Dorn v Romillo

Facts:

Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a
citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and established their residence in
the Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively. But
the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982 and the petitioner had remarried also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn be ordered to
render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila and be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property.

Issue:

Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding
in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen

Held:

As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. Owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.

As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent Richard Upton is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise control over conjugal assets. He
was bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he did not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

Garcia v Recio

FACTS:

Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree
of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26,
1992, respondent became an Australian citizen and was married again to petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio,
a Filipina on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent
was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage.

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. On his Answer,
Rederick contended that his first marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to
marry Grace.

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the declaration of
nullity was pending , respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on the ground that
the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the couple thus there was no more marital union to
nullify or annul.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.

2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner

RULING:

1st issue:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of respondent’s marriage to
Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Furthermore, the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic
one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

2nd issue:

Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence
on this matter.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence. The
Court mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to marry.

Republic v Iyoy

FACTS:
Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They begot five children. After the
celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of
their five children to the care of respondent Crasus. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned,
through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she
eventually had a child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly
using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the USA. Crasus filed a declaration
of nullity of marriage on March 25, 1997.

On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having
herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After
securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American
citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an
American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also prayed that
the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered
to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null and void ab ignition on the ground
of psychological incapacity. One factor considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained a divorce decree in
the United States of America and married another man and has established another family of her own.
Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another
man in another country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological incapacity.

2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.

RULING:

1st issue:

The totality of evidence presented during the trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely. Using the guidelines established by the cases of Santos, Molina and Marcos, this Court
found that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under the said Article.

2nd issue:

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting
married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its
plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus
and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although
the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after
which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an
American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was
still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when
she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize
divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.

The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains
valid and subsisting.

Amor Catalan v CA

FACTS:

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan.
Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens
thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. Two months after the
divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan. Contending
that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol,
petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City
against Orlando and Merope. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied. Trial on the merits
ensued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has legal personality to file the petition for nullity of marriage between
Orlando and Merope

RULING:

Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the
case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same
allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did
not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents’ marriage as
bigamous and void ab initio. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity
of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.
The case was remanded to the trial court for its proper disposition.

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or
even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity
of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate “proper interest” can file the same. A petition
to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interestand must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, the Court
held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of the marriage of
their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights. Significantly, Section 2(a)
of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically provides: a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife

Bayot v CA

FACTS:

On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They had
a child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California.

In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which resulted to
judgment ordering the dissolution of the marriage and the distribution of conjugal properties

After obtaining a Department of Justice affirmation of her Filipino citizenship, she then filed a declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente’s alleged psychological incapacity, seeking for
distribution of conjugal properties and support.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente’s motion to dismiss but CA reversed lower court’s decision. According to the CA, RTC
ought to have granted Vicente’s motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the spouses is already
dissolved when the divorce decree was granted since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied
for the decree.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

RULING:

Yes, the divorce is valid.

Article 26 (2) of the Civil Code states that: “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains to be
one, being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the principle of jus
soli granting American citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder of
American passport. She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as an American
citizen, as shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix’s birth certificate, when she secured divorce in
Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a
country which allows divorce. The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen
by affirmation of the DOJ Secretary does not invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an
American citizen in 1996. In determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within
the jurisdiction of the country’s policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of
the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

Corpus v Sto. Tomas

FACTS:

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto.
Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he
returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with
another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was
eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree
took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He
went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage
certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office
informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a
judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular
No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out
that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he
is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can
institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen
to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to
institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree?

HELD:

Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.

The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens -with the complementary statement that this conclusion
is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.

The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have
been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor
of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign
judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of aright by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the
foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided
in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Catalan v Lee

DOCTRINE:

Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which maybe recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
ac-cording to their national law.

FACTS:

Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen,allegedly obtained a divorce in the United States from
his first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then contracted a second marriage with petitioner.

