1.

G.R. No. 122269 September 30, 1999

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE,

petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO A. BANTUGAN, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Alaminos, Pangasinan, and HEIRS OF ZENAIDA BUSTRIA-
TIGNO, represented by CAMILO TIGNO, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

For review is the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated October 4, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 34013,
dismissing a petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines for the annulment of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, which declared private respondents to be the absolute
owners of a piece of land in Barangay Malacapas, Dasol, Pangasinan. The government, as petitioner,
prays that the aforesaid decision of the trial court, rendered in Civil Case No. A-1759, be annulled.
1âwphi1.nêt

The facts are stated in the following portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals:

Sometime in 1957, one Matias Bustamante filed with the then CFI of Pangasinan an
application for registration under Act No. 496, as amended, of a tract of land
containing an area of 880,000 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay
Malacapas, Dasol, Pangasinan.

Both the Director of Forestry and the Director of Fisheries filed oppositions to the
aforecited application, alleging among others, that "said parcel of land, with the
exception of 97,525 square meters, is a part of the Timber Land Block "A" Land
Classification Project 44, which is converted into fish ponds." Isidro Bustria [private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest] and Julian Bustria, also opposed the said
application for land registration, alleging that they "have in the year 1943 occupied in
good faith their respective portions having a total area of fifty (50) hectares, more or
less . . . converted their respective portions into fish ponds . . . and actually
possessed and occupied their respective portions . . . exclusively against all persons,
except the Director of Forestry & Director of Fishery." After trial, the lower court
rendered a Decision in favor of applicant Bustamante.

On appeal to this Honorable Court, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 30058-R, it was found
that 783,275 square meters of the land applied for were accretions added to
applicant Bustamante's riceland of 9.7525 hectares, and that said accretion was
caused by the sea on the southward portion of said riceland. This Honorable Court
then ruled:

This being so, the said accretion belongs — not to the riparian owner
— but the State. All lands thrown up by the sea and formed upon the
shores, belong to the national domain and are for public use, in
accordance with the provisions of the Law on Waters of August 3,
 1866 (Insular Government vs. Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 505) (p. 20, Decision,
November 16, 1967).

Thus, modifying the judgment of the lower court, this Honorable Court rendered a
Decision on November 16, 1967, disposing:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby

modified so that only 9.7525 of the land applied for is hereby
adjudicated and ordered to be registered in the name of the
applicant, the remaining area being hereby declared land of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, without
prejudice to whatever rights oppositors Isidro Bustria and Julian
Bustria may have acquired over portions of the area thus declared as
land of the public domain, with costs against applicant.

SO ORDERED.

When brought up on certiorari to the Supreme Court, the foregoing Judgment was
affirmed in toto in the Resolution in G.R. No. L-18605 dated February 29, 1968.

It is relevant to state at this point that the parcel of land that is presently the subject
of the dispute in the instant case, Lot No. 7764, CAD 624-D (Portion) [Psu-155696,
Lot 3 (Portion)], forms part of the above-mentioned parcel of land declared by this
Honorable Court as belonging to the public domain, classified/zonified land available
for fishpond development, per L.C. Map No. 3175, approved on June 24, 1984,
under administrative Order No. 4-1829 (Annex "D", Petition). The subject lot contains
an area of 49,999 square meters, more or less. This lot has been leased to Mr.
Porfirio Morado by the [Republic of the Philippines], represented by the Secretary of
Agriculture, for a period of twenty-five (25) years, or up to December 31, 2013, under
Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 5132, dated August 17, 1989 (Annex "E", Petition).

On July 6, 1988, however, the late Zenaida Bustria [daughter of Isidro Bustria] filed a
complaint against Porfirio Morado in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos,
Pangasinan, Branch 55, for ownership and possession over the lot in question
[docketed as Civil Case No. A-1759]. Herein petitioner, the Republic of the
Philippines, was not made a party to that suit.

In her complaint, Zenaida Bustria claimed absolute ownership and quiet and peaceful
possession of several lots under PSU-155696 surveyed in the name of her father,
Isidro Bustria. She further asserted that said Porfirio Morado maliciously applied for a
fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources over Lot 3
thereof (the subject lot), well-knowing that said lot had always been occupied,
possessed and worked by her and her predecessors-in-interest.

Porfirio Morado denied the allegations in the complaint, claiming that the lot in
question is part of the public domain which he developed and converted into a
fishpond. Due, however, to Porfirio Morado's and his counsel's failure to appear at
the pre-trial and subsequent court hearings, the trial court subsequently declared
Porfirio Morado "as in default."

On December 17, 1991, respondent Judge rendered a decision, the dispositive

portion of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive and

absolute owner of the land in question stated in
paragraph 4 of the Complaint and entitled to the
exclusive and quiet possession of the said land; and

(b) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the

amount of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and the sum
of P500.00 per day of hearing of the counsel; plus
costs.

