Political Law Reviewer

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Atty. Norieva de Vega

Second Trimester, SY 2016-2017
ARTICLES AND CASES DIGESTS
Article X
Local Government
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
A. Local autonomy
1. LINA, JR. V. PANO- 364 SCRA 76
D: An ordinance which merely states the “objection” of the council to lotto is but a mere policy statement on the part of the
local council which is not self-executing, and could not serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system
in the province. While a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto is valid, as it is part of the
local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government’s, this freedom to
exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly
enacted by Congress
WHAT THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURE ALLOWS BY LAW, SUCH AS LOTTO, A PROVINCIAL BOARD MAY NOT
DISALLOW BY ORDINANCE OR RESOLUTION.
In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is
merely a delegated power coming from Congress. Ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by
Congress. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated
legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior
to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government
units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute. Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights
wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it
may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right,
the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep
from existence all of the municipal corporations in the state, and the corporation could not prevent it.
Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local
governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization”. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state or an “imperium in imperio.”
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Br. 93.
F: On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna,
for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The
ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg.
508, T. 1995 which was issued on September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said
Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 1 of 43

complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs:
(1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or
enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; z. (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a
business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508,
T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the
petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
I: Whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid
H: While it is valid as a local policy, it is not valid for running counter to national law.
R: As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the
local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government’s. However, this
freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against
laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be
interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto. In our system of government, the power of local
government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress.
Ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress.
2. DADOLE V. COA- 393 SCRA 262
D: Power of Supervision vs. Power of Control; The supervisory power of the President is different from the power of control
exercised by Congress.
The President’s power of supervision over local government officials with that of his power of control over executive
officials of the national government. It was emphasized that the two terms—supervision and control—differed in meaning
and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows: “x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the
other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.”
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The members of the Cabinet and other
executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and
behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. IN CONTRAST,
THE HEADS OF POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS ARE ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE. THEIR SOVEREIGN POWERS
EMANATE FROM THE ELECTORATE, TO WHOM THEY ARE DIRECTLY ACCOUNTABLE. By constitutional fiat,
they are subject to the President’s supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their
legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the
Constitution and the law.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
F: In 1986, RTC and MTC Judges of Mandaue City started receiving P1260 each as monthly allowance pursuant to an
appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangunian PangLungsod. In 1991, the amount was increased to P1500. In 1994,
DBM issued a local budget circular which provides that, Additional allowances granted by LGUs not exceeding P1000 in
cities and P700 in municipalities may be granted. Pursuant to this, Mandaue City reduced their allowance to P1000 and
were asked to reimburse the excess. The petitioner judges filed for protest which was denied by the COA.
I: Whether City Ordinance prevails over the DBM Circular.
H: YES
R: Since the LGC authorizes local governments to give allowances to judges and to determine how much allowances should
be, local autonomy prohibits COA from interfering with the authority of Mandaue City by reducing what the local
government has already decided.

Even as we recognize that the Constitution guarantees autonomy to LGUs, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject
to the power of control by the Congress, and the power of general supervision by the President. The president however can
only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he finds that it had acted contrary to law.
Hence, the president or any of his alter egos, cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned LGU acts within the
parameters of law and the Constitution.
Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming
judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy
and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.
3. SAN JUAN V. CSC - 196 SCRA 69
D: DBM Secretary appoint from the list of nominees recommended by the Provincial Governor is mandatory. The DBM
may appoint only from the list of qualified nominees recommended by the Governor. If none are qualified, the DBM
Secretary must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why none within the list meet the legal
requirements and ask for new nominees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
WHERE A LAW IS CAPABLE OF TWO INTERPRETATIONS, ONE IN FAVOR OF CENTRALIZED POWER IN

MALACAÑANG AND THE OTHER BENEFICIAL TO LOCAL AUTONOMY, THE SCALES MUST BE WEIGHED IN
FAVOR OF AUTONOMY.
The value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy.
Local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. A people may establish a system of free government
but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty. Our national officials should not
only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon
which these provisions are based.
N: PETITION for certiorari to review the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission.
F: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left vacant; thereafter Rizal Governor San Juan, peititioner, nominated
Dalisay Santos for the position and the latter quickly assumed position. However, Director Abella of Region IV Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and recommended private respondent Cecilia Almajose
as PBO on the ground that she was the most qualified. This appointment was subsequently approved by the DBM.
Petitioner protested the appointment of Almajose before the DBM and the Civil Service Commission who both dismissed
his complaints. His arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees
to the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section
1 of Executive Order No. 112.
I: Whether DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who was not expressly nominated by the provincial governor?
H: No.
R: Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power to recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing
laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the
required standards, the appointing authority, public respondent DBM is expected to reject the same. In the event that the
Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the Department Head free to appoint anyone he fancies?
Petitioner states that the phrase of said law: "upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned" must be given
mandatory application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under
Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a
mere administrative issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case
the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget
Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.

This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have
to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized
power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general supervision . . . as may be
provided by law." The President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has
only supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute. The exercise of greater local autonomy
is even more marked in the present Constitution. Article II, Section 25 provides: "The State shall ensure the autonomy of
local governments"
Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified
recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor
explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities
and qualifications.
4. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. COURT OF APPEALS - 231

SCRA 292
D: It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated
under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of
promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan.
Congress, through Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983,
authorizes the LLDA to “make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution.” The same explicitly
authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction. It is likewise a settled
rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers
In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to
pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a “cease and desist order” is, perforce,
implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a “toothless” paper agency.
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
F: A letter of complaint was filed seeking to stop the operation of the open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water
content of the surrounding area. The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) conducted an investigation and
sampling of the leachate that seeps from the dumpsite to the nearby creek, which is a tributary of the Marilao river. It was
discovered that: The City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite without securing the required
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) and clearance from the
LLDA.; The water collected from the leachate indicates the presence of bacteria that could affect the quality of the receiving
waters.
The LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping garbage in the
Camarin dumpsite. The City Government of Caloocan contested the Cease and Desist Order claiming that it was sole
authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced
ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.
I: Does the LLDA have the power to issue a cease and desist order prohibiting the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
H: Yes.
R: LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is mandated by Republic Act No. 4850 to carry out the declared national
policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and
adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological
systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.

Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the
Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding
areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve
or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public
corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the
LLDA for the development of the region.
RA 4850 authorizes the LLDA to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance or pollution. Sec. 4(d) explicitly
authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
While the LLDA may not have been expressly conferred the power to issue a cease and desist order, this does not mean
that it is denied such power. In the exercise of its express power powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial
body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order
is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a “toothless” paper agency.
5. MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES - 234 SCRA 255
D: The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance
must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute;
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive;
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory;
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy;
6) It must not be unreasonable.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts
of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of
the statute. This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy.
N: PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
F: In 1992, PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building belonging
to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., (private respondents) renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate
its casino there during the Christmas season. It was objected not just by the Mayor and City Legislators but also women’s
group and youth. Later that year, an ordinance was enacted prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling
existing business permit to any establishment for using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for operating
a casino. Private respondents, joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner challenged the ordinance CA
declared the ordinances invalid
I: Whether the ordinance is valid?
H: NO
R: PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including
casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In the previous cases decided by SC, it has
sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third
highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs.
While, Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes
indicated in the LGC. It is also authorized to regulate properties and businesses within their territorial limits in the interest
of the general welfare
Thus, by virtue of this, petitioner insist it is within their power to prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve
games of chance, which are detrimental its people.

HOWEVER, the court in this case laid down the tests of a valid ordinance:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
In this case, although LGC was later enacted than PD 1869, nowhere in the said LGC which provides that it impliedly
repealed PD 1869. Instead SC finds that it is the ordinance in issue that violates P.D. 1869. Thus, 1st requisite is absent.
Rationale for the 1st requisite of a valid ordinance: Municipal governments are only agents of the national government.
The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest
that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place,
and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. This basic relationship between the national legislature and the
local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local
autonomy.
6. LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DENR - GR. NO. 175368,

APRIL 11, 2013
D: Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but subject to limitations like following national
policies or standards, and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring of local governments and
the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the different local government units and local officials
have been placed by the Constitution in the hands of Congress under Section 3, Article X of the Constitution . It does
not make local governments sovereign within the State. Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers,
but subject to limitations like following national policies or standards, and those provided by the Local Government
Code, as the structuring of local governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the
different local government units and local officials have been placed by the Constitution in the hands of Congress under
Section 3, Article X of the Constitution
The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial
government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State’s
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the country’s natural
resources.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary’s power to review and, therefore, decide the
issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by
the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB), is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of what
the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the
basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
F: Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Liberato Sembrano filed with the Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan their respective Applications for Quarry Permit (AQP). Atlantic Mines
and Trading Corp (AMTC) also filed for Application for Exploration Permit with PENRO of Bulacan. (Same area). Then
Governor Dela Cruz (Bulacan) issued the corresponding Small-Scale Mining Permits in favor of Eduardo D. Mercado,
Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez. AMTC protested, DENR ruled in favor of AMTC and against the
small scale miners.
DENR voided the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Governor. (VALID) - does not infringe
ISSUE: W/N SECTION 17(B)(3)(III) OF THE, 1991 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AND SECTION 24 OF THE PEOPLE'S
SMALL-SCALE MINING ACT OF 1991 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR PROVIDING FOR EXECUTIVE CONTROL
AND INFRINGING UPON THE LOCAL AUTONOMY OF PROVINCES.

