Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
*
Same; Same; There is no question that a co-ownership exists between
petitioner and respondents—to this extent, the trial court was correct in decreeing
CONSOLACION Q. AUSTRIA, petitioner, vs. CONSTANCIA Q.
partition in line with the Civil Code provision that no co-owner shall be obliged to
LICHAUCO, CONSUELO Q. JALANDONI, JOSE ALBERTO L.
remain in the co-ownership.— There is no question that a co-ownership exists
QUINTOS, RICARDO M. QUINTOS, JR., AILEEN M. QUINTOS and between petitioner and respondents. To this extent, the trial court was correct in
TYRONE M. QUINTOS, respondents. decreeing partition in line with the Civil Code provision that no co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Rules of procedure are intended to be,
not tools of delay, but of prompt and just disposition of every party’s cause.—This PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
case has crept, ever so slowly, up the ladder of judicial process. While we are not
Court of Appeals.
dissuading parties from availing of the judicial remedies outlined in the Rules of
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Court, they should be cautioned to be judicious in availing of these remedies.
After all, rules of procedure are intended to be, not tools of delay, but of prompt Josefino D.M. Cualing for petitioner.
and just disposition of every party’s cause. Having fully availed of, even exploited, Fortun, Narvasa and Salazar for respondents.
these remedies, petitioner cannot feign denial of her day in court. She has been
given every opportunity to fully ventilate her side. TINGA, J.:
Ownership; Co-Ownership; Property; There are two stages in every action for Petitioner Consolacion Q. Austria assails the Decision of the Court of
1
partition. The first phase is the determination of whether a co-ownership in fact Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68591 dated June 21, 2005 and its
exists and a partition is proper, i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed, and may be
Resolution dated October 7, 2005, which respectively affirmed the
made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.—There
2
are two stages in every action for partition. The first phase is the determination decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142, dated
3
of whether a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, i.e., not February 14, 2000 and its order dated August 7, 2000, and denied
4
otherwise legally proscribed, and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
parties interested in the property. This phase may end either: (a) with a _______________
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-
ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited; or (b) with a 1 Rollo, pp. 31-61.
determination that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the
2 Id., at pp. 63-64.
3 Records, Vol. 2I, pp. 448-455.
premises, and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from 4 Id., at pp. 492-494.
the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they
are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of 403
conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. The second
VOL. 520, APRIL 3, 2007 403
phase commences when it appears that the parties are unable to agree
_______________ Austria vs. Lichauco
The facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
SECOND DIVISION.
“Plaintiffs-appellees Constancia Lichauco, Consuelo Jalandoni, defendants
*
of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 9, 2001, denying her motion
for reconsideration of the decision denying her petition for certiorari and Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which dismissed her
prohibition. petition and affirmed the trial court’s decision but deleted the order that
Undaunted, the defendant-appellant Austria then filed a petition for review petitioner pay reasonable rental for her use of a portion of the disputed
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. properties. The appellate court denied reconsideration.
In a resolution dated October 15, 2001, the Supreme Court denied the said _______________
petition for review for non-compliance with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for
failure to pay on time docket and other fees and deposit costs in violation of Sec. 5 Rollo, pp. 33-38.
3, Rule 45 in relation to Sec. 5(c), Rule 56.
Still not satisfied, on November 9, 2001, the defendant-appellant Austria filed 406
a motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated October 15, 2001 denying her 406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
petition for review.
Austria vs. Lichauco
In assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner avers that Evidently, petitioner utilized the appropriate remedies available to
her motion for new trial and appeal of the judgment by default are valid her. The fact, however, that she availed of the proper remedies does not
remedies under the Rules of Court. She insists that the appellate court by itself result in a judgment in her favor or the reversal of the assailed
erred in not reversing the declaration of default despite the fact that she order and decision of the trial court. As correctly ruled by the Court of
questioned the default order in the petition for review which she Appeals, petitioner was declared in default because of her adamant
seasonably filed with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner also contends that refusal to file an answer despite being required to do so.
it was error for the trial court to allow the sale of the entire property in The factual circumstances in the cases of Heirs of Akut v. Court of
dispute. Appeals and Ampeloquio v. Court of Appeals, cited by petitioner in
9 10
April 4, 2001, 356 SCRA 367; Tan v. Dumarpa, G.R. No. 138777, September 22, 2004, 438
A defendant declared in default has the following remedies: (a) a SCRA 659.
motion to set aside the order of default under Sec. 3(b), Rule 9 of the 9 No. L-45472, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 213.
Rules of Court; (b) a motion for new trial under Sec. 1(a), Rule 37 if the 10 G.R. No. 124243, June 15, 2000, 333 SCRA 465.
default was discovered after judgment but while appeal is still available;
408
(c) a petition for relief under Rule 38 if judgment has become final and
executory; and (d) an appeal from the judgment under Sec. 1, Rule 41 408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
even if Austria vs. Lichauco
_______________ was first filed in 1997 but is only now being finally laid to rest because of
several procedural stumbling blocks, including the elevation of the case to
6 Id., at pp. 121-128. this Court on the issue of the propriety of the trial court’s denial of
7 Id., at pp. 144-147.
petitioner’s motion to dismiss, hurled by petitioner one after the other.
407 Parenthetically, the appellate court initially issued a temporary
VOL. 520, APRIL 3, 2007 407 restraining order as an incident to the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner questioning the trial court’s order denying her motion to
Austria vs. Lichauco
dismiss but the restraining order was lifted after its 60-day validity. The 11
no petition to set aside the order of default has been resorted to.
8
availing of these remedies. After all, rules of procedure are intended to _______________
be, not tools of delay, but of prompt and just disposition of every party’s
Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot, G.R. No. 132518, 385 Phil. 720; 329 SCRA 78 (2000); Daffon
cause. Having fully availed of, even exploited, these remedies, petitioner
12
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129017, August 20, 2002, 387 SCRA 427.
cannot feign denial of her day in court. She has been given every 13Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot, supra.
opportunity to fully ventilate her side. 142 FERIA AND NOCHE, CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED 597 (2001 ed.).
Now, we turn to the second issue raised by petitioner, i.e., the validity
of the trial court’s decision alternatively directing the partition of the 410
subject properties or authorizing their sale to a third party. 410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
There are two stages in every action for partition. The first phase is Austria vs. Lichauco
the determination of whether a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition There is no question that a co-ownership exists between petitioner and
is proper, i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed, and may be made by respondents. To this extent, the trial court was correct in decreeing
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This partition in line with the Civil Code provision that no co-owner shall be
phase may end obliged to remain in the coownership. 15
_______________ However, the trial court went astray when it also authorized the sale
of the subject properties to a third party and the division of the proceeds
11 RULES OF COURT, Rule 58, Sec. 5.
thereof. What makes this portion of the decision all the more
409 objectionable is the fact that the trial court conditioned the sale upon the
VOL. 520, APRIL 3, 2007 409 price and terms acceptable to plaintiffs (respondents herein) only, and
adjudicated the proceeds of the sale again only to plaintiffs. The pertinent
Austria vs. Lichauco
portion of the trial court’s disposition states:
either: (a) with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a “WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is rendered in favor of plaintiff:
legally prohibited; or (b) with a determination that a co-ownership does in
truth exist, partition is proper in the premises, and an accounting of rents 1. 1)Directing the partition (physical division) of the subject properties and
and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is all improvements thereon among the co-owners in accordance with
in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, their respective shares; or
make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, 2. 2)Authorizing the sale, conveyance or transfer of the above-described
and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. 12 properties to a third-party at such price and under such terms
The second phase commences when it appears that the parties are acceptable to plaintiffs and thereafter, dividing the proceeds of
unable to agree upon the partition directed by the court. In that event, said sale among them in accordance with their proportionate
interests.” [Emphasis supplied.]
partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of
16
not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also
deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the It is true that petitioner did not assign this error on appeal resulting in
court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard the appellate court’s failure to rule on the matter. Nonetheless, we cannot
thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto simply brush this issue aside considering that its resolution is necessary
entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in in arriving at a just disposition of the case. The rectification of the trial
17
question. 13
court’s decision is accordingly in order.
_______________
The proceedings in this case have only reached the first phase. It must
be mentioned as an aside that even if the order decreeing partition leaves 15 CIVIL CODE, Art. 494.
something more to be done by the trial court for the complete disposition 16 Records, Vol. 2I, p. 454.
of the case, i.e., the appointment of commissioners, the proceedings for 17 Dumo v. Espinas, G.R. No. 141962, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 53.
the determination of just compensation by the appointed commissioners,
411
VOL. 520, APRIL 3, 2007 411
Austria vs. Lichauco
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated June 21, 2005 is REVERSED in so far as it
affirms the portion of the decision dated February 14, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142, which authorizes the
sale, conveyance or transfer of the properties subject of this case and the
division of the proceeds of said sale to respondents herein. The Decision
dated June 21, 2005 and Resolution dated October 7, 2005 are
AFFIRMED in all other respects. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio-Moralesand Velasco,
Jr., JJ., concur.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. respondent Lourdes Osmeña Vda. de Daffon allegedly admitted that the
land sought was the only property of the late Amado Daffon.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. In an Order dated July 22, 1994, the trial court denied the Motion to
Lawrence L. Fernandez for petitioner. Dismiss. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was also
4
Batiquin & Batiquin Law Office for private respondent. denied on September 23, 1994. 5
_______________
5 Ibid., p. 27.
Osmeña, and they bore six children, namely, Aileen, Joselito, Jr., Ana
Vanesa, Leila, Julius and Suzette. 431
Amado passed away on January 21, 1982. His son, Joselito, died on VOL. 387, AUGUST 20, 2002 431
October 25, 1990.
Vda. de Daffon vs. Court of Appeals
On January 21, 1994, respondents Lourdes Osmeña Vda. De Daffon,
On October 25, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
together with her six minor children, instituted an action for partition
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35536. On November 14,
against petitioner Concepcion Villamor Vda. de Daffon, which case was
1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision denying due
docketed as Civil Case No. DNA-281 of the
430 course and dismissing the petition for certiorari. Petitioner’s motion for
6
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED reconsideration was denied in the Resolution dated April 21, 1997. 7
There is no merit in the petition. The rules of procedure require that the complaint must make a concise statement
It should be stressed that in the determination of whether a complaint of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of
fails to state a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the
be properly considered. Moreover, a defendant who moves to dismiss the
9 statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action
complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits only when it has its three indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of
all the averments thereof. The test of sufficiency of the facts found in a the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of
the facts alleged the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the
accordance with the prayer thereof. The hypothetical admission extends plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. 14
to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if the allegations in the The allegations contained therein are sufficient to establish respondents’
complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be right to the estate of Amado Daffon. By stating their relationship to the
maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense deceased, they established their line of succession as the basis for their
that may be assessed by the defendants. 10
claim. Their rights to succeed as heirs were transmitted from the moment
In the case at bar, the complaint sufficiently alleged that “defendant of death of the decedent. 15
(i.e., petitioner herein) was married to Amado Quiros Daffon” and that Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the fact that she repudiated the
“they begot an only son in Joselito Daffon.” The complaint further alleged
11
co-ownership between her and respondents did not deprive the trial court
that “Joselito Daffon later got married to herein plaintiff Lourdes of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition. In a
Osmeña and before the former died on October 25, 1990 he sired the six complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a
(6) children who are now plaintiffs with their mother.” This, to our mind,
12
co-owner of the subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his
was sufficient allegation that Joselito Daffon was a legitimate son of the lawful shares. As the Court of Appeals correctly held, an action for
16
spouses Amado and Concepcion Daffon; and that plaintiffs partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
(i.e.,respondents herein) were likewise legitimate heirs of Joselito Daffon. segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties
Admitting the truth of these averments, there was, therefore, no need to involved. If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the property, the
inquire whether respondent minor children were duly acknowledged by action for partition
the deceased Amado Daffon. To be sure, the illegitimacy of the said _______________
children and the lack of acknowledgment are matters which petitioner
13 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8, Section 1.
14 Uy v. Hon. Evangelista, G.R. No. 140365, July 11, 2001, 361 SCRA 95. 20, 2002
15 Emnace v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126334, November 23, 2001, 370 SCRA 431.
16 Mallilin, Jr. v. Castillo, 333 SCRA 628, 640 (2000). Vda. de Daffon vs. Court of Appeals
434
property left to us by my father-in-law and his son
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED and his grandchildren. 19
whether or not these belonged to Amado Daffon and formed part of his
An action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for partition
estate is a matter best taken up during trial and after an evaluation of
which determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether partition is
proper; and, second, a decision confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the evidence to be presented by the contending parties.
the parties or the commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be. The Petitioner argues that the order which denied the Motion to Dismiss
first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the is an interlocutory order which is not appealable. Hence, it may be the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise subject of a special civil action for certiorari. However, for certiorari to lie,
legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties it must be convincingly proved that the lower court committed grave
interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is abuse of discretion, or an act too patent and gross as to amount to an
not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an enjoined or act in contemplation of law; or that the trial court exercised
adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the
its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from
the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they personal hostility. In the case at bar, the trial court did not commit grave
21
are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. Thus, the
conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. 18 Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
We are indeed distressed by the circumstances under which the
Petitioner insists that in her testimony given in Civil Case No. 56336, instant case reached this Court. Instead of filing an answer and meeting
respondent Lourdes Daffon admitted that the land in Mandaluyong was the issues head-on, petitioner and her counsel chose to elevate the
the only property left by the deceased Amado Daffon. The pertinent incident of the denial of the Motion to Dismiss to the higher courts. In
portion of her testimony runs this way: doing so, they effectively delayed the resolution of the case and the
Q And because of that incident being the surviving spouse of Joselito adjudication of the respective rights of the parties by the court below.
Daffon, how did it affect you personally and also your husband at that What makes this case more reprehensible is
_______________
time when he was still alive?
A She (sic) felt sad and she (sic) suffered mental torture, mental anxiety 19 Civil Case No. 56336; TSN, December 21, 1990, p. 19; Italics ours.
20 Complaint, par. IV, pp. 2-4; Record, pp. 28-30.
and numerous sleepless nights for that is the only 21 Lim v. Hon. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002, 380 SCRA 739.
_______________
436
17 Citing Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 165 SCRA 118, 125-126 (1988).
18 Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot, 329 SCRA 78, 89-90 (2000).
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Daffon vs. Court of Appeals
435 that petitioner abused the legal process to delay her own grand-children’s
VOL. 387, AUGUST 435 expectancy to share in the estate left by their father and grandfather. If
there is any merit in her claim of absolute ownership over the contested
properties, she could have just allowed the case to be fully tried, during
which she should have proved her case with competent proof. While
litigants may utilize all available means to defend themselves, the legal
strategies they employ should not amount to machinations which
frustrate and prejudice the rights of others. Moreover, frivolous appeals,
such as the one filed in this case, are not countenanced in this
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35536
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), On official leave.
shows that indeed the action has already prescribed, otherwise, the issue of In lieu of an Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
2
prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on following grounds:
the merits and cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss.—On the matter
of prescription cited by the petitioners as a ground for the dismissal of the
complaint, it is noteworthy that the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners did 1. 1.Failure to state a cause of action—plaintiff, though she claims
not ipso facto establish prescription. An allegation of prescription can effectively to be a daughter of Maximino who died sometime in 1946, failed
be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that to allege whether or not she is a legitimate child. Plaintiff’s
indeed the action has already prescribed; otherwise, the issue of prescription is failure to allege legitimacy is fatal considering the provision of
one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits and Article 992 of the Civil Code. To allow Plaintiff to inherit from
3
cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss. the estate of the spouses Eugenio and Maria Balo in
representation of her father Maximino Balo would be to permit
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. intestate succession by an illegitimate child from the legitimate
parent of his father, assuming that she is the child of Maximino
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Balo.
Ricardo M. Ribo for petitioners. 2. 2.The complaint does not show that the estate of the spouses
Enerio Sabulao for private respondent. Eugenio and Maria Balo have been settled and its obligations
have been paid.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: 3. 3.The properties enumerated in the Complaint were proceeded
against by way of execution to satisfy a judgment against
A complaint for Judicial Partition of Real Properties and Accounting with Eugenio and Maria Balo. Subsequently, defendant Ulpiano
Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 279, was filed by private respondent repurchased the said properties and has been, together with his
Josefina Garrido against petitioners Ulpiano Balo, Lydia Balo-Lumpas, children,
_______________ Balo vs. Court of Appeals
1Rollo, pp. 41-46.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC denied in
7
3Article 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestatofrom the legitimate Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
9
children or relatives of his father or mother. After the filing of Comment and other pleadings, the case was deemed
submitted for decision. In a resolution dated 16 April 1997, the Court of
232
Appeals denied due course to the petition and accordingly dismissed the
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
same. The Court of Appeals justified the dismissal in the following
Balo vs. Court of Appeals manner:
It is an established rule that an order denying a motion to dismiss is basically
1. openly, exclusively and adversely in possession of the real estate interlocutory in character and cannot be the proper subject of a petition for
properties in question. certiorari. When a motion to dismiss is denied, the proper procedure is to proceed
with the trial and if the decision be adverse to the movant, the remedy is to take
an appeal from said decision, assigning as one of the errors therefore the denial of
Private respondent filed her comment/opposition to the motion to the motion to dismiss. 10
dismiss. 4
In an Order dated 12 September 1996, the RTC denied the motion to Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of
11
“The complaint clearly states that the late Eugenio Balo, Sr., and Maria Pasagui for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
13
Balo had two (2) children, namely: Ulpiano, Sr. and Maximino. The plaintiff is the Petitioners cite the following grounds for the allowance of their
daughter of the late Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao; while the defendants petition, to wit:
are children of the late Ulpiano Balo, Sr. and Felicidad Superio. I
The complaint enumerates/annexes 13 tax declarations in the name of
Eugenio Balo, Sr. marked as Annexes “A” to “M.” The plaintiff as an heir prays
WHETHER OR NOT THE FAILURE TO ALLEGE THE NATURE AND EXTENT
that these parcels of land be partitioned in accordance with Article 982 of the
OF PLAINTIFF’S TITLE IN A PETITION FOR PARTITION IS FATAL TO ITS
Civil Code which states:
CAUSE OF ACTION.
“The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation, and if _______________
any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall
be divided among the latter in equal portions.” 7 Rollo, pp. 75-77.
8 Rollo, p. 78.
No evidence may be alleged or considered to test the sufficiency of the 9 CA-G.R. SP No. 42803; Rollo, p. 105.
complaint except the very facts pleaded therein. It would be improper to inject 10 Rollo, p. 24.
11 Rollo, p. 159.
into the allegation, facts not alleged and use them as basis for the decision on the 12 Rollo, p. 104.
The Court is not permitted to go beyond and outside of the allegations in the
complaint for data or facts. 234
Therefore, the allegation of illegitimacy and claim of absolute ownership are 234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
modifications and unreasonable inferences. If there is doubt to the truth of the
facts averred in the complaint, the Court does not dismiss the complaint but Balo vs. Court of Appeals
requires an answer and proceeds to hear the case on the merit.” 6
II
_______________
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION FOR JUDICIAL PARTITION AND
4 Rollo, p. 64. ACCOUNTING HAS PRESCRIBED, WAS WAIVED, OR WAS OTHERWISE
5 Rollo, pp. 72-74. ABANDONED. 14
233
VOL. 471, SEPTEMBER 30, 2005 233
At the threshold of the instant petition for review is the correctness of the The Court of Appeals having failed in this regard, it behooves upon this
appellate court’s dismissal of the petition for certiorari filed by the Court to discuss the merits of the petition to put to rest the issues raised
petitioners. by the petitioners.
In resolving to deny the petition, the Court of Appeals relied on the Contrary to petitioners’ contention, allegations sufficient to support a
long established jurisprudence that an order denying a motion to dismiss cause of action for partition may be found in private respondent’s
is interlocutory and cannot be the proper subject of a petition complaint. 17
for certiorari. Nothing is more settled than the rule that in a motion to dismiss for
The general rule regarding denial of a motion to dismiss as a basis of failure to state a cause of action, the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not
a resort to the extraordinary writ of certiorariis that: the veracity, of the material allega-
. . . [A]n order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither _______________
terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the
court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is Bank of America NT&SA v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120135, 31 March 2003, 400
16
that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil SCRA 156, 166.
action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction Ocampo v. Ocampo, et al., G.R. No. 150707, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 545.
17
in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations
_______________ of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts
alleged in the complaint.
14Rollo, p. 235. The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or
15Rimbunan Hijau Group of Companies v. Oriental Wood Processing Corporation, 23 not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the
September 2005, 470 SCRA 650. same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. (Garcon vs. Redemptorist
Fathers, 17 SCRA 341)
235 If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but
VOL. 471, SEPTEMBER 30, 2005 235 their veracity and correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to deny
the motion to dismiss and require the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove
Balo vs. Court of Appeals his defense. The veracity of the assertions of the parties can be ascertained at the
Specific instances whereby the rule admits certain exceptions are trial of the case on the merits. (Galeon vs. Galeon, 49 SCRA 516-521) 20
provided as follows:
. . . Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamusis considered Section 1, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
appropriate, i.e., (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of complaint needs only to allege the ultimate facts upon which private
jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; respondent bases her claim.
or (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an The rules of procedure require that the complaint must make a concise statement
appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of
patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiff’s baseless action and action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the
compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action
the court dockets by another futile case.16
only when it has its three indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
Applying the foregoing, the Court of Appeals should not have dismissed _______________
the petition outright as the same alleges grave abuse of discretion.
Instead, it should have proceeded to determine whether or not the trial 18 Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, 30 April 1971, 38 SCRA 587, cited in Dabuco v. Court of
237 is not a prerequisite before an action for partition may be filed. We said: 25
VOL. 471, SEPTEMBER 30, 2005 237 . . . In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to
Balo vs. Court of Appeals compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here
violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. For instance, if the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery
plaintiff had in this action impleaded all of the persons who would be necessary
of damages.
parties defendant to an action to compel acknowledgement, and had asked for
21
relief of that character, it would have been permissible for the court to make the
In her Complaint, the private respondent made the following assertions:
judicial pronouncement declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to be recognized as
. . . That the afore-described parcels of lands were originally owned by Eugenio
the natural child of Maximo Briz, and at the same time to grant the additional
Balo, Sr. and Ma. Pasagui-Balo, who are now both deceased and after their death,
relief sought in this case against the present defendants; that is, a decree
were inherited into two (2) equal shares by their two (2) children, namely:
compelling them to surrender to the plaintiff the parcel of land sued for and to
Ulpiano, Sr. and Maximino, both surnamed Balo, the later (sic) being already
pay her the damages awarded in the appealed decision.
dead.
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by
That plaintiff is the daughter of the late Maximino Balo and Salvacion
this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by
Sabulao, who after her father’s death, had inherited her father’s share of the _______________
inheritance.
That defendant Ulpiano Balo, Sr. aside from being the son of Eugenio Balo, 23 Rule 69, Section 1. Complaint in action for Partition of real estate. A person having the right to
Sr., is married to Felicidad Superio, and is the father of all the other defendants compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his Complaint the
in this case. nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is
demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property. Heirs of Bartolome
The defendants took possession of the above-described real properties Infante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77202, 22 June 1988, 162 SCRA 431.
immediately after the death of plaintiff’s grandfather Eugenio Balo, Sr. without 24 43 Phil. 763, 768-769 (1922).
25 Cited in Tayag v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95229, 09 June 1992, 209 SCRA 605.
her knowledge and consent.
That plaintiff is desirous that the above-described real properties be
partitioned between her and defendants. 239
That plaintiff has proposed to the defendants that the above-described real VOL. 471, SEPTEMBER 30, 2005 239
properties be amicably partitioned between them by mutual agreement in a very Balo vs. Court of Appeals
fair and practical division of the same, but said defendants refused and continue our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must
to do so without any justifiable cause or reason to accede to the partition of the be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel
said properties. 22
acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may
maintain partition (proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his
The foregoing allegations show substantial compliance with the formal coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil. 5; Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil. 62); and
and substantial requirements of a Complaint for the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of
_______________ his deceased natural father, or mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8 Phil. 135; Conde
vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). In neither of these
21 See Nadela v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 149627, 18 September 2003, 411 SCRA 315. situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree
22 Rollo, pp. 43-44.
compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and
238
distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are
before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED proceedings.
Balo vs. Court of Appeals
Partition as required under Section 1, Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil To further reiterate that in partition proceedings, dismissal prior to
Procedure. 23
answer is premature, this Court has held:
In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co- 27Penned by Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago with Associate Justices Jose C.
owner of the subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. Vitug and Alicia Austria-Martinez, concurring. G.R. No. 129017, 20 August 2002, 387 SCRA
As the Court of Appeals correctly held, an action for partition is at once an action 427.
National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129169, 17 November
for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
28
* SECOND DIVISION. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Walter S. Lawas for petitioner.
303 Almase, Suarez & Almase-Martinez Law Offices for respondent.
able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of 43758 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Danao
conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the City, Branch 25, in Civil Case No. SF-175.
parties.” In either case, whether the action is dismissed or partition and/or On December 6, 1972, private respondent Atty. Pacifico Pelaez filed a
accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be appealed by any party complaint against his granduncle, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., with the then
aggrieved thereby. The second stage commences when the parties are unable to Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, for the recovery of possession and
agree upon the partition ordered by the court. In that event, partition shall be
ownership of his one-half (1/2) undivided share of several parcels of land
covered by Tax Declaration (T.D.) Nos. 28199, 18197, 18193 and 28316; The private respondent further narrated that his granduncle executed
his undivided one-third (1/3) share in several other lots covered by T.D. an affidavit on November 28, 1961, stating that he was the sole heir of
4
Nos. 28304, 35090, 18228, 28310, 26308, 28714, 28311, 28312 and 28299 Dionisia when she died intestate on June 5, 1921, when, in fact, the latter
(all located in Danao, Cebu); and for the partition thereof among the co- was survived by her three sons, Santiago, Pedro and Vicente. Pedro
owners. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SF-175. Sepulveda, Sr.