(Annex "A", Petition)

On January 23, 1992, Porfirio Morado filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment which
was denied on July 21, 1992 for lack of merit.

On July 8, 1992, a writ of execution was issued, and it was implemented by Sheriffs
Manuel O. de Asis and Sheriff Cesar A. Gines. Spouses Porfirio Morado and Juliana
Morado thereafter filed with this Honorable Court a Petition for Certiorari with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 28932. In a Resolution dated
December 11, 1992, the Petition was denied for lack of merit. The related Motion for
Reconsideration was denied in the Resolution dated February 18, 1993. (Rollo, pp.
107-112) (emphasis omitted) 2

On April 19, 1994, petitioner, invoking §9 of B.P. Blg. 129, 3 filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
the annulment of the trial court's decision, dated December 17, 1991. Petitioner alleged that the land in
question is within the classified/zonified alienable and disposable lend for fishpond development, per L.C.
Map No. 3175 approved on June 24, 1984, under Administrative Order No. 4-1829 and that since the land
formed part of the public domain, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) has jurisdiction
over its disposition in accordance with P.D. No 704, §4.

On October 4, 1995 the, Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition. 4

Hence, this petition for review.

The judgment rendered in a case may be annulled on any of the following grounds: (a) the judgment
is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law; or (b) it was obtained through
extrinsic fraud. 5 The question in this case is whether the decision of the Regional Trial Court is void on
any of these grounds. The preliminary question, however, is whether the government can bring such
action even though it was not a party to the action in which the decision sought to be annulled was
rendered.

We shall deal with these questions in inverse order.

First, is the question whether petitioner has personality to bring the action below. To begin with, an
action to recover a parcel of land is in personam. As such, it is binding only between the parties
thereto, as this Court explained in Ching v. Court of Appeals, viz:
6

An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an

action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding
or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment
 therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given
an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the
former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the
latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek
judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a
parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular
individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.

The appellate court, holding that the proceedings before the trial court were in personam, ruled that
since petitioner was not a party to Civil Case No. A-1759, it is not a real party-in-interest and,
therefore, has no personality to bring the action for annulment of the judgment rendered in that case.
The appellate court said:

Private respondents are correct. Civil Case No. A-1759 was purely for "Ownership
and Possession". The decision sought to be annulled is solely "between the private
respondents [the Bustrias] and Porfirio Morado" (Rollo, p. 142). Petitioner Republic
was not a party in the case and is not bound by the judgment rendered therein.

It is settled, a real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the

judgment in the suit (Salonga vs. Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd., 88 Phil. 128; University
of the Philippines Board of Regents vs. Ligot-Telan, 227 SCRA 342; Tampingco vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 207 SCRA 652; Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 203
SCRA 310; Travelwide Associated Sales, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 205).

Petitioner Republic not being a party, and the judgment not being in rem, it does not
stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment sought. Petitioner Republic can on
its own, and even without resorting to this petition for annulment of judgment,
institute the proper action to assert its claim that the "subject lot is a land forming part
of the public domain'' (Rollo, p. 145). It need not seek the annulment of the subject
judgment, in Civil Case No. A-1759 in which it was not a party and involves merely a
question of ownership; and possession between plaintiffs Zenaida B. Bustria and
defendant Porfirio Morado and which decision is not binding on it, to be able to assert
its claim or interest in the property. It is clear for this reason that petitioner is not a
real party-in-interest (Section 2, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court). 7

The appellate court is in error. In Islamic Da'wah Council of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 8 this Court held
that a party claiming ownership of a parcel of land which is the subject of foreclosure proceedings has a
sufficient interest to bring an action for annulment of the judgment rendered in the foreclosure
proceedings even though it was not in the party in such proceedings. It was held:

[A] person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. What is
essential is that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the
use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.

In this present case it is true that the heirs of Araneta are not parties to the
foreclosure case. Neither are they principally nor secondarily bound by the judgment
rendered therein. However, in their petition filed with the Court of Appeals they
alleged fraud and connivance perpetuated by and between the Da Silvas and the
Council as would adversely affect them. This allegation, if fully substantiated by
preponderance of evidence, could be the basis for the annulment of Civil Case No. 4-
43476. 9
 This ruling was reiterated in Top Management Programs Corp. v. Court of Appeals. 10

The next question is whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to declare the land in question to
belong to private respondent. The government asserts that the lot is within the "classified/zonified
alienable and disposable land for fishpond development," hence, it is part of the public domain; 11 that
under P.D. No. 704, §4, jurisdiction over its disposition is vested in the BFAR; that unlike agricultural land,
public lands which are declared suitable for fishpond purposes may only be disposed of by way of license,
concession, or lease; and that possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. 12

On the other hand, private respondents do not deny that Isidro Bustria, to whom they trace their
ownership, previously filed a fishpond application with the BFAR over the disputed land. 13 Neither do they
deny that the disputed land formed part of the public domain. They insist, however, that P.D. No. 704
applies only to "lands suitable for fishpond purposes" while the land in dispute is already a "fully
developed fishpond." They assert ownership of the subject lot through open and continuous possession of
their predecessor-in-interest since the Second World War. 14

We agree with petitioner. The State clearly stands to be adversely affected by the trial court's disposition
of in alienable public land.

