Introduction To Law-1

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
SET 1 Questions
1. What is law
Meaning of Law in General

Law -means any rule of action or any system of uniformity
Law is a set of rules and norms of conduct, just and obligatory, promulgated by the competent
authority for the welfare of the people. -
General divisions of law

2 general groups:
1. law in the strict legal sense, which is promulgated and enforced by the state
2. law in the non-legal sense which is not promulgated and enforced by the state.
First
Refers to the state law.
Second
Includes:
· Divine law
· Natural law
· Moral law and
· Physical law
The first four kinds of law

-are comprised in the definition of law as a rule of action
-They apply to men as rational beings.
Physical Law
-operates on all things, including men without regard to the latter’s use of their will power and
intelligence
-It is called law only figuratively speaking.
1. Divine law
is the law of religion and faith which concerns itself with the concept of sin (as contrasted with
crime) and salvation.
-It is formally promulgated by God and revealed or divulged to mankind by means of direct
revelation.
-Under the Old Testament, divine law is embodied in the ten commandments.
-It is believed that these laws were formally given by God through Moses, the great Hebrew
prophet and leader.
-Divine law differs according to what one believes to have been established and communicated
to mankind by revelation.
Thus, to the Mohammedans, divine law is embodied in the Muslim Quoran.
-The sanction of law lies in the assurance of certain rewards and punishments in the present
life or in the life to come.
2. Natural law
The divine inspiration in man of the sense of justice, fairness and righteousness not by divine
revelation or formal promulgation but by the internal dictate of reason alone.
-Ever present and binding on all men everywhere and at all times.
-reasonable basis of state law.
Natural and divine law are very similar, they are not however the same…
Divine law
-Law of religious faith
-Is made known to man by means of direct revelation
Natural law
Said to be impressed in man as the core of his higher self at the very moment of being, or
perhaps even before that.
Moral law
-Totality of norms of good and right conduct growing out of the collective sense of right and
wrong of every community.
-There is no definite legal sanction (punishment imposed by law like imprisonment and or
payment of fines is produced in the form of public displeasure, contempt or even indignation.
-If on the other hand, there is no conformity to the moral norms, there is created spontaneous
social reaction which may be in the form of public pleasure, approval or even joy.
Moral law
-Is not absolute
-It varies with the changing conditions or convictions of the people.
-For example, polygamy is considered immoral 9it is also a crime) in the Philippines, whereas it
is allowed in some parts of the world.
-Today’s fashion in women’s dress are socially allowed but at different times, they would have
been morally condemned.
-Moral law, to a great extent influences or shapes state law.

Physical law
-In the operation or course of nature, there are uniformities of actions and orders of sequence
which are the physical phenomena that we sense and feel.
State Law
-promulgated and enforced by the state . called positive law
-municipal law ,
-civil law or
imperative law.
Law maybe understood in 2 concepts

1. general or abstract concept
2. specific or material sense
Characteristics of Law
1. rule of conduct
2. obligatory
3. promulgated by legitimate authority
4. common observance and benefit
Necessity and functions of law

- Society comes into existence because its members could not live without it.
- The need for internal order is as constant as the need for external defense.
- No society can be stable in which either of these requirements fails to be provided
for.
What does the law do?

- It has been said that law secures justice, resolves conflict , orders society ,protects
interest , controls social relations.
- No society can last without means of social control, without rules of social order
binding on it members.
- The sum of such rules as existing in a given society under whatever particular
forms is what common speech we understand by law.
- Since we find law necessary , every citizen should have an understanding of law.
Sources of law
1. Constitution
2.legislation
3.Administrative or executive orders, regulations and rulings
4. judicial decisions or jurisprudence
5. Custom
1. Philippine Constitution
-Written instrument by which the fundamental powers of the government are established,
limited and defined and
-By which these powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and
useful exercise for the benefit of the people.
· Fundamental
· Supreme
· Highest law of the land.
2.Legislation
- It consists in the declaration of legal rules by a competent authority.
- It is the preponderant source of law in the Philippine
- Acts passed by the legislatures are called enacted or statute law.
- It includes ordinances enacted by local governments.
3.Administrative or Executive Orders, Regulations and Rulings

- Issued by administrative officials under legislative authority.
- Administrative rules and regulations are intended to clarify or explain the law and
carry into effect its general provision
- Administrative acts are valid only when they are not contrary to laws and the
Constitution.
4.Judicial decisions or Jurisprudence

- The decisions of the courts, particularly the Supreme Court applying or interpreting
the laws or the constitution form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
- The decisions of a superior court on a point of law are binding on a point of law are
binding on all subordinate courts. This is called the DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT OR
STARE DECISIS
- The Supreme Court however may reverse or modify any of its previous rulings.
5.Custom
- It consists of those habits and practices through long and uninterrupted usage have
become acknowledged and approved by society as binding rules of conduct.
- It has the force of law when recognized and enforced by the state.
- A custom must be proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence. (Article 12,
Civil Code of the Philippines.
- It may be applied by the courts in the absence of law or statute exactly applicable to
the point in controversy.
- But customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy are not
countenanced.
Other sources
To the above may be added:
· Principles of justice and equity
· Decisions of foreign tribunals
· Opinions of text writers and religion
They are only SUPPLEMENTARY

· RESORTED TO ONLY IN THE ABSENCE OF ALL OTHER SOURCES.
· NOT BINDING ON THE COURTS.
Article 9
No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the laws.
Article 10
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail.
Law is not an end in itself.

It maybe viewed as a means of social control.-the control of behavior that affect others.
2. Explain the Doctrine of Incorporation.

- In relation to Sec 2, Article II of the Constitution which states that:
“The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with
all nations.”
- Doctrine of Incorporation means that the rules of International law form part of the law
of the land and no legislative action is required to make them applicable in a country.
By this doctrine, the Philippines is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.
- It is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provisions of the Constitution or statute of the local state.
- The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly,
the principle of lex posterior derogat priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute
and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law
of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be
invalidated if they are in conflict with the Constitution. (Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,
G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000)
3. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, GR 139465, digest and principles

Facts:
Ø January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country".
Ø Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution;
Ø June 18, 1999, the DOJ received from the DFA U.S. a request for the extradition of
private respondent Mark Jimenez
Ø Private respondent Mark Jimenez request copies of documents of the extradition
request from the secretary of justice
Ø Secretary of Justice denied the request on the grounds that the DOJ is still evaluating
THE documents and It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the
person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court, it contains through grand
jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law and the DOJ is not
in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request.
Ø Mr. Jimenez filed with filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region a petition presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion against the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation
Ø Honorable Ralph C. Lantion ordered the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of
Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation to maintain the status quo
for a period of 20 days from the service of the order.
Ø Hon. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
ordered Hon. Lantion to cease and desist from enforcing the order Due to
transcendental importance
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent be issued a copy of the extradition documents and be given
ample time to explain himself as part of his twin basic due process rights granted by Sec.
3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
HELD:
The court ruled in favor of private respondent. Petitioner is hereby ordered to
furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers,
and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in
administrative proceeding is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of. In essence, procedural due
process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced. This Court will not
tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or
treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections to the
Requested State's non-performance of its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are
insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration.
4. Constitution Article 2, Section 2 [Principles]

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom and amity with all nations.
- Philippines cannot declare war on other countries
- Can only declare an existing state of war as an act of defense
- “Doctrine of Incorporation”- commitment of the state to international laws
- Constitution prevails over treaty (Secretary of Justice v. Lantion)
- Philippines supports other countries in sense of equality, justice and freedom
5. International School Alliance vs. Hon. Quisumbing, digest and principles
FACTS:
● Petitioner: International School Alliance Educators (ISAE)
● Respondents: Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing in his capacity as Secretary of
Labor and Employment (DOLE)
● International School Inc is a domestic educational institution established
primarily for foreign personnel and temporary residents.
● It hires both foreign and local teachers as faculty classifying them as
foreign-hires and local-hires.
● It grants foreign hires benefits for housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes,
and home leave travel allowances, which are not accorded to local hires.
○ Foreign-hires have limited tenure; and local-hires enjoy security of
tenure.
○ Foreign-hires are also paid a salary of 25% more than local-hires,
because of two economic disadvantages:
■ The dislocation factor of foreign hires
■ The lack of security of tenure for foreign hires
● June 1995 bargaining agreements between ISAE and representatives of faculty
of the school concluded in a deadlock.
● The Department of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over the
dispute.
● A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all
or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the
employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of
the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
ISSUE:
● Whether the foreign-hires should be included in the same bargaining unit as the
local-hires.
HELD:
● Point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local-hires was an invalid
classification. No reasonable distinction between services provided between
hires, and this practice of the School contravenes public policy and deserves no
sympathy from the Court.
○ 1987 Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor
is entitled to “humane conditions of work.” These conditions are not
restricted to the physical workplace – the factory, the office or the field –
but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
○ Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.
○ The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution
mandates “to afford labor full protection”. The State has the right and duty
to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are
not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor
contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the
common good.
● While the Court recognizes the need of the School to attract foreign-hires,
salaries should NOT be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires.
The dislocation factor and limited tenure factor can not serve as basis for
distinction in salary rates as both concerns are legally compensated by certain
benefits accorded to them that are not given to local-hires.
● Court agrees that foreign-hires do not belong in the same bargaining unit as
the local-hires. The acceptability of a bargaining unit is whether its collectivity
assure employees of their collective bargaining right. Foreign-hires have not
indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purpose of
collective bargaining.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby
GRANTED IN PART.
6. When is a classification valid?

The equal protection of the laws clause allows for valid classification. This means:
● that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences;
● that it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
● that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
● that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
7. Oposa vs. Factoran, digest and principle

Petitioner: Oposa et al
Respondents: Hon. Fulgencio S. Factoran Jr.
(ADDITIONAL INFORMATION)
● Oposa vs. Factoran is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines which recognizes the doctrine of Intergenerational Responsibility on
the environment in the Philippine legal system.
● The case is a contributor to the development of international environmental law.
● In 2008, Antonio Oposa, a Filipino Lawyer, was awarded by Center for
International Environmental Law for his contributions to the development and
implementation of international environmental law in his native country and
internationally
● FACTS
● In 1990, 44 children, through their parents, sought to make the DENR Secretary
stop issuing licenses to cut timber, invoking their right to a healthy environment.
● The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to
numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining
forests of the country. Petitioners request the defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting on his behalf to:
➔ Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
➔ Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements.
● The petitioners said that the massive commercial logging in the country is
causing vast abuses on rain-forest.They further asserted that the rights of their
generation and the rights of the generations yet unborn to a balanced and
healthful ecology.
● This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
● Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office.
● On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all
logging permits in the country. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel
the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.
● ISSUE
● Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file the case.
● RULING
● YES. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the
legal standing to file the case based on the concept of “intergenerational
responsibility”. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to
preserve that environment for the succeeding generation. In this, the Court
recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of the future generations.
8. What is a disposition? Cite examples.
A disposition is the court’s final ruling on the case. (i.e. convicted, dismissed,
acquitted, expunged, reversed, etc.)
Reference: Legal dictionaries (https://dictionary.findlaw.com/definition/disposition.html,

https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/disposition)
9. Explain the principle of Locus standi. When does a court grant locus standi?
locus standi /or legal standing (right to appear before the/a court) is defined as
a personal and substantial interest in the case- this means that the party a.) has
sustained or b.) will sustain direct injury given the consequences of the case.
(See Oposa v. Factoran G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
10. League of Cities vs. COMELEC, digest and principles

11. What is the Doctrine of Immutability of judgment? What are the exceptions?
The Doctrine of Immutability of Judgment bars courts from modifying
decisions that have already attained finality, even if the purpose of the modification is to
correct errors of fact or law. (source: G.R 194560 LAWPHIL)
Exceptions:
a. Clerical Errors
b. Nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party
c. Void judgements
d. Whenever the circumstances transpires after the finality of the decision rendering
its execution unjust and inequitable.
12. Holy See vs. Del Rosario, Jr., digest and principles
Holy See vs Rosario G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994
Facts:
Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy
See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation
(PRC). The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which
represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his
residence. Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to
respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a
dispute arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to
evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy
See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or
the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned
the P100,000 earnest money.
The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and
damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction
based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner
already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was
forwarded to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.
Ruling:
The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As
expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International
Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition
and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. It was noted in Article 31(A) of the
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be granted
immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action
relating to private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that
the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the
Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a
diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court. Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the
case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate
business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However,
petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit
but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in
the Philippines.
The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concerns is
non-proprietary in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of
Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place
of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent
disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold
the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said
property.
Doctrine:
State Immunity (Jure Gestionis and Jure Imperii). "The state may not be sued without its
consent. The application of the doctrine of state immunity from suit has been restricted to
sovereign government activities (Jure Imperii). The mantle of state immunity cannot be
extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts (Jure Gestionis).
13. Differentiate Jure imperii and Jure gestionis.
Jure imperii - a state is immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts as to its sovereign
or public acts.
Jure gestionis – acts of a state that are private or commercial in nature which nullifies
the concept of absolute immunity from adjudication by foreign courts.
14. American Insurance Association vs. Garamendi, digest and principle

American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (U.S. 2003)
FACTS
• Germany and US entered into an agreement where Germany agreed to make
reparations to Holocaust victims. US made agreements with Austria and France not to
interfere with International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC)
efforts to make reparations to Holocaust victims.
• California, however, required any insurance company that conducts business in
California to disclose insurance policies that existed between 1920 and 1945 under the
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA).
• Insurance companies argued that the federal law preempts state law, and the
district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The court of appeals reversed
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
ISSUE
• Whether or not federal law preempts state law if federal law and state law conflict
HELD
• YES. The HVIRA is preempted by the ICHEIC. State laws should not undermine
federal policy.
15. What are statutes?
A statute is a written law passed by the legislature on the state or federal level. Statutes set
forth general propositions of law that courts apply to specific situations. A statute may forbid a
certain act, direct a certain act, make a declaration, or set forth governmental mechanisms to
aid society.
16. What are the types of statutes?
TYPES OF STATUTES
I. Classification with reference to duration
1. temporary - enacted for a specific time
2. permanent - no specific period of its applicability.
II. Classification with reference to effect

1. statute with immediate effect - becomes effective soon after it coming into existence
2. prospective statute - operates and regulate acts which shall take place in the future.
3. retrospective - operates though from a future date but it impairs certain rights or creates
a new obligation with respect to the acts occurred in the past.
4. retroactive - operates from some past date and regulates the transaction which
occurred in the past.
III. Classification with reference to operation / extent.

1. general statute - applicable through the territory or to all individuals of a particular state.
2. special -making rules for a particular group of individuals.
3. local -having operation only on a specified territory.
IV. Classification w/ reference to nature

1. directory - recommend the doing or not doing of certain acts but does not imposes
penalty on its non-observance.
2. mandatory- mandates the doing or refraining from doing certain acts.
TWO TYPES
Positive - require the doing of an act in a certain manner
negative - refraining from doing a certain act.
V.Classification w/ reference to object
1. enabling statute - making the doing of something lawful w/c is otherwise unlawful.
2. disabling - doing of something unlawful w/c otherwise lawful.
3. permissive - merely permitting the doing of certain acts but w/o commanding.
4. prohibitory - forbid the doing of certain acts.
5. codifying -collecting the single document ang systematically arranging the rules.
6. consolidating - present the whole existing law on a particular subject.
7. curative or validating - cures the defects in the prior law and violate proceedings.
8. repealing - repeals whether expressly or by necessary.
9. amending - to amend
10. declaratory - removing doubts in law.
VI. Classification w/ reference to content

1. substantive - deals w/ the substance of law.
2. adjective/ procedural - deals with the procedure of enforcing the infringement of the
rights and duties.
VII.Classification w/ reference to subject matter / scope.

1. public - regulate the relationship between the private and individual.
2. private - regulate the relationship existing between specific individual.
3. criminal - deals entirely with crimes
4. penal - prescribe punishment for certain criminal acts.
5. punitive - deals w/ offences and punishment.
6. fiscal - deals w/ fiscal or financial matters.
7. real statute - deals w/ property matter.
8. remedial - dealing with the remedies to be granted to an individual in case of violation of
their civil or private rights.
17. Differentiate between law and statute.
Law and Statute both refer to a certain laws that have been made and
implemented in a society to impose discipline, rules, and regulations to be followed by a
community, society, or nation as a whole. Law can be defined as a body of principles
and rules governing the affairs or behavior or society or community. It refers to some
common rules made and followed by the society for a long time which are still being
followed. These are not necessarily written whereas a statute refers to laws which have
been passed and approved as bills by the legislature of a country or have been written
down and are consulted for use.
18. Can laws be oral? Expound.
From a legal point of view, an oral law can be:

● a habit, or custom with legal relevance or when the formal law expressly refers to
it (but in this latter case, it is properly an indirect source of legal rights and
obligations);
● a spoken command or order that has to be respected as a law (in most modern
western legal systems, some dispositions can be issued by word in given cases
of emergency).
An oral law, intended as a body of rules, can be admitted in jurisprudence

as long as it shows some efficacy, therefore it needs that the law is public, the
human action is evaluated by a judge (ordinarily producing a sentence according
to the general interpretation of the law) and then a punishment has eventually to
be put into effect. Some oral laws provide all these elements (for instance, some
codes of conduct in use among criminal associations like the Mafia do have a
well known law, a judge, a condemnation), while others usually miss some of
them.
19. What are the differences between a civil law and common law?
a. Order of Priority: Jurisprudence and Doctrine - A major difference between
the civil law and common law is that priority in civil law is given to doctrine
(including the codifiers' reports) over jurisprudence, while the opposite is true in
the common law. This difference in priority can be explained by the role of the
legislator in both traditions. French civil law adopts Montesquieu's theory of
separation of powers, whereby the function of the legislator is to legislate, and
the function of the courts is to apply the law. Common law, on the other hand,
finds in judge-made precedent the core of its law.
b. Doctrine: Functions - The civil law doctrine's function is "to draw from this
disorganised mass [cases, books and legal dictionaries] the rules and the
principles which will clarify and purge the subject of impure elements, and thus
provide both the practice and the courts with a guide for the solution of particular
cases in the future. The common law doctrine's function is more modest: authors
are encouraged to distinguish cases that would appear incompatible to a civilist,
and to extract from these specific rules. (Of course, there is a point where the
common law author will refuse to draw specific rules that have no policy basis
and will criticize openly absurd judgments.)
c. Doctrine: Style - The common law author focuses on fact patterns. He or she
analyzes cases presenting similar but not identical facts, extracting from the
specific rules, and then, through deduction, determines the often very narrow
scope of each rule, and sometimes proposes new rules to cover facts that have
not yet presented themselves. The civilist focuses rather on legal principles. He
or she traces their history, identifies their function, determines their domain of
application, and explains their effects in terms of rights and obligations. At this
stage, general and exceptional effects are deduced. Apart from requiring some
statutory analysis, determining the area of application of a principle involves
some induction from the existing case law, while delimiting exceptions involves
some deductions.
d. Jurisprudence: Functions - Common law jurisprudence sets out a new specific
rule to a new specific set of facts and provides the principal source of law, while
civil law jurisprudence applies general principles, and that is only a secondary
source of law of explanation.
e. Stare Decisis - The English doctrine of stare decisis compels lower courts to
follow decisions rendered in higher courts, hence establishing an order of priority
of sources by "reason of authority." Stare decisis is unknown to civil law, where
judgments rendered by judges only enjoy the "authority of reason.” This
distinction makes sense. Confusion would result in the common law world if the
core of the law was to differ from one court to the other. This is not true in the civil
law world, where the general principles are embodied in national codes and
statutes, and where doctrine provides guidance in their interpretation, leaving to
judges the task of applying the law.
f. Jurisprudence: Style - Civil law judgments are written in a more formalistic style
than common law judgments. Civil law decisions are indeed shorter than
common law decisions, and are separated into two parts-the motifs (reasons)
and the dispositif (order). This is because civil law judges are specially trained in
special schools created for the purpose, while common law judges are appointed
from amongst practising lawyers, without special training. The method of writing
judgments is also different. Common law judgments extensively expose the facts,
compare or distinguish them from the facts of previous cases, and decide (if not
create) the specific legal rule relevant to the present facts. Civil law decisions first
identify the legal principles that might be relevant, then verify if the facts support
their application (only the facts relevant to the advanced principle thus need be
stated). (In Quebec, the common law methodology is followed.)
g. Statutes: Functions - Although statutes have the same paramountcy in both
legal traditions, they differ in their functions. Civil law codes provide the core of
the law-general principles are systematically and exhaustively exposed in codes"
and particular statutes complete them. Finally follows the jurisprudence. Common
law statutes, on the other hand, complete the case law, which latter contains the
core of the law expressed through specific rules applying to specific facts. (It is
not surprising that the English word "law" means all legal rules whatever their
sources, while the French word "loi" refers only to written statutory rules. The
word "droit" in the French civil law is the equivalent of "law" in English common
law.)
h. Style of Drafting of Laws - Civil law codes and statutes are concise (le
stylefranfais), while common law statutes are precise (le style anglais). Indeed,
civil law statutes provide no definitions, and state principles in broad, general
phrases. Common law statutes, on the other hand, provide detailed definitions,
and each specific rule sets out lengthy enumerations of specific applications or
exceptions, preceded by a catch-all phrase and followed by a demurrer such as
"notwithstanding the generality of the foregoing." This difference in style is linked
to the function of statutes. Civilian statutory general principles need not be
explained, precisely because they are not read restrictively (not being
exceptions), but need to be stated concisely if the code is to be exhaustive.
Common law statutory provisions need not be concise, because they cover only
the specific part of the law to be reformed, but must be precise, because the
common law courts restrict rules to the specific facts they are intended to cover.
Those styles can be found in international conventions. The Hamburg Rules were
drafted in a civilian style with the rule of responsibility in-one sweeping article.
The Hague Rules, by comparison, were drafted in a common law fashion, with
responsibility in three very long and detailed articles, being Article 3(1) on
seaworthiness, Article 3(2) on care of cargo and Article 4(2)(a) to (q) on
seventeen exculpatory exceptions.
i. Interpretations of Laws - In civil law jurisdictions, the first step in interpreting an
ambiguous law, according toMazeaud,'m is to discover the intention of the
legislator by examining the legislation as a whole, including the "travaux
priparatoires," as well as the provisions more immediately surrounding the
obscure text. In common law jurisdictions, by comparison, statutes are to be
objectively construed according to certain rules standing by themselves, such as
that an enactment must be read as a whole, and that special provisions will
control general provisions, so as to meet the subjects' reasonable
understandings and expectations. Two reasons can be advanced to explain this
difference in interpretation. Firstly, common law statutes have to be read against
a case law background, while civil law codes and statutes are the primary source
of law under Montesquieu's theory. Secondly, civil law judges are influenced by
Rousseau's theory that the State is the source of all rights under the social
contract, while English judges favour Hobbes' theory that the individual agreed to
forfeit to the State only certain rights.
j. The Appointment of Judges - Common law judges, who are called to play an
important role in deciding what the law is, are appointed from among experienced
practising lawyers. Civil law judges, whose main function is adjudicating, are
appointed fresh from specialized schools. (Qudbec judges, in the common law
tradition, however, are all appointed from practising lawyers, this being another
example of the common law tradition in Qudbec.)
k. Consequences-Evolution of the Law - While the civil law principles, frozen into
codes and often rigid doctrine, are imposed on courts, most common law rules
can be changed from time to time, subject to the doctrine of stare decisis. On one
hand, the realities of modem life can be addressed in a more timely fashion
through the common law, e.g. the salvage lien and repairer's lien. On the other
hand, common law judges are sometimes hesitant to change a rule, where the
consequences of doing so in relation to the whole of the law are not clear. Less
timid to reform, civil law jurisdictions have sometimes hired learned authors to
assist in effecting major legal changes. An example is the engagement by the
French Government of the late Dean Rend Roditre, then regarded as the premier
maritime law author and professor in France, to draft five statutes by which
French maritime law was reformed in the 1960's.
l. Concept of the Legal Rule - In countries of the Romano-Germanic family, ... in
which doctrinal writing is held in high esteem, the legal rule is not considered as
merely a rule appropriate to the solution of a concrete case. Through the
systematising efforts of the doctrinal authors, the legal rule has risen to a higher
level of abstraction: it is viewed as a rule of conduct, endowed with a certain
generality, and situated above the specific application which courts or
practitioners may make of it in any concrete case.. In the eyes of an Englishman,
the French regle de droit is situated at the level of a legal principle (principe
juridique); to him it appears to be more a moral precept than a truly "legal rule.”
The English legal rule is situated at the level of the case for which-and for which
alone-it has in fact been found and enunciated in order to ground a decision. The
English legal rule [... ], in the eyes of a French jurist, is situated at the level of a
particular judicial application made of the rule; it is easy enough for him to
understand but to him such a concept gives English law a case-by-case and
therefore an organisationally unsatisfactory character. Consequentially, civil law
systems are "closed," in the sense that every possible situation is governed by a
limited number of general principles, while common law system are "open," in the
sense that new rules may be created or imported for new facts. Civil law allows
for wider rules than does the common law in private law matters (those rules that
can be avoided by contract), in that civil law rules are suppletive (the parties are
deemed to know the law and hence to be aware of those rules), while common
law rules are presumptive of the intention of the parties when relevant facts are
present.
m. Categories of Laws - Civil law categories are based on the rules themselves,
e.g. private law and public law, while common law categories were founded on
the law that was administered by different courts, e.g. common law courts and
the court of Equity. It is not surprising that adjectival law (which includes the rules
of procedure and evidence) was traditionally given considerable attention in
common law jurisdictions, while substantive law habitually received more
attention in civil law jurisdictions.
n. Rights Versus Remedies - Civil law focuses on rights and obligations, while
common law is oriented toward the jurisdiction of particular courts to grant the
sought-after remedy ("remedies precede rights"). It follows that the civil law does
not have a clearly defined system of remedies, but relies rather on the courts to
choose or even create the appropriate remedy. Conversely, the common law
does not have a unitary system of rights and obligations. Courts having
jurisdiction to hear a matter falling within a cause of action set the rights and
obligations aufur et a mesure that they are called to rule on them; it is only
through precedents that specific rights (always in relation to a cause of action)
can be found. Maritime liens, for example, have been restricted in their scope by
jurisdictional confrontations between the courts of common law and of Admiralty
(The Halcyon Isle), while Canada and the United States consider maritime liens
to be substantive rights in the civilian tradition (The loannis Daskelelis).
20. Where does customary law fall under?
Customary law is a set of custom, belief, tradition, and practices that are accepted as
obligatory rules of conduct by the community or by the state. Customary law falls under
common law since it follows precedence rather than codals.
21. Are municipal laws / ordinances considered statutes?
Yes. Municipal laws or ordinances are considered statutes.
An ordinance, a local law, or a regulation enacted by a city council or other similar body under
powers delegated to it by the state is legislative in nature by its own definition.
A local ordinance is a municipal legislative enactment. An ordinance passed in pursuance

