# 01 - Publication:

Tanada v. Tuvera GR-963915 December 29, 1986

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary
as a rule, it was not so when it was “unless otherwise it is provided” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.

Petitioner invokes the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that for the laws to be valid
and enforceable it must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters
of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal
personality to bring the instant petition. But the court ruled in favor of the petitioner, hence, this motion for reconsideration made by the
respondent.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.
2. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their publication;
3. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

RULING:

(1) Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim “ignoratia legis nominem excusat”. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes
upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law
that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

(2) The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval,
or in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general
albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of
privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve
if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.

(3) Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement
for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

Note: Amended by EO 200 (June 18, 1987) – publication can be either in the Official Gazette or in the Newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
# 02 - Publication:

Dadole v. COA GR-125350 December 03, 2002

FACTS:

In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation
ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge.

On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which
provided that: such additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates not exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00
in municipalities may be granted

Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein petitioners, in excess of the amount
authorized by LBC 55... the additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They were also asked to
reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000

The petitioner judges filed a motion for reconsideration and indorsed the same to the COA. Respondent COA rendered a decision denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Local Budget Circular No. 55 is considered null and void.
2. Whether or not the LBC 55 go beyond the law it seeks to implement?
3. Whether or not the said circular needs for publication?

RULING:

(1) We declare LBC 55 to be null and void.

We recognize that, although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains
subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution provides that:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x

This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.

In Taule v. Santos, we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local
governments or their officials were performing their duties as... provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere
with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is
the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not... include any restraining authority over such body," the heads of political
subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate; to whom they are directly accountable.

By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the
sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by
the Constitution and the law.

the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary
to law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any... of his or her
alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the
Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a... law-conforming
judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation
of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.

(2) Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional
allowances to judges "when the finances of the city government allow." The said provision does not authorize setting a definite
maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges. Thus, we need not belabor the point that the finances of a... city
government may allow the grant of additional allowances higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city government exceed its
annual expenditures.

Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458,
par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition that
did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.

(3) Furthermore, LBC 55 is void on account of its lack of publication

Principles:
Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of... an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their
discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does
not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it... that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules,
nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only
to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except
to see to it that the rules are followed.

the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to
law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any... of his or her alter
egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the
Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a... law-conforming
judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of
powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.
# 03 - Publication:

Cawad v. Abad GR-207145 July 28, 2015

FACTS:

On March 26, 1992, Republic Act (RA) No. 7305, otherwise known as The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers was signed into law in
order to promote the social and economic well-being of health workers, their living and working conditions and terms of employment, to
develop their skills and capabilities to be better equipped to deliver health projects and programs, and to encourage those with proper
qualifications and excellent abilities to join and remain in government service.

Public health workers (PHWs) were granted the following allowances and benefits:

Section 20. Additional Compensation.

Section 21. Hazard Allowance

Section 22. Subsistence Allowance

Section 23. Longevity Pay.

Pursuant to Section 35 of the Magna Carta, the Secretary of Health promulgated its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) in July 1992.
Thereafter, in November 1999, the DOH, in collaboration with various government agencies and health workers' organizations,
promulgated a Revised IRR consolidating all additional and clarificatory rules issued by the former Secretaries of Health dating back from
the effectivity of the Magna Carta.

On July 28, 2008, the Fourteenth Congress issued Joint Resolution No. 4, entitled Joint Resolution Authorizing the President of the
Philippines to Modify the Compensation and Position Classification System of Civilian Personnel and the Base Pay Schedule of Military and
Uniformed Personnel in the Government, and for other Purposes, approved by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on June 17, 2009,
which provided for certain amendments in the Magna Carta and its IRR. On September 3, 2012, respondents DBM and CSC issued one of the
two assailed issuances, DBM-CSC Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, to prescribe the rules on the grant of Step Increments due to
meritorious performance and Step Increment due to length of service. Shortly thereafter, on November 29, 2012, respondents DBM and
DOH then circulated the other assailed issuance, DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012

In a letter dated January 23, 2013 addressed to respondents Secretary of Budget and Management and Secretary of Health, petitioners
expressed their opposition to the Joint Circular cited above on the ground that the same diminishes the benefits granted by the Magna Carta
to PHWs.