The land involved in this case was classified as public land suitable for fishpond development. 15 In
controversies involving the disposition of public land, the burden of overcoming, the presumption of state
ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant. 16 Private respondents have not
discharged this burden.

The fact that the land in dispute was transformed into a "fully developed fishpond" does not mean
that it has lost its character as one declared "suitable for fishpond purposes" under the decree. By
applying for a fishpond permit with the BFAR, Isidro Bautista admitted the character of the land as
one suitable for fishpond development since the disposition of such lands is vested in the BFAR.
Consequently, private respondents, as his successors-in-interest, are estopped from claiming
otherwise.

It is settled under the Public Land Law 17 that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or
through his predecessor-in-interest, openly, continuously, and exclusively for 30 years is ipso jure
converted to private property by the mere lapse of time. 18 However, only public lands classified as
agricultural 19 are alienable. Lands declared for fishery purposes are not alienable 20 and their possession,
no matter how long continued, cannot ripen into ownership.

Since the disposition of lands declared suitable for fishpond purposes fall within the jurisdiction of the
BFAR, in accordance with P.D. No 704, §4, 21 the trial court's decision, dated December 17, 1991, is null
and void. The trial court has no jurisdiction to make a disposition of inalienable public land. If, as claimed,
Porfirio Morado secured a fishpond permit through fraud and misrepresentation, private respondents' sole
recourse, if any, is to secure the annulment of the same before the BFAR and apply for a new one in their
favor, provided that they are qualified therefor. What they did, however, was not only to bring their action
in the wrong forum but to ask to be declared owners of the land in dispute.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, Ninth Division, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 34013, dated October 4, 1995, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The decision of
Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Civil Case No. A-1759 is hereby
declared NULL AND VOID. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
2.

G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989

THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner

vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares,
as they are commonly known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under
the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they may be acquired under private
ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged by these criteria.

The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of
Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was
opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance. of Capiz. The decision was
1

affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for
2

review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.

It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the
land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is
the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and therefore
not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue before
us is legal, not factual.

For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the
earlier American organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or forest
lands. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in
1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new charter expanded the
classification of public lands to include industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, and
grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other categories. This provision has
3

been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the present Constitution. 4

Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only
agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No.
5

141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership unless they were first
reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.

In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps or
6

manglares were defined by the Court as:

... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various
kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their
roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These
constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also,
to some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the
mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated thereon.
Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they cannot
be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in
general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for
purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without impairment of the public
interest in what remains.

xxx

Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom
had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a
common feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time of the change of
sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the
abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster.

Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership.

Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case, that
mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative
Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus:

Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public
forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land,
including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character.

It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the
Montano case when two years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7

...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act
(Act of Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this translation
and that a better translation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English
means land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant would never be called a tree
in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants
growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.

xxx xxx xxx

 The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not
change the general character of the land from manglare to timber land.

More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:

'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that
the phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.

Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law,
the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine
Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not
timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are
used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.

The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of

1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.

These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have
considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the rights of
appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.

The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v. Obias, promulgated on
8

March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917.
Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:

The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the
application there are mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we
think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been
definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this
phrase is used in the Act of Congress.

No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano and
Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry, with Justice
9

Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The decision even
quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that:

... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees
are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of
commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public land. Such lands are
not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain.

Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10

the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 11

reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are
necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or
ordinary farm lands.

But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the
contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled
12

"that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands
forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands.

Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 13

the Court was more positive when
it held, again through Justice Gutierrez:

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as
forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although
conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of forest land in
accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners
argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as first, second
and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that
Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration
proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons
for many years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land' better adapted
and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the
public interests to be kept under forest classification.

The petition is without merit.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have
to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.'

The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where this Court agreed with
14

the Solicitor General's submission that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove
or forestal land," were not private properties and so not registerable. This case was decided only
twelve days after the De Porkan case.

Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical
pronouncement that should resolve once and for all the question of whether mangrove swamps are
agricultural lands or forest lands.

The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the
authority to implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is
now even permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The legislature having made
such implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own role, administer
our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed'
and in accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts will step into the picture if the
rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they
are not being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating with
each other, pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization
of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function of
making periodic classifications of public lands, thus:

Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain
into:

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Lumber, and

(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.

Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or

disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession under this Act.

With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides:

For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes
to which such lands are destined, as follows:

(a) Agricultural;

(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;

(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and

(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.

The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this
section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class
to another.

As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows:

Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon
there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department
Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves from the public
lands and he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves and
the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves shall not be entered,
sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for forest uses, and shall be
administered in the same manner as public forest.
 The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify
the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any such
proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and become
part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been made.

Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public
forest, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry
that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be
declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.

With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:

Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the
Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The
legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect
veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and,
no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said
provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the
requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid
and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of
mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent
argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall.

Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be
understood as covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the
Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as
forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due
process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was
15

much later classified as timberland.

It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove
swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of
Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of
the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of
his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as
agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827
of the Revised Administrative Code.

The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director
of Lands, to prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence
16

of such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into
agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands
was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who
has the authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than
forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership.

Thus we held in the Yngson case:

 It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that
until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the
Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or
otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing
or other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.

The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp

lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still
classified as forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or other purposes.

The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:

It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which can
be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot
commence until after the forest land has been declared alienable and disposable.
Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private property.'

We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the private
respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious
persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence of the informacion
posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the
conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it been shown that the
informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of property and that the land
has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty years as
required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. These matters are not presumed but must be established
17

with definite proof, which is lacking in this case.

Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basis
used by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax
declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in favor
of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18

We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of the
subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.

It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section 1820
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove
swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not
alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless
they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for
registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

3.

G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all
surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988

ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all
surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth even if the land where the
discovery is made be private. 1 In the cases at bar, which have been consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not
correctly applied.

These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965,
by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and
Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered
by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-
9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big
Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. 3

In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject
land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after
the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was possessed by her parents under
claim of ownership. Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who
4

declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado,
nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix
Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father. 5

Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6

Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964. 7

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had
been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced
by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological
samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land. 8
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma
and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded
on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased
from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous
and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the
claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon. 9

The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of
1902 which provided that:

SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both
surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration,
occupation and purchase and the land in which they are found to occupation and
purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands.

The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be
registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10

The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of
possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. 11 The applicants appealed to the
respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject
to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. 12 In other words, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-
surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The
Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the private
respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not
alienable and registerable.

It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time .
The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:

There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral claims
of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug
mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly,
American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the location of the June Bug
mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14,
1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements on the June
Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had submitted the
required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet introduced
improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted geological mappings,
geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June
Bug" for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.

The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison registered in
1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots
6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company.

The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of
Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines
of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become private
properties of Benguet and Atok.

It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under

consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the
Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according
to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this
court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid
location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public
domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the locator
discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and
perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United
States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the
possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands
had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that
could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public
lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected
locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon
public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or
reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such
location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public
domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith,
249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).

"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to

segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator
the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor
upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes
segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator."
(St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650;
655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is
perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right
of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive
enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals
within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral right
of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as
after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a
vested property right by virtue of his location made in compliance with
the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent
issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon.
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico
Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266)

It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in
the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner
is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the
 mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good
as though secured by patent.

We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the requirements
of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain, and not even
the government of the Philippines can take away this right from them. The reason is
obvious. Having become the private properties of the oppositors, they cannot be
deprived thereof without due process of law. 13

Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made
subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that:

SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines
or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources with the exception of public agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and
no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development or utilization of any
of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as
to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which case beneficial use may be the measure and
the limit of the grant.

Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:

Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary

notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935 within
lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative
Code which would be valid and subsisting location except to the existence of said
reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of
their respective locations.

The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in
force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over
14

the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the
land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the
15

locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.

It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the
"vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private
respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is
not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.

First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession
submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They themselves
had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier
alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest. The trial judge, who had the opportunity to
16

consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility
was not convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with
grave abuse of discretion or without sufficient basis. 17

Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really been in
possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining
claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and
they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of the mining locators
nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact,
Balbalio testified that she was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below" but she did
18

not mind, much less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.

The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners of
the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-
known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid
19

ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to
separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the
mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may
interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops
above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each
other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?

The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land
which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and completely
mineral — once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were being
20

undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only
partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully
occupying the surface.

What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as follows:

Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State, and
their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of government established under the
Constitution.

SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not include the
ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or
under the surface.

SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted are excluded
and excepted from all such patents.
 SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and excepted from
all such titles.

This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit
of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be
found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or
(for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize
the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.

The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could
be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that
once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time,
such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise
of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any
private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the
mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course
entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of
their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited
the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights
existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the
private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously
by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that of
the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.