of express legislative authority is a law and has the same effect as a local law, and it may
prevail over a general law upon the same subject. Therefore, an ordinance is equal to a
municipal statute and it governs matters not already covered by federal or state law.
ttps://municipal.uslegal.com/ordinances-resolutions-and-other-legislation/)
(source:h
22. What is a legislative power?

Legislative power is “the authority, under the Constitution to make laws, and to
alter and repeal them”. S ection 1 Article VI of the Constitution provides that “legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representative except to the extent reserved to the people by provision
on initiative and referendum”.
23. What is a bill?
- A bill is a draft of a law submitted to the consideration of a legislative body for its
adoption.
24. Where does a bill originate? May an individual propose a bill?
● A bill may be proposed by any member of the congress (HoR &Senate)
● Appropriation , revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of public debt, bills
of local application and private bills, shall originate EXCLUSIVELY from House of
Representatives.
25. Differentiate a bill, an approved bill, and an enrolled bill.

- Bill is a mere proposal of any individual from the Congress
- An Enrolled bill is a bill that had been passed the 3 readings, concurring
process and the authentication process.
- An Approve Bill is a bill that has been either of the following:
a. signed by the President
b. When the president does not sign nor communicate his veto of the bill
within 30 days after his receipt
c. When vetoed bill is repassed by the Congress by two-thirds vote of all its
members, voting separately.
26. When does an enrolled bill become a law?

-An enrolled bill,a final copy of a bill or joint resolution which has passed both Houses of
Congress,becomes a law when:(1) the President signs it; (2) the President does not sign
nor communicate his veto of the bill within 30 days after his receipt thereof; and (3) the
vetoed bill is repassed by Congress by ⅔ vote of all its members,each House voting
separately.
27. How is authentication of a bill done?
Authentication of a bill is done when a PROPOSED LAW (BILL), i s ( 1.) PASSED

BEFORE THE PRESIDENT as a bill that has passed Congress (2). it should be deemed
COMPLETE and UNIMPEACHABLE, and a bill is finally authenticated after being (3)
SIGNED by both The Speaker of the House and Senate President. Reference:
StatCon AGPALO NOTES.
28. How does a bill become a law? Explain the process.
In a nutshell, the steps of bill passage include:
Filing of bill A bill is filed to the Office of the Secretary,

given a corresponding number, scheduled for
First reading.
A bill may originate from either the House of

Representatives or the Senate. However, bills
such as appropriation act, taxation,
increasing public debts, bills with local
application, and private bills must originate
from the lower house.
First Reading Title, bill number, and author’s name are read
on the floor; referred to the proper committee
Committee Hearings/Report Proper committee conducts hearing and

consultations. The committee may:
a. Approve the bill in its entirety;
b. Approves with changes;
c. Recommends substitution; or
d. Recommends consolidation with other
bills filed
Committee report is submitted to Committee

on Rules for schedule in Second reading.
Second Reading - Bill author delivers sponsorship

speech on the floor;
- Members of the specific chamber
engage in debates, interpellation,
turno en contra, and rebuttal to
highlight pros and cons of the bill;
- Amends necessary provisions of the
bill;
- Voted by members of the specific
chamber and scheduled for third
reading.
Third Reading - Printed copies of bill’s final version are

distributed;
- Only the title of the bill is read on the
floor;
- Voting is held to approve the final bill;
- If passed, transferred to the other
chamber for concurrence.
Concurrence The other chamber conducts the same

process from First reading to Third Reading.
If concurred in its entirety, the final version is

printed in its enrolled form.
If with certain differences, a Bicameral

Conference Committee reconciles the
conflicting provisions. Conference committee
submits report on the reconciled version of
the bill, then approved by both chambers.
The bill is then printed in its enrolled form.
Authentication The enrolled bill shall be certified as correct

by the Secretary of both chambers, then
signed by the Speaker of the House and
Senate President. The final enrolled bill is
submitted to Malacanang.
Approval The President may do the following:

a. Approve the bill by signing it;
b. Vetoes any portion of the bill and
send it back to the originating
chamber;
c. Inaction, the bill becomes a law if the
President did not sign the bill 30 days
from receipt in his office
NOTE: A vetoed bill may still be a law without

the President’s signature if Congress
overrides the Presidential veto by two-thirds
(⅔) vote.
Reference: www.senate.gov.ph > Legislative Process, 1987 Constitution Article VI
Sections 26-27
29. May the President veto a bill? How?

Yes. According to Article VI Sec 27 of the 1987 Constitution:
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to
the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it
and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall
enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill,
it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise
be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas
or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its
Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items
in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or
items to which he does not object.
30. May authentication be withdrawn after the president vetoes a bill?

Yes. The authentication that the Senate President (for the Upper House) and the Head
of the House (Lower House) gave through their signatures may be withdrawn up until the
bill becomes a law.
31. Differentiate Administrative Interpretation and Administrative laws.
Administrative Interpretations are merely guidelines to interpret an ambiguous laws or

statutes. It is issued by Administrative Agencies while Administrative Rules are regulated
and binding upon the courts.
32. Is an Administrative interpretation binding within the court?

NO. The judiciary has the sole power to interpret laws. While Administrative
interpretation can serve as guidelines, it has no binding effect with regard to application
of administrative laws in courts.
33. What are administrative rules?

a. Issuance of Administrative Rules and Regulations - The fundamental rule in
administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must
be issued by authority of law and must not contravene the provisions of the
Constitution. The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be
used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor
can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the
scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to
what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and
the scope of their regulations. (DAR v. Uy, G.R. No. 169277, February 9, 2007,
Callejo, J).
SET 2 Questions
1. Who issues administrative rules and regulations?
Issuance of Administrative Rules and Regulations
- Administrative rules are officially promulgated agency regulations that have

the force and effect of law. Generally these rules elaborate the requirements of a
law or policy.
- The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules
and regulations must be issued by authority of law and must not contravene the
provisions of the Constitution.
- The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge
the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to
enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended.
Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of
their regulations.
2. In Re: Cunanan, digest and principles [Please explain the disposition]

The petitioners, who were unsuccessful candidates for admission to the Bar filed a
petition invoking the provisions of the Republic Act 972 or an “AN ACT TO FIX THE
PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE”
FACTS:
- On June 21, 1953, Republic Act No. 972 was enacted, has for its object, according to
its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of
reading materials and inadequate preparation.
- “The Bar Flunkers Act of 1953” reduced the passing general average in bar exam to:
-70% to any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951,
-71% in the 1952 bar examinations,
-74% in the 1955 bar examinations
without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50% in any subject shall be allowed to take
and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as a member of the Philippine Bar.
- The petitioners after the law was enacted filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking the provision of the Act as a ground to be admitted in the Philippine Bar. Some
filed motions for the revisions of their examination papers also invoked the law in
question and there are others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their
grades without invoking the said provisions.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
HELD:
Republic Act No. 972 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore, void and without any force
nor effect, to wit;
1. Manifest encroachment on the constitutional mandate of the Supreme Court.
2. Only the Supreme Court, in its judgment in revoking court’s resolution may revise
and alter them. RA No. 972 attempting to do it directly violated the constitution.
3. Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules on admission to the bar. It is the Supreme Courts prerogative to render the
ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules.
4. Class legislation. (Pretended classification of candidates does not justify the
admission to the bar of law students inadequately prepared).
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to
what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1,
the entire law is void.
RESOLUTION of the Court:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations
of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and,
therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to
the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955
inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10,
article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 percent or more, without
having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed,
whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become
final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar on the date or dates that the Chief Justice may set.
NOTES:
1. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that
should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is
entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of
those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate
mission is to create a serious social danger.
2. The act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating of attorneys at law in the
practice of profession is concededly judicial.
3. The power and responsibility concerning the admission to the practice of law continue
to reside in the Supreme Court.
3. Who is an amicus curiae?

> Latin for "friend of the court.". Frequently, a person or group who is not a party to an
action, but has a strong interest in the matter, will petition the court for permission to
submit a brief in the action with the intent of influencing the court's decision. Such briefs
are called "amicus briefs."
4. Carinño vs. CHR, digest and principles
Cariño v. CHR
GR. No. 96681
FACTS:
- Some 800 public school teachers, among them are members of Manila Public School
Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), undertook
what they described as “mass concerted actions” (staying away from their classes,
converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies).
- The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours
or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the
Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended
for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced.
- After failure to heed the order, the CHR complainant (private respondents) were
administratively charged and preventively suspended for 90 days. The private
respondents moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending
resolution by the Supreme Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive
writ/temporary restraining order. The motion was denied.
- The petition for certiorari in RTC was dismissed. Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme
Court was also denied.
- Respondent complainant filed a complaint on the Commission of Human Rights

alleging they were denied due process and dismissed without due notice. The
Commission issued an order to Cariño to appear and enlighten the commission so that
they can be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter.
- Cariño filed a petition before the Supreme Court for certiorari and prohibition whether
the Commission has the jurisdiction to try and decide on the issue regarding denial of
due process and whether or not grievances justify their mass action or strike.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CHR has jurisdiction on the matter of hearing and adjudicating the issues
involved.
RULING:
No. The CHR has no jurisdiction over the matter. The CHR only has the power to merely
investigate and shall not and cannot “try and resolve merits” the matters involved. These are
matters undoubtedly and clear within the original jurisdiction of Secretary of Education, being
within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also,
within the appellate jurisdiction of Civil Service Commission.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the
Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking
Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."
PRINCIPLE:
Doctrine of Separation of Powers- system of checks and balances making sure that certain
branches do not go beyond their jurisdictions and given powers.
5. Lopez vs. Roxas, digest and principles (November 1965)

Petitioner: Fernando Lopez
Respondent: Gerardo Roxas
FACTS:
● Lopez and Roxas were both candidates for the Office of the Vice President in
the election of November 1965. Roxas filed a petition to the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, and Lopez filed a petition to the Supreme Court the present action, for
prohibition with preliminary injunction, against respondent Roxas, to prevent the
PET from hearing and deciding the aforementioned election contest.
● Lopez’ petition cites Republic Act no 1793, creating said Tribunal is
unconstitutional and that proceeds taken by it are a nullity.
○ It is unconstitutional on the grounds that it is illegal for Justices of the
SUpreme Court to sit as members of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
since the decisions thereof are appealable to the Supreme Court on
questions of law.
○ The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is a court inferior to the Supreme
Court
○ Congress cannot by legislation apoint in effect the members of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
ISSUE
● Whether the RA 1793 is unconstitutional on said grounds.
ARGUMENT
● 1. Enactment of Republic Act 1793 does NOT entail an assumption by
Congress of the power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the
President. It only connote the imposition of additional duties upon the
Members of the Supreme Court.
○ 1.a. The Constitution intended to vest Congress with discretion to
determine by law whether or not the election of a president-elect or that of
a vice-president-elect may be contested and, if Congress should decide
on the affirmative, which court of justice shall have jurisdiction to hear the
contest.
● 2. Supreme Court and Court of Appeals are both vested with original
jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction, hence they are both trial courts and
appellate courts.
● 3. A court of first instance when performing its judicial functions with powers less
broad those of other court of first instance, is not inferior to the latter, for one
cannot be inferior to itself. So too, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not
inferior to the Supreme Court.
COURT RULING
● No, petition is dismissed. See Argument 1.a.
6. What is a judicial power?
● Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable, enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. [Art. XIII, sec. 1(2) of the 1987 Constitution]
● The constitutional authority vested in courts and judges to hear and decide
justiciable cases, and to interpret, and enforce or void, statutes when disputes
arise over their scope or constitutionality.
● Judicial power rests with the Supreme Court and the lower courts, as established
by law (Art. VIII, sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution). Its duty is to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable (Art.
VIII Sec. 1 (2))
7. What is equal protection clause?

o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
Equal Protection Clause states that “N
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.” (1987 Constitution:Article III “Bill of Rights”, Sec. 2)
(NOTE: Kindly double check po. Because no exact definition can found online kasi pero
someone answered this when it was asked during the class)
8. Explain and illustrate the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.

The doctrine states that a case must be filed before the lowest court possible having
appropriate jurisdiction before they made to the higher courts.
Exceptions to this are:

a. When the challenged orders were patent nullities and there are special and important
reasons stated in the petition
b. When it involves public welfare and the advancement of public policy
c. When demanded by the broader interest of justice
d. When analogous and compelling circumstances call for and justify the immediate and
direct handling by a higher court.
Reference: University of the Philippines Law Archives, General Principle of Remedial

Law; In the case of Republic v Caguioa, 2013; Attorney Manuel Laserna Jr. in Dy v
Bibatpalamos
9. Is the doctrine of hierarchy of courts absolute? Why or why not?

NO. Doctrine of Hierarchy is not absolute because there are special cases
wherein the higher courts deem it important to review certain cases: cases
wherein resorting to courts at their level would not be practical considering that
their decisions could still be appealed before higher courts. One reason may be
is that such cases are concerned or are in conflict with the interest of justice.
(See: Diocese of Bacolod v COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, July 21, 2015)
10. When does an official or agency or court act with grave abuse of discretion?
11. What is the remedy if the judge acted beyond discretion?

A. Motion for Reconsideration
● Filing for motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the availment of a
petition for certiorari.
● The filing of a motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie
is intended to afford public respondent an opportunity to correct any
actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of reexamination of the legal
and factual aspects of the case. (source: G.R no 195248)
B. Writ of Certiorari
● The trial court's failure to comply with procedural rules constitutes grave
abuse of discretion and may be the subject of a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals.
The writ of certiorari is not issued to correct every error that may have
been committed by lower courts and tribunals. It is a remedy specifically
to keep lower courts and tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction. In
our judicial system, the writ is issued to prevent lower courts and tribunals
from committing grave abuse of discretion in excess of their jurisdiction.
Further, the writ requires that there is no appeal or other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy available to correct the error. Thus, certiorari may
not be issued if the error can be the subject of an ordinary appeal.
(source: G.R no 224974)
12. What is the doctrine of separation of powers?
Separation of Powers
It is the fundamental principle of the State which explains that the three branches must
discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution.
The primary purpose of the principle is to prevent a concentration of authority in one person of
group of persons that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment
of our republican institutions. According to Justice Laurel "the doctrine is intended to secure
action, to forestall ove-action, to prevent depotism and to obtain efficiency." (Pangasinan
Transportation Co. vs PSC)
13. Enumerate and briefly explain the three (3) Constitutional Commissions
1.Civil Service Commission- Responsible over the civil service. It is tasked with
overseeing the integrity of government actions and processes. The commission was
founded in 1900 through Act No. 5 of the Philippine Commission and was made a
bureau in 1905. It has 16 regional offices throughout the country.
Composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born

citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years
of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their
appointment.
2.Commission on Elections- One of the three constitutional commissions of the
Philippines. Its principal role is to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall in the
Philippines.
Composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born

of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
positions in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
3.Commission on Audit- The Commission has the power, authority and duty to
examine, audit and settle all accounts and expenditures of the funds and properties of
the Philippine government.
Composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born

of age, Certified Public Accountants with not less than ten years of auditing experience,
or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the
Commission belong to the same profession.
14. When is a law considered unconstitutional?