The eleven (11) lots were among the twenty-five (25) parcels of land _______________
which the private respondent’s mother, Dulce Sepulveda, inherited from
TSN, 13 April 1992, p. 28.
her grandmother, Dionisia Sepulveda under the Project of
3
4 Records, p. 171.
Partition dated April 16, 1937 submitted by Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. as the
2
(retired), concurring. covered by T.D. No. 19804 (T.D. No. 35090) in favor of the City of Danao
2 Records, p. 12.
for P7,492.00. According to the private respondent, his granduncle
305 received this amount without his (private respondent’s) knowledge.
VOL. 450, JANUARY 31, 2005 305 The private respondent prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be
rendered in his favor, thus:
Sepulveda, Sr. vs. Pelaez ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
former’s estate, duly approved by the then CFI of Cebu in Special
Proceeding No. 778-0. Under the said deed, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. 1. 1.Declaring the plaintiff the absolute owner of ONE-HALF (1/2) portion
appeared to be the owner of an undivided portion of Lot No. 28199, while of the TWO (2) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of the
his brother and Dulce’s uncle Santiago Sepulveda, was the undivided complaint;
owner of one-half (1/2) of the parcels of land covered by T.D. Nos. 18197, 2. 2.Declaring the plaintiff the absolute owner of the ONE-THIRD (1/3)
18193 and 28316. Dulce and her uncles, Pedro and Santiago, were portion of the NINE (9) parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of the
likewise indicated therein as the co-owners of the eleven other parcels of complaint;
land, each with an undivided one-third (1/3) share thereof. 3. 3.Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the latter’s ONE-
In his complaint, the private respondent alleged that his mother THIRD (1/3) share of the SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
NINETY-TWO PESOS (P7,492.00) representing the purchase price of
Dulce died intestate on March 2, 1944, and aside from himself, was
the parcel of land described in paragraph 3(a) of the complaint with
survived by her husband Rodolfo Pelaez and her mother Carlota interest thereon until the amount is fully paid;
Sepulveda. Dulce’s grandfather Vicente Sepulveda died intestate on
October 25, 1920, and Dulce was then only about four years old.
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
3
307 Dulce’s share in the eleven parcels of land. The court likewise declared
VOL. 450, JANUARY 31, 2005 307 therein that Dulce, through her grandchildren and her mother, Carlota,
had already received her share of the estate from Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. as
Sepulveda, Sr. vs. Pelaez early as January 10, 1938.
According to the petitioner, Dulce and Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. had a
1. 2.Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff exemplary damages the verbal agreement wherein the eleven parcels of land covered by the
amount of which is left to the discretion of this Honorable Court; complaint would serve as the latter’s compensation for his services as
2. 3.Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the latter’s share of administrator of Dionisia’s estate. Thus, upon the termination of Special
the fruits of the ELEVEN (11) parcels of land subject-matter of this
Proceeding No. 778-0, and subsequent to the distribution of the shares of
complaint, the value of which will be proven during the trial;
3. 4.Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff actual litigation expenses, Dionisia’s heirs, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. then became the sole owner of
the value of which will be proven during the trial; Dulce’s shares.
4. 5.Ordering the defendant to pay attorney’s fee in the amount of The petitioner likewise adduced evidence that Santiago Sepulveda
TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00); died intestate and was survived by his wife, Paz Velez Sepulveda and
5. 6.Granting to the plaintiff such other reliefs and remedies as he may be their then minor children. It was pointed out that the private respondent
10
in favor of Danao City, but averred that the latter failed to pay the purposes since the beginning of 1948. It was likewise alleged that the
12
purchase price thereof; besides, the private respondent had no right to eleven (11) parcels of land deeded to Dulce under the Project of Partition
share in the proceeds of the said sale. He likewise denied having received had been declared for taxation purposes under the name of Pedro
any demand for the delivery of Dulce’s share of the subject properties Sepulveda since
from the latter’s mother Carlota, or from the private respondent. _______________
During the trial, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. died intestate. A petition for
Id., at p. 12.
the settlement of his estate was filed on May 8, 1975 with the RTC of
8
9 Exhibit “1”.
Cebu, docketed as Special Proceeding No. SF-37. His daughter, petitioner 10 TSN, 11 November 1994, p. 7.
Socorro Sepulveda Lawas, was appointed administratrix of his estate in 11 Exhibit “L-3”.
July 1976. In compliance with the decision of this Court in Lawas v. 12 TSN, 18 November 1994, pp. 10-11.
Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. L-45809and promulgated on
7
309
December 12, 1986, the deceased was substituted by the petitioner.
To prove the delivery of Dulce’s share under the project of partition, VOL. 450, JANUARY 31, 2005 309
the petitioner presented the Affidavit of Consolida- Sepulveda, Sr. vs. Pelaez
_______________ 1974, and that he and his heirs paid the realty taxes thereon. 13
7 Id., at p. 331.
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
308 plaintiff and against the defendant by declaring that the plaintiff is legally and
rightfully entitled to the one half (1/2) portion of the two (2) parcels of land
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED described in paragraph 2 of the Complaint and to the one third (1/3) portion of the
Sepulveda, Sr. vs. Pelaez nine (9) parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint as co-owner
tion she executed in October 1940 covering thirteen (13) of the twenty- thereof, and ordering the partition and segregation of the said one half (1/2)
five (25) parcels of land which were deeded to her under the Project of portion of the said two (2) parcels of land and of the said one third (1/3) portion of
the nine (9) parcels of land, and in the partition thereof, the mechanics of 4. 4.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL
partition outlined in Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court must be followed AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND A SHARE IN THE
(Magallon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282); ordering the defendant Socorro Lawas, as RENTS AND PROFITS OF THE ELEVEN (11) PARCELS TO
administratrix of the Estate of Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., to deliver to plaintiff the
HEREIN RESPONDENT.
latter’s one third (1/3) share of the P7,492.00 representing the purchase price of
5. 5.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
the parcel of land sold to Danao City with interest of twelve
[per] centum (12%) per annum (Reformina vs. Tomol, 139 SCRA 260) from the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT ATTORNEY’S
date of filing of the Complaint until the amount due to plaintiff is fully paid, to FEES ARE TO BE AWARDED AND EVEN INCREASING THE
pay attorney’s fees to plaintiff’s attorney in the sum of P10,000.00, and to pay the AMOUNT THEREOF. 16
1. 1.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE INCORRECT entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of
APPLICATION OF ART. 494 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND IN legitime to each of the legitimate children who has not received any
UPHOLDING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT’S FINDING betterment. The rights of the usufructuary are provided in Articles 471 to
THAT A TRUST RELATIONSHIP WAS CREATED BETWEEN 490 of the old Civil Code. In Gamis v. Court of Appeals, we held that:
18 19
Under articles 807 and 834 of the old Civil Code the surviving spouse is a forced
HEREIN RESPONDENT AND PEDRO SEPULVEDA, [SR.].
heir and entitled to a share in usufruct in the
2. 2.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE _______________
LAWS ON PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES TO THE FACTS AS
PROVEN IN THE CASE AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENT. 17 Art. 834. A widower or widow who, on the death of his or her spouse, is not divorced, or should be
so by the fault of the deceased, shall be entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by
3. 3.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE way of legitime to each of the legitimate children or descendants who has not received any betterment.
FINDING OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 25 If only one legitimate child or descendant survives, the widower or widow shall have the usufruct of
the third available for betterment, such child or descendant to have the naked ownership until, on the
IN DANAO CITY THAT PAYMENT WAS MADE BY DANAO death of the surviving spouse, the whole title is merged in him.
CITY FOR ONE (1) OF THE ELEVEN (11) PARCELS If the spouses should be separated by a suit for divorce, the result of the suit shall be awaited.
INVOLVED IN THE CASE AND OF WHICH HEREIN If there should have been a pardon or a reconciliation between the divorced spouses, the survivor
shall preserve his or her rights.
RESPONDENT SHOULD BE PAID BY PETITIONER ONE 18 Now Articles 566 to 582 of the New Civil Code.
of Appeals: 22
314
The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned 314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a
partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be made Sepulveda, Sr. vs. Pelaez
by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.—Parties in interest without
may whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as
_______________ plaintiffs or defendants.
20 Salvador v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 239 (1995). Indeed, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua
Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals, 387 SCRA 427 (2002).
non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an
21
indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be
313 dismissed. Thus, the plaintiff is mandated to implead all the
VOL. 450, JANUARY 31, 2005 313 indispensable parties, considering that the absence of one such party
Sepulveda, Sr. vs. Pelaez renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition either authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
because a co-ownership does not exist or a partition is legally prohibited. It may present. One who is not a party to a case is not bound by any decision of
24
also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in the court, otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due process.
truth exist, that partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of Without the presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court
rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in could not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of the private
respondent. The failure of the private respondent to implead the other
heirs as parties-plaintiffs constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court
and the appellate court’s exercise of judicial power over the said case, and
rendered any orders or judgments rendered therein a nullity. 25
_______________
24See Borlasa v. Polistico, 47 Phil. 345 (1925); People, et al. v. Hon. Rodriguez, et al., 106
Phil. 325 (1959); Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975); Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals, 93 SCRA 238 (1979); Alabang Development Corporation v. Valenzuela, 116 SCRA
261 (1982); Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 20 (1997); Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 287(1998).
25Lozano v. Ballesteros, 195 SCRA 681 (1991).
26Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, supra.
27Ibid.
315
VOL. 450, JANUARY 31, 2005 315
Borbajo vs. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43758 and of the
Regional Trial Court are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is
ORDERED to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions; Quieting of Title; Partition of an estate Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The fact that a deed of extrajudicial
may not be ordered in an action for quieting of title.—The trial court may not, settlement was not notarized is immaterial where the heir questioning it admits
therefore, order partition of an estate in an action for quieting of title. As there is having executed it.—The deed of extrajudicial settlement executed by Mauricia
and Laurencia evidence their intention to partition the property. It delineates Alejandrino vs. Court of Appeals
what portion of the the decision is final; and (4) the two actions involve identical parties, subject
539
matter and causes of action. The fourth element is not present in this case. The
parties are not identical because petitioner was not impleaded in Civil Case No.
VOL. 295, SEPTEMBER 17, 1998 5 CEB-7028. While the subject matter may be the same property of the Alejandrino
39 spouses, the causes of action are different. Civil Case No. CEB-7028 is an action
Alejandrino vs. Court of Appeals for quieting of title and damages while Civil Case No. CEB-11673 is for
redemption and recovery of properties.
property belongs to each other. That it was not notarized is immaterial in
view of Mauricia’s admission that she did execute the deed of extrajudicial
Same; Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; A charge of forum shopping may not
settlement. Neither is the fact that the trial court only mentioned the existence of
be anchored simply on the fact that the counsel for different plaintiffs in two cases
such document in its decision in Civil Case No. CEB-7028. That document was
is one and the same.—It appears moreover, that private respondent’s argument
formally offered in evidence and the court is deemed to have duly considered it in
on forum shopping is anchored on the fact that counsel for both plaintiffs in those
deciding the case. The court has in its favor the presumption of regularity of the
two cases is one and the same, thereby implying that the same counsel merely
performance of its task that has not been rebutted by petitioner Mauricia.
wanted to prevail in the second case after having failed to do so in the first. The
records show, however, that Laurencia executed an affidavit consenting to the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where two co-heirs acquired the
appearance of her counsel in any case that petitioner Mauricia might file against
shares of their co-heirs, only the two need to participate in the extrajudicial
private respondent. She affirmed in that affidavit that she could be included even
settlement of estate.—Neither may the fact that the other heirs of the Alejandrino
as a defendant in any case that petitioner Mauricia would file because she “fully
spouses, named Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco and Abundio did not participate in
agree(d)” with whatever cause of action Mauricia would have against private
the extrajudicial settlement of estate affect its validity. In her amended complaint
respondent. Such a statement can hardly constitute a proper basis for a finding of
in Civil Case No. CEB-11673, petitioner Mauricia herself admitted having
forum shopping, much less evidence of misconduct on the part of counsel. As
acquired by purchase the rights over the shares of her brothers.
noted earlier, the two cases have different causes of action and the two plaintiffs
Courts; Judgments; A court may issue an order clarifying its decision that who would have conflicting claims under the facts of the case actually presented a
had become final and executory in order that the execution thereof will not be united stand against private respondent. If there is any charge that could be
rendered futile.—The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in issuing leveled against counsel, it is his lack of thoroughness in pursuing the action for
the order for the segregation of the property. In so doing, it was merely quieting of title. As counsel for plaintiff therein, he could have impleaded
reiterating the partition of the property by petitioner Mauricia and her sister petitioner Mauricia knowing fully well her interest in the property involved in
Laurencia that was embodied in the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate. order to avoid multiplicity of suits. However, such an omission is not a sufficient
The order may likewise be deemed as a clarification of its decision that had ground for administrative sanction.
become final and executory. Such clarification was needed lest proper execution of
the decision be rendered futile. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Pleadings and Practice; Res The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Judicata; Elements; Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia Sitoy, Go & Associates for petitioner.
are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in Reuben B. Baldoza for private respondent.
the other.—The Court finds no merit in the issue of forum shopping raised by 541
private respondent. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
VOL. 295, SEPTEMBER 17, 1998 541
judicata in the other. Because the judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-7028 is Alejandrino vs. Court of Appeals
already final and executory, the existence of res judicata is determinative of
whether or not petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. For the principle of res ROMERO, J.:
judicata to apply, the following must be present: (1) a decision on the merits; (2)
by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3)
540
Questioned in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision of the 1
Court of Appeals which ruled that the trial court, in an action for quieting
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED of title, did not act in excess of jurisdiction when it issued an order for the
segregation of property, after the finality of its decision.
40
The facts show that the late spouses Jacinto Alejandrino and Enrica 2. 2.Pay the defendant the amount of P15,000.00 as litigation and
Labunos left their six children named Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco, necessary expenses; the sum of P10,000.00 as reimbursement for
Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio a 219-square-meter lot in Mambaling, attorney’s fees; the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages and
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
Cebu City identified as Lot No. 2798 and covered by Transfer Certificate
3. 3.Plus costs.
of Title No. 19658. Upon the demise of the Alejandrino spouses, the
property should have been divided among their children with each child
SO ORDERED.”
having a share of 36.50 square meters. However, the estate of the
3
Alejandrino spouses was not settled in accordance with the procedure Laurencia appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals under CA-G.R.
outlined in the Rules of Court. CV No. 33433 but later withdrew the same. On April 13, 1992, the Court
4
Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased 12.17 of Appeals considered the appeal withdrawn in accordance with Rule 50
square meters of Gregorio’s share, 36.50 square meters of Ciriaco’s share of the Rules of Court. 5
and 12.17 square meters of Abundio’s share thereby giving her a total Meanwhile, herein petitioner Mauricia Alejandrino filed on May 5,
area of 97.43 square meters, including her own share of 36.50 square me- 1992 before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch VII, a
ters. It turned out, however, that a third party named Licerio Nique, the complaint for redemption and recovery of properties with damages
private respondent in this case, also purchased portions of the property, against private respondent Nique that was docketed as Civil Case No.
to wit: 36.50 square meters from Laurencia, 36.50 square meters from CEB-11673. Adelino B. Sitoy,
Gregorio “through Laurencia,” 12.17 square meters from Abundio also _______________
“through Laurencia” and 36.50 square meters from Marcelino or a total
area of 121.67 square meters of the Alejandrino property. 2 3 Ibid., p. 25.
However, Laurencia (the alleged seller of most of the 121.67 square 4 Ibid., p. 50.
Ibid., p. 51.
meters of the property) later questioned the sale in an action for quieting
5
of title and damages against private respondent Nique. It was docketed 543
as Civil Case No. VOL. 295, SEPTEMBER 17, 1998 543
_______________
Alejandrino vs. Court of Appeals
1 Penned by Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez and concurred in by Laurencia’s counsel in Civil Case No. CEB-7038, filed Civil Case No.
Associate Justices Santiago M. Kapunan and Alfredo L. Benipayo. CEB-11673 for petitioner Mauricia.
2 Rollo, pp. 54-55.
The amended complaint in the latter case dated May 17, 1992 alleged
542 that private respondent Nique never notified petitioner Mauricia of the
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED purchase of 121.67 square meters of the undivided Lot No. 2798 nor did
he give petitioner Mauricia the preemptive right to buy the area as a co-
Alejandrino vs. Court of Appeals
owner of the same lot. As such co-owner, petitioner Mauricia manifested
CEB-7038 in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 9, presided her willingness to deposit with the court the amount of P29,777.78, the
by Judge Benigno G. Gaviola. In due course, the lower court rendered a acquisition cost of the portion purchased by private respondent Nique.
decision on November 27, 1990 disposing of the case as follows: Petitioner Mauricia also alleged that she demanded from private
“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of defendant and
respondent the area of around 24.34 square meters that the latter had
against plaintiff, dismissing the complaint filed by plaintiff against defendant,
and on the Counterclaim and prayer of defendant in its Answer, the Court hereby “unduly, baselessly and maliciously claimed as his own but which, as part
declares defendant as the owner in fee simple of the share of plaintiff Laurencia of Lot No. 2798, actually belongs to her.” The amended complaint prayed
Alejandrino and the shares of Marcelino, Gregorio and Abundio, all surnamed that petitioner Mauricia be allowed to redeem the area of 121.67 square
Alejandrino, of the parcel of land known as Lot No. 2798 and covered by Transfer meters under the redemption price of P29,777.78 and that private
Certificate of Title No. 19658 which 4 shares totals an area of 146 square meters respondent Nique be ordered to execute the necessary documents for the
more or less; and the Court further Orders plaintiff to: redemption and the eventual transfer of certificate of title to her. The
amended complaint further prayed for the return to petitioner Mauricia
1. 1.Vacate the premises subject of the complaint and surrender the of the 24.34-square-meter portion of the lot and for damages amounting
property to defendant to the extent of the 4 shares aforementioned; to P115,000 and attorney’s fees of P30,000.
On August 2, 1993, the lower court granted the motion to admit the the property while the 73 square meters of Maurecia (sic) Alejandrino
amended complaint and forthwith ordered the defendant therein to file shall be at the back portion, then, the Court cannot see its way clear,
an amended answer. why the 146 sq. meters share of defendant may not be segregated.
5. 5.The contention by oppositor that the ‘segregation of defendant’s share
In Civil Case No. CEB-7038 in the meantime, private respondent filed
of 146 sq. meters from Lot No. 2798 was not
a motion for the segregation of the 146-square-meter portion of the
property that had been declared by the trial court as his own by virtue of
545
purchase. On May 6, 1993, the trial court issued an order the pertinent
portions of which read as follows: VOL. 295, SEPTEMBER 17, 1998 545
“O R D E R Alejandrino vs. Court of Appeals
For resolution is a ‘Motion to Order Segregation of 146 Square Meters In Lot No. 1. decreed in the judgment’ is a rather narrow way of looking at the
2798’ dated January 15, 1993 filed by defendant and the ‘Opposition’ thereto judgment. Paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion of the judgment by
dated February 2, 1992 by plaintiff. this Court, Orders plaintiff to ‘vacate the premises subject of the
complaint and surrender the property to defendant to the extent of the
544
4 shares aforementioned.’ The 4 shares of Laurencia Alejandrino of 146
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED sq. meters can be segregated because Laurencia and Maurecia had
Alejandrino vs. Court of Appeals already executed an extrajudicial partition indicating where their
Movant-defendant also filed a rejoinder dated February 15, 1993 to the respective shares shall be located (Exh. ‘16’). To deny the segregation is
Opposition. to make the decision of this Court just about valueless is not altogether
After going over the allegations in the motion, the opposition thereto and the useless. The matter of allowing the segregation should be read into the
rejoinder as well as the records of the case, particularly the decision rendered by decision.
this Court and the Order dated October 28, 1992, denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by plaintiffs and allowing the issuance of a writ of execution, The bottomline is still that plaintiff Laurencia, despite the fact that the
the Court is inclined to Grant the instant motion. decision of this Court had long become final; and despite the fact that she even
xxx xxx xxx xxx withdraw (sic) her appeal, she still is enjoying the fruits of the property to the
In addition thereto, the Court makes the following observation: exclusion of the rightful owner.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby Grants the motion. The defendant Licerio
1. 1.Plaintiff (oppositor) has a total share of 146 square meters. This is Nique may proceed to segregate his 2146 (sic) sq. meters from Lot No. 2798
admitted by her in her complaint (par. 4 thereof). In the decision covered by TCT No. 19658, by having the same surveyed by a competent Geodetic
rendered by this Court, this share now belongs to defendant movant by Engineer, at the expense of movant-defendant.
way of sale. The decision of this Court has long become final. SO ORDERED.” 6
2. 2.The total area of the land is 219 sq. meters (par. 2 of complaint), thus,
the share of Mauricia Alejandrino is only 73 square meters. Petitioner Mauricia questioned this order of the lower court in a petition
3. 3.As early as June 10, 1983, Mauricia Alejandrino and Laurencia for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
Alejandrino had entered into an ‘Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate’ preliminary injunction filed before the Court of Appeals. In due course,
whereby they agreed to divide the land subject of this case with the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in a Decision promulgated on
Laurencia Alejandrino owning 146 square meters in the frontage and August 25, 1993.
Mauricia Alejandrino owning 75 square meters in the back portion The Court of Appeals stated that, in issuing the questioned order of
(Exh. ‘16,’ Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, par. 1) (italics supplied), May 6, 1993, the respondent court was merely performing its job of seeing
and that the parties assure each other and their successor in interest
to it that “execution of a final judgment must conform to that decreed in
that a right of way of two meters is granted to each party by the other
permanently (Exh. ‘16,’ par. 2). This partition is signed by the parties
the dispositive part of the decision.” It ratiocinated thus:
“x x x. In ordering the segregation of the 146 square meters, respondent Judge
and their witnesses. Although not notarized, it is certainly valid as
between the parties, Maurecia (sic) Alejandrino, being an immediate correctly referred to the text of the decision to
_______________
party, may not renege on this.
4. 4.Since the share of defendant Licerio P. Nique is specifically known to 6 Ibid., pp. 11-12, 25-27.
be 146 square meters, and that its location shall be on the ‘frontage’ of
546 did not act in excess of its jurisdiction. Hence, writs of certiorari and prohibition
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED do not lie in this case.” 7
Alejandrino vs. Court of Appeals Petitioner Mauricia filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Court of
ascertain which portion of the land covered by TCT No. 19658 was actually sold
Appeals’ decision. However, on February 15, 1994, the Court of Appeals
by Laurencia Alejandrino (sister of herein petitioner Mauricia) to private
denied the same for lack of merit “there being no new ground or
respondent Nique. The respondent Judge did not err in relying upon Exhibit ‘16,’
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, dated June 10, 1983, mentioned in page 3 of compelling reason that justifies a reconsideration” of its Decision. 8
the Decision. Pertinent portion of Exhibit ‘16’ reads: In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails the
‘NOW, THEREFORE, the above-named parties-heirs hereby stipulates (sic), declare and decision of the Court of Appeals, contending that the lower court acted
agree as follows: beyond its jurisdiction in ordering the segregation of the property bought
by private respondent as the same was not decreed in its judgment,
1. ‘1.That the parties have agreed to divide the parcel of land with Laurencia which had long become final and executory. Petitioner argues
Alejandrino owning 146 square meters in the frontageand Mauricia Alejandrino
73 square meters in the back portions;
that partition of the property cannot be effected because private
2. ‘2.That the parties mutually and reciprocally assure each other and their respondent is also a defendant in Civil Case No. CEB-11673. She asserts
successor of interest (sic) that a right of way of two meters is granted to each that Exhibit 16, the extrajudicial settlement of estate referred to in the
party to the other perma-nently.’ (italics supplied, Annex ‘1,’ Comment, p. 65, questioned order of the lower court, was not discussed in the decision of
Rollo)
the lower court and even if it were, she could not be bound thereby
considering that she was not a party litigant in Civil Case No. CEB-7038.
duly signed by herein petitioner and witnessed by private respondent Nique. She questions the validity of the deed of extrajudicial settlement because
It readily reveals that when Laurencia subsequently sold her shares to herein
it was not notarized or published.
private respondent, per the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 29, 1986 (Exhs.
‘B’ and ‘10’), the parties must have referred to the 146 square meters in the In his comment on the petition, private respondent alleges that
frontage described in said document, Exhibit ‘16.’ Laurencia had no authority to although petitioner was not a party litigant in Civil Case No. CEB-7038,
sell more, or, less, than that agreed upon in the extrajudicial settlement between she is estopped from questioning the decision in that case and filing the
her and herein petitioner Mauricia. Insofar as the latter is concerned, she is instant petition because she had “knowledge of the existence of said case”
estopped from claiming that said extrajudicial settlement was a fatally defective where res judicata had set in. He adds that the instant petition was filed
instrument because it was not notarized nor published. What is important is that in violation of Circular No. 28-91 on forum shopping “in that the
private respondent personally knew about Laurencia and Mauricia’s agreement _______________
because he was a witness to said agreement and he relied upon it when he
purchased the 146 square meters from Laurencia. 7 CA Decision, pp. 5-7.
