions,
the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the
wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed of
gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and
second, that should the purported renunciation be
declared legally effective, no deductions whatsoever
are to be made from said estate.
25 of 36
PCIB and Avelina should act thenceforth always
conjointly, never independently from each other, as
administrators.

26 of 36
48. RAMON CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES V.
HON. RODRIGUEZ (RTC MANILA), JOSEPH CHENG,
JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCENA
SANTOS, SUBSTITUTED BY HER SON, EDUARDO S.
BALAJADIA
G.R. 192828
Date: November 28, 2011
Ponente: Reyes, J.
Digest Author (Consolidator): Pajo
Topic in the Syllabus:
Disinheritance (Art. 915 – 923)
Relevant Law:
Art. 916. Disinheritance can be effected only through
a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be
specified.
Doctrine: Art. 916.
Decedent: Antonio Ching
Parties:
Petitioners:
● Ramon Ching
● Po Wing Properties
Respondents:
● Joseph Cheng
● Jaime Cheng
● Mercedes Cheng
● Lucena Santos
○ Subsituted by Eduardo S. Balajadia
FACTS:
● The respondents filed a Complaint against the
petitioners and Stroghold Insurance Company,
Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank),
Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources
Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and
Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles
from Ramon Ching (Ramon).
● The Complaint was captioned as one for
"Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of
Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale,
Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the]
Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and
[a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction."
● In the complaint, the respondents alleged that:
○ They are the heirs of Antonio Ching;
○ Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonio's
son when he was, in fact, adopted and his
birth certificate merely simulated;
○ Antonio was killed with Ramon as the prime
suspect;
○ Prior to the conclusion of the investigations,
Ramon made an inventory of the formers
estate and illegally transferred to his name
the titles to Antonios properties;
○ Ramon sweet-talked respondent Mercedes
into surrendering to him:
■ a Certificate of Time Deposit of
P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio
and
■ the TCTs of two condo units registered
under Ramons name;
○ Ramon illegally transferred to his own name
through a forged document 40,000 shares
in Po Wing Corporation;
○ Ramon executed an Affidavit of
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate
adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's
entire estate to the prejudice of the
respondents; and
○ Ramon sold:
■ Antonio's two parcels of land in
Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic
Business Ventures, Inc.
■ Another parcel of land, which was part
of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon
to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at
an unreasonably low price.
The respondents thus prayed for the:
1. Issuance of a TRO to restrain Ramon or his
representatives from disposing or selling any
property that belongs to the estate of Antonio;
2. That Ramon be declared as disqualified from
inheriting from Antonio Ching; and
3. Declaring null the unauthorized transfers made
by Ramon.
The RTC denied the petitioners Motion to Dismiss
and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the RTC should have granted the
Motion to Dismiss with regard to the issues
which could only be resolved in a special
proceeding and not in an ordinary civil action.
2. Whether there can be disinheritance in
intestate succession.
RULING:
No reversible errors were committed by the RTC and
the CA when they both ruled that the denial of the
petitioners' second motion to dismiss was proper.
27 of 36
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title
with damages is a civil action, whereas matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased
person such as advancement of property made by
the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the
Rules of Court.
Under Article 916 of the NCC, ​disinheritance can be
effected only through a will wherein the legal cause
therefor shall be specified​.
This Court agrees with the ​RTC and the CA that
while the respondents in their Complaint and
Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of
Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly
effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was
ever mentioned​.
Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's
disinheritance, the case filed does not partake of
the nature of a special proceeding and does not call
for the probate court's exercise of its limited
jurisdiction.
Even without the necessity of being declared as heirs
of Antonio, the respondents have the standing to
seek for the nullification of the instruments in the
light of their claims that there was no consideration
for their execution, and that Ramon exercised undue
influence and committed fraud against them.
hence, not the proper subject of a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of
Court.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action
before the RTC may not be strategically sound,
because a settlement proceeding should thereafter
still follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon
the properties alleged to have been illegally
transferred in his name.
Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from
taking cognizance of respondents' Complaint and
Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the
prayers indicated therein are matters which need
not be threshed out in a special proceeding.
WHEREFORE​, the instant petition is ​DENIED​. The
petitioners' (a) Opposition to the respondents'
Motion to Admit Substitution of Party; and (b)
Manifestation through counsel that they will no
longer file a reply to the respondents'
Comment/Opposition to the instant petition are
NOTED​.

Consequently, the respondents then claimed that

the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonios
estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued
upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and
void as well.

Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues

raised shall first require a declaration of the
respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which
is not determinative of which court shall properly
exercise jurisdiction.

In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the

nullification of the documents subject of the civil
case could be achieved in an ordinary civil action,
which in this specific case was instituted to protect
the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent
acts of Ramon.