● To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution
must be clear and unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the attainment of
some public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is allowed. To strike
down a law there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law
condemns or prohibits; the statute allows it to be done.
15. FDCP vs. Colon, digest and principle
Film Development Council of the Philippines vs. Colon Heritage Realty

FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,vs. COLON
HERITAGE REALTY CORPORATION, operator of Oriente Group Theaters, represented
by ISIDORO A. CANIZARES, Respondent. FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE
PHILIPPINES,Petitioner, vs. CITY OF CEBU and SM PRIME HOLDINGS,
INC.,Respondents.
G.R. No. 203754 June 16, 2015 Nature of the Case:
Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Facts
: In 1993, City of Cebu, in its exercise of its power to impose amusement taxes under
Section 140 of the LGC anchored on the constitutional policy on local autonomy, passed
City Ordinance known as the "Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance of the City of Cebu (tax
ordinance)." Under issue are Sections 42 and 43, Chapter XI which require proprietors,
lessees or operators of theatres, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and
other places of amusement, to pay an amusement tax equivalent to 30% of the gross
receipts of admission fees to the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu City. Sec 42. Rate
of Tax. - There shall be paid to the Office of the City Treasurer by the proprietors,
lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia and
other places of amusement, an amusement tax at the rate of 30% of the gross receipts
from admission fees.
Sec 43. Manner of Payment. - In the case of theaters or cinemas, the tax shall first be
deducted and withheld by their proprietors, lessees, or operators and paid to the city
treasurer before the gross receipts are divided between said proprietor, lessees,
operators, and the distributors of the cinematographic films. Congress passed RA 9167,
creating the Film Development Council of the Philippines (FDCP) and abolishing the Film
Development Foundation of the Philippines, Inc. and the Film Rating Board. Secs. 13
and 14 of RA 9167 provided for the tax treatment of certain graded films:
Sec 13. Privileges of Graded Films. - Films which have obtained an "A" or "B" grading
from the Council pursuant to Secs 11 and 12 of this Act shall be entitled to the following
privileges: a. Amusement tax reward. - A grade "A" or "B" film shall entitle its producer to
an incentive equivalent to the amusement tax imposed and collected on the graded films
by cities and municipalities in Metro Manila and other highly urbanized and independent
component cities in the Philippines pursuant to Sections 140 to 151 of RA 7160: 1. For
grade "A" films - 100% of the amusement tax collected on such film; and 2. For grade
"B" films - 65% of the amusement tax collected on such films. Remaining 35% shall
accrue to the funds of the Council. Sec14. Amusement Tax Deduction and Remittance. -
All revenue from the amusement tax on the graded film which may otherwise accrue to
the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly urbanized and
independent component cities in the Philippines pursuant to Section 140 of RA 7160
during the period the graded film is exhibited, shall be deducted and withheld by the
proprietors, operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted within 30 days from
the termination of the exhibition to the Council which shall reward the corresponding
amusement tax to the producers of the graded film within 15 days from receipt thereof.
Proprietors, operators and lessees of theaters or cinemas who fail to remit the
amusement tax proceeds within the prescribed period shall be liable to a surcharge
equivalent to 5% of the amount due for each month of delinquency which shall be paid to
the Council.
According to petitioner, from the time RA 9167 took effect up to the present, all the cities
and municipalities in Metro Manila, as well as urbanized and independent component
cities, with the sole exception of Cebu City, have complied with the mandate of said law.
Accordingly, petitioner, thru OSG, sent on January 2009 demand letters for unpaid
amusement tax reward (with 5% surcharge for each month of delinquency) due to the
producers of the Grade "A" or "B" films). In said letters, proprietors and cinema
operators, including Colon Heritage, operator of the Oriente theater, were given 10 days
from receipt thereof to pay the aforestated amounts to FDCP but to no avail. Meanwhile,
on March 25, 2009, petitioner received a letter from Regal Entertainment, Inc., inquiring
on the status of its receivables for tax rebates in Cebu cinemas for all their A and B rate
films along with those which it co-produced with GMA films. This was followed by a letter
from Star Cinema ABS-CBN Film Productions, Inc., requesting the immediate remittance
of its amusement tax rewards for its graded films for the years 2004-2008. Because of
the persistent refusal of the proprietors and cinema operators to remit the said amounts
as FDCP demanded, on one hand, and Cebu City's assertion of a claim on the amounts
in question, the city finally filed on May 18, 2009 before the RTC, Branch 14 a petition for
declaratory relief with application for a writ of preliminary injunction. In said petition,
Cebu City sought the declaration of Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as invalid and
unconstitutional. Colon Heritage likewise sought to declare Sec. 14 of RA 9167 as
unconstitutional.
Contentions:
FDPC: The inclusion in RA 9167 of the questioned provisions was a valid exercise of the
legislature's power to amend laws and an assertion of its constitutional authority to set
limitations on the LGU' s authority to tax.
Actions of the Court:

RTC: City of Cebu v. FDCP Rendered judgement in favor of petitioner City of Cebu and
declared Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 unconstitutional. What RA 9167 seeks to
accomplish is the segregation of the amusement taxes raised and collected by Cebu City
and its subsequent transfer to FDCP. This cannot be classified as a tax exemption but is
a confiscatory measure where the national government extracts money from the local
government's coffers and transfers it to FDCP, a private agency, which in turn, will award
the money to private persons, the film producers, for having produced graded films.
Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 are contrary to the basic policy in local autonomy that all
taxes, fees, and charges imposed by the LGUs shall accrue exclusively to them, as
articulated in A1iicle X,. Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution. This is a limitation upon the
rule-making power of Congress when it provides guidelines and limitations on the LGU's
power of taxation. When Congress passed this "limitation," if went beyond its legislative
authority, rendering the questioned provisions unconstitutional. Colon Heritage v. FDCP
Ruled against the constitutionality of said Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167: (a) while
Congress, through the enactment of RA 9167, may have amended Secs. 140(a)8 and
1519 of the LGC, in the exercise of its plenary power to amend laws, such power must
be exercised within constitutional parameters; (b) the assailed provision violates the
constitutional directive that taxes should accrue exclusively to the LGU concerned; (c)
the Constitution, through its Art. X, Sec. 5,10 directly conferred LGUs with authority to
levy taxes-the power is no longer delegated by the legislature; (d) In CIR v. SM Prime
Holdings, the Court ruled that amusement tax on cinema/theater operators or proprietors
remain with the LGU, amusement tax, being, by nature, a local tax.
Issue
: Whether Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 are invalid for being unconstitutional.
Ruling
: Yes. RA 9167 violates local fiscal autonomy It is beyond cavil that the City of Cebu had
the authority to issue its City Ordinance No. LXIX and impose an amusement tax on
cinemas pursuant to Sec. 140 in relation to Sec. 151 of the LGC. Sec. 140 states that a
"province may levy an amusement tax to be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or
operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places
of amusement at a rate of not more than 30% of the gross receipts from admission fees."
By operation of said Sec. 151, extending to them the authority of provinces and
municipalities to levy certain taxes, fees, and charges, cities, such as respondent city
government, may therefore validly levy amusement taxes subject to the parameters set
forth under the law. The difference between Sec. 133 and the questioned amendment of
Sec. 140 of the LGC by RA 9167 is readily revealed. In Sec. · 133, what Congress did
was to prohibit the levy by LGUs of the enumerated taxes. For RA 9167, however, the
covered LGUs were deprived of the income which they will otherwise be collecting
should they impose amusement taxes, or, in petitioner's own words, "Section 14 of [RA
9167] can be viewed as an express and real intention on the part of Congress to remove
from the LGU's delegated taxing power, all revenues from the amusement taxes on
graded films which would otherwise accrue to [them] pursuant to Section 140 of the
[LGC]."36 Per RA 9167, covered LGUs still have the power to levy amusement taxes,
albeit at the end of the day, they will derive no revenue therefrom. The same, however,
cannot be said for FDCP and the producers of graded films since the amounts thus
levied by the LGUs which should rightfully accrue to them, they being the taxing
authority-will be going to their coffers. As a matter of fact, it is only through the exercise
by the LGU of said power that the funds to be used for the amusement tax reward can
be raised. Without said imposition, the producers of graded films will receive nothing
from the owners, proprietors and lessees of cinemas operating within the territory of the
coveredLGU. It is apparent that what Congress did in this instance was not to exclude
the authority to levy amusement taxes from the taxing power of the covered LGUs, but to
earmark, if not altogether confiscate, the income to be received by the LGU from the
taxpayers in favor of and for transmittal to FDCP, instead of the taxing authority. This, to
Our mind, is in clear contravention of the constitutional command that taxes levied by
LGUs shall accrue exclusively to said LGU and is repugnant to the power of LGUs to
apportion their resources in line with their priorities. Through the application and
enforcement of Sec. 14 of RA 9167, the income from the amusement taxes levied by the
covered LGUs did not and will under no circumstance accrue to them, not even partially,
despite being the taxing authority therefor. Congress, therefore, clearly overstepped its
plenary legislative power, the amendment being violative of the fundamental law's
guarantee on local autonomy, as echoed in Sec. 130(d) of the LGC.
Supreme Court Ruling:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the disquisitions, judgment is rendered in favor of the City of
Cebu against the Film development Council of the Philippines.
16. Francisco vs. House of Representatives, digest and principle

FACTS:
The house of representative adopted a resolution , which directed the committee on
justice to conduct an investigation in aid of legislation on the manner of disbursements
and expendituresFormer pres.estrada file an impeachment complaint against chief
justice davide and seven associate justices.The impeachment was dismissed for being
insufficient in substance. Then second impeachment complaint was filed by the
secretary general of the house of Representatives But the second the impeachment
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of sec 5 of article XI of the constitution.
ISSUES:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the second impeachment complaint constitute
valid impeachable offenses under the constitution.
This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial
power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of
what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable
and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its
power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot
contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended
to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other
specific limitations on its power to make rules.
II. whether section 15 and 16 of rule V of the rules on impeachment adopted by the 12 congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provision of sec 3, article 11 of the constitution
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it
would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.
III. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under section 3 (5) of article XI of the
constitution.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate
justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against
the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on
November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella
with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on
October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution.
17. What is a judicial review? What are its requisites?
Judicial Review is a type of court proceeding in which a judge reviews the

lawfulness of a decision or action provision by a public body. Judicial review is
concerned not with the merits of the decision, but whether the public body has acted
lawfully. The court may exercise its power of judicial review if the following requisites
are present:
1. an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists;

2. a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question
3. the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity
4. the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case.
18.In Re: Vallarta and Valenzuela, digest and principle
Facts: ● March 30, 1998 - Referred to the En Banc, t he President

signed the appointments of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and
s Judges of the Regional Trial Court
Hon. Placido B. Vallarta a
(RTC) Branch 62, Bago City and Branch 24, Cabanatuan
City.
● The decision was based prima facie by the Chief Justice,
implemented via Sec. 4(1) of Article VIII of the Constitution
and Sec. 9 of Article VIII:
○ Sec. 4 (1), Article VIII :
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief

Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
○ Sec. 9, Article VIII :
The members of the Supreme Court and judges in

lower courts shall be appointed by the President from
a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
f the
However, the decision omitted the Sec 15, Art VII o
Constitution:
○ Sec. 15, Article VII :
Two months immediately before the next presidential

elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
Issue: ● Whether or not the imposed ban in Sec. 15 Art. VII of the
Constitution shall be implemented, in spite of the requirement
to fill the vacancies on the Judiciary, as viewed on Sec. 4(1)
and Sec. 9 of Art VIII of the Constitution.
Ruling: ● The appointment of Vallarta and Villanueva were clearly

dated during the period of ban and they assumed that the
position within the operation of prohibition relating
appointments. There is no plausible reason to justify the
making of appointments despite filling the vacancies for the
sake of public interest.
● In view of the foregoing considerations, the court declared the
appointment as VOID and to forthwith CEASE AND DESIST
from discharging the judge offices to which they are
appointed. Furthermore, they are considered by the Judicial
and Bar Council for re-nomination to the same positions.
Principle: ● Sec. 4 and Sec. 9 of Art VII are deemed as general provision
however Sec.15 of Art. VII is a particular provision which
occurred only two months before election for the reason “not
to tie the hands of incoming President through midnight
appointment
● s” Sec. 4(1) and Sec 9. Art VII. necessarily mean that the
President can appoint positions in judiciary except to the
timeframe of ban imposed by Sec. 15 Art. VII those two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and
up to his term, the President is neither required to make
appointments to the courts nor be allowed to do so. This
prohibition on appointment comes to effect once in every 6
years.
19. De castro vs. JBC
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President
from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process
of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated
January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because
the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90
days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the
framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have
easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article
VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power
to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political
vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall
appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could
only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of
course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one
from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon
his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc
or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect
the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers,
if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most
likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
20. What gave rise to the difference in the decisions between (18) and (19)?
In Re: Vallarta and Valenzuela ; De Castro vs JBC Although they both used section 4 of
article 7 and section 15 of article 8 as grounds for their petitions in In Re Vallarta and Villanueva
their proclamation as RTC Judges were deemed unconstitutional because they come within the
operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be for the
purpose of buying votes or influencing the election while in De Castro vs JBC the vacancy of the
supreme chief justice will be detrimental for the public interest, The constitution clearly and
expressly provides that the SC should have 14 associate justices and one chief justice to fully
serve the purpose for the general welfare of the Filipino people.
21. What is a midnight appointment? Is it allowed?

Midnight appointment is defined as an appointment to political office made during the
last hours of the term of office of the person in whom the right of making such
appointment is vested.
It’s not allowed based on the Section 15 of Article VII of the

1987 Philippine Constitution, however temporary appointments can be made in cases
wherein the vacancy will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Art. 7 Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
There is no provision in the constitution that prohibits Local Executives including city
mayors, municipal mayor and provincial governors from making appointments during the last
hours of his term of office.
However, at present, appointments in local government units are regulated by Sec. 261
(G) of the Omnibus Election Code and Civil Service Commission Regulation No. 010988.
It is a prohibited act under Sec. 261 (G) of the Omnibus Election
Code, the appointment of new employees, creation of new position,
promotion or giving salary increases during the period of forty-five days
before a regular election and thirty days before a special election by any
head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency or
instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, whether provisional, temporary or casual, or
creates and fills any new position except upon prior authority of the
Commission. Appointments made during the prohibited period will not
be invalidated when it is in conformity with CSC Regulation No. 010988
which outlined the following requirements: All appointments, whether
original, transfer, reemployment, reappointment, promotion or demotion,
which are issued AFTER the elections, regardless of their dates of
affectivity and/or date of receipt by the Commission, shall be
disapproved unless the following requisites concur relative to their
issuance:
a) The appointment has gone through the regular screening by
the Personnel Selection Board (PSB) before the prohibited period on the
issuance of appointments as shown by the PSB report or minutes of its
Meeting;
b) That the appointee is qualified;
c) There is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately in order not to prejudice public service
and/or
endanger public safety; and
d) That the appointment is not one of those
mass appointments issued after the elections.
22. Republic vs. Sereno, cite and answer briefly [Issues 1-3]
prescription
23.Republic vs. Sereno, cite and answer briefly [Issues 4-6]
ISSUE ANSWER
Whether/not the instant petition is case of The principle of transcendental importance

transcendental importance pertains to the exercise of the Court's rule on
standing as a matter of overreaching
significance to society or of paramount to
public interest and take cognizance of a
petition. This principle then find its application
in the petition in the sense that the
qualification, eligibility, and appointment of an
incumbent Chief Justice are being scrutinized
through an action for quo warranto. It is
paramount that the Court make definitive
pronouncements on the issues presented for
the issues herein presented merit serious
infringement over the highest ideals of
integrity, honesty, and uprightness that the
judiciary must uphold and is vital to society.
Here, strict compliance with legal and
procedural requirements in the appointment
of the Court's members must be given
importance for it involves the highest official
of the judicial branch that has sole duty to
protect the State's interest.
Whether/not Sereno can be the subject to Sereno can be subject both to quo warranto
quo warranto proceeding knowing that she proceedings and impeachment because they
can be removed from office only by can proceed independently and
impeachment simultaneously. Quo warranto is the proper
legal remedy to determine/question the
right/title to the contested public office. Here,
the proceedings are referring to offices filled
by appointment, not by election, and is
determined by the legality of the appointment.
Quo warranto can only be filed against an
appointed official when he/she usurped the
public office. Moreover, it directly attacks the
title to public office by inquiring into the
validity and legality of the appointment of a
public officer. Here, the quo warranto was
filed by the Solicitor-General who questioned
over the validity of Sereno's appointment as
Chief Justice due to lack of integrity in her
failure to fully declare her SALN during her
17-year teaching in UP College of Law.
On the other hand, impeachment is the legal

process for the removal from office of a high
public official criminally charged by the House
of Representatives due to an offense or
misbehavior. Here, Sereno is subject to
impeachment not only because she is an
impeachable officials but also because of her
betrayal to disclose and submit her SALN (as
stated in R.A. 6713 or "Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials"
requiring the constituents to file their SALN
annually) which falls under the betrayal of
public trust and culpable violation against
Constitution.
Whether/not the Supreme Court's exercise of No. According to the Divinagracia v.

its jurisdiction over quo warranto petition is Consolidated Broadcasting System, the Court
violative of the doctrine of separation of is entrusted with the adjudication of the legal
powers status of persons since it is the final arbiter of
their rights and obligations under law and is
part of its inherent power. Truly, the Court's
exercise of jurisdiction over quo warranto
proceedings falls within its judicial power to
settle justiciable issues (actual controversies)
involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable. Moreover, quo warranto is a
judicial in character that calls the Court's
constitutional duty and power to decide cases
that involve matters affecting the society such
of culpable violation of the Constitution.
Indeed, the Court exercise its judicial
independence in defending the Constitution.
24.Republic vs. Sereno, cite and answer briefly [Issues 7-9]
ISSUE ANSWER
Whether the petition is out rightly the prescription does not lie against the
dismissible on the ground of prescription state
it is the government itself which

commented on the present petition of quo
warranto and not a private individual .
“the Solicitor General or a public

prosecutor, when directed by the
President of the Philippines, or when
upon complaint or otherwise he has good
reason to believe that any case specified
in the preceding section can be
established by proof must commence
such action.” It may be stated that
ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or
penal, have no application to quo
warranto proceeding brought to enforce a
public right. There is no limitation or
prescription of action in an action for quo
warranto, neither could there be, for the
reason that it was an action by the
Government and prescription could not be
pleaded as a defense to an action by the
Government.
(based on Rule 66, sect 2. Rules on Quo

Warranto)
Whether the determination of a The court has supervisory authority over

candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the the JBC this includes ensuring that the
sole and exclusive function of the JBC JBC complies with their own rules
and whether such determination partakes
of the character of a political question
outside the Court’s supervisory and
“ the JBC is hereby created under the
review powers.
supervision of the SC” (Phil Consti: Art.8,
Sec 8)
JBC’s autonomy from the court as to

place its not-action or improper actions
beyond the Supreme Court’s reach is
therefore not what the constitution
contemplates .
power of supervision - “overseeing or the

authority of an officer to see to it that the
subordinate officers perform their duties.”
Whether filing of SALN is a constitutional Filing of SALN is a constitutional and
and statutory requirement for the position statutory requirement
of chief justice
“A public officer or employee shall, upon

assumption of office and as often
thereafter as may be required by law,
submit a declaration under oath of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth.”
(Phil Consti: Art.11, Sec 17)
SALN has been required by RA 3019 and

RA 6713. “Failure to comply” with the law
is a violation of law, a “prima facie
evidence of unexplained wealth, which
may result in the dismissal from service of
the public officer.”
It is a clear breach of the ethical

standards set for public officials and
employees. The filing of the SALN is so
important for purposes of transparency
and accountability that failure to comply
with such requirement may result not only
in dismissal from the public service but
also in criminal liability.
Non-compliance with this requirement is

not only punishable by imprisonment
and/or a fine, it may also result in
disqualification to hold public office.
( R.A. No. 6713, Sec 11)
ISSUE ANSWER
10. If answer to ninth issue is in - Sereno chronically failed to file her

the affirmative, whether Sereno SALNs and thus violated the
failed to file her SALNs as Constitution, the law, and the Code of
mandated by the Constitution Judicial Conduct.
and required by the law and its = CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
implementing rules and Ø Canon 1: A judge should
regulations. uphold the integrity
And independence of
the judiciary
RULE 1.01 - A judge
should be the
Embodiment of
competence,
integrity and
independence
= CONSTITUTION
Ø Section 7(3) Article VIII
= OTHER LAWS
Ø Republic Act No. 6713
An act establishing a code of
conduct and ethical standard
for public officials and
employees, to uphold the
time-honored principle of
public office being a public
trust, granting incentives and
rewards for exemplary service,
enumerating prohibited acts
and transactions and providing
penalties for violations thereof
and for other purposes
11. If Answer to ninth issue is - Sereno failed to property and promptly
affirmative, whether Sereno filed file her SALNs, again in violation of the
SALNs are not filed properly Constitution and statutory requirements
and promptly. = CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Ø Canon 1: A judge should
uphold the integrity
And independence of
the judiciary
RULE 1.01 - A judge
should be the
Embodiment of
competence,
integrity and
independence
= CONSTITUTION
Ø Section 7(3) Article VIII
= OTHER LAWS
Ø Republic Act No. 6713
An act establishing a code of
conduct and ethical standard
for public officials and
employees, to uphold the
time-honored principle of
public office being a public
trust, granting incentives and
rewards for exemplary service,
enumerating prohibited acts
and transactions and providing
penalties for violations thereof
and for other purposes
12. Whether Sereno failed to - Sereno failed to submit the required

comply with the submission of SALNs as to qualify for nomination
SALNs as required by the JBS. pursuant to the JBC rules
Ø The required number of SALNs
to be submitted that time is not less
than 10.
1.Motions for Intervention The Court noted the IBP’s intervention and
resolved to deny the motions for intervention
filed by several other groups. It observed that
intervention is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion; that movant
intervenors have no legal interest in the case,
as required in order to qualify a person to
intervene; and that the remedy of quo
warranto is vested in the people, and not in a
particular group. Lastly, such individuals do
not claim a right to the questioned position,
which is the only time when an individual
himself/herself may commence an action for
quo warranto. In this case, the
movants-intervenors are neither individuals
claiming to be entitled to the questioned
position nor are they the ones charged with
the usurpation thereof.
2. Motions for Inhibition There is no basis for the Associate Justices to

inhibit. Movant must prove bias and prejudice
by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify
a judge. Justice Tijam’s statement, taken as a
whole, was only to prod the Respondent to
observe and respect the constitutional process
of impeachment. It does not appear that there
are grounds for compulsory inhibition. As to
voluntary inhibition, the mere fact that some of
the Associate Justices participated in the
hearings of the Committee on Justice
determining probable cause for the
impeachment of Respondent does not
disqualify them to hear the instant petition.
Their appearance was in deference to the
House of Representatives whose
constitutional duty to investigate the
impeachment complaint filed against
Respondent could not be doubted. Their
appearance was with the prior consent of the
Supreme Court En Banc and they faithfully
observed the parameters that the Court set for
the purpose. Their statements in the hearing
should be carefully viewed within this context,
and should not be hastily interpreted as an
adverse attack against Respondent.
3. Whether the petition is a. Prescription does not lie against the State.
dismissible outright on the The one-year limitation is not applicable when
ground of prescription. the Petitioner is not a mere private individual
pursuing a private interest, but the government
itself seeking relief for a public wrong and
suing for public interest. In the three instances
enumerated by Rules of Court, the Solicitor
General is mandated under the Rules to
commence the necessary quo warranto
petition, as seen in the use of the word “must.
In effect, when the government is the real
party in interest, and is proceeding mainly
to assert its rights, there can be no defense
on the ground of laches or prescription. 6
Indubitably, the basic principle that
“prescription does not lie against the
State” which finds textual basis under
Article 1108 (4) of the Civil Code, applies in
this case.
b. Circumstances obtaining in this case

preclude the application of the prescriptive
period. That prescription does not lie in this
case can also be deduced from the very
purpose of an action for quo warranto, which is
to prevent a continuing exercise of an authority
unlawfully asserted. The Republic, then,
cannot be faulted for questioning
Respondent’s qualification for office only upon
discovery of the cause of ouster. Respondent
cleverly hid the fact of non-filing by stating that
she should not be required to submit the said
documents as she was considered to be
coming from private practice; that it was not
feasible to retrieve most of her records in the
academe considering that the same are more
than fifteen years old; and that U.P. already
cleared her of “all academic/administrative
responsibilities, money and property
accountabilities and from administrative
charges”. She has never been clear on
whether she had filed the required SALNs or
not. Given the foregoing, there can be no
acquiescence or inaction, in this case, on the
part of the Republic as would amount to an
abandonment of its right to seek redress
against a public wrong and vindicate public
interest.
c. Lastly, the Court finds it more important to

rule on the merits of the novel issues imbued
with public interest presented before Us than
to dismiss the case outright merely on
technicality.
(highlighted part is the main answer according

to atty. mansa)
13. If answer to the twelfth issue is in the Sereno's failure to submit to the JBC her
affirmative, whether the failure to submit SALN means that her integrity was not
SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and established at the time of her application
appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice. thereby rendering her nomination and
appointment void.
14. In case of a finding that Sereno is No.Neither the nomination of the JBC nor the
ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, appointment of the President shall extinguish
whether the subsequent nomination by the the non-negotiable requirements that the
JBC and the appointment by the President appointee must be qualified and all other
cured such ineligibility. legal requirements are satisfied.
15. Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto Sereno is a de facto officer removable

officer. through quo warranto.
For lack of a constitutional

qualification,Sereno is ineligible to hold the
position of Chief Justice and is merely holding
the title thereto.
27. Illustrate the impeachment process.
NOTE:
1. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases
of impeachment
2. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member.
3. After hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within together with the corresponding resolution.
4. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or
override its contrary resolution.
5. In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third
of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate
7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment
according to law
ONSTI
REFERENCE: C
28.What is the Doctrine of Operative Fact?
Generally, when a law is declared unconstitutional, it becomes invalid, void, and

inoperative.
As an exception to the general rule, the Doctrine of Operative Fact applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on
those who have relied on the invalid law. See FDCP vs. Colon for example.
Reference: Planters Products vs. Fertiphil, GR No. 166006
29. Explain the Notion of Primary and Secondary rules in Hart, The Concept of Law?
Primary rules, according to Hart, are "rules of obligation," i.e., rules that impose duties.
As examples of such duties, he cites those imposed by criminal and tort law, and says
that under such rules "human beings are required to do or abstain from certain actions,
whether they wish to or not."
Secondary rules, on the other hand, introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish
or modify old ones, or in various ways determine their incidence or control their
operations.
Kinds:
● Rule of Recognition - Remedies uncertainty by identifying which rules are to
count as rules of the system (Legal validity).
● Rules of Change - Remedies staticity, meaning each individual merely has fixed
obligations to do or abstain. Rules of change empower people to legislate and to
enter private transactions for the purpose of varying their rights and duties.
● Rules of adjudication - Remedies inefficiency by empowering persons
authoritatively to apply rules and sanctions and conferring jurisdiction, prescribing
procedure, etc.
For Professor Hart, this "union" of primary and secondary rules is at the "centre" of a
legal system.
30. What is the principle of check and balance?