No, it is CONSTITUTIONAL, it does not infringe.
HELD: In this case, petitioner admits that respondent DENR Secretary had the authority to nullify the Small-Scale Mining
Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the
implementation of the Small-Scale Mining Program is subject to control by respondent DENR.
Petitioner argues that respondent DENR Secretary went beyond mere executive supervision and exercised control when he
nullified the small-scale mining permits granted by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the former substituted the
judgment of the latter.
The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the
administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government
authority. It does not make local governments sovereign within the State. Administrative autonomy may involve
devolution of powers, but subject to limitations like following national policies or standards, and those provided by the
Local Government Code, as the structuring of local governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and
resources among the different local government units and local officials have been placed by the Constitution in the hands
of Congress under Section 3, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
A. Local Government Code
7. GARCIA V. COMELEC - 227 SCRA 100
D: Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The people’s
prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional
restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. Such power has been held to be indispensable for the
proper administration of public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a fundamental right of the
people in a representative democracy.
The Constitution did not provide for any specific mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections. The
Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit
the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the
Constitution is for Congress to “enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum. By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective
mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates.
N: ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition.
F: In 1992, Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan. In 1993, some mayors, vice-mayors and
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province met and constituted themselves into
a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) in accordance to the provision of the Local Government Code. This is to initiate the
recall election of Garcia. 146 composed the PRAC consisting of mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of all the 12 towns of the province of Bataan. RA 7160 or the Local Government Code (LGC) provided for two (2)
modes of initiating the recall from office of local elective officials on the ground of loss of confidence of the electorate: 1)
Preparatory Recall Assembly composed of local elective officials; or 2) Petition by at least 25% of all the registered voters of
the LGU.
RA 7160 further provides that recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation
of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall. Should

the official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and he shall
continue in office.
Gov. Garcia assailed the Constitutionality of the section in the LGC providing for PRA. According to him, initiation for a
recall election must be done directly by the people and not through PRA because the people have the sole and exclusive
right to decide whether or not to initiate proceedings,
I: Whether the alternative mode of allowing a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the process of recall is
unconstitutional?
H: No.
R: Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The people's prerogative
to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power
is implied in all governmental operations. Such power has been held to be indispensable for the proper administration of
public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative
democracy.
Congress provided for a second mode of initiating the recall process through a preparatory recall assembly which in the
provincial level is composed of all mayors, vice-mayors and Sanggunian members of the municipalities and component
cities. Alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted (a) to diminish the difficulty of
initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.
They have embraced the view that initiation by the PRAC is not initiation by the people. This is a misimpression for
initiation by the PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly through their representatives. It is not
constitutionally impermissible for the people to act through their elected representatives. Nothing less than the paramount
task of drafting our Constitution is delegated by the people to their representatives, elected either to act as a constitutional
convention or as a congressional constituent assembly
Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component
units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
A. General supervision
8. GANZON V. COURT OF APPEALS - 200 SCRA 271
D: The Constitution did not intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over
municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, “local autonomy” is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other
things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national
representation law, and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of
autonomy, the Constitution places the local governments under the general supervision of the Executive. It is
noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of
local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code
has done, delegate its exercise to the President.
“Control” has been defined as “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter.”
“Supervision” on the other hand means “overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties.”
N: PETITIONS to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

F: Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and
misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the
merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the
issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution
does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987
Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere
supervisory power.
I: W/N the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
H: Yes.
R: It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other
things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national representation
law, and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the
Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive.
Also, the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which
suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its
exercise to the President.
Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly
excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a
mistaken impression because legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government
officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was
emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning
and extent. “In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step
as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” But from this
pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government
officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He
however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and
to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local governments.
A. Sources of Revenue
9. MANILA ELECTRIC V. PROVINCE OF LAGUNA - 306 SCRA 750
D: Local governments do not have the inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might be delegated to
them either by the basic law or by statute.
Under the now prevailing Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must
be deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines.

Indicative of the legislative intent to carry out the Constitutional mandate of vesting broad tax powers to local
government units, the Local Government Code has effectively withdrawn tax exemptions or incentives theretofore
enjoyed by certain entities.
Contractual tax exemptions, in the real sense of the term and where the non-impairment clause of the Constitution can
rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing authority in contracts, such as those contained in government bonds
or debentures, lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in which the government, acting in its private
capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives its governmental immunity, which contractual tax exemptions,
however, are not to be confused with tax exemptions granted under franchises.
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laguna, Br. 28.
F: MERALCO is claiming for the refund of the franchise taxes it paid to the Province of Laguna
The Local Government Code of 1991 (RA7160), was enacted and enjoined LGUs to create their own sources of revenue and
to levy taxes, fees and charges, subject to the limitations expressed therein, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. Pursuant to the provisions of the Code, respondent province enacted Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92,
effective 01 January 1993, providing, in part, as follows:
Sec. 2.09. Franchise Tax. There is hereby imposed a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, at a rate of fifty percent (50%) of
one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts, which shall include both cash sales and sales on account realized during the
preceding calendar year within this province, including the territorial limits on any city located in the province.
On the basis of the above ordinance, respondent Provincial Treasurer sent a demand letter to MERALCO for the
corresponding tax payment. Petitioner MERALCO paid the tax but it filed a claim for refund claiming that the franchise tax
it had paid and continued to pay to the National Government pursuant to P.D. 551 already included the franchise tax
imposed by the Provincial Tax Ordinance.
MERALCO’s contention: The imposition of a franchise tax under Section 2.09 of Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92,
insofar as it concerned MERALCO, contravened the provisions of Section 1 of P.D. 551 which read:
Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable by all grantees of
franchises to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat and power shall be 2% of their gross receipts received
from the sale of electric current and from transactions incident to the generation, distribution and sale of electric current.
Such franchise tax shall be payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative on or
before the twentieth day of the month following the end of each calendar quarter or month, as may be provided in the
respective franchise or pertinent municipal regulation and shall, any provision of the Local Tax Code or any other law to
the contrary notwithstanding, be in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature imposed by any national or local
authority on earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric current.
I: Whether the local government can impose franchise tax?
H: Yes.
R: Prefatorily, it might be well to recall that local governments do not have the inherent power to tax except to the extent
that such power might be delegated to them either by the basic law or by statute. Presently, under Article X of the 1987
Constitution, a general delegation of that power has been given in favor of local government units.
Under the now prevailing Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must be
deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale for the current
rule is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general and broad
tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional; the
constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are being strengthened and made more
autonomous, the legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple and
unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit will have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources of
the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just.
The 1991 Code explicitly authorizes provincial governments, notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other
special law, x x x (to) impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise. Section 137 thereof provides:
Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 10 of

43
Sec. 137. Franchise Tax Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law, the province may impose
a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, at a rate not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual
receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the incoming receipt, or realized, within its territorial jurisdiction. In the
case of a newly started business, the tax shall not exceed one-twentieth (1/20) of one percent (1%) of the capital investment.
In the succeeding calendar year, regardless of when the business started to operate, the tax shall be based on the gross
receipts for the preceding calendar year, or any fraction thereof, as provided herein.
Indicative of the legislative intent to carry out the Constitutional mandate of vesting broad tax powers to local government
units, the Local Government Code has effectively withdrawn under Section 193 thereof, tax exemptions or incentives
theretofore enjoyed by certain entities. This law states: Section 193 Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges Unless
otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether
natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly
registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn
upon the effectivity of this Code.
To exemplify, in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Marcos, the Court upheld the withdrawal of the real
estate tax exemption previously enjoyed by Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority. The Court ratiocinated: x x x
These policy considerations are consistent with the State policy to ensure autonomy to local governments and the objective
of the LGC that they enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them effective partners in the attainment of national goals. The power to tax is the most
effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities of local government units for the
delivery of basic service essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and
prosperity of the people. It may also be relevant to recall that the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption
privileges granted to government-owned and controlled corporations and all other units of government were that such
privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises, and there
was a need for these entities to share in the requirements of development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying the taxes and other
charges due from them.
10. YAMANE V. BA LEPANTO- 474 SCRA 258
D: THE POWER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS TO IMPOSE TAXES WITHIN ITS TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION DERIVES FROM THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF, WHICH RECOGNIZES THE POWER OF THESE
UNITS “TO CREATE ITS OWN SOURCES OF REVENUE AND TO LEVY TAXES, FEES, AND CHARGES SUBJECT
TO SUCH GUIDELINES AND LIMITATIONS AS THE CONGRESS MAY PROVIDE, CONSISTENT WITH THE
BASIC POLICY OF LOCAL AUTONOMY.
As a general rule, condominium corporations are exempt from local business taxation under the Local Government Code,
irrespective of any local ordinance that seeks to declare otherwise. The exception is if unit owners of a condominium band
together to engage in activities for profit under the shelter of the condominium corporation. In this case, the City Treasurer
of Makati sent the BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation a Notice of Assessment for business taxes, fees and charges. The
City Treasurer based such assessment on the dues the condominium collected from the members of the Corporation,
alleging that such dues caused the value of each unit to appreciate, making such dues subject to business tax. The Supreme
Court affirmed that local tax on businesses is authorized under the Local Government Code. However, it ruled that
condominiums, such as the one in this case, are not engaged in a business or “a trade or commercial activity regularly
engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit. Thus, the condominium is exempt from local business taxation
under the LGC.
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
F: The City Treasurer of Makati sent the BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation a Notice of Assessment for business taxes,
fees and charges. The City Treasurer based such assessment on the dues the condominium collected from the members of
the Corporation, alleging that such dues caused the value of each unit to appreciate, making such dues subject to business
tax. The condominium corporation replied with a written letter protest, which was denied. The condominium filed an
appeal with the RTC Makati, which dismissed the appeal, rendering a decision in favor of the City Treasurer. The Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC and held that the condominium was not liable to pay business taxes to the City of Makati, relying
on the statutory concept of a condominium corporation showed that it was not a juridical entity intended to make profit,
as its sole purpose was to hold title to the common areas in the condominium and to maintain the condominium.
43
I: Whether or not condominiums, such as the one in the case at bar, are subject to local business taxation?
H: NO
R: The power of local government units to impose taxes within its territorial jurisdiction derives from the Constitution itself,
which recognizes the power of these units “to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject
to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.” These
guidelines and limitations as provided by Congress are in main contained in the Local Government Code of 1991 (the
“Code”), which provides for comprehensive instances when and how local government units may impose taxes.
The power of local government units to impose local taxes is exercised through the appropriate ordinance enacted by the
sanggunian, and not by the Local Government Code alone. What determines tax liability is the tax ordinance, the Local
Government Code being the enabling law for the local legislative body.
Section 143 of the Code specifically enumerates several types of business on which municipalities and cities may impose
taxes. Moreover, the local sanggunian is also authorized to impose taxes on any other businesses not otherwise specified
under Section 143 which the sanggunian concerned may deem proper to tax. The coverage of business taxation particular
to the City of Makati is provided by the Makati Revenue Code. In order for a corporation to be subjected to business taxes,
its activities must fall within the definition of business as provided in the Local Government Code.
The word “business” itself is defined under Section 131(d) of the Code as “trade or commercial activity regularly engaged
in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit.” We can elicit from the Condominium Act that a condominium
corporation is precluded by statute from engaging in corporate activities other than the holding of the common areas, the
administration of the condominium project, and other acts necessary, incidental or convenient to the accomplishment of
such purposes. Thus, as a general rule, condominium corporations are exempt from local business taxation under the Local
Government Code, irrespective of any local ordinance that seeks to declare otherwise. The exception is if unit owners of a
condominium band together to engage in activities for profit under the shelter of the condominium corporation.
11. PFDA V. CA – 534 SCRA 490
D: Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA), being an instrumentality of the national government, is exempt
from real property tax but the exemption does not extend to the portions of the Fishing Port Complex that it manages and
operates that were leased to taxable or private persons and entities for their beneficial use.
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
F: Municipality of Navotas assessed the real estate taxes allegedly due from petitioner Philippine Fisheries Development
Authority (PFDA) for the period 1981-1990 on properties under its jurisdiction, management and operation located inside
the Navotas Fishing Port Complex (NFPC). Taxes were not paid despite the demands of the treasures hence they give notice
of sale by public auction of the properties of PFDA. Petitioner sought the deferment of sale contending they are exempted
from such tax. The matter was referred to the DOF and ordered to conduct an ocular inspection to determine who the actual
users of the properties concerned are. Despite the order of DOF Navotas proceeded to publish the notice of sale. PFDA
instituted a civil case before the RTC to enjoin the auction sale. RTC ruled in favor of PFDA issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction. The writ dissolved when PFDA failed to present clear and convincing evidence that they are exempted from
real property tax. Upon appeal CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, hence this petition.
I: Whether an instrumentality of national government is liable to pay real property tax?
H No.
R: Section 234 (a) of the LGC states that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions is exempted from payment of the real property tax "except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted,
for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person. "Thus, as a rule, petitioner PFDA, being an instrumentality20of the
national government, is exempt from real property tax but the exemption does not extend to the portions of the NFPC that
were leased to taxable or private persons and entities for their beneficial use. In light of the above, petitioner is only liable