In the event that the RTC will find grounds to grant

the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only
consequence will be the reversion of the properties
subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio.

The civil case was not instituted to conclusively

resolve the issues relating to the administration,
liquidation and distribution of Antonio's estate,
28 of 36
49. TEOTICO v. DEL VAL ● Said will was acknowledged before Notary
G.R. No. L-18753 Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and
Date: March 26, 1965 her witnesses.
Ponente: BAUTISTA ANGELO, J. ● In said will the testatrix made the following
Digest Author: Doms preliminary statement:
○ that she was possessed of the full use of her
Topic in the Syllabus: mental faculties;
Compulsory Succession ○ that she was free from illegal pressure or
influence of any kind from the beneficiaries
Relevant Law: of the will and from any influence of fear or
Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An threat;
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato ○ that she freely and spontaneously executed
from the legitimate children and relatives of his said will and
father or mother; ... ." ○ that she had neither ascendants nor
descendants of any kind such that she could
Doctrine: freely dispose of all her estate.
● Among the many legacies and devises made in
Decedent: ​Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A.
Aguirre Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named
Josefina Mortera.
Will: ​Yes ○ To said spouses the testatrix left the
usufruct of her interest in the Calvo
Parties: building,
○ while the naked ownership thereof she left
in equal parts to her grandchildren who are
the legitimate children of said spouses.
● The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as
her sole and universal heir to all the remainder
of her properties not otherwise disposed of in
the will.

● On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a

petition for the probate of the will before the
CFI.

● Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be -

FACTS:
● Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died
on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving
properties worth P600,000.00.
● She left a will written in Spanish which she
executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St.,
Quiapo, Manila.
● She affixed her signature at the bottom of the
will and on the left margin of each and every
page thereof,
○ in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C.
Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in
turn affixed their signatures below the
attestation clause and on the left margin of
each and every page of the will,
○ in the presence of the testatrix and of each
other.
○ an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a
deceased sister of the testatrix,
○ as well as an acknowledged natural child of
Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the
same testatrix,
● filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the
probate of the will; alleging the following
grounds:
(1) said will was not executed as required by
law;
(2) the testatrix was physically and mentally
incapable to execute the will at the time of its
execution; and
(3) the will was executed under duress, threat or
influence of fear.
● Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the
opposition alleging that the oppositor had no
legal personality to intervene.
PROBATE COURT:
● Admitted the will to probate
● but declaring the disposition made in favor of
Dr. Rene Teotico (physician who took care of the
29 of 36
 testatrix during her last illness) void with the
statement that the portion to be vacated by the
annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by
way of intestate succession.
● Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal
heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for
reconsideration of that part of the decision
which declares the portion of the estate to be
vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr.
Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs,
○ while the oppositor filed also a motion for
reconsideration of the portion of the
judgment which decrees the probate of the
will.
● On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to
intervene and to file a motion for
reconsideration with regard to that portion of
the decision which nullified the legacy made in
his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to
having been denied, both petitioner and oppositor
appealed from the decision, -
● the petitioner from that portion which nullifies
the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and
declares the vacated portion as subject of
succession in favor of the legal heirs, and
● the oppositor from that portion which admits
the will to probate.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N the oppositor Ana del Val Chan had the
right to intervene in this proceeding? ​NO
(2) W/N the will was validly executed?​ YES
(3) W/N the probate court could determine the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will? ​NO
RULING:
1. NO. The oppositor has no right to intervene
either as testamentary or as legal heir in this
probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of
the court a quo.
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to
intervene because she has no interest in the estate
either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does
she have any claim to any property affected by the
will, because it nowhere appears therein any
provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee
of any portion of the estate.
She has also no interest in the will either as
administratrix or executrix.
Neither has she any claim against any portion of the
estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and
while she previously had an interest in the Calvo
building located in Escolta, she had already disposed
of it long before the execution of the will.
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate,
would the oppositor acquire any interest in any
portion of the estate left by the testatrix?​ She would
acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the
deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code.
It is true that oppositor claims to be an
acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a
deceased brother of the deceased, and also an
adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased
sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her
any comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not
give her any right to succeed to the estate of the
deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca
Mortera.
And this is so because being an illegitimate child she
is prohibited by law from succeeding to the
legitimate relatives of her natural father.
· Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides:
"An illegitimate child has no right to inherit
ab intestato​ from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; ... ."
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the
fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera because under our law the relationship
established by adoption is limited solely to the
adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the
relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted
child except only as expressly provided for by law.
Hence, no relationship is created between the
adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents.
As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the
adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
2. YES. Will was validly executed.
The claim that the will was not properly attested to
is contradicted by the evidence of record.
Pilar Borja testified -
● that the testatrix was in perfect state of health
at the time she executed the will for she carried
her conversation with her intelligently;
● that the testatrix signed immediately above the
attestation clause and on each and every page
thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence
of the three instrumental witnesses and the
notary public;
● that it was the testatrix herself who asked her
and the other witnesses to act as such; and
● that the testatrix was the first one to sign and
later she gave the will to the witnesses who
read and signed it.
30 of 36
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified-
● that she knew the testatrix since 1945;
● that it was the testatrix herself who asked her to
be a witness to the will;
● that the testatrix was the first one to sign and
she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign
and afterwards she gave it to the notary public;
● that on the day of the execution of the will the
testatrix was in the best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified -
● that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of
the witnesses to the will;
● that he read and understood the attestation
clause before he signed the document, and
● all the witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in
Tagalog.
● He finally said that the instrumental witnesses
and the testatrix signed the will at the same
time and place and identified their signatures.
entertained in Probate proceeding because its
only purpose is merely to determine if the will
has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law​."
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the
pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring
invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the
will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made
in excess of its jurisdiction.
Another reason why said pronouncement should be
set aside is that the legatee was not given an
opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for
he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding.
As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching
on the disposition of the estate in favor of some
relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for
the same reason.