This principle* allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or
to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other departments.
31. What is the doctrine of intergenerational responsibility?
The doctrine of intergenerational responsibility hinges on the right of the present generation to
sue in its behalf and in behalf of the succeeding generations for the protection of the
environment. Intergeneration responsibility has been enunciated in Oposa vs Factoran
32. What are impeachable offenses?

33.Angara vs. Electoral Commission
ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION

Facts:
● November 15, 1935 - Jose Angara won the elections for the position of member
of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas against
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor and took his Oath of Office
● December 3, 1935 – National Assembly in session passed a resolution
confirming the election of those who have not been a subject of an election
protest prior to the adoption of the resolution
● December 8, 1935 – Pedro Ynsua filed a Motion to Protest against the Petitioner
● December 20, 1935 – Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the protest on the
following grounds:
○ Resolution 8 was adopted in the legitimate exercise of the commission
○ Resolution is an accepted formula for the limitation of said period
○ Protest was filed out of the prescribed period
● December 27, 1935 - Pedro Ynsua filed an Answer alleging that there is no
legal or constitutional provision barring the election protest against the election of
a member of the National Assembly
● January 23, 1936 – Electoral Commission denied petitioner’s motion
● February 25, 1936 – SolGen filed on behalf of the commission the following
grounds:
○ Constitution created the commission as an instrument to decide on all
cases relating to election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly.
○ The Resolution cannot deprive the Commission of its jurisdiction.
○ The Electoral Commission is invested with quasi-judicial functions.
● March 2, 1936 – Pedro Ynsua filed a separate but similar defense
Issue:
1. Did the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the
petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution
of the National Assembly?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court concluded the following matters with regards to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission:
a. The government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory

of separation of powers into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
b. The system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties
often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
c. In cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies
thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only
constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries.
d. Judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate
cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or
agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all
authority.
e. The Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of
classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the
government.
f. The Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
g. Under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect,
each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of their elective members.
h. The present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by
the legislature with respect to contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.
i. Such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full,
clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter
alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing
protests.
j. The avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an
independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of
partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the
National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations
regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
k. Section 4 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution repealed not only Section 18 of
the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the
sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but
also Section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by
resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its
members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or
bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
l. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member,
irrespective of whether his election is contested or not, is not essential before
such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.
m. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against
whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot
deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time
within which protest against the election of any member of the National Assembly
should be filed.
Dispositive Portion:
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with
costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
SET 3 Questions
1. What is a political question?
Political question - a question that a court will not consider because it involves the exercise of
the discretionary power of the executive or legislative of the government - also termed
nonjusticiable question. (Black’s Law Dictionary)
Political Question Doctrine - the judicial principle that a court should refuse to decide an issue
involving the exercise of discretionary power by the executive or the legislative branch of the
government.
"political question" doctrine arising from the principle of separation of powers, the
Judicial Branch cannot decide questions "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government" (Tañada vs. Cuenco GR
L-10520).
Sample case of political question is the case of Tanada vs Cuenco with the issue on the
dispute regarding the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal in the nature of a political question that will divest the Court of jurisdiction?
The court ruling :
T]he term “political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum (supra), it refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.”
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are
called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the
Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator
Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in
the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate
that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen “upon nomination ..
of the party having the second largest number of votes” in the Senate, and hence, is null
and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with “full
discretionary authority” in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The
exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to
be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department
to pass upon the validity of the proceedings in connection therewith.
“.. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the
judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election
procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election
has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has
been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights ..”
(16 C.J.S., 439).
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to
consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein.
2. Differentiate between political question and judicial question.

A ‘political question’ is one the resolution of which has been vested by the Constitution
exclusively in either the people, in the exercise of their sovereign capacity, or in which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to a co-equal branch of the Government.
While a ‘judicial question’ is when courts determine questions of legality with respect to
governmental action in which it will be decided or adjudicated in the courts of law. Courts
cannot review government policy and the wisdom thereof, for these questions have been
vested by the Constitution in the Executive and Legislative Departments.
3. Carpio-Morales vs. CA, digest and principle

FACTS:
Ø On July 22, 2014 Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI file a case on
the Ombudsman accusing Binay JR. of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019
Ø Ombudsman charge them with 6 administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and 6 criminal
cases for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and
Falsification of Public Document
Ø The Ombudsman place them on preventive suspension because it believes that their
continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed
against them.
Ø Binay Jr. seeking to nullify the decision of the ombudsman to place him on
preventives suspension filed
a petition for certiorari before the CA and asking for a TRO.
Ø He claims that he cannot be held liable for any anomalous activity attending any of
the five phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were
undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V
transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a
second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus
rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic.
Ø The CA granted Binay’s prayer for TRO
Ø The Ombudsman claims that the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.’s prayer for
a TRO.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of condonation should apply in Binay’s case.
HELD:
The petition is partly meritorious.
This Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this
jurisdiction. It was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and
thus, out of touch from – and now rendered obsolete by – the current legal regime. In
consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that
originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as
Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon
by the CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s abandonment of the condonation
doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines.
The condonation doctrine was first enunciated in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija, There is no truth in Pascual’s postulation that the courts would be depriving
the electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be
sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by which a particular
constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office.
In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically
implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and
republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective
official’s administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the
same should have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it
be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law,
whether in a constitutional or statutory provision, exists.
Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate’s will
has been abdicated.
4. What is the “Doctrine of Condonation?”

- It is a limited empowerment of the electorate over the accountabilities of their
elective local officials. It is limited because it does not cover criminal
accountability.
- There is a presumption that electorates are well aware of all the misconducts of
the public official.
5. Firestone vs. CA, digest and principle
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines, Director of Land Management Bureau
Respondents: Court of Appeals
FACTS
● Case at bar involve a vast tract of land with an area of around ninety-nine
hectares presumptively belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, which land
has been adjudicated to private individuals by a court alleged to be without
jurisdiction.
● Should any error be perceived, those affected are not precluded from seeking
relief therefrom, by way of a motion of reconsideration.
● Petitioner’s motions to call for a Court En Banc has been voted 4-1 by The Third
Division (March 8 2000) to deny petitioners’ motion to transfer particular cases to
the Banc.
○ Sumilao case is not on all fours with these cases. In the Sumilao case,
the motion for reconsideration has been voted upon by the Second
Division with a vote of 2-2. The Court ruled that the statement resulting
from the said voting constituted a denial of the motions for
reconsideration.
○ In the two consolidated cases under consideration, however, the Motions
for Reconsideration of the Petitioners, Republic of the Philippines and
Firestone Ceramics et. al. are pending and unresolved.
● But on March 14 2000 the Court deliberated on the consulta and thereafter voted
9-5 to accept the cases for the en Banc upon finding that cases above entitled
are of sufficient importance.
ISSUE
● Whether pending cases are admissible to a Court En Banc.
LAWS
● Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated February 7, 1989 as amended by
Resolution of November 18, 1993. The following are considered en banc cases.
1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty.
3. Cases raising novel questions of law
4. Cases affecting ambassadors or other public ministers and consuls
5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service
Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer
or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the
suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine
exceeding 10,000,000 pesos or both.
7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed.
8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least (3) members
thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a
majority of the actual membership of the court en banc; and
9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual
membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention.
COURT RULING
● WHEREFORE, these consolidated cases are considered and treated as en banc
cases; and petitioners' motions for reconsideration are hereby set for oral
argument on July 18, 2000, at 11:00 a.m. Let corresponding notices issue.
6. Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan, digest and principle

G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015
PETITIONER: Danilo A. Duncano, Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
RESPONDENT: Sandigangbayan
FACTS:
Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional
Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as
classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758. On March 24, 2009, the Office of
the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case
against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713,
allegedly committed as follows:
● On April 15, 2003, in Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused DANILO DUNCANO y ACIDO, a Regional
Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in Quezon City, is under an
obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of his assets,
liabilities and net worth and financial and business interests;
● The accused willfully, unlawfully and criminally failed to disclose in his
Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the
year 2002;
● Duncano failed to disclose his financial and business interests/connection
to Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading (he and his
family are the registered owners), and the failure to declare a 1993
Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his son (still a part
of his assets)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the petitioner.
HELD: NO. According to Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
“A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379 where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors,
vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; (b) City mayor, vice-mayors,
members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads; (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director
and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors
and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law.
In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. The specific inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification
relating to “officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.”
RULING: The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e),
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees
occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade “27” or higher, under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to
their office. In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the
position of Director II with Salary Grade “26” under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error
of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
suspending petitioner from office.
7. Differentiate En banc vs Division of the Supreme Court.
The Court is authorized to sit either en banc or in divisions of three, five or seven
members. Since the 1987, the Court has constituted itself in 3 divisions with 5 members each. A
majority of the cases are heard and decided by the divisions, rather than the court en banc.
However, the Constitution requires that the Court hear en banc "[a]ll cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, as well as "those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations". The Court en banc also decides cases
originally heard by a division when a majority vote cannot be reached within the division. The
Court also has the discretion to hear a case en banc even if no constitutional issue is involved,
as it typically does if the decision would reverse precedent or presents novel or important
questions.
En banc sessions refer to a session where the entire membership of the court will
participate in the decision rather than the regular quorum. It is often used for unusually complex
cases or cases considered to be of greater importance
8. What are SC en banc cases? Enumerate.

Supreme Court en banc cases are cases heard by all judges of a court and are often
complex or considered of greater importance. The 1987 constitution rules that the
following cases should be heard en banc:
a. all cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international, or executive

agreement as well as those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of
presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations
b. cases originally heard by a division but when a majority vote cannot be reached within
the division.
c. cases wherein the constitutionality is not the question. The court can also hear cases
en banc at its own discretion if it believes that its decision can reverse precedent.
Reference: 1987 Constitution, Article 8 Section 4
9. Why is division of SC not an implication of incompetency of En banc?
NO. En banc cases are special sessions that call for the decision of all fifteen (15) members of
the Supreme Court. They do not imply incompetency of the division of SC, but the division deem
it special that calls for the decision of all members with regards to its merits or non-merits for
constitutionality. It doesn’t necessarily imply that the division cannot render fair and competent
justice.
10. Ang vs. CA, digest and principles
11. Ebralinag vs. Division, digest and principle

Petioner: Ebralinag et al
Respondent : Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
Facts:
● Students, teachers, and staff who are members of the religious sect Jehovas
Witnesses may be expelled from various schools in Cebu for refusing, on
account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony (sing, salute &
recite).
● All of the petitioners were expelled for non compliance of RA no 1265 “An Act
Making Flag Ceremony Compulsory in All Educational Institution”
Issue:
● Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion
Held:
● Yes. The court held the expulsion of the petitioners.
- Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the
amplest protection of human rights.
12. Fabian vs. Desierto, digest and principle
Fabian vs Desierto G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998
Facts:
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction project including those under
the FMED. Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties.
Fabian tried to terminate their relationship but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do
so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed
the aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.
A complaint sought the dismissal of Agustin for violation of Section 19, R.A. No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an
ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. The case later led to an appeal to the
Ombudsman - who inhibited himself - and transferred the case to the Deputy Ombudsman. The
deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and in the order exonerated the private respondents from the
administrative charges.
Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive
or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
Ruling:
No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently
presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained
in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a
measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily
burden the Court.
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be
brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and
conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which was precisely formulated and adopted to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Doctrine:
Express Limitations to Power of Legislation; Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court. It has been
generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are
procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the
time the statute went into effect or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was declared.
Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the transfer of
appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.
13. Ocampo vs. Enriquez, digest and principle

Facts:
• The case began when Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in
forma pauperis in the Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they
prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina,
Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 8943.
• They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had
illegally entered upon that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or
erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. They further
alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc., et.al. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment.
• The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds of the
motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer of Tuason and J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those
defenses. The Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the
complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the said case, and a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued.
Issue:
• Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy.
Held:
• The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the
remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a
justiciable controversy.
• In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a
land of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine
purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it
shall promote national healing and forgiveness.
14. People vs. Malmstedt, digest and principle

People v. Malmstedt, G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991
FACTS
· Persistent reports reveal that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana
and other prohibited drugs which is why NARCOM, through Captain Alen Velasco, set up a
checkpoint at Camp Dangwa.
· A bus was stopped to be inspected and there a certain Caucasian/Swedish was checked
because of a noticed bulge on his waist. Suspecting that it might be a gun, the officers asked for
the passport and other identification papers from the foreigner but he failed to comply.
· With this, the officer required him to bring out what was bulging on his waist. It turned out
to be a pouched bag which contained hashish, a derivative of Marijuana. Thereafter, the
accused was invited outside the bus for questioning and there was he also arrested for violating
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
ISSUE
· Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure
HELD
· NO. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in the act, thus the search allows a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
15. What are the instances when an unwarranted arrest is valid?
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that “a peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.”
The first situation refers to “in flagrante delicto” arrest. Under this rule, it must be shown that: (a)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer (Valdez vs. People, G.R. No. 170180, 23 November
2007). Thus, if a person is caught in the act of stealing money from a sari-sari store, he may be
immediately arrested without any warrant.
The second situation is often described as the “hot pursuit” arrest. For this rule to apply, it is
required that: (a) an offense has just been committed; and (b), the arresting officer has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it. (Pestilos vs. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, 10 November 2014). Law
enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime, but they must have personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested
committed it. (Veridiano vs. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017) Also, there must be no
appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime. Otherwise, a
warrant of arrest must be secured.
The third kind of warrantless arrest is self-explanatory. Necessarily, an escapee must be

brought back to the prison or in the place where he is serving sentence without any warrant of
arrest to be issued again by the court.
Note that the law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen to arrest offenders only if
the latter are committing or have just committed a crime. (Posadas vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No.
131492, 29 September 2000).
16. What is probable cause and its requisites?

PROBABLE CAUSE
● has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed , and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.
REQUISITES
● when in the presence of peace officer,the person to be arrested has committed,is
actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense.
● when an offense has in fact just been committed and the peace officer has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
● when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgement or temporarily confined while
being transferred from one confinement to another. (people v. malmstedt).
17.Tecson vs. Comelec, digest and principle
CASE: Tecson vs. Comelec, 424 SCRA 227 G.R. No. 161434
Facts:
● December 31, 2003 – Ronald Allan Kelly Poe also known as Fernando Poe Jr. filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines
● In his birth certificate, FPJ represented himself as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and was born on August 20, 1939 and his place of birth is Manila
● Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner G.R. No. 161824 initiated a petition on January 9, 2004 to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the
thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen
● According to Fornier, FPJ’s parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was
an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was
a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child of an alien mother.
● The assertions of the petitioner are as follows: first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second,
even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a
year after the birth of respondent.
● Petitioner, Fornier asserted his claim by presenting several documents exhibits –
1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ,
2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez
attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley
3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid
4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe 5) a certification issued
by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that
there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided
or entered the Philippines before 1907
6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the
National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
● Respondent then presented 22 documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant
ones being –
a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National
Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan
F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan
b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez could be found
c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe
d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou
e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the
name of Lorenzo Pou
f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou
g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley
h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan,
stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May
1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
● COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit.
● The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No.
161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. ‘Fernando Poe, Jr.’), and
Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Issue: Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino Citizen

Ruling: The court dismissed the petition.
The citizenship of FPJ depended on the citizenship of his father Lorenzo Pou. His father
would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime
in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to
his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which
regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate. The totality of FPJ’s presented evidence may not establish conclusively that he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in
his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Principle
In this case, the court used the "Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution which states that
the following are citizens of the Philippines -
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
18. People vs. Cayat, digest and principle
Facts: ● Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the

non-Christian tribe was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of
Act No. 1639 for possessing an intoxicating liquor (one bottle of gin)
which is not a native wine.
Section 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639:
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands

who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act
Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have
in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or
intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines
and liquors which the members of such tribes have been
accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act,
except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of
any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any
provincial, municipal, or township government to seize and forthwith
destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any
member of a non-Christian tribe.
SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section

two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each
offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, at the discretion
of the court.
● Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines, who
is a member of the non-Christian tribe to buy, receive and possess
any intoxicating liquor other than their so-called native wines.
Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides for its punishment.
● Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the

grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of
the laws, violative of the due process and it is an improper exercise
of police power.
Issue: ● Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?
Ruling: ● No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection
clause.
● Equal protection of the laws are not violated by a legislation based
on reasonable classifications. The classification to be reasonable,
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class.
● Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite,
the classification rests on real and substantial distinctions. The
non-Christian tribes refer not to the religious belief, but in a way to
the geographical and more directly to the natives of the Philippines
of a low grade of civilization. Second, Act No. 1639 was designed
to insure peace and order among the non-Christian tribes. The
experience of the past and the lower court observed that the use
of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes often
resulted in lawlessness and crimes, which hamper the efforts of
the Government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
Third, the said act is intended to apply for all times as long as the
conditions exist. Legislature understood that civilization of a
people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go
measures of protection and security. Fourth, the act applies
equally to all members of the same class.
Principle: Protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable

classification. The classification to be reasonable:
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
19. When is a classification valid?
20. Phillips, MD vs. Irons, MD

PHILLIPS, MD v. IRONS, MD
Facts
On Jan 1999, plaintiff, Richard Phillips and the defendant, Sharon Irons began dating. At the
time, the defendant informed Phillips that she was married a year ago and claimed that she has
been divorced from her husband, Dr. Adebowale Adeleye. Time passed and Phillips and Irons
were engaged to be married. The couple talked about the possibility of having children after
getting married. Plaintiff informed the defendant that he did not wish to have children, at least
not until they are married, and intended that he would use a condom whenever they engage in
sex. The defendant understood and agreed.
During the course of their relationship, the couples engaged in oral sex 3 times, with 2 of those
instances having occurred on the same date. They never engaged in vaginal intercourse
because of the defendant’s menses.
Around Feb 19 and/or March 19 of 1999, Irons engaged in oral sex with Phillips. She
used the semen that hadn’t been discarded to artificially inseminate herself without the plaintiff’s
knowledge.
On May 1999, the defendant confessed to Phillips that she is still married to her former
husband. She told him that she planned to get a divorce, and showed him a “petition for
dissolution of marriage” which was filed on May 20, 1999. In the petition, the defendant swore
that she was not pregnant.
The couple ended their relationship when Phillips learned that his fiancé was still married to her
husband on May 1999.
In November 21, 2000, Irons filed a “Petition to Establish Paternity and Other Relief”
against plaintiff, claiming she and plaintiff had a sexual relationship which gave birth to Serena
on December 1, 1999, where DNA tests have confirmed that Phillips is the
biological father of Iron’s daughter. Phillips asserted that he had no knowledge of Iron’s
pregnancy nor the birth of the child until receiving the defendant’s petition to establish paternity.
He also claimed that Iron’s continued to live with his Adeleye during her pregnancy.
Adeleye and the public were led to believe that Serena is Adeleye’s daughter because of the
presence of Adeleye’s name on Serena’s birth certificate. Even Serena, doesn’t know that
Phillips is her biological father.
Phillips filed a complaint before the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois against defendant
seeking damages for: intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent misrepresentation,
and conversion. At the initial filing of the complaint, the plaintiff’s paternity hasn’t been
established.
At the time this case was before the circuit court, and as of the filing of plaintiff's original brief,
plaintiff's paternity had not been established. Although the parties agree that plaintiff is Serena's
biological father, no documentation is provided in the record on appeal.
Following the filing of plaintiff's initial complaint, defendant successfully moved to