When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance
of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate. While the case
was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage,
filed a similar petition with the RTC. The two cases were consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent on the ground of litis
pendentia. Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file
the petition. Respondent further alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner by
Felicitas Amor contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been
married to one Eusebio Bristol.

However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the deceased was a divorced
American citizen, and that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage
between him and petitioner was not valid. The RTC took note of the action for declaration of nullity then
pending filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to
be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petition-er for the crime of bigamy. The RTC also
found that petitioner had never been married to Bristol.

The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by
petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the
RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she
married Orlando. The RTC held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file said petition.
The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case for bigamy meant that the marriage with Bristol
was still valid.

2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized under Philippine jurisdiction.

HELD:

It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful
party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando. Petition is partially granted.
Case is remanded to RTC.
1. No. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case that
petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. It concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of
bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid.

2. Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a
spouse of for-eign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must
still first be proven by the divorce decree itself. The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office.

Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary
in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the
burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. It is well-
settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved.

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce
under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there
is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the
fact of divorce.

Quita v CA

Facts:

Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. No
children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final judgment of
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On August 31,
1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning
the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to
be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the
petition. The RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death
of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void
since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Issues:

1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?

2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?

Held:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to
the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.

No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are
proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as
heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary shares.

Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage considered void ab inito
under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving spouse.

The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.

Carlos v Sandoval

Doctrine: ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during
the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and
annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment.

FACTS:

· Spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.

· Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son. Upon Teofilo’s
death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 (registered in the name of Teofilo) were registered in the name of respondent
Felicidad.

· In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action against respondents for the declaration of nullity
of marriage. Petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent
Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license.

· On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. But before the parties could even
proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment.

· Petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment and lodged his own motion for summary
judgment.

· RTC rendered judgment: defendants (respondents) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows: Declaring the marriage between defendant
Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license.

· In the appeal, respondents argued that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad.

· CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling.

ISSUES:
1) Whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a
summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. NO

2) Whether one who is not a spouse may bring an action for nullity of marriage. Yes if the marriage
was celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family code and the plaintiff is a real party-in-interest.

HELD:

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the
pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the question on the application of summary judgments
or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with
clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 2003 is found
in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of
evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the
spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to
intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the public
prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to
appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is
no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public
prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not
fabricated.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.: SEC. 13. Effect of failure to
appear at the pre-trial. (b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to
intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence.

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the
interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages
by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party
outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses [Sec. 2(a)]. The innovation
incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The advent of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs
of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are
without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for
declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15,
2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new
Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application.

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in
controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the
marriage took place. The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil
Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any
person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage? NO. The absence of a provision in
the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such
person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest.

Ablaza v Republic

Doctrine: It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be
construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a
marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited
by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action
must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can
demonstrate a proper interest can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material
interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished
from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff
is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.

FACTS:

On October 17, 2000, Petitioner filed in the RTC a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of
the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Honato. The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering
the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his
being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of
the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in
interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being
void ab initio.

RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner is not a party to the marriage. CA affirmed
this decision.

ISSUE: Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage
of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code. YES if he is a real party-in-
interest.

RULES:

The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according
to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage
already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law.

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative
Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such
limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to
marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule
that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are
excepted from the limitation, to wit:

1) Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and

2) Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those
celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

HELD:

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949,
the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action
for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to
the petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog, the children were allowed to file after the death of
their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their fathers marriage to their stepmother
contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license.

Bolos v Bolos

DOCTRINE:

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which the Court promulgated
on 15 March 2003, extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on 3 August 1988.

FACTS:

Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC
granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by respondent Danilo and he
thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal.

The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the order declaring its
decision declaring the marriage null and void as final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of
Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition forcertiorari under Rule
65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically
capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of
abandoning him, the family home and their children.

The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC declaring the
nullity of marriage as final and executory. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion
for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as
the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code
took effect.

Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.” Such that petitions filed
after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if the marriage was
solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not
applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its
effectivity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to the case at bench.