ISSUE:

1. Whether Respondents' Issuance of DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1, S. 2012 Is Null and Void for being an Undue Exercise of Legislative
Power
2. Was the joint circular valid despite it not meeting the publication requirement of RA 7305?

RULING:

(1) The Court finds the petition partly granted. The DBM-DOH Joint Circular, insofar as it lowers the hazard pay at rates below the minimum
prescribed by Section 21 of RA No. 7305 and Section 7.1.5 (a) of its Revised IRR, is declared INVALID. The DBM-CSC Joint Circular,
insofar as it provides that an official or employee authorized to be granted Longevity Pay under an existing law is not eligible for the
grant of Step Increment Due to Length of Service, is declared UNENFORCEABLE. The validity, however, of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular
as to the qualification of actual exposure to danger for the PHW's entitlement to hazard pay, the rates ofP50 andP25 subsistence
allowance, and the entitlement to longevity pay on the basis of the PHW's status in the plantilla of regular positions, is UPHELD.

(2) Yes. The joint circular did not modify, amend, or supplant the revised IRR. It gave no real consequences to what the law itself has
already prescribed. As an exception to the rule on publication, interpretative regulations which “need nothing further than their bare
issuance for they give no real consequence more than what the law itself already prescribed” need not be published. These kinds of
regulations do not need to be published to be effective since they do not add anything to the law and do not affect substantial rights of
any person.
# 04 - Retroactive:

Liam Law v. Olympic Sawmill GR-30771 May 28, 1984

FACTS:

On 7 September 1957, Liam Law (plaintiff) loaned P10,000.00, without interest, to Olympic Sawmill Co. and Elino Lee Chi, as the latter s
managing partner (defendants). The loan became ultimately due on 31 January 1960, but was not paid on that date, with the debtors asking
for an extension of 3 months, or up to 30 April 1960. On 17 March 1960, the parties executed another loan document. Payment of the
P10,000.00 was extended to 30 April 1960, but the obligation was increased by P6,000 which formed part of the principal obligation to
answer for attorney s fees, legal interest, and other cost incident thereto to be paid unto the creditor and his successors in interest upon
the termination of this agreement. The defendants again failed to pay their obligation. On 23 September 1960, the plaintiff instituted the
collection case before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The defendants admitted the P10,000.00 principal obligation, but claimed that
the additional P6,000.00 constituted usurious interest. Upon the plaintiff s application, the Trial Court issued a writ of Attachment on
real and personal properties of defendants. After the Writ of Attachment was implemented, proceedings before the Trial Court versed
principally in regards to the attachment. On 18 January 1961, an Order was issued by the Trial Court allowing both parties to simultaneously
submit a Motion for Summary Judgment. On 26 June 1961, the Trial Court rendered decision ordering defendants to pay the plaintiff the
amount of P10,000.00plus the further sum of P6,000.00. The defendants appealed before the then court of Appeals, which endorsed it to
the Supreme Court stating that the issue involved was one of law.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the allegation of usury should be made in writing and under oath, pursuant to Section 9 of the Usury Law.
2. Whether the repeal of Rules of Court or any procedural law is with retroactive effect

RULING:

(1) Section 9 of the Usury Law provides that the person or corporation sued shall file its answer in writing under oath to any complaint
brought or filed against said person or corporation before a competent court to recover the money or other personal or real property,
seeds or agricultural products, charged or received in violation of the provisions of this Act. The lack of taking an oath to an answer to
a complaint will mean the admission of the facts contained in the latter. It envisages a complaint filed against an entity which has
committed usury, for the recovery of the usurious interest paid. In that case, if the entity sued shall not file its answer under oath
denying the allegation of usury, the defendant shall be deemed to have admitted the usury. The provision does not apply to a case
where it is the defendant, not the plaintiff, who is alleging usury.

