REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna
a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that
Jennifer Cagandahan is sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare
medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics.
Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her
petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is
suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female but
because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally,
thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the
Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same
was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did
not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the
case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.”
The Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the
fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by
the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen),
which is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and
(2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court
respects the respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life
is already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not
a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and
the consequences that will follow.

G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016

 RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
VERONICA B. KHO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-GR. CV No. 69218.
The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's favor in an action he filed for
declaration of nullity of his marriage with private respondent, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.

The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein petitioner with
the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

xxxx

3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio
Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said
clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were required for the intended
marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight
of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony;

4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony

which actually took place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account
that there was a public dance held in the town plaza which is just situated adjacent to the
church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the dance only finished at around 2:00
o'clock of same early morning of June 1, 1972;

5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage
license and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the
procurement of a marriage license;

6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the
treasurer's office was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972
so required for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual
marriage was celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could
have been validly issued, thereby rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null and
void for want of the most essential requisite;

7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage aforestated
was solemnized sans the required marriage license, hence, null and void from the beginning
and neither was it performed under circumstances exempting the requirement of such
marriage license;

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court

that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered:

1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on June 1,
1972, at Arteche, Eastern Samar, null and void ab initio and of no legal effect;

x x x x4
ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry
Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has
neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their
marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.

Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of action
because there is no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation that their marriage was celebrated without the
requisite marriage license and that, on the contrary, both petitioner and respondent personally appeared
before the local civil registrar and secured a marriage license which they presented before their marriage
was solemnized.

Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to the RTC of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 2, where the parties submitted their respective pleadings as well as affidavits of
witnesses.

On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the
said Decision reads:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage contracted
between Raquel G. Kho and Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio,
pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the Family Code. The
foregoing is without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar for proper registration of this decree of nullity of marriage.

SO ORDERED.7 ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the requisite marriage
license when the marriage between petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that
based on Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the absence of the said marriage
license rendered the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA promulgated its
assailed Decision, disposing thus:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September 2000 of Branch 2
of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage between the petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho is declared
valid and subsisting for all intents and purposes.

SO ORDERED.8 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending parties, there is a
presumption that a marriage license was issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome such
presumption. The CA also ruled that the absence of any indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage
license was issued is a mere defect in the formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate the parties'
marriage.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated January 14, 2009.

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-

CALLED "ETHICAL DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED
LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS MARRIAGE IN QUESTION WITH RESPONDENT;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING

 AGAINST PETITIONER THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING
TO ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER

DISREGARDING PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES
OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED
PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION; and

4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR

REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE
LICENSE.10 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA to give due
credence to petitioner's evidence which established the absence or lack of marriage license at the time that
petitioner and respondent's marriage was solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding the
case not on the basis of law and evidence but rather on the ground of what the appellate court calls as
ethical considerations as well as on the perceived motive of petitioner in seeking the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with respondent.

The Court finds for the petitioner.

At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a procedural question by
arguing that the issues presented by petitioner in the present petition are factual in nature and it is not
proper for this Court to delve into these issues in a petition for review on certiorari.

The Court does not agree.

The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing law and prevailing
jurisprudence. However, intertwined with these issues is the question of the existence of the subject
marriage license, which is a question of fact and one which is not appropriate for a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule, nonetheless, is not without exceptions, viz.:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings arc contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.11 ChanRobles Vi rt ualawlib ra ry
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there was indeed a marriage
license obtained by petitioner and respondent, are conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for this Court to review
these findings.

The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out
the essential requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. 13

ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry

Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.14 Under
the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles
72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war;
(2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious
ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's
and respondent's marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding
marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that
the license is the essence of the marriage contract.15 The rationale for the compulsory character of a
marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting
parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.16 Stated
differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.17

In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a marriage license which
they presented to the solemnizing officer before the marriage was performed.

The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage and that
any doubt should be resolved to sustain such validity. Indeed, this Court is mindful of this principle as well
as of the Constitutional policy which protects and strengthens the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.

On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar, coupled with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence to prove the absence
of the subject marriage license.

The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his favor.

Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.18 There, it was held that the certification of the Local
Civil Registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance
of said license.19 It was further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been
overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage
was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.20

As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of any
marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent]
whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972."21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed
validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome and it becomes the burden of
respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC,
respondent was not able to discharge that burden.

It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. In
addition, the Certificate of Marriage22 issued by the officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding
the said marriage license. Respondent could have obtained a copy of their marriage contract from the
National Archives and Records Section, where information regarding the marriage license, i.e., date of
issuance and license number, could be obtained. However, she also failed to do so. The Court also notes,
with approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's observation that the statements of the witnesses for
respondent, as well as respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony was conducted but
neither one of them testified that a marriage license was issued in favor of petitioner and respondent.
Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim that she and petitioner were able to obtain a marriage
license, she failed to present evidence to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.23

Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with
respondent's failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such
license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was, in
fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a total
absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect the validity of the marriage. The fact remains
that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage license was issued and the law is clear that a
marriage which is performed without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.