dismiss under section 2615. Plaintiff ultimately filed a third amended complaint, which was
dismissed with prejudice, the circuit court finding each count “continues to lack sufficient facts”
necessary to state a cause of action. Plaintiff timely appeals.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the circuit court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for intentional
infliction of emotional distress;
2. Whether or not the circuit court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for fraudulent
misrepresentation;
3. Whether or not the circuit court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for conversion.
Ruling:
1. Yes. the circuit court erred in dismissing count plaintiff’s complaint for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Three elements are needed to state a cause of action for IIED: (1)
the conduct involved must be truly extreme and outrageous (2) the actor must either
intend that his or her conduct inflict severe emotional distress, or know that there is at
least a high probability that it will cause severe emotional distress and (3) the conduct
must, in fact, cause severe emotional distress. An action can be considered “outrageous
and extreme” if the nature of the conduct goes beyond the possible bounds of decency
and is considered intolerable in a civilized community. In the case at bar, defendant’s
actions can be considered “extreme and outrageous” when she deliberately misled the
plaintiff that she didn’t want to bear children until after marriage, but deceitfully engaged
in sexual acts which no one would expect could result in pregnancy, and using the
plaintiff’s sperm in unorthodox, and unexpected manner yielding extreme consequences.
It must also be established that actor must intend that his/her actions inflict severe
emotional distress, or at least know that there is a high probability that it will cause
severe emotional distress.
2. No. The circuit court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation. The tort of fraudulent misrepresentation cannot be applied in the
case at bar since historically, it has been limited to cases involving financial transactions
where plaintiff suffered monetary harm. It is an economic tort under which one may
recover only monetary damages. Therefore, plaintiff may not recover on allegations of
physical and emotional distress.
a. Elements of a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation:
● a false statement of material fact;
● known or believed to be false by the party making it;
● intent to induce plaintiff to act
● action by plaintiff in justifiable reliance on the truth of the statement
● damage to plaintiff resulting from such reliance.
3. No. The circuit court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claim for conversion.
Conversion is an unauthorized act that deprives a person of his property permanently or
for an indefinite time. It must be shown that the money claimed, or its equivalent, at all
times belonged to plaintiff and that defendant converted it to his own use. The elements
of a claim for conversion are: (1) plaintiff's right in the property; (2) plaintiff's right to
immediate, absolute, and unconditional possession of the property; (3) defendant's
unauthorized and wrongful assumption of control, dominion, or ownership over the
property; and (4) plaintiff's demand for possession. The plaintiff cannot show “right to
immediate, absolute, and unconditional possession” of his sperm. Plaintiff presumably
intended, and he does not claim otherwise, that defend discard his semen, not return it
to him.
“The essence of conversion is the wrongful deprivation of one who has a right to the immediate
possession of the object unlawfully held.”
Jus Soli Jus Sanguinis“birthright citizenship”, “by land” “by blood”Citizenship of the
person is determined where the person was born. Whoever is born in the said country and is
subject to its jurisdiction, is automatically granted that country’s citizenship Citizenship
through their parents or by blood of the parents per seThe most common mean a person
acquire its citizenship United States of America
ISSUE:
HELD:
“there was no agreement that the original deposit would be returned upon request, or where the
transaction did not create a bailment, a claim for conversion cannot be sustained.
21.People vs. Marti, digest and principle
FACTS :
● Andre Marti together with his common-law wife Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the
"Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila,
carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages.
● Anita Reyes (the proprietress) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes
that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
● Anita Reyes asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages.
Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books,
cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich.
● Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita following standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor
emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside.
● He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the
contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI
and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the
cellophane wrapper He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the
Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
● Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office. Job
Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the
presence of the NBI agents, opened the packages wherein dried marijuana leaves were
found.
ISSUE :
Whether or not there has been a violation of Marti’s constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure and privacy of communication. (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution)
HELD :
● No. Evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private
person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State
authorities. In the absence of governmental interference, the libertied guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
● Mere presence of NBI agents does not convert it to warrantless search and seizure.
Merely to look at that which is plain sight is not search. Having observed that which is
open, where no trespass has been committed is not search.
PRINCIPLE :
According to Commissioner Bernas :
The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy is a
protection against the State. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the
individual and the State. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to
declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.
22. Valmonte vs. De Villa [1989 & 1990], digest and principle
Issue:
Whether the installed check point in Valenzuela or elsewhere is unconstitutional
and violative of the right against unlawful searches and seizures.
Fact:
· NCRDC installed checkpoints in various part of Valezuela in lieu of the instruction
from the AFP for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to social, economic and
political development of the NCR.
· Benjamin Parpon was gunned down allegedly by members of NCRDC
who’s manning the check point at that time for not complying with the said check
point, wherein it increased the fear of resindent of Valenzuela.
· The Petitioner contended that said check points give the respondent a blanket
authority to make searches and seizure without search warrant and that it is violative
of the Constitution.
Ruling:
The court dismissed the petition for the ff. Grounds:
1. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed or threatened to be
infringed.
-In the case at the bar, it was reasonable because the setting up of the questioned
checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense
and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Between the inherent right of
the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should
prevail.
23.Church of Lukumi vs. City of Haileah, digest and principle

Facts:
● Church of the Lukumi practice the Santeria religion, which employs animal sacrifices as
part of its devotion. However, it kept its religion and rituals in secret because of the
widespread persecution on its members.
● The Church leased land in the city of Hialeah, Florida and announced to establish a
house of worship. Ernesto Pichardo, the Church's priest, indicated that its purpose was
to bring the Santeria faith into the open. With this, the Church began the process of
obtaining utility service and receiving the necessary licensing, inspection, and zoning
approvals.
● However, this plan distressed to many members of the Hialeah community and
prompted the city council to hold an emergency public session. The session talked about
the concerns of establishing a Santeria church for it may propose to engage in practices
which are inconsistent with public morals and stressed over the prohibition against
practices of killing animals cruelly.
● As a response, the Church filed a petition against the city council for it violates their
rights to practice their religion.
● The District Court responded and ruled that preventing public health risks cruelty to
animals as part of governmental interests which then orders the absolute prohibition on
ritual sacrifices accomplished by the ordinances and an exception to that prohibition for
religious conduct would interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest. The Court
of Appeals affirmed to this rule. However, the Supreme Court dissented.
Issue:
Whether the ordinances prohibiting animal cruelty violates the religious conduct of the
Church of the Lukumi Babalu to free exercise principles.
The Court’s ruling:

Yes. Under the Free Exercise Clause, a law that burdens religious practice need not be
justified by a compelling governmental interest if it is netural and of general applicability. Here,
the ordinances demonstrate that they are not neutral and have their objection over the
Santeria's religion and rituals of animal sacrifice which then impedes its right to religious
freedom. The animal sacrifice became the central theme of concern because of its threat
against public morality and safety. In this sense, the ordinances more likely to suppress
religious of the Church rather than to grant their request for them to achieve their ends. The
remedy should be focus more in protecting public health through implementing general
regulations on segregation and disposal of wastes from animal sacrifices. Because of the
suppression stated in the ordinance passed in Hialeah, Flordia which is "forbidding the
unnecessary killing of an animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary
purpose of food consumption" against the Church's rituals, the Court declared it as
unconstitutional for it disrespects the freedom of religion as fundamental right of the members of
the Santeria's rituals.
24.Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, digest and principle
Facts:
1. The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of
the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death
penalty for the said crime.
2. Meanwhile, Congress changed the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection, Under Republic Act No. 8177
3. The petitioner contends that it is cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative
of due process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an
undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent
Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the
Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.
4. execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules,
is constitutional, lethal injection being the best choice for death penalty (more humane)
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty
6. R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that it
confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of
Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
7. The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or
Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus
Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegaray’s arguments.
8. Petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional
muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of
legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster
for being an undue delegation of legislative power
(note: there are 3 other issues but in discussion we only focused on this)
Ruling:
· reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is no undue delegation of legislative
power from the Secretary of Justice to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple
reason that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere
constituent unit of the Department of Justice.
· The Department of Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of the "administration
of the correctional system."
· The import of the phraseology of the law is that the Secretary of Justice should supervise
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in
consultation with the Department of Health.
· Reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity

of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot
be expected to attend to by itself. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
25. Perez vs. Estrada, digest and principle
CASE: Secretary of Justice Perez v. Estrada

Facts:
- Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) is an association
representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks
throughout the
- KBP sent a letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the
anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former
President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order:
1. To assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of
an unprecedented case in our history
ISSUE:
Whether or not the media coverage be allowed to air Estrada`s trial to the public.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before
the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the
Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions:
● the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, §21 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure
● cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the
movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings
● the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and
shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted
therein as may be necessary to explain them
● the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have
rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be
prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of
violations of the prohibition
● to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the
proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the
Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules
promulgated by it
● simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public
broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the
Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in
accordance with law.
PRINCIPLE:
NO.
· The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras be installed
in the courtroom. This right might be fulfilled by less distracting, degrading and more
judicial means.
· In a criminal case, a life is at stake, and the due process rights of the accused
shall take precedence over the people’s right to information.
· The accused has the right to a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his to
make, because it is his life and liberty that is in the balance. A public trial is not the same
as publicized trial.
26. Tanada vs. Cuenco, digest and principle
Facts:
1. Petitioners Tanda,a senator and lone member of opposition party Citizen’s Party ,and
Macapagal,a senatorial candidate who lost in the recent election,was contesting the
election of Cuenco and Delgado,both from Nacionalista Party,as members of the
Senatorial Electoral Tribunal.
2. It is stated in the Constitution that the members of the Electoral Tribunal shall compose
of 3 justices of the Supreme Court, no more than 3 senators from the majority , and no
more than 3 senators from the minority.
3. Tanada was the only member of the minority.The other 2 seats which are for minority
members were given to Cuenco and Delgado.
4. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the Senatorial Electoral
Tribunal is vested in the Senate and the remedy on the issue was not to raise it before
the judicial courts but to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
Issue: Whether or not the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal is a political question thereby not within the jurisdiction of the court.
Ruling: No.Although the Senate has,under the Constitution,the exclusive power to choose the
Senators who shall form part of the Senatorial Electoral Tribunal,the fundamental law has
prescribed the manner in which authority shall be exercised.
The court is called upon to decide on the constitutionality of the election of Cuenco and
Delgado,both senators from the majority,to fill in the seats reserved for the minority.
27.What is Writ of Amparo? When is it available as a remedy?
a. The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in

Spanish.
b. Writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
REFERENCES: SEC. OF DEFENSE v MANALO and A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
28. Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. CA, digest and principle
FACTS:
Pacific Cement Company Incorporated (respondent) entered into a contract to
supply Oil and Natural Gas Commission (petitioner from India) 4,300 metric tons of oil
well cement. The oil well cement did not reach its point of destination. The respondent
and petitioner agreed that the oil well cement will be replaced by a class G cement.
Upon inspection, the class G cement did not conform to the petitioner’s specifications.
Petitioner submitted the claim to an arbitrator pursuant to clause 16 of their contract. The
arbitrator resolved the dispute in petitioner’s favor. The respondent refused to pay the
amount adjudged by the foreign court. Petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC. The
RTC and Court of Appeals denied the complaint stating that the arbitrator did not have
jurisdiction over the dispute of the parties, hence the judgment of the foreign court is not
enforceable in this jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Is the foreign court’s judgment valid and enforceable in this jurisdiction?
HELD: YES, foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure
in foreign courts differs from that of our courts in which the judgment is relied on.
PRINCIPLES:
a. Lex fori or the internal law of the forum. When the foreign court allows that a valid
judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrator’s findings, then it must be
accorded respect.
b. Presumption of validity - the foreign judgment is presumed to be valid. The party
attacking the foreign judgment had the burden of overcoming the presumption of
its validity.
29.Delta vs. CA, digest and principle
Facts:
● In an action for a sum of money against Delta Motors filed by private respondent State
Investment House, Inc. (SIHI), Delta was ordered to pay SIHI P20,061,898.97. The
decision could not be served on Delta because it was dissolved earlier. In the meantime,
Delta had been taken over by the Philippine National Bank.
● SIHI moved for service of the decision by way of publication, in the Thunderer, a Manila
weekly publication. A writ of execution was issued and granted certain properties of
Delta were levied upon and sold.
● Delta filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA, insisting that the trial court’s
decision was void since there was no proper service of summons, and that being void,
the decision never became final and executory.
● CA ruled that the RTC’s decision did not become final and executory because no copy of
the assailed judgment had been properly served on PNB which assumed Delta’s
operation. In a motion for reconsideration.
● Delta filed a Notice of Appeal with the and prayed that the records of the case be
elevated to the CA. RTC dismissed the Notice of Appeal, and denied Delta’s motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal.
● Delta filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, where it prayed for the
annulment of the RTC’s order and for the elevation of the original records to CA but SIHI
filed motion to dismiss the appeal because it was filed beyond 15 days after obtaining
the copy so the motion of DELTA was dismissed.
● Delta filed an Omnibus Motion to declare all acts and proceedings to the earlier
decisions void. Petition is merely noted because issues were not raised in the instant
petition.
● DELTA filed motion for reconsideration (a) while it was true that the matters prayed for in
the Omnibus Motion of petitioner were not raised in the instant petition, they were,
nevertheless, included in the general prayer in the petition "for such other reliefs and
remedies just and equitable in the premises;" (b) it could not file the Omnibus Motion
with the RTC since the records had already been elevated to the Court of Appeals and
upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case; and (c)
the matters raised in the Omnibus Motion were incidental to and included in the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
● SIHI filed motion for clarification for it being mere obiter dictum. (While it is true that as a
necessary consequence the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 22, 1991
ruling that the decision "has not attained finality pending service of a copy thereof on
petitioner Delta, which may appeal therefrom within the reglementary period", all
proceedings and/or orders arising from the trial court’s decision in Civil Case No.
84-23019 are null and void . . .) this paragraph was "not necessary to the decision of the
case before it" 34 and "cannot be considered binding for the purpose of establishing
precedent;" 35 likewise, the Resolution itself did not decide the incident on its merits or
consider and dispose of the issues, nor determine the respective rights of the parties
concerned. CA granted this petition
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in denying the Omnibus Motion?
2. WON the paragraph petitioned by SIHI an orbiter dictum?

HELD:
1. No. According to Sec 7 of Rules of Court, No error which doesn’t affect the
jurisdiction over the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the assignments of
error properly argued in the brief, save as the court as its option, may notice plain errors
not specified and clerical errors. The CA could only consider issues raised by the
petitioner that are limited to RTC’s order and not CA’s previous decisions.
OBITER DICTUM, DEFINED. — An obiter dictum has been defined as an

opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the
decision of the case before it. It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in
his decision upon a cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not
directly Upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the caused, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument.
Such are not binding as preceden
OBITER DICTUM; MAY BE DELETED FROM THE DECISION. — The Court of

Appeals likewise did not commit reversible error in deleting the phrase SIHI protested as
obiter dictum. The assailed phrase was indeed obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter
not raised by petitioner expressly in its petition assailing the dismissal of its notice of
appeal. It was not a prerequisite in disposing of the aforementioned issue. The body of
the resolution did not contain any discussion on such matter nor mention any principle of
law to support such statement.
WHEREFORE, instant petition is DISMISSED.
30.Sell vs. US, digest and principle
ISSUE: Whether a criminal defendant should be involuntary medicated for the purpose of
restoring the defendant to competency so that he can stand trial.
FACTS: Charles Sell is a dentist who was convicted of multiple counts of health care fraud. He
was diagnosed as suffering from "delusional disorder," and while the trial court did not find him
to be a danger to himself or others, it did conclude that absent antipsychotic medication he was
not competent to stand trial. The case raises the question of how to balance the liberty interest
to be free from unwarranted intrusions on bodily integrity, the First Amendment interest in
controlling one's own thought processes, and the right to a fair trial against the government's
interest in obtaining an adjudication of guilt or innocence in a case involving only non-violent
offenses. The Eighth Circuit upheld an order mandating involuntary medication. The case was
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court who agreed to address whether the Court of Appeals
"erred in rejecting petitioner's argument that allowing the government to administer antipsychotic
medication against his will solely to render him competent to stand trial for non-violent offenses
would violate his rights under the First, Fifth and Sixth Amendments."
DECISION:
(1Held) In a divided opinion (6-3), the Court held that the Constitution allows the Federal
Government to administer antipsychotic drugs, even against the defendant's will, in limited
circumstances as decided previously in Washington v. Harper and Riggins v. Nevada. It
affirmed that involuntary administration for the purposes of restoring a defendant's competency
to stand trial can be an appropriate means of acting in the state's interest to bring to trial
defendants who are charged with serious crimes, overriding the defendant's right to refuse
forced medication. However, the court outlined specific criteria which must be satisfied to justify
involuntary medication.
(2Held) The Supreme Court held that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in approving the
lower court's order to allow forced medication to restore Sell's competence to stand trial
(VACATED AND REMANDED) In examining the lower courts' findings, the Court found no
evidence that Sell was dangerous, so the Court assumed that he was not. Determining that the
findings of the District Court and Court of Appeals did not satisfy the criteria for involuntary
medication, the Court vacated the appellate court's judgment.
RATIONALE:
(To: 1HELD) The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 6-3 ruling, stated that the government may
involuntarily administer antipsychotic medications to a mentally ill criminal defendant in order to
render him competent to stand trial, "but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is
substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial and, taking
account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important
governmental trial-related interests." The court clarified that (1) in determining whether the
government has an important interest in bringing a defendant to trial, a trial court must consider
the possibility that the defendant will be civilly committed, or has already been detained for a
lengthy period; (2) the government must show that the medication is substantially likely to
render the defendant competent to stand trial; (3) the court must find that no alternative, less
intrusive approach is likely to achieve substantially the same result of restoring a defendant to
competency; and (4) the particular medication must be in the patient's best interest, taking into
account both efficaciousness and side effects.
(To: 2HELD) CA erred because the original decisions of the hospital and the judge were based
on an assessment of Sell's dangerousness. Since the experts testifying at the hearings focused
mainly on the issue of dangerousness and not on Sell's trial competence, there was not enough
evidence in the court record regarding the possible effect of the medication on Sell's ability to
obtain a fair trial.
PRINCIPLE: Sell is a distinguishable case because of the government interest involved: making
the defendant competent to stand trial.
Government Interest - is a concept that allows the government to regulate a given matter.
*The (US) Supreme Court weighs the government’s interest against the individual's interest
when certain constitutional issues are before it. For individual rights that are not considered
fundamental, the Court will determine whether the government’s action is constitutional by
applying the rational basis test. The government’s interest under that test has to be a legitimate
one. A legitimate government interest usually applies when the government is trying to protect
the health, safety, and economy of its citizens.Governmental actions that infringe fundamental
rights must survive strict judicial scrutiny. That is, reviewing courts will require the government to
prove that the infringing action serves a compelling governmental interest by narrowly tailored
means.
31. Clinton vs. Jones, digest and principle
Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Paula Jones Corbin (Respondent), filed a complaint
containing four counts against the Petitioner, President Clinton (Petitioner), alleging the
Petitioner made unwanted sexual advances towards her when he was the Governor of
Arkansas.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The United States Constitution does not automatically grant the
President of the United States immunity from civil lawsuits based upon his private conduct
unrelated to his official duties as President.
Facts: The Respondent filed a complaint against the Petitioner alleging that the Petitioner made
unwanted sexual advances towards her when he was the Governor of Arkansas. The Petitioner
filed motions asking the district court to dismiss the case on grounds of presidential immunity
and to prohibit the Respondent from re-filing the suit until after the end of his presidency. The
district court rejected the presidential immunity argument, but held that no trial would take place
until the Petitioner was no longer president. Both parties appealed to the United States
Supreme Court (Supreme Court), which granted certiorari.
Issue: Whether the President can be involved in a lawsuit during his presidency for actions that
occurred before the tenure of his presidency and that were not related to official duties of the
presidency?
Ruling: Affirmed.
The President of the United States can be involved in a lawsuit during his tenure for actions not
related to his official duties as President.
It was an abuse of discretion of the District Court to order a stay of this lawsuit until after the
President’s tenure. The District Court’s decision to order a stay was premature and a lengthy
and categorical stay takes no account whatsoever of the Respondent’s interest in bringing the
suit to trial.
Concurrence. It is important to recognize that civil lawsuits could significantly interfere with the
public duties of an official. The concurring judge believed that ordinary case-management
principles were likely to prove insufficient to deal with private civil lawsuits, unless supplemented
with a constitutionally based requirement that district courts schedule proceedings so as to
avoid significant interference with the President’s ongoing discharge of his official
responsibilities.
The Court ruled that the doctrine of separation of powers does not require federal courts to stay
all private actions against the President of the United States until he leaves office. When
defining the scope of an immunity for acts clearly taken within an official capacity, the Supreme
Court has applied a functional approach. Thus, an official's absolute immunity should extend
only to acts in performance of particular functions of his office. Immunities are grounded in the
nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.
32. Quinto vs. Comelec, digest and principle
FACTS:
● Congress enacted RA 8436 on December 22, 1997. On January 23, 2007. it enacted RA
9369, amending the previous act.
● Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678,4 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of
Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in
Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of
Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.
a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or
position.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate of candidacy shall be
filed on regular days, from November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the
last day, which shall be until midnight.
● Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they
file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold
appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections,5
filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the
afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
ISSUES:
1. Do petitioners have locus standi?
2. Do the second proviso in paragraph 3, Section 13 of RA 9369, Section 66 of the

Omnibus Election Code, and Section 4(a) of RA 8678 violate the equal protection clause?
HELD:
1. YES. The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they
have the standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters.
A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters
to choose their public officials. The Court, in this case, finds that an actual case or controversy
exists between the petitioners and the COMELEC, the body charged with the enforcement and
administration of all election laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that they would
engage in the very acts that would trigger the enforcement of the provision they would file their
CoCs and run in the 2010 elections. Given that the assailed provision provides for ipso facto
resignation upon the filing of the CoC, it cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or
hypothetical obstacle to petitioners' candidacy.
2. NO. The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated different from the other.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privelege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it
is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not enfringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class and reasonable ground exists for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Equal Protection refers to the idea that a governmental body may not deny people
equal protection of its governing laws. The governing body state must treat an individual
in the same manner as others in similar conditions and circumstances.
33. Stogner vs. California Digest
STOGNER v. CALIFORNIA
Facts:
● In 1993, California enacted a new criminal statute of limitations permitting prosecution for
sex-related child abuse where the prior limitations period has expired if the prosecution
is begun within one year of a victim's report to police.
● A subsequently added provision makes clear that this law revives causes of action
barred by prior limitations statutes.
● In 1998, petitioner Stogner was indicted for sex-related child abuse committed between
1955 and 1973. At the time those crimes were allegedly committed, the limitations period
was three years.
● Stogner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Ex Post Facto Clause
forbids revival of a previously time-barred prosecution.
● The trial court agreed.
● California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling.
● The trial court denied Stogner's subsequent dismissal motion, in which he argued that
his prosecution violated the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses. The Court of
Appeals affirmed.
Issue: Did the decision of the court violates Stogner’s rights as pertains to the ex post facto
clause?
Ruling:
Yes, the US Supreme Court agreed so.
A law enacted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution. California's law
extends the time in which prosecution is allowed, authorizes prosecutions that the passage of
time has previously barred, and was enacted after prior limitations periods for Stogner's alleged
offenses had expired. Such features produce the kind of retroactivity that the Constitution
forbids. First, the law threatens the kinds of harm that the Clause seeks to avoid, for the Clause
protects liberty by preventing governments from enacting statutes with "manifestly unjust and
oppressive" retroactive effects.
Second, the law falls literally within the categorical descriptions of ex post facto laws that Justice
Chase set forth more than 200 years ago in Calder v. Bull. It falls within the second category,
which Justice Chase understood to include a new law that inflicts punishments where the party
was not, by law, liable to any punishment.
Third, numerous legislators, courts, and commentators have long believed it well settled that the
Clause forbids resurrection of a time-barred prosecution. The Reconstruction Congress of 1867
rejected a bill that would have revived time-barred treason prosecutions against Jefferson Davis
and others, passing instead a law extending unexpired limitations periods. Roughly
contemporaneous State Supreme Courts echoed the view that laws reviving time-barred
prosecutions are ex post facto. Even courts that have upheld extensions of unexpired statutes
of limitations have consistently distinguished situations where the periods have expired, often
using language that suggests a presumption that reviving time-barred criminal cases is not
allowed.
*See Dissenting Opinions.
In relation to the Philippine Constitution:

The Bill of Rights: Article III, Section 22 states that no ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall
be enacted.
SET 4 Questions
1. What are ex-post facto laws? Are they valid?
An ex post facto law (corrupted from Latin: ex postfacto, lit. 'out of the aftermath') is a
law that retroactively changes the legal consequences (or status) of actions that were
committed, or relationships that existed, before the enactment of the law. In criminal law,
it may criminalize actions that were legal when committed; it may aggravate a crime by
bringing it into a more severe category than it was in when it was committed; it may
change the punishment prescribed for a crime, as by adding new penalties or extending
sentences; or it may alter the rules of evidence in order to make conviction for a crime
likelier than it would have been when the deed was committed.
The Philippine Constitution prohibits the passing of any retroactive law. Article III
of the Bill of Rights, Section 22 says: "No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall
be enacted." therefore it is invalid in the Philiippine context. In the civil code of the
Phillippines Article 4 says: “Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless on the
contary is provided.”
There are exceptions to the same, one of which is the retroactive effect on penal
laws. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that penal laws shall
have a retroactive effect insofar as they are beneficial to the accused, to
wit:“Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.”
Further Explanation
The prospectivity and retroactivity of laws are important concepts in the operation of law.
First, let us define the terms.
A thing is prospective if it is expected to happen in the future. Meanwhile, a thing is

retroactive if it takes effect from a date in the past.
Now, let us look at what the law says about prospectivity and retroactivity.
“Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Art. 4, Civil Code.
Thus, a law is prospective at all times. Laws always take effect after they have been
enacted and published. A law may only be retroactive if such retroactive effect is
expressly provided for in the law.
Example:
Law A provides that it shall take effect after 15 days following its publication on Aug. 5,
2010. The law takes effect on Aug. 20, 2010 and will continue to take effect thereafter until
it is repealed or struck down. Law A is prospective.
Law B provides that it shall take effect after 20 days following its publication on Dec. 3,
2012, and that it shall have retroactive effect. The law takes effect on Dec. 23, 2012 and
will continue to take effect thereafter, but the law shall also be applied to things and
events that have happened in the past—prior to Dec. 23, 2012. Law B is both prospective
and retroactive, but its retroactivity only comes into operation upon the effectivity of the
law itself, which is Dec. 23, 2012.
There are other exceptions to the rule that laws shall have no retroactive effect. The
following laws have retroactive effect even if retroactivity is not expressly provided for in
the law.
1. When the law is a penal statute and that it favors the accused who is not a
habitual criminal, even though at the time of the law’s enactment, final
sentence has already been rendered. (See Art. 22, Revised Penal Code.)
2. When the law is procedural and that it does not affect or change vested rights.
3. When the law creates new substantive rights.
4. When the law’s purpose is to cure defects in judicial or administrative
proceedings.
5. When the law’s purpose is to interpret other laws.
The reason for the rule that laws shall have no retroactive effect is the tendency of
retroactive laws to be unjust and oppressive. They may infringe upon vested rights or
disrupt the legal effect of transactions prior to the enactment of the law.
References:
● Civil Law Reviewer by Desiderio P. Jurado
2. Cruzan vs. Director, digest and principle

Facts:
- Nancy Cruzan was involved in a car accident which left her in a “persistent
vegetative state.” After it became apparent that Cruzan had virtually no chance for
recovery, Cruzan’s parents asked hospital employees to terminate the life support
procedures. The hospital refused to do so without a court order since removal of the
tube would cause Cruzan's death.
- A testimony from Cruzan's housemate established that Cruzan wouldn't have
wanted to remain alive under the circumstances.
- The Cruzans filed for and received a court order for the feeding tube to be removed.
The trial court ruled that constitutionally, there is a "fundamental natural right to
refuse or direct the withholding or withdrawal of artificial death prolonging
procedures when the person has no more cognitive brain function and there is no
hope of further recovery." The court ruled that Nancy had effectively 'directed' the
withdrawal of life support by telling a friend earlier that year that if she were sick or
injured, "she would not wish to continue her life unless she could live at least
halfway normally."
- The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial court's decision. It ruled that no
one may refuse treatment for another person without an adequate living will "or clear
and convincing, inherently reliable evidence" of the person's wishes.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the State of Missouri had the right to require "clear and
convincing evidence" for the Cruzans to remove their daughter from life support.
2. Whether or not State of Missouri was violating the Due Process Clause by
refusing to remove Nancy's feeding tube.
Held:
1. The Court found in favor of the Missouri Department of Health and ruled that
nothing in the Constitution prevents the state of Missouri from requiring "clear
and convincing evidence" before terminating life-supporting treatment.
2. The Court held that while individuals enjoyed the right to refuse medical
treatment under the Due Process Clause, incompetent persons were not able to
exercise such rights. Absent "clear and convincing" evidence that Cruzan desired
treatment to be withdrawn, the Court found the State of Missouri's actions
designed to preserve human life to be constitutional. The Court ruled, because
family members might not always make decisions that the incompetent person
would have agreed with, and those decisions might lead to actions (like
withdrawing life support) that would be irreversible.
3. Constitution Article II, Section 2. Cite and explain briefly.

ARTICLE II
Declaration of Principles and State Policies
SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts

the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all
nations.
In “Holy See vs Hon. Eriberto Rosario” Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution is
expressed as the adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even
without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as
part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the
society of nations (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]).
4. Diocese vs. Comelec, digest and principle
Dioceses of Bacolod v. COMELEC
GR. No. 205728
FACTS:
-February 21, 2013, petitioners posted 2 tarpaulins, contains the message “IBASURA RH Law”
referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354 and “Conscience
Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH)
Team Patay” with an “X” mark.
- Each tarpaulin are of the same size of 6 feet by 10 feet
-Petitioners sought the nullification of the 22 February 2013 order issued by COMELEC,
ordering them to remove the supposed oversized tarpaulins and threatening the petitioner
Bishop of Bacolod with the filing of an election offense if he fails to cause its immediate removal.
- On March 5, 2013, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the respondents COMELEC and Atty. Majarucon from removing the Team Patay Tarpaulin.
ISSUES:
● Whether or not the COMELEC’s directives to remove said tarpaulins are unconstitutional
and violates the respondents right to freedom of expression.
● Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its
divisions.
RULING:
Instant Petition GRANTED.
· First Issue
Yes. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their
position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court
held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties.
Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party.
COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred
right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
· Second Issue
No. Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that

the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in
this case, organ of government before a court may come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their
medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections.
COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners
is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of
criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as

COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of
speech.
5. Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo, digest and principle

Petitioner: Secretary of National Defense
Respondent: Manalo
FACTS
● Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bluacan who were
suspected of being members of the New People’s Army, were:
○ Forcibly taken from their home,
○ Detained in various locations, and
○ Tortured by CAFGU and military units
● After several days in captivity, Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo
recognized their abductors as members of the armed forces led by General
Jovito Palparan.
○ They learned that they were being held in place of Bestre Manalo, their
brother, who is a suspected leader of the communist insurgents.
○ They met other desaperacidos including then-missing UP students
Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan who were also suspected being
members of the NPA.
● After 18 months of restrained liberty, torture and other dehumanizing acts, the
brothers were able to escape and file a petition for the writ of amparo.
ISSUE
● Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by existing
laws.
COURT RULING
● Yes. The Right to security person is not merely a textual hook in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution. At its core is the immunity of one’s person against
government intrusion. The right to security of person is “freedom from fear,” a
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity and security.
● To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos, run to, if the
Orweillian sword of the State, wielded recklessly by the military or under the
guise of police power is directed against them?
○ The law thus gives the remedy of the writ of amparo in addition to the
rights and liberties already protected by the BIll of Rights.
LAWS
● Constitution, Article III, Section 2
● Writ of Amparo. Amparo literally meaning “to protect”. This is borne out of the
long history of Latin American and Philippine human rights abuses-often
perpetuated by the armed forces against farmers thought to be communist
insurgents, anarchists or brigands. The writ serves to prevent and cure
○ Extralegal killings,Enforced disappearances, and threats thereof, giving
the powerless a powerful remedy to ensure their rights, liberties, and
dignity.
○ Amparo, a triumph of natural law that has been embodied in positive law,
gives voice to the preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
6. GMA vs. People, digest and principle
G.R. No. 220598

PETITIONER: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo; RESPONDENTS: People of the Philippines
and Sandigangbayan
FACTS:
● The Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan with plunder as defined by, and
penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659 the following: (1) GMA, (2) Benigno Aguas, (3) former PCSO General
Manager and Vice Chairman Rosario C. Uriarte, (4) former PCSO Chairman of
the Board of Directors Sergio O. Valencia, (5) former members of the PCSO
Board of Directors, and (6) two former officials of the Commission on Audit
(COA).
● The Sandiganbayan eventually acquired jurisidiction over most of the accused,
including petitioners. All filed petitions for bail, which the Sandiganbayan granted
except those of the petitioners. Their motions for reconsideration were denied.
GMA assailed the denial of her petition for bail before the Supreme Court.
However, this remains unresolved.
● After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately filed their
demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for
plunder against them.
● The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers and dismissed the case against the
accused within its jurisdiction, except for petitioners and Valencia. It held that
there was sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to commit plunder.
● Petitioners filed this case before the Supreme Court on certiorari before the
Supreme Court to assail the denial of their demurrers to evidence, on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
● WON the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the
demurrers to evidence
HELD:
● No. The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an
interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court expressly provides that “the order denying the motion for leave of
court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by
appeal or by certiorari before judgment.” It is not an insuperable obstacle to this
action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners
was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper
recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their
conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among
the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the
writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do so, “would be to
destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the
court that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary
than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control
over other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular
case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that the writ will be granted
where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.”
● The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the
sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden
constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and
wherever it is committed.
RULING: In spite of the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers
to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of
certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
7. Aguirre vs. Aguirre, digest and principle

Petitioner: Leoncia Aguirre et al.
Respondents: Vicenta Aguirre et al
FACTS:
1. Petitioner filed an action for partition and damages of the properties among the
surviving descendants of the spouses Gregorio Aguirre and Regina Antolin.
2. Petitioners are the surviving descendants of the spouses Gregorio Aguirre and
Regina Antolin.
3. The trial court rendered judgement in favour of petitioners but made no award for
damages to the plaintiffs on the ground of insufficiency of existence or proof.
4. Plaintiffs appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, in so far as damages are
concerned.
5. CA ruled that the petitioners should receive P1,000.00 – sum of P200.00 from the
properties that originated from Gregorio Aguirre and Regina Antolin and P800.00
from the properties left by the spouses Melencio Aguirre and Fructosa Perez –
from the produce of land annually from the date of verdict up to the date of the
their appeal.
6. Dissatisfied, the plaintiffs-appellants elevated the case to the Supreme Court
alleging that they are entitled to other damages such as professional’s fee, etc..
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs-appellants’, Leoncia D. Aguirre et al., are entitled to
damages and to the award of interests and costs.
ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANT:

Leoncia D. Aguirre et al.
1. Plaintiffs-appellant did not agree on the division of the share corresponding to
their children.
2. Defendants-appellees failed to accede to the demands for payment of damages,
as ruled by the Court of Appeals, by not giving the plaintiffs-appellants’ shares
from the produce of lands.
3. The plaintiffs-appellants also incurred damages, attorney’s fees, and
miscellaneous expenses.
SUPREME COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Barredo, affirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeals with modification that the amount of actual damages awarded
petitioners should be P1,000.00 annually from 1955 and the respondents shall pay
interest on all the amounts adjudged against them at the legal rate from the date of
judgement of the trial court (Section 8, Rule 51; Article 2213, Civil Code of the
Philippines). Costs in all instances against respondents (Section 1, Rule 142).
8. Morales vs. Paredes, digest and principle
Facts: The application of Pedro, Rosendo, and Prudencio Gavino for the registration of
a parcel of land in San Quintin, Pangasinan was granted by the court in June 23, 1930.
However, Baltazar Morales claimed to be the owner of the land but was not informed of
the transaction until September.
Morales filed a motion of reconsideration in the Court of First Instance, Pangasinan

regarding the court's initial decision to grant the Gavinos the land. This motion was
recorded 'pending'. Hoping for a speedier process, Morales did not dismiss the first
motion but filed for new motion to instigate a new trial (This is in accordance to Section
513 Code of Civil Procedure)
Issue: Whether or not Morales' second motion is valid

Ruling: The court ruled that the proper remedy should be to petition for a review under
section 38 of the Land Registration Act. Morales argued that the said section only allows
a review within ONE year after the final decree of registration.
The court clarified that a motion for review can be filed after a court renders a decision
granting land and not necessarily after the final decree. Morales' judgement is erroneous
and since this court has no jurisdiction to reopen judgements under section 513 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, THE CASE IS DISMISSED WITH THE COSTS AGAINST
MORALES
9. Gerona vs. Secretary, digest and principle

Gerona et al. v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No L-13954
A LANDMARK CASE:
STANDING MOTION:
Petitioners (Genaro Gerona, et al.) are appealing the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Masbate for dismissing their complaint questioning the constitutionality of
Department Order No. 8.
FACTS:
a.) Department Order No. 8, as issued by the Secretary of the Department of
Education contains the guidelines or the manner by which flag raising ceremony is to
be conducted in all educational as stated in R.A. 1265
b.) Selected students, as represented by their parents, now the Petitioners subscribe
to the religion Jehovah’s Witness.
c.) Their religious beliefs include the literal interpretation of a biblical verse that
disallows for any form of worshiping material objects or of any kind other than that of
heaven.
d.) Petitioners wanted to be excluded from abiding by the rules during flag
ceremonies because of their religion.
e.) Aforementioned students were expelled from the school for refusing to abide by
the existing and implementing rules on flag ceremony.
f.) Court of First Instance of Masbate dismissed the petitioner’sr complaint, thus
restraining them (including all other Jehovah’s Witness involved in the action) from
being admitted to public schools, particularly to the Buenavista Community School.
ISSUE:
WON D.O. No. 8, violate the Constitutional provision of free exercise of religious
expression as stated in Article III Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING AND CONCLUSION:
NO. Department Order No. 8 does not violate the provision about the freedom of
religion and exercise of religion. The decision of the Court of First Instance of
Masbate is AFFIRMED.
ARGUMENT:
a.) The flag is a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines; “the flag salute is not a
religious ceremony,” but is rather an act of “profession of love and allegiance and
pledge of loyalty” to the country that it represents, and thus is non-discriminatory nor
is a violation of any religious beliefs.
b.) The compliance with the rules and regulations as stated in the D.O. No. 8,
required flag ceremony, is a prerequisite to attend public schools; those who
voluntarily attend educational institution means that they are consenting to abide by
the implementing rules and regulations.
c.) Petioners’ non-compliance with the D.O. No. 8, refusal to participate in the flag
ceremony is a reasonable ground for dismissal from the school.
10. Columbia Pictures vs. CA, digest and discuss reversal
11. 20th Century vs. CA, digest and principle

Petitioner: 20th Century Fox Film
Respondent: Court of Appeals
Facts:
● 20th Century Fox sought the assistance of NBI in conducting searches and
seizures in connection with NBI’s anti-film piracy campaign and the Presidential
Decree no. 49 (Decree on the protection of Intellectual Property, 1972)
● NBI filed 3 applications for search warrants against the 3 video outlets owned by
private respondents
○ Junction Video of Eduardo Barreto
○ South Video Bug Center of Raul Sagulto
○ Sonix VIdeo Services of Fortune Ledesma
● Lower court issued search warrants. The NBI, together with the petitioner’s
agent, raided the video outlets and seized the items described in the 3 warrants.
● Private respondents filed a motion to lift the search warrants and released the
seized items, which was granted by the lower court.
● Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the lower court. The
petitioner then filed for certiorari with the Court of appeals which was also
dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier
Held:
Yes.
● The lower court lifted the 3 questioned search warrants in the absence of
probable cause (Sec3, Art IV of 1973, now, Sec2,Art III of 1987) that the private
respondents violated PD 49.
● NBI agents, who acted as witnesses, did not have personal knowledge of the
subject matter of their testimony which was the alleged commission of the
offense by the private respondents
● Master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court.
● The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily
reproduced from master tapes.
Principle:
The proliferation of pirated tapes of films not only deprives the government of much
needed revenue but is also an indication of the widespread breakdown of national order
and discipline. Courts should not impose an unnecessary roadblocks in the way of the
anti-film piracy campaign. However, the campaign cannot ignore or violate constitutional
safeguards. To say that the problem of pirated films can be solved only by the use of
unconstitutional shortcuts is to denigrate the long history and experience behind the
searches and seizures clause of the Bill of Rights.
12. Helvering vs. Hallock, digest and principle
Helvering vs Hallock 309 US 106
FYI: Mahaba masyado yung facts kaya yung doctrine na lang ang ilalagay ko. I am quite sure
they'll not ask for it kasi it involves a foreign law na hindi naman important satin. The relevant
issue here is that WON the doctrine of stare decisis compels the Court to accept the
distinctions between the cases at bar.
No. Stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in
law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare decisis
is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision,
however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine
more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.
The Court opted to reject a doctrine of disability at self-correction. Please bear in mind that the
problem is not that of rejecting a settled statutory construction. The real problem is whether a
principle shall prevail over its later misapplications. The Court ruled that it is not bound by
reason or by the considerations that underlie stare decisis to persevere in distinctions taken in
the application of a statute which, on further examination, appear consonant neither with the
purposes of the statute nor with the Court's own conception of it.
13. JM Tuason vs. Mariano, digest and principle
Facts:
● · The case began when Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in
forma pauperis in the Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein
they prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land located at
Balara, Marikina, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 8943.
● · They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had
illegally entered upon that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or
erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. They
further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were
issued to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., et.al. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription,
laches and prior judgment.
● · The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds
of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer of
Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be
held on those defenses. The Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the
instant civil actions of certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial
court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the
said case, and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued.
Issue:
● · Whether or not OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be
questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova.
Held:
● NO. The trial court was directed to dismiss Civil Case 8943 with prejudice
and without costs.
14. Andersons vs. CA, digest and principle
Andersons Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114928, January 21, 1997
FACTS
· Petitioner questions the decision of the Court of Appeals which set aside the two orders of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalookan City, Branch 122 which denied private respondents
Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner’s complaint is on the grounds of lis pendens.
· Private respondent Willy Denate entered into an agency agreement with petitioner as its
commission agent for the sale of distilled spirits in Davao City because the petitioner failed and
refused the pay the said commission. Petitioner then filed complaint.
ISSUE
· Whether or not the action in the Kalookan RTC be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens
HELD
YES. To constitute the defense of lis pendens, it must appear that not only are the
parties the same but there is substantial identity in the cause of action and relief sought.
It is also required that the identity be such that any judgment which may be rendered in
the other would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata on the
case on hand.
15. Villanueva vs. CA, digest and principle
VILLANUEVA V. CA 294 SCRA 901998
FACTS:
Almario Go Manuel filed a civil action for sum of money with damages before the RTC of Cebu
against Felix Villanueva and his wife Melchora. The check issued by Villanueva supposedly
represented payment of loans previously obtained by Villanueva from Manuel, as capital for
Villanueva’s mining and fertilizer business. The check when presented for payment was
dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds. A demand was made upon petitioner to make good
the check but failed to do so. Manuel then filed a criminal complaint for violation of BP 22.
RTC:
Rendered a decision in favour of Manuel.
CA:
Affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON the SC acquires jurisdiction over the case at bar.
HELD:
No. the petition should be denied. The petitioner failed to raise issues which would constitute
sufficient ground to warrant the reversal of the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts.
RATIO:
Time and again it has been rules that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the
CA is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate
court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As such, this court is not duty-bound to
analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.
The rule, however, admits of the following exceptions: 1.
When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 2.

When there is a grave abuse of discretion; 3.
When the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4.
When the judgement of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; 5.
When the findings are conflicting; 6.
When the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; 7.
When the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; 8.
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; 9.
When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and 10.
When the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record. After a review of the case at bar, we consider petitioner
to have failed to raise issues that would constitute sufficient ground to warrant the reversal of
the findings of the trial and appellate courts.
16. People vs. Pinuila, digest and principle

FACTS:
• Bonifacio del cano and buenaventura dideroy were crew of the barge no. 560 of the
visayan stevedoring company loaded w/ molasses that was anchored in some distance
from the mouth in th victoria' s river in negros.
• while the two sleeping in the cavin dideroy suddenly and violently attacked by men that
lead to his death.
• del cano reported the incident then authorities started the investigation and found out
that the murderer were bignay, pinuila and daiz.
• The authorities made a trap saying that dideroy was alive and that the case was made
through an agreement.
• The accused were trapped then the government file a case against them.
• The accused file a motion for dismissal on the ground that the jurisdiction of the court
of first instance had not been duly established and by virtue of habeas corpuz the
dependants were released.
•When the criminal proceeding were resumed, the arrest of the three accused was
sought but only bignay apprehended. Later on, based on the evidence showed, it reveal
that bignay was only there to help pinuila to get the equipment but not to kill dideroy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant has once been placed in jeopardy and therefore he should
now be acquitted.
HELD:
No. the appellant has not been jeopardized.
Following the doctrine of People v. salico which held that an appeal by the government
does not place accused in double jeopardy. This interpretation ,though later abandoned
must be held applicable to the accused, and they cannot invoke the defense of double
jeopardy. People v salico has long become final and conclusive and has become the law
of the case. It may be erroneous, judged by the law on double jeopardy as recently
interpreted by the supreme court. Even so, it may not be disturbed and modified. The
supreme court recent interpretation of the law may be applied to new cases, but certainly
not an old one finally ang conclusively determined.
LAW OF THE CASE
has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it
means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling rule of decision
between the same parties in the case continues to be the law of the case, whether
correct on general principle or not, so long as the facts on such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
17. Philippine Blooming vs. Philippining Blooming, digest and principle
Facts:
1) The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate

labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon,
Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and
members of the petitioner Union. PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of
Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
2) Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the
regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively);
and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.
3) The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO after
learning about the planned mass demonstration. During the meeting, the planned demonstration
was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out by the union that the demonstration was not
a strike against the company but was in factual exercise of the laborers inalienable
constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for
redress of grievances.
4) The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal
course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the
threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the
rally.
5) A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the
workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent
themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel
the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a
violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
6) The lower court decided in favour of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and the officers of
the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. The PBMEO’s motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two
days late.
Issue:
Whether or not to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as
a violation of freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for
redress of grievances
Whether or not the collective bargaining agreement is an inhibition of the rights of free
expression, free assembly and petition of the employers
Held:
1) Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights
is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield
against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs —
political, economic or otherwise.
The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was against alleged
abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm,
said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general
and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before
appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the
municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection
from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private
respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local
police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and
take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment,
vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its
productivity as well as profits.
2) To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of
bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement
and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches
unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is “a potent means of inhibiting
speech” and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees
of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according
to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the “duty … to
observe regular working hours.” The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that
a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration against
police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the
workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be
predicated on such a slender ground.
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the
part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the
respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right “to engage in concert activities for …
mutual aid or protection”; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in
Section Three.
The Supreme Court set aside as null and void the orders of Court of Industrial Relations.
The Supreme Court also directed the re-instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners,
with full back pay from the date of their separation from the service until re-instated,
minus one day’s pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources
during their separation from the service.
18. Estrada vs. Desierto, digest and principle

Facts: ● Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
● Ilocos Sur Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of
the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family
and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
● House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment
signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the
members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This
caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator
Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President.
Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.
● Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner.
21 senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.
● When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the
opening of the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence
showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account
under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private
prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust,
Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. By midnight,
thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full
of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the 11
senators.
● January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call
for petitioner's resignation. A 10-km line of people holding lighted
candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument
on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize
the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation.
● January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared
inevitable. Petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for
President where he would not be a candidate. Secretary of
National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together
with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA
Shrine. General Angelo Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your
Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed
Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our
support to this government.” A little later, PNP Chief, Director
General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave
a similar stunning announcement.
● January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Petitioner and
his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.
● January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent
Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the
Presidency.
● February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting
any further proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may
be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President
is over and only if legally warranted."
● February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding
the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution."
Issue: ● Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.

● Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while
respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
Ruling: ● An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration
to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by
the Vice-President as Acting President xxx.
● In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write
any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang
Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking
of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before,
during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
● What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both
houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that
the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary.
Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
Principle: 1. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual

question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by
any formal requirements as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be expressed. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
19. Corpuz vs. People Digest

CORPUZ v. PEOPLE
Facts:
● Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation
to sell the same and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after
the expiration of 30 days.
● The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy.
● When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail.
● Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz.
● Corpuz argued as follows:
a) The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere
photocopy.
b) The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be
returned and the date when crime occurred is different from the one testified to
by Tangcoy.
c) Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.
d) Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction
Issues and Ruling:

1. Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best
evidence rule (only original documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)?
Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to
evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as
waived.
Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was
identified, marked and testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an
objection in his Comment to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and even admitted
having signed the said receipt.
2. Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence?
No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article
315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material
ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence
of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.
Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:

1. The designation of the offense by the statute;
2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
3. The name of the offended party; and
4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed.
The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of offense was
committed “on or about the 5th of July 1991,” such is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause
considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when
the same is a material ingredient of the offense.
3. What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence?
Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:
a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same
b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender
or denial on his part of such receipt;
c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be
formal; it may be verbal. The specific word “demand” need not even be used to show that it has
indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of
the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.
4. May a sole witness be considered credible?
Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC gives
great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the
appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.
The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness
or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding
is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of
their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be
weighed not numbered.
20. Lawrence vs. Texas, digest and principle
Lawrence v Texas: Police entered the home of John Geedes under the report that there’s a
weapon disturbance in the said house. The Police found Lawrence having sex with Garner, the
men were arrested and charged with violating a Texas statute that prohibits a person to engage
in a sexual act with the same gender. Issue: W/N the statute prohibiting certain sexual acts
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ruling: Yes it does,
intimate sexual conduct between two consenting adults is a liberty and right protected under the
EPC of the 14th amendment.
21. Barnes vs. Glenn, digest and principle

FACTS :
● Glenn Theatre and the Kitty Kat Lounge in Indiana, operated entertainment
establishments with totally nude dancers.
● An Indiana law regulating public nudity required dancers to wear "pasties" and a
"G-string" when they perform.
● The Theatre and Lounge sued to stop enforcement of the statute
ISSUE : Does a state prohibition against complete nudity in public places violate the First
Amendment's freedom of expression guarantee?
HELD : No. The governmental interest served by the text of the prohibition is societal
disapproval of nudity in public places and among strangers. The statutory prohibition is
not a means to some greater end, but an end in itself. It is without cavil that the public
indecency statute is "narrowly tailored;" Indiana's requirement that the dancers wear at
least pasties and a G-string is modest, and the bare minimum necessary to achieve the
state's purpose.
Principle : The requirement that the dancers use pasties and a G-string does not
deprive the dance of whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply makes the message
slightly less graphic. The perceived evil that Indiana seeks to address is not erotic
dancing, but public nudity. The appearance of people of all shapes, sizes and ages in
the nude at a beach, for example, would convey little if any erotic message, yet the state
still seeks to prevent it. Public nudity is the evil the state seeks to prevent, whether or not
it is combined with expressive activity. It was not the dancing that was prohibited, but
simply its being done in the nude.
22. Freedman vs. Maryland, digest and principle
FACTS:
Appellant was convicted of exhibiting a motion picture without submitting it to the
Maryland State Board of Censors for prior approval, despite his contention that the
motion picture censorship statute unconstitutionally impaired freedom of expression. The
Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. Where motion pictures are concerned, a requirement of prior submission to a
censorship board is not necessarily unconstitutional.
-In the area of freedom of expression it is well established that one has standing to
challenge a statute on the ground that it delegates overly broad licensing discretion to an
administrative office, whether or not his conduct could be proscribed by a properly drawn
statute, and whether or not he applied for a license. "One who might have had a license
for the asking may . . . call into question the whole scheme of licensing when he is
prosecuted for failure to procure it." Standing is recognized in such cases because of the
". . . danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a
penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application." Although we have no
occasion to decide whether the vice of overbroadness infects the Maryland statute, we
think that appellant's assertion of a similar danger in the Maryland apparatus of
censorship - one always fraught with danger and viewed with suspicion - gives him
standing to make that challenge. In substance his argument is that, because the
apparatus operates in a statutory context in which judicial review may be too little and
too late, the Maryland statute lacks sufficient safeguards for confining the censor's action
to judicially determined constitutional limits, and therefore contains the same vice as a
statute delegating excessive administrative discretion.
2. One can challenge a licensing statute which endangers freedom of expression
whether or not his conduct could be prohibited by a properly drawn statute and whether
or not he applied for a license.
-Applying the settled rule of our cases, we hold that a noncriminal process which
requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it
takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a
censorship system. First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression
must rest on the censor. "Where the transcendent value of speech is involved, due
process certainly requires . . . that the State bear the burden of persuasion to show that
the appellants engaged in criminal speech." Second, while the State may require
advance submission of all films, in order to proceed effectively to bar all showings of
unprotected films, the requirement cannot be administered in a manner which would lend
an effect of finality to the censor's determination whether a film constitutes protected
expression. The teaching of our cases is that, because only a judicial determination in an
adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a
procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint.
23. Near vs. Minnesota, digest and principle

Facts:
● An appeal was filed against the erroneous construction of Chapter 285, Laws of 1925
and authorize the Court to prohibit J. M. Near from conducting a newspaper under the
name of Saturday Press for the law does not permit such construction.
● That newspaper construction refers to the publication of a periodical being referred to as
malicious and scandalous to the newspaper to which it was published. In its title, "A
Direct Challenge to Police Chief Brunskill", the periodical claimed that Jewish gangs
were ruling the city along Frank W. Brunskill, the chief police. It also targetted mayors
and members of grand jury and described them as incompetent to investigate such
criminal activity.
● A Minnesota statute, known as the "Minnesota Gag Law", contravenes to such action
which merely prohibits "engaging in the business regularly or customarily producing,
publishing or circulating a malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspaper". Thus,
silencing and banning all publications that caused public nuisance.
● In Minnesota Supreme Court's decision, it ordered Near to stop publishing his
newspaper in accordance to the Gag Law. Yet, Near appealed this decision to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the Minnesota statute's censorship is unconstitutional which then violated the
First Amendment.
The Court’s ruling:

Yes. It ruled that enact laws must respect the liberty of the press as part of the First
Amendment. The Minnesota statute restraints the continuous publication of Near's newspaper
which clearly violated the liberty of the press. Moreover, the Court declared that the State truly
protected and cherished this liberty as it pay respects in charging official misconduct, as shown
in the periodical of Near. In effect, any censorship to newspaper publications was prohibited in
the State as it wants to uphold the good quality of news content directing against any
misbehavior of government officials.
24. Zulueta vs. CA, digest and principle
Facts:
● In the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent’s secretary the petitioner ,
Cecilia Zulueta, entered the clinic of her husband, Dr. Alfonso Martin .
● · Petitioner forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic; taking
157 documents consisting of pricate correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries , Dr. Martin’ s passport and
photographs.
● · The documents where seized for the use of evidence for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her
husband.
● · Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and
for damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the RTC of Manila which, after
trial, rendered judgment for private respondent
● · ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to immediately return
the properties to Dr. Martin
● · The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner
Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Issue: The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful
means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification
from medical practice
Ruling:
● The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s
infidelity, who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced”
● The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from
a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
● A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy
as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The
law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged.
25. Goesart vs. Cleary, digest and principle
CASE: Goesaert v. Cleary
Facts:
· Valentine Goesaert owned and operated a bar in Dearborn, Michigan
· A Michigan statute required that all bartenders hold licenses in cities with
populations greater than 50,000
· The statute also stated that a woman could not be issued a license
unless she was of the following:
Ø Wife or daughter of the male owner of a liquor establishment
· Taking an important stand against sexual discrimination, twenty-eight
Michigan women, bar owners and barmaids, sued the Michigan Liquor Control
Commission resulting in the case, Goesaert v. Cleary (1947)
ISSUE:
Whether the law prohibiting women from getting their bartender license violated
14th Amendment equal protection rights
DECISION:
Supreme Court rejected the Goesaert decision
PRINCIPLE:
· Court concluded that the Constitution "does not preclude the States from
drawing a sharp line between the sexes" or "to reflect sociological insight, or
shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the
latest scientific standards."
· The Court found that the Michigan legislature, in enacting the statute, could
have determined that allowing women to bartend could "give rise to moral
and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures."
26. O’Sullivan vs. Boerckel, digest and principle
Facts:
1. Boerckel was convicted of rape, burglary,and aggravated battery by the Illinois
trial court and was subsequently affirmed by the Illinois appellate court.
2. Boerckel filed a petition for certiorari to the Illinois Supreme Court raising only 3
claims (1.illegal arrest,2.prosecutorial misconduct,3 denial of discovery) and was
denied.
3. Boerckel applied to federal district court for writ of habeas corpus raising 3 claims
(1. Involuntary waiving of his Miranda rights, 2.Involuntary confession, 3.
Insufficiency of evidence for conviction) not included in his petition for review by
the Illinois Supreme Court.His failure to raise these claims to the Illinois Supreme
Court barred his petition for federal review.
4. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision.
5. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the court
of appeals,holding that failure to raise claims in the state’s highest court
procedurally bars federal courts from entertaining such claims.
Issue: Must state prisoner present all of his claims to the state supreme court in order to
satisfy the exhaustion requirement?
Ruling: Yes,the state prisoner must present all of his claims to the state supreme court
to give it the full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issue before resorting to petition
to the federal courts.The court found that his claims have been procedurally defaulted
because he failed to comply with the exhaustion requirement.
Principles:
1. Doctrine of Exhaustion and Procedural Default
-The failure to present a claim in the state court bars granting of relief from the
federal courts.
27. Employment Division vs. Smith, digest and principle
FACTS:
1.) A private drug rehabilitation clinic fired two members of the Native American
Church, Alfred Smith and Galen Black, for using the drug peyote.
2.) Peyote was an integral part of Native American religious ceremonies. However,
possession of the drug was illegal in Oregon, and the law did not provide for any
exceptions related to religious use.
3.) When Smith and Black brought a claim for unemployment compensation, the
state denied them benefits because their use of peyote was viewed as
misconduct. Unemployment benefits are not available to individuals who are
terminated from their jobs because of related misconduct
ISSUE: WON, (1) the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits the State of
Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general criminal
prohibition on use of that drug, and
(2) thus permits the State to deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs
because of such religiously inspired use.
HELD: The Free Exercise Clause permits the State to prohibit sacramental peyote use, and
thus to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use
Since the Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a law that
incidentally forbids or requires the performance of an act that his religious belief requires
or forbids. The Court has held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral,
generally applicable law to religiously motivated actions are distinguished on the ground
that they involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but that Clause in conjunction with
other constitutional protection. And although it is constitutionally permissible to exempt
sacramental peyote use from the operation of drug laws, it is not constitutionally required.
Lastly, in order to permit these professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of
the land in effect it should permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.
28. Webb vs. de Leon, digest and principle
FACTS:
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a
letter-complaint charging the petitioners with the crime of rape with homicide of the Vizconde
family including the mother and 2 daughters. NBI presented sworn statements of witnesses, one
of which is Maria Jessica Alfaro’s, the principal witness. Mainly, petitioner Webb claimed that he
did not commit the crime at bar as he was in the United States on dates of interest. Based on
the reports and information submitted by the DOJ panel to RTC, Judge Tolentino issued
warrants of arrest against the petitioners and their co-accused. The petitioners contended that
the RTC judges gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them. Also, the petitioners argued that the
DOJ panel lost its impartiality due to the prejudicial publicity waged in the press and broadcast
media by the NBI.
ISSUES:
a. Did the RTC judges gravely abused their discretion upon issuing warrants of arrest without
conducting preliminary examination and without issuing an Order of arrest?
b. Is the effect of publicity prejudicial to their right to due process?
HELD:
a. No. Section 6 of Rule 12 simply provides that upon filing of an information, the RTC may
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The contention of the petitioner that the court
is required to conduct ‘searching examination of witness’ before issuing warrants of arrest
against them is incorrect. The court also rejects the petitioners’ contention that a judge must
first issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule
requiring the issuance of such order prior to warrant.
b. No. The court recognizes that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain
circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. The court find
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content, of the publicity that attended
the investigation of petitioners, fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ panel.
PRINCIPLE:
a. Preliminary Investigation – determines whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a
well-grounded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional trial Court has been committed
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
b. Probable cause – are facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe than an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.
29. Osmena vs. Comelec, digest and principle
FACTS:
Petitioners Governor Emilio M. Osmeña (Province of Cebu), et al. pray for this Court to declare
Republic Act No. 7056 "An Act Providing for the National and Local Elections in 1992, Pave the
Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995, and Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor," as unconstitutional and, therefore, invalid and inoperative by by way of
a petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Injunction with temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of said Republic Act 7056 and the
consequent expenditure of public funds and to compel the Comelec to immediately and with all
deliberate speed set up the machinery and make the necessary preparation for the holding of
synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May, 1992. The petitioners’
claim they have actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case not only
because, as public officials, they have taken an oath to support and defend the Constitution but
also because, as taxpayers, they have an interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly
and, more importantly, lawfully disbursed.because:
1. It violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized national and local
elections on the second Monday of May 1992.
2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all
incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall
serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article
XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution.
3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term or
tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential,
Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX under
the title “Commission on Elections” of the Constitution.
5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056
to synchronized national and local elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of
May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing the local elections to
the second Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at
all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to
eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be made
to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision.
Respondents argue that the questioned provision is a valid exercise of legislation power, and
that the amending process in the Constitution does not apply to transitory provisions.
ISSUES:
Can the national and local elections be desynchronized?
Is RA 7056 valid and constitutional?
RULING:
1. No. It is very evident that the Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local
election prior to June 30, 1992 or more specifically as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5-on the
second Monday of May, 1992. On this point, it has to be stressed that the term of office of
elective local officials, except barangay officials, is fixed by the Constitution at three years (Sec.
8, Art. X). The incumbent local officials were elected in January 1988. Therefore, their term
would have expired on February 2, 1991. But their term was adjusted to expire at noon of June
30, 1992. The reason for the said adjustment, as well as those of the Senators, members of the
House of Representatives, President and Vice-President, is the same — to synchronize the
national and local elections.
2.Yes. With the clear mandate of the 1987 Constitution to hold synchronized (simultaneous)
national and local elections in the second Monday of May, 1992, the inevitable conclusion would
be that Republic Act 7056 is clearly violative of the Constitution because it provides for the
holding of a desynchronized election. Stated differently, Republic Act 7056 particularly Sections
1 and 2 thereof contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, Republic Act 7056 is hereby declared

UNCONSTITUTIONAL, hence, NULL and VOID. The restraining order earlier issued is hereby
made permanent. No costs.
30. Keenan vs. Superior Court, digest and principle
Keenan vs. Superior Court, digest and principle
PRINCIPLES:
Coordination - may be requested when civil actions sharing a common question of fact
or law are pending in different courts.
Steps in requesting Coordination:
1. The first is a request to the Chief Justice by the presiding judge of a trial court.
The Chief Justice then assigns a judge to determine whether coordination is
appropriate courts.
2. A hearing before the assigned judge. If that judge determines that, under the
standards set forth in section 404.1,2 coordination is appropriate, an order to that
effect is made and reported to the Chief Justice.
3. The third step is the action of the Chief Justice in assigning a judge “to hear and
determine the actions in the site or sites the assigned judge finds appropriate.
ISSUE: Conflict between the actions (requests for coordination) of two separate courts.
Whether the trial will be on the jurisdiction of El Dorado County or in Los Angeles.
FACTS: On 1977 crash of a Piper aircraft while taking off from South Lake Tahoe Airport in El
Dorado County on its return flight to El Monte Airport in Los Angeles County. The pilot and one
passenger were killed; the surviving three passengers were injured. The pilot and three
passengers were residents of Los Angeles County, where the aircraft had been maintained and
leased for the flight, and one passenger resided in San Diego County.
(*Actions – acts that led to the plane malfunctioning and consequently crashing)
Actions will be identified by the names of the respective plaintiffs. Actions by Tobin and
Peterson were filed in Los Angeles County. An action by Long was filed in El Dorado County.
The Keenans simultaneously filed actions in Los Angeles and El Dorado Counties. The
defendants in these actions included the manufacturer of the plane, Piper Aircraft Corporation,
the lessor of the plane, El Monte Flight Service, the administrator of the estate of the pilot,
Tobin, and the owner of the plane, Hueckel.
Keenans filed in the Los Angeles Superior Court a motion to commence proceedings for the
coordination of the five actions. On November 23, 1979, that court gave its approval and
transmitted the request to the Chief Justice who assigned Honorable David N. Eagleson (LA
judge #1), judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, to sit as coordination motion
judge to determine whether coordination of the included *actions enumerated is appropriate.
Meanwhile, Piper had filed motions in Los Angeles to change the venue of the three Los
Angeles cases to El Dorado County. These motions came on for hearing in a law department,
where on January 25, 1980, Judge Ralph (LA judge #2) granted the motions and ordered the
three cases transferred to El Dorado.
On February 1, 1980, the Keenans filed in this court a petition for a writ of mandate or
prohibition (case no. 2 Civ. 58463) to review Judge Ralph's (LA judge #2) January 25, 1980,
order.
On February 13, 1980, Judge Eagleson (LA J#1) conducted a hearing pursuant to section 404.3
after which he made the following order: “…coordination of the included actions is appropriate
under the standards specified in Code of Civil Procedure, Section 404.1, it is ordered that the
petition for coordination of the included actions is granted. The Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, is designated the reviewing court having appellate jurisdiction and the court in
which any petition for a writ relating to any subsequent order in this proceeding shall be filed.
“Judge Jack T. Ryburn is nominated the coordination trial judge.”
On February 25, 1980, Piper filed its petition in this court (Court of Appeal, California) for a writ
prohibiting any action in the coordination proceeding. Gulo na ha
DECISION:
In case 2 Civil 58463 let a writ of mandate issue requiring the respondent court to vacate its
order of January 25, 1980, changing the place of trial to El Dorado County in the actions entitled
Keenan v. Piper, No. C 247282; Peterson v. Piper, No. C 248311; and Tobin v. Piper, No. C
239920.
In case 2 Civil 58662 the petition is denied.