43
to pay the amount of P62,841,947.79 representing the total taxes due as of December 31, 2001 from PFDA-owned properties
that were leased, as shown in the Summary of Realty Taxes Due
12. SMART COMMUNICATIONS V. MUNICIPALITY OF MALVAR - G.R. NO.

204429, FEBRUARY 18, 2014
D: Local Government Units; Section 142 of the Local Government Code grants municipalities the power to levy taxes,
fees, and charges not otherwise levied by provinces.
Since the main purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate certain construction activities of the identified special
projects, which included “cell sites” or telecommunications towers, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are primarily
regulatory in nature, and not primarily revenue-raising; Thus, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are not taxes.
Settled is the rule that every law, in this case an ordinance, is presumed valid. To strike down a law as unconstitutional,
Smart has the burden to prove a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, which Smart miserably failed to do.
In Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. Secretary of Budget and Management, 670 SCRA 373 (2012), the
Court held, thus: To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal,
not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality,
the Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the
wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.” This presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution,
and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the
duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc.
F: Smart constructed a telecommunications tower within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality. On 30 July 2003, the
Municipality passed Ordinance No. 18, which imposes fees on the tower constructed by SMART.
On 24 August 2004, Smart received from the Permit and Licensing Division of the Office of the Mayor of the Municipality
an assessment letter with a schedule of payment for the total amount of P389,950.00 (based on Ordinance No. 18) for Smart’s
telecommunications tower.
SMART didn’t pay. Municipality ordered closure of tower. SMART protested.
I: Whether the municipality encroached on the regulatory powers of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
Making Ordinance No. 18 VOID.
H: NO, It is valid.
R: Smart cites Section 5(g) of Republic Act No. 7925 which provides that the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC), in the exercise of its regulatory powers, shall impose such fees and charges as may be necessary to cover reasonable
costs and expenses for the regulation and supervision of the operations of telecommunications entities. Thus, Smart alleges
that the regulation of telecommunications entities and all aspects of its operations is specifically lodged by law on the NTC.
To repeat, Ordinance No. 18 aims to regulate the "placing, stringing, attaching, installing, repair and construction of all gas
mains, electric, telegraph and telephone wires, conduits, meters and other apparatus" within the Municipality. The fees are
not imposed to regulate the administrative, technical, financial, or marketing operations of telecommunications entities,
such as Smart’s; rather, to regulate the installation and maintenance of physical structures – Smart’s cell sites or
telecommunications tower. The regulation of the installation and maintenance of such physical structures is an exercise of
the police power of the Municipality. Clearly, the Municipality does not encroach on NTC’s regulatory powers.
REGARDING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORD 18: (NOT REALLY RELATED TO SECTION 5)
Smart contends that Ordinance No. 18 violates Sections 130(b) (3) and 186 of the LGC since the fees are unjust, excessive,
oppressive and confiscatory. Aside from this bare allegation, Smart did not present any evidence substantiating its claims.

43
SMART, has not sufficiently proven anything, e.g. that the license taxes are unreasonable. The presumption of validity of
the ordinance subsists.
There was a discussion regarding fees vs. taxes. Because CTA dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. CTA only has
jurisdiction on taxes, not fees. SC ruled that Ordinance No. 18 levies fees, NOT TAXES.
Smart argues that the "fees" in Ordinance No. 18 are actually taxes since they are not regulatory, but revenue-raising.
The LGC defines the term "charges" as referring to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property, while
the term "fee" means "a charge fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or activity."
Since the main purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate certain construction activities of the identified special projects,
which included "cell sites" or telecommunications towers, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are primarily regulatory
in nature, and not primarily revenue-raising. While the fees may contribute to the revenues of the Municipality, this effect
is merely incidental. Thus, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are not taxes.
Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes
which shall be automatically released to them.
A. Share in National Taxes
13. PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE - 336 SCRA 201
D: In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties, and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties; Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power
of mere oversight over an inferior body—it does not include any restraining authority over such body.
By constitutional fiat, the heads of political subdivisions are subject to the President’s supervision only, not control, so
long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers, and by the same token, the President may
not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of

administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments ‘more responsive and
accountable,’ and ‘ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners
in the pursuit of national development and social progress.’ At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises ‘general
supervision’ over them, but only to ‘ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.’ He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand,
involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case,
the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to ‘self-immolation,’ since
in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its
powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and
effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected
to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs
and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting
for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.
FISCAL AUTONOMY MEANS THAT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE THE POWER TO CREATE THEIR OWN
SOURCES OF REVENUE IN ADDITION TO THEIR EQUITABLE SHARE IN THE NATIONAL TAXES RELEASED
BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

43
Local fiscal autonomy does not, however, rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of
supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals.
THE WITHHOLDING OF 10% OF THE LGUS’ IRA PENDING THE ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION BY THE
DEVELOPMENT BUDGET COORDINATING COMMITTEE, PURSUANT TO SECTION 4 OF AO 372, ALTHOUGH
TEMPORARY, IS EQUIVALENT TO A HOLDBACK, WHICH MEANS “SOMETHING HELD BACK OR WITHHELD,
OFTEN TEMPORARILY,” AND CONTRAVENES THE CONSTITUTION.
Although the President was well-intentioned in issuing AO 372 withholding the LGUs’ IRA, the rule of law requires
that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
F: On December 27, 1997, the President of the Philippines issued AO 372. This AO ordered: (SECTION 1). All government
departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations and
local governments units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year
by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items, along the following suggested areas:
SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging
fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld.
I: Whether the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program
in violation of the LGU'S fiscal autonomy? Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the withholding of 10% of the LGU'S IRA?
H: - YES - NOT VALID; YES - cannot withhold. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents and their successors
are hereby permanently PROHIBITED from implementing Administrative Order Nos. 372 and 43, respectively dated
December 27, 1997 and December 10, 1998, insofar as local government units are concerned.
R: While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and while we agree with petitioner that the
requirements of Section 284 of the Local Government Code have not been satisfied, we are prepared to accept the solicitor
general's assurance that the directive to "identify and implement measures x x x that will reduce total expenditures x x x by
at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory or
binding order that interferes with local autonomy. The language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a command
that emanates from a boss to a subaltern.
Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a
period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and
teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and
their officials who do not follow such advice. It is in this light that we sustain the solicitor general's contention in regard to
Section 1.
SECTION 1 which mandates reduction of 25% is partly valid, however, the supervisory power of the executive department
over LGUs cannot order, but only recommend.
A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue.This
is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made
directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or
holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.” As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of
command that must be given a compulsory meaning.
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no
color of validity at all. The latter provision effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Concededly,
the President was well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs IRA, but the rule of law requires that even
the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes
must be carried out by legal methods.