This evidence which has not been successfully DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

refuted proves conclusively that the will was duly WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of
executed because it was signed by the testatrix and the decision which declares that the will in question
her instrumental witnesses and the notary public in has been duly executed and admitted the same to
the manner provided for by law. probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside.
This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for
The mere claim - further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs
● that Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene
Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure
on the testatrix simply because she lived in their
house several years prior to the execution of the
will and
● that she was old and suffering from
hypertension in that she was virtually isolated
from her friends for several years prior to her
death
is insufficient to disprove what the instrumental
witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and
voluntarily and with full consciousness of the
solemnity of the occasion executed the will under
consideration.

The exercise of improper pressure and undue

influence must be supported by substantial
evidence and must be of a kind that would
overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix
as to destroy her free agency and make her express
the will of another rather than her own​ (Coso v.
Deza, 42 0. G. 596).

The burden is on the person challenging the will that

such influence was exerted at the time of its
execution, a matter which here was not done, for
the evidence presented not only is insufficient but
was disproved by the testimony of the instrumental
witnesses.

3. NO. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or

legality of the provisions of the will cannot be
31 of 36
32 of 36
50. AGUINALDO-SUNTAY v. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
GR No. 183053
June 16, 2010
Ponente: Nanchura
Digest Author: Santos
Topic in the Syllabus:
Article 992; the Successional Bar
Relevant Law:
Article 992 - An illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child. (943a)
Doctrine:
See RULING
Decedent: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
Will: ​No will​.
Parties:
FACTS:
● The decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
married Dr. Federico Suntay;
○ Cristina died intestate
● They begot only one son, Emilio
Aguinaldo-Suntay I,
○ however, he predeceased his parents
● During the lifetime of Emilio I,
○ he married Isabel Cojuangco, and
○ they begot three children, Isabel, Margarita,
and Emilio II
● His marriage with Isabel Cojuangco was
eventually annulled and
○ that the Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II all
lived together with their mother in Quezon
City
● Emilio I had 2 children out of wedlock.
○ One with Isabel Santos, and they begot one
child named Nenita Suntay.
■ Nenita was also acknowledged as a
natural child of Emilio and was brought
up ever since childhood by Federico and
Cristina
○ Another one with Concepcion Mendoza and
they begot Emillio III
■ Despite the illegitimate status of Emillio
III, he was reared ever since he was a
mere baby, nine months old, by spouses
Federico and Cristina and​ was
acknowledged as a natural child of
Emilio I.
● After the death of Cristina, Federico ​adopted
their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and
Nenita
● On October 26, 1995, respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor
● Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his
grandchild respondent Isabel, ​Federico filed his
opposition on December 21, 1995
○ Stated that he is the surviving spouse of
Cristina; he should be appointed as
administrator and he is better suited to be
as such
○ That they (Isabela et al) have not been in
contact with their grandparents for 30 years
○ The petition of Isabel did not include Emilio
III and Nenita
● Emilio III filed his Opposition-in-Intervention,
echoing the arguments of Federico
● During the proceedings, Federico died.
○ He was substituted by Emilio III
RTC: Appointed Emilio III as administrator
CA: Reversed the decision of the RTC, appointed
Isabel Cojuangco as administrator.
33 of 36
 milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons
The CA argued that Emilio III cannot represent the with legal interest in the subject estate.
estate of Cristina as the administrator because he is
an illegitimate child It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch.
ISSUES:
No costs.
Between Emilio III and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, who
is better qualified to act as administrator of the
decedent’s estate?

