ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA,

petitioners, vs COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984

Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Digested by: Dela Fuente, Dyan

FACTS:

Petitioner Roy Padilla is the mayor of the Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Province of Camarines Norte,
while the other petitioners are policemen of the same municipality.

An information for the crime of grave coercion was filed against herein petitioners for brutally demolishing
and destroying the market stall and seizing the goods and furniture contained therein which is owned by
Antonio Vergara and his family located in the Public Market, Building No. 3 of the Municipality on
February 8, 1964; since then up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken out from the
store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not been made known. Vergara alleged in the
information that the petitioners took advantage of their government positions in the said demolition and
that the same is unlawful.

Petitioner contended as a defense that the act was not unlawful but was in compliance of a municipal
ordinance declaring the market stalls as nuisance per se and that they gave Vergara 72 hours to vacate
the place, but to no avail.

The Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioners for the crime of Grave Coercion, sentencing them to an
imprisonment of five months and one day and an obligation to pay Vergara P10,000 for actual damages,
P30,000 for moral damages and P10,000 for attorney’s fees. The court held that the couple has been
paying rentals for the premises to the government which allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore,
farfetched to say that the stall was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated. The petitioners
appealed to the higher court.

The Court of Appeals acquitted the petitioners on the ground that the crime was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, but still held them liable to pay P9,600 to Vergara as actual damages. The petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the extinction of the criminal offense was an extinction
of the civil liability as well. The motion was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are still liable for the civil indemnities imposed against them even though they
were acquitted in the criminal case.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners were still liable for the civil indemnities. There appear to be
no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved
in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was
acquitted. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean
needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of
time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.

Under Rule 111, Sec. 3(C) of the Revised Rules of Court, the extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability does not arise where: a) the acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; b) where the
court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature as, for
instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who
thereby incur only civil liability; and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the
criminal act of which the accused was acquitted. Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:

• When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found
to be malicious.

• If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides was a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has
been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for
the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed
of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such
separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.

There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a
judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of
acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability
unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.

Petition denied.