43
14. BATANGAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY- 429 SCRA 736
D: Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads: Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined
by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. When parsed, it would be readily seen that
this provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a “just share” in the national taxes; (2) the “just share” shall be
determined by law; and (3) the “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs.
The LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the “just share” accruing to them from the national coffers—
the “just share” of the LGUs shall be released to them “without need of further action”; “Automatic” means
“involuntary either wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex nature;
without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an automation.
The Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even control, over the distribution and release of a portion of the IRA,
the LGSEF, is an anathema to and subversive of the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution; The
Oversight Committee’s authority is undoubtedly limited to the implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991,
not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over the IRA, or even a portion thereof, of the
LGUs.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs’ IRA is if the national internal revenue
collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which
case what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year.
The adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue
taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year. In the instant case, however, there is no allegation that the national
internal revenue tax collections for the fiscal years 1999, 2000 and 2001 have fallen compared to the preceding three fiscal
years.
Amendments and Repeals of Laws; While it is conceded that Congress may amend any of the provisions of the Local
Government Code, a substantive law, it may not do so through appropriations laws or GAAs—any amendment to the
Local Government Code should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law, because Congress cannot
include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
DOCTRINE OF INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION - A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose
content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit—any provision
therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an “inappropriate provision.
The value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy—
our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also
appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
F: President Estrada issued EO 48, which created the the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF), to address
the funding shortfalls of functions and services devolved to the LGUs and other funding requirements. Pursuant to EO 48,
the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, included provisions wherein: 1) P5 Billion of the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) was uniformly earmarked for the LGSEF; and 2) It imposed conditions and guidelines for its
release: a.) LGSEF could not be released without the Oversight Committees prior approval; b) The LGUs should identify
the projects eligible for funding based on the criteria laid down by the Oversight Committee; c) The LGUs should submit
their project proposals to the DILG for appraisal; d) The project proposals that passed the appraisal of the DILG to be
submitted to the Oversight Committee for review, evaluation and approval.
The Province of Batangas, represented by Governor Hermilando I. Mandanas, filed a petition questioning the
constitutionality of the GAA of 1999, 2000, and 2001.
I: Whether the questioned provisions of the GAAs are constitutional?
H: No.

43
R: Sec. 6, Art. X: Local Government units shall have a just share, as determined by law in national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. Sec. 6 mandates that: 1) LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes; 2) The just share
shall be determined by law; and 3) The just share shall be automatically released.
“Automatic” connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. LGUs are not required to perform any act to
receive the just share accruing to them from the national coffers. It shall be released without need of further action.
The LGSEF is part of the IRA or "just share" of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the
vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by
the Oversight Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and
the OCD resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that
the "just share" of the LGUs "shall be automatically released to them."
Finally, Section 284 of the Local Government Code provides that, beginning the third year of its effectivity, the LGUs' share
in the national internal revenue taxes shall be 40%. This percentage is fixed and may not be reduced except "in the event
the national government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit" and only upon compliance with stringent
requirements set forth in the same section. While it is conceded that Congress may amend any of the provisions in the Local
Government Code, it may not do so through appropriations laws or GAAs. Any amendment to the Local Government Code
of 1991 should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law, because Congress cannot include in a general
appropriation bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization
and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by
law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
A. Term of Office
15. BORJA V. COMELEC- 295 SCRA 157
D: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve
in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in
an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
A fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose those whom they please
to govern them. To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the first as a
result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle.
F: In 1988, Jose Capco was elected VM of Pateros (3 year term will end on 1992). In 1989, incumbent Mayor (Cesar Borja)
died so by operation of law, CAPCO became Mayor and served for the unexpired term until 1992 as Mayor. In 1992, Capco
run and was elected as Mayor (3 years term ended 1995) = 1st term of Mayor. In 1995, Capco run and was reelected (3 year
term ended 1998) =2nd year term of Mayor. In 1998 Capco filed coc for Mayor. Opposed by Petitioner arguing that when
CAPCO became Mayor in 1989 and served until 1992 it is already considered 1 term. Thus, he is disqualified to run for 1998
elections.

43
Petitioner also argued that it is irrelevant that private respondent became mayor by succession because the purpose of the
constitutional provision in limiting the number of terms elective local officials may serve is to prevent a monopolization of
political power.
I: Whether Capco is considered to have served for a full term during 1989-1992 (serving only the unexpired term of Borja)
H: NO
R: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the
same elective position. It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he
must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply as
illustrated by the following situations cited in this case:
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six months before the
next election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election. Yes, because
although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from office before the full term
expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit.
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected Mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year.
If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election? Yes, because he has served only two full
terms successively.
In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification
provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that
he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official is considered to have served three full
terms notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three
times. In the second case, the local official has been elected three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three
consecutive terms.
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to
concur for the purpose of applying Art. X 8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the
next election? Yes, because he was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust
into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the
death, of the deceased mayor.
To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection
would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern
them.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that
while the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be
taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
16. SOCRATES V. COMELEC - 391 SCRA 453
D: The intent in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and under Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160 is that the first part
provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only
consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance
from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term.
Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a
subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

43
The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not
immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term. The winner in the recall
election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of
an elective official’s terms in office
F: SOCRATES (Mayor of Puerto Princesa - 2001-2002) was recalled by the barangay officials. A recall election on September
7, 2002 was scheduled by COMELEC, where HAGEDORN ran for the position. Several petitions for disqualification of
HAGEDORN were filed, on the ground that HAGEDORN served from 1992-2001 (3 full terms) HAGEDORN won.
I: Whether HAGEDORN is limited to run for mayor in the 2002 recall election of Puerto Princesa.
H: No.
R: Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot
serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-
term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the
continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity
of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service
or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any
subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election
like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his
third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from
seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
In Hagedorn’s case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of three years, constituted
an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be
a full term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption for any length of time, as long as the cause is involuntary, is
sufficient to break an elective local officials continuity of service.
17. RIVERA V. COMELEC- 523 SCRA 41
D: Fact that respondent was ousted as mayor in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee does not constitute an
interruption in serving the full term
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will
govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

43
F: In the 2004 elections Marino “Boking” Morales filed for his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor of Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera and Normandick De Guzman filed with the Second Division of the COMELEC a
petition to cancel respondent Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he was elected and had served three
previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for First term
from 1995 to 1998, Third term from 2001 to 2004, but Second term only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer"
because, RTC declared his proclamation as void in 2001. Ombudsman preventively suspended him in 1999 for graft charges
Comelec second division cancelled COC of Morales. However, was reversed by the En Banc as it held that Morales was
just a de facto officer on his second term. Morales won in the election!
This time, Anthony Dee, another candidate for mayoralty filed a petition for quo warranto before RTC Mabalacat. RTC,
Comelec 1st Division and Comelec En Banc all ruled that in Morales’ second term he only served as caretaker his
proclamation being void.
I: Whether Morales has served 3 terms and is disqualified to run for mayor in 2004?
H: Yes!
R: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms in the same local government post, and
(2) that he has fully served 3 consecutive terms.
Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30,
2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest ousting him as
mayor. Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term. Since his disqualification became
final and executory after the elections, the candidate having the second highest number of votes cannot assume the position.
Hence, it is the petitioner, the elected Vice Mayor Anthony Dee who should be declared as the mayor.
Additional facts: Cases cited by the Court in case ma’am asks:

Ong v. Alegre, Francis Ong was elected and assumed the duties of the mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for three
consecutive terms. But his proclamation as mayor in the May 1998 election was declared void by the RTC of Daet, Camarines
Norte in its Decision dated July 4, 2001. As ruled by this Court, his service for the term 1998 to 2001 is for the full term.
Clearly, the three-term limit rule applies to him.
Francis Ong was never unseated during the term in question; he never ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term. Indeed, there is no reason why
this ruling should not also apply to respondent Morales who is similarly situate.
In Borja v. Comelec, Vice Mayor Capco assumed the post of Mayor of Pateros upon the death of the Mayor and served for
a period of less than 3 years. After which, Capco ran for 2 elections and won. When he filed COC for third election, one
fellow candidate petitioned for his disqualification as he posited that that would be his 4th term. The Court ruled that
Capco may still run because he held the position for a period of less than three years. Moreover, he was not elected to that
position.
Adormeo v. Comelec: assumption of the office of mayor in a recall election for the remaining term is NOT the "term"
contemplated under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
18. ALDOVINO, JR. V. COMELEC- GR NO. 184836, DECEMBER 23, 2009
D: The word “renunciation” carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is to give up, abandon,
decline, or resign. It is an act that emanates from its author, as contrasted to an act that operates from the outside. Read
with the definition of a “term” in mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the second branch of the constitutional
provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting short the term, i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive
word “voluntary” linked together with “renunciation” signifies an act of surrender based on the surenderee’s own freely
exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to office by conscious choice. In the context of the three-term limit rule,

43
such loss of title is not considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to avoid the application
of the term limitation.
The “interruption” of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less
than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of
time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and
its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective official’s continuous stay in office to no more tha n
three consecutive terms, using “voluntary renunciation” as an example and standard of what does not constitute an
interruption.
Based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of service
within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the
functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because
it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while
retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, both by structure and substance, fixes an elective official’s term of office and
limits his stay in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule—the provision should be read in the context of
interruption of term, not in the context of interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective
position.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective officials’ service in office and
they do not overlap. As already mentioned above, preventive suspension involves protection of the service and of the
people being served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term limitation,
on the other hand, is triggered after an elective official has served his three terms in office without any break. Its
companion concept—interruption of a term—on the other hand, requires loss of title to office. If preventive suspension
and term limitation or interruption have any commonality at all, this common point may be with respect to the
discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even on this point, they merely run parallel to each other and never
intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken term; in
the context of term limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the term.
STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE INTENT OF THE THREE-TERM LIMIT RULE DEMANDS THAT PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AN INTERRUPTION THAT ALLOWS AN ELECTIVE OFFICIAL’S
STAY IN OFFICE BEYOND THREE TERMS; THE BEST INDICATOR OF THE SUSPENDED OFFICIAL’S
CONTINUITY IN OFFICE IS THE ABSENCE OF A PERMANENT REPLACEMENT AND THE LACK OF THE
AUTHORITY TO APPOINT ONE SINCE NO VACANCY EXISTS.
F: Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004,
and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive
suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and
Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by herein
petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-
term Constitutional limit.
I: WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?
H: NO.
R: The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under
the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in contravention of
the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive
suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong
seeking Asilo’s disqualification.

