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Without, Foucault’s contribution on contemporary philosophy, things in reality will seem

very much, less complex. Basically the author is trying to give what he has to say, in a manner that

is partially biased. That is because the author, is already impinged with preconceived notions, and

stands about other philosophies, that which can also be related to Foucault’s perspective. It is a

partially biased as I have said, but the whole entirety of his philosophical enquiry on Foucault, is

best measured only as multiple expositions on account to what Foucault has to say, or reason out


A. Based on theories about that which is both in the metaphysical and the physical,

Foucault, mentions that “we have to accept that we are a part of a language game.” It

is that we have to accept reality as it is, and perhaps maybe, reality is not really

understood fully after all.

B. Thus, he speaks about madness, which is totally out of the context of good and bad,

saying that, “if there is really a perfect reality, we are dismissing those who do not fall

under these norms.” And those that fall, are categorized to be the ones that are

unfortunately unable to get parallel with the standards of what is in reality. Because

those who are part of the perfection, are those which succumb themselves to the

standards in which they are in, or they ought to be in, and those who do not are the ones

who are unable to meet these regular standards, which is the norm, regardless to the
concept of good and bad. (Thoughts on – Contemporary Philosophy, Knowledge as

power: Techniques of Social Control).

Apart from the A – B examples, and talking about the general view on Foucault’s, I myself

haven’t yet arrive on the full grasp of the entire context. But upon discourses with lectures and

reading, upon the author’s view, Michel Foucault fails, to come up with the fact about the objective

reality. It is that which he tried to claim that which led him to a so called “dilemma” – “Foucault

falls into contradiction that afflicts all those who profess some kind of relativism or skepticism,

and specifically all the postmodernists because on the one hand they try to be objective and

document their theses, but on the other hand they despise objective truth.”1 Hence, “If he is telling

the truth about the impossibility of objective truth, then all truth is suspect (including this very

claim) in which case Foucault’s truth cannot advocate for its own truthfulness.”2

With these questions at bay, I am left with the question and in need of answer about the

question about what is really the truth inside and outside man. Here ends my short note on the

author’s critic about Foucault’s philosophical views about the man as sacting and seeking.

1 Fazio & Labastida, A History of Contemporary philosophy: 19th and 20th Centuries, Scepter Publisher
Inc., New York, 2009, P. 311.
2 Fazio & Labastida, A History of Contemporary philosophy: 19th and 20th Centuries, Scepter Publisher
Inc., New York, 2009, P. 311.