It cannot be validly claimed by petitioner that she was deprived of her 8 Rollo, p. 32.
property without due process of law considering that private respondent is merely
segregating the portion of the land actually sold to him by Laurencia Alejandrino 548
and it does not affect the 73 square meters that properly pertain to petitioner. 548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled that where there is ambiguity caused
Alejandrino vs. Court of Appeals
by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of a decision the court may
clarify such ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment had become Petitioner in the instant petition whose counsel is also the counsel of
final, and for this purpose it may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties, the plaintiff-appellant Laurencia Alejandrino in CA-G.R. CV No. x x x, had
filed a civil action—Civil Case No. CEB-11673 x x x for ‘REDEMPTION &
547 RECOVERY OF PROPERTIES WITH DAMAGES,’ which is presently
VOL. 295, SEPTEMBER 17, 1998 547 pending before Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.” He
Alejandrino vs. Court of Appeals asserts that the lower court did not exceed its jurisdiction and/or commit
court’s finding of facts and conclusions of law as expressed in the body of the grave abuse of discretion in granting his motion for segregation of the 146
decision (Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., et al. versus Intermediate square meters of the land involved that rightfully belonged to him in
Appellate Court, et al., 152 SCRA 309). The assailed order, in effect, clarifies the accordance with the decision of the lower court. He charges counsel for
exact location of the 146 square meters pursuant to Exhibit ‘16.’ Respondent court petitioner with exhibiting “unethical conduct and practice” in appearing
as counsel for petitioner in Civil Case No. CEB-11673 after he had
appeared for complainant Laurencia in CA-G.R. CV No. 33433 or Civil In the instant case, Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling
Case No. CEB-7038. Under the circumstances of this case, the ultimate her pro indiviso share in Lot No. 2798. However, because the property
issue that needs determination is whether or not as an heir of the had not yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no
Alejandrino property, Laurencia may validly sell specific portions thereof particular portion of the property could be identified as yet and
to a third party. delineated as the object of the sale. Thus, interpreting Article 493 of the
Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or Civil Code providing that an alienation of a co-owned property “shall be
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in limited to the portion which may be allotted to (the seller) in the division
common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the upon the termination of the co-ownership,” the Court said:
deceased. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or _______________
right belongs to different persons. Each co-owner of property which is
9
The Estate of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 590, 603 (1996).
held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may
11
use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not 550
injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that 550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be
determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co- Alejandrino vs. Court of Appeals
participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to “x x x (p)ursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate his pro-
indiviso share in the co-owned property even without the consent of the other co-
his use and enjoyment of the same. 10
_______________
owners. Nevertheless, as a mere part owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the
other co-owners. The prohibition is premised on the elementary rule that ‘no one
9 Art. 484, Civil Code.
can give what he does not have’ (Nemo dat quod non habet). Thus, we held
10 Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76351, October 29, 1993, 227 SCRA 472, 480. in BailonCasilao vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA
738, 745), viz.:
549 ‘x x x since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by
one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only
VOL. 295, SEPTEMBER 17, 1998 549 the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
Alejandrino vs. Court of Appeals property.
‘The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted
as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law 11
the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common
allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate property of the co-owners who possessed and administered it.’ ” 12
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within The trial court may not, therefore, order partition of an estate in an
the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by action for quieting of title. As there is no pending
the vendor.” _______________
14 A public document is “any instrument authorized by a notary public or a competent public official, The deed of extrajudicial settlement executed by Mauricia and Laurencia
with the solemnity required by law” (MORENO, PHILIPPINE LAW DICTIONARY, 3rd ed., p. 763 evidence their intention to partition the property. It delineates what
citing Cacnio v. Baens, 5 Phil. 742 (1906).
portion of the property belongs to each other. That it was not notarized is
552 immaterial in view of Mauricia’s admission that she did execute the deed
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED of extrajudicial settlement. Neither is the fact that the trial court only
mentioned the existence of such document in its decision in Civil Case
Alejandrino vs. Court of Appeals
No. CEB-7028. That document was formally offered in evidence and the
partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or
court is deemed to have duly considered it in deciding the case. The court
any other transaction.”
16
respondent Nique. The sale was made after the execution of the deed of _______________
extrajudicial settlement of the estate that private respondent himself
First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 280, 306 (1996)
witnessed. The extrajudicial settlement of estate having constituted a
17
Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. The question is This is in response to your letter, dated 20 June 1991, which I received
whether in an action for partition filed against her and her husband, who on 3 July 1991. Please address all communications to my lawyer, Atty.
is also her attorney, summons intended for her may be served on her Alfredo D. Valmonte, whose address, telephone and fax numbers appear
husband, who has a law office in the Philippines. The Regional Trial below.
Court of Manila, Branch 48, said no and refused to declare Lourdes A. c/o Prime Marine
Valmonte in default, but the Court of Appeals said yes. Hence this Gedisco Center, Unit 304
petition for review on certiorari. 1564 A. Mabini, Ermita
The facts of the case are as follows: Metro Manila
Petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte are 97
husband and wife. They are both residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive South
VOL. 252, JANUARY 22, 1996 97
Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a
member of the Philippine bar, however, practices his profession in the Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals
Philippines, commuting for this purpose between his residence in the Telephone: 521-1736
state of Fax: 521-2095
96
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Service of summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte,
who at the time, was at his office in Manila. Petitioner Alfredo D.
Valmonte accepted the summons, insofar as he was concerned, but appearance, she would nonetheless now insist that the same husband would
refused to accept the summons for his wife, Lourdes A. Valmonte, on the nonetheless had absolutely no authority to receive summons on her behalf. In
ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. effect, she is asserting that representation by her lawyer (who is also her
husband) as far as the Paco property controversy is concerned, should only be
Accordingly the process server left without leaving a copy of the summons
made by him when such representation would be favorable to her but not
and complaint for petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte.
otherwise. It would obviously be inequitable for this Court to allow private
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with respondent Lourdes A. Valmonte to hold that her husband has the authority to
Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her represent her when an advantage is to be obtained by her and to deny such
Answer. For this reason private respondent moved to declare her in authority when it would turn out to be her disadvantage. If this be allowed, Our
default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in Rules of Court, instead of being an instrument to promote justice would be made
behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondent’s motion. use of to thwart or frustrate the same.
In its Order dated July 3, 1992, the trial court, denied private ....
respondent’s motion to declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. Turning to another point, it would not do for Us to overlook the fact that the
disputed summons was served not upon just an ordinary lawyer of private
A motion for reconsideration was similarly denied on September 23, 1992.
respondent Lourdes A. Valmonte, but upon her lawyer husband. But that is not
Whereupon, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
all, the same lawyer/husband happens to be also her co-defendant in the instant
and mandamus with the Court of Appeals. case which involves real property which, according to her lawyer/husband/co-
On December 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision defendant, belongs to the conjugal partnership of the defendants (the spouses
granting the petition and declaring Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. A Valmonte). It is highly inconceivable and certainly it would be contrary to human
copy of the appellate court’s decision was received by petitioner Alfredo D. nature for the lawyer/husband/co-defendant to keep to himself the fact that they
Valmonte on January 15, 1993 at his Manila office and on January 21, (the spouses Valmonte) had been sued with regard to a property which
1993 in Seattle, Washington. Hence, this petition.
99
The issue at bar is whether in light of the facts set forth above,
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with summons. In VOL. 252, JANUARY 22, 1996 99
holding that she had been, the Court of Appeals stated: 1 Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals
______________ he claims to be conjugal. Parenthetically, there is nothing in the records of the
case before Us regarding any manifestation by private respondent Lourdes A.
Per Serafin Guingona, J., with whom Santiago Kapunan (now member of the Supreme
1
Valmonte about her lack of knowledge about the case instituted against her and
Court) and Oscar Herrera, JJ. concurred. her lawyer/husband/co-defendant by her sister Rosita. . . .
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and
98
mandamus is given due course. This Court hereby Resolves to nullify the orders
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED of the court a quo dated July 3, 1992 and September 23, 1992 and further declares
Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals private respondent Lourdes Arreola Valmonte as having been properly served
[I]n her above-quoted reply, Mrs. Valmonte clearly and unequivocally directed the with summons.
aforementioned counsel of Dimalanta to address all communications (evidently
referring to her controversy with her sister Mrs. Dimalanta over the Paco Petitioners assail the aforequoted decision, alleging that the Court of
property, now the subject of the instant case) to her lawyer who happens also to Appeals erred (1) in refusing to apply the provisions of Rule 14, §17 of the
be her husband. Such directive was made without any qualification just as was Revised Rules of Court and applying instead Rule 14, §8 when the fact is
her choice/designation of her husband Atty. Valmonte as her lawyer likewise that petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident defendant; and (2)
made without any qualification or reservation. Any disclaimer therefore on the because even if Rule 14, §8 is the applicable provision, there was no valid
part of Atty. Valmonte as to his being his wife’s attorney (at least with regard to substituted service as there was no strict compliance with the
the dispute vis-a-vis (sic) the Paco property) would appear to be feeble or trifling, requirement by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with
if not incredible.
petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte. Private respondent, upon the other hand,
This view is bolstered by Atty. Valmonte’s subsequent alleged special
appearance made on behalf of his wife. Whereas Mrs. Valmonte had manifestly
asserts that petitioners are invoking a technicality and that strict
authorized her husband to serve as her lawyer relative to her dispute with her adherence to the rules would only result in a useless ceremony.
sister over the Paco property and to receive all communications regarding the We hold that there was no valid service of process on Lourdes A.
same and subsequently to appear on her behalf by way of a so-called special Valmonte.
To provide perspective, it will be helpful to determine first the nature VOL. 252, JANUARY 22, 1996 101
of the action filed against petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals
Valmonte by private respondent, whether it is an action in personam, in
jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is not
rem or quasi in rem. This is because the rules of service of summons
found in the country, summons may be served exterritorially in
embodied in Rule 14 apply according to whether an action is one or the
accordance with Rule 14, §17, which provides:
other of these actions.
§17. Extraterritorial service.—When the defendant does not reside and is not
In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is found in the Philippines and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff
not possible and he cannot be personally served, sub- or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which
100 the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from
Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within
the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines
stituted service, as provided in Rule 14, §§7-8 is essential for the
2
[An action quasi in rem is] an action which while not strictly speaking an action
101
in rem partakes of that nature and is substantially such. . . . The action quasi in
rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an file her Answer which, according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject (60) days after notice. It must be noted that the period to file an Answer
his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All in an action against a resident defendant differs from the period given in
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the
an action filed against a nonresident defendant who is not found in the
property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of
Philippines. In the former, the period is fifteen (15) days from service of
remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these
proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. summons, while in the latter, it is at least sixty (60) days from notice.
Strict compliance with these requirements alone can assure
As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in observance of due process. That is why in one case, although the Court
9
the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with considered publication in the Philippines of the summons (against the
Rule 14, §17. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be contention that it should be made in the foreign state where defendant
made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of was residing) sufficient,
general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may ______________
order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should
8 E.g.., De Midgely v. Ferrandos, 64 SCRA 23 (1975).
be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or 9 Sahagun v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 44 (1991). Compare the strict observance of
(3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient. rule required for substituted service under Rule 14, §8 in Keister vs. Navarro, 77 SCRA 215
Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner (1977).
Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two
104
modes, the question is whether the service on her attorney, petitioner
Alfredo D. Valmonte, can be justified under the third mode, namely, “in 104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
any . . . manner the court may deem sufficient.” Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals
We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the first two, must be nonetheless the service was considered insufficient because no copy of the
made outside the Philippines, such as through the summons was sent to the last known correct address in the Philippines.
______________ Private respondent cites the ruling in De Leon v. Hontanosas, 67
SCRA 458, 462-463 (1975), in which it was held that service of summons
37 Phil. 921, 928 (1918). See also Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186, 192 (1939).
upon the defendant’s husband was binding on her. But the ruling in that
7
103 case is justified because summons were served upon defendant’s husband
VOL. 252, JANUARY 22, 1996 103 in their conjugal home in Cebu City and the wife was only temporarily
absent, having gone to Dumaguete City for a vacation. The action was for
Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals collection of a sum of money. In accordance with Rule 14, §8, substituted
Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the defendant service could be made on any person of sufficient discretion in the
resides. Moreover, there are several reasons why the service of summons
8
dwelling place of the defendant, and certainly defendant’s husband, who
on Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte cannot be considered a valid service of was there, was competent to receive the summons on her behalf. In any
summons on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte. In the first place, service of event, it appears that defendant in that case submitted to the jurisdiction
summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court by instructing her husband to move for the dissolution of the
of the court as required by Rule 14, §17 and certainly was not a mode writ of attachment issued in that case.
deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the On the other hand, in the case of Gemperle v. Schenker, it was held 10
service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. that service on the wife of a nonresident defendant was found sufficient
Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer. because the defendant had appointed his wife as his attorney-in-fact. It
In the second place, service in the attempted manner on petitioner was held that although defendant Paul Schenker was a Swiss citizen and
was not made upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule resident of Switzerland, service of summons upon his wife Helen
14, §17. As provided in §19, such leave must be applied for by motion in Schenker who was in the Philippines was sufficient because she was her
writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his husband’s representative and attorney-in-fact in a civil case, which he
behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application. had earlier filed against William Gemperle. In fact Gemperle’s action was
Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting for damages arising from allegedly derogatory statements contained in
such leave, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not given ample time to
the complaint filed in the first case. As this Court said, “[i]n other words, Eugenio vs. Drilon
Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued, on behalf of Notes.—A party voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial
her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent him in suits court when he files a petition for relief from judgment. (Palma vs. Court
filed against him, particularly in a case, like the one at bar, which is a of Appeals, 232 SCRA 714[1994])
consequence of the It is elementary that a party may sue or defend an action by himself.
______________
(Estoya vs. Singson, 237 SCRA 1 [1994])
10 125 Phil. 458 (1967).
105
VOL. 252, JANUARY 22, 1996 105
Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals
action brought by her on his behalf.” Indeed, if instead of filing an
11
11 Id. at 47.
106
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
G.R. No. 177703. January 28, 2008. *
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever
owns the property or constituted the family home. (Emphasis supplied.) The
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA,
purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following
petitioners, vs. JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA, respondent.
the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the physical
symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the following restrictions on
Civil Procedure; Contempt; Requirements for Initiating an Indirect
its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a period of
Contempt Proceeding; Filing of a verified petition that has complied with the
10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
requirements for the filing of initiatory pleading, is mandatory.—Under the
family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein;
aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the requirements for initiating an
and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid
indirect contempt proceeding are a) that it be initiated by way of a verified
periods unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason
petition and b) that it should fully comply with the requirements for filing
has been alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to
initiatory pleadings for civil actions. In Regalado v. Go, 514 SCRA 616 (2007), we
order the partition of the family home, either by physical segregation or
held: As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado, the filing of a verified petition
assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale as suggested by the
that has complied with the requirements for the filing of initiatory
parties.
pleading, is mandatory x x x.
Same; Same; Same; Article 159 imposes the proscription against the
Civil Law; Family Code; Family Home; One significant innovation
immediate partition of the family home regardless of its
introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family home 668
from the time of its occupation as a family residence without need anymore for the
judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court.—One significant innovation
introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family home 68
from the time of its occupation as a family residence, without Arriola vs. Arriola
_______________
ownership.—Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate
* THIRD DIVISION.
partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even
if the family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or
667 has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family
home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by
VOL. 542, JANUARY 28, 2008 66 the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot
subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family
7 home.
Arriola vs. Arriola
need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Court of Appeals.
Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family
home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as
the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted
Oliver O. Lozano for petitioners.
as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they Nelson A. Clemente for respondent.
began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Same; Same; Same; It being settled that the subject house (and the subject
lot on which it stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of
shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code.—It the Rules of Court, assailing the November 30, 2006 Decision and April 1
being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the
30, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93570.
2
family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate
The relevant facts are culled from the records.
partition under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz.: Article 159. The family home
shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action No. 03-
of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor 0010 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Piñas City (RTC)
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola (petitioners) for
judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola (the decedent 8 Rollo, p. 20.
Fidel). Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria
670
C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel with his
second wife, petitioner Vilma. 670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________ Arriola vs. Arriola
The RTC denied the motion in an Order dated August 30, 2005, for the
9
1 Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid with the concurrence of Associate reason that petitioners were justified in refusing to have the subject
Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Mariflor P. Punzalan-Castillo; Rollo, p. 96.
2 Id., at p. 115. house included in the auction, thus:
“The defendants [petitioners] are correct in holding that the house or
669 improvement erected on the property should not be included in the auction sale.
VOL. 542, JANUARY 28, 2008 669 A cursory reading of the aforementioned Decision and of the evidence adduced
during the ex-parte hearing clearly show that nothing was mentioned about the
Arriola vs. Arriola house existing on the land subject matter of the case. In fact, even plaintiff’s
On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive [respondent’s] initiatory Complaint likewise did not mention anything about the
portion of which reads: house. Undoubtedly therefore, the Court did not include the house in its
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered: adjudication of the subject land because it was plaintiff himself who failed to
allege the same. It is a well-settled rule that the court can not give a relief to that
1. 1.Ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer which is not alleged and prayed for in the complaint.
Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S. To hold, as plaintiff argued, that the house is considered accessory to the land
Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola on which it is built is in effect to add to plaintiff’s [a] right which has never been
and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each considered or passed upon during the trial on the merits.
without prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if In the absence of any other declaration, obvious or otherwise, only the land
any; should be partitioned in accordance to [sic] the aforementioned Decision as the
2. 2.Attorney’s fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) house can not be said to have been necessarily adjudicated therein. Thus, plaintiff
PESOS is hereby awarded to be reimbursed by the defendants to the can not be declared as a co-owner of the same house without evidence thereof and
plaintiff; due hearing thereon.
3. 3.Costs against the defendants. The Decision of the Court having attained its finality, as correctly pointed out,
judgment must stand even at the risk that it might be erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of
SO ORDERED.” 3
Court filed by plaintiff is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.” 10
As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land The RTC, in its Order dated January 3, 2006, denied respondent’s Motion
covered by TCT No. 383714 (subject land), respondent sought its sale for Reconsideration. 11
sale was scheduled on May 31, 2003 but it had to be reset when 9 Supra note 5.
Rollo, pp. 34-35.
petitioners refused to include in the auction the house (subject house)
10
11 Id., at p. 49.
standing on the subject land. This prompted respondent to file with the
7
4 CA Decision, id., at p. 98. have the RTC Orders set aside, and prayed that he be allowed to proceed
5 See RTC Order dated August 30, 2005, id., at p. 33. with the auction of the subject land including the subject house.
Id.
In its November 30, 2006 Decision, the CA granted the Petition
6
7 Id.
for Certiorari, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders dated August 30, “As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado, the filing of averified petition that
2005 and January 3, 2006 issued by the RTC, in Civil Case No. SCA 03-0010, are has complied with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleading, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the sheriff is ordered to proceed with the mandatory x x x:
public auction sale of the subject lot covered by TCT No. 383714, including This new provision clarifies with a regularity norm the proper procedure for commencing
the house constructed thereon. contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as special civil action
SO ORDERED.” (Emphasis supplied.)
13
under the former Rules, the heterogenous practice tolerated by the courts, has been for any
party to file a motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefore and without
complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same second paragraph of this amended section.
in its Resolution of April 30, 2007.
14
xxxx
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the CA erred in Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by order of
holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified
petition with full compliance with the requirements therefore and shall be disposed in
motion for contempt of court. accordance with the second paragraph of this section.
The assailed CA Decision and Resolution must be modified for reasons
other than those advanced by petitioners. _______________
The contempt proceeding initiated by respondent was one for indirect
contempt. Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court prescribes the 15 G.R. No. 167988, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 616.
procedure for the institution of proceedings for indirect contempt, viz.: 673
“Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced.—Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by VOL. 542, JANUARY 28, 2008 673
an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why Arriola vs. Arriola
he should not be punished for contempt. xxxx
Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which the
_______________ court already acquired jurisdiction, the rules direct that the petition for contempt
be treated independently of the principal action. Consequently, the necessary
12 Rollo, p. 51. prerequisites for the filing of initiatory pleadings, such as the filing of a verified
13 Id., at p. 105. petition, attachment of a certification on non-forum shopping, and the payment of
14 Id., at p. 115. the necessary docket fees, must be faithfullyobserved.
672 xxxx
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The provisions of the Rules are worded in very clear and categorical language.
In case where the indirect contempt charge is not initiated by the courts, the
Arriola vs. Arriola filing of a verified petition which fulfills the requirements on initiatory pleadings
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall becommenced by a is a prerequisite. Beyond question now is the mandatory requirement of a verified
verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of petition in initiating an indirect contempt proceeding. Truly, prior to the
documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the amendment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, mere motion without complying
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court with the requirements for initiatory pleadings was tolerated by the courts. At the
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal onset of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, such practice can no
action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but longer be countenanced.” (Emphasis ours.)
16
said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in
its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal The RTC erred in taking jurisdiction over the indirect contempt
action for joint hearing and decision.” (Emphases supplied.) proceeding initiated by respondent. The latter did not comply with any of
the mandatory requirements of Section 4, Rule 71. He filed a mere
Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the requirements for Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, and not a
initiating an indirect contempt proceeding are a) that it be initiated by verified petition. He likewise did not conform with the requirements for
way of a verified petition and b) that it should fully comply with the the filing of initiatory pleadings such as the submission of a certification
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions. In Regalado against forum shopping and the payment of docket fees. Thus, his
v. Go, we held:
15
674 themselves implicitly recognized the inclusion of the subject house in the
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED partition of the subject land when they proposed in their letter of August
5, 2004, the following swappingarrangement:
Arriola vs. Arriola Sir:
It is noted though that, while at first the RTC overlooked the infirmities
in respondent’s unverified motion for contempt, in the end, it dismissed Thank you very much for accommodating us even if we are only poor and simple
the motion, albeit on substantive grounds. The trouble is that, in the CA people. We are very much pleased with the decision of Presiding Judge Manuel B.
decision assailed herein, the appellate court committed the same Fernandez, Jr., RTC Br. 254, Las Piñas, on the sharing of one-third (1/3) each of a
oversight by delving into the merits of respondent’s unverified motion land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) in Las Piñas
and granting the relief sought therein. Thus, strictly speaking, the proper City.
However, to preserve the sanctity of our house which is our residence for more
disposition of the present petition ought to be the reversal of the CA
than twenty (20) years, we wish to request that the 1/3 share of John Nabor C.
decision and the dismissal of respondent’s unverified motion for contempt Arriola be paid by the defendants depending on the choice of the plaintiff between
filed in the RTC for being in contravention of Section 4, Rule 71. item (1) or item (2), detailed as follows:
However, such simplistic disposition will not put an end to the dispute (1) Swap with a 500-square meters [sic] lot located at Baras Rizal x x x.
between the parties. A seed of litigation has already been sown that will (2) Cash of P205,700.00 x x x.
likely sprout into another case between them at a later time. We refer to x x x x.” 22
citing Articles 440, 445 and 446 of the Civil Code, the CA held that as the
18 19 20
21 CA Decision, Rollo, p. 100.
deceased owned the subject land, he also owned the subject 22 Rollo, pp. 102-103.
_______________
676
17 Supra note 5. 676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
18 Article 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything
which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or Arriola vs. Arriola
artificially. It is true that the existence of the subject house was not specifically
Article 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the
alleged in the complaint for partition. Such omission notwithstanding,
19
improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land, subject to the
provisions of the following articles. the subject house is deemed part of the judgment of partition for two
20 Article 446. All works, sowing and planting are presumed made by the owner and at compelling reasons.
his expense, unless the contrary is proved. First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil
675
Code, the subject house is deemed part of the subject land. The Court
quotes with approval the ruling of the CA, to wit:
VOL. 542, JANUARY 28, 2008 675 “The RTC, in the assailed Order dated August 30, 2005 ratiocinated that since the
Arriola vs. Arriola house constructed on the subject lot was not alleged in the complaint and its
house which is a mere accessory to the land. Both properties form part of ownership was not passed upon during the trial on the merits, the court cannot
the estate of the deceased and are held in coownership by his heirs, the include the house in its adjudication of the subject lot. The court further stated
parties herein. Hence, the CA concludes that any decision in the action that it cannot give a relief to [sic] which is not alleged and prayed for in the
complaint.
We are not persuaded. _______________
To follow the foregoing reasoning of the RTC will in effect render meaningless
the pertinent rule on accession. In general, the right to accession is automatic Generosa v. Pangan-Valera, G.R. No. 166521, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 620, 628.
25
(ipso jure), requiring no prior act on the part of the owner or the Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-
26
principal. So that even if the improvements including the house were owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned.
not alleged in the complaint for partition, they are deemed included in
Bravo-Guerrero v. Bravo, G.R. No. 152658, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 244, 266; De Guia
27
the lot on which they stand, following the principle of accession. v. Court of Appeals, 459 Phil. 447, 464; 413 SCRA 114(2003).
Consequently, the lot subject of judicial partition in this case includes Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot, 385 Phil. 720, 730; 329 SCRA 78, 89 (2000).
28
the house which is permanently attached thereto, otherwise, it would be Supra note 24.
29
absurd to divide the principal, i.e., the lot, without dividing the house Petition, Rollo, p. 6.
30
678
Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house was 678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
built by the deceased. Petitioners never controverted such claim. There is
24
Arriola vs. Arriola
then no dispute that the subject house is part of the estate of the
house is a family home within the contemplation of the provisions of The
deceased; as such, it is owned
_______________
Family Code, particularly:
“Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or
by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their
23 CA Decision, Rollo, p. 104.
24 Motion for Reconsideration, id., at p. 36; Petition for Certiorari, id., at p. 51. family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on ahouse and lot
677 from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its
VOL. 542, JANUARY 28, 2008 677 constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
Arriola vs. Arriola attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed
in common by the latter’s heirs, the parties herein, any one of whom, 25 by law.” (Emphasis supplied.)
under Article 494 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the
26
and therefore susceptible of partition among them. It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it
Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is
by the RTC is an entirely different matter, depending on the exact nature shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family
of the subject house. Code, viz.:
_______________
Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel
on his exclusive property. Petitioners add that said house has been their
29
31 Spouses Versola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164740, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 385,
residence for 20 years. Taken together, these averments on record
30
392.
establish that the subject
679 and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction.