43
“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should
therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can pose
as a threat “more potent” than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term limit
as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after
a preventive suspension has been imposed.
19. DATU ABAS KIDA VS. SENATE – G.R. NO. 196271, FEBRUARY 28, 2012
D: While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the
clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,
which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of
the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the
three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover.
In the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be
shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is
what will happen—a term of less than two years—if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while
synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
N: PETITIONS assailing the validity of R.A. No. 10153.
F: RA No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM
elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every 3 years thereafter, to coincide with the
country's regular national and local elections.
RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the ARMM, Amending for the Purpose RA
No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the ARMM, as Amended) was the next legislative act passed. This law provided
further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic act, and reset the regular elections for
the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001. The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join
ARMM on the same date.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and
ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided
by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.
I: Whether the holdover option is constitutional?
H: Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
R: We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM
during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the
Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmeña v. COMELEC
It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their
successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and

43
when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the
office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:
It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill an office the term of which is
limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond the period as limited by the Constitution.
Independently of the Osmeña ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates that where
the Constitution has itself made a determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated should
be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional process.
A necessary corollary is that none of the three branches of government can deviate from the constitutional mandate except
only as the Constitution itself may allow If at all, Congress may only pass legislation filing in details to fully operationalize
the constitutional command or to implement it by legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court, on the other hand, may
only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and called for.
In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from
this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and
cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress
to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is
constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would
effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly,
then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position
for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm
option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (Section 7, Article VII
of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no
express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that
prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within
the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results.
20. ABUNDO V. COMELEC- G.R. NO. 201716 , JANUARY 8, 2013
D: When due to an incorrect proclamation, the true winner of an election is not able to hold office while his election
protest is pending, the service of such term will be considered involuntarily interrupted, and shall not be counted as
one of the terms contemplated in the three-consecutive term limit under the Constitution. In this case, Abundo had
served as Mayor of Viga from 2001-2004. However, his opponent in the 2004 mayoral election was incorrectly proclaimed
as the winner. He filed an election protest, which was eventually successful. However, because of the time it took for
his election protest to be decided, Abundo was only able to serve 1 year and 1 month in the 2004-2007 term. After which
he won and served again as mayor from 2007-2010. When he filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor for the 2010-
2013, his opponent sought his disqualification. The Supreme Court held that Abundo’s service of the 2004-2007 term
had been involuntarily interrupted, excluding such term from the 3-consecutive years term-limit under the Constitution.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and (2) that he has
fully served three consecutive terms.

43
The conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute an interruption of the incumbent official’s continuity
of service; He never ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of the same local
government unit.
To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or
involuntary interruption, viz.:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant
to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced
official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory
provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again
for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position
is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for
what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the
official’s service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a
private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work
to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement
to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the
functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted
when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would
otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon).
The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an
interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of
service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had served
the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has
managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the
application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term
(Ong and Rivera).
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the “monopolization of political power” and
prevent elected officials from breeding “proprietary interest in their position” but also to “enhance the people’s freedom
of choice.” In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, “while people should be protected from the evils that a
monopoly of power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.”
The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the concepts of interruption of service and voluntary
renunciation of service. The word interruption means temporary cessation, intermission or suspension. To interrupt is
to obstruct, thwart or prevent. When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the
obstruction to the continuance of the service by the concerned elected official by effectively cutting short the service of
a term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the word “renunciation” connotes
the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or resign. Voluntary
renunciation of the office by an elective local official would thus mean to give up or abandon the title to the office and
to cut short the service of the term the concerned elected official is entitled to.
To be considered as interruption of service, the “law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official
steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular local government unit.” Applying the said principle in the present case, there is no question tha t during the
pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the good people of Viga,
Catanduanes. Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest
period or break in his service because, as earlier stated, prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundo’s
opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation.
F: In 2001, Abelardo Abundo was proclaimed the winner of the election for Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In 2004, the Viga
municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed Jose Torres the winner of the election. Thereafter, Jose Torres performed
43
the functions of the office of the mayor. Abundo protested against Torres’ election and proclamation. His protest was
successful, which led to his proclamation as Mayor and winner of the 2004 election. He assumed office in May 2006 until
June 2007 (one year and one month). In 2007, Abundo again won as Mayor of Viga. In 2010, Abundo filed his certificate of
candidacy for Mayor.Torres sought Abundo’s disqualification to run, alleging that allowing him to do so would violate the
3-consecutive term limit under the constitution. The COMELEC 1st Division issued a Resolution in favor of Abundo, who
was accordingly proclaimed the 2010 Mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes. Private respondent Ernesto Vega commenced a
quo warranto action before the RTC, alleging that Abundo was ineligible to be mayor due to the 3-consecutive term limit
under the constitution. The RTC granted the petition. On appeal, the COMELEC affirmed the RTC and denied Abundo’s
MR.
I: Whether or not there was an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s 2004-2007 term?
H: YES
R: The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the concepts of interruption of service and voluntary
renunciation of service. The word interruption means temporary cessation, intermission or suspension. To interrupt is to
obstruct, thwart or prevent. When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the
obstruction to the continuance of the service by the concerned elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a
term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the word “renunciation” connotes the
idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or resign. Voluntary renunciation
of the office by an elective local official would thus mean to give up or abandon the title to the office and to cut short the
service of the term the concerned elected official is entitled to.
Abundo’s three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially
deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was
eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.
In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and declares that the two-year period during which his
opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case
from the ambit of the three-term limit rule. The Court reiterated that Abundo’s case differs from other cases involving the
effects of an election protest because while Abundo was, in the final reckoning, the winning candidate, he was the one
deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constituents. If in the cases of Lonzanida and Dizon, this Court ruled in
favor of a losing candidate―or the person who was adjudged not legally entitled to hold the contested public office but held
it anyway―We find more reason to rule in favor of a winning candidate-protestant who, by popular vote, deserves title to
the public office but whose opportunity to hold the same was halted by an invalid proclamation.
The Supreme Court summarized the applicable jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or
involuntary interruption:
Involuntary Interruption/ Voluntary or Non-Interruption/

Breaks continuity Does not break continuity
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position 1. The abolition of an elective local office due to the
and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself,
rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of
unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot service (Latasa).
be treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject 2. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event
constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to
counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the the office remain unaffected during the period of
official runs again for the same position he held prior to his suspension, although he is barred from exercising the
assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
position is by operation of law and is considered an 3. When an official is defeated in an election protest and
involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon). said decision becomes final after said official had served
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive the full term for said office, then his loss in the election
terms and who did not seek the elective position for what contest does not constitute an interruption since he has
could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full

43
had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the
For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the application of term limits because the nullification of his
3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong
and Socrates). and Rivera).
3. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective
position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he
loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the
unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been
dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption
need not be for a full term of three years or for the major part
of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time,
provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the
continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
Section 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation as may be
prescribed by law.
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
A. Creation of Political Units
21. TAN V. COMELEC - 142 SCRA 727
D: It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained “the
approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” whenever a province is created, divided or
merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of
the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing
boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic
will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros
Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those
in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Said sentence states that the “territory need not be contiguous.” Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching
along all or most of one side; (c) near, next, or adjacent (Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). “Contiguous”,
when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching
of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to
words associated with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R., p. 110).
Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not be “contiguous” is the “territory”—the physical mass of
land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term
“territory” embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can be safely concluded that the word territory in
the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with “land area” only. The words and phrases used in a
statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are
used furnished the rule of construction.
N: PETITION for prohibition to stop Commission on Elections from conducting a plebiscite.
F: B.P. No. 885 was passed allowing for the creation of the province of Negros Del Norte on the Island of Negros. Petitioner
Patricio Tan claimed that B.P. no 885 violated Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution which states: “No province, city,
municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes
43
in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected”. Specifically, the remaining areas in the province of Negros Occidental were not
allowed to participate in the plebiscite for the creation of Negros del Norte. Petitioner also claims the proposed province of
Negros del Norte failed to meet the requirements of Sec. 197 of the LGC of 1983, specially that a future province must have
at least an area of 3,500 sq. km. Negros del Norte, Petitioner avers, is actually only 2,856.56 sq km. Respondent claims the
issue was already rendered moot and academic as the new province of Negros del Norte was already proclaimed.
Moreover, the area of Negros del Norte is really 4,019.95 sq km, since the waters falling under the jurisdiction and control
of Negros del Norte must be included in the total area of the province.
I: Whether plebiscite is valid.
H: Tan is correct. The plebiscite is declared null and void.
R:1)The phrase “subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must be
construed to mean that the remaining areas in the province of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to participate
in the said plebiscite. The reason is that cities belonging to Negros Occidental will be added to Negros del Norte, thus
Negros Occidental’s land area will be dismembered. Certainly, the people of Negros Occidental should have been allowed
to vote in the plebiscite as they are directly affected by the diminution in land size of their province.
2) A reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 LGC of 1983 says. “The territory need not be contiguous
if it comprises 2 or more islands”. The use of the word ‘territory” clearly reflects that the law refers only to the land mass
and excludes the waters over which the political unit has control. In other words, Negros del Norte failed to meet the
required land area of 3,500 sq. km for it to become a province.
22. UMALI V. COMELEC - G.R. NO. 203974, APRIL 22, 2014
D: The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities or
barangays, which is pertinent in the case at bar, is essentially legislative in nature. The framers of the Constitution have,
however, allowed for the delegation of such power in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution as long as (1) the criteria
prescribed in the LGC is met and (2) the creation, division, merger, abolition or the substantial alteration of the
boundaries is subject to the approval by a majority vote in a plebiscite.
The provision makes it ministerial for the President, upon proper application, to declare a component city as highly
urbanized once the minimum requirements, which are based on certifiable and measurable indices under Sec. 452, are
satisfied.
As the phrase implies, “substantial alteration of boundaries” involves and necessarily entails a change in the
geographical configuration of a local government unit or units. However, the phrase “boundaries” should not be limited
to the mere physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of the LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also
connotes a modification of the demarcation lines between political subdivisions, where the LGU’s exercise of corporate
power ends and that of the other begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration must be “substantial” for it to be within the
ambit of the constitutional provision.
In identifying the Local Government Unit (LGU) or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what
should primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire to participate will be “directly affected”
by the change.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition
F: On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-2011, requesting the
President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly
urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012,
proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as
provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991."
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 which reads:

43
WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion
of Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City
should participate in the said plebiscite.
The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), citing conversion cases
involving Puerto Princesa City in Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern Leyte, and Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu, where only the
residents of the city proposed to be converted were allowed to vote in the corresponding plebiscite.
Umali, the Gov of Nueva Ecija objected, saying that the conversion would affect the whole province. HIS CONTENTION:
The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters
of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner
Umali justified his position by enumerating the various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it will
cause material change not only in the political and economic rights of the city and its residents but also of the province as a
whole.
The Commission, taking into consideration the arguments of counsels including the Reply-memorandum of Oppositor,
after due deliberation, RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:
1) To DENY the Motion for Reconsideration of oppositor Governor Aurelio M. Umali; and
2) To SCHEDULE the conduct of Plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city into highly-
urbanized city with registered residents only of Cabanatuan City to participate in said plebiscite.
I: Should the plebiscite only cover the City of Cabanatuan or the whole Province of Nueva Ecija. - THE WHOLE NUEVA
ECIJA.
H: The upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will come at a steep price. It can
be gleaned from the above-cited rule that the province will inevitably suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought
about by Cabanatuan City’s gain of independence. With the city’s newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight
powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What once formed part of Nueva
Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the province. In more concrete terms, Nueva Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq.
km. of its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City’s severance from its mother province. This is equivalent to carving
out almost 5% of Nueva Ecija’s 5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the alteration be
"substantial."
"Political units directly affected" defined

In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should primarily be determined
is whether or not the unit or units that desire to participate will be "directly affected" by the change. To interpret the phrase,
Tan v. COMELEC and Padilla v. COMELEC are worth revisiting.
1973 v 1987 PH CONS: The removal of the phrase "unit or" only served to sustain the earlier finding that what is
contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected" is the plurality of political units which would participate in the
plebiscite.
HOW AFFECTED: The conversion into an HUC carries the accessory of substantial alteration of boundaries and that the
province of Nueva Ecija will, without a doubt, suffer a reduction in territory because of the severance of Cabanatuan City.
The residents of the city will cease to be political constituencies of the province, effectively reducing the latter’s population.
Taking this decrease in territory and population in connection with the formula for IRA, it is conceded that Nueva Ecija
will indeed suffer a reduction in IRA given the decrease of its multipliers’ values.
COMELEC is hereby ordered to conduct a plebiscite for the purpose of converting Cabanatuan City into a Highly Urbanized
City to be participated in by the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija within 120 days from the finality of this Decision.
Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to
a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain
their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies.
The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will hereby be created shall be limited to basic
services requiring coordination.
43
A. Special Metropolitan Subdivisions
23. MMDA V. BEL-AIR VILLAGE 328 SCRA 836
D: A local government is a “political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial
control of local affairs.” The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a “body politic and
corporate”—one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory. Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays. They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the state.
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The legislative body of the
provincial government is the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang panlungsod,
that of the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The
Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang
bayan to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or
municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of
the corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code x x x.” The same Code gives the
sangguniang barangay the power to “enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred
upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants thereon.”
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration.
There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro
Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government
units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to “enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare” of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed
inthe MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila
Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA’s functions. There is
no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis
the charter itself, a “development authority.”
It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative
power. It is not even a “special metropolitan political subdivision” as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the
Constitution. The creation of a “special metropolitan political subdivision” requires the approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R.A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of
Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the
President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties
as may be assigned to him by the President, whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises
supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.
It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and
police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution
ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent
Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
F: MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. MMDA sent a letter to the
Bel-Air Village Association, the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village, informing the same that
said street would be opened to vehicular traffic. The perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan
Avenue was also to be demolished. The Association challenges the authority of MMDA to order the opening of Neptune
street to vehicular traffic and to demolish the perimeter wall. The MMDA alleges that its power to open said street is
pursuant to its status as an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services, including traffic
management, in Metro Manila.

43
I: Can MMDA an order to the Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to open Jupiter Street to the public considering that
Jupiter Street is owned by BAVA?
H: No. MMDa is not a local government unit with police power. I
24. MMDA V. GARIN- APRIL 15, 2005
D: Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature and cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power through the National Legislature may delegate it to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.
A local government is a “political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control
of local affairs.
Only where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative
powers have been delegated that the MMDA may confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses in the exercise of
its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs.
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Br. 260.
F: The MMDA issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) to and confiscated the driver’s license of Atty. Dante O. Garin for
illegal parking. Garin questions the constitutionality of Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924 (creating the MMDA), which authorizes it to
confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations.
I: Whether Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924, which authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s licenses in the enforcement
of traffic laws and regulations, constitutional?
H: Yes.
R: The MMDA is only allowed to confiscate or suspend driver’s licenses if there is a traffic law or regulation enacted by the
legislature or those agencies to whom legislative power have been delegated). A license to operate a motor vehicle is a
privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police power. Police power is primarily lodged in the National
Legislature. Through the Local Government Code of 1991, Congress delegated police power to the LGUs. Local Government
is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs.
LGUs are provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. MMDA is a body composed of several LGUs. -- not a political
unit of the Government. Its powers are limited to formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. Unlike legislative bodies of LGUs,
the MMDA is not empowered to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of
the inhabitants of Metro Manila. All its functions are administrative in nature.
Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924 provides that the MMDA shall… “confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s licenses in the enforcement
of such traffic laws and regulations…” Where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those
agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the MMDA is not precluded to
confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as
well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic
education programs.
Therefore, by itself, the MMDA cannot legislate that it can confiscate driver’s licenses, only when the Congress or LGU
enacts a law or ordinance providing such, can it do so as an exercise of its power to implement traffic laws.
25. MMDA V. TRACKWORKS- GR NO. 179554, DECEMBER 16, 2009
D: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) has no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy
the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the Metro Rail Transit-3 (MRT3) structure by

43
Trackworks—MMDA’s powers are limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924
granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
The power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code is lodged in the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), not in MMDA
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
F: Phil Government entered into a Built-Lease-Transfer agreement with the Metro Rail Transit Corp (MRTC) for the
construction of the MRT3. The contract provides that MRTC shall own it for 25 years before turning it over to the Phil
Government in accordance to RA 6957. The contact includes/allows MRTC to develop commercial premises in the MRT 3
structure or to obtain advertising income.
Thus, in 1998 it entered into a contract of advertising services with Trackworks (respondent) and thereafter several
billboards, banners and other advertising materials were installed in the MRT 3. MMDA requested respondent to dismantle
the billboards in conformity with MMDA Regulation which prohibits the posting, installation and display of any kind or
form of billboards in any part of the road, sidewalk, center, island, posts, trees, parks and open space.
Respondent refused to comply and invoke its contract with MRTC and that MMDA does not have either legislative or police
power. Respondent filed for petition for injunction. CA granted the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of respondent
I: Whether MMDA has the right to dismantle billboards in MRT 3?
H: NO
R: The contract with the MRTC vested it the exclusive right to undertake advertising and promotional activities at the MRT
3 structure. The CA therefore correctly ruled that what is involved here is not an indiscriminate posting and installation of
commercial advertisements but one sanctioned by a contract. If not restrained, the dismantling of, and prohibition from,
installing advertisements at the MRT 3 will cause irreparable injury to TRACKWORKS.
26. GANCAYCO V. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY – G.R. NO. 177807,

OCTOBER 11, 2011
D: A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated
under the undefined law of necessity.—Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of
others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes
with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.
A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity.
Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine
whether a thing is a nuisance. In AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp., 506 SCRA 625 (2006), we held: We agree
with petitioner’s contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other
forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a
nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a
nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction
of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in
the ordinary courts of law. If a thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be
determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.
N: PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
F: In 1950s, retired justice Emilio Gancayco bought a parcel of land located in EDSA. Then on March 1956, Quezon City
Council issued Ordinance No. 2904 requiring the construction of arcades for commercial buildings to be constructed. At

43
the outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no building
code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the discretion of
local government units. Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by
constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building
owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the
first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it
for their own purposes.
The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the
exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he
be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancayco’s request and issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66,
“subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the
enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands.”
Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to clear obstructions along EDSA, in consequence, they sent a
notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code.
Gancayco did not comply with the notice and filed a petition for TRO with the RTC Quezon City to prohibit the MMDA
from demolishing his property. The RTC rendered its Decision on 30 September 2003 in favor of Justice Gancayco. It held
that the questioned ordinance was unconstitutional, ruling that it allowed the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. The RTC said that because 67.5 square meters out of Justice Gancayco’s 375 square meters of
property were being taken without compensation for the public’s benefit, the ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive.
It likewise held that the ordinance violated owners’ right to equal protection of laws.
MMDA appealed with the CA. CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished the subject property.
It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public
places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancayco’s private property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not
clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances.
I: WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO.
H: No.
R: (1) We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the undertaking to comply with all issuances of the
BIR, which at that time it considered as valid, petitioner did not commit any false misrepresentation or misleading act.
(2) Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground of equal protection when he also benefited from the
exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself requested for an exemption from the application of the
ordinance in 1965 and was eventually granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the
demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with regard
to its different treatment of properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to do
so.
(3) The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication
that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect
the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that
structure a nuisance. Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the
city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property.
This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure.
Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the
power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize
the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those
things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.
Section 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose
charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of