RATIONALE:
Rules 1520-1545, adopted by the Judicial Council, give the coordination judge broad discretion
to adopt procedures which will serve the convenience of parties, witnesses and counsel, and
utilize judicial personnel and facilities efficiently. The statute and rules clearly establish that the
coordination judge is not to be constrained by the preexisting law relating to the place of trials.
The venue statutes (ss 392-401) require that the place of trial be determined by such matters as
the nature of the action, the county in which certain events occurred, the legal form or capacity
of a party and the residence of a party. Once the proper place of trial is determined under these
statutory standard, all trial court proceedings are conducted in that place.
The coordination law, on the other hand, enjoins the trial judge to “assume an active role in
managing all steps of the pretrial, discovery, and trial proceedings ” (rule 1541(b)) and gives the
court new flexibility in selecting the place or places where judicial activities may be conducted.
Under rule 1541(b) the court may “(1) order any coordinated action transferred to another court
pursuant to Rule 1543; (2) schedule and conduct hearings, conferences, and a trial or trials at
any site within this state he deems appropriate with due consideration to the convenience of
parties, witnesses, and counsel; the relative development of the actions and the work product of
counsel; the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower; and the calendar of the
court;”
In November 1979, when the Los Angeles Superior Court took the first step to request the
assignment of a coordination motion judge, and on January 21, 1980, when the Chief Justice
assigned Judge Eagleson as the motion judge, there were three actions pending in Los Angeles
County and two pending in El Dorado County, all of which shared common questions of fact and
law. Thus, the request met the threshold standard set forth in section 404.
The action of Judge Ralph on January 25, 1980, in granting Piper's motion to transfer the three
Los Angeles actions to El Dorado was inconsistent with the pending proceedings for
coordination. That order cannot be given effect if the cases are to be litigated through the
flexible procedures of the coordination statute and rules. Once a case has come under the
coordination procedure, the place of trial must be determined by the coordination judge
unfettered by the narrow perspective of the venue statutes (see Pesses v. Superior Court,
(1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 117, 125, 165 Cal.Rptr. 680).
The coordination procedure, where applicable, was clearly intended to govern subsequent
activities without interference by any judge other than those designated by the Chief Justice as
coordination motion judge and coordination trial judge. Section 404.5 authorizes the
coordination motion judge to “stay any action being considered for, or affecting an action being
considered for, coordination.” Rule 1529 provides “(A)n order granting a petition for coordination
of any action shall, upon filing in that action, automatically stay all further proceedings in that
action, except as directed by the coordination trial judge, ”
When Judge Ralph acted on January 25, 1980, Judge Eagleson, the coordination motion judge,
had not ordered any stay, and the petition for coordination had not yet been granted. Therefore,
no statutory or court ordered stay was in effect. Notwithstanding that, the statutory system
reflects the legislative intent to give priority to the pending coordination proceedings, and the
action taken on January 25, 1980, was an improper intrusion upon cases which the Chief
Justice had assigned to the coordination motion judge. Ordinarily, when a case is assigned to a
judge of a multi-judge court, that judge must be allowed to carry out the assignment without
interference by some other judge. The January 25, 1980, order was, at best, an abuse of
discretion and should be set aside.
The court found no merit in Piper's contention that the Keenans lacked standing to seek review
of the January 25, 1980, order. As parties to the coordination proceeding, the Keenans properly
asked this court to review an order which could not be given effect without interfering with the
powers to be exercised by the coordination judge. Some of the parties in interest have asserted
that Judge Eagleson's order established venue in Los Angeles. The order does “nominate”
Judge Ryburn of the Los Angeles Superior Court as the coordination judge. That nomination will
have only such effect as the Chief Justice sees fit to give it. Section 404.3 provides that the
Chief Justice will assign the coordination judge, and the latter is empowered by rule 1541(b) to
determine the place or places where proceedings are to take place. As we have pointed out
above, the coordination trial judge will have a broad discretion to conduct proceedings in various
places as may be appropriate, considering the convenience of the parties, witnesses and
counsel, and the efficient use of judicial time. The exercise of that power should afford at least
as much convenience as the ruling erroneously made on January 25, 1980, under the narrower
statutory venue standards.
31. Ayer vs. J. Ignacio, digest and principle
Facts:
Hal McElroy, an Australian film maker and his production company, Ayer Productions pty Ltd.
(Ayer Productions) envisioned a commercial viewing and international release of their film “The
Four Day Revolution”. Lope V. Juban, local movie director suggested that they consult
appropriate government agencies, General Fidel V. Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile who
had major parts in the movie. The proposed movie was endorsed by MTRCB and on December
16 1987, Hal McElroy informed about the proposed film enclosing a synopsis of the film.
On December 21, 1987, Enrile replied that he would not approve of the use, reproduction of his
name in any cinema, television or any commercial “exploitation”. Enrile was deleted from the
film and Ayer productions proceeded with the film.
On Feb 23 1988, Enriled filed a Temporary Restraining Order and Wilt of Pretion.
On March 9, 1988, McElroy filed a motion to dismiss with opposition contending that the
mini-series would not involve the private life onf Juan Ponce Enrile nor his family
Issue:
Whether or not Enrile’s right to privacy was violated
Whether or not Ayer Production’s freedom of expression was violated
Ruling:
Enrile’s Restraining order was dissolved.
The film was not about the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile and his family and there was no
clear and present danger. The film related to the change in government that happened in EDSA
which is a matter of public interest. Enrile is a public figure in which his accomplishments, fame,
or adopting profession give the public a legitimate interest in his character.
32. People vs. Rodrigueza, digest and principle

FACTS: The purpose of buy-bust operation is to catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto.
A confidential informant told the police officers that there is an on-going illegal traffic of
prohibited drugs therein Major Zeidem formed a team to conduct buy-bust operation.
CIC Taduran acted as poseur buyer and was able to buy 100grams of marijuana from
appellant. The CIC Taduran reported to Major Zeidem that he was able to purchase
marijuana. Based on the information they have formed a team to apprehend appellant.
The Officers were not, however, armed with a warrant of arrest when they apprehended
the three accused.
Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid in the house
of Jovencio Rodrigueza, father of appellant. During the raid, they were able to
confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe, among others. The search,
however, was not authorized by any search warrant.
ISSUE: Was the act of the Police Officers valid?
RULING: NO.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and

catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante
delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of
selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a buyer.
In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to
meet this qualification. Based on the very evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged
consummation of the sale of dried marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released
appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his custody. This act of
CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the supposed sale of marijuana did take place, is
decidedly contrary to the natural course of things and inconsistent with the aforestated
purpose of a buy-bust operation. It is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape
without having been subjected to the sanctions imposed by law.
As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be

authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper government authority. True, in
some instances, the Court has allowed government authorities to conduct searches and
seizures even without a search warrant. Thus, when the owner of the premises waives
his right against such incursion; when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it
is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; when it is made on
automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws;
when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; or in cases of inspection of buildings
and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, a
search may be validly made even without a search warrant.
In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of
Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search warrant. It does not appear,
either, that the situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases. Hence, appellant's
right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated.
33. What is double jeopardy?

a. This is when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated
either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. -
Philippine Law Dictionary
b. Double Jeopardy as enshrined in Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution
states that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act.
SET 5 Questions
1. Is the power of court inherent or constitutional? Explain.

The inherent power of the court comes from the constitution, in article VIII Section 1
states that The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
As such,
The Rule 135 of the Rules of Court
POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS
SEC. 5. Inherent powers of courts. - Every court shall have power:
(a) To preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence;

(b) To enforce order in proceedings before a person or persons empowered to conduct a judicial
investigation under its authority;
(c) To compel obedience to its judgments, orders and processes, and to the lawful order of
judge out of court, in a case pending therein;
(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other
persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto;
(e) To compel the attendance of persons to testify in a case pending therein;
(f) To administer or cause to be administered oaths in a case pending therein, and in all other
cases where it may be necessary in the exercise of its powers;
(h) To authorize copy of a lost or destroyed pleading or other paper to be filed and used instead
of the original, and to restore, and supply deficiencies in its records and proceedings.
2. What are the three branches of government and their basic powers?
a. Legislative branch
- authorized to make laws, alter, and repeal them through the power vested in the
Philippine Congress.
- divided into the Senate and the House of Representatives.
b. Executive branch
- has the power to administer the laws, which means carrying them into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance.
- composed of the President, the Vice President and the Cabinet.
c. Judicial branch
- holds the power to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and determines whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part and
instrumentality of the government, (adjudicatory power)
- has the power to pass upon the validity or constitutionality of the laws of the State
and the acts of the other departments of the government, to interpret them, and to
render them binding judgments, (power of judicial review)
- It is made up of a Supreme Court and lower courts.
3. Explain the doctrine of segregation and blending of powers.

Blending of powers is actually sharing of powers of the different departments of
government whereby one department helps and coordinates with the other in the exercise of a
particular power, function or responsibility.
The following are examples under the 1987 Philippine Constitution where powers are not
confined exclusively within one department but are in fact shared:
The President and Congress help one another in the making of laws. Congres enacts
the bill and the President approves it.
The President prepares a budget and Congress enacts an appropriation bill pursuant to
that budget.
The President enters into a treaty with foreign countries and the Senate ratifies the
same.
The Supreme Court may declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law,
as unconstitutional, and it has also the power to declare invalid any act done by the othe
departments of government.
The grant of amnesty by the President is subject to the concurrence of a majority of all
the members of the Congress.
4. What are third level courts? Example.
Third-level Court
Court of Appeals
- Exercises its power, function, and duties through 23 divisions
- Each divisions has 3 members
- 1 presiding Justice
- 68 associate judges
- Reviews the following:
o Cases elevated to it from RTCs
o Cases from quasi-judicial agencies (CSC, SEC, NLRC, LRA)

o Death penalty cases
o Office of the Ombudsman (administrative disciplinary cases)
- May call En Banc to exercise administrative, ceremonial, or other

non-judiciary functions
5. What are second level courts? Example.

● Regional Trial Courts (RTC), also known as Second Level Courts, are the
highest regular trial courts in the Philippines.
● It was formerly called as the Court of First Instance since the Spanish era. It
continued throughout its colonization under Spanish and Americans.
● After World War II, Republic Act No. 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948 was
enacted to reinforce the jurisdictional powers of the Court of First Instance.
● The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which reorganized the lower and
intermediate courts in the country, included the change of Court of First Instance
to Regional Trial Court.
● Highest Trial Courts in the Philippines (according to Wikipedia)
Pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or Judicial Reorganization Act of 1980, each
province or city (in case of Metro Manila cities and other Philippine cities, chartered by
law) should have a Regional Trial Court (RTC) branch. Congress can create additional
RTC branches, when necessary by passing a law.
Examples:
● National Capital Region (Metropolitan Manila)
● First (East of North Luzon - Ilocos Region, Abra, Benguet, Mountain Province),
● Second (West of North Luzon - Cagayan Valley, Apayao, Ifugao, Kalinga),
● Third (Central Luzon), Fourth (CALABARZON, MIMAROPA), Fifth (Bicol Region).
● Sixth (Western Visayas), Seventh (Central Visayas), Eight (Eastern Visayas)
● Ninth (Zamboanga Peninsula & archipelagos-Basilan, Suli, Tawi-tawi),
● Tenth (North Mindanao - Agusan regions, Bukidnon, Dinagat island, Misamis
region, Surigao del Norte),
● Eleventh (Davao region, Sarangali, South Cotabato, Surigao del Sur)
● Twelfth (ARMM regions)
6. What are first level courts? Example.

First level courts are the lowest in the hierarchy of courts, in which every municipality
in the Philippines has. This court is the first refuge of people, living in municipalites or
cities, seeking judicial remedy in accordance to their grievances. The lower courts
nationwide are the ones that directly bring the concept of justice to the majority of the
people. It is the face of the Judiciary which people see every day. Courts that administer
justice in towns and cities.
● Municipal Trial Courts - Trial courts located in towns and cities
● Metropolitan Trial Courts - Municipal trial court located in the towns and cities
of Metropolitan Manila.
● Municipal Circuit Trial Court - When a court covers two or more municipalities.
● Shari’a Circuit Court - which were established in certain municipalities in
Mindanao where the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines is being
enforced. There are five Shari'a Circuit Courts and fifty one Shari'a Circuit Courts
in existence. Shari'a Circuit Court has original jurisdiction over the following:
- All cases involving offenses defined and punished under Presidential Decree
No. 1083;
- All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have been
married in accordance with Article 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1083involving
disputes relating to: Marriage, Divorce recognized under Presidential Decree No.
1083, Betrothal or breach of contract to marry, Customary dowry (mahr),
Disposition and distribution of property upon divorce, Maintenance and support,
and concolotary gifts(mut'a); and Restitution of marital rights.
-All cases involving disputes relative to communal properties
7. What is Obiter dictum? Explain.

Obiter dictum (plural obiter dicta) is an opinion or a remark made by a judge which
does not form a necessary part of the court's decision. The word obiter dicta is a
Latin word which means “things said by the way.” Obiter dicta can be passing
comments, opinions or examples provided by a judge. Statements constituting obiter
dicta are therefore not binding. For example, if a court dismisses a case due to lack of
jurisdiction and offers opinions on the merits of a case, then these opinions constitutes
obiter dicta. (Source: https://definitions.uslegal.com/o/obiter-dictum/)
8. What is stare decisis? Explain.
The doctrine of stare decisis et quieta non movere (meaning to stand by things decided
and not disturb settled law) or "stare decisis" commands judges to apply what happened
in similar precedent cases to the new cases.
E.g. A case's issue is whether or not an ex-diplomat can be punished for the crimes
he/she committed during his/her service where he/she enjoyed immunity. Following stare
decisis, he/she will not be punished because a court with high standing also did not
punish an ex-diplomat who had the same case earlier. The previous case served as a
ruling factor for the new case.
Reference: Lost in Translation
9. What is res judicata? Explain.
The principle of res judicata basically states that relitigation of the same issues should be
avoided. The principle recognizes the limited resources and number of cases that can be heard
in court, thus promoting just, fair, and speedy trial.
TWO MAXIMS OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW UNDERLYING THE DOCTRINE OF RES
JUDICTA: a.) no person should be twice vexed by the same claim, and b.) it is in the interest of
the state that there be an end to litigation. (from SC Annotation in the Villanueva v. CA GR.No.
110921)
10. What is dura lex, sed lex? Explain.
11. What are the parts of a statute? Brief description each.

12. What are the types of public statutes?
13. Who approves barangay ordinances?

The majority of the members of the Sanguniang barangay.
14. Instances when a bill must originate from the lower house.
● A bill must come exclusively from the lower house when it is an appropriation
bill, a revenue bill, tariff bill, a bill authorizing increase of the public debt, a bill of
local application, or a private bill.
15. What are the differences between first, second, and third reading in Congress?
16. Differentiate forum non conveniens and forum conveniens.

• forum non conveniens is the discretionary power of court to decline jurisdiction when
conveniens of the parties and the ends of justice would be better served if action were brought
and tried elsewhere while forum conveniens is the most appropriate court for a resolution of a
particular dispute which the case may most suitably be tried for the interest of all the parties and
the ends of justice.
17. What is a forum shopping?
Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of multiple judicial
remedies in different fora, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances; and raising substantially similar
issues either pending in or already resolved by some other court; or for the purpose of
increasing their chances of obtaining favorable decision, if not in one court, then in another. The
rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in two different courts, for to do so would constitute abuse against court processes
which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc against orderly judicial
procedure, and adds the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.
There is forum shopping when there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties
as represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
18. May the president veto the whole law or just a portion of it?
According to Section 27(2) of the 1987 Constitution, it states that:
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall
veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which
shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill,
it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise
be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas
or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its
Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a
law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items
to which he does not object.
19. What is a class suit? Cite example.
a. A "class action" lawsuit is one in which a group of people with the same or similar
injuries caused by the same product or action sue the defendant as a group.
Other names for lawsuits brought by a number of people who suffered similar
harm or losses are "mass tort litigation" and "multi-district litigation".
20. Differentiate jus sanguinis and jus soli.
21. Explain the hierarchy of civil rights.

Article III Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws. Life, liberty and property are the three basic areas protected
by our constitution, however it doesn’t mean that constitutional protection to these areas
are equal. Under the doctrine of Hierarchy of Rights, even if the three areas are
protected by the Constitution, nonetheless, not all rights are created equal. Under this
doctrine, property rights rank lower than civil liberties and political freedoms.
While the bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are
"delicate and vulnerable”, as well as supremely precious in our society. Thinking about
the hierarchy of rights pragmatically means thinking about prioritising their
implementation.
22. .What is the doctrine of laws of case? Explain.
23. Differentiate substantial and procedural due process.

Substantial is what should be done (equires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering
with the rights of the person to life, liberty or property. In short, it is to determine whether
it has a valid governmental objective like for the interest of the public as against mere
particular class.)
Procedural due process refers to the method or manner b y which the law is enforced
24. What is the doctrine of equal protection of laws? Is it absolute?
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it
is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons
or things without distinction.w
What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid

classification.
w The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,law which
has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the
other
(Based on Phil Con: Art 3, sect 1)
25. What is immunity from suit?

IMMUNITY FROM SUIT: term used for people who are free from legal action due to
reasons of public policy
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292
CHAPTER 3
State Immunity from Suit
SECTION 10. Non-suability of the State.—No suit shall lie against the State except with
its consent as provided by law.
SECTION 11. The State’s Responsibility for Acts of Agents.—(1) The State shall be
legally bound and responsible only through the acts performed in accordance with the
Constitution and the laws by its duly authorized representatives.
(2) The State shall not be bound by the mistakes or errors of its officers or
agents in the exercise of their functions.
26. What are the sources of law?

(1) Legislation - The power vested in the Congress to enact laws.
(2) Precedent - Court decisions which serve as guide and authority to be followed by
all other courts of equal or inferior jurisdiction in all cases involving the same
question until the same is overruled or reversed by a superior court.
(3) Custom - A traditional and widely accepted behavior of a society which is not
contrary to the law and must be proven as a fact according to the rules of
evidence. (Civil Code, Art. 11 & 12)
(4) Court Decision - Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. (Civil Code, Art.
8)
27. What is a constitution? What are the Philippine constitutions?
(1) Constitution is a body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the power of
sovereignty are habitually exercised (Cruz, Constitutional Law) OR
(2) a constitution is a written instrument by which the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited, and defined by which these powers are
distributed among the several departments, for their more safe and useful
exercise for the benefit of the body politic. (Justice Miller Quoted by Bernas)
(3) PH CONSTITUTIONS ARE the FF:
(a) Malolos Constitution

(b) The American Regime and the Organic Acts
(i) Act of the US Congress
(ii) Philippne Organic Act of 1902
(iii) Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 (JONES LAW)
(iv) Tydings MC-Duffie ACT (1934)
(c) 1935 Constitution
(d) 1943 Constitution
(e) 1973 Constitution
(f) 1986 Freedom Constitution
(g) 1987 Constitution
28. Basic principles in Constitutional constructions.

a. Verba legis – words must be given their ordinary meaning, except where
technical terms are employed. If the ordinary meaning of the word is not found to
be clear, the proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framer’s understanding thereof.
b. Ratio legis est anima – when there is ambiguity, words should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of the framers. The reason of the law is the spirit of
the law.
c. Ut magis valeat quam pereat – the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.
No one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others. It is to
be considered alone. The court must harmonize its provisions, if practicable,
must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather
than one which may make the words idle or nugatory.
Reference: Francisco vs. House of Representatives
29. What are quasi-judicial agencies? Example.

Definition of Quasi-Judicial Power
It is the power of administrative authorities to make determinations of facts in the

performance of their official duties and to apply the law as they construe it to the facts so found.
The exercise of this power is only incidental to the main function of administrative authorities,
which is the enforcement of the law.
A quasi-judicial body or agency is a non-judicial body which can interpret law. It is an

entity such as an arbitrator or tribunal board, generally of a public administrative agency, which
has powers and procedures resembling those of a court of law or judge, and which is obliged to
objectively determine facts and draw conclusions from them so as to provide the basis of an
official action. Such actions are able to remedy a situation or impose legal penalties, and they
may affect the legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties. Example is COMELEC in the
Philippines.
30. Who may exercise legislative power?
31. What is motion to intervene? This allows a nonparty (intervenor/intervener) to join an

ongoing case, either as a matter of right or at the discretion of the court, without the permission
of the original litigants. This is given to a nonparty because a judgment in a particular case may
also affect their rights despite their status, and thus should also have the right to be heard.
32. When may a judge inhibit to take part in the court proceedings?
33. What is demurrer to evidence?

a. It is a motion to dismiss the case filed by the defense after the prosecution rests
on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution.
b. It has been said that a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court takes place of
a demurrer, which pleading raised questions of law as to sufficiency of the
pleading apparent on the face thereof.
c. In the same manner as a demurrer, a motion to dismiss presents squarely before
the court a question as to the sufficiency of the facts alleged therein to constitute
a cause of action.

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INTRODUCTION TO LAW

Meaning of Law in General

General divisions of law

The first four kinds of law

-reasonable basis of state law.

-Moral law, to a great extent influences or shapes state law.

Law maybe understood in 2 concepts

Necessity and functions of law

What does the law do?

3.Administrative or Executive Orders, Regulations and Rulings

4.Judicial decisions or Jurisprudence

They are only SUPPLEMENTARY

Law is not an end in itself.

2. Explain the Doctrine of Incorporation.

3. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, GR 139465, digest and principles

4. Constitution Article 2, Section 2 [Principles]

5. International School Alliance vs. Hon. Quisumbing, digest and principles

6. When is a classification valid?

7. Oposa vs. Factoran, digest and principle

Reference: Legal dictionaries (https://dictionary.findlaw.com/definition/disposition.html,

(See Oposa v. Factoran G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)

10. League of Cities vs. COMELEC, digest and principles

Holy See vs Rosario G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994

13. Differentiate Jure imperii and Jure gestionis.

14. American Insurance Association vs. Garamendi, digest and principle

15. What are statutes?

16. What are the types of statutes?

II. Classification with reference to effect

III. Classification with reference to operation / extent.

IV. Classification w/ reference to nature

VI. Classification w/ reference to content

VII.Classification w/ reference to subject matter / scope.

17. Differentiate between law and statute.

18. Can laws be oral? Expound.

From a legal point of view, an oral law can be:

An oral law, intended as a body of rules, can be admitted in ​jurisprudence

20. Where does customary law fall under?

A local ordinance is a municipal legislative enactment​. An ordinance passed in pursuance

22. What is a legislative power?

25. Differentiate a bill, an approved bill, and an enrolled bill.

26. When does an enrolled bill become a law?

Authentication of a bill is done when a ​PROPOSED LAW (BILL), i​ s (​ 1.) ​PASSED

28. How does a bill become a law? Explain the process.

In a nutshell, the steps of bill passage include:

Filing of bill A bill is filed to the Office of the Secretary,

A bill ​may originate from either the House of

Committee Hearings/Report Proper committee conducts hearing and

Committee report is submitted to Committee

Second Reading - Bill author delivers ​sponsorship

Third Reading - Printed copies of bill’s final version are

Concurrence The other chamber ​conducts the same

If concurred in its ​entirety​, the final version is

If with certain ​differences​, a ​Bicameral

Authentication The enrolled bill shall be certified as correct

Approval The President may do the following:

NOTE: ​A vetoed bill may still be a law without

29. May the President veto a bill? How?

30. May authentication be withdrawn after the president vetoes a bill?

31. Differentiate Administrative Interpretation and Administrative laws.

Administrative Interpretations are merely guidelines to interpret an ambiguous laws or

32. Is an Administrative interpretation binding within the court?

33. What are administrative rules?

1. Who issues administrative rules and regulations?

An oral law, intended as a body of rules, can be admitted in jurisprudence

A local ordinance is a municipal legislative enactment. An ordinance passed in pursuance

Authentication of a bill is done when a PROPOSED LAW (BILL), i s ( 1.) PASSED

A bill may originate from either the House of

Second Reading - Bill author delivers sponsorship

Concurrence The other chamber conducts the same

If concurred in its entirety, the final version is

If with certain differences, a Bicameral

NOTE: A vetoed bill may still be a law without

- Administrative rules are officially promulgated agency regulations that have

- Respondent complainant filed a complaint on the Commission of Human Rights

Facts: ● March 30, 1998 - Referred to the En Banc, t he President

Generally, when a law is declared unconstitutional, it becomes invalid, void, and

Reference: Planters Products vs. Fertiphil, GR No. 166006