VOL. 542, JANUARY 28, 2008 679 Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of the subject house
Arriola vs. Arriola although for a different reason.
“Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for subject house is part of the judgment of coownership and partition. The
as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same evidence also establishes that the subject house and the portion of
same unless the courtfinds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall the subject land on which it is standing have been constituted as the
apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family family home of decedent Fidel and his heirs. Consequently, its actual and
home.” (Emphasis supplied.) immediate partition cannot be sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10
years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013.
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit
It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle
following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home
to the immediate public auction of the portion of the subject land covered
as the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the
by TCT No. 383714, which falls outside the specific area of the family
following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot
home.
extrajudicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November
or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for a longer
30, 2006 Decision and April 30, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second,
are MODIFIED in that the house standing on the land covered by
that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 is DECLARED part of the co-
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason
ownership of the parties John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and
has been alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling
Anthony Ronald G. Arriola but EXEMPTED from partition by public
reason to order the partition of the family home, either by physical
auction
segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale as _______________
suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the 32 RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 26.
immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This 33 G.R. No. 166333, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 280.
signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the co-
681
ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact
alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much VOL. 542, JANUARY 28, 2008 681
less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the Arriola vs. Arriola
individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the within the period provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code.
rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home. No costs.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home—consisting of the SO ORDERED.
subject house and lot on which it stands—cannot be partitioned at this Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Corona, Nachuraand Reyes, JJ.,
**
time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties concur.
herein. Decedent Fidel
680 Petition partly granted, judgment and resolution modified.
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Note.—Respondents are liable for indirect contempt when they
Arriola vs. Arriola openly disobeyed the Court’s decision. (Province of Camarines Norte vs.
Province of Quezon, 367 SCRA 91[2001])
died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10 years from said date or until March
32
exception from execution or forced sale under Article 153 should be set up
G.R. No. 149313. January 22, 2008. *
transfer or alienate after partition. In a contract of sale of co-owned property,
what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor
JULITA ROMBAUA PANGANIBAN, PAQUITO ROMBAUA, RUPERTO
had as co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-
ROMBAUA, TERESITA ROMBAUA TELAJE and LEONOR ROMBAUA
owner.
OPIANA, petitioners, vs. JULITA S. OAMIL, respondent.
Same; Partition; Jurisdictions; A court trying an ordinary civil suit has no
Co-Ownership; During the existence of the co-ownership, no individual can jurisdiction to act as a partition court—trial courts trying an ordinary action
claim title to any definite portion of the community property until the partition cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because the latter
thereof, and, prior to the partition, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract are subject to specific prescribed rules.—The court in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 is
quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.—Under a co-ownership, not a partition court but one litigating an ordinary civil case, and all evidence of
the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. During alleged acts of ownership by one co-owner should have been presented in the
the existence of the co-ownership, no individual can claim title to any definite partition case, there to be threshed out in order that the partition court may
portion of the community property until the partition thereof; and prior to the arrive at a just division of the property owned in common; it is not for the trial
partition, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate court in the specific performance case to properly appreciate. Being a court trying
share in the entire land or thing. Before partition in a co-ownership, every co- an ordinary civil suit, the court in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 had no jurisdiction to
owner has the absolute ownership of his undivided interest in the common act as a partition court. Trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to
property. The co-owner is free to alienate, assign or mortgage this undivided perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject to specific
interest, except as to purely personal rights. The effect of any such transfer is prescribed rules.
limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of the
property. Judgments; Principle of Conclusiveness of Judgments; Words and
Phrases; The principle of conclusiveness of judgments states that a fact or question
Civil Law; Co-Ownership; Under Article 497 of the Civil Code, in the event of which was in issue in a former suit and was there
a division or partition of property owned in common, assignees of one or more of 168
the co-owners may take part in the division of the thing owned in common and
object to its being effected without their concurrence.—Under Article 497 of the 1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Civil Code, in
_______________ 68
Panganiban vs. Oamil
* THIRD DIVISION.
judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
167 is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action
and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 16 any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any
other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of
7 action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority.—The trial
Panganiban vs. Oamil court and the Court of Appeals, by disregarding the final and executory judgment
the event of a division or partition of property owned in common, assignees in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86, certainly ignored the principle of
of one or more of the co-owners may take part in the division of the thing owned conclusiveness of judgments, which states that—[A] fact or question which was in
in common and object to its being effected without their concurrence. But they issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a
cannot impugn any partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as
case it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to prevent it, far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned
without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its validity. and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their
privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either
Same; Sales; In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by
obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can
and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner.—The be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same
decision in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86, which is an action for judicial parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular
partition of the subject property, determines what Partenio, and ultimately, point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on
respondent, as his successor-in-interest, is entitled to in Civil Case No. 140-0-93. the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment
As Partenio’s successor-in-interest to the property, respondent could not acquire between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the
any superior right in the property than what Partenio is entitled to or could second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit
(Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is 3 Docketed as Civil Case No. 140-0-93, Regional Trial Court Branch 73 of Olongapo City.
not required but merely identity of issues. The ruling in Special Civil Action No. 4 Juliana died in 1976.
340-0-86—that the Canda St. portion shall go to Partenio—became the law of the
case and continues to be binding between the parties as well as their successors- 170
in-interest, the decision in said case having become final and executory. Hence, 170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be relitigated Panganiban vs. Oamil
anew in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 since said issue had been resolved and finally
There are two portions of the subject property in contention: one
laid to rest in the partition case, by conclusiveness of judgment, if not by the
principle of res judicata. It may not be reversed, modified or altered in any consisting of 204.5 square meters facing 21st Street (the 21st St. portion),
manner by any court. and another consisting of 204.5 square meters facing Canda Street (the
Canda St. portion). Petitioners and their father Partenio are
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the acknowledged co-owners of the subject property to the following extent:
Court of Appeals. one-half to Partenio as his conjugal share, and one-sixth each of the
remaining half to petitioners and Partenio as the surviving heirs of
169 Juliana.
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 169 For failure to file an answer, Partenio was declared in default, and
respondent presented her evidence ex parte.
Panganiban vs. Oamil
On December 26, 1993, the trial court promulgated its Decision, the 5
to Sell” consists of 204.5 square meters of land located at #11 21st St.,
East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City, and is claimed by respondent Oamil to _______________
be Partenio’s conjugal share in a parcel of commercial land (the subject
Rollo, pp. 40-46. Penned by Judge Alicia L. Santos.
property) with an aggregate area of 409 square meters acquired by
5
6 Id., at p. 46.
Partenio and his deceased first wife Juliana during their marriage.
4
_______________ 171
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 171
1Rollo, pp. 22-36. Penned by Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino and concurred in by
Associate Justices Delilah VidallonMagtolis and Josefina Guevara-Salonga. Panganiban vs. Oamil
2Id., at pp. 38-39.
Note that the trial court did not specify which portion of the property— the enumeration under Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
the 21st St. portion or the Canda St. portion—should be deeded to Petitioners opposed the motion.
respondent as buyer of Partenio’s conjugal share. In an Order dated January 13, 1995, the trial court denied the
Partenio failed to appeal, and the decision became final and executory petition for relief because the decision in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 had
on February 4, 1994. Entry of judgment was made on February 8, 1994, become final and executory. It held that only indispensable parties to the
and a writ of execution was issued on February 15, 1994 and served upon case may participate in the proceedings thereof, and since petitioners
Partenio on February 21, 1994. The writ was served as well upon the City may not be considered as indispensable parties because the subject
Assessor of Olongapo City, who caused the transfer of the Tax matter of the proceedings involves Partenio’s conjugal share in the
Declaration covering the 21st St. portion in respondent’s name. property, they are precluded from filing a petition for relief from the
In June 1994, petitioners filed a verified petition for relief from the court’s judgment.
decision of the trial court, grounded on the following: 1) that Partenio’s Petitioners moved for reconsideration insisting that they are
conjugal share in the property, and that of petitioners as well, are being indispensable parties in Civil Case No. 140-0-93because as co-owners of
litigated in a judicial partition proceeding (the partition case) which is
7 the subject property by virtue of succession to the rights of their deceased
pending with the mother, they possess an interest
_______________ _______________
7 Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86 for judicial partition, entitled “Paquito Rombaua, et 1. manner that the conjugal share of the defendant Partenio Rombaua will
al. vs. Partenio Rombaua” was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch be that portion presently occupied by him and where the carinderia is
75. erected, with CANDA ST. as the frontage;
The decision dated July 31, 1990 (Rollo, pp. 49-56) in said case annuls the deed of 2. 4.The one storey building with a floor area of 101 square meters and as described
extrajudicial partition and settlement entered into between the plaintiffs (herein in the complaint to be divided, pro indiviso, in the proportion as indicated above;
petitioners) and their father Partenio, declares spouses Partenio and Juliana Rombaua and
conjugal owners of the subject property (the whole 409 square meters at No. 11, 21st Street, 3. 5.The income on the building by way of rentals to be divided likewise in such
East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City), and orders the partition thereof between the plaintiff proportion as indicated above. (Emphasis supplied)
heirs and their surviving father Partenio in the following manner:
173
1. 1.One half of the lot pertains to defendant Partenio Rombaua as his share in the
conjugal assets or a portion with an area of 204.5 square meters; VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 173
2. 2.One half of the lot with an area of 204.5 square meters to be owned pro Panganiban vs. Oamil
indiviso by the defendant Partenio Rombaua and the plaintiffs Paquito
Rombaua, Leonor R. Opiana, Ruperto Rombaua, Julita R. Panganiban and
that must be protected. Instead of resolving the motion, the trial court,
Teresita R. Terlaje at 1/6 share each; with the concurrence of the petitioners and the respondent, deferred the
3. 3.To physically divide the lot in accordance with the sketch Exhibit “E” proceedings, to await the result of a pending appeal with the Court of
prepared by the parties, in such a Appeals of the decision in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86, the partition8
case, where the trial court, in its decision, awarded specifically the Canda
172 St. portion to Partenio as his conjugal share.
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED In the meantime, or sometime in 1995, a Motion for leave of court to
Panganiban vs. Oamil file a Complaint in Intervention was filed by Sotero Gan (Gan), who
Court of Appeals, hence the trial court may not yet render a decision claims to be the actual and rightful owner of Partenio’s conjugal share.
disposing of a definite area of the subject property in respondent’s favor; Gan claims to have purchased Partenio’s conjugal share in the property,
and, (2) that petitioners were unjustly deprived of the opportunity to and in return, the latter on November 29, 1990 executed a deed of waiver
protect and defend their interest in court because, notwithstanding that and quitclaim of his possessory rights. Gan likewise claims that the tax
they are indispensable parties to the case (being co-owners of the subject declaration covering the portion of the property had been transferred in
property), they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. 140-0-93. his name. He thus seeks the dismissal of Civil Case No. 140-0-93 and the
In lieu of a hearing, the parties were directed to submit their reinstatement of his name on the tax declaration which by then had been
respective position papers. Respondent, meanwhile, moved to dismiss the placed in respondent’s name.
petition, claiming that the stated grounds for relief are not included in The parties submitted their respective oppositions to Gan’s motion,
the core of their argument being that with the finality of the decision in
the case, intervention was no longer proper, and that Gan’s cause of acknowledged their father Partenio’s “acts of ownership” over the 21st St.
action, if any, should be litigated in a separate proceeding. portion, thus signifying their consent and thereby barring them from
The trial court, in an Order dated January 22, 1996, denied Gan’s questioning the award.
motion for intervention for being filed out of time, considering that the _______________
decision of the court had become final and executory in February 1994.
Rollo, pp. 58-68.
Gan moved for reconsideration which was opposed by respondent, citing,
9
10 See footnote 7.
among others, an
_______________ 175
8 See footnote 7. The appeal with the Court of Appeals was docketed therein as CA-G.R.
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 175
CV No. 34420. Proceedings in said appeal have since been terminated with the entry of Panganiban vs. Oamil
judgment, on May 29, 1995, of the appellate court’s Decision dated March 31, 1995, which Respondents moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
affirmed in totothe trial court’s decision declaring that Partenio was entitled to the front
portion of the subject property, specifically that portion facing Canda St. Petitioners are now before us via the present petition, raising the sole
issue of whether petitioners can intervene in the proceedings in Civil
174 Case No. 140-0-93 in order to protect their rights as co-owners of the
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED subject property. We resolve to GRANT the petition.
Panganiban vs. Oamil Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right
Order dated April 18, 1994 issued by the Department of Environment belongs to different persons. During the existence of the co-ownership, no
and Natural Resources (CENRO of Olongapo) which includes a finding individual can claim title to any definite portion of the community
that Gan had transferred his rights and interest in the subject property property until the partition thereof; and prior to the partition, all that the
to one Chua Young Bing. co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the
In another Order dated October 23, 1997, the trial court denied Gan’s
9
entire land or thing. Before partition in a co-ownership, every co-owner
11
motion for reconsideration, as well as the petitioners’ motion for has the absolute ownership of his undivided interest in the common
reconsideration of the January 13, 1995 order denying the petition for property. The co-owner is free to alienate, assign or mortgage this
relief. In said order, the court made reference to the decision in Special undivided interest, except as to purely personal rights. The effect of any
Civil Action No. 3400-86, which by then had become final and such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon
executory. The trial court likewise substantially modified its Decision
10
the partition of the property. 12
dated December 26, 1993, by awarding specifically the 21st St. portion of Under Article 497 of the Civil Code, in the event of a division or
the property to Partenio as his conjugal share, despite the partition of property owned in common, assignees of one or more of the
pronouncement in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86 which awards the co-owners may take part in the division of the thing owned in common
Canda St. portion to him. and object to its being effected without their concurrence. But they cannot
From the foregoing October 23, 1997 order, the petitioners and Gan impugn any partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in
interposed their separate appeals to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, case
_______________
respondent filed a motion for execution pending appeal, which was denied
on the ground that there exist no special or compelling reasons to allow it. 11City of Mandaluyong v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 137152, January 29, 2001, 350 SCRA 487,
On March 2, 2001, the appellate court rendered the herein assailed 499; Article 493 of the Civil Code provides that:
Decision, which affirmed in toto the appealed October 23, 1997 Order of Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
the trial court.
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But
The appellate court sustained the trial court’s ruling that Partenio’s the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the coowners shall be limited to
conjugal share in the subject property consists of the 21st St. portion, the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-
thereby disregarding the prior final and executory decision in Special ownership.
Id., at p. 500.
Civil Action No. 340-0-86 which declares that Partenio is entitled to the
12
Canda St. portion. The appellate court based the award of the 21st St. 176
portion to respondent on the ground that petitioners have always 176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Panganiban vs. Oamil should put an end to the co-ownership between Partenio and the
it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to prevent it, respondents, and the award made to each co-owner of specific portions of
without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its the property as their share in the co-ownership should be respected.
validity. Since the issue of each of the co-owners’ specific portion in the
The decision in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86, which is an action aggregate property has been laid to rest in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-
for judicial partition of the subject property, determines what Partenio, 86, the final and executory decision in said proceeding should be
and ultimately, respondent, as his successor-in-interest, is entitled to conclusive on the issue of which specific portion of the property became
in Civil Case No. 140-0-93. As Partenio’s successor-in-interest to the the subject matter of the sale between Partenio and the respondent; that
property, respondent could not acquire any superior right in the property is, that Partenio, as declared owner of the Canda St. portion, could have
than what Partenio is entitled to or could transfer or alienate after transferred to respondent only that part of the property and not the 21st
partition. In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee St. portion. Although Partenio was free to sell or transfer his undivided
obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as interest to the respondent, the effect of such transfer is limited to the
co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co- portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of the property.
owner. 13
It was likewise error for the appellate court to have considered the
As early as May 17, 1990, when respondent and Partenio executed the alleged acts of ownership exercised upon the 21st St. portion by Partenio
“Agreement to Sell,” the former knew that the property she was as weighing heavily against the decreed partition in Special Civil Action
purchasing was conjugal property owned in common by Partenio and the No. 340-0-86. The determination of this issue is beyond the ambit of the
heirs of his deceased wife. And while Civil Case No. 140-0-93 (the specific
14
trial court in Civil Case No. 140-0-93. As far as it was concerned, it could
performance case) was pending, respondent was apprised of the pendency only award to the respondent, if proper, whatever specific portion
of Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86 (the partition case). Yet, respondent Partenio is found to be entitled to in the event of a partition, in
did not intervene, nor did she take part, nor enter any formal accordance with Article 493 of the Civil Code and the procedure outlined
opposition—as assignee of Partenio’s conjugal share in the property—in in the Rules of Court. It could not, in an ordi-
178
said partition proceedings. She did not exercise the rights granted her
under Article 497 of the Civil Code. Instead, when the court in Civil Case 178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
No. 140-0-93 decided to suspend the proceedings and hold the same in Panganiban vs. Oamil
abeyance while the appeal in Special Civil Action No. 340-086 remained nary proceeding for specific performance with damages, subject the
unresolved, the respondent unconditionally agreed to its temporary property to a partial division or partition without the knowledge and
abatement. In other words, she chose to sit back and await the resolution participation of the other co-owners, and while a special civil action for
thereof. partition was simultaneously pending in another court.
_______________ The court in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 is not a partition court but one
litigating an ordinary civil case, and all evidence of alleged acts of
Del Campo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108228, February 1, 2001, 351 SCRA 1, 8.
ownership by one co-owner should have been presented in the partition
13
14 Rollo, p. 60.
case, there to be threshed out in order that the partition court may arrive
177 at a just division of the property owned in common; it is not for the trial
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 177 court in the specific performance case to properly appreciate. Being a
Panganiban vs. Oamil court trying an ordinary civil suit, the court in Civil Case No. 140-0-
93 had no jurisdiction to act as a partition court. Trial courts trying an
Consequently, when the decision in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86
ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special
became final and executory without the respondent having questioned
proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed rules.
the same in any manner whatsoever, by appeal or otherwise, the division
15
That the trial court suspended the proceedings in Civil Case No. 140-
of property decreed therein may no longer be impugned by her.
0-93 to make way for the resolution of Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86
Thus said, the trial court in Civil Case No. 140-0-93could not award
was an indication that it intended to abide by whatever would be decreed
the 21st St. portion to Partenio, since the court in Special Civil Action No.
in the latter case. For, understandably, the resolution of Special Civil
340-0-86 specifically awarded the Canda St. portion to him. The decision
Action No. 340-0-86 will settle the issue in Civil Case No. 140-0-93with
in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86, which became final and executory,
respect to which specific portion of the property constitutes the subject 16Heirs of Clemencia Parasac v. Republic, G.R. No. 159910, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 498,
citing Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, G.R. Nos. 76265 & 83280, March 11,
matter of the specific performance suit and which would, in any case, be
1994, 231 SCRA 88, 99-100.
adjudicated to either of the two—the defendant co-owner and seller
Partenio or the plaintiff buyer Oamil, the herein respondent. Yet in the 180
end, the trial court ultimately disregarded what had been finally 180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
adjudicated and settled in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86, and instead
Panganiban vs. Oamil
it took a position that was entirely diametrically opposed to it.
enforceability of that dictum can no longer be relitigated anew in Civil
It was likewise irregular for the respondent to have obtained a
Case No. 140-0-93 since said issue had been resolved and finally laid to
certificate of title over specific property which has
_______________ rest in the partition case, by conclusiveness of judgment, if not by the
principle of res judicata. It may not be reversed, modified or altered in
15 Natcher v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 385, 392. any manner by any court.
As a result of the trial court’s refusal to abide by the decision in
179 Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86, the rights of the petitioners have been
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 179 unnecessarily transgressed, thereby giving them the right to seek relief
Panganiban vs. Oamil in court in order to annul the October 23, 1997 Order of the trial court
not been partitioned, especially where she concedes awareness of the which substantially and wrongly modified its original decision in Civil
existing co-ownership which has not been terminated, and recognizes her Case No. 140-0-93. It was clear mistake for the trial court to have gone
status as mere successor-in-interest to Partenio. The spring may not rise against the final and executory decision in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-
higher than its source. 86 and its original decision, which does not award a definite portion of the
In sum, the trial court and the Court of Appeals, by disregarding the disputed property to Partenio, precisely because, as a court litigating an
final and executory judgment in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86, ordinary civil suit, it is not authorized to partition the subject property
certainly ignored the principle of conclusiveness of judgments, which but only to determine the rights and obligations of the parties in respect
states that— to Partenio’s undivided share in the commonly owned property. As a
“[A] fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially result of this mistake, the petitioners are entitled to relief.
passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively Finally, with respect to Gan’s intervention, we affirm the appellate
settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in court’s finding that the same is no longer proper considering that the
privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future decision in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 had become final and executory. Gan
action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court moved to intervene only in 1995, when the decision became final and
of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the
executory in February 1994. Certainly, intervention, being merely
judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order
that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
collateral or ancillary to the principal action, may no longer be allowed in
another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the a case already terminated by final judgment. Moreover, since Gan did
17
issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, not appeal the herein assailed decision of the appellate court, then the
and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or same, as against him, has become final and executory.
question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be _______________
final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). 17Looyuko v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 102696, 102716, 108257 & 120954, July 12,
Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issues.” 16
2001, 361 SCRA 150, 165.
181
The ruling in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86—that the Canda St.
portion shall go to Partenio—became the law of the case and continues to VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 181
be binding between the parties as well as their successors-in-interest, the Panganiban vs. Oamil
decision in said case having become final and executory. Hence, the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
binding effect and Appeals dated March 2, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 57557 and the
_______________ Resolution dated July 10, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with
the exception that the denial of the intervenor Sotero Gan’s motion for
intervention is AFFIRMED.
The Order dated October 23, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 is hereby DECLARED of no
effect. In all other respects, the Decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. 140-0-93 dated December 26, 1993 is AFFIRMED. The said court is
moreover ORDERED to abide by the pronouncement in Special Civil
Action No. 340-086 with respect to Partenio Rombaua’s conjugal share in
the disputed property.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
**
Petition dismissed.
Note.—A co-owner may not convey a physical portion of the land
owned in common. A mere co-owner could not validly sell a specific part
of the land he owns in common. The buyer, therefore, cannot claim title to
that definite portion of the land owned in common. (Abad vs. Court of
Appeals, 179 SCRA 817.)
G.R. No. 156224. February 19, 2008.* by affinity of Faustino it is more important to remember that, as shown by their
HEIRS OF PANFILO F. ABALOS,1 petitioners, vs.AURORA A. BUCAL, documents of acquisition, they became254owners of the subject fishponds not
DEMETRIO BUCAL, ARTEMIO F. ABALOS, LIGAYA U. ABALOS, through Faustino alone but also from a third person (i.e., Maria Abalos).
Respondents are asserting their own rights and interests which are distinct and
ROMULO F. ABALOS, JESUSA O. ABALOS, MAURO F. ABALOS and
separate from those of Faustino’s claim as a hereditary heir of Francisco Abalos.
LUZVIMINDA R. ABALOS, respondents.
Hence, they cannot be considered as privies to the judgment rendered in Civil
Case No. 15465. Unfortunately for petitioners, they relied solely on their
Judgments; Res Judicata; Requisites; Words and Phrases; Res judicata
untenable defense of res judicata instead of contesting the genuineness and due
means “a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided, a thing or
execution of respondents’ documentary evidence.
matter settled by judgment.”—Res judicatameans “a matter adjudged; a thing
Actions; Partition; Parties; Pleadings and Practice; In an action for
judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.” It lays
partition, all other persons interested in the property shall be joined as
the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, without
defendants—not only the co-heirs but also all persons claiming interests or rights
fraud or collu-
_______________ in the property subject of partition are indispensable parties.—Panfilo erred in
repeatedly believing that there was no necessity to implead respondents as
* FIRST DIVISION. defendants in Civil Case No. 15465 since, according to him, the necessary parties
1 The original petitioner in this case was Panfilo F. Abalos. After his death on April 23, 2003, he in a partition case are only the co-owners or co-partners in the inheritance of
was substituted, with prior leave of court, by his children, namely: Florentina Abalos-Castro, Rustica Francisco Abalos. On the contrary, the Rules of Court provides that in an action
Abalos-Ricardo, Magdalina Abalos-Garcia, Wilfredo Abalos and Vila Abalos-Buada (Rollo, pp. 178-183).
for partition, all other persons interested in the property shall be joined as
253sion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its
defendants. Not only the co-heirs but also all persons claiming interests or rights
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other in the property subject of partition are indispensable parties. In the instant case,
actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent it is the responsibility of Panfilo as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 15465 to implead all
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. For the preclusive indispensable parties, that is, not only Faustino and Danilo but also respondents
effect of res judicata to be enforced, however, the following requisites must be in their capacity as vendees and donees of the subject fishponds. Without their
present: (1) the judgment or order sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) presence in the suit the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality against
the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the them. Being strangers to the first case, they are not bound by the decision
subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the first case must be a rendered therein; otherwise, they would be deprived of their constitutional right
judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second to due process.
action, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. Same; Same; An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of
Same; Same; Actions; Intervention; Intervention is not compulsory or co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
mandatory but merely optional and permissive.—Panfilo, the father of petitioners, properties involved.—It must be stressed that in a complaint for partition, the
should have impleaded respondents when he filed Civil Case No. 15465 since at plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties;
that time the latter were already claiming ownership over the subject fishponds, and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. An action for partition is at once
which were transferred in their names prior to the commencement of the case. an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
Petitioners cannot shift to respondents the burden of joining the case because determinate portion of the properties involved.
they are not duty bound to intervene therein and they have every right to
255
institute an independent action: First, intervention is not compulsory or
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
mandatory but merely optional and permissive; and Second, as the persons who
are in actual possession of the fishponds they claim to own, respondents may wait Court of Appeals.
until their possession are in fact disturbed before taking steps to vindicate their The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
rights. Understandably, at the time of the institution and pendency of Civil Case Perpetuo G. Paner for petitioner.