HELD:

No, it does not.

RATIO:

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its
scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only
to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation
that the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather
than to the word “marriages.”

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due course
to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration.

Diño v Diño

DOCTRINE:

Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article
36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties. In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.

FACTS:

Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño(respondent) got married on 14 January 1998 before
Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.

On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent,
citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was incurable and deeply ingrained in her system since her
early formative years.

The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage and declared
their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner, modified its decision holding that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that adecree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.

HELD:

Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with modification. Decree of absolute nullity of the marriage
shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

RATIO:

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148
of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such
as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;

They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and

Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.

The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The
ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles
147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:

Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that
the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance
with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family
Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property
in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to
liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is
not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code
and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by
petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property
relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147
or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of
the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x
x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration
of nullity of marriage.

Yu v Carpio

DOCTRINE:

It is more proper to rule first on the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of each party’s
psychological incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations. If the Court eventually finds that
the parties’ respective petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis
of either or both of the parties’ psychological incapacity, then the parties shall proceed to comply with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued.
Pending such ruling on the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage, the Court finds no legal ground,
at this stage, to proceed with the reception of evidence in regard the issues on custody and property
relations, since these are mere incidents of the nullity of the parties’ marriage.

FACTS:

Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the RTC of Pasig.
Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Eric’s partial offer of evidence dated April 18,
2006 would be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits have been remarked. But the exhibits were
only relative to the issue of the nullity of the marriage of Eric and Caroline. On September 12, 2006,
Caroline moved to submit the case for resolution, considering that the incidents on custody, support,
and property relations (incidental issues) were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the
parties’ marriage.

Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity cannot be resolved without
presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and property relations. Eric added that
the incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity can both proceed and be simultaneously
resolved. RTC ruled in favour of Eric’s opposition.

Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled to another branch
presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by Judge Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an
Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation by the said judge of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that the case on the declaration on
nullity be already submitted for resolution ahead of the incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric
opposed this motion.

Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause of action is the declaration
of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues are merely ancillary incidents thereto. Eric moved for
reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with the CA under
Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUES/HELD:

Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution first before the reception
of evidence on custody, support, and property relations (incidental issues) – NO.

RATIO:

It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to have been exercised with
grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order is one which “does not finally
dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things
remain to be done by the Court. Eric Yu to prove that the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of
discretion and that those were patently erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would justify
certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the
proper recourse for petitioner should have been an appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial
court on the merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders.

It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of evidence on the incidents
on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed orders that the trial court judge
merely deferred the reception of evidence relating to custody, support, and property relations. And the
trial judge’s decision was not without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support in the Court En Banc
Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations after the trial court renders a decision granting the
petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the petition:

Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.

Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of
their presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal,
upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on
motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes
pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this Court, to a time when a
decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a final decree is issued. Conversely, the trial
court, or more particularly the family court, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution,
custody, support of common children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of
judgment granting the petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution
in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code,
contrary to what petitioner asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:

Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings.

Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as
of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such
matters.

Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody,
support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence on the subject incidents
after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or annulment of marriage is
issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the assailed orders. As
correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu’s assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving evidence
on the subject incidents would result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative
and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the
evidence submitted by the parties.

Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and whimsical manner,
much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she issued the assailed orders deferring
the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations. To reiterate, this decision is left to
the trial court’s wisdom and legal soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot likewise be said to
have committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in
ultimately finding an absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part.

Weigel v Sempio

Facts:

Karl Heinz Wiegel before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City filed for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia’s previously existing
marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion. Lilia, while admitting the existence of the said prior subsisting
marriage claimed that the said marriage was null and void as she and first husband Eduardo Maxion was
forced to enter the said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties
was the status of the first marriage (whether the said prior marriage is void or merely voidable). Lilia
contested the validity of the pre trial order asking for respondent court for an opportunity to present
evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a need for Lilia Wiegel to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by fore.
Ruling:

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against
both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable. Since no
annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married
to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is void.