(2) The Court opined that the Rules of Court in regards to allegations of usury, procedural in nature, should be considered repealed with
retroactive effect. It has been previously held (People vs. Sumilang, and De Lopez, et al. vs. Vda. de Fajardo, et al.) that statutes regulating
the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

Comments:

The last sentence of Section 11, Rule 9, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that Allegation of usury in a complaint to recover
usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied under oath, and is similar in context to Section 9 of Usury Law, which was raised in
this 1984 case (although improperly applied). The reiteration of matters pertaining to usury in the 1997 rules is perplexing as the 1984
decision itself admits that usury has been legally non-existent; as interest can now be charged as lender and borrower may agree upon, and
that the Rules of Court in regards to allegations of usury, procedural in nature, should be considered repealed with retroactive effect.
These incongruent realities, however, are secondary only to the fact that a mere Central Bank circular or memorandum effectively
suspended the application of the Usury Law to a degree tantamount to its repeal.
# 05 - Retroactive:

SEC v. Laigo GR-188639 September 02, 2015

FACTS:

Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, (SEC) to prescribe rules and regulations governing the pre-need industry.

New Rules on the Registration and Sale of Pre-Need Plans (New Rules)

Rule 1.9 of the New Rules, " 'Trust Fund' means a fund set up from planholders' payments, separate and distinct from the paid-up capital of
a registered pre-need company, established with a trustee under a trust agreement approved by the SEC, to pay for the... benefits as provided
in the pre-need plan."

Legacy, being a pre-need provider, complied with the trust fund requirement and entered into a trust agreement with the Land Bank of the
Philippines (IBP).

Mid-2000, the industry collapsed for a range of reasons.

Legacy being the subject of a petition for involuntary insolvency, filed... by private respondents in their capacity as planholders.

Legacy did not object to the proceedings.

Declared insolvent by the RTC... trial court also ordered Legacy to submit an inventory of its assets and liabilities

RTC ordered the SEC, being the pre-need industry's regulator, to submit the documents pertaining to Legacy's assets and liabilities.

SEC opposed the inclusion of the trust fund in the inventory of corporate assets on the ground that to do so would contravene the New
Rules which treated trust funds as principally established for the exclusive... purpose of guaranteeing the delivery of benefits due to the
planholders.

It was of the position that the inclusion of the trust fund in the insolvent's estate and its being opened to claims by non-planholders would
contravene the purpose for its establishment.

Judge Laigo viewed the trust fund as Legacy's corporate assets and, for said reason, included it in the... insolvent's estate.

SEC filed "this present recourse directly to this Honorable Court in accordance with Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for
the reason... that the matters involve an issue of transcendental importance

SEC contends... that the trust fund should redound exclusively to the benefit of the planholders, who are the ultimate beneficial owners; the
trust fund is held, managed and administered by the trustee bank to address and answer the claims against the pre-need company by all its
planholders and/or beneficiaries in issuing the order, Judge Laigo effectively allowed non-planholders to reach the trust fund in patent
violation of the New Rules established to protect the pre-need investors.

SEC stressed that the setting-up of the trust funds effectively created a demarcation line between the claims of planholders vis-a-vis those
of the other creditors of Legacy;

SEC is of the position that Section 52 of the Pre-Need Code should be given retroactive effect for being procedural in character.

The private respondents... submit that nothing in the New Rules expressly provided that the trust fund is excluded from the inventory of...
corporate assets which is required to be submitted to the insolvency court... under the provisions of the Insolvency Law, all claims, including
those against the trust funds... should be filed in the liquidation proceedings.

the Assignee contends that the trust fund forms part of Legacy's corporate assets... insolvency court has jurisdiction over all the claims...
against the insolvent, cited Abrera v. College Assurance Plan. Court held that claims arising from pre-need contracts should not be treated
separately from other claims against a pre-need company.