RULING:

Emilio III must also be appointed as administrator.

The Court herein held that Emilio III is better suited

to be the administrator of Cristina’s estate.

The CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the

administration of the decedent’s estate.

As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the

estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court
as the interest therein of respondent,​ considering
that the CA even declared that under the law,
[Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have
the right of succession over a portion of the
exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his
share in the conjugal partnership.

The successional bar between the legitimate and

illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in
this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate
the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of
the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent
and her husband as their own son, reared from
infancy, educated and trained in their businesses,
and eventually legally adopted by decedents
husband, the original oppositor to respondent's
petition for letters of administration.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Letters of Administration over the estate of

decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to
both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment
by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special
Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos,

Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination
and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual

34 of 36
51. CHUA vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
GR No. L-29901
Date ​August 31, 1977
Ponente: Martin, J.
Digest Author: Sumanga
Topic in the Syllabus:
Requisites of Reserva Troncal
Relevant Law:
Art. 891. ​The ascendant who inheritts from his
descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendat,
or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and belong to the line from which said
property came.
Doctrine:
In order that a property may be impressed with a
reservable character the following requisites must
exist, to wit:
(1) that the property was acquired by a descendant
from an asscendant or from a brother or sister by
gratuitous title;
(2) that said descendant died without an issue;
(3) that the property is inherited by another
ascendant by operation of law; and
(4) that there are relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property came.
Decedent: ​Juanito Frias Chua (Prepositus)
Will: ​No will
● Jose Frias Chua contracted 2 marriages.
First with Patricia Militar in which begot 3
children - Ignacio, Manuel and Lorenzo.
● When Patricia died, he married Consolacion
de la Torre and had one child - Juanito Frias
Chua.
● Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any
issue.
● Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his
widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son
Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage
and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo
Frias Chua of his first marriage.
● However, after an intestate proceeding the
court adjudicated half of Lot No. 399 and a
sum of P8,000 in question to Consolacion
and the other half to their only son, Juanito.
● The two sons in the first marriage, Lorenzo
and Ignacio, received P3,000 and P1,550
respectively
● ​Juanito also died intestate without issue.
● A ​week​ after his death Consolacion de la
Torre executed a ​declaration of heirship
adjudicating in her favor the ​pro-indiviso
share of her son Juanito in the lot in
question, ​it resulted to a TCT being issued
in her name
● Consolacion died intestate leaving no direct
heir either in the descending or ascending
line except her ​brother and sisters.
● Thereafter, Ignacio and the legitimate heirs
(Dominador and Remedios) of Lorenzo filed
a complaint praying that the ​one-half
portion of the Lot No. 399 formerly
belonging to Juanito which passed to
Consolacion upon his death be declared as
a reservable property​ for the reason that
the lot in question was subject to reserval
troncal pursuant to Article 891 NCC.
● CFI (respondent court) dismissed complaint,
hence this case.

ISSUES:
Whether property in question was acquired by
Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias Chua
gratuitously (as first requisite of Reserva Troncal).
YES

RULING:

All of the requisites of reserva troncal are present

in this case.
Parties:
In order that a property may be impressed with a
FACTS:
reservable character the following requisites must
● The crux of the problem in instant petition
exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a
is focused on the first requisite of ​reserva
descendant from an ascendant or from a brother or
troncal
sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant
died without an issue; (3) that the property is
35 of 36
inherited by another ascendant by operation of law;
and (4) that there are relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which said
property came.

Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias

Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952;
he died without leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of
1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother,
Consolacion de la Torre died, Juanito Frias Chua who
died intestate had relatives within the third degree.
These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and
Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, the suppose
legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias
Chua, who are the petitioners herein

According to Manresa, "The transmission is

gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient
does not give anything in return." It matters not
whether the property transmitted be or be not
subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that
the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act
of mere liberality of the person making it, without
imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient;
and that the person receiving the property gives or
does nothing in return.

"The essential thing is that the person who transmits

it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity,
without requiring from the transferee any
prestation." It is evident from the record that the
transmission of the property in question to Juanito
Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of
his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a
hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous.

As long as the transmission of the property to the

heirs is free from any condition imposed by the
deceased himself and the property is given out of
pure generosity, it is gratuitous

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed
from is hereby set aside. The petitioners Ignacio
Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are
declared owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399;
and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is
hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name
of Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new
Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la
Torre, 1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4
undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and
Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot.
Without pronouncement as to costs.

36 of 36