No. 15465, respondents still had no definite idea as to how the very nature of the Tanopo & Serafica Cosme for respondents.
partition case could actually affect their possession.
Same; Same; Even if res judicata requires not absolute but substantial AZCUNA, J.:
identity of parties, still there exists substantial identity only when the “additional” This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules on
party acts in the same capacity or is in privity with the parties in the former Civil Procedure assails the August 31, 2001 Decision 2 and November 20,
action.—Even if res judicatarequires not absolute but substantial identity of 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 39138,
parties, still there exists substantial identity only when the “additional” party
which affirmed with modification the May 25, 1992 Decision 4 of the
acts in the same capacity or is in privity with the parties in the former action. In
this case, while it is true that respondents are legitimate children and relatives
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Civil covered by Tax Declaration No. 21592 in the name of Faustino Abalos and
Case No. 16289. assessed at P370.00;
e.) A parcel of fishpond situated in Linoc, Binmaley, Pangasinan, containing
an area of 1,158 sq. meters, bounded on the North by Leoncio Dalmacio; On the
Prologue
East by Teodoro Abalos; On the South by Leoncio Dalmacio; And on the West by
Evaristo Dalmacio. It is originally declared in the name of Francisco Abalos and
On October 30, 1978, petitioners’ father, Panfilo Abalos, filed before now covered by Tax Declaration No. 21591 in the name of Faustino Abalos and
the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan, a complaint5docketed as Civil Case assessed at P370.00;
No. 15465 for Partition, Annulment of Certain Documents, Accounting f.) A parcel of unirrigated riceland situated in Linoc, Binmaley, Pangasinan,
and Damages against Faustino Abalos, his brother, and Danilo Abalos, containing an area of 950 sq. meters[,] bounded on the North by Liberato Gonzalo;
his nephew and the only surviving heir of his brother Pedro Abalos. In On the East by Severina Catalan;
the amended complaint,6 Panfilo alleged that their father/grandfather, 257On the South by Severina Catalan; And on the West by Barrio Road of Linoc[;]
Francisco Abalos, died intestate and was survived by his wife, Teodorica, [d]eclared under Tax Declaration No. 124 in the [name] of Francisco Abalos and
[a]ssessed at P20.00;
and their children, namely: Maria, Faustino, Pedro, Roman and Panfilo;
g.) A parcel of fishpond situated in Canaoalan, Binmaley, Pangasinan,
that at the time of his death, Francisco left the following real properties:
containing an area of 2,480 sq. meters, bounded on the North by Francisco
_______________
Deogracias; On the East by a Path; On the South by Ponciano Cayabyab; And on
the West by Ponciano Cayabyab[;] [d]eclared under Tax Declaration No. 122 in
2 Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices B.A.
Adefuin-De la Cruz and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring. the name of Francisco Abalos and assessed at P70.00;
3 Rollo, p. 58. h.) A parcel of fishpond situated in Canaoalan, Binmaley, Pangasinan,
4 Penned by Judge Eugenio G. Ramos. containing an area of 1,585 sq. meters, bounded on the North by Adriano Gonzalo;
5 Evidence Folder for the Petitioners, pp. 1-5. On the East by Florencio Perez; On the South by Pioquinto Ferrer; And on the
6 Rollo, pp. 59-65. West by Pastor Terrado[;] [d]eclared under Tax Declaration No. 123 in the name
of Francisco Abalos and assessed at P60.00;
256 i.) A parcel of little fishpond adjoining and North of the land described in
xxx xxx xxx paragraph 4 sub-paragraph (a) of this complaint whose Tax Declaration could not
a.) A parcel of residential land situated in Linoc, Binmaley, Pangasinan, be produced by the plaintiff; 7
containing an area of 1,020 sq. meters, bounded on the North by Leoncio xxx xxx xxx
Dalmacio; On the East by Dimas Perez; On the South by Callejon; And on the
West by Magno Dalmacio; declared under Tax Declaration No. 121 in the name of that said properties were administered by Teodorica; that following their
Francisco Abalos and assessed at P255.50; [n]ot registered under Act 496 [or]
mother’s death, there was a verbal agreement among Faustino, Pedro
under the Spanish [M]ortgaged Law[;]
and Panfilo that Faustino would administer all the properties left by
b.) A parcel of unirrigated riceland situated in Linoc, Binmaley, Pangasinan,
containing an area of 841 sq. meters, bounded on the North by Callejon; On the their parents except those given by Teodorica to each of the siblings as
South by Roberto Aquino; On the East by Eulalio Javier; And on the West by their partial advance inheritance; that taking undue advantage of his
Hipolito Perez. It is originally covered by Tax Declaration in the name of position and in clear breach of the trust and confidence reposed on him,
Francisco Abalos now covered by Tax Declaration No. 14457 in the name of Faustino, by means of fraud and machination, took possession of the
Faustino Abalos and assessed at P20.00[;] [n]ot registered under Act 496 [or] properties given to Maria and Roman upon their death and transferred
under the Spanish [M]ortgaged Law; some of the administered properties in his name and/or in the name of his
c.) A parcel of unirrigated riceland situated in Linoc, Binmaley, Pangasinan, heirs or disposed of them in favor of third parties; that since his
containing an area of 1,196 sq. meters, bounded on the North by Callejon; On the
administration of the properties, Faustino has not made any accounting
East by Estanislao Ferrer; On the South by Saturnino Aquino; And on the West
of the produce, appropriating them almost to himself; and that Panfilo
by Hipolito Perez[.] It is originally declared in the name of Francisco Abalos and
now covered by Tax Declaration No. 14458 in the name of Faustino Abalos and repeatedly demanded the partition of
_______________
assessed at P30.00;
d.) A parcel of fishpond situated in Linoc, Binmaley, Pangasinan, containing
7 Evidence Folder for the Petitioners, pp. 1-3.
an area of 1,158 sq. meters, bounded on the North by Doyao River; On the East by
Hipolito Perez; On the South by Leoncio Dalmacio; And on the West by Teodoro
258the properties but Faustino refused to do so despite earnest efforts
Abalos. It is originally declared in the [name] of Francisco Abalos and now
towards amicable settlement.
After Panfilo rested his case and following the postponements at the January 8, 1986 a case for Quieting of Title, Possession, Annulment of
instance of defendants, the trial court, upon motion, declared that Document and Damages with Preliminary Injunction. 16 Docketed as Civil
Faustino and Danilo were deemed to have waived their right to present Case No. 16289, the complaint alleged, among others, that:
evidence.8 On February 21, 1984, RTC Branch 37 of Lingayen, xxx xxx xxx
Pangasinan, rendered its Decision,9 the dispositive portion of which III
stated: Plaintiffs are the absolute owners and in actual possession of the following
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering: parcels of land more particularly described, to wit:
i. the partition of the intestate estate of the deceased Francisco Abalos in the (a.) A parcel of land (fishpond) with an approximate area of 289.5 square
following manner meters, more or less, located at Linoc, Binmaley, Pangasinan. Bounded on the
a. to the plaintiff, Panfilo Abalos, is the fishpond, Parcel D referred to as North by the Duyao River; on the East by
_______________
“Duyao”; and ½ of fishpond, Parcel H referred to as “Pinirat” plus his advance
inheritance, Parcel F referred to as “Manga”; 11 Rollo, p. 113.
b. to defendant, Faustino Abalos, is the residential land where his house stands 12 Id., at pp. 114-121.
and parcels A to I, plus his advance inheritance, Parcels [B] and C; 13 Records, p. 54.
c. to defendant, Danilo Abalos, is that fishpond, parcel E referred to as “Emong,” 14 Id., at p. 249.
15 Id., at pp. 31-32.
and the 1/2 portion of the fishpond, Parcel H referred to as “Pinirat” and his 16 Id., at pp. 1-12.
advance inheritance of his father Pedro Abalos, Parcel G.
ii. the defendant Faustino Abalos to reimburse to plaintiff the total amount 260Faustino Abalos before, now Romulo Abalos; on the South by Leoncio
of P19,580.00, Philippine Currency, as plaintiff’s lawful share from 1944; Dalmacio; and on the West by Romulo Abalos. Declared in the name of Aurora A.
iii. the annulment of all documents and/or instruments which transferred Bucal under Tax [Dec.] No. 1568 of the current land records of Binmaley,
said properties and are considered inconsistent with the above partition; Pangasinan; assessed value—P150.00;
iv. the dismissal of defendants’ counterclaim; (b.) A parcel of riceland located at Linoc, Binmaley, Pangasinan, containing
v. the defendants to pay the costs of the suit. an area of 1,196 square meters, more or less. Bounded on the North by Callejon;
SO ORDERED.” 10
on the East by Estanislao Ferrer; on the South by Saturnino Aquino; and on the
West by Hipolito Ferrer. Declared in the names of Artemio F. Abalos and Mauro
_______________ F. Abalos under Tax [Dec.] No. 1007 of the land records of Binmaley, Pangasinan;
assessed value—P260.00;
8 Id., at p. 10. (c.) A parcel of residential land located at Linoc, Binmaley, Pangasinan, with
9 Id., at pp. 6-11.
an area of 1,029 square meters, more or less. Bounded on the North by Leoncio
10 Id., at pp. 10-11.
Dalmacio; on the East by Dimas Perez; on the South by Callejon; and on the West
by Magno Dalmacio. Declared in the name of Romulo F. Abalos under Tax [Dec.]
259Despite the filing of a notice of appeal beyond the reglementary
No. 35 of the current land records of Binmaley, Pangasinan; assessed value—
period, the trial court still gave due course to the appeal of Faustino and P6,120.00;
Danilo; thus, Panfilo filed a petition for certiorari before this Court, which (d.) A portion of fishpond located at Linoc, Binmaley, Pangasinan, with an
subsequently referred the case to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC, area of 289.5 square meters, more or less. Bounded on the North by the Duyao
now the Court of Appeals).11 The IAC granted the petition and denied the River; on the East by Faustino Abalos; on the South by Leoncio Dalmacio; and on
motion for reconsideration.12 On October 30, 1985, this Court affirmed the the West by Teodoro Abalos. Declared in the name of Romulo F. Abalos under Tax
Decision.13 Upon the issuance of an entry of judgment on November 4, [Dec.] No. 33 of the current land records of Binmaley, Pangasinan; assessed
1985, the IAC ordered the remand of the case to the RTC. 14Thereafter, on value—P180.00;
December 11, 1985, the trial court issued a writ of execution in favor of (e.) A portion (eastern) of fishpond located at Linoc, Binmaley, Pangasinan,
with an area of 579 square meters, more or less. Bounded on the North by Leoncio
Panfilo.15
Dalmacio; on the East by Teodoro Abalos; on the South by Leoncio Abalos; and on
the West by Evaristo Dalmacio. Declared in the names of Artemio F. Abalos and
The Case Mauro F. Abalos under Tax [Dec.] No. 1009 of the land records of Binmaley,
Pangasinan; assessed value—P340.00;
The instant case arose when petitioners’ father, Panfilo, began to (f.) A parcel of fishpond located at Canaoalan, Binmaley, Pangasinan, with
execute the Decision in Civil Case No. 15465. In opposition, respondents, an area of 1,506 square meters, more or less. Bounded on the North by Adriano
who are children and in-laws of the now deceased Faustino, filed on Gonzalo; on the East by Florencio Perez; on the South by Pioquinto Ferrer; and on
the West by Pastor Terrado. Declared in the names of Romulo F. Abalos and
Mauro F. Abalos under Tax [Dec.] No. 1314 of the land records of Binmaley, Luzviminda R. Abalos and are in actual possession as such having acquired the
Pangasinan; assessed value—P970.00;261 same by absolute sale in 1978 as shown by a deed a copy of which is hereto
IV attached as ANNEX “P”; that Faustino in turn inherited the same from his
Parcel (a) above-described belongs in absolute ownership to spouses Aurora A. deceased parents; and that the present owners have declared the same for
Bucal and Demetrio Bucal who are in actual possession thereof as such, having taxation purposes as shown by Tax [Dec.] No. 1314 a copy of which is hereto
acquired the same by absolute sale from Romulo F. Abalos who in turn bought the attached as ANNEX “Q”;
same from Maria Abalos; that the latter in turn acquired the same by inheritance X
from her deceased parents, Francisco Abalos and Teodorica Ferrer, who died on The possession of the present owners as well as their predecessors-in-interest
May 4, 1928 and June 2, 1945, respectively. A copy of the sale from Maria Abalos have always been in good faith, peaceful, public, exclusive, adverse, continuous
to Romulo F. Abalos is hereto attached as ANNEX “A” while the sale by Romulo and in the concept of absolute owners since their respective acquisition [up to] the
F. Abalos to Aurora A. Bucal is hereto attached as ANNEX “B.” A copy of Tax present without question from anyone, much less from the defendant herein. Said
[Dec.] No. 1568 covering said land is hereto attached as ANNEX “C”; owners have likewise religiously paid the taxes due on the lands [up to] the
V current year; 17
Parcel (b) above-described belongs in absolute common ownership to the xxx xxx x x x”
spouses Artemio F. Abalos and Ligaya U. Abalos and spouses Mauro F. Abalos
and Luzviminda R. Abalos who acquired the same by absolute sale in 1978 from _______________
Faustino Abalos as shown by a deed a copy of which is hereto attached as ANNEX
“D”; that the latter acquired the same by absolute sale from Bernardo Victorio in 17 Id., at pp. 2-6.
1914, and that Faustino Abalos donated the same in consideration of his marriage
with Teodora Ferrer as shown by a deed a copy of which is hereto attached as 263Respondents claimed that on two separate occasions in December
ANNEX “E.” A copy of Tax [Dec.] No. 1007 is hereto attached as ANNEX “F”; 1985 Panfilo sought to execute the decision by attempting to take
VI possession of the lands in question through the use of force, threat,
Parcel (c) above-described belongs in absolute ownership to the spouses violence and intimidation. In addition, to satisfy the damages awarded to
Romulo F. Abalos and Jesusa O. Abalos and are in actual possession as such Panfilo, the deputy sheriff also levied upon parcels (b) and (c) above-
having acquired the same by absolute sale from Aurora A. Bucal as shown by a described for the purpose of selling the same at public auction, in regard
deed a copy of which is hereto attached as ANNEX “G”; that Aurora A. Bucal in
to which they also filed their respective notice of third-party claim.
turn bought the same from Maria Abalos as shown by a deed a copy of which is
hereto attached as ANNEX “H”; and that Maria Abalos inherited the same land Respondents argued that to compel them to abide by the writ of execution
from her deceased parents; and notice of levy issued by the court in Civil Case No. 15465 would
VII amount to deprivation of property without due process of law because the
Parcel (d) above-described belongs in absolute ownership to spouses Romulo F. decision rendered in said case is not binding upon them as they were not
Abalos and Jesusa O. Abalos having acquired the same in 1978 by means of a made parties thereto and they became owners thereof prior to the
deed of quitclaim and renunciation of rights a copy of which is hereto attached as institution of the case.
ANNEX “I”; that Romulo262F. Abalos declared the same for taxation purposes as On January 8, 1986, the trial court directed the parties to maintain
shown by Tax [Dec.] No. 33 a copy of which is hereto attached as ANNEX “J”; the status quo pending the resolution on the motion for the issuance of
VIII
the writ of preliminary injunction.18
Parcel (e) above-described belongs in common absolute ownership to the
spouses Artemio F. Abalos and Ligaya U. Abalos and spouses Mauro F. Abalos In the Objection to the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
and Luzviminda R. Abalos having acquired the same from Maria Abalos as shown Injunction,19 Answer,20 and Memorandum of Authorities21filed by Panfilo,
by two (2) documents copies of which are hereto attached as ANNEXES “K” and he stressed that the title, right or interest of respondents with respect to
“L”; that Faustino and Maria bought the same from Genoveva Perez as shown by the fishponds mentioned in sub-paragraphs (a), (d), and (f) of paragraph
a deed a copy of which is hereto attached as ANNEX “M”; that Genoveva Perez in III of the Complaint had already been declared null and void in Civil
turn bought the same from Teodoro Abalos as shown by a deed a copy of which is Case No. 15465 by a co-equal and competent court and affirmed with
hereto attached as ANNEX “N”; that Mauro F. Abalos and Artemio F. Abalos finality by this Court. It was averred that respondents were never in
have declared the land in their names for taxation purposes as shown by Tax possession of the fishponds as he was the one peacefully placed in its
[Dec.] No. 1009 a copy of which is hereto attached as ANNEX “O”;
possession by the deputy sheriff. For failing to intervene in Civil Case No.
IX
Parcel (f) above-described belongs in absolute common ownership to spouses 15465, Panfilo asserted that respondents are now barred by the
Romulo F. Abalos and Jesusa O. Abalos and spouses Mauro F. Abalos and principles of res judicata and estoppel in pais.
_______________
18 Id., at p. 46. Upon motion of respondents, the trial court ordered the issuance of
19 Id., at pp. 51-53.
an alias writ of preliminary injunction on March 14, 1989.25 Again,
20 Id., at pp. 57-63.
21 Id., at pp. 66-67. Panfilo challenged the order via petition for certiorari with prohibition
before the CA but the same was denied.26 When the incident was elevated
264On July 21, 1986, however, the trial court ordered the issuance of a to this Court, it was dismissed on November 15, 1989. The resolution
writ of preliminary injunction.22 Concurring with the position of became final and executory on February 9, 1990.27
respondents, it held that the principle of res judicata does not apply since Meanwhile, in the proceedings before the trial court, Panfilo and
there is no identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action respondents submitted their respective pre-trial briefs.28 On October 23,
between Civil Case No. 15465 and the present case. In Civil Case No. 1989, the trial court issued the Pre-trial Order.29 Taking into account the
15465, the parties are Panfilo, as plaintiff, and Faustino Abalos and admissions made by the parties, particularly the fact that Panfilo claimed
Danilo Abalos, as defendants, while in the present case, the parties are proprietary rights only with respect to parcels (a), (d) and (f) mentioned
the children of Faustino Abalos and their respective spouses, as plaintiffs, in the complaint, the court delimited the issues for resolution as follows:
and Panfilo, as defendant; in the former, the principal action is for “The factual issues are: (1) With respect to parcels A, D, and F, whether or not
partition while in the latter, the suit is for quieting of title, possession, the plaintiffs claiming ownership and possession over said parcels are the lawful
annulment of document and damages. The trial court opined that while it owners and possessors thereof by virtue of genuine and duly executed documents
of sale, quitclaim and renunciation of rights; (2) Whether or not plaintiffs’
is true that respondents Aurora, Artemio, Romulo, and Mauro are
predecessors-in-interest were the lawful owners and possessors of parcels A, D
legitimate children and compulsory heirs of Faustino Abalos, the and F; (3) Whether or not Faustino Abalos and his wife [Teodorica] Ferrer were
documents showing their acquisition of the properties in question awarded the properties subject of partition proceedings in Civil Case No. 15465;
revealed that they became owners thereof not through their father alone (4) Whether or not by virtue of the decision rendered in that partition
but also by way of third persons who were not parties in Civil Case No. proceedings, the fishpond referred to as Duyao which is parcel A, D and F was
15465. Moreover, they acquired their ownership prior to the institution of awarded; (5) Whether or not
said case. _______________
March 20, 1972; (b) Roman, who died single on June 10, 1944; (c) Panfilo, As to respondents—
petitioner herein; (d) Pedro, who died on May 11, 1971 and was survived 1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LATE
by his only child, Danilo; and (e) Faustino, whose children Aurora, SPOUSES FRANCISCO ABALOS AND TEODORICA FERRER LEFT AN
Artemio, Romulo and Mauro are among the respondents herein; that INTESTATE ESTATE CONSISTING OF FIVE PARCELS OF LAND ONLY.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ONE-
Roman predeceased his mother, hence, when the latter died only four of
FOURTH PRO INDIVISO OF THE LAND KNOWN AS [“DUYAO”] WAS THE
the siblings inherited the Duyao, becoming its pro indiviso co-owners; SHARE OF FAUSTINO ABALOS, WHICH
that on November 11, 1968, Maria sold her 1/4 share to Romulo, who, in _______________
turn, sold the same to Aurora; that in view of the sale, the said portion of
the Duyao should have been excluded from the Decision in Civil Case No. 35 CA Rollo, pp. 51-52.
15465 for the reason that said case refers to the partition of the estate
269HE QUITCLAIMED IN FAVOR OF HIS SON ROMULO ABALOS, AND IN
only of spouses Francisco and Teodorica; that Romulo is not the owner APPLYING RES JUDICATA.
the other 1/4 portion of the Duyao for failure to establish his ownership 3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAND
thereon and also considering that it could have been the same 1/4 portion KNOWN AS “PINIRAT” WAS THE SHARE OF FAUSTINO ABALOS, WHICH
that he sold to Aurora; and that the Decision in Civil Case No. 15465 HE SOLD TO HIS SONS, THE PLAINTIFFS ROMULO AND MAURO ABALOS,
has res judicata effect with respect to the Pinirat since the deed of sale AND IN APPLYING RES JUDICATA.
executed by Faustino in favor of Romulo and Mauro was simulated and 4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VOIDING THE INSTRUMENTS OF
employed merely to defraud the other heirs. TRANSFER EXECUTED BY FAUSTINO ABALOS IN FAVOR OF ROMULO
Both Panfilo and respondents elevated the case to the CA, assigning ABALOS OF HIS 1/4 SHARE OF THE [“DUYAO”] LOT AND IN FAVOR OF
MAURO ABALOS AND ROMULO ABALOS OF THE “PINIRAT” LOT.
the alleged errors of the trial court:
As to Panfilo—
5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF Luzviminda R. Abalos; That defendant-appellant Panfilo Abalos is the sole
PLAINTIFF ROMULO ABALOS OVER 1/4 OF THE [“DUYAO”] LOT AND THE owner of another 1/3 portion of the Pinirat fishpond; While the remaining 1/3
CLAIM OF PLAINTIFFS MAURO ABALOS AND ROMULO ABALOS OVER portion is for Danilo Abalos, in representation of his deceased father Pedro
THE [“PINIRAT”] LOT. 36 Abalos;
3. No pronouncement as to cost.
On August 31, 2001, the CA rendered its Decision. 37According to the SO ORDERED.” 38
appellate court, the first and second assigned errors of Panfilo are
_______________
unmeritorious on the ground that the disposition of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 15465 insofar as the Duyao is concerned has no factual and
38 Id., at pp. 200-201.
legal basis. It also held untenable his third and fourth assigned errors,
noting that the principles of res judicataand estoppel are not applicable in 271
this case since respondents were not made parties to Civil Case No. Panfilo moved for reconsideration of the Decision but was denied. 39
15465 despite their acquisition of the contested parcels prior to the Hence this petition.
commencement of said case. Finally, Panfilo’s fifth assigned error was Echoing the same grounds relied upon by their father, petitioners now
rejected, saying that this Court already settled the issue of res judicata in claim that the CA seriously erred in failing to consider the finality of the
G.R. No. 77965 when petitioner questioned the propriety of the issuance Decision in Civil Case No. 15465. According to them, the finding that
of the writ of preliminary injunction. respondents became owners of the subject properties prior to the
On the other hand, the CA ruled that the first assigned error of institution of said case in effect modified the disposition and distribution
respondents was rendered moot and academic since it was stipulated and previously ordered. Petitioners opine that when the CA ruled that
agreed upon during the pre-trial of the respondents have acquired ownership of the questioned parcels prior to
_______________ the commencement of Civil Case No. 15465 it had disregarded the
conclusiveness of a final judgment rendered in said case which decreed
36 Id., at pp. 91-92.
37 Id., at pp. 183-201.
the annulment of all documents and/or instruments transferring said
properties and were considered inconsistent with the order of partition.
270present case that the dispute covers only parcels (a), (d) and (f). The They contend that sustaining the conclusion of the CA would allow the
second assigned error, nonetheless, was affirmed, observing that re-opening of the factual issue of whether the documents, which were the
the Duyao property was co-owned pro-indiviso by the four remaining source of respondents’ alleged title, were valid—an issue that was dealt
children of spouses Francisco and Teodorica; hence, Faustino’s transfer of with in an extensive hearing on the merits conducted in said case and
his 1/4 share during his lifetime in favor of his son Romulo is perfectly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence for the purpose.
legal. However, the CA denied the third assigned error as it found that Being the prevailing party in Civil Case No. 15465, in regard to which
the Pinirat was Roman Abalos’ advance legitime, which, upon his death, respondents had remained silent and did not even care to intervene or
was inherited by his remaining siblings. Since Maria subsequently died question, petitioners assert that they already acquired a vested right over
without transferring her share, her part of the Piniratshould be divided the entire Duyao and 1/2 portion of the Pinirat. They also oppose the CA’s
among Pedro (which is transmitted to Danilo), Faustino and Panfilo. As failure to recognize that estoppel and laches have already set in to bar
Faustino’s share over the Pinirat is with respect to 1/3 portion thereof, he respondents from further pursuing their claims.
could validly convey only such part to Romulo and Mauro. The petition is not meritorious.