No law authorized the SEC to interfere in the insolvency proceedings because its authority under the SRC is only to regulate the sale of pre-
need plans and not to regulate the management of trust funds.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Trust Funds of Legacy form part of its Corporate Assets.
2. Whether or not respondent Trial Court Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the herein assailed Order dated June 26- Whether or not the claims of planholders are to be treated differently from the claims of other
creditors of Legacy.
3. Whether or not Legacy retains ownership over the trust funds assets despite the execution of trust agreements.
4. Whether or not the insolvency court, presided by respondent Trial Court Judge, has the authority to enjoin petitioner SEC from further
validating the claims of Legacy's planholders and treating them as if they are ordinary creditors of Legacy.
5. Whether or not the provision of the Pre-need Code regarding liquidation is in the nature of a procedural law that can be retroactively
applied to the case at bar

RULING:

The overarching consideration in the legislative mandate to establish trust funds is the protection of the interest of the planholders in
the investment plans. It is in this context that this Court rules to grant the petition filed by the SEC.

(1) The Trust Fund is for the sole benefit of the planholders and cannot be used to satisfy the claims of other creditors of Legacy, the Pre-
Need Code clearly provides that the proceeds of trust funds shall redound solely to the planholders.

(2) SECTION 30. Trust Fund. — To ensure the delivery of the guaranteed benefits and services provided under a pre-need plan contract, a
trust fund per pre-need plan category shall be established. A portion of the installment payment collected shall be deposited by the...
pre-need company in the trust fund, the amount of which will be as determined by the actuary based on the viability study of the pre-
need plan approved by the Commission. Assets in the trust fund shall at all times remain for the sole benefit of the planholders. At no
time shall any part of the trust fund be used for or diverted to any purpose other than for the exclusive benefit of the planholders. In
no case shall the trust fund assets be used to satisfy claims of other creditors of the pre-need company. The provision of any law to the
contrary notwithstanding, in case of insolvency of the pre-need company, the general creditors shall not be entitled to the trust fund.

(3) Legacy's claimed interest in the enforcement of the trust and in the trust properties is more apparent than real. Legacy is not a
beneficiary.
A person is considered as a beneficiary of a trust if there is a manifest intention to give such a person the beneficial interest over the
trust properties.
Here, the terms of the trust agreement plainly confer the status of beneficiary to the planholders, not to Legacy.

(4) This categorical declaration doubtless indicates that the intention of the trustor is to make the planholders the beneficiaries of the trust
properties, and not Legacy. Second, considering the fact that a mandated pre-need trust is one imbued with public interest, the issue
on who the beneficiary is must be determined on the basis of the entire regulatory framework. Under the New Rules, it is unmistakable
that the beneficial interest... over the trust properties is with the planholders.

Rule 16.3
No withdrawal shall be made from the trust fund except for paying the benefits such as monetary consideration, the cost of services
rendered or property delivered, trust... fees, bank charges and investment expenses in the operation of the trust fund, termination
values payable to the planholders, annuities, contributions of cancelled plans to the fund and taxes on trust funds.

Rule 17.1... to ensure the liquidity of the trust fund to guarantee the delivery of the benefits provided for under the plan contract and
to obtain sufficient capital growth to meet the growing actuarial reserve liabilities, all investments of the trust fund shall be limited to
Fixed Income Instruments, Mutual Funds, Equities, and Real Estate, subject to certain limitations.

Trustee to exercise due diligence for the protection of the planholders guided by sound investment principles in the exclusive
management and control over the funds and its right, at any
# 06 - Madatory:

UOBP v. Board of Commissioners GR-182133 June 23, 2015

FACTS:

Respondent J.O.S. Managing Builders, Inc. (JOS Managing Builders) is the registered owner and developer of the condominium project
Aurora Milestone Tower. On December 16, 1997, JOS Managing Builders and respondent EDUPLAN Philippines, Inc. (EDUPLAN) entered
into a Contract to Sell covering Condominium Unit E, 10th Floor of the Aurora Milestone Tower

In August 1998, EDUPLAN effected full payment, and in December 1998, JOS Managing Builders and EDUPLAN executed a Deed... of Absolute
Sale over the condominium unit.