43
the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such
prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
Section 13. Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts,
services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them in accordance with law.
Section 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar bodies
composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other government
offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the regions for purposes
of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate
the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region.
AUTONOMOUS REGION
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that
the laws are faithfully executed.
Section 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to
the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.
27. SEMA V. COMELEC - JULY 16, 2008
D: Only an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only
Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to
regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to
reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has
delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,
subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act of Congress”
can create provinces, cities or municipalities.
A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a
population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province,
or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation
of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the city’s
population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI
of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province
or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or
reapportion legislative districts for Congress. On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM
Organic Act, provides, “The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x

43
x x (k) National elections. x x x.” Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to
national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections.
Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on regional autonomy, nor Congress
in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch
system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be
delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
SC declared Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional
Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare
VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule
that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
F: In 2006, the ARMMs legislature’s, ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified
Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.Because of the creation of the new province, Bai Sandra
Sema ran as its new representative. Sema contended that that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is self-executing.
Thus, every new province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in the House
of Representatives even in the absence of a national law
I: Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is
Constitutional.
H: No, It is unconstitutional.
Whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province
H: No, It is unconstitutional
R: MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void. The power to create a province, or a city with a
population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province
or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. The allowable membership of the House of
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law
passed by Congress. Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or
impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress. ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power
to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national
elections. A legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of
Representatives, is a national official. ARMM shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive
department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units.
The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent
with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
A. Creation of Autonomous Region

43
28. ABBAS V. COMELEC - 179 SCRA 287
D: Under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities
where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities
wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an
autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section
1(2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No.
6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2)
which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall comprise it.
The creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the
will of the majority in each of the constituent units; For if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the
majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the
ratification of the Constitution, i.e. “the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.”
Administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
[see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in
the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the
power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between
the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in
the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to
provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.
Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. If the Organic
Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the
autonomous region immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an Oversight
Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less would the organization
of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at
effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government. The constitutional objection on this point thus cannot
be sustained as there is no basis therefor.
N: PETITIONS to review the decision of the Commission on Elections.
F: A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, was scheduled for November 19,
1989, in implementation of RA 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao" (Organic Act). These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC from conducting the
plebiscite; and (2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners
may generally be categorized into either of the following: (a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
I: Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are unconstitutional.
H: The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional.
R: 1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of a provision in the Organic Act makes the creation of an autonomous region
absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created
composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained. there is a specific provision in the Transitory
Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in the
Constitution and fills in the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be
held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided,
That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain
the existing administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

43
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved
by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority
vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a
majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is
created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall
be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be
determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities,
among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.
2. The question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the
plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or both?
The 1987 Constitution provides: The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic
areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It will readily
be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but
on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this.
3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such
concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas, which do not strictly
share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous
region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which
areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of
the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this
ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law.
4. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on
free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should
there be any conflict between the Muslim Code and the Tribal Code on the one had, and the national law on the other hand,
the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law
(Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made"
national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of
the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious
convictions.
In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the
application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may
not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and
national law.
5. According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred
by the Constitution upon the President.
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has
traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments. There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the
constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a
plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.
6. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The
dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.

43
29. LEONOR V. CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION - 194 SCRA 101
D: The Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural
community. It is not a part of the Philippine judicial system and does not possess judicial power.
Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted
into an indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court
existing under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community. Such tribal courts are not a part of the
Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts which have been established by
law.
N: PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Maeng Tribal Court.
F: Petitioners, spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua, allegedly own a farm land in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra. They
were forcibly ejected from the land by virtue of a "decision" of the Cordillera Bodong Administration in a case entitled
"David Quema vs. Leonor Badua."
Factual Background of Quema v Badua:
In 1966, Quema, as the owner of two parcels of land in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra, mortgaged said parcels of land
for P6,000 to Dra. Erotida Valera. He was able to redeem the land 22 years later, long after the mortgagee had already died.
He allegedly paid the redemption price of P10,000 to the mortgagee's heir, Jessie Macaraeg. On the other hand, Rosa Badua,
alleged that the land was sold to her by Dra. Erotida Valera when she was still alive. However, Rosa could not produce the
deed of sale because it is allegedly in the possession of Vice-Governor Benesa. As Quema was prevented by Rosa Badua
from cultivating the land, he filed a case before the Barangay Council, but it failed to settle the dispute, A certain Judge
Cacho advised Quema to file his complaint in the provincial level courts. Instead, Quema filed it in the tribal court of the
Maeng Tribe. The tribal court conducted a trial and rendered the following decision: The Maeng Tribal Court, therefore,
decides to give the land to DAVID QUEMA and ROSA BADUA and her husband must pay the persons to whom they
mortgaged the said land. The Maeng Tribal Court also decides that ROSA BADUA and her husband must reimburse the
expenses of DAVID QUEMA in following-up the land case amounting to P2,000.00. The Maeng Tribal Court further decides
to penalize ROSA BADUA and her husband in the amount of P5,000.00 for telling the lie that they bought this land from
the late DRA. EROTIDA VALERA; for misleading the Maeng Tribal Court which handled the continuation of this case here
in Bangued, CBA Provincial Office where they failed to make an appearance; and their illegal acquisition of the said parcel
of land. This decision is based on the "PAGTA." (pp. 16-17, Rollo.)
When Leonor and Rosa Badua did not immediately vacate the land, they received a "warning order" from Ka Blantie, Zone
Commander, Abra Zone-1 of the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, thus: WARNING ORDER xxxx
Non-compliance of the said decision of the Court and any attempt to bring this case to another Court will force the CPLA
to settle the matter, in which case, you will have no one to blame since the case has been settled.
Fearful for his life, Leonor Badua went into hiding. His wife, Rosa, was arrested by the Cordillera People's Liberation Army
and detained for two days.
I: W/N a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a valid and executory decision in a land dispute?
H: No.
R: In Cordillera Regional Assembly Member Alexander P. Ordillo, et al. vs. COMELEC, the Court en banc, found that in
the plebiscite that was held on January 23, 1990 pursuant to Republic Act 6766, the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous
Region was rejected by all the provinces and city * of the Cordillera region, except Ifugao province, hence, the Cordillera
Autonomous Region did not come to be.
Resolution No. 2259 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous region, the
February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the February 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary,
Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order No. 220 is
declared to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended.

43
As a logical consequence of that judicial declaration, the Cordillera Bodong Administration created under Section 13 of
Executive Order No. 220, the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region
(Sec. 1, Art. VII, Rep. Act 6766), and the Cordillera People's Liberation Army as a regional police force or a regional
command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Secs. 2 and 4, Article XVIII of R.A. 6766), do not legally exist.
Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted
into an indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court existing
under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community.
Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts
which have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). They do not possess judicial power. Like the
pangkats or conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508 in the barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose
principal objective is to bring together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise.
An amicable settlement, compromise, and arbitration award rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonably repudiated, has the
force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D. 1508), but it can be enforced only through the local city or
municipal court to which the secretary of the Lupon transmits the compromise settlement or arbitration award upon
expiration of the period to annul or repudiate it (Sec. 14, P.D. 1508). Similarly, the decisions of a tribal court based on
compromise or arbitration, as provided in P.D. 1508, may be enforced or set aside, in and through the regular courts today.
30. CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V. COA - 181 SCRA 495
D: The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution,
contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. In this case, petitioners
assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220, alleging that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act and the conduct of a
plebiscite with respect to the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. The Supreme Court held that E.O. 220,
which created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) is a mere transitory coordinating agency the purpose of which
is to prepare the stage for political autonomy. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent
territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested
with political autonomy. The creation of such administrative region is not prohibited by the Constitution, including Article
10, Section 18 thereof.
A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the
delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the
administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous
region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of
an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not
necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show later.
After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new territorial and political
subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision. 1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial
and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.
x x x Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the offices created
under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable participation of the line departments of the National
Government, the CAR may be considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National
Government, similar to the regional development councils which the President may create under the Constitution [Art.
X, sec. 14]. x x x In this wise, the CAR may be considered as a more sophisticated version of the regional development
council.
The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987
Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus,
the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an
executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction
in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].

43
F: Petitioners question the constitutionality of E.O. 220, which created the Cordillera Administrative Region on the ground
that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras by approval of the act through a plebiscite.
E.O. 220 created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the
planning and implementation of programs and services [secs. 2 and 5]. To determine policy, it created a representative
assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-day regular session, tasked with, among others, identifying priority projects
and development programs [sec. 9]. To serve as an implementing body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board composed
of the Mayor of Baguio City, provincial governors and representatives of the Cordillera Bodong Administration, ethno-
linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations as regular members and all regional directors of the line
departments of the National Government as ex-officio members and headed by an Executive Director [secs. 10 and 11].
While the case was pending, Congress had passed an organic act for an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. However, a
plebiscite had yet to be conducted.
I: Whether or not E.O. 220 created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras?
H: NO
R: The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution,
contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions.
The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous
government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an “umbrella” that brings together the existing local
governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental
organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
E.O. 220 provides for the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the
National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to
the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory
measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares
the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions.
The creation of the CAR for purposes of administrative coordination is underscored by the mandate of E.O. No. 220 for the
President and appropriate national departments and agencies to make available sources of funds for priority development
programs and projects recommended by the CAR [sec. 21] and the power given to the President to call upon the appropriate
executive departments and agencies of the National Government to assist the CAR [sec. 24].
The process of creating an autonomous region is as follows:

1. First, a regional consultative commission shall be created;
2. Second, the President shall then appoint the members of a regional consultative commission from a list of nominees
from multisectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the Congress in preparing the organic act for the
autonomous region;
3. Third, the organic act shall be passed by the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution within eighteen months
from the time of its organization and enacted into law; and
4. Fourth, thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for the approval of the organic act [Art. X, sec. 18].
5. Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite, shall the autonomous region be created. Undoubtedly, all of these
will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened,
saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the
organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created. These measures we find in E.O. No. 220.
31. DATU ABAS KIDA VS. SENATE – G.R. NO. 196271, FEBRUARY 28, 2012
D: From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments,
as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled “Local Government.” Autonomous regions are established and
discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article—the article wholly devoted to Local Government. That an autonomous
region is considered a form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution.

43
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections are recognized
and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at
all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional
autonomy—as the term suggests—directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be
discounted.
WHILE AUTONOMOUS REGIONS ARE GRANTED POLITICAL AUTONOMY, THE FRAMERS OF THE
CONSTITUTION NEVER EQUATED AUTONOMY WITH INDEPENDENCE. THE ARMM AS A REGIONAL
ENTITY THUS CONTINUES TO OPERATE WITHIN THE LARGER FRAMEWORK OF THE STATE AND IS STILL
SUBJECT TO THE NATIONAL POLICIES SET BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, SAVE ONLY FOR THOSE
SPECIFIC AREAS RESERVED BY THE CONSTITUTION FOR REGIONAL AUTONOMOUS DETERMINATION.
N: PETITIONS assailing the validity of R.A. No. 10153.
F: These cases are motions for reconsideration assailing the SCs Decision dated October 18, 2011, where it upheld the
constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153
postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be
held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the Presidents power to
appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected
officials.
I:
1. Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and local elections?
2. Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the supermajority vote and
plebiscite requirements?
3. Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
4. Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?
5. Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and representative nature of ARMM regional
legislative and executive offices?
6. Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President's supervisory powers over autonomous
regions?
H: The constitutionality of RA No. 10153 is upheld.
R:
1. The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly there was to be a single election in
1992 for all elective officials from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing
to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the importance
of this constitutional mandate. That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the
constitutional mandate of synchronization. The ARMM had not yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution
was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for the
exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate
sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the
present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain
fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand
for a great length of time, to be progressive and not static.
2. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM elections; it does not provide
the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333
and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any provision in RA No.
9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled
the gap left in RA No. 9054.
Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, it is well-settled that the supermajority vote requirement
set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass
irrepealable laws.

43
Similarly, the petitioners contention that the plebiscite requirement applies to all amendments of RA No. 9054 for being an
unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the Constitution is incorrect. Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution provides that the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. This means that only amendments to, or revisions of, the
Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the
Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite.
3. The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, which allows the
regional officials to remain in their positions in a holdover capacity. The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM
regional officials should be allowed to remain in their respective positions until the May 2013 elections since there is no
specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional elective officials from performing their duties in a holdover
capacity.
The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. Since elective
ARMM officials are also local officials, they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It,
therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover
capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a
holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by
the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
4.The Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election. Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has
granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and
circumstances provided for in the law. Both Section 5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances where elections have already
been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances,
such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous circumstances. In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by
law, in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. Obviously, this does
not fall under any of the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.
5. The President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the
classification of presidential appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the
Presidents appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.
6. There is no incompatibility between the President's power of supervision over local governments and autonomous
regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs. The power
of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in
accordance with law. This is distinguished from the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or modify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
the latter.
The petitioners apprehension regarding the President's alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that
the President's appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee
that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not of the people.
This is incorrect. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members
of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected
officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the
appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent than real. MR DENIED.
Section 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from
the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
43
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare
of the people of the region.
A. Organic Act
32. PANDI V. COURT OF APPEALS - 380 SCRA 436
D: The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code as Provincial Governor Mutilan’s authority to
appoint Saber is misplaced. Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code, which provides officer shall be mandatory for provincial,
city and municipal governments,” is not a grant of power to governors and mayors to appoint local health officers. It is
simply a directive that those empowered to appoint local health officers are mandated to do so. In short, the appointment
of local health officers, being essential for public services, is a mandatory obligation on the part of those vested by law
with the power to appoint them. Moreover, as explained earlier, the 1991 LGU Code did not amend the Organic Act of
1989.
As Regional Secretary of Health, Macacua was, as of November 6, 1993, the official vested by law to exercise supervision
and control over all provincial health offices in the ARMM. The Regional Secretary, by virtue of Executive Order No.
133, assumed the administrative powers and functions of the Secretary of Health of the National Government with
respect to provincial health offices within the ARMM. The official exercising supervision and control over an office has
the administrative authority to designate, in the interest of public service, an Officer-in-Charge if the office becomes
vacant. Macacua, therefore, had the authority on November 6, 1993 to designate an Officer-in-Charge in the provincial
health office of Lanao del Sur pending the appointment of the permanent provincial health officer. After the effectivity
of the ARMM Local Code, the Regional Secretary of Health lost the authority to make such a designation.
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
F: Dr. Macacua, the Regional Director and Secretary of DOH of ARMM, issued a memo designating Dr. Pandi who was
then Asst. Regional Sec. of DOH-ARMM as OIC of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Transferring Dr. Sani, provincial health
officer, to Cotabato.Governor Mutilan issued an order designating Dr. Saber also as OIC of the IPHO-APGH. Dr. Sani
questions his transfer on the ground that he is a holding a permanent appointment. Dr. Saber filed for quo warranto with
preliminary injunction claiming that he is the lawfully designated OIC.
I: WON the transfer of incumbent health officer is valid, and who is empowered to appoint the OIC.
H:
R: The SC in coming up with a decision examined the different laws governing at different time periods:
 Prior to the enactment of Organic Act of 1989
 After the enactment of the Organic Act but before the adoption of 1991 LGC
 After the enactment of the LGC but before the adoption of the ARMM Local Code.
 After the adoption of the ARMM local code but before the enactment of the Organic Act of 2001
 After the Organic Act of 2001.
In examining this laws, the court ruled: The organic act of 1989 provides that upon the reorganization of the ARMM, line
agencies of the government shall be immediately placed under the control and supervision of the Regional Government

43
After the effectivity of the organic act, revised admin code stated that Provincial Health Officers (PHO) shall be assigned
by the Secretary of Healt
An ordinary statute cannot amend an organic act that provides for an autonomous region which under the Constitution
may only be created, and therefore changed, through a plebiscite called for the purpose. Unless this amendatory process is
followed, no subsequent law can amend or revise the Organic Act of 1989. In any event, with respect to the appointment
and assignment of provincial health officers, the Revised Administrative Code did not change the existing law applicable
to the ARMM under the Organic Act of 1989
Applying the laws at the time of appointments:

Saber – In 1993, it was the DOH that had supervision and control over PHO and the governor had not power therein, as
such his designation is void. The PHO of Lanao became a provincial government official only after the effectivity of the
ARMM Local Code in 1994.
Sani – Sani cannot claim security of tenure as his appointment was not to a particular station but made in the interest of
service. Macacua’s transfer of Sani to Cotabato is void since the Secretary of Health of the national government had the
power to appoint PHOs in ARMM. This was cured by the passing of EO 133, which transferred the power of supervision
and control to the Regional DOH, and after that another memo was issued by Macacua reiterating Sani’s transfer.
Pandi – Valid. At the time, the official vested by law to exercise supervision and control over all PHOs in the ARMM was
the Regional SOH. After the effectivity of the ARMM Code however, the Regional Secretary of Health lost its authority.
Section 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the
local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance
with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the
National Government.

43

Political Law Reviewer

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Political Law Reviewer

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

Atty. Norieva de Vega

ARTICLES AND CASES DIGESTS

1. LINA, JR. V. PANO- 364 SCRA 76

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 1 of 43

I: Whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

2. DADOLE V. COA- 393 SCRA 262

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

I: Whether City Ordinance prevails over the DBM Circular.

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 2 of 43

3. SAN JUAN V. CSC - 196 SCRA 69

WHERE A LAW IS CAPABLE OF TWO INTERPRETATIONS, ONE IN FAVOR OF CENTRALIZED POWER IN

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 3 of 43

4. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. COURT OF APPEALS - 231

N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 4 of 43

5. MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES - 234 SCRA 255

N: PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

I: Whether the ordinance is valid?

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 5 of 43

6. LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DENR - GR. NO. 175368,

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 6 of 43

A. Local Government Code

7. GARCIA V. COMELEC - 227 SCRA 100

N: ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition.

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 7 of 43

8. GANZON V. COURT OF APPEALS - 200 SCRA 271

N: PETITIONS to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 8 of 43

9. MANILA ELECTRIC V. PROVINCE OF LAGUNA - 306 SCRA 750

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 9 of 43

I: Whether the local government can impose franchise tax?

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 10 of

10. YAMANE V. BA LEPANTO- 474 SCRA 258

N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

11. PFDA V. CA – 534 SCRA 490

I: Whether an instrumentality of national government is liable to pay real property tax?

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 12 of

12. SMART COMMUNICATIONS V. MUNICIPALITY OF MALVAR - G.R. NO.

SMART didn’t pay. Municipality ordered closure of tower. SMART protested.

REGARDING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORD 18: (NOT REALLY RELATED TO SECTION 5)

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 13 of

A. Share in National Taxes

13. PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE - 336 SCRA 201

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 14 of

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 15 of

I: Whether the questioned provisions of the GAAs are constitutional?

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 16 of

15. BORJA V. COMELEC- 295 SCRA 157

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 17 of

16. SOCRATES V. COMELEC - 391 SCRA 453

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 18 of

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

17. RIVERA V. COMELEC- 523 SCRA 41

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 19 of

Additional facts: Cases cited by the Court in case ma’am asks:

18. ALDOVINO, JR. V. COMELEC- GR NO. 184836, DECEMBER 23, 2009

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 20 of

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.