As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the basis of this Court's ruling
in Sevilla v. Cardenas,24 the certification issued by the local civil registrar, which attests to the absence in its
records of a marriage license, must categorically state that the document does not exist in the said office
despite diligent search.

However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court considered the certification issued
by the Local Civil Registrar as a certification of due search and inability to find the record or entry sought by
the parties despite the absence of a categorical statement that "such document does not exist in their
records despite diligent search." The Court, citing Section 28,26 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, held that the
certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued
by the civil registrar, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there
is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.

Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,27 this Court considered the
marriage of the petitioner and her deceased husband as void ab initio as the records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the
local civil registrar, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification
issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their
marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is
undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan,
Jr.28

Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas,29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic v.
CA30 that, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, this Court relied
on the Certification issued by the local civil registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage license could
not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Contrary to petitioner's asseveration, nowhere in
the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search. In this
respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court does not require a categorical
statement to this effect. Moreover, in the said case, this Court ruled that:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
 Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an
official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the
contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative
evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. x x x31 ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the absence of the subject
marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties.32

Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.33 As cited above,
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except marriages of exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier
stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be characterized as among the exceptions.

As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be that his motives
are less than pure - that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another
woman. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they
had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The law must be applied.
As the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.cha nrob leslaw

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu
City, dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar,
Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra r

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DIVISION

[ GR No. 226013, Jul 02, 2018 ]

LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO v. RYOJI* MORISONO +

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 (RTC),
through a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated July 18, 2016 of the RTC in
SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 which denied petitioner Luzviminda Dela Cruz Morisono's (Luzviminda)
petition before it.

The Facts

Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono (Ryoji) in Quezon City on December 8,
2009.[3] Thereafter, they lived together in Japan for one (1) year and three (3) months but were not
blessed with a child. During their married life, they would constantly quarrel mainly due to Ryoji's
philandering ways, in addition to the fact that he was much older than Luzviminda.[4] As such, she and
Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by Agreement" before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan, which
was eventually approved on January 17, 2012 and duly recorded with the Head of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya
City, Japan on July 1, 2012.[5] In view of the foregoing, she filed a petition for recognition of the foreign
divorce decree obtained by her and Ryoji[6] before the RTC so that she could cancel the surname of her
former husband in her passport and for her to be able to marry again.[7]

After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the RTC set the case for hearing. Since nobody
appeared to oppose her petition except the government, Luzviminda was allowed to present her
evidence ex-parte. After the presentation and absent any objection from the Public Prosecutor,
Luzviminda's formal offer of evidence was admitted as proof of compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements, and as part of the testimony of the witnesses.[8]

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision[9] dated July 18, 2016, the RTC denied Luzviminda's petition. It held that while a divorce
obtained abroad by an alien spouse may be recognized in the Philippines – provided that such decree is
valid according to the national law of the alien – the same does not find application when it was the
Filipino spouse, i.e., petitioner, who procured the same. Invoking the nationality principle provided
under Article 15 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, the RTC opined that
since petitioner is a Filipino citizen whose national laws do not allow divorce, the foreign divorce decree
she herself obtained in Japan is not binding in the Philippines;[10] hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly denied Luzviminda's petition for
recognition of the foreign divorce decree she procured with Ryoji.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as follows: first, Philippine laws do
not provide for absolute divorce, and hence, the courts cannot grant the same; second, consistent with
Articles 15[11] and 17[12] of the Civil Code, the marital bond between two (2) Filipino citizens cannot be
dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad; third, an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws; and fourth, in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former
is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[13]

The fourth rule, which has been invoked by Luzviminda in this case, is encapsulated in Article 26 (2) of
the Family Code which reads:

Article 26. x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise. have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to
a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. It
authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines
does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to
trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained
by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the
children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts. The rationale for
this rule is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse,
although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad
that is recognized by his or her national law.[14] In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,[15] the Court held:

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by
clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to
have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.
Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign
decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in
another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize
divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this
rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and
his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to
the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.[16] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

According to Republic v. Orbecido III,[17] the following elements must concur in order for Article 26 (2)
to apply, namely: (a) that there is a valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and (b) that a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.[18] In the same case, the Court also initially clarified that Article 26 (2) applies not only to cases
where a foreigner was the one who procured a divorce of his/her marriage to a Filipino spouse, but also
to instances where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and
obtained a favorable decree.[19]
However, in the recent case of Republic v. Manalo (Manalo),[20] the Court En Banc extended the
application of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code to further cover mixed marriages where it was the
Filipino citizen who divorced his/her foreign spouse. Pertinent portions of the ruling read:

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity
to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. x x x.

We rule in the affirmative.

xxxx

When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not
stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute
divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic
relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

xxxx

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does
not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of
the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure."

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the
divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the
letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve,
and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. x x x.
xxxx

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective
measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his
or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the
subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are
severed by operation of the latter's national law.

xxxx

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a
foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political,
economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too
unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More
importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and
void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in
accordance with the national law of the foreigner.

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the
same rights and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not
for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference
of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives
undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

xxxx
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with
other constitutional provisions. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is
equally mandated to actively promote its total development. It is also obligated to defend, among
others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development. To our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce
these obligations if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce
initiated by the alien spouse. x x x.