The CA disposed: Res judicata means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the court a or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.” It lays the rule that an
quo in Civil Case No. 16289 is hereby modified, as follows: existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, without fraud
1. Being co-owners of Duyao Fishpond, plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Aurora or collusion, by a court of
Bucal and Demetrio Bucal, plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Romulo Abalos and _______________
Jesusa O. Abalos, defendant-appellant Panfilo Abalos and Danilo Abalos, in
representation of his deceased father, Pedro Abalos, should divide and 39 Id., at pp. 204-208, 255.
distribute the same equally;
2. One-third of the Pinirat Fishpond is co-owned by plaintiffs-appellants 272competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
Spouses Romulo Abalos and Jesus Abalos, and Spouses Mauro Abalos and conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions
or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent Civil Case No. 15465, respondents still had no definite idea as to how the
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.40 very nature of the partition case could actually affect their possession.
For the preclusive effect of res judicata to be enforced, however, the _______________
following requisites must be present: (1) the judgment or order sought to
42 Art. 499 of the Civil Code provides:
bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been
Art. 499. The partition of a thing owned in common shall not prejudice third
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the persons, who shall retain the rights of mortgage, servitude, or any other real rights
parties; (3) the disposition of the first case must be a judgment on the belonging to them before the division was made. Personal rights pertaining to third
merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second action, persons against the co-ownership shall also remain in force, notwithstanding the
partition.
identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.41
43 See Cruzcosa v. Hon. H. Concepcion, et al., 101 Phil 146, 150 (1957), as cited
In the instant case, the fourth requisite, in particular the identity of in California Bus Lines, Inc. v. State Investment House, Inc., 463 Phil. 689, 711; 418 SCRA
parties, is clearly wanting. 297, 316 (2003), and Mabayo Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 112, 119; 386 SCRA
As found by the CA, this Court, through our earlier resolution in G.R. 110, 116 (2002).
No. 77965, already settled that res judicata does not apply in this case. In
274
G.R. No. 77965, which Panfilo instituted to challenge the propriety of the
On the other hand, Panfilo had personal knowledge that respondents
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, this Court agreed
acquired ownership of the properties prior to the filing of Civil Case No.
with the CA’s disposition that respondents are considered as third
15465, that they are in actual possession thereof, and that they have
persons with respect to Civil Case No. 15465 since they were not
declared the lands in their names for taxation purposes. Panfilo could not
impleaded as defendants therein. This Court held as in accordance with
be ignorant of these because he resided in the same locality where the
law and jurisprudence the CA’s opinion that all those who did not in any
properties are found.44 Quite startling, however, is that he did not bother
way participate or intervene in
_______________
to implead respondents in the partition case despite all these and the fact
that the defendants therein raised the point that Faustino was not the
40 See Khemani v. Heirs of Anastacio Trinidad, G.R. No. 147340, December 13, 2007, owner of some of the lands in question and that they belong to others not
540 SCRA 83, 94, citing Oropeza Marketing Corp. v. Allied Banking Corp., 441 Phil. 551; parties to the case.45 As his successors-in-interest, petitioners must suffer
393 SCRA 278 (2002). from Panfilo’s evident omission.
41 Heirs of Igmedio Maglaque v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163360, June 8, 2007, 524
SCRA 234, 240; Heirs of Rosendo Lasam v. Umengan, G.R. No. 168156, December 6, 2006,
Even if res judicata requires not absolute but substantial identity of
510 SCRA 496, 510; and Rivera v. Heirs of Romualdo Villanueva, G.R. No. 141501, July 21, parties, still there exists substantial identity only when the “additional”
2006, 496 SCRA 135, 140. party acts in the same capacity or is in privity with the parties in the
former action.46 In this case, while it is true that respondents are
273the partition case are considered third persons within the legitimate children and relatives by affinity of Faustino it is more
contemplation of Article 499 of the Civil Code.42 important to remember that, as shown by their documents of acquisition,
The foregoing rule still stands. they became owners of the subject fishponds not through Faustino alone
Indeed, Panfilo, the father of petitioners, should have impleaded but also from a third person (i.e., Maria Abalos). Respondents are
respondents when he filed Civil Case No. 15465 since at that time the asserting their own rights and interests which are distinct and separate
latter were already claiming ownership over the subject fishponds, which from those of Faustino’s claim as a hereditary heir of Francisco Abalos.
were transferred in their names prior to the commencement of the case. Hence, they cannot be considered as privies to the judgment rendered in
Petitioners cannot shift to respondents the burden of joining the case Civil Case No. 15465. Unfortunately for petitioners, they relied solely on
because they are not duty bound to intervene therein and they have every their untenable defense of res judicata instead of contesting the
right to institute an independent action: First, intervention is not genuineness and due execution of respondents’ documentary evidence.
compulsory or mandatory but merely optional and _______________
permissive;43 and Second, as the persons who are in actual possession of
the fishponds they claim to own, respondents may wait until their 44 Records, p. 180.
45 Id., at p. 99.
possession are in fact disturbed before taking steps to vindicate their
46 Khemani v. Heirs of Anastacio Trinidad, G.R. No. 147340, December 13, 2007, 540
rights. Understandably, at the time of the institution and pendency of SCRA 83, 95.
275 It is only properties owned in common that may be the object of an
Moreover, Panfilo erred in repeatedly believing that there was no action for partition; it will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest
necessity to implead respondents as defendants in Civil Case No. 15465 over the subject property. Thus, in this case, only the shares in the lots
since, according to him, the necessary parties in a partition case are only which are determined to have been co-owned by Panfilo, Faustino and
the co-owners or co-partners in the inheritance of Francisco Abalos. On Danilo could be included in the order of partition and, conversely, shares
the contrary, the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, in the lots which were validly disposed of in favor of respondents must be
all other persons interested in the property shall be joined as excluded therefrom. In this connection, the Court sees no reason to
defendants.47 Not only the co-heirs but also all persons claiming interests depart from the findings of fact and the partition ordered by the appellate
or rights in the property subject of partition are indispensable court as these are amply supported by evidence on record. Furthermore,
parties.48 In the instant case, it is the responsibility of Panfilo as plaintiff the rule is that factual issues are beyond our jurisdiction to resolve since
in Civil Case No. 15465 to implead all indispensable parties, that is, not in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
only Faustino and Danilo but also respondents in their capacity as Procedure this Court’s power is limited only to review
vendees and donees of the subject fishponds. Without their presence in _______________
the suit the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality against
them. Being strangers to the first case, they are not bound by the decision 51 G.R. No. 152862, July 26, 2004, 435 SCRA 232.
52 Id., at p. 239. See also Heirs of Velasquez v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 438, 453-454;
rendered therein; otherwise, they would be deprived of their
325 SCRA 552, 566 (2000).
constitutional right to due process.49
Finally, it must be stressed that in a complaint for partition, the 277questions of law—when there is doubt or difference as to what the law
plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject is on a certain state of facts.53
properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. An action for WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the August 31, 2001
partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for Decision and November 20, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties CA-G.R. CV No. 39138 are AFFIRMED.
involved.50 No costs.
SO ORDERED.
_______________
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez,
47 SECTION 1, RULE 69.
Corona and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., concur.
48 Sepulveda, Sr. v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 152195, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 302, 312.
49 See Galicia v. Manliquez Vda. de Mindo, G.R. No. 155785, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
85, 93-95; Moldes v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 161955, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 697,
708; and Sepulveda, Sr. v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 152195, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 302, 314. Notes.—A party-in-intervention cannot be considered a principal in a
50 Dapar v. Biascan, G.R. No. 141880, September 27, 2004, 439 SCRA 179, 197. prior case for purposes of applying the principle of res judicata since the
276
contrary goes against the true import of the action of intervention as a
mere subsidiary proceeding without an independent life apart from the
Reyes-De Leon v. Del Rosario51 held: principal action as well as the intrinsic character of the intervenor as a
“The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be mere subordinate party in the main case whose right may be said to be
resolved in order to effect a partition of properties. This should be done in the only in aid of the right of the original party. (Islamic Directorate of the
action for partition itself. As held in the case of Catapusan v. Court of Appeals: Philipppines vs. Court of Appeals, 272 SCRA 454 [1997])
‘In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a
property unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co- thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. (Lopez vs.
ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first Court of Appeals, 398 SCRA 550 [2003])
stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for partition will
not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In
fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his
complaint the ‘nature and the extent of his title’ to the real estate. Until and
unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to
effect a partition of the properties. x x x’ (citations omitted)
52
G.R. No. 118822. July 28, 1997. *
unit, petitioner loses all its rights and interests to the unit in favor of the buyer.
Consequently, it has no right to use the certificate of title of respondent Teng as
G.O.A.L., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE
collateral for a new loan. The title of Teng must be released to him as provided by
PRESIDENT LEGAL AFFAIRS, HOUSING AND LAND USE
law.
REGULATORY BOARD, RIZALINO SIMBILLO, WILLIAM ONG,
HERMINIA MESINA, SELFA MARTINEZ, FILOMENO TENG, Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In a condominium, common areas
RAFAEL JAVIER, FERNANDO DEL MUNDO, MILDRED PAREJA, and facilities are “portions of the condominium property not included in the units,”
REMEDIOS LASQUETE, GEORGE CABIGAN and ARCADIO whereas, a unit is “a part of the condominium property which is to be subject to
SAMPANG, respondents. private ownership.”—In a condominium, common areas and facilities are “portions
of the condominium property not included in the units,” whereas, a unit is “a part
Civil Law; Condominium Act; National Housing Authority; In alteration of the condominium property which is to be subject to private ownership.”
plans, written approval of the National Housing Authority alone is not sufficient. Inversely, that which is not considered a unit should fall under common areas
It must be coupled with the written conformity or consent of the duly organized and facilities. Hence, the parking spaces not being subject to private ownership
homeowners association or the majority of the lot buyers.—GOAL contends that form part of the common area over which the condominium unit owners hold
the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the fact that the construction of the fifth undivided interest. As such, petitioner cannot invoke Sec. I, Art. III, of the Bill of
floor was with the written approval of public respondent HLURB as required by Rights which provides that “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
Sec. 22 of P.D. No. 957 which provides—Sec. 22. Alteration of Plans.—No owner without due process of law.” Petitioner alone does not own the parking area. The
or developer shall change or alter the roads, open spaces, infrastructures, parking space is owned in common by the developer and the unit owners. Private
facilities for public use and/or other form of subdivision development as contained respondents must be allowed to use the parking area.
in the approved subdivision plan and/or represented in its advertisements,
without the permission of the Authority and the written conformity or consent of PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
the duly organized homeowners association, or in the absence of the latter, by
majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision (italics supplied). The above provision The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
is clear. We do not have to tussle with legal hermeneutics in the interpretation of
Felix T. de Ramos for petitioner.
Sec. 22 of P.D. No. 957. The written approval of the National Housing Authority
Abelardo B. Albis for private respondent.
alone is not sufficient. It must be coupled with the written conformity or consent
of the duly organized homeowners association or the majority of the lot buyers.
Failing in this, the construction of the fifth floor is violative of the decree invoked. BELLOSILLO, J.:
The Court of Appeals simply applied the law, and correctly so.
G.O.A.L., INC. (GOAL), in this petition for review on certiorari, seeks to
Same; Same; Same; Upon full payment of a unit, petitioner loses all its set aside part of the decision of the Court of
rights and interests to the unit in favor of the buyer. Consequently, it has no right 361
to use the certificate of title of respondent Teng as collateral for a new loan. The VOL. 276, JULY 28, 1997 361
title of Teng must be
______________ G.O.A.L., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Appeals dated 28 September 1994 which affirmed the decision of the
1
FIRST DIVISION.
Office of the President Legal Affairs (OPLA) that earlier likewise
*
360 affirmed the decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). Petitioner confines its petition to the construction of the fifth
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED floor of Gemin I Condominium and all works related thereto, including
60 the issuance of title to private respondent Teng and providing free
parking spaces for the condominium units. 2
G.O.A.L., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals On 23 May 1983 GOAL and the National Housing Authority (NHA)
released to him as provided by law.—The Court observes the frequent
entered into an agreement whereby NHA extended to GOAL a loan of
allusion of petitioner to its predicament brought about by the abandonment of the
project by the first contractor. But such is irrelevant in light of Sec. 25 of P.D. No.
P4.425 million for the construction of Gemin I Condominium at 941
957 as well as of the Contract to Sell of the parties. While we emphathize with Gonzales St., Ermita, Manila. Sometime in 1984 a “Contract Agreement”
petitioner in its financial dilemma we cannot make innocent parties suffer the was entered into between GOAL and Matson International Corporation
consequences of the former’s lack of business acumen. Upon full payment of a for the construction of the condominium within one (1) year at the cost of
P4.2 million. However, in the later part of 1984, the contractor The above provision is clear. We do not have to tussle with legal
abandoned the project with only 60% of it finished. In 1985 GOAL offered hermeneutics in the interpretation of Sec. 22 of P.D. No. 957. The written
the condominium units for sale with private respondents among its approval of the National Housing Authority alone is not sufficient. It
buyers. To remedy the situation brought about by the abandonment of must be coupled with the written conformity or consent of the duly
the project by the first contractor, GOAL subsequently pursued the organized homeowners association or the majority of the lot buyers.
construction of the fifth floor with NHA granting additional funding on Failing in this, the construction of the fifth floor is violative of the decree
the condition that it would hold on to the condominium certificates of title invoked. The Court of Appeals simply applied the law, and correctly so.
of private respondents. ______________
In August 1989 private respondents filed with the Housing and Land
Decision, HLURB Case No. REM-191587-3284, pp. 12-13.
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), Office of Appeals, Adjudication and
3
Legal Affairs (OAALA), a complaint against GOAL. Among the issues 363
raised were the illegal construction of the fifth floor of Gemin I VOL. 276, JULY 28, 1997 363
Condominium, the failure to deliver the title of private respondent
Filomeno Teng despite his repeated demands, and the failure to provide G.O.A.L., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
adequate parking spaces for the unit owners. Petitioner likewise contends that it should not have been faulted for
______________ failing to deliver the title to private respondent Teng as the proximate
cause thereof was the abandonment of the construction project by the
1 CA-G.R. SP No. 31082, Decision penned by Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, concurred in first contractor, hence, due to force majeure. 4
by Justices Ricardo P. Galvez and Eugenio S. Labitoria; Rollo, pp. 8-17. We cannot sustain petitioner. There is no one else to blame but itself.
2 Petition, p. 7; Rollo, p. 27.
Upon full payment of the agreed price, petitioner is mandated by law to
362 deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer. Both the “Contract to Sell”
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED of petitioner and private respondents, and Sec. 25 of P.D. No. 957 state—
Sec. III (Contract to Sell).—Title and Ownership of Unit. Upon full payment by
G.O.A.L., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals the vendees of the full amount of the purchase price stipulated under Sec. III
On 31 March 1989 OAALA rendered its decision ordering GOAL, inter hereof, the assessments and expenses under Sec. IV and otherwise upon
alia, (a) to stop the construction of the fifth floor, (b) to deliver the title of compliance by the VENDEES of all obligations therein, the VENDOR will convey
private respondent Teng, and (c) to provide adequate parking space for to the VENDEE all rights and interests of the former and to the Unit, subject
the unit owners. 3 hereof together with the interest in the common area and in the Condominium
On appeal to the Office of the President Legal Affairs (OPLA) and Corporation appurtenant to such unit x x x x”
Sec. 25, P.D. No. 957—Issuance of Title.—The owner or developer shall deliver
subsequently to the Court of Appeals, the decision rendered by the
the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit x x x x
HLURB-OAALA was affirmed in toto. Petitioner’s motion for
In the event a mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at the time of the
reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition. issuance of the title to the buyer, the owner or developer shall redeem the
Petitioner imputes error to the Court of Appeals in not finding the mortgage or the corresponding portion thereof within six months from such
true facts of the case that greatly affected its decision, and its decision issuance in order that the title over any paid lot or unit may be secured and
being contrary to law. delivered to the buyer in accordance herewith.”
GOAL contends that the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the fact
that the construction of the fifth floor was with the written approval of Petitioner also attempts to justify its failure to deliver the certificate of
public respondent HLURB as required by Sec. 22 of P.D. No. 957 which title of private respondent Teng by claiming that it used the title as part
provides— collateral for the additional loan NHA had extended for the construction
Sec. 22. Alteration of Plans.—No owner or developer shall change or alter the of the fifth floor.
roads, open spaces, infrastructures, facilities for public use and/or other form of The Court observes the frequent allusion of petitioner to its
subdivision development as contained in the approved subdivision plan and/or predicament brought about by the abandonment of the project by the first
represented in its advertisements, without the permission of the Authority and contractor. But such is irrelevant in light of Sec. 25 of P.D. No. 957 as
the written conformity or consent of the duly organized homeowners association, well as of the Contract to Sell of the parties. While we emphathize with
or in the absence of the latter, by majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision
petitioner in its financial
(italics supplied).
______________ Finally, petitioner contends that the payment of P10,000.00 as moral
damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages plus P5,000.00 as
Petition, p. 10; Rollo, p. 30.
attorney’s fees is too much of a penalty. However, the Court of Appeals
4
not exclude “indoor parking.” What it specifically excludes is “street Petitioner can hardly be excused for its failure to comply with the
parking.” Therefore, parking may be in the basement or, in the absence provisions of P.D. No. 957 by claiming ignorance of the requirements of
thereof, in the first floor. the decree and that a “mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law
Furthermore, at this point, a definition of terms may be necessary. In may be the basis of good faith.” Being engaged in a business affected by
a condominium, common areas and facilities are “portions of the P.D. No. 957, petitioner should be aware of its provisions and its
condominium property not included in the units,” whereas, a unit is “a mandates which, as can be readily perceived, are clear, simple and
part of the condominium property which is to be subject to private unmistakable. 7
known as the Condominium Act. Under the law, a condominium is an interest in While we agree with the City Treasurer’s position on the first issue,
real property consisting of a separate interest in a unit in a residential, industrial there ultimately is sufficient justification for the Court to overlook what
or commercial building and an undivided interest in common, directly or is essentially a procedural error. We uphold respondents on the second
indirectly, in the land on which it is located and in other common areas of the issue. Indeed, there are disturbing aspects in both procedure and
building. To enable the orderly administration over these common areas which substance that attend the attempts by the City of Makati to flex its
are jointly owned by the various unit owners, the Condominium Act permits the taxing muscle. Considering that the tax imposition now in question has
creation of a condominium corporation, which is specially formed for the purpose utterly no basis in law, judicial relief is imperative. There are fewer
of holding title to the common area, in which the holders of separate interests indisputable causes for the exercise of judicial review over the exercise of
shall automatically be members or shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in
the taxing power than when the tax is based on whim, and not on law.
proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective units. The necessity of a
condominium corporation has not gained widespread acceptance, and even is The facts, as culled from the record, follow.
merely permissible under the Condominium Act. Nonetheless, the condominium Respondent BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation (the
corporation has been resorted to by many condominium projects, such as the “Corporation”) is a duly organized condominium corporation constituted
Corporation in this case. in accordance with the Condominium Act, which owns and holds title to
2
Same; Same; Corporation Law; Condominium Act; Condominium the common and limited common areas of the BA-Lepanto
corporations are generally exempt from local business taxation under the Local _______________
Government Code, irrespective of any local ordinance that seeks to declare
otherwise.—Whatever capacity the Corporation may have pursuant to its power to 1 The general authority for local government units to create their own sources of
exercise acts of ownership over personal and real property is limited by its stated revenue through taxation is established under Section 5, Article X of the Constitution, as
corporate purposes, which are by themselves further limited by the Condominium affirmed under Section 129 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
Act. A condominium corporation, while enjoying such powers of ownership, is
2 Republic Act No. 4726.
prohibited by law from transacting its properties for the purpose of gainful profit.
263
Accordingly, and with a significant degree of comfort, we hold that condominium
corporations are generally exempt from local business taxation under the Local VOL. 474, OCTOBER 25, 2005 263
Government Code, irrespective of any local ordinance that seeks to declare Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation
otherwise. Condominium (the “Condominium”), situated in Paseo de Roxas, Makati
City. Its membership comprises the various unit owners of the
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Condominium. The Corporation is authorized, under Article V of its
Amended By-Laws, to collect regular assessments from its members for The protest was rejected by the City Treasurer in a letter dated 4
operating expenses, capital expenditures on the common areas, and other March 1999. She insisted that the collection of dues from the unit owners
special assessments as provided for in the Master Deed with Declaration was effected primarily “to sustain and maintain the expenses of the
of Restrictions of the Condominium. common areas, with the end in view [sic] of getting full appreciative
On 15 December 1998, the Corporation received a Notice of living values [sic] for the individual condominium occupants and to
Assessment dated 14 December 1998 signed by the City Treasurer. The command better marketable [sic] prices for those occupants” who would
Notice of Assessment stated that the Corporation is “liable to pay the in the future sell their respective units. Thus, she concluded since the
6
correct city business taxes, fees and charges,” computed as totaling “chances of getting higher prices for well-managed common areas of any
P1,601,013.77 for the years 1995 to 1997. The Notice of Assessment was
3 condominium are better and more effective that condominiums with poor
silent as to the statutory basis of the business taxes assessed. [sic] managed common areas,” the corporation activity “is a profit venture
Through counsel, the Corporation responded with a written tax making [sic].” 7
protest dated 12 February 1999, addressed to the City Treasurer. It was From the denial of the protest, the Corporation filed an Appeal with
evident in the protest that the Corporation was perplexed on the the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. On 1 March 2000, the Makati
8
statutory basis of the tax assessment. RTC Branch 57 rendered a Decision dismissing the appeal for lack of
9
“With due respect, we submit that the Assessment has no basis as the merit. Accepting the premise laid by the City Treasurer, the RTC
Corporation is not liable for business taxes and surcharges and interest thereon, acknowledged, in sadly risible language:
under the Makati [Revenue] Code or even under the [Local Government] Code. _______________
The Makati [Revenue] Code and the [Local Government] Code do not contain
any provisions on which the Assessment could be based. One might argue that 5 Records, pp. 20-21.
Sec. 3A.02(m) of the Makati [Revenue] Code imposes business tax on owners or 6 RTC Rollo, p. 16.
operators of any business not specified in the said code. We submit, however, that 7 Ibid.
this is not applicable to the Corporation as the Corporation is not an owner or 8 Docketed as Civil Case No. 99-748.
operator of any business in the contemplation of the Makati [Revenue] Code and 9 Penned by Judge Reinato G. Quilala.
even the [Local Government] Code.” 4
265
_______________ VOL. 474, OCTOBER 25, 2005 265
Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation
Broken down as follows: Tax Deficiency from 1995 to 1997—P800,855.66; 25%
“Herein appellant, to defray the improvements and beautification of the common
3
Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation With this, the RTC concluded that the activities of the Corporation fell
Proceeding from the premise that its tax liability arose from Section squarely under the definition of “business” under Section 13(b) of the
3A.02(m) of the Makati Revenue Code, the Corporation proceeded to Local Government Code, and thus subject to local business taxation. 11
argue that under both the Makati Code and the Local Government Code, From this Decision of the RTC, the Corporation filed a Petition for
“business” is defined as “trade or commercial activity regularly engaged Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of
in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit.” It was submitted that Appeals. Initially, the petition was dismissed outright on the ground that
12
the Corporation, as a condominium corporation, was organized not for only decisions of the RTC brought on appeal from a first level court could
profit, but to hold title over the common areas of the Condominium, to be elevated for review under the mode of review prescribed under Rule
manage the Condominium for the unit owners, and to hold title to the 42. However, the Corporation pointed out in its Motion for
13
parcels of land on which the Condominium was located. Neither was the Reconsideration that under Section 195 of the Local Government Code,
Corporation authorized, under its articles of incorporation or bylaws to the remedy of the taxpayer on the denial of the protest filed with the local
engage in profit-making activities. The assessments it did collect from the treasurer is to appeal the denial with the court of competent
unit owners were for capital expenditures and operating expenses. 5
jurisdiction. Persuaded by this contention, the Court of Appeals
14 The City Treasurer also claims that the Corporation had filed the
reinstated the petition. 15 wrong mode of appeal before the Court of Appeals when the latter filed its
On 7 June 2002, the Court of Appeals Special Sixteenth Division Petition for Review under Rule 42. It is reasoned that the decision of the
rendered the Decision now assailed before this Court. The appellate
16 Makati RTC was rendered in the exercise
court reversed the RTC and declared that the Corporation was not liable _______________
to pay business taxes to the City of Makati. In doing so, the Court of
17
Citing among others, Madrigal v. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 414; and Lynch v. Turrish, 264 US
Appeals delved into jurisprudential definitions of
18
221.
_______________ 19 Id., at p. 21.
20 Ibid.
Rollo, p. 106.
10
21 In a Resolution dated 28 August 2002.
Ibid.
11
22 Rollo, p. 33.
In a Resolution dated 18 May 2000.
12
Id., at p. 64.
13
267
Id., at p. 144.
14
to defray the expenses in the maintenance of the common areas and There are discernible conflicting views on the issue. The first, as
management the condominium. 20
expressed by the Court of Appeals, holds that the RTC, in reviewing
Upon denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, the City Treasurer
21
denials of protests by local treasurers, exercises appellate jurisdiction.
elevated the present Petition for Review under Rule 45. It is argued that This position is anchored on the language of Section 195 of the Local
the Corporation is engaged in business, for the dues collected from the Government Code which states that the remedy of the taxpayer whose
different unit owners is utilized towards the beautification and protest is denied by the local treasurer is “to appeal with the court of
maintenance of the Condominium, resulting in “full appreciative living competent jurisdiction.” Apparently though, the Local Government Code
24
values” for the condominium units which would command better market does not elaborate on how such “appeal” should be undertaken.