JOS Managing Builders failed to cause the issuance of a Condominium Certificate of Title over the condominium unit in the name of
EDUPLAN.

EDUPLAN learned that the... lots on which the condominium building project Aurora Milestone Tower was erected had been mortgaged by
JOS Managing Builders to petitioner United Overseas Bank of the Philippines (United Overseas Bank) without the prior written approval of
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

Due to the inability of JOS Managing Builders to deliver the condominium certificate of title covering the unit purchased by EDUPLAN, the
latter filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against JOS Managing Builders and United Overseas Bank before the HLURB
praying that: (a) the mortgage between JOS Managing Builders and United Overseas Bank be declared null and void; (b) JOS Managing
Builders and United Overseas Bank be compelled to cause the issuance and release of the Condominium Certificate of Title; and (c) JOS
Managing Builders be ordered to provide emergency power facilities, to refund the monthly telephone carrier charges, and to permanently
cease and desist from further collecting such charges.

ISSUE:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE EXCEPTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES... whether the HLURB is correct in declaring null and void the entire mortgage constituted by JOS Managing
2. Builders in favor of United Overseas Bank, as well as the foreclosure of the entire mortgage, is a legal question which is an exception
to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must
allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their...
respective competence
It has been held, however, that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not
iron-clad rules.

In the case of Republic v. Lacap. the Court enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules, namely:
(a) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of... justice
The issue on whether non-compliance with the clearance requirement with the HLURB would result to the nullification of the entire
mortgage contract or only a part of it is purely legal which will have to be decided ultimately by a regular court of law.
The issue does not require technical knowledge and experience, but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law.
Here is, thus, no need to exhaust administrative remedies, under the premises.

The HLURB erred in declaring null and void the entire mortgage executed between JOS Managing Builders and United Overseas Bank.

We find the recent view espoused in Philippine National Bank to be in accord with law and equity. While a mortgage may be nullified
if it was in violation of Section 18 of P.D. No. 957, such nullification applies only to the interest of the complaining buyer. It cannot...
extend to the entire mortgage. A buyer of a particular unit or lot has no standing to ask for the nullification of the entire mortgage.

Since EDUPLAN has an actionable interest only over Unit E, 10th Floor, Aurora Milestone Tower, it is but logical to conclude that it has
no standing to seek for the complete nullification of the subject mortgage and the HLURB was incorrect when it voided... the whole
mortgage between JOS Managing Builders and United Overseas Bank.

It should be noted, however, that the failure of JOS Managing Builders to secure prior approval of the mortgage from the HLURB and
United Overseas Bank's failure to inquire on the status of the property offered for mortgage placed the condominium developer and
the creditor Bank... in pari delicto.

Hence, they cannot ask the courts for relief for such parties should be left where they are found for being equally at fault.

More importantly, it should be understood that the prior approval requirement is intended to protect buyers of condominium units
from fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous condominium sellers and operators, such as their failure to deliver titles
to the buyer or... titles free from lien and encumbrances. This is pursuant to the intent of P.D. No. 957 to protect hapless buyers from
 the unjust practices of unscrupulous developers which may constitute mortgages over condominium projects sans the knowledge of
the... former and the consent of the HLURB.

Thus, failure to secure the HLURB'S prior written approval as required by P.D. No. 957 will not annul the entire mortgage between the
condominium developer and the creditor bank, otherwise the protection intended for condominium buyers will inadvertently be
extended to the... condominium developer even though, by failing to secure the government's prior approval, it is the party at fault.

From all the foregoing, the HLURB erred when it declared the entire mortgage constituted by JOS Managing Builders, Inc. in favor of
United Overseas Bank null and void based solely on the complaint of EDUPLAN which was only claiming ownership over a single
condominium unit of Aurora Milestone Tower. Accordingly, the mortgage executed between JOS Managing Builders and United
Overseas Bank is valid.

Principles:

There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the
falsehood of alleged facts. Said question at best could... be resolved only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final decision on
the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice.