Lawyer's Oath

I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance

to the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give
aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these
voluntary obligations without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco
R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the
bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance)
in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already,
as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)

Annex A .......- "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in

Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC

Annex B .......- "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in
Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM

Annex C .......- "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required
Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP
(not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the
bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides
that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the
Roll of Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a
member.

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of
professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme
Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28,
1981 ( in SCRA )

2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see
attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is
purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997
referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondents signature above his name, address
and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."1 Also attached was a copy of the order,2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by
Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondents motion for
reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has
not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after which
the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,4 dated June
3, 1998, respondent alleged:5cräläwvirtualibräry
3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of
the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good standing is
entitled to practice law.

The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as above cited, the October
28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances.

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and respondent was even
promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is
still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and
reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned
himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited
practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard
and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4
of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he
honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment
by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP
member to vote and be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he never in any
manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all
past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not
for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but
as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in
all food faith, to the contrary.

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution6 adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues.

Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,7 dated April 22,
1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the
IBP ordering respondents suspension for three months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his
pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three
years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier
that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being
a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the
payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."
....

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the
practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up
to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the
same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his
memorandum did not discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He
likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060"
in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP
chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is
only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as
income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors
shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from
each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of
deceased members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does
not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the
payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include
payment of membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he
had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION,
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most
severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more
temperate application of the law,8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has
paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or
until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in
the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all
courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 94457 June 10, 1992
VICTORIA LEGARDA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC. and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH
94, respondents.
R E S O L U T I ON

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the defendant in a complaint for specific performance with damages filed by private respondent New
Cathay House, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The complaint was aimed at compelling Victoria Legarda to sign a
lease contract involving her house and lot at 123 West Avenue, Quezon City which New Cathay House, Inc. intended to use in
operating a restaurant.1

As prayed for in the complaint, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Victoria Legarda and her agents from
stopping the renovation of the property which was being done by New Cathay House, Inc. After hearing, the lower court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction.

Thereafter, Antonio P. Coronel of the Coronel Law Office at 146 Katipunan Road, White Plains, Quezon City, entered his appearance
as counsel for Victoria Legarda. He also filed an urgent motion for an extension of ten (10) days from February 6, 1985 within which to
file an answer to the complaint. The motion was granted by the court which gave Victoria Legarda until February 20, 1985 to answer the
complaint.

However, Victoria Legarda failed to file her answer within the extended period granted by the court. Hence, upon motion of New Cathay
House, Inc., she was declared in default, thereby paving the way for the presentation of evidence ex parte.

On March 25, 1985, the lower court rendered a decision by default. It ordered Victoria Legarda to execute and sign the lease contract
and to pay the following: (a) exemplary damages of P100,000.00, (b) actual and compensatory damages in the total amount of
P278,764.37 and (c) attorney's fees of P10,000.00.

Atty. Coronel received a copy of the lower court's decision on April 9, 1985 but he did not interpose an appeal therefrom within the
reglementary period. Consequently, the decision became final and, upon motion of New Cathay House, Inc., the lower court issued a
writ of execution. In compliance with the writ, on June 27, 1985, the sheriff levied upon, and sold at public auction, the property subject
of the litigation to New Cathay House, Inc., the highest bidder. The sheriff's certificate of sale was registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

The one-year redemption period having expired on July 8, 1986, the sheriff issued a final deed of sale which, on July 11, 1986, was
duly registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds. On November 6, 1986, Victoria Legarda, represented by her attorney-in-fact
Ligaya C. Gomez, filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment against her in Civil Case No. Q-43811. She
alleged therein that the decision was obtained through fraud and that it is not supported by the allegations in the pleadings nor by the
evidence submitted.

Forthwith, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from dispossessing petitioner of the
premises in question. Private respondent New Cathay House, Inc. then filed its consolidated comment on the petition with a motion for
the lifting of the temporary restraining order. Victoria Legarda, through Atty. Coronel, filed a reply to the consolidated comment. The
petition was thereafter orally argued. Required by the Court of Appeals to manifest if the parties desired to file their respective
memoranda, Dean Coronel informed the appellate court that he was adopting Victoria Legarda's reply to the consolidated comment as
her memorandum.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on November 29, 1989. On the issue of fraud, for which Victoria Legarda claimed that
Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., who represented New Cathay House, Inc., made her believe through false pretenses that he was agreeable to
the conditions of the lease she had imposed on the lessee and that the latter would withdraw the complaint against her, thereby
prompting her to advise her lawyer not to file an answer to the complaint anymore, the Court of Appeals 2 said:

On the other hand, petitioner's above allegation of fraud supposedly practiced upon her by Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. is
so improbable as to inspire belief. For the Coronel Law Office had already entered its appearance as petitioner's
counsel by then, so that if it were true that Cabrera had already agreed to the conditions imposed by petitioner, said
 law office would have asked plaintiff to file the proper motion to dismiss or withdraw complaint with the Court, and if
plaintiff had refused to do so, it would have filed defendant's answer anyway so that she would not be declared in
default. Or said law office would have prepared a compromise agreement embodying the conditions imposed by their
client in the lease contract in question which plaintiffs had allegedly already accepted, so that the same could have
been submitted to the Court and judgment on a compromise could be entered. All these, any conscientious lawyer of
lesser stature than the Coronel Law Office, headed by no less than a former law dean, Dean Antonio Coronel, or
even a new member of the bar, would normally have done under the circumstances to protect the interests of their
client, instead of leaving it to the initiative of plaintiff to withdraw its complaint against defendant, as it had allegedly
promised the latter. Thus, it is our belief that this case is one of pure and simple negligence on the part of the
defendant's counsel, who simply failed to file the answer in behalf of defendant. But counsel's negligence does not
stop here. For after it had been furnished with copy of the decision by default against defendant, it should then have
appealed therefrom or file (sic) a petition for relief from the order declaring their client in default or from the judgment
by default. Hence, defendant is bound by the acts of her counsel in this case and cannot be heard to complain that
the result might have been different if it had proceeded differently (Pulido v. C.A., 122 SCRA 63; Ayllon v. Sevilla, 156
SCRA 257, among other cases). And the rationale of this rule is obvious and clear. For "if such grounds were to be
admitted as reasons for opening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be
employed who could allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or
learned" (Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick, 1 SCRA 1138). (Emphasis supplied.)

Finding the second ground for the petition to be likewise unmeritorious, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Surprisingly,
however, inspite of the Court of Appeals' tirade on his professional competence, Atty. Coronel did not lift a finger to file a motion for
reconsideration. Neither did he initiate moves towards an appeal to this Court of the decision which was adverse and prejudicial to his
client.

Thus, the Court of Appeals decision became final. On December 8, 1989, counsel for New Cathay House, Inc. sent petitioner through
the Coronel Law Office, a letter demanding that she vacate the property within three days from receipt thereof. Atty. Coronel did not
inform petitioner of this development until sometime in March, 1990. Due to petitioner's persistent telephone calls, Atty. Coronel's
secretary informed her of the fact that New Cathay House, Inc. had demanded her eviction from the property. Consequently, petitioner
had no recourse but to oblige and vacate the property. 3

On August 7, 1990, Victoria Legarda, represented by a new counsel, 4 filed before this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
contending that the decisions of the courts below "are null and void as petitioner was deprived of her day in court and divested of her
property without due process of law through the gross, pervasive and malicious negligence of previous counsel, Atty. Antonio Coronel.5

In its decision of March 18, 1991, this Court declared as null and void the decisions of March 25, 1985 and November 29, 1989 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and the Court of Appeals, respectively, as well as the sheriff's certificate of sale dated June 27,
1985 of the property involved and the subsequent final deed of sale covering the same. The Court further directed private respondent
New Cathay House, Inc. to reconvey the property to the petitioner and the Register of Deeds to cancel the registration of said property
in the name of said private respondent and to issue a new one in the name of the petitioner.

The same decision required the former counsel of petitioner, Atty. Antonio Coronel, to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why
he should not be held administatively liable for his acts and omissions which resulted in grave injustice to the petitioner. Said counsel
having been inadvertently omitted in the service of copies of said decision, 6 on February 11, 1992, the Clerk of Court of this Division to
which this case was transferred, sent Atty. Coronel a copy thereof which he received on February 12, 1992. 7

On the tenth day from his receipt of said copy, Atty. Coronel filed an urgent ex-parte motion for an extension of thirty (30) days from
February 22, 1992 within which to file his explanation. He alleged as reason for the motion pressure of work "consisting of daily
hearings in several forums and preparations of pleadings in equally urgent cases, such as the more than 80 civil and criminal cases
against the Marcoses. 8

The Court, in its resolution of March 9, 1992, granted said motion for extension with warning that no further extension will be given. Atty.
Coronel received a copy of said resolution on March 27, 1992 but it appears that on March 24, 1992, 9 a day after the expiration of the
30-day extended period prayed for in his first motion for extension, he had mailed another urgent motion for a second extension of thirty
(30) days within which to submit his explanation on the ground that since March 2, 1992, he had been "treated and confined at the St.
Luke's Hospital." Attached to the motion is a medical certificate stating that Atty. Coronel had "ischemic cardiamyopathy, diabetes
mellitus, congestive heart failure class IV and brain infarction, thrombotic." 10

While off-hand, the reasons cited in the second motion for reconsideration seem to warrant another extension, the fact that it was filed
on day late, coupled with the circumstances of this case do not call for a reconsideration of the resolution of March 9, 1992. Hence, the
second motion for extension must be denied. Lawyers should not presume that their motions for extension of time will always be
granted by the Court. The granting or denial of motions for extension of time is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court with a
view to attaining substantial justice. 11

It should be emphasized that the show-cause resolution was addressed to Atty. Coronel not in his capacity as a lawyer of a litigant in
this Court. It was addressed to him in his personal capacity as a lawyer subject to the disciplinary powers of this Court. That he failed to
immediately heed the directive of the decision of March 18, 1991 to show cause, notwithstanding the grant of a 30-day extension for
him to do so, reflects an unbecoming disrespect towards this Court's orders. We cannot countenance such disrespect. As a lawyer,
Atty. Coronel is expected to recognize the authority of this Court and obey its lawful processes and orders. 12

Hence, the Court considers his failure to show cause, not-withstanding reasonable notice therefor, as a waiver of his rights to be heard
and to due process, thereby warranting an ex parte determination of the matter for which he had been required to explain. 13

The facts of the case clearly show that Atty. Coronel violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that
"a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." He failed to observe particularly Rule 18.03 of the same Code which
requires that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable."

Indeed, petitioner could not have gone through the travails attending the disposition of the case against her not to mention the
devastating consequence on her property rights had Dean Coronel exercised even the ordinary diligence of a member of the Bar. By
neglecting to file the answer to the complaint against petitioner, he set off the events which resulted in the deprivation of petitioner's
rights over her house and lot. In this regard, worth quoting is the observation of Justice Emilio A. Gancayco in his ponencia of March
18, 1991:

Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to be expected that he would
extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to have abandoned
the cause of petitioner. After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil case filed against her by private respondent,
said counsel did nothing more than enter his appearance and seek for an extension of time to file the answer.
Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence, petitioner was declared in default on the motion of private
respondent's counsel. . . .

This is not the only case wherein, in dealing with this Court's orders, Atty. Coronel appears to exhibit a pattern of negligence, inattention
to his obligations as counsel, sloppiness and superciliousness. In G.R. No. 97418, "Imelda R. Marcos, et al. v. PCGG, et al., the
Court en banc, in its Resolution of May 28, 1992, imposed upon Atty. Coronel a fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) after he was
found guilty of inexcusable negligence in his failure to comply with this Court's resolutions. The Court said:

We find the explanation for his failure to comply with the Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991
unsatisfactory, Atty. Coronel had obviously taken this Court for granted. Although he received a copy of the 4 June
1991 Resolution on 4 July 1991, he nonchalantly let the 10-day period pass and even deliberately chose to remain
silent about it even after he received a copy of the Resolution of 27 August 1991. It was only on the last day of the
period granted to him under said Resolution that he showed initial efforts to comply with the Resolution by filing a
motion for a 20-day extension from 30 September 1991 to file the Reply. This was a self-imposed period and,
therefore, he was expected to faithfully comply with it not only because of the respect due this Court, but also
because he had put his honor and virtues of candor and good faith on the line. For reasons only known to him, he did
not. Worse despite his receipt on 27 November 1991 of the Resolution of 5 November 1991 which granted his 30
September 1991 motion, Atty. Coronel did not even move for a new period within which to comply with the
Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991. This Court had to issue the Resolution of 30 January 1992 to
compel compliance. When he finally did, he committed, allegedly through inadvertence, the blunder of placing his
Reply under a wrong caption.

For deliberately failing, if not stubbornly refusing, to comply with the Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991
and meet his self-imposed deadline. Atty. Coronel was both unfair and disrespectful to this Court. Furthermore, he
has unduly delayed the disposition of the pending incidents in this case. (Emphasis supplied.)

Undoubtedly, in the case at hand, Atty. Coronel's failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the interest of his client
caused the latter material prejudice. 14 It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he
will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his client's cause
makes him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the
latter. 15 Moreover, a lawyer owes fealty, not only to his client, but also to the Court of which he is an officer. Atty. Coronel failed to obey
this Court's order even on a matter that personally affects him, such that one cannot avoid the conclusion that he must be bent on
professional self-destruction. Be that as it may, Atty. Coronel cannot escape this Court's disciplinary action for gross negligence which
resulted in depriving petitioner of her property rights, for, as this Court enunciated in the aforecited Cantiller v. Potenciano case:

Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong
and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance with one's oath of office and the
canons of professional ethics is an imperative.

Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing with their clients. The
profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public interest.

WHEREFORE, the second motion for an extension of time to file explanation is hereby DENIED. Atty. Antonio P. Coronel is hereby
found GUILTY of gross negligence in the defense of petitioner Victoria Legarda in Civil Case No. Q-43811 and accordingly
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this resolution. A repetition
of the acts constituting gross negligence shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to his personal record, another copy be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
copies thereof be circulated in all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

Santos, Jr. vs. Atty. Llamas, AC 4749

FACTS:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against Atty. Francisco R. Llamas. In a letter-
complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that Atty.
Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only
indicated IBP Rizal 259060 but he has been using this for at least 3 years already. Petitioner cited that Atty. Llamas was dismissed as
Pasay City Judge. But later revealed that the decision was reversed and he was subsequently promoted as RTC Judge of Makati. He
also had criminal case involving estafa but was appealed pending in the Court of Appeals.

On the other hand, respondent, who is now of age, averred that he is only engaged in a limited practice of law and under RA 7432, as a
senior citizen, he is exempted from payment of income taxes and included in this exemption, is the payment of membership dues

In the numerous violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he expressed willingness to settle the IBP dues and plea for a
more temperate application of the law.

CANON 7: A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated
bar.

CANON 10: A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his
pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions.

Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of law and for being a
senior citizen.

Or

Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, or until he has paid his IBP dues.

Even if he had “limited” practice of law, it does not relieve him of the duties such as payment of IBP dues.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues
for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.

Held: GUILTY. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default thereof for
six months shall warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal
of the delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of
law. Moreover, the exemption invoked by respondent does not include exemption from payment of membership or association dues.

In addition, by indicating “IBP Rizal 259060” in his pleadings and thereby misprepresenting to the public and the courts that he
had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01
which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice. Lawyer was suspended for 1 year or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.