_______________
prices should they be sold in the future. The City Treasurer likewise
avers that the rationale for business taxes is not on the income received “This Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the manner and
23
or profit earned by the business, but the privilege to engage in business. within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The failure
The fact that the Corporation is empowered “to acquire, own, hold, enjoy, to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right to appeal of
a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. The
lease, operate and maintain, and to convey sell, transfer or otherwise
right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
dispose of real or personal property” allegedly qualifies “as incident to the privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
fact of [the Corporation’s] act of engaging in business. 22
the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirement of the
rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.” See Balgami v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation
131287, 9 December 2004, 445 SCRA 591.
24See Section 195, Rep. Act No. 7160 (1991). of courts belongs to the legislature. While the traditional notion of
appellate jurisdiction connotes judicial review over lower court decisions,
268 it has to yield to statutory redefinitions that clearly expand its breadth to
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED encompass even review of decisions of officers in the executive branches
Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation of government.
The other view, as maintained by the City Treasurer, is that the Yet significantly, the Local Government Code, or any other statute for
jurisdiction exercised by the RTC is original in character. This is the first that matter, does not expressly confer appellate jurisdiction on the part of
time that the position has been presented to the court for adjudication. regional trial courts from the denial of a tax protest by a local treasurer.
Still, this argument does find jurisprudential mooring in our ruling On the other hand, Section 22 of B.P. 129 expressly delineates the
in Garcia v. De Jesus, where the Court proffered the following distinction
25
appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, confining as it does
between original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction: “Original said appellate jurisdiction to cases decided by Metropolitan, Municipal,
jurisdiction is the power of the Court to take judicial cognizance of a case and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Unlike in the case of the Court of
instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions provided Appeals, B.P. 129 does not confer appellate jurisdiction on Regional Trial
by law. Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a Court higher in rank to Courts over rulings made by non-judicial entities.
re-examine the final order or judgment of a lower Court which tried the From these premises, it is evident that the stance of the City
case now elevated for judicial review.” 26
Treasurer is correct as a matter of law, and that the proper remedy of the
The quoted definitions were taken from the commentaries of the Corporation from the RTC judgment is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41
esteemed Justice Florenz Regalado. With the definitions as beacon, the to the Court of Appeals. However, we make this pronouncement subject
review taken by the RTC over the denial of the protest by the local to two important qualifications. First, in this particular case there are
treasurer would fall within that court’s original jurisdiction. In short, the nonetheless significant reasons for the Court to overlook the procedural
review is the initial judicial cognizance of the matter. Moreover, labeling error and ultimately uphold the adjudication of the jurisdiction exercised
the said review as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction is inappropriate, by the Court of Appeals in this case. Second, the doctrinal weight of the
since the denial of the protest is not the judgment or order of a lower pronouncement is confined to cases and controversies that emerged prior
court, but of a local government official. to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9282, the law which expanded the
The stringent concept of original jurisdiction may seemingly be jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
neutered by Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9282 definitively proves in its Section 7(a)(3) that
which lists a slew of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial tribunals the CTA exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal
or their officers whose decisions may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. However, the basic law of cases original decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their
jurisdiction, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129), ineluctably confers27
originally or appellate jurisdiction. Moreover, the provision also states
appellate jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over final rulings of quasi- that the review is triggered “by filing a petition
270
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, by explicitly
using the phrase “appellate jurisdiction.” The power to create or
28
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
characterize jurisdiction Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation
_______________ for review under a procedure analogous to that provided for under Rule
42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.”29
G.R. Nos. 88158 & 97108-09, 4 March 1992, 206 SCRA 779.
Republic Act No. 9282, however, would not apply to this case simply
25
Ibid.
26
Otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and since amended
27
because it arose prior to the effectivity of that law. To declare otherwise
several times. would be to institute a jurisdictional rule derived not from express
See Section 9, B.P. 129.
28
statutory grant, but from implication. The jurisdiction of a court to take
cognizance of a case should be clearly conferred and should not be deemed
269
to exist on mere implications, and this settled rule would be needlessly
30
Be that as it may, characteristic of all procedural rules is adherence to Evidently, by employing the Rule 42 mode of review, the Corporation
the precept that they should not be enforced blindly, especially if faced a greater risk of having its petition rejected by the Court of Appeals
mechanical application would defeat the higher ends that animates our as compared to having filed an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. This was
civil procedure—the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every not an error that worked to the prejudice of the City Treasurer.
action and proceeding. Indeed, we have repeatedly upheld—and utilized
31 We now proceed to the substantive issue, on whether the City of
ourselves—the discretion of courts to nonetheless take cognizance of Makati may collect business taxes on condominium corporations.
petitions raised on an erroneous mode of appeal and instead treat these We begin with an overview of the power of a local government unit to
petitions in the manner as they should have appropriately been impose business taxes.
filed. The Court of Appeals
32 The power of local government units to impose taxes within its
_______________ territorial jurisdiction derives from the Constitution itself, which
recognizes the power of these units “to create its own sources of
29See Section 9, Rep. Act No. 9282. _______________
30Philippine Ports Authority v. Fuentes, G.R. No. 91259, 16 April 1991, 195 SCRA 790,
796, citing Victorias Milling Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 66381, Feburary 29, 1984.
SCRA 392; Rubenito v. Lagata, G.R. No. 140959, December 21, 2004, 447 SCRA 417.
31See Section 6, Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Section 13, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
33
32“The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid technical sense, as they
See Section 6, Rule 42, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
34
are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. If a technical and rigid
See Section 9, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
35
enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Consequently, in the interest
of justice, the instant petition for review may be treated as a special civil action on
272
certiorari. [A] petition which should have been brought under Rule 65 and not under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, is not an inflexible rule. The strict application of procedural 272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on the merits.” Ramiscal
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 140576-99, 13 December 2004, 446 SCRA
Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation
166. See also e.g., Abcede v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-42400, revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines
August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 53; Lagua v. Cusi, G.R. No. L-44649, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic
260; Longos Rural Waterworks v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135496, July 30, 2002, 385 policy of local autonomy.” These guidelines and limitations as provided
36
271 by Congress are in main contained in the Local Government Code of 1991
(the “Code”), which provides for comprehensive instances when and how
VOL. 474, OCTOBER 25, 2005 271
local government units may impose taxes. The significant limitations are
Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation enumerated primarily in Section 133 of the Code, which include among
could very well have treated the Corporation’s petition for review as an others, a prohibition on the imposition of income taxes except when levied
ordinary appeal. on banks and other financial institutions. None of the other general
37
Moreover, we recognize that the Corporation’s error in elevating the limitations under Section 133 find application to the case at bar.
RTC decision for review via Rule 42 actually worked to the benefit of the The most well-known mode of local government taxation is perhaps
City Treasurer. There is wider latitude on the part of the Court of the real property tax, which is governed by Title II, Book II of the Code,
Appeals to refuse cognizance over a petition for review under Rule 42 and which bears no application in this case. A different set of provisions,
than it would have over an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. Under Section found under Title I of Book II, governs other taxes imposable by local
13, Rule 41, the stated grounds for the dismissal of an ordinary appeal government units, including business taxes. Under Section 151 of the
prior to the transmission of the case records are when the appeal was Code, cities such as Makati are authorized to levy the same taxes fees
taken out of time or when the docket fees were not paid. On the other 33
and charges as provinces and municipalities. It is in Article II, Title II,
hand, Section 6, Rule 42 provides that in order that the Court of Appeals Book II of the Code, governing municipal taxes, where the provisions on
may allow due course to the petition for review, it must first make business taxation relevant to this petition may be found. 38
a prima facie finding that the lower court has committed an error that Section 143 of the Code specifically enumerates several types of
would warrant the reversal or modification of the decision under business on which municipalities and cities may impose taxes. These
review. There is no similar requirement of a prima facie determination of
34
include manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, dealers of any article of
commerce of whatever nature; those engaged in the export or commerce T-shirt printing shops; stables; travel agencies; vaciador shops; veterinary clinics;
of essential commodities; contractors and other independent contractors; video rentals and/or coverage services; dancing schools/speed reading/EDP;
banks and financial institutions; and peddlers engaged in the sale of any
274
merchandise or article of commerce. Moreover, the local sanggunian is
also authorized to impose 274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________ Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation
nursery, vocational and other schools not regulated by the Department of
36See Section 5, Article X, Constitution. Education, Culture and Sports, (DECS), day care centers; etc. 39
taxes on the business of printing and publication, on businesses enjoying a franchise, and on
persons exercising a profession requiring government examination. While these are restaurant owners and operators, real estate dealers, and lessors of real
40
admittedly taxes imposed on businesses, they find no relevance to the present case. estate to business taxes.
41
business as provided in the Local Government Code. And to hold that incorporation or by-laws of the condominium corporation from containing
they do is to ignore the very statutory nature of a condominium any provisions which are contrary to the provisions of the Condominium
corporation. Act, the enabling or master deed, or the declaration of restrictions of the
The creation of the condominium corporation is sanctioned by condominium project. 52
Republic Act No. 4726, otherwise known as the Condominium Act. Under _______________
the law, a condominium is an interest in real property consisting of a
Ibid.
separate interest in a unit in a residential, industrial or commercial
47
48 “The suggestion has been cautiously advanced that the unit owners might form a
building and an undivided interest in common, directly or indirectly, in corporation to operate the condominium and in this way probably avoid unlimited personal
the land on which it is located and in other common areas of the liability.” See §12, Alberto Ferrer and Karl Stecher, I Law of Condominium (1967 ed.).
building. To enable the orderly administration over these common areas
46
49 See Section 2, Rep. Act No. 4726.
See Section 9(d), Rep. Act No. 4726.
which are jointly owned by the various unit owners, the Condominium
50
necessary expenses that arise from the maintenance of the Condominium or oppressive methods are used in assessing and collecting taxes. The 57
Project. Just as much is confirmed by Section 1, Article V of the Amended fact that the Corporation did not fall within the enumerated classes of
By-Laws, which enumerate the particular expenses to be defrayed by the taxable businesses under either the Local Government Code or the
regular assessments collected from the unit owners. These would include Makati Revenue Code already forewarns that a clear demonstration is
the salaries of the employees of the Corporation, and the cost of essential on the part of the City Treasurer on why the Corporation should
maintenance and ordinary repairs of the common areas. 54 be taxed anyway. “Full appreciative living values” is nothing but blather
The City Treasurer nonetheless contends that the collection of these in search of meaning, and to impose a tax hinged on that standard is both
assessments and dues are “with the end view of getting full appreciative arbitrary and oppressive.
living values” for the condominium units, and as a result, profit is The City Treasurer also contends that the fact that the Corporation is
obtained once these units are sold at higher prices. The Court cites with engaged in business is evinced by the Articles of Incorporation, which
approval the two counterpoints raised by the Court of Appeals in specifically empowers the Corporation “to acquire, own,
rejecting this contention. First, if any profit is obtained by the sale of the _______________
units, it accrues not to the corporation but to the unit owner. Second, if
“This is not to say though that the constitutional injunction against deprivation of
the unit owner does obtain profit from the sale of the corporation, the
56
property without due process of law may be passed over under the guise of the taxing power,
owner is already required to pay capital gains tax on the appreciated except when the taking of the property is in the lawful exercise of the taxing power, as when
value of the condominium unit. 55
(1) the tax is for a public purpose; (2) the rule on uniformity of taxation is observed; (3)
Moreover, the logic on this point of the City Treasurer is baffling. By either the person or property taxed is within the jurisdiction of the government levying the
tax; and (4) in the assessment and collection of certain kinds of taxes notice and opportunity
this rationale, every Makati City car owner may be considered as being
for hearing are provided.” Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v. Municipality of Tanauan, 161
engaged in business, since the repairs or improvements on the car may be Phil. 591; 69 SCRA 460 (1976).
deemed oriented towards appreciating the value of the car upon resale. 57Ibid.
There is an evident distinction between persons who spend on repairs
and improvements on their personal and real property for the purpose of 282
increasing its resale 282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________ Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation
hold, enjoy, lease, operate and maintain, and to convey, sell, transfer
53 See RTC Records, pp. 44-46.
54 Id., at pp. 35-36. mortgage or otherwise dispose of real or personal property.” What the 58
55 Rollo, p. 20. City Treasurer fails to add is that every corporation organized under the
Corporation Code is so specifically empowered. Section 36(7) of the
59
Corporation Code states that every corporation incorporated under the not make the arrangement a partnership. The Federal regulations specifically prescribe
that a joint undertaking merely to share expenses is not a partnership.
Code has the power and capacity “to purchase, receive, take or grant,
Mere co-ownership or property which is maintained, kept in repair, and rented or
hold, convey, sell, lease, pledge, mortgage and otherwise deal with such leased does not constitute a partnership. . . . Tenants in common may, however, be partners
real and personal property . . . as the transaction of the lawful business of if they actively carry on a trade, business, financial operation or venture and divide the
the corporation may reasonably and necessarily require . . . .” Without 60 profits thereof.
Consequently a partnership may be created if the co-owners of an apartment building
this power, corporations, as juridical persons, would be deprived of the
lease space and provide services to the occupants. The principal question is whether the
capacity to engage in most meaningful legal relations. owners are engaged in a business for profit. . . . Accordingly where portions of a
Again, whatever capacity the Corporation may have pursuant to its condominium project are leased or rented as barber shops, drug stores, beauty shops, or
power to exercise acts of ownership over personal and real property is other comer enterprises, the income therefrom will be subject to taxation.
If the condominium owners are conducting a business for profit, it must also be
limited by its stated corporate purposes, which are by themselves further
determined whether the business is a partnership or a corporation. If it meets the tests
limited by the Condominium Act. A condominium corporation, while prescribed for a corporate entity by the Revenue Service its income will be subject to
enjoying such powers of ownership, is prohibited by law from transacting taxation as a corporation, otherwise it will be considered as some other form of taxable
its properties for the purpose of gainful profit. entity.
See Ferrer and Stecher, supra note 48, at §454. Under Philippine law though, a
Accordingly, and with a significant degree of comfort, we hold that
condominium corporation may not adopt purposes other than those provided under the
condominium corporations are generally exempt from local business Condominium Act. Infra.
taxation under the Local Government Code, irrespective of any local
ordinance that seeks to declare otherwise. 284
Still, we can note a possible exception to the rule. It is not unthinkable 284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
that the unit owners of a condominium would band together to engage in Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation
activities for profit under the shelter of the condominium reason why the condominium corporation may be made liable by the local
corporation. Such activity would be prohibited un-
61
government unit for business taxes. Even though such activities would be
_______________
considered as ultra vires, since they are engaged in beyond the legal
58Rollo, p. 33. capacity of the condominium corporation, the principle of estoppel would
62
59Batas Pambansa Blg. 68. preclude the corporation or its officers and members from invoking the
60See Section 36(7), Corporation Code. void nature of its undertakings for profit as a means of acquitting itself of
61Indeed, at least one commentator on American condominium law has offered the tax liability.
following explanation on how this may be accomplished:
Under certain conditions it is possible for the owners of a condominium project to engage in a business, Still, the City Treasurer has not posited the claim that the
the income of which would be subject to the Federal income tax. . . . To meet these conditions, however, Corporation is engaged in business activities beyond the statutory
the owners of the condominium, acting through their asso
purposes of a condominium corporation. The assessment appears to be
283 based solely on the Corporation’s collection of assessments from unit
VOL. 474, OCTOBER 25, 2005 283 owners, such assessments being utilized to defray the necessary expenses
for the Condominium Project and the common areas. There is no
Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation contemplation of business, no orientation towards profit in this case.
der the Condominium Act, but if the fact is established, we see no Hence, the assailed tax assessment has no basis under the Local
_______________
Government Code or the Makati Revenue Code, and the insistence of the
ciation of owners, must generally fall into one of two general classifications insofar as the city in its collection of the void tax constitutes an attempt at deprivation
Internal Revenue Code is concerned, either as a partnership or as a corporation. of property without due process of law.
The Federal income tax regulations define a partnership as including a syndicate, WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
group, pool, joint venture or other unincorporated organization through or by means of SO ORDERED.
which any business, financial operation or venture is carried on and which is not a
corporation, trust or estate within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,concur.
A corporation includes association, which are taxable as corporation, and joint-stock Chico-Nazario, J.,On Leave.
companies. . . . The individual apartment owners are generally tenants in common of the
common areas and joint owners of the personal property of the organization. Almost Petition denied.
invariably they are not partners and the mere fact that they agree to share expenses does
Notes.—A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct
of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issu-
_______________
62“The term ultra vires refers to an act outside or beyond corporate powers, including
those that may ostensibly be within such powers but are, by general or special laws,
prohibited or declared illegal.” Twin Towers Condominium Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 446
Phil. 280; 398 SCRA 205 (2003).
285
Condominium Corporation. Inasmuch as ownership is conveyed only upon full The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporation, in both cases,
payment of the purchase price, it necessarily follows that a purchaser of a unit is a condominium corporation within the meaning of Republic Act No.
who has not paid the full purchase price thereof is not the owner of the unit and 4726 in relation to a duly registered Amended Master Deed with
consequently is not a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation. Declaration of Restrictions of the Sunset View Condominium Project
Same, Same, Same, Same; Same; Ownership of a unit is a condition to located at 2230 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City of which said petitioner is
become a shareholder in the condominium corporation; “Separate interest” in a the Management Body holding title to all the common and limited
condominium, construed.—Pursuant to the above statutory provision, ownership
common areas. 2
because nobody can be a shareholder unless he is the owner of a unit and Commercial, Incorporated bought the ‘“Solana” unit on installment from
when he ceases to be the owner, be also ceases automatically to be a shareholder. the Tower Builders, Inc. The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium
4
its opposition thereto. The motion to dismiss was granted on December After the private respondent had filed her answer to the opposition to
11, 1979 by the respondent Judge who opined that the private respondent the motion to dismiss of the petitioner, the trial court issued an order
10
is, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4726. a “holder of a separate dated August 13, 1979 denying the motion to dismiss, The private11
interest” and consequently, a shareholder of the plaintiff condominium respondent’s motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the trial
corporation; and that “the case should be properly filed with the court in its Order dated September 19, 1979. 12
The petitioner filed its amended complaint dated July 16, 1979 docketed Annex “J”, Rollo, p. 77.
11
as Civil Case No. 14127 of Branch I of the City Annex “M”, Rollo, p. 84.
12
299
_______________ VOL. 104, APRIL 27, 1981 299
3Deed of Assignment, Rollo of G.R. No. 52361, pp. 28-29.
Sunset View Condominium Corp. vs. Campos, Jr.
4Contract to Buy and Sell, Idem., Rollo, pp 30-33. The private respondent then appealed pursuant to Section 10 of Rule 40
298 of the Rules of Court to the Court of First Instance, where the appeal was
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED docketed as Civil Case No. 7530-P. The petitioner filed its “Motion to
Sunset View Condominium Corp. vs. Campos, Jr. Dismiss Appeal” on the ground that the order of the trial court appealed
Court of Pasay City for the collection of overdue accounts on assessments from is interlocutory. 13
and insurance premiums and the interest thereon amounting to The motion to dismiss the appeal was denied and the parties were
P6,168.06 as of March 31, 1979 against the private respondent Lim Siu ordered to submit their respective memorandum on the issue raised
Leng to whom was assigned on July 11, 1977 a unit called “Alegria” of
5
before the trial court and on the disputed order of the trial judge. After
14
dispute between her and the petitioner corporation; that she has denied in an order dated January 14, 1980. Hence this petition for
16
automatically become, as a purchaser of the condominium unit, a certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
stockholder of the petitioner pursuant to Section 2 of the Condominium Judge.
Act, Republic Act No. 4726; that the dispute is intra-corporate and is Issues Common to Both Cases
consequently under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities & It is admitted that the private respondents in both cases have not yet
Exchange Commission as provided in Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A. 8
fully paid the purchase price of their units.
The petitioner filed its opposition thereto, alleging that the private The identical issues raised in both petitions are the following:
respondent who had not fully paid for the unit was not the owner thereof,
consequently was not the holder of a separate interest which would make 1. 1.Is a purchaser of a condominium unit in the condominium project
managed by the petitioner, who has not yet fully paid the purchase
price thereof, automatically a stockholder of the petitioner The Amended Master Deeds in these cases, which were duly registered in
Condominium Corporation? the Register of Deeds, and which contain, by
2. 2.Is it the regular court or the Securities & Exchange Commission that 301
has jurisdiction over cases for collection of assessments assessed by the VOL. 104, APRIL 27, 1981 301
Condominium Corporation on
Sunset View Condominium Corp. vs. Campos, Jr.
________________
1. mandate of Section 4, a statement of the exact nature of the interest
Annex “O”, Rollo, pp 87-89.
13
acquired by, a purchaser of a unit, provide in Section 6 of Part I:
Annex “R”, Rollo, p. 102.
14
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Amended Master Deeds likewise provide in Section 7 (b), thus:
“(b) All unit owners shall of necessity become stockholders of the Condominium
Sunset View Condominium Corp. vs. Campos, Jr. Corporation. TOWER shall acquire all the shares of stock of SUNSET VIEW and
shall allocate the said shares to the units in proportion to the appurtenant
1. condominium units the full purchase price of which has not been paid? interest in the COMMON AREAS and LIMITED COMMON AREAS as provided
in Section 6 b) above. Said shares allocated are mere appurtenances of each unit,
and, therefore, the same cannot be transferred, conveyed, encumbered or
The private respondents in both cases argue that every purchaser of a otherwise disposed of separately from the Unit x x x.” 18
condominium unit, regardless of whether or not he has fully paid the It is clear from the above-quoted provisions of the Master Deeds that the
purchase price, is a “holder of a separate interest” mentioned in Section 2 shareholding in the Condominium Corporation is inseparable from the
of Republic Act No. 4726, otherwise known as “The Condominium Act” unit to which it is only an appurtenant, and that only the owner of a unit
and is automatically a shareholder of the condominium corporation. is a shareholder in the Condominium Corporation.
The contention has no merit. Section 5 of the Condominium Act Subparagraph (a) of Part I, Section 6, of the Master Deeds determines
expressly provides that the shareholding in the Condominium when and under what conditions ownership of a unit is acquired by a
Corporation will be conveyed only in a proper case Said Section 5 purchaser thus:
provides: “(a) The purchaser of a unit shall acquire title or ownership of such Unit, subject
“Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or other space to the terms and conditions of the instrument conveying the unit to such
therein, shall include the transfer or conveyance of the undivided interests in the purchaser and to the terms and conditions of any subsequent conveyance under
common areas or, in a proper case, the membership or shareholding in the which the purchaser takes title to the Unit, and subject further to this MASTER
condominium corporation x x x.” DEED x x x.” 19
“The provisions of this Act shall apply to property divided or to be divided into 302
condominium only if there shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds of the
province or city in which the property lies and duly annotated in the 302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
corresponding certificate of title of the land x x x an enabling or master deed Sunset View Condominium Corp. vs. Campos, Jr.
which shall contain, among others, the following: The instrument conveying the unit “Solana” in G.R. NO. 52361 is the
xxx “Contract to Buy and Sell” dated September 13, 1977, Annex “D”, while
“(d) A statement of the exact nature of the interest acquired or to be acquired
that conveying the unit “Alegria” in G.R. NO. 52524 is the “Contract to
by the purchaser in the separate units and in the common areas of the
condominium project x x x.” Buy and Sell” dated May 12, 1976, Annex “C”. In both deeds of
conveyance, it is provided:
“4. Upon full payment by the BUYER of the total purchase price and full Inasmuch as the private respondents are not shareholders of the
compliance by the BUYER of all its obligations herein, the SELLER will convey petitioner condominium corporation, the instant cases, for collection
unto the BUYER, as soon as practicable after completion of the construction, full cannot be a “controversy arising out of intracorporate or partnership
and absolute title in and to the subject unit, to the shares of stock pertaining
relations between and among stockholders, members or associates;
thereto and to all rights and interests in connection therewith x x x.”
between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or
20
The assigned errors can more conveniently be restated into the following: More specifically, Pres. Decree No. 902-A grants to the Commission in
1) whether or not the respondent Commission validly approved the paragraph 1(1), Section 6 the power:
alleged unauthorized resolution or decision made by Mr. Norberto B. Ruiz “SEC.6.
on the revocation case; and 2) whether or not the appeal, SEC-AC No. 297 xxx xxx xxx
1) To suspend or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the franchises or
was correctly treated as a motion for reconsideration and, thereafter,
certificate of registration of corporations, partnerships or associations, upon any
dismissed. of the grounds, provided by law, including the following:
The petitioner essentially questions the authority of Mr. Ruiz to 1) Fraud in procuring its certificate of registration;”
decide. It was Mr. Ruiz who was assigned the case of PED No. 88-0418 for
investigation and prosecution. Accordingly, Mr. Ruiz filed a petition (SEC 574
No. 3601) before the Securities Investigation and Clearance Department 574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
(SICD) of the SEC. It is argued that Mr. Ruiz acted as prosecutor and Skyworld Condominium Owners Association, Inc. vs. Securities and
judge over the case, hence, he issued the resolution without authority and
Exchange Commission
with grave abuse of discretion. He allegedly went beyond the duties
xxx xxx xxx
required of a member of the PED which are
The Commission can validly delegate the authority to exercise the specific “SEC.6. The Prosecution and Enforcement Department shall have, subject to the
powers assigned to it by law. The final paragraph of Section 6, Pres. Commission’s control and supervision, the exclusive authority to investigate, on
Decree No. 902-A states: complaint or motu proprio, any act or omission of the Board of Directors/Trustees
“In the exercise of the foregoing authority and jurisdiction of the Commission, of corporations, or of partnerships, or of other associations, or of their
hearings shall be conducted by the Commission or by a Commissioner or by such stockholders, officers or partners, including any fraudulent devices, schemes or
other bodies, boards, committees and/or officers as may be created or designated representations, in violation of any law or rules and regulations administered and
by the Commission for the purpose. x x x” enforced by the Commission; to file and prosecute in accordance with law and
rules and regulations issued by the Commission and in appropriate cases, the
In the consolidated cases, the Commission empowered the PED to corresponding criminal or civil case before the Commission or the proper court or
body upon prima facie finding of violation of any laws or rules and regulations
conduct the hearing and to decide on the revocation of a certificate of
administered and enforced by the Commission; and to perform such other powers
registration. The task was assigned to Mr. Ruiz for and in behalf of the and functions as may be provided by law or duly delegated to it by the
Commission. Commission.”