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino
citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and
still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent
relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being
branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the
parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The
irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is
meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and. against unions not formalized by marriage, but without
denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to
indigenous customs.

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of
communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system
that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too
uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect
humans more often than not create imperfect unions. Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality
for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not found
and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing
marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of rotten quality.

Going back, We hold that marriage, being mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital
bond while the other remains bound to it. x x x.[21] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino and
an alien citizen may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses
initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign
divorce decree – presumably the Filipino citizen – must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[22]

In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to have her
foreign divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground that she
admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do. In
light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such ground relied upon by the RTC had been rendered
nugatory. However, the Court cannot just order the grant of Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the
foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her. "Divorce by Agreement"
obtained, in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce. Notably,
the RTC did not rule on such issues. Since these are questions which require an examination of various
factual matters, a remand to the court a quo is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2016 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the instant case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings, as directed in this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.

DAVID A. NOVERAS v. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, GR No. 188289, 2014-08-20

Facts:
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with
the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted
the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.[6] The
California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple's
properties in the USA.[7]
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before
the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David's
failure to comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to
administer... all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and
desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal
properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as
share of
Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of P50,000.00 and
P100,000.00 litigation expenses.[8]
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered
on 29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded
that the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be
liquidated and... that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney's fees of both parties be
charged against the conjugal partnership.
David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines.
Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005
wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to
Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial
separation of conjugal properties.
Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is
highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed
that the spouses had been living separately... since 2003 when David decided to go back to
the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that
David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita
Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital... where David was once confined,
testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for
Operation form.[20] Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was
granted by the California court in June

2005.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the
petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
Issues:
Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital
infidelity which can result into the forfeiture of the parties' properties in favor of the petitioner
and their two (2) children.
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the
same can be included in the judicial separation prayed for.
Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and
respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter's property
rights over their conjugal properties.
Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras is entitled to reimbursement of one-half of the P2.2
[M]illion sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the P1.5
[M]illion used to redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and...
charges.
How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
Whether or not the attorney's fees and litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable
against their conjugal properties.
Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is
highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed
that the spouses had been living separately... since 2003 when David decided to go back to
the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that
David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita
Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital... where David was once confined,
testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for
Operation form.[20] Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was
granted by the California court in June

2005.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the
petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
Ruling:
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over
the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly
states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country...
where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the
spouses in the absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of
their children's presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property. While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property,
absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to
have... come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of
half of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property
for the benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of
P120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election
expenses... in the amount of P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be
allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the
Commission on Elections. Likewise,... expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of his
personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia
and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of P120,000.00
or in the respective amounts of
P1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate
children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of
the mother." The children are therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the
net... assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents
covering the same, as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of
the Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of
P410,000.00.
Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their
presumptive legitimes therefrom.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we
shall adopt the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court's Decision with
respect to liquidation.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over
the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly
states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country...
where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the
spouses in the absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of
their children's presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property. While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property,
absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to
have... come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of
half of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property
for the benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of
P120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election
expenses... in the amount of P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be
allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the
Commission on Elections. Likewise,... expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of his
personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia
and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of P120,000.00
or in the respective amounts of
P1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate
children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of
the mother." The children are therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the
net... assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents
covering the same, as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of
the Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of
P410,000.00.
Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their
presumptive legitimes therefrom.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA v. MICHIYUKI KOIKE, GR No. 215723, 2016-07-27
Facts:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike
(Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City,
Philippines.[4] Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on January 23,
2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007.[5]
On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce[6]
before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even
date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate[7] and the same was duly recorded in the
Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.[8]
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage[9] on
file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a
petition[10] for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry
pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code[11] before the RTC
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.[12] On the other hand, Doreen
presented several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of
Acceptance of Divorce"[13] and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike"[14] both issued by the
Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the
Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy of a document
entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila
that was authenticated by the Department of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a
Certification[15] issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said
divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the
Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books
entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000"[16] and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009"[17] were
likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce.[18]
In a Decision[19] dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in an
action for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code,
the foreign divorce decree and" the national law of the alien recognizing his or her capacity
to obtain a divorce must be proven
The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully
proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the
national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce. The RTC
observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009,"
presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan... adding too that
the testimony of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found therein and its effect on
the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was not presented as a qualified expert
witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working knowledge of the laws of
Japan, particularly those on family relations and divorce.
since no expert witness on the subject matter was presented and considering further that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign judgments and law.[23]
Doreen's motion for reconsideration[24] was denied in a Resolution[25] dated November
28, 2014
Issues:
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in denying the
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.
Ruling:
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses
foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino
spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by
an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads:... the law confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage.[26]
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself.
Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained
the divorce must be proven.[30] Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national
law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.[31]
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well
as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for
a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant
appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for
review.
The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these
matters are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions.[32]
In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA)
It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure proper administration of law
and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense,
for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its
rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the
dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the courts.[35]
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is
hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of
evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in accordance with
this Decision