It is true that Mr. Ruiz signed a petition with the BSCC as a relator xxx xxx x x x (Emphasis supplied)
prior to the consolidation of the two cases. However, that petition was
apparently disregarded. Mr. Ruiz was validly authorized to handle the The action of Mr. Ruiz was still within the ambit of the investigative
two cases simultaneously filed by the private parties themselves against authority given to him by the Commission under its delegated power to
each other. It must be recalled that in PED No. 88-0418, BSCC pursued revoke, after proper notice and hearing, a certificate of registration of any
its case by itself and not as a mere relator suing through the help of the corporation on the ground of fraud in procuring the certificate of
PED. A private entity is not prohibited from prosecuting its action for registration (Section 6, 1[1], Pres. Decree No. 902-A as amended).
revocation of registration by itself. Otherwise, the petition of SCOAI At the time the consolidated cases were filed and tried, the SEC Rules
against the BSCC also seeking the revocation of the latter’s registration of Procedure (effective July 12, 1977) did not contain any provision
would not have been taken cognizance of by the SEC on the ground that specifically designating the body or officer who should hear and decide
the case should have been prosecuted by the Commission upon the suits for suspension or revocation of
relation of SCOAI. Under the old rules, the Commission may, motu 576
proprio,commence such an action (Section 3(c), Rule XX, SEC Rules of 576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Procedure [1977]; See also Section 2(a) and (b), Rule XX, SEC Revised Skyworld Condominium Owners Association, Inc. vs. Securities and
Rules of Procedure [1989]). Commencement of a similar action by a
Exchange Commission
private citizen or corporation is not precluded.
franchise or certificates of registration. No amendments were yet infused
In judging the merits of the case at the instance of the Commission,
into the rules to keep up with the changes introduced by Pres. Decree No.
Mr. Ruiz acted only as a trier of the facts presented to him and not as a
1758. The Commission had to rely on a particular office to hear the case
prosecutor at the same time. The resolution arrived at was adopted by
on September 11, 1989.
the Commission, en banc as its own decision, upon its approval.
575
The Revised SEC Rules of Procedure (1989) that designates the body
(SICD) before which, actions for suspension or revocation of franchise or
VOL. 211,JULY17,1992 575
certificate of registration of a corporation should be filed took effect only
Skyworld Condominium Owners Association, Inc. vs. Securities and on October 29, 1989 (See Section 2[c], Rule XX). To require the specified
Exchange Commission body to take over the adjudication after the case was ready for decision
The Court agrees with the analysis of the respondent Commission that was improper and impractical.
the petitioner was barred by estoppel by laches from repudiating the We take this occasion to reiterate our ruling on the validity of the
jurisdiction of the hearing officer to whom it has submitted itself and delegation of the power to hold a hearing. In American Tobacco Company
before whom it presented evidence by way of memorandum. v. Director of Patents, 67 SCRA 287 (1975), where the authority of the
The petitioner alleges further that Mr. Ruiz went beyond the limited Director of Patents to assign hearing officers to receive evidence was
powers to investigate and to prosecute granted to the PED by Pres. questioned, we ruled:
Decree No. 902-A as amended by Pres. Decree No. 1758 (1981). “Thus it is well-settled that while the power resides solely in the administrative
The pertinent provision, Section 6 of Pres. Decree No. 1758 states: agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a
hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be In the present case, it was the Commission for whom the PED acted in
made. gathering data in the consolidated cases. The delegation made to the PED
“The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment was done in accordance with law and the resulting recommendation was
and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical
arrived at after notice and hearing. The subsequent approval by the
administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him
Commission, en banc was the ultimate exercise of judgment of the
the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that
the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by Commission. Contrary to the allegation of the petitioner, the approval by
law. the Commission, en banc was regular and valid for having been done in
xxx xxx xxx the exercise of its original jurisdiction on a case involving the right of
“In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on each of the party corporations to exist as an entity (Section 5, Pres.
the myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases,the ultimate decision Decree No. 902-A as amended)
on the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of In view of these, it was also proper for the commission to have treated
Patents.”(Italics supplied, at pp. 295-296) the appeal of the petitioner as a motion for recon-
578
The provisions of Pres. Decree No. 902-A as amended do not prohibit the
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
respondent Commission from designating an officer or a division to hear a
case. The Court reiterates that in the absence in the then rules of the Skyworld Condominium Owners Association, Inc. vs. Securities and
Commission of a provision designating a particular officer or department Exchange Commission
that should try a particular action, the Commission can validly call upon sideration. In doing so, no right of the petitioner to due process was
any of violated.
577 The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion committed by the
VOL. 211,JULY17,1992 577 Commission in deciding in that manner. The Commission properly made
Skyworld Condominium Owners Association, Inc. vs. Securities and a thorough study of the facts presented by the opposing parties, and
exhaustively explained its reasons for sustaining its decision to revoke
Exchange Commission
the certificate of registration of the SCOAI. A reading of the order in
its qualified departments to try a particular action, including the PED to
SEC-AC No. 297 dated September 14, 1990 reveals that its findings are
hear and make a preliminary ruling on the case. This was what the
supported by substantial evidence and justified by the relevant laws and
Commission did to meet the demands of orderly and responsible
jurisprudence.
administration of all the tasks assigned to it as a government agency.
The Court, thus, upholds the finding of the Commission that the
“The reduction of existing delays in regulating agencies requires the elimination
of needless work at top levels. Unnecessary and unimportant details often occupy indispensable requirement that all incorporators of a condominium
far too much of the time and energy of the heads of these agencies and prevent corporation must be shareholders thereof was not satisfactorily complied
full and expeditious consideration of the more important issues. The remedy is a with by the petitioner at the time a certificate of registration was applied
far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers. The subdelegation of power for. (Section 5, Corporation Code of the Philippines [Batas Pambansa Blg.
has been justified by ‘sound principles of organization’ which demand that ‘those 68]; Section 10, Condominium Act [Rep. Act 4726]. To be a shareholder,
at the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more one must necessarily be an owner of a condominium unit. (Sunset View
important questions of policy and practice; and their time be freed, so far as Condominium Corporation v. Campos, Jr., 104 SCRA 295 [1981]) In the
possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of case at bar, it was found by the SEC that only one, Angel Bautista, was
detail.’” (American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents, supra, at page 293-294).
considered to be an owner of a unit in the Skyworld Condominium at the
The Commission can not also be faulted for approving the PED resolution time of incorporation. (Rollo, p. 32)
without the knowledge of the petitioner. The Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions in its section 8
The parties do not participate in the deliberation and decision making provides that a condominium corporation should be organized by a
process. They are not supposed to be present when the SEC deliberates developer “pursuant to the provisions of the Condominium Act and of the
and votes on the action to be taken. Notice is given after the decision is Corporation Code as amended for the purpose of holding files to all
promulgated but not before the Board sits down to act on cases already common areas and managing the project” (See Rollo, p. 158). The Court
heard and awaiting resolution. likewise confirms the analysis of the respondent Commission that
petitioner SCOAI was barred by estoppel from repudiating the resulting
adverse decision after it had voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of 580
the hearing officer in settling the issue of revocation. (Tijam v. 580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968]; Bañaga v. Commission on the People vs. Alacar
Settlement of Land Problems, 181 SCRA 599 [1990]; Sapugay v. Court of The Court sustains the decision of the respondent Commission dated
Appeals, 183 SCRA 464 [1990]; 166 SCRA 657 [1988]; Maersk-Tabacalera December 12, 1989 and the Order dated September 14, 1990 denying the
Shipping Agency (Filipinas), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA motion for reconsideration since no jurisdictional flaw has been found to
646 [1990]; Marquez v. Secretary of justify a reversal.
579
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of grave
VOL. 211,JULY17,1992 579 abuse of discretion committed by the public respondent. The Order
Skyworld Condominium Owners Association, Inc. vs. Securities and revoking and cancelling the certificate of registration of petitioner
Exchange Commission corporation is AFFIRMED.
Labor, 171 SCRA 337 [1989]). SO ORDERED.
The contentions that the private respondent BSCC and the CBC were Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ.,concur.
engaged in forum-shopping and that the prosecution of the SEC
consolidated cases was barred by res judicata deserve scant Petition dismissed.
consideration. Suffice it to state that the actions before the courts Note.—Whether or not a Court has jurisdiction over the subject
commonly involved prayers for restraint and/ or injunction against matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the complaint
SCOAI. The petitions did not seek an administrative inquiry on (Orosa, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 391).
revocation of a certificate of registration. The pertinent issue in the case
at bar is one that is more appropriately dealt with by an administrative
agency such as the SEC. Hence, even if the courts did touch on the right
of a corporation (SCOAI) to exist and to exercise prerogatives as such, the
court decisions would not bind the parties as to prevent a recourse before
the SEC.
The Court finds this petition to be part of a dilatory attempt to stall
the execution of the order revoking and cancelling the certificate of
registration of the Skyworld Condominium Owners Association, Inc. That
petitioner seeks a re-examination of the facts is evident from its
arguments. It is unfortunate for it that courts do not grant a judicial
review much less a factual inquiry absent any showing of arbitrary action
or manifest and grievous error on the part of administrative agencies
regarding the determination of facts and interpretation of laws which
they are entrusted to enforce (Blue Bar Coconut Philippines v. Tantuico,
Jr., 163 SCRA 716 [1988]; Beautifont, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA
481 [1988]; Maximo v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 420 [1990]).
We have further held that:
“The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly performed (Section 5,
m, Rule 131, Rules of Court); and it is ‘particularly strong as regards
administrative agencies x x x vested with powers said to be quasi-judicial in
nature, in connection with the enforcement of laws affecting particular fields of
activity, the proper regulation and/or promotion of which requires a technical or
special training, aside from a good knowledge and grasp of the overall conditions,
relevant to said field obtaining in the nation.’ [Pangasinan Transportation v.
Public Utility Commission, 70 Phil. 221].” (Beautifont, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, at
p. 493).
JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST, petitioner, vs. PR BUILDERS, INC., Medialdea, Ata, Bello, & Guevarra for petitioner.
respondent. Aguirre & Associates Law Firm for respondent.
Property; Ownership; Condominium Act (R.A. No. 4726); The Condominium RESOLUTION
Act expressly allows foreigners to acquire condominium units and shares in
condominium corporations up to not more than 40% of the total and outstanding
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
capital stock of a Filipino-owned or controlled corporation.—Under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 4726, otherwise known as the Condominium Act, foreign nationals can This resolves petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
own Philippine real estate through the purchase of condominium units or On September 3, 2007, the Court rendered a Decision1 in the present
townhouses constituted under the Condominium principle with Condominium case, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Certificates of Title. Section 5 of R.A. No. 4726 states: SECTION 5. Any transfer “WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or store or other space therein, October 30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60981 is REVERSED
shall include the transfer or conveyance of the undivided interest in the common and SET ASIDE. The Order dated August 28, 2000 of HLURB Arbiter Ma.
areas or, in a proper case, the membership or shareholdings in the condominium Perpetua Y. Aquino and Director Belen G. Ceniza in HLRB Case No. IV6-071196-
corporation; Provided, however, That where the common areas in the 0618 is declared NULL and VOID. HLURB Arbiter Aquino and Director Ceniza
condominium project are held by the owners of separate units as co-owners are directed to issue the corresponding certificates of sale in favor of the winning
thereof, no condominium unit therein shall be conveyed or transferred to persons bidder, Holly Properties Realty Corporation. Petitioner is ordered to return
other than Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital stock of to respondent the amount of P2,125,540.00, without interest, in excess of
which belong to Filipino citizens, except in cases of hereditary succession. Where the proceeds of the auction sale delivered to petitioner. After the finality of
the common areas in a condominium project are held by a corporation, herein judgment, the amount of P2,125,540.00 shall earn 6% interest until fully
no transfer or conveyance of a unit shall be valid if the concomitant paid.
transfer of the appurtenant membership or stockholding in the SO ORDERED.” (Emphasis supplied)
2
(e) "To divide" real property means to divide the ownership thereof or (h) Any reasonable restriction not contrary to law, morals or public policy
other interest therein by conveying one or more condominiums therein regarding the right of any condominium owner to alienate or dispose of
but less than the whole thereof. his condominium.
The enabling or master deed may be amended or revoked upon (c) Unless otherwise, provided, the common areas are held in common by
registration of an instrument executed by the registered owner or owners the holders of units, in equal shares, one for each unit.
of the property and consented to by all registered holders of any lien or
encumbrance on the land or building or portion thereof. The term (d) A non-exclusive easement for ingress, egress and support through the
"registered owner" shall include the registered owners of condominiums common areas is appurtenant to each unit and the common areas are
in the project. Until registration of a revocation, the provisions of this Act subject to such easements.
shall continue to apply to such property.
(e) Each condominium owner shall have the exclusive right to paint,
Sec. 5. Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or repaint, tile, wax, paper or otherwise refinish and decorate the inner
store or other space therein, shall include the transfer or conveyance of surfaces of the walls, ceilings, floors, windows and doors bounding his
the undivided interests in the common areas or, in a proper case, the own unit.
membership or shareholdings in the condominium
corporation: Provided, however, That where the common areas in the (f) Each condominium owner shall have the exclusive right to mortgage,
condominium project are owned by the owners of separate units as co- pledge or encumber his condominium and to have the same appraised
owners thereof, no condominium unit therein shall be conveyed or independently of the other condominiums but any obligation incurred by
transferred to persons other than Filipino citizens, or corporations at such condominium owner is personal to him.
least sixty percent of the capital stock of which belong to Filipino citizens,
except in cases of hereditary succession. Where the common areas in a
(g) Each condominium owner has also the absolute right to sell or dispose
condominium project are held by a corporation, no transfer or conveyance
of his condominium unless the master deed contains a requirement that
of a unit shall be valid if the concomitant transfer of the appurtenant
the property be first offered to the condominium owners within a
membership or stockholding in the corporation will cause the alien
reasonable period of time before the same is offered to outside parties;
interest in such corporation to exceed the limits imposed by existing laws.
(e) That the conditions for such partition by sale set forth in the (5) For payment of taxes and special assessments which would be a lien
declaration of restrictions, duly registered in accordance with the terms of upon the entire project or common areas, and for discharge of any lien or
this Act, have been met. encumbrance levied against the entire project or the common areas;
Sec. 9. The owner of a project shall, prior to the conveyance of any (6) For reconstruction of any portion or portions of any damage to or
condominium therein, register a declaration of restrictions relating to destruction of the project;
such project, which restrictions shall constitute a lien upon each
condominium in the project, and shall insure to and bind all (7) The manner for delegation of its powers;
condominium owners in the project. Such liens, unless otherwise
provided, may be enforced by any condominium owner in the project or by
(8) For entry by its officers and agents into any unit when necessary in
the management body of such project. The Register of Deeds shall enter
connection with the maintenance or construction for which such body is
and annotate the declaration of restrictions upon the certificate of title
responsible;
covering the land included within the project, if the land is patented or
registered under the Land Registration or Cadastral Acts.
(9) For a power of attorney to the management body to sell the entire
project for the benefit of all of the owners thereof when partition of the
The declaration of restrictions shall provide for the management of the
project may be authorized under Section 8 of this Act, which said power
project by anyone of the following management bodies: a condominium
shall be binding upon all of the condominium owners regardless of
corporation, an association of the condominium owners, a board of
whether they assume the obligations of the restrictions or not.
governors elected by condominium owners, or a management agent
elected by the owners or by the board named in the declaration. It shall
also provide for voting majorities quorums, notices, meeting date, and (b) The manner and procedure for amending such restrictions: Provided,
other rules governing such body or bodies. That the vote of not less than a majority in interest of the owners is
obtained.
Such declaration of restrictions, among other things, may also provide:
(c) For independent audit of the accounts of the management body;
(a) As to any such management body;
(d) For reasonable assessments to meet authorized expenditures, each
condominium unit to be assessed separately for its share of such expenses
(1) For the powers thereof, including power to enforce the provisions of
in proportion (unless otherwise provided) to its owners fractional interest
the declarations of restrictions;
in any common areas;
(e) For the subordination of the liens securing such assessments to other Sec. 13. Until the enabling or the master deed of the project in which the
liens either generally or specifically described; condominium corporation owns or holds the common area is revoked, the
corporation shall not be voluntarily dissolved through an action for
(f) For conditions, other than those provided for in Sections eight and dissolution under Rule 104 of the Rules of Court except upon a showing:
thirteen of this Act, upon which partition of the project and dissolution of
the condominium corporation may be made. Such right to partition or (a) That three years after damage or destruction to the project in which
dissolution may be conditioned upon failure of the condominium owners the corporation owns or holds the common areas, which damage or
to rebuild within a certain period or upon specified inadequacy of destruction renders a material part thereof unfit for its use prior thereto,
insurance proceeds, or upon specified percentage of damage to the the project has not been rebuilt or repaired substantially to its state prior
building, or upon a decision of an arbitrator, or upon any other to its damage or destruction; or
reasonable condition.
(b) That damage or destruction to the project has rendered one-half or
Sec. 10. Whenever the common areas in a condominium project are held more of the units therein untenantable and that more than thirty percent
by a condominium corporation, such corporation shall constitute the of the members of the corporation, if non-stock, or the shareholders
management body of the project. The corporate purposes of such a representing more than thirty percent of the capital stock entitled to vote,
corporation shall be limited to the holding of the common areas, either in if a stock corporation, are opposed to the repair or reconstruction of the
ownership or any other interest in real property recognized by law, to the project, or
management of the project, and to such other purposes as may be
necessary, incidental or convenient to the accomplishment of said (c) That the project has been in existence in excess of fifty years, that it is
purposes. The articles of incorporation or by-laws of the corporation shall obsolete and uneconomical, and that more than fifty percent of the
not contain any provision contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions members of the corporation, if non-stock, or the stockholders representing
of this Act, the enabling or master deed, or the declaration of restrictions more than fifty percent of the capital stock entitled to vote, if a stock
of the project. Membership in a condominium corporation, regardless of corporation, are opposed to the repair or restoration or remodeling or
whether it is a stock or non-stock corporation, shall not be transferable modernizing of the project; or
separately from the condominium unit of which it is an appurtenance.
When a member or stockholder ceases to own a unit in the project in (d) That the project or a material part thereof has been condemned or
which the condominium corporation owns or holds the common areas, he expropriated and that the project is no longer viable, or that the members
shall automatically cease to be a member or stockholder of the holding in aggregate more than seventy percent interest in the
condominium corporation. corporation, if non-stock, or the stockholders representing more than
seventy percent of the capital stock entitled to vote, if a stock corporation,
Sec. 11. The term of a condominium corporation shall be co-terminus with are opposed to the continuation of the condominium regime after
the duration of the condominium project, the provisions of the expropriation or condemnation of a material portion thereof; or
Corporation Law to the contrary notwithstanding.
(e) That the conditions for such a dissolution set forth in the declaration
Sec. 12. In case of involuntary dissolution of a condominium corporation of restrictions of the project in which the corporation owns of holds the
for any of the causes provided by law, the common areas owned or held by common areas, have been met.
the corporation shall, by way of liquidation, be transferred pro-indiviso
and in proportion to their interest in the corporation to the members or Sec. 14. The condominium corporation may also be dissolved by the
stockholders thereof, subject to the superior rights of the corporation affirmative vote of all the stockholders or members thereof at a general or
creditors. Such transfer or conveyance shall be deemed to be a full special meeting duly called for the purpose: Provided, That all the
liquidation of the interest of such members or stockholders in the requirements of Section sixty-two of the Corporation Law are complied
corporation. After such transfer or conveyance, the provisions of this Act with.
governing undivided co-ownership of, or undivided interest in, the
common areas in condominium projects shall fully apply.
Sec. 15. Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration of restrictions project that such conveyance is in accordance with the provisions of the
upon voluntary dissolution of a condominium corporation in accordance declaration of restrictions of such project.
with the provisions of Sections thirteen and fourteen of this Act, the
corporation shall be deemed to hold a power of attorney from all the In cases of condominium projects registered under the provisions of the
members or stockholders to sell and dispose of their separate interests in Spanish Mortgage Law or Act 3344, as amended, the registration of the
the project and liquidation of the corporation shall be effected by a sale of deed of conveyance of a condominium shall be sufficient if the Register of
the entire project as if the corporation owned the whole thereof, subject to Deeds shall keep the original or signed copy thereof, together with the
the rights of the corporate and of individual condominium creditors. certificate of the management body of the project, and return a copy of
the deed of conveyance to the condominium owner duly acknowledge and
Sec. 16. A condominium corporation shall not, during its existence, sell, stamped by the Register of Deeds in the same manner as in the case of
exchange, lease or otherwise dispose of the common areas owned or held registration of conveyances of real property under said laws.
by it in the condominium project unless authorized by the affirmative
vote of all the stockholders or members. Sec. 19. Where the enabling or master deed provides that the land
included within a condominium project are to be owned in common by the
Sec. 17. Any provision of the Corporation Law to the contrary condominium owners therein, the Register of Deeds may, at the request
notwithstanding, the by-laws of a condominium corporation shall provide of all the condominium owners and upon surrender of all their
that a stockholder or member shall not be entitled to demand payment of "condominium owner's" copies, cancel the certificates of title of the
his shares or interest in those cases where such right is granted under property and issue a new one in the name of said condominium owners as
the Corporation Law unless he consents to sell his separate interest in pro-indiviso co-owners thereof.
the project to the corporation or to any purchaser of the corporation's
choice who shall also buy from the corporation the dissenting member or Sec. 20. An assessment upon any condominium made in accordance with
stockholder's interest. In case of disagreement as to price, the procedure a duly registered declaration of restrictions shall be an obligation of the
set forth in the appropriate provision of the Corporation Law for owner thereof at the time the assessment is made. The amount of any
valuation of shares shall be followed. The corporation shall have two such assessment plus any other charges thereon, such as interest, costs
years within which to pay for the shares or furnish a purchaser of its (including attorney's fees) and penalties, as such may be provided for in
choice from the time of award. All expenses incurred in the liquidation of the declaration of restrictions, shall be and become a lien upon the
the interest of the dissenting member or stockholder shall be borne by condominium assessed when the management body causes a notice of
him. assessment to be registered with the Register of Deeds of the city or
province where such condominium project is located. The notice shall
Sec. 18. Upon registration of an instrument conveying a condominium, state the amount of such assessment and such other charges thereon a
the Register of Deeds shall, upon payment of the proper fees, enter and may be authorized by the declaration of restrictions, a description of the
annotate the conveyance on the certificate of title covering the land condominium, unit against which same has been assessed, and the name
included within the project and the transferee shall be entitled to the of the registered owner thereof. Such notice shall be signed by an
issuance of a "condominium owner's" copy of the pertinent portion of such authorized representative of the management body or as otherwise
certificate of title. Said "condominium owner's" copy need not reproduce provided in the declaration of restrictions. Upon payment of said
the ownership status or series of transactions in force or annotated with assessment and charges or other satisfaction thereof, the management
respect to other condominiums in the project. A copy of the description of body shall cause to be registered a release of the lien.
the land, a brief description of the condominium conveyed, name and
personal circumstances of the condominium owner would be sufficient for Such lien shall be superior to all other liens registered subsequent to the
purposes of the "condominium owner's" copy of the certificate of title. No registration of said notice of assessment except real property tax liens
conveyance of condominiums or part thereof, subsequent to the original and except that the declaration of restrictions may provide for the
conveyance thereof from the owner of the project, shall be registered subordination thereof to any other liens and encumbrances.
unless accompanied by a certificate of the management body of the
Such liens may be enforced in the same manner provided for by law for his property. Upon receipt of a copy of the decree, the Register of Deeds
the judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgages of real property. shall enter and annotate the same on the pertinent certificate of title.
Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration of restrictions, the
management body shall have power to bid at foreclosure sale. The Sec. 24. Any deed, declaration or plan for a condominium project shall be
condominium owner shall have the same right of redemption as in cases liberally construed to facilitate the operation of the project, and its
of judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgages. provisions shall be presumed to be independent and severable.
Sec. 21. No labor performed or services or materials furnished with the Sec. 25. Whenever real property has been divided into condominiums,
consent of or at the request of a condominium owner or his agent or his each condominium separately owned shall be separately assessed, for
contractor or subcontractor, shall be the basis of a lien against the purposes of real property taxation and other tax purposes to the owners
condominium of any other condominium owner, unless such other owners thereof and the tax on each such condominium shall constitute a lien
have expressly consented to or requested the performance of such labor or solely thereon.
furnishing of such materials or services. Such express consent shall be
deemed to have been given by the owner of any condominium in the case Sec. 26. All Acts or parts of Acts in conflict or inconsistent with this Act
of emergency repairs of his condominium unit. Labor performed or are hereby amended insofar as condominium and its incidents are
services or materials furnished for the common areas, if duly authorized concerned.
by the management body provided for in a declaration of restrictions
governing the property, shall be deemed to be performed or furnished
Sec. 27. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
with the express consent of each condominium owner. The owner of any
condominium may remove his condominium from a lien against two or
more condominiums or any part thereof by payment to the holder of the Approved: June 18, 1966
lien of the fraction of the total sum secured by such lien which is
attributable to his condominium unit.